V ANGUARD SERIES

EDITOR: MARTIN WINDROW

ALLIED
TANK DESTROYERS
Text by BRYAN PERRETT
COIOUT plates by MIKE CHAPPELL
OSPREY PUBLISHI NG LONDON
Published in 1979 by
Osprey Publishing LId
Member company of lhe George Philip Group
12- 14 Long Acre, London WC2E 9LP
Copyright 1979 Osprey Publishing Ltd
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ISBN 0850453151
Filmset by BAS Printers Limilcd,
Over Wallop, Hampshirc
Printed in Hong Kong
The author would likc la thank Coloncl RobcrtJ. Icks
for his invaluablc advice; also MI' Theodore H.
Aschman Jr and Mr Albert Baybutt. Thanks are also
due to MI' J ohnJ. Slonakcr ofthe Uniled States Army
Military History Institulc and Brigadier R.J.
Lewendon of the Royal Arlillery Institution for
perrnilting access 10 their records. Sorne of the
material on colour Plalc G is taken from the published
researches oflhe Company ofMililary HisLOrians,
USA. We are graleful LO M. Daniel Ambrogi and J ohn
Sandars for lheir assislance with Plates C, D and G.
Mike Chappell's cover painting depicts an M 1 o of
lhe HQ Company, 8991h Tank Destroyer Bn. , flying
lhe pennant ofthe 8th T.D. Group, against the
background of lhe LudendorS" railway bridge al
Remagen, March 1945. The insignia on lhe back
cover are lhe shoulder pateh ofthe US Tank
Destroyer Farees, and lhe Royal ArtilJery eap badgc
narmally worn by British lank destroyer erews,
1943- 45
Prescience
In '9'4 William Albert Murley joined the Royal
Regirnent of Artillcry. He was cornmissioned the
following year, and before the Orcat War had
ended he had becn awarded the Military Cross.
Between the wars promotion for Regular officcrs
was slow, bUl by 1939 he had reached the rank of
major, having held a variety of appointments,
including that of Pcrmanent Staff Instructor to a
Territorial regiment o He served throughout World
War JI and retired as a in 1946.
Ostensibly, his thirty-two years of service had
followed the pattern of hundreds of his COI1-
tcmporaries; but there was a difference.
In 1923, while still a licutenant, he gave a grcat
dcal of thought t the problems oC anti-tank
defence, and he sel clown his conclusions in an
artide which was printed the same year in the RoyaL
Artillery JoumaL. He began by criticizing lhe British
Army's currenl anti-tank gun, the 3.7in howitzer.
He pointed out that it lacked lhe essential charac-
teristic of an anti-tank weapon, all round
traverse- the 3.7's lraversc was limited lO 40
degrees on the top carriage. The weapon had
2pdr. portee and crew at range practice. In action as many oC
the crew as possible worked OD the ground, as a direct hit
would orten dismount tbe gua, which would be tbrown
backwards, killing or injuring tbe men on tbe vehicle.
(hnperial War Mu seum)
insufficient muzzle velocity; it lacked mobility over
rough going; and it required lhe dumping oflarge
quantities ofammunition beside the gun.
,j'J"ext, he -took issue with anti-tank tactics
prescribed in the ManuaL oJ ArtiUery Training, which
suggested that 'When engaging tanks with guns
giving only a Iimited degree of traverse, a section
[i.e. two guns] should be employed against each
tank.' Murley commented that 'any method which
necessitates the changing of a target from one gun
to anolher is bound to be unsatisfactory, as there
will nearly always be delay in getting lhe second
gun to open fire at the proper momem, and unless
both guns shoot exactly alike, which would be very
doubtful, erra tic shooting will result'.
The solution to these problems, he fell, lay in the
adoption of the 6pdr. gun in place of the 3.7in
howitzer, and he went on to describe how it could
be done.
' (a) It should be possible to fix a central pivot
mountingtoa tank chassis, thusadmittingall -round
traverse. The recoil of the 6pdr. is shon and lhe
base plate to which the pedestal is bolted would
Tbe Deacon,l t oftbe portee . h walil outranged even before it
entered service. (RAe Tank Museum)
lherefore have to be fairly thick in order to
withstand the shock ofthe firiog ofthe gun. As the
gun will be mOUnled on a central pivot it will be
possible lO traverse it rapidly in any required
direclion. The largel could therefore be engaged in
a fraction oflhe time taken with the 3.7io howitzer,
and when once on the target the layer could follow
it anywhere by simpl y swinging lhe gun round.
Also, the layer will have ooly the elevaling wheel
and firing handle 10 worry aboUl, which will result
in more rapid and aceurate shooling. Jt may be
necessary to fit a traversing handwheel, bUl if so, a
quiek release clamp should also be provided.
'(b) Thc ract or,hc 6pdr. being a gun and nOl a
howitzer will enable greater muzzle vcloeity lO be
obtained. The extra muzzle veloei ty of lhe 6pdr.
would compensate for the differenee in weighl of
shell. The typc of shell suggested for use Wilh the
6pdr. is an armour-piereing with a delay action
fuse. A 6pdr. is quile heavy enough lO stop a tank.
'(e) The faet ohhe gun being mountcd 00 a lank
ehassis would inerease its mobility.lt is nol suggested
lltal the anli-tank gun s/wuld go oul lo meellhe lank, bulllte
facl of the gun being ah/e lo move quick{y would pennit a
cerlain amount oJ manoeuvre, and the gun could therifore
take up flfry previous{y selected position al a momalt's nolice.
Under presmt conditions il would seeTn lhal a gun musllake
up o posilion ond hope lhat a lonk will appear, and iJ one
should oppear il mtry nol be possih/efor tite gun lo engoge il.
[Author's italics]
'(d) ''''ith the gun mOUnled on a tank chassis
lhere should be no difficulty in arranging for lhe
carrying of al Icast one hundred rounds of ammu-
nition, so lhe diffieulty of dumping ammunition
wiII disappear. The ammunition eould be plaecd in
4
a kind ofbox on wheels runniog on a circular track,
thus ensuring lhat it wi ll always be close to the
breech.
'The next poiot lO eonsider is the proteetion of
lhe dctaehment against rifle bullets and splinters.lt
should be a simple matter 10 provide a circular
shield about tin or tin thick. The shield would be
bolted to the carriage, so lhat when the gun is
moved the shield moves with it. The fact of the
shicld movingwith thegun will permitofall-round
traverse and will also afford protection of the
detachment against fire from 0191 direetion.
' The engine could be driven from inside the
shield, so that the driver would nol be exposed
to fire. Two Lewis guns could also be carried for
use lhrough movable [sliding] slots in case of
emergency.'
Murley conduded his anide by submitting with
due deference that his suggestions were worth a
trial; but in the political and national climate ofthc
timc, very similar lO today's, there was nol the
slighlest chance of their being accepted, although
some years laler lhe shon-lived Birch Cun (an
18pc1r. field piece on a Vickers Mec1ium tank
chassis) was produced.
The significance of Murley's article is that not
only did it predict lhe layoul of the typical World
War II turreted tank destroyer, but also forecast
the sort of tactics which would be employed. It
would be too easy to suggesllhal Murley conceived
the idea of the tank destroyer; very possibly other
officers around the world were thinking along
similar lines, although it would be many years
before lheir thoughts turned to substance. In such
circumstances one callnOl help wondering whal
might have beeo the thoughts of lhe now middlc-
aged lieutenant-colonel in 1945, as the Allied
armies swarmed across Europe using hundreds of
lhe type ofvehicle he ha'd suggested building more
than twenty years earl ier.
In fact lhe British Arrny had entered World War
11 without any sel f-propell ed artillery al all,
whelher field or anti-tank, a nd lhe lack of it was
cruelly feIt for several years. 1t was true lhal the
guns had a new mobiJily due to the replacernent of
lhe old horse tcams with malar traction units, bUl
lhis had only bcen achieved afler a struggle, which
in sorne measure also eontributed 10 lhe failure to
develop self- propelled artillery.
Opposition to mechanizauon within lhe Royal
Artillery was not simply a matterofbloody-minded
anti- radicalism, an ultra-conservative rejection of
the concept of total mobi lity as defined by the
fashionable ' Armoured Idea'. Nor was it lhe
product of sentimental a6'eclion for lhe 'hairies'
which had always dragged the guns iOlO action and
which had always been the gunners' constant
companions. Artillerymen are, after all, practical
people, and it seemed to many lhat as long as sorne
of the leam were on their feel it would always be
possible lO attempl recovery of a gun from a
difficull siluation. Internal combustion engines, on
the other hand, were subjecl to breakdown, and
lhis could lead lo the loss of a towed gun unless
other vehic1es were on hand te lend assistance; in
the case of a self-propelled gun engine failure
during a withdrawal would almost certainly lead te
its loss, an idea abhorrent lO a RegimeOl which had
always fought to the muzzleand beyond as a matter
ofcourse. In lhe end it waslhedistances involved in
mechanized operations that led to lhe demise ofthe
horse leams- although, curiously, lhe majority of
German field batteries oUlside arrnoured for-
mations remained horse-drawn throughout lhe war.
7snun Gun Motor Carriage M3I with front and liide-door
IcreeQS n ~ (RAe Tan,k MuseUlll)
On its own, the horse team versus internal
combustion engine debate could nOl have dclayed
the introduction of self-propelled arti llel)' inlo the
British Army for long. The Birch Cun battery
serving Wilh lhe Experimental Armoured Force
were enthusiastic abOUl its rle, for which they saw
a greal future. It was unfortunate that senior
officers of the Royal Artillery and lhe lhen Royal
Tank Corps got on extremcly badly. The brilliant
and irascible Coloncl P. C. S. Hobart, RTe, later
to command the famous 79th Arrnoured Division,
for sorne reason could nOl telerate Cunner officers
and made no bones aboul it ; he added fuellO the
ftames by speaking ofsclf-propelled guns as ' Royal
Tank Artillery'. To Woolwich this sounded rather
like an auempled take-over, and lhe very cool
response was that iflhe Royal Tank Corps wanted
self-propelled guns to support ilS operations it
should modify sorne ofi151anks accordingly. This is
simply lhe tip of lhe iceberg, and the whole story is
an excelleOl example ofBritish military tribalism al
ilS worsl, lhe net result being lhe waste ofthe best
pan of a decade during which research and
developmeOl could profitably have been pursued.
Norshould it be forgouen lhat for mOSl ofthe in ter-
war period the Army as a whole was forced to work
within stri ngent finaneia l limils, and no funds
could bespared for projecls upon which lhere was a
lack of common agreemenl on policy and which did
oot seemingly bear the slamp ofimmediacy.
In 1973 lhe editor of the Royal Artillery Journal,
looking for items ofinterest from fifty years earlier,
carne aeross William Murl cy's articlc, and had it
rcprinted with the comment that the young author
had shown considerable prescience. By then the big
gun tank destroyer had become a battlefie1d
memory for as long after the evenl as it had bcen
Murley's vision before il; bUl in the few years of iLS
active Ji fe it had had a most interesting and unusual
careCL
The Concept
The dramatic success of lhe German bLit<.krieg
leehniquc in PoJand, Franee, the Balkans and the
'oVestcrn Desert illuslralcd beyond any reasonable
doubl lhat a defensive cordon of towed anti-lank
guns was nol lhe answer to a massed tan k attaek,
particularly ir the tanks were closely supported by
aircraft and infantry. Once lhe cordon had beeo
ruplUfed the tanks moved 100 quickly for funher
defensive fronts 10 be constructed across their path,
and lhe eontainrnent of such breakthroughs seerncd
10 presem insuperable difficultics for armies equip-
ped with conventionaJ artillery.
In the still neutraJ United Sta tes lhe problem was
studicd carefully at lhe highesl levels. ''''ithin tbe
Unitcd Slales Army, as wilhin cvcry army of thc
period, lhere bad been a debate as to whether the
best defence against the tan k was the anti -tank gun
or another tank. Events abroad seerned to indicate
that lhe anli-tank gun had faiJed in its primary
mission; but the tank represemed an expensive
Soluli on, and in any evelllthe Chief ofthe Arrnored
Force did nOl wish bis vehicles to be employed in a
dcfensive role, as the nature and lraining ofhis arm
was spceifieally designed for o[ensive operations.
On the other hand, the anti -tank gun was
potentially a more powerful weapon than that
carricd by the majority ofconlemporary tanks, and
ifit could be given a self-propelled mobility it could
be deployed and re-depJoyed rapidly 10 deal with
any developing crisis, which lhe towed gun could
nol.
6
MJ witb annoured sCreflIslowered. (US Anny)
On 14 May 1941 General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff United States Army, issued a
directive for the establishment of an organization,
armed wi th an offensive weapon, whose function
would be defenee against armoured rorces. 1 n his
directive Marshall emphasized that lhis 'was a
problem beyond the eapabi liti es of any one arm
and probably required lhe organization and use of
a special force of combined arms, eapable ofrapid
movement, interception and active ralher than
passive defence tactics"
The following day Lt.-Col. Aodrew D. Bruce
was detailed to set up a planning branch for the
new organization, designed to look into lhe
questions of equipmelll, training and adminis-
l r a l i ~ l By the end of November lhe planning
phase had been compJcled, and Bruce was appoin-
tedto command lhe new Tank Destroyer Tactical
and Firing Center al its temporary headquarters al
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. In accordance
with lhe new concepl of aggressive defence, existing
anti-tank batlalions were re-designated Tank
Destroyer battalions the following month.
The task facing Bruce was enormous. He had 10
build a central adminislraLvc organization for lhe
rapidly cxpanding Tank Destroyer Force, and al
the same time formulale doctrine, organize train-
ing, superintend weapons devclopmenl, and pre-
pare tablcs of organizalion. With very limitcd
rcsources he was founding what amoullled 10 a new
arm ofservice, starting from scratch.
The basic thinking behind lhe new arm was
simple. Mobile lank destroyers in large numbers
I Tlle Tonk Des/oya History. Study No. 29, Historical Section,
Army Ground Forces.
would be deployed rapidly in the path and on the
flanks of any enemy mass tank attack, where they
would destroy their opponcnls by direct gunfire. In
Brucc's own words, ' Panther-like, we seek infor-
mation of enemy tanks and of suitable firing
positions; pamher-like, we strike and destroy by
gunfire from favourable positions. This does not
mean that we seek out tanks with guns, nor chase
lhem, nor pursue lhem, nor charge them." In lhe
ycars that followed, this was emphasized time and
again in training circulars: 'The primary mission of
Ilbid.
tank destroyer uni ts is thedestruction ofhostile tanks
by [lhe direct] fire ofa superior mass ofguns.'2 The
choice of a panther head for a badge and a motto of
Seek, Strike and Destro) were constant remindcrs of
the ncw methods.
Belligerent monoes are not usually taken too
seriously by the mcn who actually do the fighting.
'Training Circulan 88 and 125, June and November 1943.
TIte nonna! recoil ofthe MI8g7-4 7,;mm gun was 4:Pn. This
pbotograpb illustrates the sbarply tapered construction ofthe
baTrel and the method ofita carriage iD. the recoilaUdes. (RAe
Ta.n1r.Muaeum)
FoUowiDg the arrival oC the fir.Jt Muw in North Africa, a
DUlDber oC M3S were handed over to the French Anny, which
iJnposed its OWD lDotded sand colour scheJne. (ECP Annes)
In this case occasional over-usage by instructors
sometimes led to irreverem yells of 'Shag Ass!' a
coarse expression which might be translated as 'It
sounds nOl slopping to find out!'
In spite of this the TD soldier was proud of his
trade, and reckoned he was a better aH-round
soldier than anyone else in the Army.
The basic unit was the battaJion, of which
initially there were three types, as foHows:
Heavy, Se/j-Propelied: Headquarters Company and
three gun companies with a total oftwenty-four 3in
or 75mm anti-tank guns, twelve M6 37mm anti-
tank guns and eighteen 37mm anti-aircraft guns,
aH self-propelled. A Reconnaissance Company
equipped with M3 halftracks (Iater M8 armoured
cars) was added t this establishment, performing
the invaluable service of roule finding and selection
of fire positions for the battalion. The 37mm ami-
aircraft guns were later replaced by dual mount .50
cal. machinc guns in M3 halftracks, and the M6
light tan k destroyers replaced by the heavier
weapons.
Light, Se/j-Propelled: Similar establishmem to Heavy
Baualion, but equipped with thirty-six M6 37mm
anti-tank guns and eighteen dual moum .50 cal.
anti-aircraft machine guns, aH self-propelled. The
light tank destroyer was soon seen lO faH be!ow
battlefield requirements, and units so equippcd
were converted to the Heavy rle.
Light, Towed: Similar establishment to Light SP
TDF did not dispense with towed anti-tank guns
altogether, and at one phase there was even an
increase in the proportion of towed guns. The
37mm was replaced by the 3in anti-tank gun MI.
The heavy anti-aircraft e!ement within eaeh
battalion was a clear indieation that the dive-
bombing attacks which had disrupted the British
and French static anti-tank gun cordons would
have less success against the new American
formations. In the event, the twin (and later,
quadruplc) .50 mounting was used extensively
against ground targets as well, with su eh murd-
erously suecessful results that il earned ilself lhe
title of'the meat grinder'.
As already mentioned, tank destroyers were
designed to operale enmasse and the next step up the
formation ladder from battalion was the Tank
Destroyer Croup, consisting ofa group Headquar.
ters and HQ Company, plus three TD battalions.
The largest formation of all was the Tank Destroyer
Brigade, which included a Headquarters and two
TD Croups. As originally conceived one TD
Brigade would SUppOfl each eorps, and two each
army; in raet only two such brigades were raised
and ofthese only one, the 1St, saw active serviee.
The Tank Destroyer Tactical and Firing Center
began moving from FortMeade to a new per-
manent station named Camp Hood at Kill een,
Texas, in the middle of January 1942. Once
eSlablishl, the Tank Destroyer Center was able ro
concentra te on the training of individuals and
units. The men carne from the cavalry, the artillery
battalion, and equipped with thirty-six towed
37mm anti-tank guns and eighteen dual mount .50
cal. anti-aircraft machine guns, sclr.propelled. The ...
8
and the infantry; the first task was lO establish a
common standard oftraining, including the use of
small arms and explosives, after which they learned
their basic TD crew trade. Training of entire
battalions took aboul three months, including five
weeks' gunnery and range practice, six weeks'
taetics, and one week's battle eonditioning.
1
In
addition 10 training new battalions, lhe TD Center
established its own Offieer Candidale Sehool and a
Replaeement Training Center, designed to keep
batlalions in lhe field at full strength. A total of
5,187 offieers and 17,062 enlisted men qualified on
courses conducted by the TD Sehool, while 42,000
enlisted men passed through the Replacement
Training Center and 5,299 2nd lieutenants grad-
uated from the Officer Candidate School. Thc unit
l"Dle Tank Destroyer Center eslabtished somelhing or a fint in il5
batde oonditioning melhods, in thal advancing trlXlps were fired on
frorn Ihe from with tive arnmunition, instead of from Ihe nanb; Ihis
wasfrightening, reatisticalld effective.
1'!bos in Tunisia. The complete absence oC stowage suggests
tKat tbe vehicles are in transit to join their battalions; the
undam.aged condition oCtbe sandshields seens to support this
view. Note tank crasb-helmets, later generaUy replaced Cor
crews oC apeo vehicles by steel helmets. (hop. War Mus.)
training record was equally impressive, including
two Brigade and twenty-four Group Headquarters,
and 100 battalions. In lhe equipment field the
Tank Destroyer Board had devcloped lhe MI8
Tank Destroyer and evaluated the bazooka on
behalf of the Arrny'
Because of his vastly increased responsibilities,
Lieutenant-ColoneJ Bruce was promoted to
Brigadier-General in February 1942 and to Major-
General in September ofthat year. He handed over
command orthe Tank Destroyer Center to Major-
General Orlando C. vVard on 25 May 1943. His
achievement should not beseen assimply a brilliant
piece of administration; prior to the establishment
ofthe'TDF the US Army had serious doubts that it
!TheTank DutroyerHistory.
could meet lhe Panzer Divisions on equal terms-
those doubls no longer exisled.
General Ward had commanded 1St Armored
Di vision in North Afri ca and had seen the new tank
destroyer ba ttalion; in action. He was able to
comment on what was good battle practice a nd
what was not, and instituted a seri es of'battle plays'
to emphasize lhe lessons, as well as having signs
placed around the ranges illustrating good and bad
combal firing posilions. Under Ward the Tank
Destroyer Cemer reached its maximum expansion,
and at one time lhere were more guns at Camp
Hood than the total of all the divisional artillery
pieces possessed by the Ameri can Expeditionary
Force in \<Vorld War l.
Thereafter, the importance of the arm declined
and the T D Center contracted rapidly towards its
event ual inactivation. There were several reasons
for this. First, by the autumn of 1943 the US Army
had achieved the strength required to altain its
stra tegic objectives. Secondly, lhe German mass
A scene in the luio beachhead on 3 May 1944. The MIO is
standing by in the counter-attack rle. and its suspension has
been protected apiost ground strafing by enenly airuaft;
otherwise. its crew Seet1l to be very poor housekeepers. even
allowing for the conditions o static war! (Imp. War Mus. )
10
tank attack was no longer the threat it had becn in
1940 te 194 1. Thirdl y, tanks were inevitably
fighting tanks on lhe battlefield, regardless of
doctrine. Finally, such progress had been made in
tank design that tanks were now capable of
carrying guns of greater rangc and killing-power
than those carri ed by the tank destroyers j in fact,
there was sorne da nger ofthe hunters becoming the
hunted.
The Weapons:
General Bruce had becn quite clear from the outsel
a bout thesort ofweapon he was looking fOL ""'hal
we are after is a fast-moving vehicle, armed with a
wcapon wi lh a powerful punch which can be easily
and qui ckly fircd, and in lhe lasl analysis we would
like to get armoured protection againsl small arms
fire so that this weapon cannOl be pUL out of action
by a machine gun.'1 He wanted 'a cruiser, not a
battleshi p', and he favoured the employment ofthe
Christie suspension, which provided the best basis
for high speed cross-country movement.
' /bid,
75JlU1l Gun Motor Carriage M3
Pending the appearance of such a vehicle, Bruce
had l O makc do with whatever was ~ a i l a b l e Thcrc
\\Iere several hundred old 75mm guns on hand, and
Bruce learned from a French ordnance designer
that this lypC of weapon had becn mountcd
successfull y 00 a 5-lon truck. It was decided that
the American stock should be filt ed lO the M3
halftrack armourcd pcrsonneJ carrier, and Major
Robert J. kks was assigned lO carry out lhe
Ordnance Department 's request for the gun and
pan of ilS field carriage la be mounted in lhe
vchicle and test fired . Having complctcd lhis task al
the Aberdeen Provi ng Ground, lcks dclivercd the
vehic1e lo Fort Meade, where it underwent [urther
tests and modifications befare being sent t the
Autocar Company of Ardmore, Pennsylvania, ror
lhe production runo
A total or 2,202 vehicles were converted, or
which all but842 were re-converted la ter to APCs.
Arter lhe MI8 entered service the M3 became a
limited standard (i.c. seeond line) vehicle, bUl it
served on in the British Army in the heavy lroops or
armoured car and divisional recee regiments. In
general, the vehicles were popular with their erews
and did their work well:
'They wcighed ten lons and were equipped Wilh
a 75mm M1897-A4 gun. The normal rate or fire
was six rounds per minute, bUl 26-28 rounds per
minute was possible with a well-trained crew. T he
tube and breech or this gun weighed 1,035 pounds
and the barrcl had a unirorm right-ha nd twist with
'24 lands and grooves. Total traverse or the piece
was 39 degrees, 20 right and 19 lert. Consequentl y
when we pulled into position, lhe whecls or lhe
haIrtrack were eramped hard lO the right. To gain
more traverse lo lhe len, the vehicl e was baeked
up- more to lhe right, you pulled ahead. Elevation
was rrom minus 10 degrecs lO plus 29. vVhen fir ing,
lhe vehicle was always len in neutral gear with lhe
engine running. Normal recoil or lhe piece was
43in, and on more than one oecasion the loader was
knocked Hat. On our vehicles we used an M33 fixed
sight- a simple but elfect ive sighl Wi lh lead and
range markings.'l
3tn.Dl Gun Motor Carriage M6
There were numerous designs contcndi ng ror
' Theodore H. Aschman J r, 8'4th Tank Destroyer Batlalion.
'Ihe gunner's quadrant, which, D1.ounted on the breech blO(:k
and used in conjunction with the traverse indication, pe ....
IDitted tank destroyers to engage iD indirect firing.
standardization as the TDF's light lank
destroyer- so many, in raet, that there was a saying
that lhe Army had mounted a gun 'on anylhing
and everylhing rrom a roller skale up'. A total or
nineleen vehicl es in the light class were devcloped,
nine mounting the 37mm gun, seven a 40mm gun,
and lhree a 57mm gun. or these the 37mm
mounted on a t-ton truck was standardized as the
GMC M6, and 3, 117 were produced. I n layout lhe
M6 followed thal or lhe British 2pdr. portees already
fi ghling in the Western Desert, and indeed the two
guns had a very similar performance. The light
dass or tank destroyer was intendcd as an ex-
p'i?dient, vo!ume production measure pending the
appearance ofl arger vehicl es, bUl sorne did serve in
North Africa.
3D Gun Motor Carriage MIO
Meanwhil e lhe General MOlors Corporation and
the Ford MOlOr Company were producing a tank
destroyer based on lhe M4A2 mcdiurn tan k chassis.
In aceordance wi th lhe Tank Destroyer Board's
specifica tion it had an angled hull and an open-
topped turret, capable of all-round traverse,
mounting a 3in high-veloeity gun.
When General Bruce examined the vehicle at lhe
Aberdeen Proving Ground on 2 May 1942 he was
agai nsL its being acceplcd as a standard weapon
system. Al thirty tons he relt it was lOO heavy; wirh a
lOp speed of 30mph he felt it was too slow.
Nonetheless it was accepted as standard, and
became lhe best-known of all lhe US Army's tan k
deslroyers. lt was constructed in two versions, the
Elem.ent. oCthe lnerican advance guard iD ROlDe, -iJUDe 1944.
Detall. oC the do.e-defence .so cal. IDOUDting and stowage oC
' ready' anununitiOD are dearl), visible on the MIo iD the
Coreground. Behind i. an Mt lDediwn ta.nk and ODe oC the
UDpopular M8 annoured can. (hnp. War Mus. )
MIO and lhe M lOA 1, of which lhe former was
more popular with its crews:
'The M 10 mOlor carriage, powered by two diese!
engines, proved 10 be a very good se!f-propelled
mount. The main advantages were: ( 1) the
f1exibililY oflhe lWO mOlors, which made it possible
10 move afler one had becn knocked out or failed in
operation; (2) lhe power of lhe diese! motors al low
12
spccd; (3) lhe increascd rangc per gallon of fuel;
(4) lhe case of motor maintenancc of lhe diescl
engine.
' The MI oA I motor carriage, powered by a
500hp Ford tank gasoline cnginc, also proved to be
a vcry slurdy and well-dcsigned gun mounl. The
units thal were equipped Wilh bolh lhe MIO and
M lOA I fell lhat lhe latter had a lilde less power
lhan lhe MI O, lhal its one engine made il less
fl exible, and that lhe gasoline engine was a iule
harder to maintain and would not stand lhe rough
going as well as the diese! engines.'1
Over6,700 MIos were built, and as well as being
the TDF's primary wcapon, the vchicle saw active
servicc with the British, French and Russian
armies.
90JlUIl Gun Motor Carriage M36
The appearance in early Ig43 of larger, beuer-
armoured German tanks meant that lhe TOF
needed a gun capable of greater penetralion than
the 3in carried by the MIO, and the weapon choscn
was a gomm high-vclocity AA gun. The basic M 1 o
turrel could not housc this, so a ne\\' turret was
designcd and fitted t thc MIO chassis, the new
vehicle being accepted as standard and dcsignatcd
M3
6
nJune '944
The gomm gun was the mOSl powerful carried by
unmodifi ed US lank deslroyers. It could penetrate
six inches of armour at 1,000 yards; al the same
range it could penetrate five feel of reinforced
concrete, usingonly two rounds as opposed 10 ten of
3in. Other improvements upon lhe MIo were
thicker armour and lhe addition of a power
traversc, although lhe rate of fire was slower
because of the larger ammunition.
The M36 GMe proved lO be an acceptable
answer lO lhe Tigcr and total of 1,722 were built,
including 500 converted MIOAl s.
Near [sola del Piano, an MIO o 93rd Anti_Ta.nk RegUnf'!D.t RA
overtakes 5th Battalion, Sherwood Fornten. When D1.oving
mto the line, taDk destroyen ofteo carried a..nunu.nitiOD and
IS/ud] of Organisa/ion, Equipmtn/ and T ac/icol Employmtnt Tonk coDsolidatiOD stores for the infantry. Tbe vehide crew's pads
Dulrf.I]tT Unils; General Board, US Force:s, European Theatre, Study are attacbed to an additional stowage rail whicb has been
No. 60. = .......... _w.,.lded across the glacis plate. (hopo War Mus. )
' 3
'6nu:n Gun Motor Carriage MI8
Unlike the M3, M I O and M36, lhe MI 8 was not a
modification of existing equipment but had been
dcsigncd ' from the ground up' as a purpose-built
tank destroyer and carne closest LO the original
concept ofGeneral Bruce and the Tank Destroyer
Board (who, it will be recalled, had always sought
high speed, hilling power and limiled protcction
against small arms).
While the early preference for a Christie-type
suspension had given way LO a trsion bar system,
the MI8 barcl y topped 19 lOns al combat weighl
and was driven by a 400hp engine, a power to
weight ratio that made it the fastes t tracked AFV of
World War Il and earned it the name of'Hellcal' .
As originally planned, the M 18 would have
mounted a 7.5mm gun, bUl in September 1942 Lh e
Ordnance Dcpartmelll called Bruce's auenton t a
new 76mm gun which had been dcveloped for lhe
laLer modcls of theM4 medium lank series. ' This
gun embodied the same physical characterislics as
lhe 75mm, had lhe same breechblock, recoil and
similar design of tu be. Through a longer tube and
lhe use of a larger cartridge case, a much higher
muzzle velociLY and a grealer slriking power were
attained lhan wilh lhe 7.5mm gun, and lhal wi lhout
an appreciable increase in weight. The 76mm gun
was in rcality a 76.2mm calibre wcapon, equivalenL
to lhe 3in bUl much lighter in weight. It had lhe
additional advantage over Lhe 7.5mm of using the
same proj ective [sic] as lhe 3in.'!
The M 18 began entering service in the autumn
of 1943, and was an immcdiaLe success. lt 'proved
LO be an ideal tight destroyer and was highly praised
by Lhe using lroops. Tnt lhe design oft his destroyer
were built maintenance aids which proved ofgreal
value in combat. Two such aids were (1) the
extension lrack for replacing engines, and (2) Lhe
removable frontal plate which made it possible 10
change lhe lransmission in less than one hour. In a
vcry largc per cenl of its employment in this
lhealre, its road speed of60mph and iLS grcat cross-
country spced were never needed. However, its
flota Li on did prove lO be a greaL advantage during
Lhe winter operations.'l!
The Buick Division ofGeneral MOLOrs manufacl-
lured a total Of2.507 MI8s betweenJuly 1943 and
October 1944. A turret less version, known as lhe
Armored Ut ility M39, was employcd as an APC,
' 4
an ammunition carrier wilh a payload of 263
rounds, and as a prime mover for the lowed gin
anti-tank guns MI and M6.
M8 Light Armored Car and M20 Armored
Utility Vehicle
'These vehicles were not popular wilh lhe tank
destroyer units. The common complaints were:
lack of power in lhe higher range of speeds; lack of
flot alion ; lack of sufficient armour and armament;
the open turreL of lhe M8 alld lhe open-top
conslruction ofthe M20; thc position oflhe driver
and commander directl y over lhe fronl wheels
caused casualties whenever a mine was hit; lhe lack
ofsufficientoperaling room for lhe crew in lhe M20 ;
and lhe vulnerability ofthe radiator LO small arms
fire. Maintenance was nOl difficult) but it was a
major operation LO gCl lO lhe motor for even lhe first
echelon check.'3 The M20 was a command version
oflhe M8, and was intended LO carry a crew ofsix,
plus two radios. IL was also used as an APC and asa
cargo carrier.
US Tank Destroyers
in Combat
The Philippines, 1941- 42
In December 1941 fifty 75mm M3 halftracks werc
haslil y despa.tched to Luzon to bolster lhe island's
defences. Details of their use is fragmentary, and
one source indi cates that ' they were used cffectively
as sel f-propelled arLillery'. Thc majority were sent
10 lhe soulh oflhe island, bUl several were allached
lO lhe Provisional Tank Group whi ch was contest-
ing lhe principal J apanese axis of advancc) from
Lingayen GulfsoUlh 10 Manila. TheJapancse were
using lanks on lhis axis, and quile heavy armoured
engagements took place al Moncada and Bali uag.
On lhe basis ofLhc evidence available il seems vet)'
probabl e that lhe TDF's firsl viclims were Type 89
and Type 97 medium tanks and Type 94 lankettes
oflheJapanese 7th T ank Regiment. The M3s were
1051 in Lhe subsequent fi ghting and general sur-
rendcr.
Tan!" DtSt,a.JU Hislbry. In spite orthis Ihe two rounds werc 1101 inter-
changeable.
'Sludy No. 60.
3lhid.
North Afriea, 1942- 43
The next vehicl es 10 find themsclvcs in the M3's
gunsights were obsolete French tanks, and
belonged to armoured units whi ch brieft y opposed
lhe Alli ed landings in North Afri ca. A typical
exampl e was the action fought by 3rd Pl atoon,
Company ' B', 70lS1 Ta nk Destroyer Baltalion a t Sl
Lucien, south ofOran, on 9 Novembcr 1942. The
3rd Pla toon was supporting a light ta nk compa ny,
Even weary infantry corniog out oC the line could oot Cail to
commeot 00 a sight such al! this. The vehicle conunander'l!
explanation must uve provided lIOtne interestiog listeoing!
Just visible on tbe Cront top decking oCthe turret is a Brirish air
recognition rowtdel. (hnp. Wa r Mus.)
and bcgan the engagement by knocking out 1WO
lanks al a range in exccss of 2,000 yards, a range
weH beyond lhe capability of any tank on either
side. T he remaining lweJve French vehi cles werc
also di sposed of withoU1loss.
' 5
In British service tbe MIO wa$ known a. tbe Wolverine. This V
Corps vehicle . Sftn beiog guided aeross the River Sa vio on 24
October 194{, usiog a causeway of Churdll AR.I;. A 'dead'
Pantber lies beyond. Tbe crew are clearly experienced at
looking alter thenllelve!J, a$ can be 1Jet9l by tbe neat, flecure
IJtowage, tbe 'acquired' oversize fwmel (an invaluable aid
during repleni.flhment ), bivouac stake!J and bucket. (Imp. War
MU!J. )
It was a small but optimistic beginning; but
thereafter tank destroyer battalions in North Africa
found themselves shamefully misused by senior
commanders who did not properly understand
their function. To quole Theodore Aschman, a
former officer of814th Tank Destroyer Battalion:
'The TDs were a sort of maverick. Regimental
and divisional commanders looked upon us as a SOrl
or makeshift organization and an cxpendablc onc
al that. Often we were used as an attacking point
and preceded lhe tanks- sort or a sacrificiallamb.
We were (at leaSl our battalion) never permanelltly
assigned t any division .... We were always on
the move, lravelling from 200 LO 300 miles during
lhe nige.t to be on hand for an engagemenl during
the pre-dawn orthe nex1day, afterwhich we would
pack up and move anotheronc hundred orso miles.
1 madc a dozen or so such trips across the lOp of
Arrica. On occasions, we would acl like ani llcry
and sel up emplacemcnts and lay in wait rOl" ground
troops. On olher occasions we aCled as inrantry. To
me itseemed lhal wedid everylhing that nooneelse
wanted to do. However, our esprit de corps was high,
and 1 am surc thatleft to lheir own devices, the TDs
would have done better thejob for which lhey wcre
organized. Patton, in his misguided wisdom, used
them indfeclivcly, lO the poinllhat he placed lhem
in tactical engagcments ror which they were n01
intended, in that he used them as tanks. My outnt
was all bUI wiped out beca use of lhis, as was lhe
60Ist. '
In mid-February 1942 the Gcrmans launched a
massive armoured auackon lhe US 11 Corps. After
penetration had been achieved, lhe plan call cel for
lhe panzer divisions 10 seize Kasserine Pass and
then swing nonh-west, so isolating all 1st Allicd
Army's troops in soulhern Tunisia. It was a
tcxlbook situation which called for lhe cleploymenl
en masse of tank destroyer battalions. Unfor-
lunalely, the Arnericans responded wh an ar-
moured counter-attack of their own, which lhe
Gcrmans were expecting and wiLh which lhey dcalt
severely. Such tank destroyers as were involved
were employed in 'penny packets'.
By the evening of 14 February the US 1st
Armored Di vision's CombaL Command 'A' had
been CUL o([on Lwo hills east ofSidi Bau Zid. The
following day a relief opcralion was mounted by
the tanks of CCB, accompanied by Company 'B',
70lSl Tank Destroyer Baualion. The advance was
made in open order, and lhe action is described
from the TD's viewpoint:
'Our attack was launched aboul 1400hrs on lhe
15th from an assembly point some len miles west of
Sidi Bou Zid. The lanks of 2nd Baltalion, 1st
Arrnored Regirnenl were preceded by a lightscreen
of rcconnaissance. Our 3rd Plaloon was 10 protecL
lhe ...... right ftank, the 2nd Platoon to support the
centre and be ready LO protect the left Hank, and the
1St Plaloon was LO guard lhe rear and be ready to
move lO either Hank. The artillery and infantry
moved along with the rear elements.
'The enemy had had many hours' warning ofour
approach and had placed many 88s in position in
and aboul Sidi Rou Zid. As our tanks drew c1ose,
two or tluee 88s would comrnence firing. Then as
our tanks would concentrate on lhese and Illove in
c1oser, having apparently si lenced them, olher 88s
would open up. Tanks in lhe open were al a greal
disadvantage. After lhe baltle had progrcssed for
sorne Lime, enemy tanks rnoving from Faid men-
aced the right ft ank of our force. After lhe 3rcl
Platoon hacl moved oul lo meel this attack, other
enemy tanks, procecding from Lassouda, menaced
lhe left Aank. The reserve lank company was in lhe
best position LO meel lhis threal, bUl il sel out in a
17
mistaken direction. As our 2nd and grd Pl a100ns
(lhe lalter had been called back from ilS mission 10
lhe right flank) were attempting lO deal wilh lhe
last lhreat a third enemy taok columo c10sed in
from the soulh. Our forees were being fired on from
four direetions. All that were not too far advaneed
beat a hasty retreal, or rather rout, our eompany
abandoning olle 37mm gun and one jeep. Only
seven out of fifty-four medium tanks of lhe 2nd
Battalion escaped from this well-eonceived and
perfectly exeeuled trap.'1 lt took several days' hard
fighting befo re the German dueal was eventually
contained.
Meanwhile, M I os were beginning to arrive in
North Afriea, and several battalions handed over
1heir M3S to lhe under-equipped Freneh, now
firmly commiucd 10 the Allied cause. On 23 March
an MIO ballalion, the 8991h, ahead ofwhich laya
mOSl distinguished combat record, showed what
could be done. The day began badly when a
spoili ng attack by 10th Panzer Division overran the
M3S of60IS1 TD Battalion near El Guettar after a
night approach marcho The panzers were lhen
stall ed by a mineficld eovered by lhe 8991h'S ' B'
Company, which had moved hurri edly into posi-
tion. Under lhe command ofLieutenant Gerald G.
Coady, lhe M lOS engaged in a six-hour fire fight
across lhe minefield against the hull-down lanks,
destroying ten PzKpfw IVs, damaging three more
and knocking out two anti-tank guns, in exchange
for five damaged TDs.
Meanwhile, 'C' Company had moved iOlo
position along a ridge from which 'jt was possible 10
watch all the proceedings, just like one would
watch an opera from a balcony seal'. After an air
attack, the German infaOlry began to advance bUl
walked into the American artillery's defensive
barrage, nd two PzKpnv IVs wh ich ventured out
in support were picked offatonce by 'C' Company,
as were abrace of APCs. 10th Panzer Di vision
retired during the nighl, and it was withjustifiable
pride that lhe 8991h'S historian was able lo write,
'This was lhe firsl time an American unit had
slopped a German armoured attack'.2
On 7 April, while attached to Benson Force, lhe
899t h became the firsl American unil lo make
contact with lhe Idl flank ofthe advancing Brjtish
8th Arrny.
In spite of its ma,IY frustralions, the North
314 Battery, 105 AT Regt. RA, on parade with their Archers
shortly after the conclusion ofhostilities.
African campaign vindicaled lhe concept of the
mobile lank destroyer. On lhe other hand, many
senior American officcrs had becn impressed by lhe
British system ofinterlocked arlillery and stalic in-
depth anti -tank defence which had provided
Rommel with such a signal defeal al Medenine. As
a resul t of their reporlS the TDF was instructed in
December 1943 that its establ ishment henceforth
would be fifty per cent self-propelled and fifty per
cem LOwed ballalions, and sorne twemy self-
propclled units were converted to the .latter role.
3
ltaly "
The Italian landscape did nOl pcrmit lhe deploy-
men1 of large a rmoured formations, and TD
baualjons serving in this theatre were largely
confined to what was termed their Secondary
Mission, that is providing dirccl and indirecl fire in
lhe role of suppl ementary arti ll ery, supporting
infantry opcrations, acting in the counter-attack
role, and opportunity shooling. In this American
praclice varied little from British, and further
dctails can be found in the British section of lhe
book.
France and Gennany
No sooner had the initi al Norrnandy landings becn
complcled than it became obvious that the 10wed
anti-tank gun was entirely unsu itable for lhe bocage.
INorth AJriconCompaign Diory, 'B' Company, 70lS1 TD Bn. and 2nd PI,
Ren Company, 70151 TD Bn.
ITD- A Brie! Hi.swry oflhe 899th Tanlc Dtstroyer Baltafwn.
'Sludy No. 60.
Il was unabl e lO fire over the banks,
could cover only a limited are, was difficult to
emplace and was easily lost if the local infantry
were forted lO givc ground. In consequence, there
was an immediate clamour for TDs.
Simultaneously, lhe appearance ofwellarmed and
heavily armoured tallks and tank hunters on the
German side led lO a request that the M lOS should
be replaced by M36s.
By September 1944 a new policy had begun to
take shape. Only twelve of the fift y- lwo battalions
in lhe theatre would remain lowed; twenty
battalions would be equipped with the M36, and
the remainder wi lh the MI o or MI 8 as availabl e.
Later losses during the Ardennes campaign spelled
the doom of the towed gun, and by lhe end of
hostilities all towed units had either beeo converted
or were scheduled lO COllvert to the SP rle}
By now there was a general acceplance that TD
cornmanders, as the experts in direcl shooting,
should be permitted to execute assigned missions in
accordance with lheir training and without in-
terfcrencc from aboye. As well as carrying out their
Primary Mission of destroying enemy armour, TOs
also acted extensively as assault guns for infantry
fonnalons , destroying pillboxes, bunkcrs and olhcr
fonificalions, and as supplementary artill er y.
Unfortunatcly thcir very popularity tended to work
against the rle for which they had been designed,
for once a formati on had acquired the support of a
TD company it was mOSl reluctant to relinquish it.
This meant thal the TO battali on commander
could be left without a single plaLOon under his
Although the two vehicles were c:arried 00 si.n:ill.ar suspen.
s ioDs, the MJ6 (rigbt) can easily be distinguisbed frODl the MIO
(Ieft ) by ts larger gun and distinctive turret. (lm.p. War Mus .)
immediate command, with the rcsu!t lhat it was nOl
always possibl e to a mobile anti- tank
defence in an emergency.
00 lhe other hand, local aCl ions by TD
panies could prevent a most serious situalion
dcveloping. Al o2oohrs on 11 Jul y 1944 lhe
Panzer Lehr Division launched a lhrusl at lsigny,
delermined to cut lhe American beachhead in two.
The German attack was canalized by marshes on
ei lher ftank, and directl y in its path lay the
899lh"Tank Destroyer Battalion, the vicLOrs of El
Guettar, with Companies ' A' and 'C' supporting
res pectivel y lhe 39th and 47th Infantry RegimenLS.
In a desperate c1ose-quarter night action the
TDs halted the enemy's advance, ' A' Colllpany
destroyi ng six Panthers, one PzKpfw IV and an
assault gun, whil e'C'Company accounted for a fur-
lher six Panthcrs. Shortl y afterdawn the Germans'
cxploitation force was discovered a Illile down the
road and destroyed by bombing. Both companics
received almost identical Presiden ti al Citations
for lhis action, and that of ' A' Company is quoled
below.
' Company ' A', 899th Tank Destroyer Baltalion
'610 Tank Destroyer Battalion aetually went through the whole
range of TD equipmem. InJanuary ' 943 il was equipped with M3!,
and eonverttd 10 M lOS in July of that year. During the following
winter it was converttd lO the towtd role, and fought iu way across
Franee with towtd guns. In September 1944 the battalion was re-
assigntd as a self-propelltd uni! and equipptd wi th M36s. When he
war endcd it was in process of exehanging lhese for MISs.
19
is cited for outstanding performance of duty in
action on II July 1944, near St Jean de Daye,
France. Company 'A' was supporting 39th In-
fantry in a tdefense role near StJean de Daye. Al
0200hrs on the morning of I I J uly 1944 the enemy
launched a combined armored and infantry
attack in this sector. Two columns of heavy lanks
Wilh supporting infantry smashed lhrough and
penetratcd to the rcar ofthis position in an attempt
to capture StJean de Daye and to sever the Allied
beachhcad. Outgunned and outnumbcred, and
despile the fact that the enemy infantry threalened
to overrun their tank destroyers, the men of
Company ' A' fearlessly remained in position and
fired on enemy lanks wherever discernible in the
darkness, fully realizing that the Aash ofeach round
would draw not only artillery and tank fire bUl also
small arms fire as wel!. As daylight appeared,
Company 'A' , aware that their 3in guns could not
penetrate the heavy frontal armor of the Panther
lanks, boldly manoeuvred their tank deslroyers
under close enemy observation to Aanking positions
where effecl ive fire was placed on the enemy tanks.
Forced to fighl al extremely close quancrs and al
This pbotograpb illustrates bow tbe earth banks of tbe
NOrrDandy boclI.ge inhibited tbe fire ofta.nk destroyers.1D sum
cirCUIllStaDCeS towed anu-ta.nk guns were almost use1ess.
(hopo War Mus.)
20
point-blank ranges, the officers and men of Com-
pany 'A' gallantly and courageously repelled
numerous attempts of the enemy to seize these
positions. So cffective was their fire that the enemy
was forced t withdraw their remaining tanks from
the action, leaving the infantry in small isolated
pockets which were quickly overcome by our
forces. The individual courage, valor, and ten-
acity displayed by the personnel ofCompany 'A' in
the face of superior odds were in keeping with lhe
highcst traditions of the Armed Forces aod are
worthy ofhigh praise.
By command of Major-General Craig:
William C. Westmoreland,
Colone!, G.S.C., ChiefofStalf.'
The identity ofthe signatory will be ofinterest 10
studems of more recent military history.
The higher TD formation headquarters were oot
used extensively. The 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade
HQ commanded Third Army' s Task Force 'A',
whose mission was to assist in clearing the Brittany
Peninsula. Task Force 'A' consistcd of2nd and 15th
Cavalry Groups, 6th TD Group plus 705th TD
Baualion, '59th Combat Engineer Battalion and
509th Light Pontoon Company. The task force
advanced rapidly up the peninsula to St Malo in
mid-August, whence it proccedcd lO Brest, making
One Dlethod of cutting through the banks was by attaching a
'rhino' device, here seeD fitted to an MIo. The 'rhino' was
invented by Sgt. Curtis Culin, US Anur, and preveDted the
vehide's DOse rismg as it pusbed its way tbrough. Dozer
blades were also attached to the MIo and MJ6. (US Anuy)
contact with 6lh Arrnored Division, and laler
assisled in clearing the city itseJe
The TD Croup headquarters generally acted in
an advisory capaci ty to their respective corps,
although one Croup HQ found itseJf running the
Corps Rest Cenler! Occasionally Croup HQs
would cornrnand specifi c lask forces, bUl these
occasions were infrequent, and one exarnple will
suffice.
During the Roer River crossing on 23 February
[945 XIX Corps used the 2nd Tank Destroyer
Group (702nd TD Bn. wilh M36s, and SOISl TD
Bn. with 3in towed guns) to provide neutralization
and interdictory fire on targets up to 4,000 yards
distant in supplement to the Corps' own arti llcry,
with which the Croup had established a firc control
centre. The M36s fired at the rate of 100 rounds per
hour per platoon, while lhe towed guns fired al 300
rounds per hour per company.
It might be expected that the Ardennes fighting
provided numerous occasions involving the use of
TD Groups, but the situation was so fluid that as
TD uni ts arrived they were pushed straight ioto the
line, where they continued to write down the
enemy's armour.
011 7 March 1945 the great rail way bridge over
lhe Rhine at Remagen was capt ured almost intact
by a coup de main. Amongsl the first troops rushed
across to support lhe dcfenders of rhe shallow
bridgehead were the 899th Tank Destroyer Bat-
talion; Company 'c' crossing on the 8th, aod 'A'
and 'B' two days la ter, all crossings being made
under fire:
'The Cermans fired direct at the bridge and the
surrounding arca on both sides of the ri ver. lt was a
' hot spot', and not a healthy one to be in for any
lenglh of time. As the TDs neared the river it was
necessary to slow down, almost to a halt every few
feet .... The bridge was hit often, but there was
onlya sl ight deJay until it was cleared ofwrecked
vehicles and trafRc continued once again. Gerrnan
planes carne in at regular intervals, and all hell
would break loose from the anti-aircraft uni ts. 1 f we
weren't dodgingJerry's shells, bornbs and strafings
there was rhe falling ack-ack to put up with.'
For several days the Germans made fanatical
attempts lo throw the Americans back ioto the
river. Then, as further bridgeheads were estab-
lished eJsewhere resislance collapsed, and the
AHied armoured columns ft owed across Germany.
1 May found the 899th on the Mulder River,
waiting; in due course lhere appeared on the far
bank hard-looking soldiers in woro, drab uniforms.
They were Russians. For a day or two they were
quite friendly.
The Pacific Theatre
In itself, J apanese armour posed no problem to
American forces. On the other hand, 'The War
Department feJl growing concern over the Iarge
number of casualties experienced by units attack-
ing Japanese fortifications. Ley te, le Shima and
Okinawa were extremely costly in wounded and
dead. Japanese field fortifications were mainly
natural lerrain barriers developed into intricate
subterranean strongholds from which theJapanese
would emerge and attack American units in the
rear and on each ftank. Cave openings were self-
supporting and were so ably concealed thal assault
teams, after taking a frontal andjor reverse slope,
would find thal they had bypassed strongpoints
from which a murderous fire all but wiped thern
ou1.']
To combat this menacc the Tank Destroyer
Center set up a study unit known as the Sphinx
Delachment, which had full-scale replicas of
'Tank Deslrop Hislory.
21
AD MIO crew at manten.ance near Montch.arivel, Nonnandy,
subjected to banter from 6th Bn. Royal Scots Fusiliers, who
SeeDl to appreciate the skill with wbich the driver is using bis
'tool, special adjusting'. (Ln.p. War Mus.)
Tank Destroyer success
in COD1bat
(1) Enemy losses incurred directly by action of
TDF units, compiled from the after action
reports of thirtywnine baualions serving in the
European theatre. The figures are said to be
incomplete, and are quoted from Study 60:
Tanks and SP guns: 1,344. Average battalion scorc,
34 Top score, 105
Annoured Cars and Heavy Vehicles: 251
Other Vehicles: 924
Antiwlank guns and olher arlilLery pitas: 684
Pillboxes knocked out : 668
Machint Guns: 614
Aircrafl shol down by organic AA weapons: 18. Top
score, 5
Prisoners cif War laken: 40,070. Top scorc, 5,42 1
(2) Analysis of kills scored by 899th Tank
Destroyer Baualion in North Africa and
Europe, from the unit history citcd elscwherc:
Tanks: PzKpfw 111 8 Antiwtank guns 67
PzKpfw IV 27 Field Guns
Panther 32 Aircraft 4
Tiger Pillboxes 62
Others Strongpoints 15
]agdpanther Machne gun nests 93
Other SPs 15 20mm AA gUlls 20
Halftracks 10 Observation posts 7
Other vehicles 45 Prisoners 2,618
Qlher targets destroycd include a barracks, a
factory and a flak towcr.
Japanese positions built, and then established the
best method of either demolishing them or at least
sealing the cave entrances. Various types of
projectile were used with fuses varying from
instantaneous to .15 second dclay, and ir was found
that the 90mm M36 produced the best results, with
the 76mmMI8 not far behind.
Since direct shooting was a TDF speciality, the
J.najority ofrank destroyer battalions in the Pacific
theatre found themselves serving in an assault gun
rle, dealing with bunkers and cave entrances. This
was not lhe rle for which they had trained, bUl it
saved their infantry comrades countless casualties.
British Service: Africa
When in 1940 the British Expeditionary Force was
evacuated from France it left behind it no less than
509 2pdr. anti-tank guns which would have lO be
replaced immediately. The 2pdr. was also the
principal British tank armament of lhe time; and
although lhe more powerful 6pdr. design for both
tank and anti-tank use was well advanced, the
ordnance factories were forced ro continue quan-
tity production of the smaller gun for the im-
mediate requirements of home defence. This
decision, whi le inevitable in the circumstances, was
to have disastrous effects for some years t come.
Tn the Western Desert the British forces in Egypt
were ffced with an invasion in strength from lhe
Italian colonics in Libya. Antiwtank gunners,
forced to tow the hule 2pdrs. al speed over all sorts
of going, found that the weapon's efficiency was
becoming badly impaired by the constal1l baltCf
w
ng, and urgently 50ught mcthods ofreducing wear
and tear whilsl sti ll maintaining mobility.
T he answer appeared in the shape of lhe portee,
said to be the invention of a Lieutenant Gillson, a
Rhodesian officer.
1
The gun was mounted on lhe
back ofa cut-down lorry, usually a Chevrolet, and
the idea was that it would be carried piggywback
fashion te the scene of action and there dismounted
for use. In fact rhe gun was very rarely dismounted,
first beca use time would not permit, and second
because the mounting itself permitted a wide
LA variety of porlu equipments were already in use in the United
Kingdom, and had been produce<! lO incrcasc lhe mobilityofresponse
to Ihe expectoo Gennan landings.
degree of traverse and the ammunion bins were
located immediately behind the driver. The 2pdr.
portee was the first British self-propelled anti-tank
gun to see action, and was used extensively during
the offensive which ejected the Italians first from
Egypt and then from their own province of
Cyrenaica.
The final action ofthi s campaign, foughl at Beda
Fomm during the earl y days ofFebruary 1941, saw
lhe portees being used in preciseJy lhe role which lhe
United Slates Army in tended for its own Tank
Destroyer Force. The Italians, decisiveJy bcaten in
lhe fieJd al Sidi Barrani, had fallen back on their
fortresses of Bardia and Tobruk, but each of thesc
hollow refuges had becn stormcd, and whal was len
of lheir army was now relreating along Lhe coaSl
road through Bcnghazi lOwards T ripolitania.
Hoping to intercept them, Lt.-Gen. Richard
Q'Connor, commander ofthe British XI I I Corps,
An MJ6 involved in clo$e quarter amoa in Bust, September
19+{. The vehicle beloags to Compaay 'B' . 705th Tank
Destroyer Battalion, and carries a full set of unir markings.
The 705th fonned part ofThird Army's Task Force 'A', which
was CODl.Dlanded by HQ. 1St Tank Destroyer Brigade. (US
Anny)
dcspatched 7th Armoured Di vision through the
difflCUIt goi ng of lhe Dj ebel Akhdar, so cutting
across lhe base of the coastal bulge round which lhe
Italians were moving. Thc division's advancc
guard, consisting of lhe armoured cars of the 1 Ith
Hussars, 2nd Battalion The Rifle Brigade, the
25pdrs. of cC' Battery Royal Horse Artillery, and
nine 37mm portees of 106lh Royal Horse Artillery,
emerged from the DjebeJ in the nick of lime to
establish a road block in the path of the retreating
enemy.l
lA number of 8ofors 37mm ami-tank fXJ,utJ were also in service at this
pcriod, but wcre withdrawll shortly anerwards. 80th the 37mm and
'1pdr. saw action al Seda Fomm.
The crews of 106th RHA, a Territori al regiment
otherwise known as the Lancashire Yeomanry,
snugged their portees down among the dunes on
either side ofthe road, and were in action almost at
once as the ltalian advance guard drove up.
StaHed, the column began launching a series of
desperale atlacks, accompanied by MI3/40 tanks,
hoping lO smash its way lhrough. By now, however,
more and more Desert Rats were emerging from
lhe Djebcl, and allhough their petrol tanks were
almost dry, they were fastening onto the flanks of
lhe c1even-milejam as well as reinforcing the block
itsclf. For a day and a night the 1 talians struggled in
the net, and made one last, brave attempl to break
out on the morning of7 Februal)'.
The weight of their attack feH mainly on 106th
RHA, whose portees received the full benefit of lhe
enemy's supporting artillery while lhe M 13s surged
forward. The attack was pressed home hard, and
clearly rhe ltalian tank men meant business as they
began trading losses with the gun detachments.
One gun commander calmly waited until the tanks
had driven past his position and then shot six of
them 'up the seat'; bUl one by one the little portees
were wrecked until only one remained, manned by
lhe batlery commander, his batman and a cook.
This drove out 10 a flank and destroyed the last
Ital ian tanks as they drove onto the objective itself.
The Italians had played lheir last eard. Every-
where men carne forward to surrender, to the
number of 25,000, leaving behind them over 200
gunsand aboul 100 tanks, nOlall ofwhich had been
knocked out. The 106lh RHA, which had done as
much as any to 'Seek, Strike a7ld Destroy', claimed
a total of twenty-seven tanks destroyed, and was
awarded [wo Mililary Crosses, one Distinguishcd
Conduel Medal and three Mil itary Medals for its
first action. Sad 10 relate, the unit was later all bUl
destroyed fighting in Greece and Crete.
WithoUl exception, British tank crews had the
highesl possible regard for lhe portee gunners, who
fired steadily away from their exposed platforms
with only lhe flimsy proleetion of lhe gun shield.
Quite oflen 2pdr. portees would be found in action
alongside the lanks; unlike lheir German Opposile
numbers manning lhe massive 885, they could not
lie back from the lank battIe since they carried lhe
same gun as rhe tanks themselves, ami to gel wilhin
killing range meant going forward into lhe very
heart ofthe action.
Perhaps more than any other, lhe action fought
by 'J' Battery 3rd Royal Horse Artillery at Sidi
Rezegh epitomizes the spirit of the men who
manned lhe portees. Operation 'Crusader', designed
to effect the relief of beleaguered Tobruk, was in
full swi ng, a nd the 7th Armoured Division's
Support Group under Brigadier J. C. Campbell
had ta ken possession of the escarpments around
Sidi Rezegh. The Germans rightly regarded the
arca as a vital pivot of manoeuvre around which
operations could be mounted 10 smash through
their siege lines, and lhey were determined lhat lhe
Support Croup was going to be ejeeted from the
position.
On lhe morning of 21 November 1941 the
Support Group's artillery was deployed al lhe foot
of the Upper Escarpment and completely domi-
nated the Sidi Rezegh airfield. The 4th RHA were
on the left, and in lhe centre was 60th Field
Regiment RA, both equipped with 25pdrs., while
on the right were the 2pdr. portees of'J' Battery, 3rd
RHA under the eommand of Major Bernard
Pinney.
Pinney deployed his 'c' Troop, under Lieu-
tenant Arthur Hardy, to cover lhe right flank of
60th Field, while ' A' Troop, commanded by
Lieulenant Ward Gunn, was further sli ll to lhe
right. The Baltery's third troop was retained as a
mobile reserve. ~
Al aboul 1130, after dive-bombing altaeks and
heavy shclling, the 21st Panzer Division began to
advance against lhe Support Group, and the
25pdrs. went in to action overopen sights, u ~ i n first
High Explosive and then changing to Armour
Piercing. This reaction was far more violcl1l lhan
anything the Germans had expeeted, and they were
shakcn to discover that a 25pdr. HE shell was quite
capable of blowing the turret off a PzKpfw IV.
Having already lost six tanks when sti ll 2,000 yards
from lhe objective, they halted and began to
engage lhe distant gun lines with concentrated
machine gun fire, while the PzKpfw IYs slammed
over HE shells. The Cerman artiJlery joined in and
then their infantry mortar teams, until, as a Rifle
Brigade officcr pUL il, 'to look over the edge of a slil
lrench wassuicidal' The British artillery was dimly
seen through a miasma of smoke, shell bursts and
drifting dust , the red muzzl e f1ashes showing 1hat
Above: Crew oC 75nuTl M] halCtrack oC US Tank Istroyer Bn., Tunisia,
winter 1942-4]. in firing positions. Below: General arrangel1l.ent oC
M3 halCtrack hull with 7511l.11l. gun l1l.ounted.
A
MIO of unidentified US VI CorPI tank dutroyer
unit in static: emplacement; Anzio beac:hhead,
Italy, May 1944
B
MJ6 of US ']05th Tank Destroyer Bn.;
Brest , France, September 1944
MIO oC Peloton de Commandemenl, le Escadron, Regt.
lliad de Fusiliers Marin., French 2e Division Blind;
Pari., Franee, summe r 19+f
r - - - ~
MI8 Melleal oC US 6th Tank Destroyer Group;
Brest, Franee. August 1!)oH
L O ~ T WANT'A __
e
D
2pdr. portee of Jrd Royal Horse Artillery, British 7th Armoured Division;
Western Deliert, NovemMr 1941
!'!:: oC uni .
r, tal)', OClob"r 1;:: a.nti-
"gllD"nl Savio 8ritish V Co
E
e
1 BoD'lbardier , Britis h Royal Horse Artillery; Wetern Desert, 1911
11 NCO Instructor, US Tank Destroyer Center; CaD'lp Hood, 19411
3 Loader of MI8 crew, J06th AT Co., US 7lh Division; Okinawa, April 1915
i Sergeant, Royal Artillery; North-West Europe, winter 191i-45
5 Q.uartier Mallre, Fusi1iers Marins, lle: Di"ision Blind; France, 1914
6 Major, US 8th Tank Destroyer GrouPi ReD'lagen bridgehead, GerD'lany. March 1915
a Standard, US 6 .... th TD Bn
b Guidon. CoD'lpany 'B', US 774th TD Bn
e Pennant, US 8th TD Group
d Flag, US 6th TD Group
G
SP 17pdr. Archer of 314 Bauery, I05th AT Regt.
Royal Artillery, British V Corp5; Italy, 1944
SP 17pdr. Archer of divi5ional AT regiment,
15th Scottish Oivilion; North-West
Europe, winter 1944-45
H
lhe gunners had not paused for an ins.tant from the
rhythm of their gun dril!.
During all this Ward Gunn had been cominuall y
edging his four portees out towards Lhe enemy,
bringing them into killing range. They were
spotted and the fu ll fury of the Germans turned
upon lhem. 'A' Troop began to fire back, the crews,
according Lo a witness, completel y composed,
serving lheir guns, while their troop leader moved
between them, directing and controlling. Watch-
ing Gunn through the all -enveloping smolher, a
Rifles' officer commeilled that 'never was there a
cJearcr case of aman possessed with lhe joy of
batde'.
Two of lhe portees were knocked OUl quickly by
direcl hits, but lhe two survivors cOiltinued to hil
back wiLh good rcsults, to become the immediale
focus of the Germans' attention. Spectators
watched in fascinalcd horror as the detachments
dropped one by one around the guns. A third portee
was knockcd out, bUL Lhe last gun continued to fire
unti l onl y one man was left, and he began to drive it
out of action.
Sorne way behind, Gunn was talking t Pinney,
who brusquely ordered him to stop Lhe gun's
withdrawal. The troop eader did so, and then
manned the weapon himself arter removing Lhe
dead crew. Hewasjoined by Pinney, who almost al
once was compelled t deal with a fire in an
arnmunition bino Whil e this raged Gunn kept on
firing until struck in lhe head. He slumped dead,
and Pinney, throwing away lhe fire extinguisher,
dragged his body as icl e and continued to man the
gun alone. lt is not possible to estimate lhe enemy's
loss, bUL when al last lhe Battery Commanderdrove
the gun out, further hits havi ng made il unusable,
lhe lwO nearest tanks were certainly in flamcs.
Pinney clrove straight to Hardy's 'C' Troop, now
coming under intense pressure. Two of iLS portees
had been knocked out, but the remaining two were
pulling back slowly onto the fl ank of 60th Fi eld,
concentrating their fire on sorne German tanks
which were trying to work round lhe posi tion. Arter
lhe lwO leacling Panzers had been knocked out the
rcmainder withdrew, and the crisis ofthe battle had
passed.
80th Gunn and Pinney were recommended for
the award of the Victoria Cross; il was given
only to Gunn, posthumously. The morning after
the action Pinney was kill ed by a stray shell . In
recognition of its heroic service his Battery was
awarded that rarest of artillery distinctions, an
Honour Title, and is now known as 'j' (Sidi
Rezegh) Battery, Royal Horse Artill ery.l
The Middle Years : Italy
During the immediate post -Dunkirk period,
anal ysis of lhe events in Franee had led lO
recommendat ions that each corps should have an
anti-tank regiment al the direcl disposal of lhe
corps commander, and that one battery of the
Divisional anti-lank regiments should be self-
propelled.
By SepLember 1941 lhe General Staff was
wanning very slowly to lhe concept of the self-
propellcd anti-lank gun, but in spite ofthe benefiLS
which had arisen from lhe aggressive use of portees in
the \'Vestern Desert , it still envisaged a largely
defensive role for such weapons, in direct contraSl
lO Lhe United Sta tes Army's poliey. However, it was
conceded that sclf-propell ed anti-tank guns per-
miued longer marches than could be achieved with
lOwed gunsj that lhey had a bener cross-country
performance; that lhey were valuable hit and run
weaponsj and that such equipment enabled reserve
guns LO be deployed rapidly. It went on to suggesl
lhe fitting of a 2pdr. LO a Loyd earrier in such a
manne.r as lO permit 225 degrees of traverse, the
idea ~ i n g that lhese vehicles would equip one
quarter of the divisional anti-tank rcgimcnt's
slrength as weJl as the anti-tank plaloons 01' lhe
divisional rcconnaissance regimenLs. Only a very
few were ever bui lt, although the Australian Anny
produced its own vari ation on lhe same theme.
2
By mid-1942 the long-awaited 6pdr. was begin-
ning lo arrivc on the battlefield. A number of
balleries carried this en portee, but as it was a much
larger gun lhan Lhe 2pdr., it was not as conveniclll,
and tended lo be dismounted more often before
going into action. These were la ter supplemented,
or replaced, by an armouroo version known as the
Deacon, in whieh the gun was housed inside a
IOnly five sueh litlo were awardcd for serviceduring World War 11.
106lh RHA's aClion al Bcda Fomm did nOI contain all Ihe
circumstanecs rcquircd by the very striet rulogoveming sueh awards.
'DewllJjJmml qf Ar/illery Toe/us and EquiJ1mA/ '939-45. Interestingly,
he Germans mountcd a 37mm anli-tank gun on eapturcd Loyd
earri ers.
A Britisb MIo Wolverine supports infantry consolidating
Dewly-wOD ground during the Gothic Une 6ghting in ItaIy,
I!H4. (Inlp. War Mus. )
turret mounted on an AEC Matador lorry. This
arrangement permitted very titde traverse, but as
the gun engaged 'over the tail' further traverse was
quickly obtainable by geUing the driver to swing
the vehicle in the required direction. The Deacons
were usually issued on the scale of one battery per
anti-tank regiment, and their official role was that
ofmobilc anti-tank reserve. By June 1943 they were
becoming obsolete and were beginning lO be
replaced by American M lOS, for which an initial
order of 1,500 had been placed.
Meanwhile work was proceeding on the pro-
duction ofthe first British tracked tan k destroyer to
en ter service, the Archer. This consisted of the
excell ent '7pdr. anti-tank gun mounted on the
chassis of the now-obsolete Valentine lnfantry
Tank. While the fighting compartment was housed
at the front ofthe vehicle, the longgun pointed over
the tail, and consequently the equipment had to be
reversed into iLS firing position. In position, the
driver became an ammunition numberofnecessity,
as the breech recoiled directly over his seat.
Traverse was timited to I I degrees either side ofthe
centre line, but could be supplemented by moving
the vehicle.
Archers began reaching the tine in October
1944, and as their numbers began te increase many
26
M lOS were withdrawn so that their 3in guns could
be replaced with the more powerful 17pdrs. In this
composite version of the MIO, known in British
service as the Achilles, the breech-heavy piece was
balanced by a counter-weight 1Tj.ounted im-
mediate1y behind the muzzle brake.
British thinking on tank destroyers was now
firmly seto 'In contrast to the American policy, the
idea of seeking out and destroying enemy armour
was discouraged. A suitable role for the SP anti-
tank gun, it was lhought, was the engagement of
tanks thal stood off and neutralized our forward
localities; or when employed with armoured
formations, to he1p in the defence of pivots or
localities he1d by the infantry.' 1
This bald statement perhaps sounds a trifle stuffy,
but it must be remembered that the days of lhe
massed tank attack were over in the Mediter-
ranean. In Tunisia, Sicily and Italy the Germans
fought defensive actions in mountainous country,
and in Italy in particular the self-propell ed gun
played a dominant role in defence. An SP,
surrounded by half a dozen machine gun posts,
would often wait in concealment and not open fire
until the Allied tanks were within a point-blank 100
yards; then, having destroyed two or three, it
would make its escape.
'What was needed was a weapon that could
move across country by a covered route to a
position f;f-om which enemy tanks could be engaged
by surprise. For lack ofit, anti-tank protection ha"d
become perhaps the most important role for tanks
in support ofinfanlry.2
In fact the MIOS and Archers provided such a
weapon, and lhe result was an extreme1y tight
battlefie1d interlock of a1l arms involved in an
attack. The tanks dealt with the enemy's infantry
and machine gun posts; the infantry dealt with
fixed anti-tank guns and pan;:.erfaust teams; the
fie1d artillery, through its Forward Observation
Officers, would lay on immediate concentrations as
required; and the tank destroyers, Iying back in
good overshoot positions, would deal with any
enemy armour which tried to intervene. In the
consolidation phase the tan k deslroyers might also
dig in 011 the captured ground until lhe infantry's
OWI1 guns could be brought up.
'Developmtnt of Artillery Tactics and Equipmtnl 1939- 45
1/bid.
A good example of these highly devcloped minor
lactics is an incidenl which occurred on the
aHernoon of 4 Seplembcr 1944 during lhe GOlhic
Line fighting. The infanlry battalion, the
Canadian 48th Highlanders, had becn stalled by
enfiladed machine gun fire; their supporting
armour, Churchills of ' B' Squadron 48th Royal
Tank Regimenl , was unabJ e to deal with lhe
problem since lhc tanks wcrc thcmsclves slallcd by
whal were bclieved to be Gcrman SPs. In support
was a nine-gun battery of MIOs (nol identifi ed)
and a field batlely of 105mm guns. I 1 was decidcd
lhal while lhe M lOS engaged lhe SPs, the lanks
would lake OUl lhe rnachine gun positions, follow-
ing which lhe infanlry would continue their
advance.
'The M lOS were manoeuvred carefuJly into fire
positions to take on the SP guns. The SP on lhe
right was observcd to be a Panther and the range
2,000 yards. It was engaged and moved off at once,
The.:;e is the wary tension oC rnen stUl under fire about these
infdtryJnen rnoving slowly inco Foatainebleau on \13 Augusc
1944. The rapid advance bad stretched even radio corn-
Ulunications tothe lim.it, as the amount oCaerial being carried
by the MIO shows. (US Army)
first behind a house and lalcr into sorne trces. The
M l OS fired about a dozen rounds and the 105s fired
to encourage him to move into view again. Whal
success was achieved is hard lO say, bUl lalcr lWO
brewcd-up Panthcrs werc examincd in the arca.
The gun or tank on lhe left could not bc obscrved so
we put down a concentration of 105s on lhe
suspected area.'l
The llalian campaign had become a killing
match between ski llcd lcams of professionals, but
now lhat they had been properly cquipped,
batteri es like 314th Anti-Tank, which had griml y
rcversed thcir lin!e portees into lhe hean of
numerous tank baldes without much hope of
'General Account ofOpcratioru from August 28th 10 September 23rd,
48RTR.
t
In additiOD to cratering road.s in lbe path of th" advancing
Allied armielJ, lbe Gennans mined the verges, so that once a
by-pallS had befta cleared it had to be stuck too (I.rn.p. War Mus. )
survival, now lookcd forward to lhe prospect of
action. During this same period an engagement
took place when sharp eyes in one of 314th Battery's
Archers detected a Tiger, and lhe 17pdr. lashcd
back on recoil. The round missed narrowly, bUl lhe
crack of heavy, high-velocity shot is instantly
recognizable, and lhe German lank commander al
once swung his hugc vehicJc out of sight bchind a
building. Unrortunatcly for him lhe Tiger was
spotted by a Lysander Air OP, which signalled its
whereabouLS. The Archer fired again and lhe
17pdr. ShOl slarnmed straight through lhe building
and lhe lank's lhin side armour as wel l. It was Wilh
considerabl e pleasure lhal lhe gunners inspecled
the wreck sorne days laler.
Firing High Explosive, lhe tank destroyers also
aCled as reinforcing artilJ ery, a role in which lhey
served in aH theatres ofwar, bUl which was initially
developcd on a large scale during the first year of
lhe Italian campaign. Sometimes the firing was
28
Oirect, lhal is Wilh lhe target in sight, but by
c1amping a Gunner's Quadrant onto lhe breech
and using lhe traverse indicator it was also possible
to undertak.e lndirect fire, in which lhe fall of shot
was correclcd by a distant observer until the target
was struck. Once targets had becn acquired and lhe
relevant elevation and traversc angles registcred on
a range card, they could be engaged by night as
well as by day.
Normandy and
North-West Europe
Back in lhe United Kingdom, as training pro
ccedcd for lhe invasion ofEuropc, il was becoming
quile apparent thal in certain circumslances lhe
tank destroyer held lhe key to success. Everyone
agreed thal lhe German reaction to lhe landings
would probably lake lhe form of a series of massive
armoured counterauacks. There was also general
agrccment that as lhe towed '7pdr. anti-tank gun
was awkward lo handle, difficulties could be
EquipDlent history oC JOSth Anti-Tank Regi-
ment, Royal Artillery-a Corps anti-tank
regiment:
1941- 42 Western Desert '2pdr. portee
314 Banery of this regiment accompanied 7t h
Armoured Brigade lO Burma, and was forced to
destroy its !)orlees during the retreat lO India. Il
subsequentl y rcturned to the Middle East va
India and Iraq.
1942-43 Western Desert , '2 baueries 6pdr. portee
1943
Ear!J
1944
Tunisia '2 batteries Deacon
Sicily
Italy
ltaly
'2 battcries [7pe1r.
towed
'2 batteries 6pe1r. towed
'2 batteries MIO
[ battery [7pe1r. towed
[ battery 6 pelr. LQwed
'2 batteries Archer
[ batteryMlo
[ battery 17pe1r. towed
Batlcry establishment in the period 1944- 45 was
lwelve guns.
Aa M36 oC 6cryth Tank Destroyer Battalion in Metz, 20
Novem.ber 1944. (US Army)
anticipated in gelting it across lhe beaches and
emplaced in lhe line in adeq uale time. lt was
dcided that the anti-tank regiments of lhose
divisions which carried out lhe assault landings
would be cquipped wilh a proponion of MIOS,
which could simply motor out of their LCTs and
fonn an immediale anti-tank gun screen where
required. That armoured counter-auacks did not
immediately develop on the scalc expected was
largcly ,he faul, of AdolfHi,ler.
The nature of lhe Normandy bocage imposeel
much lhesame SOrL offighling thal was laking place
in 1 taly, with lhe M I os providing direct firc
suppon for inlantry/ tank operalions. 'lt was as
imporlalll as evcr lO gel anti-tank guns forward
quickly lO a capLUrcd objective; all lhe more SO
because of lhe inadequate killing power of the
Churchill tank. Thc lOwed '7pelr. was nol easy lO
manoeuvre and it was oflcn twelve to fifteen hours
befare il could be dug in ready for action in lhe new
position. Hence il was decided la perpetua le lhe SP
29
Per cen tage analysis oC Gennan tank losses
in Nonnandy
Cause
Armour piercing
Hollow Charge
(bazooka, PIAT etc. )
High Explosive
Mines
Rocket-firing aircraft
Cannon-firing aircraft
Bombs
t h J u n ~ 8th- 31st
7th Augusl August
65 63
w
'The armour piercing projectile, whcther (red
from our own tanks or from an anti-tankgun, easily
held pride of place as the killer of tanks. '
(DtV(IOfJmlnt oj ATlillery Tacliu and Equipment 1939- 45.)
element introduced into anti-tank units for the
initial landings. In future, infantry divisional anti-
tan k batteries were to consisl of one lroop 17pdr.
lowed, one troop 17pdr. Wolverine (sic) or M lO,
and one troop 6pdr. towed. The idea was that the
6pdr. 01 SP 17pdr. should be used as the FDL
(Forward Defended Locality) gun, with the towed
I7pdr. acting as a 'long stop'.'1
A l7JKlr. AchiJJes oC 11th Annoured Oivision's anti-tank
regiment in amon against a pillbox on the Gennan {rontier,
II October 1944- (hnp_ War Mus.)
In response the Germans, already well aware of
the MI o's prirnary weakness, began subjecting
tank destroyer crews to air-burst shelling against
which even well emplaced vehicles could offer iule
defence. Not surprisingly, demands were made for
splinter -proof overhead cover, but beyond the
production of a few mock-ups, nothing was done.
On 8 July 1944 a battery of 62nd Anti-Tank
Regirnent RA fought a spectacular action in the
rnanner for which their vehicles had originally been
designed. The battery concerned had supported an
infantryjtank attack on the village ofBuron, and by
ogoo all seemed to be over; however, as the War
Diary recounts, it was nol.
'At about 0900 the infantry (the Highland Light
Infantry ofCanada) had taken Buron though there
werc several Germans stilJ holding out at the far
end of the village. The battery moved up, and 'B'
Troop were deployed on the south-east side ofthe
village and 'A' Troop at the south and west ofthe
village. Shortly aftervvards the G-errnans put down
a very heavy shelling and rnortar barrage and
quickly fo ll owed this up by a counter-attack of
sorne twenty or thirty taliks. Two guns of'B' Troop
were able to engage, and between thcm accounted
forsorne twelve to thirteen Panthers and Mark IVs.
The rernaining tanks then withdrew t the south-
east. The guns which accounted for the tanks were
'DeV({opmtnl oj AriiJJery Tactts and EquifJmlnl 1939- 45
(cornrnanded by) Sgt. H. W. Bowden and Sgt.
G. P.]. Donovan.'
The battery had nOl got offlightly, and arter lhe
action only three ofits Achilles were in a fit state to
cootinuc. There was also an interesting sequcl. '00
a subsequcm visit by lhe Prime Minister, lhe
victims were shown te him as lhe bag of our
Shermans and it took sorne effort on lhe part of
Second Arrny to adjust our claim,'l
During subsequent operations in Belgium, Hol-
land and Germany lhe British tank destroyers, in
addition lO their other duties, orlen acted as heavy-
weight snipers, moving ioto position before lhe stan
of an attack to take out potemial enerny obser-
vation posts in lhe church steeples and windmills
that dominated lhe flat landscape.
2
I&yal Artillny ClJmmnnoration Boo".
'A case of hislOry repeating itself. In 1917 Cdr. Oliver Locker-
Lampson's No. 1 Squadron RNACD, struggling to hold a 25-mile gap
in the line abandonoo by the disintegrating Russian Anny, had used
their 3pdr. Seabrook Heavics in juSI this role.
Another Achilles of the same wt. Gua barreis of tbis length
sdi:k out Iike very son thum.bs, and their outline must be
broken up if the vehicle is sited in a concea1ed firing posicion
hence the chlcken wire sleeve behind the counter-weight. (Imp.
WarMus.)
The periodJune 1944 t May 1945 saw the high-
water mark of British tank destroyer usage.
Although a fully turreted version, the Chariotccr,
mounting a 2opdr. gun on a Cromwell tan k chassis,
entered service during the early 19505, by then
lanks were themselves mounting such heavy
armament that lhe need for lank destroyers as a
separale family had ceased to exisl. Thus the
fundamental question was resolved; in fUlure it
would be the tank that'would concentra te on the
destruction of its own kind.
Perhaps it would be as well to leave the story at a
high point in Royal Artillery greatest
bombardment ofWorld War 11, fircd in support of
Operation 'Veritable', better known as theBattle of
the Reichswald. Participating in an HE Indirecl
fire ' Pepperpol' group were the Archers of 20th burning out long before lhe round fall s. 1 am quite
Anti-Tank RegimeOl RA, whose commanding certain of one thing; our war correspondents will
officer has left a vivid word pi cture ofthe occasion: run out of adj ectives long before we run out of
' Fifteen seconds LO go ... len . .. fi ve. There goes ammuni tion. Il is terrific; by far lhe best thing I' ve
one of my SP troopsj they' re a few seconds earl y- cver seen. More impressive than D-Day- and
not that you'd noti ce it , beca use almost im- ma kes Crystal Palace seem like ta bl e fi reworks.'
mediately the sky seems crammed with tracer. (Lt.-Col. G. B. Thatcher, DSO, in The ROjal
Bofors pumping away from in front, from (he sides Artillery Commemoration Book.)
and over our heads from behind. Wi th their ft a t
trajeclory they seem LO be ski mming lhe houselops.
The 17pdrs. have a more sober air as, wilh reduced
charge and comparati vely high traj eclOry they sail
gracefull y away iOlo lhe night sky, lhe tracer
MIOS at speed in the Huertgen Forest, 18 November 1944. (US
Anny)
Basic ballistic data oC anti-tank guns
mentioned in text:
Brilish Wtighl Mua.Le
ofshot Velociljl
.pelr.
Slb
'2800ft jsec
6pe1r. 6.olb '2700fljsec
17pdr.
'7
0Ib '2900fljsec
American
37mm M3
.. 611b '2600ftjsec
75
mm
4
6Ib
' 950ftjsec
M.897
A
3in M7 1'2.65Ib '2800ftjsec
76mmMI
'S'Slb
'2600ft jsec
series
gomm M3 'Hlb
'280oftjsec
h is interesling to note thal during Ihe relevant
period increase in weight of shol was preferred to
increased muzzle velOCily as a meansofbetter tank
killing. Effective rangc varied from 600 yards
('2 pdr. and 37mm) 10 2,000 yards ( 17pdr. and
gomm), bUI kills were regularly recorded ahovc
these fi gures, particularly in cases where lhe
enemy's lhinner side or rcar armour had been
penetrated. There are many imponderables in
antitank gunnery, not leasl ofwhich are lhe angle
and poinl ofimpacl.
British and Atnerican Tank Destroyers
BRI EF TECHNICAL DETAILS
Archa
Length: '21' 11 "
Height: 7' 4t"
Width: 8' 7t"
Weight: 16 tons
Armour: 60mm max.
Armament: 1 x 17pdr.
Speed: 15mph max.
Ammunition stowage : 39 rounds
Crew: 4
Achilles
Armamenl: I X I 7pdr. otherwise as MI o
Gun Motor Carnage MI O
Length: 9' 7"
Height: 8' .t"
Widlh: 10' O"
Weight: '29.4 tons
Annour: 37mm max.
Armamcnt: J x 3inM 7
Speed: 30mph max.
Ammunition slowage: 54 rounds
erew: 5
Gun Motor Carriage M36
Length: '20' '2"
Heighl: 8' I IN
Width: 10' O"
\oVei ght: '28.1 lons
Armour: 50mm max.
Armamenl: 1 x gomm M3
Speed: 30mph max.
Ammunition stowage : 47 rounds
Crew: 5
Guu A/olor Carriage 1\/ 18
Lengt h: 17'4"
Height: 7' 9"
\Vidth: 9' 9"
\Veight: 18.'25 LOns
Annour: I '2 mm max.
Arma ment: 1 x 76mm MI
Specd: 50mph max.
Ammunition slOwage: 45 rounds
Crew: 5
The Plates
A: Crew positions and general interior
arrangeDlent, 75tntn M3 halftrack
The erew are depicled at lhe moment of opening
firc, a nd we take lheir positions from pholographs
in a US Arrny manua l. The gunncr crouches on lhe
left ofthe breech at lhe sights, and is about LO give
the cornmand l o fire. The assistant gunner stands,
crampcd under lhe cover of lhe gunshieJd, 0 0 lhe
rghl ; he has pull cd lhe lanyard, and awails lhe
gunner's cornmand before releasing it lO fire the
gun. The loader is foreed to grovel on the deck to
keep cl ear of lhe recoil of lhe weapon, which
frequentl y caughl unwary loaders, with painful
results. The ammunit.ion stowage was benealh the
breech, with three rows of slOwage 'pipes' for
rounds; these' were slaggered, six above seven
aboye six. The IOp row can be secn ; lhe olhcr two
33
rows were below lhe main deck level, accessible precautions obviously negate the usefulness of the
only because a well in tbe deckgave access. The tip- camouflage painting, and give excellent aiming
up seats can be seen on the hull interior walls on marks for German gunners. Note the fairly un-
each side; crew accommodation was extremely common application of an individual tactical
basic. The lower painting shows from aboye the number-'S'; and lhe mouming of two .50 cal.
general interior arrangemem, with lhe tip-up seats machine guns, one al lhe from and one at lhe rear
on the side walls and rear hull door and the accss of the turrCt.
well for the ammunition stowage.
B (lOp) M.o ofunidentified US VI Corps
tank destroyer unit; Anzio beachhead, ltaly,
MaY'944
A pholOgraph of lhis vehicl e appears in the
accompanying pages. The markings are interest -
ing, as is lhe use ofOli ve Orab in conjunction with
Earth Yell ow in a faded and indistinct camouflage
scheme. Such paint jobs were sometimes seen in
Sicily and Italy, allhough nol' often as late as this.
The plelhora of white slars indica tes a certain
anxiety as 10 Allied lroops' slandards of vehicle
recognition, and the large white area on lhe rear of
lhe lurret probably had the same purpose. Such
MJ6s of 703rd Tank Destroyer Battalion tnoving into positiOD
in support of &.md Airborne DivisioD during the Arden.nes
6.ghting. Note abseace of unit tnarkings and visible stars. (US
Anny)
34
B (bollOm) M36 of 70Sth TD Bn. US:Jrd
Arm.y; Brest, France, September 1944
Again, this painting is an interpretation of one of
the accompanying photos. The plain overall Olive
Orab paint job is entirely typical of armoured
vchicl es in lhe European lheatre, as is the relalive
obscurity of the whi te Allied recognition star. NOle
typically heavy stowage ofcrew packs and bedrolls,
jcrrycans, cable reels, etc. around the outside of the
turret. The application and retention of full unit
codes in the fronlline is nOl so typica!. They follow
the regulation sequence: '3A' for US 3rd Arrny,
'705 T O' identifying the battaJion, and ' 8-14'
identifying company and vehicle. In units under
Corps or Army command the first code (e.g. '3A', or
' 11 ' for 11 Corps) replaced lhe usual divisional cocle
(e.g. '2 lriangle' for 2nd Armorcd Oivision).
e (top) MIO, Peloton de Conunandernent.
3
e
Escadron, Regt. Blind de Fusiliers
Marins, French 2
e
Division Blind; Paris,
sununer 1944
The famous ' Division Lec1erc' included repre-
sentatives ofmany Free French units, and the self-
propelled la nk deslroyers were crewed by sailors of
the Fusiliers Marins. Arter cscaping from occupied
France al various times from June 1940 onwards,
these seamen led a checkered career. At one point
lhey provided lhe anti-aircraft crews for lhe
garrison of Sir Hakeim in the Libyan desen;
incorporaled into the premier Free French for-
mation for the liberaLion of their homcland, they
commemorated their origins by painting lhe names
of their former vessels on their armoured vehicles,
e.g. 'Ftibustier'. The di visional insignia was the cross
ofLorraine 0 11 a map ofFrance, in whi le and blue
as illuslrated, on bolh forward hull sides. The
Frcnch tricolour was painled on lhe hull sides of
mOSl Free French AFVs, usually to lhe rear, and
sometimes with a yellow ouler rimo The tactical
sign ahead of il is lypical ofFrench practice at this
time. Each major unit ofthe division was identifi ed
MIOS firing iD tbe indirect role at night. Tbe occaSiOD is an
operational test ofhigh{low flash propdla.ots. Tbe vehicle 00
tbe left is usiDg standard iUIllDunition, which produced a
brilliant white IDuzzle flash, wbile tbat on tbe right is usiDg a
specially prepared charge which gaveooly adull, red glow. (US
Army)
M,J6 iD SDOW caumuflage shortly after tbe ' Battle oftbe Bolge' .
(USArmy)
by a etter- here, 'V'. The company was identified
by lhe number of uprighls on the bar, whose
position aboye, below, or veni call y at ei ther side of
lhe regimental etter indicated the pl atoon. A
French serial numbcr has replaced lhe US number,
painted in white 'Cyrilli c' l1umerals on the frolll
glacis and always preceded by a small, narrow
lri colour. Allied recognition Slars are retained. The
erew wear US uniforms Wilh French headgear and
insignia. Seamen retained lheir bonnets, petty
omcers and officers lheir pcaked caps; officers seem
often LO have worn the French armoured lroops
helmel of pre-war vintage, in khaki wilh brown
lcalher furnilure (see Plale FfG fig. 5).
e (bollom) MIS Hellcat ofUS 6th Tank
Destroyer Group; Brest, France, August
1944
Photographcd during lhe winkling-out of lhe
Cerman garrison of Bresl in the summer of '944,
this example of the fast and deadly Hellea l bears
ralher more in lhe way of indi vidual crew insignia
lhan one normally sees in front-line photos. The
na me DON'T \VANT' A is painted in small \\Ihile
capitals 10\\1 on the hull side cenlrally, and furthcr
forward is a swim-suiled pin-up. \Ve have made an
educated guess at the colours and design ofthis pin-
up, judgi ng from the tones and outline of the
necessaril y small and blurred monochromc photo-
35
Tbe wrecked jeep, ca$uaItie$, and infantrytneo $priotiog for
me cover oftbe tank destroyer eDlpbasize me fanatical quality
oC Gennan resistance in sOlDe areas: Schillingeo, 15 March
1945. (US Anny)
graph from which we worked. Crossed legs would
seem to be logical, given the name .... There are
two staggered lines of white lettering to the left of
the girl's head; these may be a repetition of the
vehicle name, butcannot be made out clearly in the
photo. The vehicle serial number is clearly
marked- often it was painted over or allowed to
wear off in the front line. The bridge classification
code is presented on a yellow disc on the hull front
cheek plate, probably on one side only.
D: 2 pdr. portee of 3rd Royal Horse Artillery,
British th Annoured Division; Western
Desert, November 1941
Two views of the equipment made famous by 'A'
Troop, 'J' Baltery, 3rd RHAon 21 November 1941
al Si di Rezegh, where Lt. Ward Gunn won a
posthumous Victoria Cross in the action described
in the body ofthe text. The typical stowage would
be heavier and more varied, as the vehicles of old
desen hands were liberally slacked with bedrolls,
jerrycans, oil and waler cans, small arms ammu-
nition boxes used for crew kit, packs, greatcoals,
camoufl age netting, ra tion boxes, tarpaulins, and
personal weapons. We have limiled lhe stowage the
belter to show details of the rather complex 2pdr.
gun and its Chevrolet-built Canadian Milicary
Pattern 3-tonner. Markings are limited to the
divisional sign, presented on a single plate (lypi-
cally of 7lh Armoured Division) with lhe tactical
sign-the Royal Artillery's red-over-blue, with the
white 'SS' carried al that period by vehicles ofthe
divisional anti-tank regirnent. Sorne, but not all
portees had a white serial nurnber rnarked high and
centrally on the cab doors, apparently ' L' followed
by seven digits. The lieutenant sighting the gun in
the lower view wears a typical (bUl purel y
speculalive) combination ofregimental No. 1 Dress
cap- a frequenl affectation by officers of'mounted'
regiments at that tirne- with battledress blouse
and KD slacks. The crewman in the upper view
wears standard KD shirl and shorts with the khaki
Field Service cap.
E (top) MIO SP I ']Pdr. Achilles of divisional
anti.tank regirnent RA, British 11th
Annoured Division; North-West Europe,
winter 1944- 45
The photo of this vehicle which accompanies the
body of the text shows typical stowage when
unobscured by foliage. It was highly characteristic
of Alli ed armoured vehicles in the often close
country of France and Germany to concentrate
attached fo liage, scrim-net and chicken wire
camouflage on the turret and upper part of the
hull - the arcas most frequently exposed to the
enemy's view aboye hedges and banks. The long
17pdr. gun of the Achilles, with its prominent
counterweight and muzzle brake, was a prime
identifi cation feature, a nd was often swathed in
chicken wire or hessian. The markings are ab-
sol utely divisional sign of 1I th
Armoured, a black bull on yellow, on the near side
front and off side rear; and the tactical sign of the
arrnoured division's integral anti- tank regiment, by
nowa white '77' on the red-over-blue RA flash, in
lhe opposite positions. Loss of a track guard has
apparently lcd lo repainting of lhe latter on this
vehicle. The accompanying photo confirms that no
other markings were carried on the turret or hull
sides, not even the Allied star. The crewman wears
lhe rirnless Royal Armoured Corps steel helrnet.
E (bottom) MIo Wolverine ofunidentified
British V Corps antitank regirnent RA;
Savio River, ItaIy, October 1944
Again, from one of the accompanying photo-
graphs, this painting shows lhe heavy slowage
typical of frollt-line vehicles. Apan from bedrolls,
tarpaulins, ammunition boxes, spare lrack links,
buckets and fuel funne1, this vehicle carries a
MISs of Company 'B', 637th Tank Destroyer Battalion,
engaging Japanese positions dug into the hills oC LuzoD,
Philippine Islands. (US Arrny)
blue RA flash with the number '11 ', and the while
top b<b" of Corps troops. An additional marking
sometimes carried on the solid lOp decking at the
front ofthe turret was a British air recognition sign,
in the form ofthe RAF roundc1- red centre, white
ring, bluc ring, and thin yellow outer rimo
F IG: Crew unifonns and unit fiags:
1 Royal Horse ArtiLlery; Western Deserl,
194
1
.. This 'desert scruff' wears a typical combination of
bundle ofstakes and several picks and shovels at the garments. The khaki greatcoat has been cut down
rear, for the use of accompanying infancry when into a 'shortie' j on the shoulder-straps are the
consolidating captured positions-a rle in which black-on-khaki regimental tabs which officially
SP anti-tank guns and infantry oflen co-operated replaced metal or coloured cloth shoulder titles al
in this theatre. Another photo ofthe same vehicle the beginning ofthe war- here, 'RHA'. The Field
from the front shows the full markings, which were Service cap, with the RA's bomb and scroll badge,
repeated exactly on the rear: the V Corps sign on is carried under the shoulder-strap; and the
the left as viewed; a white square- probably a bombardier's chevrons appearon both upper arms.
convoy station-keeping device- centrally; and the KD shirt and slacks and khaki wool sweater are set
regimental flash on the right. This lalter is lhe red- off by a touch of 'swank' in the form of the
37
regimcntaJly colourcd 'slablc bclt'. He carries his
basic web equipment, which, typicall y for the type
of unil and the period, includes the old '08 clip
pouches.
2 Technical Sergeanl, Instructioll Sta1/: US Tallk
Destroyer Cenlu; Camp Hood, 1942
The ubiquitous overall oflight Olive Drab t\-vill in a
herringbone pallern was lhe basis ofthe US vehicle
crewman's working kit. h is worn here with the
summer 'chino' version of lhe 'overseas cap', piped
around lhe turn-up wilh branch-colour cord. Al
lhis date Tank Destroyer enl isled men wore an
unofficial piping reflecling their aH-arms origins, in
a ' twisl' panern of repealed yellow-red-blue, for
lhe cavalry, art ill ery, and infantry. In March 1943
lhe branch was officially authorized a piping 01"
black and gQlden orange in alternating twist. Rank
chevrons in light Olive Drab on midnight bluc
appear on bOlh upper sleeves.
3 Jader, MI8crew, 306thATCo., US 77th
Division: Okinawa, April 1945
From a photograph of a erew re-ammunitioning
with 76mm AP rounds, this paintingshows the two-
piece faded Olive Drab fatigues which formed lhe
basis of mOSl eombal uniforms in lhe Pacific
theatre, worn in combinalion with lhe US lealher
tan k erew hclmet. The rather archaic-l ooking
goggles are intercsting- the big rubber-rimmed
si ngle-lcns type worn by lhe preceding figure are
much more common in photos. The trouser lcgs are
rolled high over standard russet leather double-
bucklc comba l boots. The gunnery gloves are wom
to prevent ha ndling accidents caused by sweating
palms, and were indispensable when clearing hot
expended cases I"rom the turret Hoor. In action
many loaders preferred lo work without gloves, but
they were not such an encumbrance as the painting
might suggesl, as American loaders used their
balled fist for ramming, lhis being knocked clear by
lhe c10sing breech-block. British loaders preferred
to use a hard back-hand sweep, whieh was faster
and which kept fingers OUl of the danger area; use
of lhe fingers of lhe forehand (i.e. that nearesl lhe
rear ofthe gun) was likcly lO result in their neal and
rapid severance between lhe breech-block and
chamber.
4 Sergealll, Royal ArtiLlery SP AT regiment, XXX
Corps; .Norlh-West Europe, willter 1944- 45
This Aehilles eomma nder is retuming from a
foraging or barter expedilion among lhe friendly
DUlch Wilh his Royal Armoured Corps helmet full
of spuds, and a SlOne bOltle of 'Geneva' to wash
them down. His 'beret' - aclually, the General
Service cap which replaced lhe Field Service cap in
1943- bears lhe RA bomb and scroll badge. Over
his battledress he wears the popular leather jerkin
worn by most British soldiers in both ' '''orld Wars,
a nd the absolute minimum ofwebbing in the form
of his bcJl alone. Vehicle crews shunned webbing,
for fear ofca lching iton protrusions ifforced to bail
out ofa burning vehide in a hurry. Al lhe lOp oflhe
blouse sleeve is the XXX Corps sign- a black boar
on a white dise on a black square- and below it the
RA arm of service flash. Sergeants of Royal
Artill ery wore lhe regiment's cannon badge aboye
their rank chevrons on bOlh sleeves. A slung Sten
gun is a lypical vehicl e commander's weapon when
wandering aboul in the open.
5 Quartier Maitre 1
I
Classe, Regl. Blind de Fusiliers
Marins, Frencll :? Division Blind; France, summer
'944
Thisjunior pctty officer, luggi ng a box ofbeJled . .50
cal. ammunition back 10 his MIO, wears almost
ent irc1y US issue clothi ng j lhe American Army
look over the outfitting and arming of lhe Free
Freneh forees in 1943, while the Brilish Army
provided lhe samc services for lhe BeJgians a nd
DUlCh. The MI 941 fieJd jacket is wom over the
one-piccc herringbone lwill vehicle overall and an
Olive Drab wool shirt. The headgear and insignia
are french j lhe sailor's bonnet, doubtlcss treasured
during lhe rcgiment's long wanderings si nce 1940,
bears the cap tall y 'FUSILI ERS MARI NS'. The
lhree red chevrons of lhis rank are worn on a
midnight-blue slip-on on both shoulder-strapsj
and lhe crossed foul anchors in red on a blue square
were lhe insignia of all active naval unils in ' lhe
fl eet'. US boots and webbing complele the uni-
formo
6 .Major, US 8th Tank Destroyer Group; Remagen
bridgehead, Germmry, March 1945
Taken from published reminiscences of a Croup
veteran, this figure wears lhe tan windchealer
' tanker's jackel' with knit waist, collar and cuffs;
US crews ofS? guns in Europe seem to have worn
combinat ions of infantry and tank c101hing in-
discriminately, but the popular tank jackel was
much in demando Since it has no shoulder-straps,
lhe major's leafinsignia is sewn to the shoulder 011 a
leather patch. The Tank Deslroyer force shoulder
patch is worn high on lhe left sleevc only: it is
repcated in detail on the back cover of lhis book.
The cavalry yellow scarf betrays lhis officer's
previous branch. The proofed M 1943 combat
trousers are lucked into slrapped lealher booLS with
composition soles- probably cut -down modifica-
tions of pre-war fie1d boots. Full basic combal
webbing is worn, and an MI carbine is carri ed as
well as a holslered .45 pisto!. The he1mel markings
are most inleresling: on lhe front, a decal ofthe TD
Force insignia, above a brazed-on major's rank
eaf; on each side, a decal of the Group's pennam,
point upwards, in orangc and black; on the back
centrally, the white vertical bar indicating an
Officer.
a Batlalion standard, US 644th TD Bn. The battalion
badge, a spiked gauntl et, is jusl visible on lhe
central panel on lhe eagle's ches!.
b GuidonojCo. 'B' , US 774'" TDBn. In lhe branch's
colours of orangc and black, wi th a stylized 75mm
M3 halftrack device, this guidon meas ured 2ft 3iin
long by 1 ft Sin deep ovcral!.
e P,nnant qfUS 8th TD Group, March 1945. The 1944
version was in black and orange only, lhe shape
being a stylized representalion of lhe cross-section
was added over halfoflhe black as a compl imenlto
lhe auachmcnt of lhe 281St field Artillery Sn. 10
lhe Croup in the Remagen bridgehead in March
1945. Other Croup units were the 629th, 6561h,
814th, 81 7th, 893rd and 899th TD Sns; lWO lroops
of 14th Cavalry; and 16th Belgian Fusilier Sn.
d Flag qf US 6/h TD Group, 1944. Overall dimen-
sion, 4ft long and 3ft deep.
H (IOp) SP lpdr. Archer oC314 Battery,
105th AT Regt. RA, British V Corps; Italy,
1944
Front travclli ng- view ofthe Archer. In contrast
la the overall dark olive green of lhe other British
vehicJes dcpicted, this gun sports lhe alternativc
colour rOl" the Italian front, officially described as
'Iight mud'. Markings are limi ted 10 lhe serial and
the vehicle name, 'DEFIANT' .
H (boltom) SP lpdr. Archer oC divisional
AT regiJn.ent RA, 15th Sottisb Division;
North-West Europe, winter 1944- 45
Rear- business end !- view of the Archer; note
extra rail welded across rear deck 10 hold jcrrycans,
etc. The RA flash bears lhe '46' of an illfantry
division's integral AT regiment. The central
marking, a blue square with a red comer, is lhe
batteryftroop idenlification, the red comer moving
around lhe square aecording 10 lhe lroop. The
divisional sign is on the right.
Tbe la.t oC the big-gua tank d e.troyen, the Charioteer,
could otrer DO Un.proveDleDt UpoD the fire..power available
to cODteDlporary batde tanlu. (RAe Taok MuseUID)
of an AP shell with a false ogive. The red seclion ~ "; .. .l.
39
Notes sur les planches en couleur
A Le canon.nier (}, gauche) donnc l'ordu de tiur; IOn second (a droite) .se
pTipare},actlOnner le manisme dc ti r, landisquc lcehargcur (premicr plan)
,'aplatit pour ctn: hors de porlee du mouvnncnt de n:cul dc la CUlaMC. On
,::
montrcladispolilionintcrieurcgnmleduvchlculc,aveclc'puilS'dansla
panielOmbrc.
B{_ haut) La coulcurdo "chicules blinds US n'itait pa$ toujours Olir>t DNlb
unie en Sicile ou en I talie, c:omme id, le revetemem de camoullage des

..
9ue Ics.,hiculo des lipes de Crom ne portaiem pa$lOu"em
mscriptlOnJ d'identification reglcmetalTu de l'unit. c.:. IIl$Cripl10ns
- le bataillon; ' 8-14' - la
e (oen hauI) Les clebres Fusilien Marins pcignaient le nom de leun anciens
bateaux surkun M tos. Le 'Y' doigue le rgimel1lde la division; IOlroisbarrt$

Franec par-dosus, lacroixde Lorraine, est I'in.sig.ne de la d.ivision. (en ba.)
l;inscripl1on: 'I)Qn't \Vant 'A' (Onn'cn\'cuI pas), 3tnl, quela pm-upcn maIllot,
IOn! l'a:uvre de I'equipage. Le 't6' correspond a une classifieation de poids
permel1antlepassagedesponl.
D Vhieu!e du rcgi.menl qui prit pan a la clebre batailJe de Sidi Rezegh le I
Novembrc I!}t .. qut val"t au 1.1. Ward G"nn Victoria Cross po$dmmc
L'nnblcmcdcd""sion$C tron"e audessusde l'tnllgne rglmcntal qui at le
llumiro'55'pcimenblanclurfondbleuet rouge, eodede la Royal Artillery
. (en ha".t) Le laurea" noir esl )'jnsigne de "Ih Armoure:d les
tns'gm:s rcg,mentaux du rgimen! imgral anll-char d'unc d,vision bllllde

l'artillerie esl sunnont& de la barre de tOUI IOUS !e
commandemenl des CJrpt.. La pelles a l'ami're du MIo IOnt p:rur I'mCantene
d'esoorte.
FI Tcnur de cor',& du d5cn type, ave<: manteau coun, el le 'cdnturou de
aux couleundu t'a La c:omhinason rglnnentain:gri. JvCTe
pale des lmupcs bhndm el da manos US ponee a\'e<: la vcrsioro d'Etc du
IRJnluHtlpk calot, Q: calot est borde dejaunc, de blf:u el de rouge, dsignant

aUlomtt en Man 1943. F3 La lenue de con'ee Iype du soldal US dalll k
Pacifique esl accompagn:e du casque de l'equipage de char. G.t Le ])rel



pantalon impenncable dc l'inCanlerie; el da hones faita a partir dc holles


Icdr.apeaudugroupe;cI:'tl'arriere,unebarrcverticalc blancheindiqucqu'ilcn
oOieter.
H ( .... haut) En l talie,eetteeouleur,domlenomo!l1ciclest 'houec1aire',lail
parfoisadoplceparl'arlllcebrilanniquepourscsvhicules,ordinairemenlpeints
d'uII "erl olive. O: vchieule n'a que 1011 numcrod'immalriculation el..,n nom,
'De.fiant'. (en bu) Le numcro '46' lur rouge esll'insigne du
antichan d'une diviSlon d",Cantcne. La plaque ccntrale
mdiquela battCTlCet la troupe; la pJaquedcdroiteesleellcde la tsth Division .
Farbtafem
A Der Kanonier (lino) gibt dcn 8dchl zum Schiesscn; sein AMuten (rechc.)
bcrcilctlch vordic Schnurzu ziehen, um das GCSChIZabzukuern, wahn:tld
der Lader leh aus dem \Vcgc da zurucklauCenden VenchluSlSludes hinlcgl.
Dn::i Rcihcn ' i\lunitionsaufbewahrrhre' lnd lchtbar, wovon zwei sieh in cinCT
' Kuhne' umeT den Dcckplatten bcfinden. Unten kann man die allgnntine
Innencinrichlungdes Fahrzcugs,mitdunkel angroeuteter'Bhne'sehcn
B (ob.. .. ) Von :il wan::ndic US Panu:ahrzcugeniehldurchausOlitv
Drd angt$trichen, IOIlckm grob mil cincr hellcnm Farbc fJ:etaml
gewhnlichC1Wei.se in Si7.ilicn oder Italien, wie hierder F!lll isl. Die wiederhohen
... cisscn Seerne auf diom deuten auf cinc Angsllichkcit, daJI die
MannKhaftell an den lIanden ,"Orcilig..r Crcundlicher Anillensten leiden
knnletl! ( ......... ) TY,Pischcr Ol;ot Drd Anslrich, dcsscn cinzigt'
AUS.5CffJ:ewohnlichkcil m dcrTauache hcgl, dasa die .-ahrzcuge dCT Vordcnrop-
lletl SCltCIl die volle Rcihe der 8euichnungcn Irugen, wodurch die Einhc;1
erhnnbar war. Diese Markierungen bcdeulen: '3A' - US 3rd Army: '705TD'
_ das Balaillon: '8-14' _ die Kompagnic und das einzelne Fahneug.
e (oben) Die lIeruhmlen ' Fusilicrs Marin,' haOcn die Namcn hrer
chemaligcn $chifl'c aufihrc tO angestrichen. Das 'Y' bcdeUlel das Rcgimenl
innerhalbderDivision.dicdreisenkreehteStabe,dieKompagnie:dieLagedCT
Kompagniesmarkierung, den ZUfJ:;.die Landkane Frankn:ichs ,,:,il daruhcf'g:dcg-
tem Lolhringerkrcuz ist das Divislonscmblcm. (UDten) Der Tllel 'Don't \Vant
'A' (hab' kene Lust) und das im Badcanzug gekleidelc Pin-up-GirJ sind
zusatzliehc Markierungennach \\'unschdcr/o.lannschan. Das't6'bcdcute tcine
GcwichtsklassifizierullfJ:in HezichungaufdieTragfahigkeitderBreken
D Fllhrzeug des RcgimentJ, das zu Sidi Rczcgh am November 1941 die
heri,hmtc Aktion bckJ,mpftc, worin der I..-:umant \Varo Gunn en po$tlnnes ve
\'erdicmc. Das Di "isionscmblcm liegl oherhaJb des Rcgimcntskennzclchcn, die
wcissc Schlussclnummcr '55' aufder rot_blaucn Grundfarbe der Royal Arlillcry
E (obfll ) DcT $Chwanc Sticr 1" das Divisionsemblem der 11th Armoured
J)i,-ision; zu dieser Zel war die weissc Nummer '77' das Kcnnzcichen des
integriertcn PanurabwehfTcgimenlS ci ner Panzerdivision, die au,f
blauen Gnmdrarbc der Artillerie uOcrgdegt wurde. (UJlten) Der Wikmgschtlrlst
das t;mblem des V CJrpl, und das rotblaue Kennzciehen der Artilleric tragt
obcn den wcisscn Stab mil der 8edeutung cines Rcgiments, das ,vm KorpoI
befehliglwar_DieSpatcnhimenamMtOlndfiirdiemitfahrendc l nfanlerie,

\"Of'SehriClSmiusige hcllgrau_grne cinlcilige Combiul1ifonn der US Pan-
zertruppcn uoo .'ahrzcu$*l"hloucr, mil dcr Sornmerreldmut1:C Krsnu cllf
gelragen. Die Mutle lt m'l gclbem, TOIem and Schnurbcsau
die farbcn der drei Wafl'cngauungen aos dencn dIe Mannscharlen mrdle Tank
Deslroyer Force PanZ(:rzerstorerfonnation) henlammten: Kavallcrie, Arlil_
t1{3r
SoIdalen im Sltllcn Ouan ",ird mil dem Stunhelm der Panunnanll$Chaften
fJ:etragen. e" I)ie Fcldmut ze ",urde im J ahn: '943 durch die khaki-
8askcnmutze ersctzl. Di cscr Kommlmdeur cines Gachulzcs aur selbslfahrender
Lafelte tr .. gt rolgendc am Anncl: "on obcn naeh uuten: 30 CJrps;
Royal Artillery; Rangszcichen Artillcric-sergeants. IXr Stahlhelm ohne
Rander "'tadc v.on den Manuschaflcn dcr
gelTagcn. G'J" Origmal CranrosJche Malrosenmtze m,1 amenkamschCT

SlicCd aU$ hergeslclh, VOTllC am
Hclm Iriigl er ein Abzug.des der Tank Destroyer Force, das
auch an seinem linkcn Anncl zu sehcn ist; umcr dcm bcfindel sieh sein
An der Seite des befindel sich ein zwciter Abzug in
Form dcr Fahnc seincr Grullpe und hmten cin weS5cr Stab, dCT ihn als OOi ... ier
hneichnel,
H (obClil ) In It alien wurdc dicsc Farhe, amllieh als li,M mil" (htl l-Drcck)
hneichnet, manehmal britischcn f'ahr-zo:ugcn anslal! dem
Olivengron Die einzige Kennzclehen dieses Fahrzcugs Jmd dIe
Seriennummer und sein Name 'Oo:fiam' ( .... ten) Die Nummer '46' aufrot-
blauem Grund iSl das Kennuichcn intcgricrlcn PanzcrabwehfTcgimentes
einer l nfanlericdivision. l nderMittebcfindc:tsichdas Kennzcicl1enderBalIerie
und des Trupps; rechlSdas Kennzciehcndcr 15th Divuion.
British 7th Annoured Division
Panzer-Grcnaruer Division
US Istlnfantry Division
Fallschinnpanzerdivision Goring'
US IOlstAirbomeDivision
The Lee/Grant Tanks in British Service
2nd SS Panzer Division 'Das Reich'
US 1st Marine Division
British Guards Annoured Division
10 Allied Tank Dcstroyers