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Copyright 2004 Thunderbird, TheGarvin School of International Management. All rightsreserved. Thiscasewas
prepared byProfessor LauraneeBuchanan for thepurposeof classroomdiscussion only, and not to indicateeither effective
or ineffectivemanagement.
America West Airl ines:
An Airl ine in Transit ion
Edward Beauvais saw an opportunity and made it a reality. As an airline consultant in the1980s, he felt
that southwest markets such as Phoenix, Arizona were overlooked by most of the major carriers. To-
gether with his partner Michael Conway, a former Continental executive, they mortgaged their houses
to raise cash to start America West Airlines (AWA) in 1981. AWA began with flights from Phoenix to
four U.S. cities; today, AWA is the eighth largest carrier in the U.S., serving 100 designations in the
U.S., Canada, Mexico, and Costa Rica. Among 150 startups formed since deregulation in 1978, AWA
is the only airline to become a major player.
1
But along the way, AWA has flown through its share of
turbulence.
Company History
AWA grew rapidly in the 1980s, establishing hubs in Las Vegas, Nevada, and Columbus, Ohio, buying
routes from bankrupt Eastern Airlines, and starting international service to Nagoya, Japan via Hawaii.
But expansion cost and intense competition from low-cost carrier Southwest Airlines led to losses of
$46 million in 1987.
2
In 1988, Beauvais and Conway were forced to cut flights, planes, and employees;
they sold the Nagoya route to Northwest Airlines. These cuts might have been enough, but the after-
math of the first Gulf War left the entire industry reeling with additional losses due to high fuel prices
and reduced demand. In 1991, AWA filed for Chapter 11.
At that point, Beauvais stepped down, and the board brought in financier and turnaround special-
ist William Franke. Mr. Frankes previous experience had been to bring Circle K, a convenience store
chain, out of bankruptcy. Making further cuts in staff and planes, AWA made a profit in 1993 and
emerged from bankruptcy in 1994. During this time, Franke and Conway were often at odds with one
another, and in 1994, Conway was fired by the board and replaced by Franke. (When Conways lifetime
pass on AWA was revoked, he started a rival airline in Las Vegas.
3
)
On the surface, AWAs situation seemed to improve as the financial burden lifted, but internally
the picture was quite different. The tension between Franke and AWA employees escalated to the point
of open warfare. A senior executive at a rival airline said he had never seen a carrier whose approach to
workers was so confrontational. AWA was the kind of employer that fires people on Christmas Eve
(500 technicians in early December 1995).
4
Flight attendants negotiated for five years to get their first
contract. Pilots protested their contract by flying extraordinarily fast to burn fuel; arriving early, they
would circle the airport to kill time.
1
Farnham, Alan, (2001), Americas Worst Airline? Forbes, June 11, 167, 14: 104.
2
Hoovers Online, (2004), America West Holding Corporation: History.
http://premium.hoovers.com/subscribe/co/history.xhtml?COID=41891.
3
Lacter, Mark, (2000), Flying Aces, Forbes, November 13, 166, 13: 54.
4
Farnham, Americas Worst Airline?
2 A12-04-0026
Cuts in planes and staff also resulted in operational problems. In 1998, the Federal Aviation
Administration (the government agency responsible for civil aviation safety) hit AWA with a $5 million
fine for maintenance violationsthe largest such fine ever levied against an airline. The FAA charged
AWA with flying 41,000 flights using 17 planes that were overdue for structural inspection.
5
AWA
subsequently paid $2.5 million in fines and agreed to a major overhaul of its maintenance and flight
operations, including joint FAA/AWA teams to revamp procedures and oversee outsourced mainte-
nance work.
6
These internal problems soon spilled over into customer service, and America West soon became
known among customers as America Worst. In June 2001, Forbesmagazine reported: We scoured
tons of data on canceled fights, lost luggage, staff rudeness, and more to find which carrier is worst at
what. And the loser is America West. Even in an industry rife with screwups, crummy service, and
dissembling, America West stands out as a paragon of badness. It ranks worst in customer complaints,
worst in lost luggage, worst in cabin comfort, and next-to worst in on-time performance. It has one
thing going for it: in denied-boardings (bumping ticketed passengers because a flight is oversold), it is
somewhat less bad than the average airline.
7
Almost 1500 people filed complaints against AWA with the Department of Transportation in
2000the highest rate in the industry. (Southwest had the lowest rate with 338 complaints.) Aarre
Laakso, a San Diego consultant, arrived in New York for a business meeting, but his bags didnt. I had
to go to the executive suite dressed in torn jeans and a stained shirt. But Mr. Laako wasnt really upset
until his bags were lost again as he traveled to Boston. That America West claimed to have the most
sophisticated baggage tracing system in the industry failed to impress Mr. Laako, since he couldnt find
anyone who knew how to use it. After the second incident, Mr. Laako vowed never to fly America West
again.
8
He wasnt alone. eComplaints, which collects and analyzes consumer complaint data, reported
that AWA customers were more likely than other travelers to say they will switch carrierspermanently.
It also claims that there may be 20 fliers that are upset with the airline for every one that bothers to
complain in writing.
9
While every airline occasionally disappoints its customers, America West could, at times, seem
completely insensitive. Sherry Layne, a blind woman traveling with her Seeing Eye dog, was booked in
first class. When her rowmate objected to the dog, AWA stuck Ms. Layne in the last row of coach,
instead of asking the discontented rowmate to move. When she complained to CEO Franke, he had an
assistant respond: Our personnel were able to accommodate you on that flight. Im disappointed you
feel this constitutes a violation of your rights. Ms. Layne received more sympathy from the Depart-
ment of Transportation, who issued AWA a fine (which was later waived).
10
New Management Team
On September 1, 2001, amid employee dissatisfaction, customer complaints, and continuing financial
problems, Mr. Franke turned the management of AWA over to a younger generation, lead by W. Dou-
glas Parker. Mr. Parker, a financial wizard who first established his credentials as a fare analyst, came up
through AWAs management ranks. During his tenure as CFO, Parker had been instrumental in restruc-
turing the airlines schedule to increase business traffic: adding service to business cities such as Boston,
Philadelphia, and Cleveland, while cutting back on flights to leisure destinations.
11
As President and
5
Ibid.
6
McCartney, Scott, (1998), America West Loses Altitude Just After Its ComebackNo. 9 Airline Struggles
Anew with Reliability, Labor, Depressed Shares, Wall Street Journal, September 18: 1.
7
Farnham, Americas Worst Airline?
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
McCartney, America West Loses Altitude.
A12-04-0026 3
COO, Parker acknowledged the airlines operational weaknesses and worked to correct them: The fact
of the matter is, we did not run a good airline through last summer (2000). When we were growing
10% a year in the late 1990s, we did not adequately invest in infrastructure or in preventive mainte-
nance. That caught up with us, and by last summer we were not delivering reliable aircraft to the gate at
the time of departure. Starting last summer we took strong corrective measures, spending a com-
bined $20 million to double our number of spare aircraft from four to eight and hire 50% more
mechanics. We also spent $40 million on extra spare parts and $5 million to hire new customer service
representatives.
12
To make improvements, Parker sought outside financing. On September 10, only nine days after
taking control of the company, he received welcomed news that the airline had obtained preliminary
approval for a $200 million loan. Mr. Parker took his newly installed management team out to cel-
ebrate, but there was little time to savor the success. With fleets grounded on 9/11, AWA started bleed-
ing $5 million a day. When flights resumed three days later, losses continued and AWAs financing fell
through.
13
A week later, Parker flew to Washington, D.C., along with the CEOs of the other airlines, to seek
a government bailout for the beleaguered industry. After months of lobbying, AWA was the first airline
to secure a government loan. (The $380 million government loan was later supplemented by a $429
million loan from a group lead by Citibank.) Getting government help wasnt easy. Mr. Parker had to
build a case for why AWA was worth saving, give the government warrants worth one third of the
airlines fully diluted common stock, and wring more than $600 million in concessions from 20 credi-
tors including manufacturers, vendors, and leasing firms.
14
Among the creditors who were willing to
help were GE Capital Aviation ServicesGEs aircraft financing arm and AWAs largest aircraft leaser
and Airbusthe European plane maker.
GE agreed to co-guarantee the Citibank loan, based on the goodwill Mr. Parker had built up in
negotiations prior to 9/11. Typically, airlines arrange several leasing companies in different rooms
during negotiations, and shuttle back and forth playing one against the other. But during a negotiation
with GE just before 9/11, Mr. Parker didnt do that, and GE took note, says Michael Chen, senior vice
president at GE Capital Aviation Services. After they struck a deal, Mr. Parker took the GE officials to
a down-to-earth neighborhood bar, instead of a fancy restaurant, to celebrate. It was more like he was
one of us, where he could talk about his family and basketball, says Mr. Chen. It made it like a more
personal level where you build trust in the guy.
15
Henri Courpron, head of Airbus Industries North American unit, concurred, characterizing Mr.
Parker as a hard bargainer who asks nicely.... Hes just going to tell you: Look Henri, this is what I
need, this is why I need it. Airbus agreed to defer delivery of 17 of the 28 aircraft on order from
AWA.
16
Even with loans and vendor concessions, AWA had to furlough 1500 employees after 9/11.
17
One
of the promises Mr. Parker made the government was to continue to hold down labor cost. Pre-9/11,
America West employees were paid about 45% less than competitors: a pilot with ten years makes an
average of $126,000 a year compared to $186,000 at other carriers.
18
Further concessions would be
12
Turrettini, John, (2001), A Bad Airline Repents, Forbes, June 11, 167, 14: 105.
13
Trottman, Melanie, (2002), Credit Lifeline: Still Wobbling a Bit, America West Tests Plan to Help
Airlines, Wall Street Journal, April 4: A1.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Alexander, Keith, (2002), A Climbing America West; Airline, Citing Loan Guarantee, Says It Is Out of
Survival Mode, TheWashington Post, June 25: E1.
18
Trottman, Credit Lifeline.
4 A12-04-0026
needed, but pilots, who had been in contract mediation for over a year, werent expected to embrace new
cost-cutting measures.
Turnaround for a Troubled Airline
Many argued that troubled airlines like America West should be allowed to go under; not surprisingly,
Mr. Parker disagreed. Were the nations largest, low-cost hub-and-spoke airline. We keep prices down
not just for our customers, but for [those of ] every other airline.
19
But the AWA team needed to make
a decision: was AWA a traditional hub-and-spoke airline, or was it a low-cost discount airline?Even
before the management team could settle on a long-term strategy, they knew they had to act to improve
operations and get passengers back onboard. Fortunately, with the promise of government loans and
new management working to ensure the future of the airline, employee faith in the company began to
return. By June 2002, AWA had rehired all 1500 employees furloughed after 9/11, including 179
pilots.
20
And operations continued to improve.
Douglas Parker and his team began taking bold steps to improve customer relations as well. In
March 2002, AWA took customersand competitorsby surprise, announcing they would eliminate
restrictions such as the Saturday-night stay-over requirement for cheaper fares. At the same time, they
slashed expensive, last-minute business fares by as much as two-thirds. To promote these initiatives,
AWA aired a low-budget ad during the Phoenix Suns basketball games. The ads opened with the text
The fine print from America West Airlines as small, white type filled in a black background. As the
fine print rolled over the screen, the type size increased in four places to publicize AWAs new, cus-
tomer-friendly policies: lower business fares, no additional charge for standby flights on the same day,
no required Saturday-night stay, and no penalties on unused tickets. The tagline asked Lower fares.
Fewer restrictions. Is that fine with you?
21
In addition to conveying AWAs new policies, the ads had
another purpose: to make fun of competitors who had added new fees for extrassuch as paper
tickets and over-sized baggagein order to generate higher revenues.
With industry revenues down and costs escalating, traditional competitors reacted quickly. They
cut business and leisure fares in AWAs main markets; a move designed to force America West to retreat
from its decision. But America West held its ground, and, by the end of 2002, several other airlines,
including Delta and American, were testing similarly priced business fares.
22
In addition to encouraging customers to fly again, America West looked for ways to increase
profitability. In May 2003, airline executives decided to experiment with the yield-management pro-
gram. As described by Scott Kirby, Executive VP of Sales and Marketing, America West sorted the
92 days in June, July, and August into 43 peak-travel days and 49 off-peak days, and blacked out sales
fares on the peak days. We refused to sell our product at ridiculously low prices, said CEO Doug
Parker. The strategy was very successful. On peak days in June, the airline had flat load factors,
much like a year earlier, but big increase in yieldcents per revenue seat mile. On off-peak days the
reverse was true; yields were flat, but the load factor was up.
23
In another initiative, referred to as the First-Rate program, AWA sought to attract higher rev-
enuesin first class at lower prices. How?By getting customers to actually pay for their seats! AWAlike
most airlineswas not breaking even on first class. Only six percent of travelers in first class paid full
fare; the remainder used frequent flyer miles to upgrade. With the First-Rate program, AWA offers first-
19
Ibid.
20
Alexander, A Climbing America West.
21
Flass, Rebecca, (2002), Moses Anshell Spells Out Benefits of America West, Adweek, December 9, 52, 49:
4.
22
Setaishi, Sonoko, (2003), A Galling Idea: Charging for Airline FoodAmerica West to Test Selling In-
Flight Meals and Snacks, Wall Street Journal, January 2: D1.
23
Bond, David, (2003), An Incredible Transformation America West Drops Ridiculously Low Prices,
Reaps Reward with Second-Quarter Profit, Aviation Week & SpaceTechnology, July 28, 159, 4: 41.
A12-04-0026 5
class seats at 50% to 70% off full-price fare, but the ticket is non-refundable. (They continue to offer
refundable tickets at full fare.) Were going to redefine what we think first class is, and (we think) first
class should be affordable, says Scott Bowers, VP of revenue management.
24
The program was designed
to attract two segments of customers: budget-conscious business travelers and high-end leisure travelers.
In the first few weeks, First-Rate increased revenues $1 million to $2 million a week. Half of the tickets
were sold more than a weekand in some cases, more than 21 daysin advance of departure. With
this in mind, AWA said that it would not hold back first-class seats for last-minute passengers hoping to
upgrade.
Back in economy class, America West took at different tactic. The airline began charging passen-
gers for meals: $3 for a snack box, $10 for a Chicken Kiev dinner. While widely ridiculed in the press
(the Wall Street Journal headline read: A Galling Idea: Charging for Airline Food), other airlines took
notice and also began experimenting with on-board food sales.
25
All the while, AWA continued to invest in IT projects to improve customer interactions and
reduce cost. Online is our lowest-cost distribution channel, and we want to shift as much of our
volume there as possible, according to Lloyd Parker, VP of distribution.
26
To encourage customer use
of the Internet, AWA introduced Low Fare Finder. In one step, customers can find the best possible
price for the preferred date of travel and compare it to fares on alternative dates. To reduce check-in
time, AWA began automating airport check-in throughout its route system with self-service kiosks. And
to reduce boarding delays, AWA began using a reverse pyramid process designed by Arizona State
University engineering students, whereby passengers board from back to front and window to aisle at
the same time.
27
Controlling costs remains a top priority, forcing America West to reexamine fundamentals
including route structure. In 2003, AWA closed its Columbus, Ohio hub. At the same time, AWA
expanded its point-to-point transcontinental services from Los Angeles International Airport to New
Yorks Kennedy and Bostons Logan. Service from San Francisco to New York and Boston began in
2004. AWA flies two round trips per day: east to west in morning and early evening, west to east in
morning and at noon. To gain a foothold in these markets, AWA dropped prices. Out of JFK, AWAs
walkup or unrestricted tickets were priced at $299 one-waycompared to $900 on American, Delta,
or United, and $1200 on US Airways. Consumers flying out of Boston benefited from even bigger
savings.
28
The expansion into new routes carries risks, but Mr. Parker sees it as the only way to remain
competitive: We are seeing a number of other low-cost airlines moving into point-to-point markets
that we have a competitive advantage over. Rather than find ourselves in a position in a few years of
wishing we had added those markets, we are going to enter them today.
29
In expanding point-to-point
service, AWA avoids competitors hubs, where passengers are more likely to use connecting flights.
America Wests costsparticularly labor costcontinue to be lower than most competitors. Af-
ter four years of negotiation, pilots accepted a three-year contract in December 2003. The contract
doesnt increase salaries, but it increased total compensation and benefits $30 million to $35 million; a
figure, Mr. Parker indicated, thats comfortable.
30
24
Trottman, Melanie, (2004), First Class at Coach Prices; America West Adds Class of Nonrefundable Seats;
Others Expected to Follow, Wall Street Journal, February 17: D1.
25
Setaishi, A Galling Idea.
26
Verton, Dan, (2002), Despite Economy, IT Projects Take Off at America West, Computerworld, August
19, 36, 34: 8.
27
Trottman, Melanie, (2003), America West Tests Low FaresDespite Broad Retooling, Airline Continues
to Suffer Losses, Wall Street Journal, June 5: B10.
28
Bond, David, (2003), Low-Fare Transcon America West Will Launch Nonstop Service in Four of the Big
Threes Profitable Markets, Aviation Week & SpaceTechnology, August 18, 159, 7: 39.
29
Josselson, Steve, (2003), Phoenix Rises, AirfinanceJournal, December: 1.
30
Ibid.
6 A12-04-0026
31
Bowen, Brent D. and Dean E. Headley, (19992004), Airline Quality Rating, April.
http://www.unomaha.edu/~unoai/aqr.
32
These results included nonoperating gains of $81.3 million related to federal government assistance and
$13.1 million from sale of investments; even without these, AWA reported an operating income of $32.9
million.
33
America West Airlines, (2004), 2004 Chairmans Message to Shareholders. http://www.americawest.com/
aboutawa/publicrelations/aa_2003shmessage.htm.
34
Josselson, Phoenix Rises.
35
America West Airlines, (2004), 2004 Chairmans Message to Shareholders.
36
Josselson, Phoenix Rises.
37
Ibid.
38
Gilbertson, Dawn, (2004), AmWest CEO Has Strategy for Crisis, Arizona Republic, August 15: D1.
39
Farnham, Americas Worst Airline?
40
Will, George, F., (2004), An Industry Ready for Takeoff? TheWashington Post, June 3: A19.
Results
The results have been dramatic. After a three-year effort, AWA has begun to show signs of a consistent
operational turnaround, improving its on-time record and maintenance procedures, as well as curbing
the number of flight cancellations. AWA lost fewer bags and logged fewer customer complaints three
years in a row. (See Exhibits 14.)
31
For 2003, AWA reported net income of $57.4 million compared to a net loss of $387.9 million
for the prior year.
32
At year end, AWA had experienced five consecutive quarters of improved earnings
and three consecutive quarters of profitability.
33
Passenger load factorthe percentage of seats filled
jumped to a record 76.4% in 2003, with business travel accounting for 40% of traffic (up from 34% in
2002).
34
Other key indicators were also up:
Revenue passenger mileone paying passenger flown one mileincreased 7.1% to 21.3 billion
with 3.3% increased capacity.
Revenue per available seat mile (RASM) increased 6.2% year-over-year (compared to the industry
RASM of 2.8%).
Revenue per passenger mile, or yield, increased 2.3%.
35
At the same time, AWA reported one of the lowest costs per available seat mile (CASM) at 7.57
cents (Q3, 2003); the only airlines with a lower CASM were Jet Blue, Northwest, and Southwest.
36
In December 2003, AWA reported that the government would make more than $200 million if
they chose to exercise the stock warrants held in exchange for providing the loan guarantee.
37
Despite the upturn in America Wests performance, some analysts remain pessimistic. By mid-
2004, the stock price was at a 52-week low, just over $5 (compared to its 52-week high of $16). No
Hope was the headline one investor slapped on an Internet message board, saying he had just sold
AWA stock at a loss.
38
In large part, this pessimism is a reflection of the state of the industry. Even before 9/11, structural
problems plagued the airline industry: too few runways, too few airports, too many flights, and out-
dated air-traffic control technology.
39
Since then, airlines have suffered through one crisis after another:
recession, SARS, the war in Iraq. Jet fuel is now at a 15-year high, having escalated more than 70 cents
per gallon in the past year; with each penny, industry cost increased by $180 million.
40
Several of the major carriers, including United and Delta, are at or near bankruptcy, while mo-
mentum has shifted to discount airlines lead by Southwest and Jet Blue. The low-cost, discount airlines
have seized opportunitieshiring furloughed workers, grabbing abandoned airport gates, making deals
A12-04-0026 7
on aircraft canceled by the bigger airlines. As noted by the Wall Street Journal: Some pilots are sitting in
the same planes but wearing different uniforms...
41
Passenger traffic at the six largest airlines was down
2.9 billion revenue passenger miles in June 2004 compared with June 2001 (a decrease of 8%), while
the six largest discount carriers flew nearly three billion more revenue passenger miles (an increase of
38%). Discounters now have a 25% market share, and are expected to capture 40% of the market in the
next year.
42
41
McCartney, Scott, (2004), How Discount Airlines Profited From Their Bigger Rivals Woes, Wall Street
Journal, August 12: A1.
42
Will, An Industry Ready for Takeoff?
8 A12-04-0026
Exhibit 2 Involuntary Denied Boardings
(per 10,000 passengers)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Air Tran 1.45
Alaska 0.91 1.41 1.36 1.17 0.81
America West 1.39 1.12 0.38 0.20 0.40
American 0.43 0.42 0.36 0.31 0.59
American Eagle 0.43 0.19 0.38
ATA 0.89
Atlantic Southeast 7.86
Continental 0.34 1.80 1.51 0.87 1.06
Delta 1.53 0.33 0.77 1.11 1.30
Jet Blue 0.00
Northwest 0.18 0.57 0.45 0.60 0.70
Southwest 1.38 1.89 1.50 1.09 1.02
TWA 0.73 2.54 1.83
United 0.90 1.43 0.92 0.69 0.65
US Airways 0.52 0.65 0.34 0.35 0.34
Industry Average 0.88 1.04 0.86 0.72 0.86
Statisticsbased on data from the Department of Transportation, compiled by Brent D. Bowen and
Dean E. Headley.
Exhibit 1 On-Time Arrival Percentage
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Air Tran 78.1
Alaska 71.0 68.1 69.0 78.0 81.0
America West 69.5 65.5 74.8 82.9 82.0
American 73.5 72.9 75.9 83.8 81.7
American Eagle 71.0 79.1 78.6
ATA 80.0
Atlantic Southeast 75.4
Continental 76.6 78.1 80.7 83.5 82.0
Delta 78.0 75.3 78.0 80.0 82.3
Jet Blue 84.3
Northwest 79.9 77.4 79.7 80.8 82.9
Southwest 80.0 75.2 81.7 82.6 86.3
TWA 80.9 76.9 80.8
United 74.4 61.4 73.5 84.0 83.3
US Airways 71.4 72.3 78.2 83.4 79.7
Industry Average 76.1 72.6 77.4 82.1 82.0
Statisticsbased on data from the Department of Transportation, compiled by Brent D. Bowen and
Dean E. Headley.
A12-04-0026 9
Exhibit 4 Total Complaints to Department of Transportation
(per 100,000 passengers)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Air Tran 0.83
Alaska 1.64 2.04 1.27 0.91 0.52
America West 3.73 7.51 3.72 1.63 0.84
American 3.50 3.54 2.51 1.29 0.88
American Eagle 1.70 0.60 0.51
ATA 0.66
Atlantic Southeast 0.59
Continental 2.62 2.84 2.23 1.41 0.95
Delta 1.82 2.01 2.16 1.37 0.78
Jet Blue 0.31
Northwest 2.93 2.61 1.97 1.45 0.95
Southwest 0.40 0.47 0.38 0.33 0.14
TWA 3.45 3.47 2.54
United 2.66 5.30 3.24 1.71 0.83
US Airways 3.15 2.59 1.87 1.13 0.90
Industry Average 2.48 2.98 2.11 1.22 0.67
Statisticsbased on data from the Department of Transportation, compiled by Brent D. Bowen and
Dean E. Headley.
Exhibit 3 Mishandled Baggage
(per 1,000 passengers)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Air Tran 2.84
Alaska 5.75 3.48 3.00 2.63 2.56
America West 4.52 6.62 4.22 3.55 3.30
American 5.21 5.50 4.60 4.27 4.45
American Eagle 7.36 9.81 8.42
ATA 4.06
Atlantic Southeast 15.41
Continental 4.42 5.35 4.29 3.14 3.11
Delta 4.39 4.49 4.11 3.57 3.84
Jet Blue 3.21
Northwest 4.81 5.24 4.19 4.52 3.42
Southwest 4.22 5.00 4.77 3.52 3.35
TWA 5.38 6.06 6.35
United 7.01 6.57 5.07 3.76 3.93
US Airways 5.08 4.76 3.86 2.95 3.55
Industry Average 5.08 5.29 4.55 3.84 4.00
Statisticsbased on data from the Department of Transportation, compiled by Brent D. Bowen and
Dean E. Headley.