Is Zen Buddhism A Philosophy

Is Zen Buddhism a Philosophy?
Author(s): Henry Rosemont, Jr.

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Jan., 1970), pp. 63-72
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
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Henry
Rosemont,
Jr.
Is Zen Buddhism a
philosophy?
Following
the lead of Daisetz T.
Suzuki,
the authors of almost all
English-
language
commentaries on Zen Buddhism are in
general agreement
that Zen
is not a
philosophy.
The
primary purpose
of this
paper
is to show how and
why
this view is
fundamentally
mistaken and that the continued
espousal
of
it is
counterproductive
for
furthering
an
understanding
of
any
facet of
Zen,
philosophical
or otherwise.
However
divergent
their
opinions
on what Zen Buddhism is, the
major
commentators on the
subject
concur in
asserting
that it is not a
philosophy.
For
example:
From Alan Watts:
Zen Buddhism is a
way
and a view of life which does not
belong
to
any
of the
formal
categories
of modern Western
thought.
It is not
religion
or
philosophy;
it is not a
psychology
or a
type
of science.'
From Robert Linssen:
Buddhism in
general
and Zen in
particular
are
essentially
"non-mental." Man
only
attains "correct vision"
from
the moment when no
idea,
no
"fabrication"
of
the mind
any longer
comes between him and the
fact.
But were we to take
what has
just
been said as a
"philosophical" position,
we would be beside the
question.2
From Carl
Jung (speaking
for,
and in
agreement with, Rudolph Otto):
Zen is
anything
but a
philosophy
in the Western sense
of
the word.3
And from the most famous of the
commentators,
D. T. Suzuki:
Strictly speaking,
there cannot be a
philosophy
of
suchness,
because such-
ness defies a clear-cut definition as an idea. When it is
presented
as an idea
it is
lost;
it turns into a
shadow,
and
any philosophy
built on it will be a castle
in the sand.4
Zen is not
explainable by
mere intellectual
analysis.
As
long
as the intellect
is concerned with words and
ideas,
it can never reach Zen.5
It
goes
without
saying
that Zen is neither
psychology
nor
philosophy.6
Henry Rosemont, Jr., Assistant
Professor of Philosophy
at Oakland
University (Rochester,
Michigan),
is
currently
a
postdoctoral
Fellow in the
Department of Foreign
Literatures
and
Linguistics,
the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology.
Alan
Watts,
The
Way of
Zen
(New
York: Mentor
Books, 1960), p.
17.
2Robert
Linssen, Living
Zen
(New
York: Grove
Press, 1960), p.
46.
(Italics
in the
original.)
3
C. G.
Jung,
Foreword to Introduction to Zen
Buddhism, by
D. T. Suzuki
(New
York:
Grove
Press, 1964), p.
11.
(Italics
in the
original.)
4
D. T.
Suzuki,
Studies in Zen
(London:
Rider &
Co., 1955), p.
141.
5
Ibid., p.
136.
D. T.
Suzuki, Essays
in Zen
Buddhism,
2d ser.
(Boston:
Beacon
Press, 1952), p.
101.
Strangely enough, Suzuki
considers this statement a
"philosophical explanation."
64 Rosemont
At the most basic
level,
the term "Zen Buddhism"
designates
the
unique
admixture of Taoist and Buddhist
beliefs, attitudes,
and
responses
of Zen
Buddhists that relates them to their environmental
surroundings,
and which
consequently
serves to
distinguish
Zen Buddhists from their fellow men. In
this
paper
we will be concerned
only
with the beliefs and attitudes of Zen
Buddhists. The activities
they engage in-especially
meditation-are an in-
tegral part
of the Zen
way
of
life,
and should be
studied,
and
practiced,
in
their own
right.
The thrust of the
present investigation,
however,
is to focus
attention on the beliefs and attitudes which
explain why
the Zen Buddhists
engage
in those activities. To be
sure,
a few Zen beliefs are to the effect that
seeking explanations
of
any
kind is
fruitless,
hence it
might
be
objected
that
the
present
effort and all others similar to it demonstrate a lack of
knowledge
of Zen. Such
objections
will be met in the
pages
to
follow;
for now it must be
pointed
out that even if
they
were not
met,
such objections
should not cause
us to lose
sight
of the fact that all these beliefs are themselves an
integral
part
of the Zen
way
of
life,
and therefore cannot be
ignored
without
running
the risk of
seriously distorting and/or obscuring
the
subject.
Against
this
background
the assertion that Zen is not a
philosophy may
be
restated as follows: The
distinguishing
beliefs and attitudes of Zen Buddhists
are not
philosophical
beliefs and attitudes.
Rephrased
in this
way,
the Zen
commentators
may
be seen to be
claiming
that the beliefs and attitudes of
Zen Buddhists fall outside the
scope
of
philosophical inquiry,
and
warning
us that it would obscure rather than illumine those beliefs to
approach
them
from a
philosophical perspective.
Our first
task, then,
is to examine the con-
siderations which
might
have led the commentators to make this claim and
issue such a
warning.
One reason
given
for
asserting
that Zen is not a
philosophy
is that it is a
way
of liberation or salvation:
[Zen]
is an
example
of what is known in India and China as a
"way
of
liberation,"
and is similar in this
respect
to
Taoism,
Vedanta and
Yoga.
As
will soon be
obvious,
a
way
of liberation can have no
positive
definition.7
The role of transcendental
[Zen]
wisdom consists not in
conditioning
the
human mind but in
liberating
it. All doctrines
using symbols
and cliches en-
slave it. .. .8
Admittedly (although
a case
might
be made for
it),
Western
philosophical
systems
are not
usually
considered to be liberation- or salvation-oriented. But
we
may grant
this
point
without
being thereby
committed to
maintaining
that
Zen is
only
a
way
of salvation. It is
certainly possible,
indeed
desirable,
to
study critically
the
ways
in which other
peoples
have looked at the
world;
7
Watts,
The
Way of Zen, p.
17.
s Tinssen, Living Zen, p.
27.
65
it is not
necessary
for a
person
to want to become a Muslim before he can
profit
from
reading
the Koran. Nor of course are the
principles
of Islam
exempt
from
philosophical scrutiny merely
because it too offers a
way
of
liberation or salvation. The same
point applies
with even
greater
force to
the
Judaic-Christian religions,
which have had such an enormous influence on
Western
philosophy.
In
sum,
from the mere
premise
that Zen is a means
of liberation or salvation we can derive no conclusions
regarding
its
philo-
sophical attributes,
or lack thereof.
Further,
that some at least of the beliefs of Zen Buddhists are
philosophical
beliefs is
strongly
evidenced
by
other statements of the Zen commentators
themselves,
such as the
following
from Suzuki:
. . . while Nature is the limit of
objectivity beyond
which our
ontology
cannot
go.
The
ontological
limit is the
psychological limit,
and vice versa.9
It is not the
object
of Zen to look
illogical
for its own
sake,
but to make
people
know that
logical consistency
is not final .. .10
Metaphysically stated,
we can
say
that a
persistent appeal
to the
spirit
of
inquiry
is based on a firm faith in the
working
of Buddha-nature in
every
individual
being.l"
The
epistemology
of Zen
is, therefore,
not to resort to the
mediumship
of
concepts.12
Terms like
"ontology," "logical consistency," "metaphysically,"
and
"epis-
temology"
are
clearly philosophical terms;
in the
quoted passages
Suzuki is
making
assertions about the nature of
reality,
human
nature,
and the
scope
and
objects
of human
knowledge.
Nor can these assertions be considered iso-
lated
curiosities;
on the
contrary,
the commentaries of Suzuki and
many
of
his
colleagues
contain a
large
number of assertions of
just
this kind. Whether
or not these and similar assertions are true is not now
relevant;
they
are all
philosophical
assertions,
and if Suzuki is correct in
making
them in the name
of Zen
Buddhism,
it follows that Zen Buddhism does contain a
large
number
of
philosophical
beliefs,
and hence is to that extent
correctly
called a
philoso-
phy.
Moreover,
it is difficult to
quarrel
with this
conclusion,
for on other
occasions Suzuki reaches it himself:
As the
philosophy
of Zen is to transcend the dualistic
conception
of flesh
and
spirit..
.13
... the
discipline
of Zen has a
great
moral value outside its
philosophy.14
9
B.
Phillips, ed.,
Essentials
of
Zen Buddhism
(London:
Rider &
Co., 1963), p.
24.
10
Introduction to Zen
Buddhism, p.
67.
11Essays
in Zen
Buddhism,
2d
ser., p.
127.
12
D. T.
Suzuki,
Zen and
Japanese
Culture
(New
York: Pantheon
Books, Inc., 1960),
p. 360.
13
D. T.
Suzuki, Essays
in Zen
Buddhism,
1st ser.
(London:
Rider &
Co., 1958), p.
317.
4
Ibid., p.
339.
66 Rosemont
The
philosophy
of Zen avoids the error of one-sidedness involved in realism
as well as in idealism.15
As we can see here and
elsewhere,
the
uniqueness
of Zen
philosophy
consists
in
offering
.. .16
This conclusion is so obvious that it is hard to believe either
(a)
that
Suzuki and his fellow commentators were able to overlook it or
ignore
it
when
asserting
that Zen is not a
philosophy;
or
(b)
that the commentators
were so concerned to
emphasize
the fact that Zen is also a
way
of liberation
that
they
were
willing
to contradict themselves to make the
point. Why
else,
then,
might they
have considered it
important
to insist that Zen Buddhism is
not a
philosophy?
To
develop
this
question
further we must turn our attention to the central
figures
in the rise of Zen
Buddhism,
the masters. These
thoroughgoing
indi-
vidualists seem to
leap
rather than march
through
the
pages
of Chinese and
Japanese history,
and it has been
largely
due to their
teachings
and the
personal
examples
of their lives that Zen has not
degenerated
into an
esoteric,
world-
negating religious
sect. Yet it must be admitted that the literature of Zen
contains
few,
if
any,
statements from several
important
masters which can
be considered
philosophical
statements. That is to
say,
when
examining
these
texts,
we find that a number of masters are not
quoted
as
making
statements
like: "I believe that sense-data are a
sign
of the existence of
physical objects";
or,
"The mind is
nothing
but a bundle of
perceptions."
Rather,
the
only
record
we have of their assertions
would,
in
English,
more
nearly
resemble the
following:
"What is the sound of one hand
clapping?"
or,
"Have a
cup
of
tea";
or "Kwatz !"
Developing
this
theme, Suzuki,
for
instance, occasionally argues
that the
Zen masters had no
philosophical
beliefs and made no
philosophical assump-
tions,
and he tries to establish the
point by appealing
to a
general
lack of
philosophical proselytization
and
disputation
in the literature.'7 Hence we
may
have another reason for the commentators
going
to
great lengths
to insist
that the
distinguishing
beliefs and attitudes of Zen Buddhists are not
philo-
sophical
beliefs and attitudes: if the Zen masters had no
philosophical
beliefs
and
assumptions,
and if their
teachings
are the central feature of Zen Bud-
dhism,
it would follow that Zen Buddhism should not be called a
philosophy.
However, from the
premise
that
any
number of Zen masters did not or
do not
actively
discuss their
philosophical
beliefs,
it
certainly
does not follow
that
they
had none. To see how and
why
this is
so,
we must consider what
it is to hold a
philosophical
belief and to "have a
philosophy."
15
Ibid., p.
362.
6
Essentials
of
Zen
Buddhism, p.
240.
17
Introduction
to Zen
Buddhism, pp.
77
ff.;
or
Essays
in Zen
Buddhism,
2d
ser., pp.
86-89.
67
Nearly everyone
in the world holds a number of beliefs
which,
if
articulated,
would
properly
be classified as
philosophical. Many people
believe that
they
are
capable
of
exercising
free
choice,
that
physical objects
exist
independently
of
perception,
that there is a Creator of the
universe,
that
they
have a
soul,
and so on. Still other
people
hold the denials of some or all of these beliefs.
But
people
who hold beliefs which are
philosophical
do
not,
on that account
alone,
hold those beliefs
philosophically.
If a
person
claims to know that
flying
saucers
exist,
for
example,
and he is asked how he knows
this,
he
might reply
that he has seen them. In the face of continued
skepticism
he
might attempt
to
produce
evidence that his
experience
had not been
illusory.
But if he is further asked how he knows that trees
exist,
in all
probability
he
would not know how to answer his interlocutor, and would
undoubtedly
think
that in
comparison
to
skepticism
about the existence of
trees,
his belief in the
existence of
flying
saucers was a
paradigm
of
rationality.
From such
replies
it would be evident that the
person
believes that visual sense
experiences
are
a source of
knowledge;
but it is not at all evident that the
person
realizes
the
philosophical
ramifications of such
epistemological
claims. If the
person
does not so realize the extent of his
claims,
if he has never
articulated, ques-
tioned,
or defended his
belief,
then he holds his belief
"uncritically," "naively,"
or
"unconsciously";
he does not hold his believe
philosophically.
Thus we
may say
of a
person
that some of his beliefs are
philosophical
with-
out
being
committed to the assertion that he holds those beliefs
philosophically.
In the case of the
flying
saucer
enthusiast,
it would be
highly misleading
to
say
that he was an
empiricist,
even
though
the belief that sense
experience
is
a source of
knowledge
is a cardinal tenet of
empiricism.
To
say
that a
person
is an
empiricist implies
that he could muster at least a minimal defense to meet
the
challenges
of a
skeptic
or an
idealist;
that he would not be
completely
befuddled
by being
asked to
justify
his claim to know that trees existed. If
the
person
could not
pass
these or similar
tests,
if he were in all
respects
a
plain
man,
we would not
say
of him that he held a number of
philosophical
beliefs;
rather we would
say
that several of his beliefs were
philosophical,
but
that he holds those beliefs
uncritically, naively,
or
unconsciously.
Returning
now to the Zen
masters,
there is a sense in which it can be
argued
that some of them seem to resemble
plain
men more than
philosophers.
One
master,
for
example,
when asked
by
a monk what
enlightenment was,
told the monk to leave and not to scatter the dirt around
;18
which
is,
to
say
the
least,
an
unphilosophical reply.
Another master described himself
by
saying:
Drinking tea, eating
rice,
I
pass
the time as it
comes;
18
Essays
in Zen
Buddhism,
2d
ser., p.
47.
68 Rosemont
Looking
down at the
stream, looking up
at the
mountains,
How serene and relaxed I feel indeed !1'
Suzuki
says
in one
place
that "Zen reveals itself in the most
uninteresting
and
uneventful life of the
plain
man of the
street,"20 and
in another
place
that the
Zen masters discussed "such
subjects
as
appealed
to the
plain
man."21
It is
clear, however,
that the Zen masters are not
plain men; they
were
and are rather
extraordinary
individuals,
the records of their occasional
mundane actions and statements
notwithstanding.
It is
equally
clear that
they
all held
important
beliefs which are
philosophical,
even
though
some masters
advocated those beliefs more
straightforwardly
than others.
Moreover,
that
some Zen masters chose not to
engage
in
philosophical
discourse should not
obscure for us the fact that
many
of them
did;
the sermons of
Hui-neng,
for
example,
are a veritable mother lode of
philosophical statements,
as are the
writings
of such men as
Huang
Po and
D6gen,
to name
only
three.22
It is correct to.
say, then,
that all of the masters held
important
beliefs which
are
philosophical,
and that most of them held those beliefs
philosophically,
as
the literature
amply
attests. The
point
must be
emphasized,
for a number of
those beliefs revolve around the functions and limits of
language;
hence the
task of
ascertaining, by
means of
language, exactly
what those beliefs are-
making
them
explicit
without undue distortion or confusion-is difficult
enough
as it is for the student of Zen
Buddhism,
without the added burden of
having
to
argue
that the masters held
any
such beliefs.
If the
foregoing
considerations are
correct,
we must conclude that the de-
scriptions
of the
everyday
verbal and other behavior of some masters recorded
in Zen literature
provide
no more
justification
for the assertion that Zen is
not a
philosophy
than does the fact that Zen is also a
way
of liberation or
salvation. There
is, however,
one additional reason which
might
be cited as
justification
for the
assertion,
and it is
perhaps
the most
significant
reason of
all,
for it involves the
purported
content of one of the beliefs of Zen Buddhism.
It is not difficult to see
why
so
many
Zen commentators have asserted that
Zen is not a
philosophy,
for the assertion
proceeds naturally
from what those
commentators claim to be one of the most fundamental beliefs of Zen Bud-
19
Essays
in Zen
Buddhism,
1st
ser., p.
264.
20
Introduction to Zen
Buddhism, p.
45.
21
Essays
in Zen
Buddhism,
1st
ser., p.
356. Note that Suzuki
says
that the masters were
using "ordinary language."
22
Hui-neng's Fa-pao-t'an-ching
has been translated
by Wong
Mou-lam under the title
The Sutra
of
Wei
Lang (London:
Luzac &
Co., 1944),
and
by Wing-tsit
Chan as The
Platform Scripture (New
York: St.
John's University Press, 1963). Huang
Po's
Ch'uan-hsin-fa-yao
has been translated
by
Chu Ch'an
(John Blofeld)
under the title
The
Huang
Po Doctrine
of
Universal Mind
(London:
Rider &
Co., 1947),
and a
partial
translation is in Suzuki's Manual
of
Zen Buddhism
(London:
Rider &
Co., 1950),
pp.
112-119. For
D6gen's ShbOdgens6,
see The Three Pillars
of Zen, by Philip Kapleau
(New
York:
Harper
&
Row, 1966), especially pp.
295-299.
69
dhism,
here
succinctly
stated
by
Suzuki: "If we
really
want to
get
to the
bottom of
life,
we must abandon our cherished
syllogisms,
we must
acquire
a new
way
of observation
whereby
we can
escape
the
tyranny
of
logic
and
the one-sidedness of our
everyday phraseology."23
The merits of this
belief,
and whether it is
accurately
made in the name of
Zen,
are not under consideration here. The
point
now is that the tools of the
philosopher
are
primarily logic
and
language; therefore,
on this
view,
not
only
is
philosophy
not conducive to
liberation,
it is a
downright
hinderance
to it. That is to
say,
one of the beliefs which the commentators claim to be
stating
as basic to Zen Buddhism is that
philosophical
methods and beliefs
are more harmful than beneficial to
mankind,
that
they
are roadblocks on the
path
to liberation.24
Now it is clear that
anyone holding
such a belief
himself,
in the name of
Zen
Buddhism,
would be at
pains
to insist that Zen was not a
philosophy,
that
the
distinguishing
beliefs and attitudes of Zen Buddhists should not be con-
sidered
philosophical.
But can we
agree
with him?
In the first
place,
even if it is accurate to
say
that one of the basic beliefs
of Zen Buddhism is that
philosophical
methods and beliefs are not conducive to
liberation,
we are not entitled to infer on that account alone that all of the
other beliefs which
comprise
Zen are
non-philosophical;
such a conclusion
simply
does not follow. More
importantly,
the belief
expressed by
Suzuki is
itself a
philosophical
belief.
Technically
it is a
metaphilosophical
belief,
and
it
might
be characterized more
specifically
as an
anti-philosophical
belief.
But on the one
hand, being
a
metaphilosophical
belief
obviously
entails
being
a
philosophical
belief;
and on the other
hand,
being
an
antiphilosophical
belief does not entail
being
a
nonphilosophical
belief,
for the two latter terms
are
logically independent,
and
they
are not
synonymous.
It is
doubtful, however,
that a Zen commentator who was himself a Zen
Buddhist or a
strong
advocate of their beliefs would be influenced
by
these
arguments.
For if he also holds the
antiphilosophical
belief that
philosophical
methods and beliefs are more harmful than beneficial to
mankind,
he must
continue to insist that the
distinguishing
beliefs and attitudes of Zen Buddhists
are not
philosophical;
if he does
not,
he will be driven to the
equally
un-
comfortable alternatives of
admitting
either that some of the beliefs he
advocates are in some
way
or another harmful to mankind or that some other
of his basic beliefs are
self-referentially
inconsistent.
Thus we have the basic reason for the commentators'
insistence that Zen
23
Introduction to Zen
Buddhism, p.
61.
24
Whatever the case
might
be for
Zen,
this belief should not be considered indicative
of Buddhist beliefs in
general. Indeed, Madhyamika Buddhism,
for
example,
has as a
cardinal doctrine the
necessity
of
using
dialectic to
destroy
erroneous views and to
establish correct ones.
70 Rosemont
is not a
philosophy,
for it is in this
way
that
they attempt
to
exempt
their
own assertions from examination on the basis of the beliefs
they
advocate in
the name of Zen Buddhism. But all such
attempts
are doomed to
failure,
as
will be seen below. For now it will suffice to note that a belief does not cease
being philosophical
because someone
says
it should. In whatever manner we
choose to demarcate the class of
nonphilosophical beliefs,
the belief that
philos-
ophy
is detrimental to liberation will
not-along
with
many
other Zen
beliefs-be included therein.
Moreover,
it is also
important
to note that
subscription
to this
antiphilo-
sophical
belief does not even warrant
asserting
that Zen is not a
philosophy
as
a means of
issuing
a
warning.
If a Zen commentator feels it
imperative
to
warn his readers that an
overly analytic approach
to Zen
might
obscure some
or
many
facets of the
subject
more than it illuminates
them,
he can
accomplish
his task in
just
so
many words;
he should not in
any
event resort to
making
statements which misdescribe the nature of the
very topic
he is
attempting
to
explicate.
On the basis of these
arguments
it must be concluded that Zen is
correctly
called a
philosophy,
and that on this issue the commentators are mistaken. We
can admit all of the
following: (a)
the activities of Zen Buddhists are an
integral part
of the
subject; (b)
Zen is also a
way
of
liberation; (c)
not all
Zen masters
openly
advocated their
beliefs;
(d)
some beliefs of Zen Bud-
dhism are not
philosophical
beliefs;
(e)
some other Zen beliefs should be
called
antiphilosophical.
All of this can be admitted without in
any way
obviating
the basic
point
that Zen Buddhism contains a
great many significant
philosophical
beliefs which are crucial for
understanding
the
subject.
Hence
to that extent it is
important,
as well as
accurate,
to state that Zen Buddhism
is a
philosophy.
Before
concluding,
however,
it is
necessary
to show that if the
philosophical
nature of
many
Zen beliefs is
clearly
seen,
the student of Zen Buddhism will
not
only
be better
prepared
for the Zen texts
themselves,
but for the
writings
of the commentators as
well,
for
by
their insistence that Zen is not a
philos-
ophy
the commentators can
easily
obscure the
philosophical
nature of their
own work. To see how this is
done,
let us return to our earlier
example
of the
flying
saucer observer.
Suppose
that after the
plain
man has
gone
off to tell others of his UFO
sightings
a
skeptic
were to
say
to us: "How mistaken he was! Not
only
couldn't he be certain that
flying
saucers
existed,
he couldn't even be certain
that trees
existed,
for the word
'certainty',
if it has
any application
at
all,
applies only
to the
knowledge
of mathematics and
logic."
We
might
choose to
argue
with the
skeptic;
we
might,
for
instance,
say
that the
plain
man was
entirely justified
in
making
his
knowledge
claim
(about trees,
at
any rate),
71
and that the
skeptic
was
misusing
the word
"certainty." By
so
arguing
we
would be committed to the belief that sense
experiences
are a source of
knowledge,
which is the same belief held
uncritically
or
unconsciously by
the
plain
man. But it is clear that we would be
holding
the belief
philosophically,
and the statements we made in defense of it would all be
philosophical
state-
ments. It would be a sheer mistake to believe that
just
because the
plain
man
made no
philosophical
statements about his
beliefs,
the statements we made
about his beliefs were not
philosophical
statements either. It
might
be correct
to
say
that our
plain
man had no
philosophy,
but it would not be correct to
say
that we had no
philosophy. By articulating
and
defending
the beliefs
held
uncritically by
the
plain
man we offer
prima facie
evidence that we hold
those beliefs
philosophically,
and hence all of our statements about those
beliefs are
philosophical
statements.
Gathering
those statements
together
in
book
form,
we could
appropriately
entitle the work "The
Philosophy
of the
Plain Man."
In
just
the same
way,
even if it were true to
say
of the Zen masters
(which
it is
not)
that
they
do not hold
philosophical
beliefs or do not hold them
philosophically,
or even if it were true to
say
of Zen Buddhism in
general
(which again,
it is
not)
that it is not a
philosophy,
it still would not be
proper
for the Zen commentators to
emphasize
this issue to the
point
of
seriously misleading
their readers. In their
attempts
to articulate the beliefs
of the
masters,
to assert that those beliefs are
true,
and to defend
them,
the
Zen commentators offer
prima facie
evidence that
they themselves,
at
least,
are
holding
those beliefs
philosophically.
And because the
philosophical
state-
ments
they
make on the basis of those beliefs form the bulk of their
writings,
readers should be told at the outset that what
they
will be
reading
in those
commentaries will
be,
in an
important
sense,
the
philosophy
of Zen Bud-
dhism.25 The commentators' statements
expressing, elaborating,
and
defending
those beliefs are one and all
philosophical
statements,
hence
they
are
engaged
in
philosophical enterprises,
their
protestations
to the
contrary
notwithstand-
ing;
and such works thus form a
proper subject
for
philosophical
examination
and evaluation. To whatever
degree
the commentators are accurate
repre-
25
The
arguments
that the assertions of the Zen commentators are
philosophical
statements
should not be
interpreted
as also
being arguments
in favor of the view that
philosophy
is a doctrine rather than an
activity.
It is
clear, however,
that
Suzuki,
at
least,
sees
philosophy
as a doctrine,
and in
dealing
with the
writings
of Suzuki and the other
commentators the statements of the
present writer, as well as those of the
commentators,
become
philosophical
in virtue of
being
asserted in the course of
philosophical activity.
In a not
altogether
dissimilar context this
point
is
ably argued by John Myhill
in
"On the Ontological Significance
of the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem,"
in
Contemporary
Readings
in
Logical Theory,
ed. I.
Copi
and
J.
Gould
(New
York: The Macmillan
Co.,
1967), pp.
40-51.
72 Rosemont
sentatives of Zen
Buddhism,
to
just
that
degree
will
anyone reading
their
writings
be
engaged
in the
study
of those
distinguishing
beliefs and attitudes
of Zen Buddhists which constitute the
philosophy
of Zen Buddhism.
Hopefully
such studies well serve to
discourage
continued tolerance for the
perpetuation
of those mistakes which
only perform
a disservice for
anyone
with an
impartial-yet
nonetheless serious-interest in the
subject.

Is Zen Buddhism A Philosophy

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Is Zen Buddhism a Philosophy?

Author(s): Henry Rosemont, Jr.

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