1. THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS.

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), October 14, 2008
Facts:
On 8 August 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP),
represented by the GRP Peace Panel and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP),
and the MoroIslamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign the Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the previous GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MOA-AD
included, among others, a stipulation that creates the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), to
which the GRP grants the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and
ancestral lands of the Bangsamoro defined as the present geographic area of the
ARMM constituted by Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City,
as well as the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the
2001 plebiscite. The BJE is then granted the power to build, develop, and maintain its own
institutions. The MOA-AD also described the relationship of the GRP and the BJE as
associative, characterized by shared authority and responsibility. It further provides that its
provisions requiring amendments to the
existing legal framework shall take effect upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact. Before
the signing, however, the Province of North Cotabato sought to compel the respondents to
disclose and furnish it with complete and official copies of the MOA-AD, as well as to hold
a public consultation thereon, invoking its right to information on matters of public concern. A
subsequent petition sought to have the City of Zamboanga excluded from the BJE. The Court
then issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 4 August 2008, directing the public
respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.
Issue:
Whether or Not there is a violation of the peoples right to information on matters of
public concern (1987 Constitution,Art. III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution,Art. II, Sec. 28), including public
consultation under RA No.7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)?
Held:
Yes.
The Supreme Court provides at least three pertinent laws that
animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the peoples right to be
consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda, these laws are as follows:
EO No. 3, which enumerates the functions andresponsibilities of the PAPP, is replete with
mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a
principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the PAPP to conduct
regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society;
RA No. 7160 (LGC) requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any
project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that
may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality
is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally
and unilaterallyvests ownership of a vast territory to theBangsamoro people, which coul
d pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a
great number of inhabitants from their total environment;
RA No. 8371 (IPRA) provides for clearcut procedure for the recognition and delineation o
f ancestral domain, which entails, among other things,
the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICC/IP).

2. SUZETTE NICOLAS VS. ROMULO, February 11, 2009

Facts:
Herein respondent, Lance Corporal Daniel Smith, is a member of the United States
Armed Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, Suzette S.
Nicolas.
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States, the United States, at its request, was granted custody of
defendant Smith pending the proceedings.
During the trial, the US Government faithfully complied with its undertaking to bring
defendant Smith to the trial court every time his presence was required.
Eventually, the Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision, finding defendant Smith
guilty. He shall serve his sentence in the facilities that shall be agreed upon by appropriate
Philippine and United States pursuant to the VFA. Pending agreement on such facilities,
accused is hereby temporarily committed to the Makati City Jail.
However, defendant was taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law
enforcement agents, and brought to a facility for detention under the control of the United
States government, provided for under new agreements between the Philippines and the
United States, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement. This agreement provides that in
accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed, Smith, United States Marine Corps, be
returned to United States military custody at the U.S. Embassy in Manila.
Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of Smith because if they
would allow such transfer of custody of an accused to a foreign power is to provide for a
different rule of procedure for that accused. The equal protection clause of the Constitution is
also violated.
Issue:
Whether or Not there is a violation of the equal protection clause.
Held:
The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a
different treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our
territory and all other accused.
The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter ones
territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of
Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the world vary in terms and
conditions, according to the situation of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining
power. But the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the
forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties.
As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt
rules of procedure is curtailed or violated, but rather one in which, as is normally encountered
around the world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of one State do not extend or apply
except to the extent agreed upon to subjects of another State due to the recognition of
extraterritorial immunity given to such bodies as visiting foreign armed forces.
Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different
treatment when it comes to detention as against custody.
It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during
the trial and detention after conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement to
cover detention. And this specific arrangement clearly states not only that the detention shall
be carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also that the detention
shall be "by Philippine authorities." Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19
and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of the accused in the United States
Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not "by Philippine
authorities."
Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate with representatives
of the United States towards an agreement on detention facilities under Philippine authorities
as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA.
The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States, is UPHELD as constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements are DECLARED
not in accordance with the VFA.

9. THE CORFU CHANNEL CASE (UNITED KINGDOM VS. ALBANIA), 1949 ICJ 4
Facts:
October 1944, the British Navy verified that no mines existed through the North Corfu
Channel in the territory of Albania. The channel was again checked (one in January and the
other in February 1945) and had negative results.
October 22, 1946 a squadron of British warships (the Mauritius, Leander, Saumarez, and
Volage) left the port of Corfu and proceeded through the channel. While in Alabanian territorial
waters, two of the warships (Saumarez and Volage) struck floating mines and sustained serious
damage. 44 British officers and crew members died, while 42 were injured.
November 1946, British mine sweepers went through the North Corfu Channel, cut 22
moored mines and took them to Malta for examination. By a Special Agreement, the British
government instituted proceedings against Albania in the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
demanding compensation for damage to its ships and for the loss of lives.
Albanias contention is that there was no proof that such mines that damaged the ships
were their own. It also asserted that coastal States have a right to regulate the passage
of foreign ships through its territorial waters, and that prior authorization to pass should be
acquired. Since Britain did not obtain prior authorization, its passage was not innocent. For this
breach of international law, Albania demands compensation from Britain.
Issue:
Should Albania be held responsible for the mines that struck the British warships?

Held:
Yes, Albania is responsible under international law for the damage and loss of lives,
and that it owned a duty to pay compensation to Great Britain. Before and after the incident,
the Albanian Governments attitude showed its intention to keep a jealous watch on its
territorial waters. And when the Albania came to know of the minefield, it protested strongly
against the minesweeping conducted by Britain but not to the laying of mines. It is but showing
that Albania desired the presence of such mines. Moreover, the layout of the minefield shows
that this could only be accomplished by stationing a look-out post near the coasts (that is in
Albania). The inevitable conclusion is that the laying of the minefield could not have been done
without the knowledge of Albania. It is then its duty to notify and warn ships proceeding
through the Strait. Its failure to undertake such constitutes neglect of its international
responsibility .As to the argument on passage through territorial waters, the ICJ ruled that the
North Corfu Channel constituted a frontier between Albania and Greece, that a part of it is
wholly within the territorial waters of these 2 States, and that the Strait is of special importance
to Greece. Hence, the Channel belongs to a class of international highways through which
passage cannot be prohibited by a coastal State in time of peace. Moreover, the passage of
the British war ships through the Channel was carried out in such manner that is consistent
with the principle of innocent passagethe guns were in a normal position and not targeted to
the shores.

10. AVELINO RAZON VS. MARY JEAN TAGITIS, December 9, 2009

Facts:

Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis), a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior
Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, together
with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of
October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY
Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following
day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around.
Kunnong looked for Tagitis.

On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor
of Muslim studies and Tagitis fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis
disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. More than a month later, or on December 28, 2007,
the respondent, May Jean Tagitis, through her attorney-in-fact, filed a Petition for the Writ of
Amparo (petition) directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine
Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal,
Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief,
Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP;
and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet (collectively referred to as
petitioners), with the Court of Appeals (CA). On the same day, the CA immediately issued the
Writ of Amparo and set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008.

On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of
Tagitis was an enforced disappearance under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The CA ruled that when military
intelligence pinpointed the investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the abduction,
the missing-person case qualified as an enforced disappearance. Hence, the CA extended the
privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed the petitioners to exert extraordinary
diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to
provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA.

Issue:

Does Tagitis fall on International Law concept of enforced disappearance and if it is
binding in the Philippines?

Held:

Enforced disappearance is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any
other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons
acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the
disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.

The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert that there is a right
not to be subject to enforced disappearance and that this right is non-derogable. It provides
that no one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance under any circumstances, be it a state
of war, internal political instability, or any other public emergency. It obliges State Parties to
codify enforced disappearance as an offense punishable with appropriate penalties under their
criminal law. It also recognizes the right of relatives of the disappeared persons and of the
society as a whole to know the truth on the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared and on
the progress and results of the investigation Lastly, it classifies enforced disappearance as a
continuing offense, such that statutes of limitations shall not apply until the fate and
whereabouts of the victim are established.

To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so that the
country is not yet committed to enact any law penalizing enforced disappearance as a
crime. The absence of a specific penal law, however, is not a stumbling block for action from
this Court, as heretofore mentioned; underlying every enforced disappearance is a violation of
the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that the Supreme Court is mandated by the
Constitution to protect through its rule-making powers.

Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the Court is guided, in
acting on Amparo cases, by the reality that the Philippines is a member of the UN, bound by its
Charter and by the various conventions we signed and ratified, particularly the conventions
touching on humans rights. Under the UN Charter, the Philippines pledged to promote
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion. Although no universal agreement has
been reached on the precise extent of the human rights and fundamental freedoms
guaranteed to all by the Charter, it was the UN itself that issued the Declaration on enforced
disappearance, and this Declaration states:

Any act of enforced disappearance is an offence to dignity. It is condemned as a denial
of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and as a grave and flagrant violation of
human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and reaffirmed and developed in international instruments in this field.

As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy matter made in a
UN Declaration, the ban on enforced disappearance cannot but have its effects on the country,
given our own adherence to generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land.

[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation
clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from
treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules
accepted as binding result from the combination [of] two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known
as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule
of law requiring it.

While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the Convention on
enforced disappearance (or by the specific terms of the Rome Statute) and has not formally
declared enforced disappearance as a specific crime, the above recital shows that enforced
disappearance as a State practice has been repudiated by the international community, so that
the ban on it is now a generally accepted principle of international law, which we should
consider a part of the law of the land, and which we should act upon to the extent already
allowed under our laws and the international conventions that bind us.







11. ISABELITA C. VINUYA VS. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET. AL, April 28, 2010

Facts:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of
the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization
registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by
Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department
through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese
officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations
in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners,
and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had
already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the
Philippines and Japan.

Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to
espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them;
and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of
reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international
tribunals.

Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the
war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations
Agreement of 1956.

On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the Philippine government signed a
Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort
women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not
espousing petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan?




Held:

Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has
the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan.

Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.

One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-
established that the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislativethe politicaldepartments of the government,
and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision. are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.
They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose
welfare they advance or imperil.

But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts
certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements.
However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its
nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is
demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In
this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the
country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace
of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.

The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions
which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his
confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and
other officials.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be
inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan,
thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the
Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy
judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been
constitutionally committed.

From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where
such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our
consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy
considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of
the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient,
and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a
claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a
government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. By taking up the case of one of its
subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his
behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect
for the rules of international law.

Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic
protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the
State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that
their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they
can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or
obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not
affect the position internationally.

The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted,
to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease. It retains, in this respect, a discretionary
power the exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a political or other
nature, unrelated to the particular case.

The International Law Commissions (ILCs) Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection
fully support this traditional view. They (i) state that "the right of diplomatic protection
belongs to or vests in the State, (ii) affirm its discretionary nature by clarifying that
diplomatic protection is a "sovereign prerogative" of the State; and (iii) stress that the state
"has the right to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of a national. It is under no duty or
obligation to do so."

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this
analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated
jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to
prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the
status of jus cogens.

The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used
as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a
whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the
international community as a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in the field of
diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of
the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes.

The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command
peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are
considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can
be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority.

12. LOURDES RUBRICO, ET. AL., VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET. AL., February 10, 2010
Facts:
On 03 April 2007, Lourdes Rubrico, chair of Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan,
was abducted by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron
(AISS) based in Lipa City while attending a Lenten pabasa in Dasmarinas, Cavite. She was
brought to and detained at the air base without charges. She was released a week after
relentless interrogation, but only after she signed a statement that she would be a military
asset. Despite her release, she was tailed on at least 2 occasions. Hence, Lourdes filed a
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary
detention and grave misconduct against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, and Jonathan, but nothing
has happened. She likewise reported the threats and harassment incidents to the Dasmarinas
municipal and Cavite provincial police stations, but nothing eventful resulted from their
investigation.
Meanwhile, the human rights group Karapatan conducted an investigation which
indicated that men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) led the abduction of
Lourdes. Based on such information, Rubrico filed a petition for the writ of amparo with the
Supreme Court on 25 October 2007, praying that respondents be ordered to desist from
performing any threatening act against the security of petitioners and for the Ombudsman to
immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of
gender of the offended party. Rubrico also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce
documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
The Supreme Court issued the desired writ and then referred the petition to the Court
of Appeals (CA) for summary hearing and appropriate action. At the hearing conducted on 20
November 2007, the CA granted petitioners motion that the petition and writ be served on
Darwin Sy/Reyes, Santana, Alfaro, Cuaresma, and Jonathan. By a separate resolution, the CA
dropped the President as respondent in the case.
On 31 July 2008, after due proceedings, the CA rendered its partial judgment, dismissing
the petition with respect to Esperon, Razon, Roquero, Gomez, and Ombudsman.
Hence, the petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or Not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an amparo
petition?
Held:
No. DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY and THE WRIT OF AMPARO
Doctrine of Command Responsibility has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings
[C]ommand responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied under international
law, has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings.
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the
development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, command
responsibility, in its simplest terms, means the responsibility of commanders for crimes
committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their
control in international wars or domestic conflict. In this sense, command responsibility is
properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of
command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior
accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of
control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is an omission mode of
individual criminal liability, whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by
his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators.
There is no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under the Doctrine of
Command Responsibility While there are several pending bills on command responsibility,
there is still no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine. It may
plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police
commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made
applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now
constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with
the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these
proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a
form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents criminal liability, if
there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such
proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of
an administrative rule may have been committed.
Reluctance of the amparo petitioners or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to
pose a hindrance to the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in question
to its natural end *T+he right to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of ones
right by the government. And this protection includes conducting effective investigations of
extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats of the same kind. The nature and
importance of an investigation are captured in the Velasquez Rodriguez case, in which the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights pronounced: [The duty to investigate] must be
undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An
investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not a
step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or
upon offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government.
The remedy of amparo ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously The privilege
of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty,
and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an
extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of
extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted
to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined
by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure
amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.

13. CARLOS GO VS. LUIS RAMOS, ET. AL., September 4, 2009
Facts:
These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis
T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration)
against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. To prove
his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmys citizenship as FChinese. Luis argued that
although it appears from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan,
are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos
appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. Jimmy refuted the
allegations in his counter-affidavit, averring that the complaint for deportation initiated by Luis
was merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business
dealings and insisted that he is a natural-born Filipino. Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who
was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in
accordance with Article IV, Section 1, paragraph 4 of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth
Act No. 625 (Com. Act No. 625), as evidenced by his having taken the Oath of Allegiance on July
11, 1950 and having executed an Affidavit of Election of Philippine citizenship on July 12, 1950.
Issue:
Whether or Not Carlos election of Philippine citizenship conferred Filipino citizenship
on him and subsequently, Jimmy?


Held:
No. Because Carlos failed to elect Filipino citizenship within three years, he is not a
Filipino citizen. Com. Act No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the
1935Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid
election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino
mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths,
and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid
statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines.
However, the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 did not prescribe a time period
within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only
provides that the election should be made upon reaching the age of majority.
The age of majority then commenced upon reaching 21 years. In the opinions of the
then Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this
dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the
effectivity of the1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine
citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the
United States Government to the effect that the election should be made within a reasonable
time after attaining the age of majority.
The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be
made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. It is true that we said that the 3-
year period for electing Philippine citizenship may be extended as when the person has always
regarded himself as a Filipino. The Supreme Court view that not a single circumstance was
sufficiently shown meriting the extension of the 3-year period. The fact that Carlos exercised
his right of suffrage in 1952 and1955 does not demonstrate such belief, considering that the
acts were done after he elected Philippine citizenship.
On the other hand, the mere fact that he was able to vote does not validate his irregular
election of Philippine citizenship. At most, his registration as a voter indicates his desire to
exercise a right appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens but does not alter his real
citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction, is determined by blood ( jus sanguinis).
The exercise of the rights and privileges granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof
of citizenship, because a person may misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the
rights and privileges of citizens of this country.
Moreover, we have also ruled that an illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform
any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines;
he automatically becomes a citizen himself. However, it is our considered view that absent any
evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina, the aforestated
established rule could not be applied to him. It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine
citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption
can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding
citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state. As Carlos and Jimmy neither showed
conclusive proof of their citizenship nor presented substantial proof of the same, the Court has
no choice but to sustain the Boards jurisdiction over the deportation proceedings. This is not to
say that they are not Filipinos, but the Court necessarily has to pass upon the issue of
citizenship only to determine whether the proceedings may be enjoined in order to give way to
a judicial determination of the same. And they are of the opinion that said proceedings should
not be enjoined.

14. BAYAN MUNA VS. ALBERTO ROMULO, February 1, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the
marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his
capacity as then Executive Secretary Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Having a key
determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court
(ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international
concern x x x and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes
adverted to cover those considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge
dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the
139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence
process. The Philippines is not among the 92.


Issue:
Whether or Not the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement is void ab initio for contracting obligations
that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized principles of international
law?
Held:
No. Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral
obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international
law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the Agreement , as petitioner would put it, leaves
criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of
humanity; x x x it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to the [ICC] x x x. The
above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlier position, which, as already discussed,
contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in the
process undermined its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law
principles. The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender
agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire
to try and punish crimes under its national law. x x x. The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and
competence of the countrys judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense
justice fairly and judiciously. Petitioner, we believe, labours under the erroneous impression that the
Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international concern to
escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who may have committed
acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US;
or with the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the formalities
necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, what the
Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international
tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime
under its existing laws. With the view we take of things, there is nothing immoral or violative of
international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the
non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the Rome
Statute.

15. PROF. MERLIN MAGALLONA VS. EDUARDO ERMITA, ET. AL., August 16, 2011
Facts:

The conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines
because an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by the
archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.

R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress in March 2009 to comply with the terms of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on
February 27, 1984. Such compliance shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some
base points around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories such as the
Kalayaan Island Ground (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal as regimes of islands whose islands
generate their own applicable maritime zones. Petitioners, in their capacities as citizens,
taxpayers or legislators assail the constitutionality of R.A. 9522 with one of their arguments
contending that the law unconstitutionally converts internal waters into archipelagic waters,
thus subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III,
including over flight. Petitioners have contended that these passage rights will violate the
Constitution as it shall expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution
hazard.

Issue:

Whether or Not R.A. 9522 is unconstitutional for converting internal waters into
archipelagic waters?

Held:

No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional and is consistent with the Philippines
national interest. Aside from being a vital step in safeguarding the countrys maritime zones,
the law also allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines
maritime zones and continental shelf. The Court also finds that the conversion of internal
waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the
UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by
the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. It is further
stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its
archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and subsoil
and the resources therein.