Professional Documents
Culture Documents
:oreover" respondents ;ecame owners of their respective hereditar1 shares from the
moment (icente Ta;anao died.
3
A prior settlement of the estate" or even the appointment of 0alvacion Ta;anao as e?ecutri? or
administratri?" is not necessar1 for an1 of the heirs to ac=uire legal capacit1 to sue. As successors who
stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his death" the1 can commence an1 action originall1
pertaining to the decedent.
*
From the moment of his death" his rights as a partner and to demand
fulfillment of petitioner<s o;ligations as outlined in their dissolution agreement were transmitted to
respondents. The1" therefore" had the capacit1 to sue and seek the court<s intervention to compel
petitioner to fulfill his o;ligations.
Finall1" petitioner contends that the trial court should have dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription" arguing that respondents< action prescri;ed four (3) 1ears after it accrued in !#$+. The trial
court and the Court of Appeals gave scant consideration to petitioner<s hollow arguments" and rightl1 so.
The three () final stages of a partnership are: (!) dissolutionD (,) winding%upD and () termination.
+
The
partnership" although dissolved" continues to e?ist and its legal personalit1 is retained" at which time it
completes the winding up of its affairs" including the partitioning and distri;ution of the net partnership
assets to the partners.
2
For as long as the partnership e?ists" an1 of the partners ma1 demand an
accounting of the partnership<s ;usiness. 6rescription of the said right starts to run onl1 upon the
dissolution of the partnership when the final accounting is done.
$
Contrar1 to petitioner<s protestations that respondents< right to in=uire into the ;usiness affairs of the
partnership accrued in !#$+" prescri;ing four (3) 1ears thereafter" prescription had not even ;egun to run
in the a;sence of a final accounting. Article !$3, of the Civil Code provides:
The right to an account of his interest shall accrue to an1 partner" or his legal representative as
against the winding up partners or the surviving partners or the person or partnership continuing
the ;usiness" at the date of dissolution" in the a;sence of an1 agreement to the contrar1.
Applied in relation to Articles !$72 and !$7#" which also deal with the dut1 to account" the a;ove%cited
provision states that the right to demand an accounting accrues at the date of dissolution in the a;sence
of an1 agreement to the contrar1. Ahen a final accounting is made" it is onl1 then that prescription ;egins
to run. In the case at ;ar" no final accounting has ;een made" and that is precisel1 what respondents are
seeking in their action ;efore the trial court" since petitioner has failed or refused to render an accounting
of the partnership<s ;usiness and assets. @ence" the said action is not ;arred ;1 prescription.
In fine" the trial court neither erred nor a;used its discretion when it denied petitioner<s motions to dismiss.
8ikewise" the Court of Appeals did not commit reversi;le error in upholding the trial court<s orders.
6recious time has ;een lost 5ust to settle this preliminar1 issue" with petitioner resurrecting the ver1 same
arguments from the trial court all the wa1 up to the 0upreme Court. The litigation of the merits and
su;stantial issues of this controvers1 is now long overdue and must proceed without further dela1.
9!EREFORE, in view of all the foregoing" the instant petition is DEN#ED for lack of merit" and the case is
REMANDED to the 'egional Trial Court of CadiB Cit1" 9ranch +7" which is ORDERED to determine the
proper docket fee ;ased on the estimated amount that plaintiffs therein seek to collect" and direct said
plaintiffs to pa1 the same within a reasona;le time" provided the applica;le prescriptive or reglementar1
period has not 1et e?pired. Thereafter" the trial court is ORDERED to conduct the appropriate
proceedings in Civil Case )o. 3!+%C.
Costs against petitioner.'(%p$i'.n)t
'O ORDERED.
:G.R. No. 1137(5. &+n/ (9, (000;
&O!NNY '. RA"AD#LLA, , vs. %OUR OF A$$EAL' AND MAR#A MARLENA
%O'%OLUELLA Y "ELLEZA V#LLA%ARLO',
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals" dated Decem;er ," !##" in
CA%&.'. )o. C(%****" which set aside the decision of 9ranch *, of the 'egional Trial Court in
9acolod Cit1" and ordered the defendants%appellees 8including $erein petitioner:, as heirs of Dr.
.orge 'a;adilla" to reconve1 title over 8ot )o. !#," together with its fruits and interests" to the
estate of Ale5a 9elleBa.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a Codicil appended to the 8ast Aill and Testament of testatri? Ale5a 9elleBa" Dr. .orge
'a;adilla" predecessor%in%interest of the herein petitioner" .ohnn1 0. 'a;adilla" was instituted as
a devisee of *!!" $** s=uare meters of that parcel of land surve1ed as 8ot )o. !#, of the
9acolod Cadastre. The said Codicil" which was dul1 pro;ated and admitted in 0pecial
6roceedings )o. 373+ ;efore the then Court of First Instance of )egros 4ccidental" contained the
following provisions:
-FI'0T
I give" leave and ;e=ueath the following propert1 owned ;1 me to Dr. .orge 'a;adilla
resident of !3! 6. (illanueva" 6asa1 Cit1:
(a) 8ot )o. !#, of the 9acolod Cadastre" covered ;1 Transfer Certificate of Title )o. 'T%
377, (!7#3,)" which is registered in m1 name according to the records of the 'egister of
Deeds of )egros 4ccidental.
(;) That should .orge 'a;adilla die ahead of me" the aforementioned propert1 and the
rights which I shall set forth herein;elow" shall ;e inherited and acknowledged ;1 the
children and spouse of .orge 'a;adilla.
???
F4C'T@
(a)....It is also m1 command" in this m1 addition (Codicil)" that should I die and .orge
'a;adilla shall have alread1 received the ownership of the said 8ot )o. !#, of the
9acolod Cadastre" covered ;1 Transfer Certificate of Title )o. 'T%377, (!7#3,)" and also
at the time that the lease of 9al;inito &. &uanBon of the said lot shall e?pire" .orge
'a;adilla shall have the o;ligation until he dies" ever1 1ear to give to :aria :arlina
Coscolluela 1 9elleBa" 0event1 (2*) (sic) piculs of >?port sugar and Twent1 Five (,*)
piculs of Domestic sugar" until the said :aria :arlina Coscolluela 1 9elleBa dies.
FIFT@
(a) 0hould .orge 'a;adilla die" his heir to whom he shall give 8ot )o. !#, of the
9acolod Cadastre" covered ;1 Transfer Certificate of Title )o. 'T%377, (!73#,)" shall
have the o;ligation to still give 1earl1" the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of
his testament" to :aria :arlina Coscolluela 1 9elleBa on the month of Decem;er of each
1ear.
0IMT@
I command" in this m1 addition (Codicil) that the 8ot )o. !#," in the event that the one to
whom I have left and ;e=ueathed" and his heir shall later sell" lease" mortgage this said
8ot" the ;u1er" lessee" mortgagee" shall have also the o;ligation to respect and deliver
1earl1 4)> @C)D'>D (!77) piculs of sugar to :aria :arlina Coscolluela 1 9elleBa" on
each month of Decem;er" 0>(>)T/ FI(> (2*) piculs of >?port and TA>)T/ FI(> (,*)
piculs of Domestic" until :aria :arlina shall die" lastl1 should the ;u1er" lessee or the
mortgagee of this lot" not have respected m1 command in this m1 addition (Codicil)"
:aria :arlina Coscolluela 1 9elleBa" shall immediatel1 seiBe this 8ot )o. !#, from m1
heir and the latter<s heirs" and shall turn it over to m1 near desendants" (sic) and the latter
shall then have the o;ligation to give the 4)> @C)D'>D (!77) piculs of sugar until
:aria :arlina shall die. I further command in this m1 addition (Codicil) that m1 heir and
his heirs of this 8ot )o. !#," that the1 will o;e1 and follow that should the1 decide to
sell" lease" mortgage" the1 cannot negotiate with others than m1 near descendants and
m1 sister.-
6ursuant to the same Codicil" 8ot )o. !#, was transferred to the deceased" Dr. .orge 'a;adilla"
and Transfer Certificate of Title )o. 333#$ thereto issued in his name.
Dr. .orge 'a;adilla died in !#$ and was survived ;1 his wife 'ufina and children .ohnn1
(petitioner)" Aurora" 4felia and Oenaida" all surnamed 'a;adilla.
4n August ,!" !#$#" :aria :arlena Coscolluela 1 9elleBa (illacarlos ;rought a complaint"
docketed as Civil Case )o. **$$" ;efore 9ranch *, of the 'egional Trial Court in 9acolod Cit1"
against the a;ove%mentioned heirs of Dr. .orge 'a;adilla" to enforce the provisions of su;5ect
Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant%heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil" in
that:
!. 8ot )o. !#, was mortgaged to the 6hilippine )ational 9ank and the 'epu;lic 6lanters
9ank in disregard of the testatri?<s specific instruction to sell" lease" or mortgage onl1 to
the near descendants and sister of the testatri?.
,. Defendant%heirs failed to compl1 with their o;ligation to deliver one hundred (!77)
piculs of sugar (2* piculs e?port sugar and ,* piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff :aria
:arlena Coscolluela 1 9elleBa from sugar crop 1ears !#$* up to the filing of the
complaint as mandated ;1 the Codicil" despite repeated demands for compliance.
. The ;anks failed to compl1 with the +th paragraph of the Codicil which provided that in
case of the sale" lease" or mortgage of the propert1" the ;u1er" lessee" or mortgagee
shall likewise have the o;ligation to deliver !77 piculs of sugar per crop 1ear to herein
private respondent.
The plaintiff then pra1ed that 5udgment ;e rendered ordering defendant%heirs to reconve1Ereturn%
8ot )o. !#, to the surviving heirs of the late Ale5a 9elleBa" the cancellation of TCT )o. 333#$ in
the name of the deceased" Dr. .orge 'a;adilla" and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the
names of the surviving heirs of the late Ale5a 9elleBa.
4n Fe;ruar1 ,+" !##7" the defendant%heirs were declared in default ;ut on :arch ,$" !##7 the
4rder of Default was lifted" with respect to defendant .ohnn1 0. 'a;adilla" who filed his Answer"
accordingl1.
During the pre%trial" the parties admitted that:
4n )ovem;er !*" !##$" the plaintiff 8private respondent: and a certain Alan ABurin" son%in%law of
the herein petitioner who was lessee of the propert1 and acting as attorne1%in%fact of defendant%
heirs" arrived at an amica;le settlement and entered into a :emorandum of Agreement on the
o;ligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar" to the following effect:
-That for crop 1ear !#$$%$#" the annuit1 mentioned in >ntr1 )o. 3#723 of TCT )o. 333$#
will ;e delivered not later than .anuar1 of !#$#" more specificall1" to wit:
2* piculs of <A< sugar" and ,* piculs of <9< sugar" or then e?isting in an1 of
our names" :ar1 'ose 'a;adilla 1 ABurin or Alan ABurin" during
Decem;er of each sugar crop 1ear" in ABucar 0ugar CentralD and" this is
considered compliance of the annuit1 as mentioned" and in the same
manner will compliance of the annuit1 ;e in the ne?t succeeding crop
1ears.
That the annuit1 a;ove stated for crop 1ear !#$*%$+" !#$+%$2" and !#$2%$$" will ;e
complied in cash e=uivalent of the num;er of piculs as mentioned therein and which is as
herein agreed upon" taking into consideration the composite price of sugar during each
sugar crop 1ear" which is in the total amount of 4)> @C)D'>D FI(> T@4C0A)D
6>040 (6!7*"777.77).
That the a;ove%mentioned amount will ;e paid or delivered on a staggered cash installment"
pa1a;le on or ;efore the end of Decem;er of ever1 sugar crop 1ear" to wit:
For !#$*%$+" TA>)T/ 0IM T@4C0A)D TA4 @C)D'>D FIFT/ (6,+",*7.77) 6esos" pa1a;le
on or ;efore Decem;er of crop 1ear !#$$%$#D
For !#$+%$2" TA>)T/ 0IM T@4C0A)D TA4 @C)D'>D FIFT/ (6,+",*7.77) 6esos" pa1a;le
on or ;efore Decem;er of crop 1ear !#$#%#7D
For !#$2%$$" TA>)T/ 0IM T@4C0A)D TA4 @C)D'>D FIFT/ (6,+",*7.77) 6esos" pa1a;le
on or ;efore Decem;er of crop 1ear !##7%#!D and
For !#$$%$#" TA>)T/ 0IM T@4C0A)D TA4 @C)D'>D FIFT/ (6,+",*7.77) 6esos" pa1a;le
on or ;efore Decem;er of crop 1ear !##!%#,.-
@owever" there was no compliance with the aforesaid :emorandum of Agreement e?cept for a
partial deliver1 of *7.$7 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop 1ear !#$$ %!#$#.
4n .ul1 ,," !##!" the 'egional Trial Court came out with a decision" dismissing the complaint
and disposing as follows:
-A@>'>F4'>" in the light of the aforegoing findings" the Court finds that the action is
prematurel1 filed as no cause of action against the defendants has as 1et arose in favor
of plaintiff. Ahile there ma1;e the non%performance of the command as mandated
e?action from them simpl1 ;ecause the1 are the children of .orge 'a;adilla" the title
holderEowner of the lot in =uestion" does not warrant the filing of the present complaint.
The remed1 at ;ar must fall. Incidentall1" ;eing in the categor1 as creditor of the left
estate" it is opined that plaintiff ma1 initiate the intestate proceedings" if onl1 to esta;lish
the heirs of .orge 'a;adilla and in order to give full meaning and sem;lance to her claim
under the Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings" the Complaint ;eing prematurel1 filed is
DI0:I00>D without pre5udice.
04 4'D>'>D.-
4n appeal ;1 plaintiff" the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
courtD ratiocinating and ordering thus:
-Therefore" the evidence on record having esta;lished plaintiff%appellant<s right to receive
!77 piculs of sugar annuall1 out of the produce of 8ot )o. !#,D defendants%appellee<s
o;ligation under Ale5a 9elleBa<s codicil" as heirs of the modal heir" .orge 'a;adilla" to
deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff%appellantD defendants%appellee<s admitted non%
compliance with said o;ligation since !#$*D and" the punitive conse=uences en5oined ;1
;oth the codicil and the Civil Code" of seiBure of 8ot )o. !#, and its reversion to the
estate of Ale5a 9elleBa in case of such non%compliance" this Court deems it proper to
order the reconve1ance of title over 8ot )o. !#, from the estates of .orge 'a;adilla to
the estate of Ale5a 9elleBa. @owever" plaintiff%appellant must institute separate
proceedings to re%open Ale5a 9elleBa<s estate" secure the appointment of an
administrator" and distri;ute 8ot )o. !#, to Ale5a 9elleBa<s legal heirs in order to enforce
her right" reserved to her ;1 the codicil" to receive her legac1 of !77 piculs of sugar per
1ear out of the produce of 8ot )o. !#, until she dies.
Accordingl1" the decision appealed from is 0>T A0ID> and another one entered ordering
defendants%appellees" as heirs of .orge 'a;adilla" to reconve1 title over 8ot )o. !#,"
together with its fruits and interests" to the estate of Ale5a 9elleBa.
04 4'D>'>D.-
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition ;1 the Court of Appeals" petitioner found his wa1 to this
Court via the present petition" contending that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the
reversion of 8ot !#, to the estate of the testatri? Ale5a 9elleBa on the ;asis of paragraph + of the
Codicil" and in ruling that the testamentar1 institution of Dr. .orge 'a;adilla is a modal institution
within the purview of Article $$, of the )ew Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
6etitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in accordance with
Article $$, of the )ew Civil Code on modal institutions and in deviating from the sole issue raised
which is the a;sence or prematurit1 of the cause of action. 6etitioner maintains that Article $$,
does not find application as there was no modal institution and the testatri? intended a mere
simple su;stitution % i.e. the instituted heir" Dr. .orge 'a;adilla" was to ;e su;stituted ;1 the
testatri?<s -near descendants- should the o;ligation to deliver the fruits to herein private
respondent ;e not complied with. And since the testatri? died single and without issue" there can
;e no valid su;stitution and such testamentar1 provision cannot ;e given an1 effect.
The petitioner theoriBes further that there can ;e no valid su;stitution for the reason that the
su;stituted heirs are not definite" as the su;stituted heirs are merel1 referred to as -near
descendants- without a definite identit1 or reference as to who are the -near descendants- and
therefore" under Articles $3 and $3* of the )ew Civil Code" the su;stitution should ;e deemed
as not written.
The contentions of petitioner are untena;le. Contrar1 to his supposition that the Court of Appeals
deviated from the issue posed ;efore it" which was the propriet1 of the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground of prematurit1 of cause of action" there was no such deviation. The Court of
Appeals found that the private respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner. The
dis=uisition made on modal institution was" precisel1" to stress that the private respondent had a
legall1 demanda;le right against the petitioner pursuant to su;5ect CodicilD on which issue the
Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent and compulsor1 heirs are called to succeed ;1 operation of law.
The legitimate children and descendants" in relation to their legitimate parents" and the widow or
widower" are compulsor1 heirs. Thus" the petitioner" his mother and sisters" as compulsor1 heirs
of the instituted heir" Dr. .orge 'a;adilla" succeeded the latter ;1 operation of law" without need
of further proceedings" and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of
death of the decedent" Dr. .orge 'a;adilla.
Cnder Article 22+ of the )ew Civil Code" inheritance includes all the propert1" rights and
o;ligations of a person" not e?tinguished ;1 his death. Conforma;l1" whatever rights Dr. .orge
'a;adilla had ;1 virtue of su;5ect Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs" at the time of his
death. And since o;ligations not e?tinguished ;1 death also form part of the estate of the
decedentD corollaril1" the o;ligations imposed ;1 the Codicil on the deceased Dr. .orge 'a;adilla"
were likewise transmitted to his compulsor1 heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil" testatri? Ale5a 9elleBa devised 8ot )o. !#, to Dr. .orge 'a;adilla" su;5ect to
the condition that the usufruct thereof would ;e delivered to the herein private respondent ever1
1ear. Cpon the death of Dr. .orge 'a;adilla" his compulsor1 heirs succeeded to his rights and
title over the said propert1" and the1 also assumed his (decedent<s) o;ligation to deliver the fruits
of the lot involved to herein private respondent. 0uch o;ligation of the instituted heir reciprocall1
corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct" the fulfillment or performance of
which is now ;eing demanded ;1 the latter through the institution of the case at ;ar. Therefore"
private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing
the complaint ;elow.
6etitioner also theoriBes that Article $$, of the )ew Civil Code on modal institutions is not
applica;le ;ecause what the testatri? intended was a su;stitution % Dr. .orge 'a;adilla was to ;e
su;stituted ;1 the testatri?<s near descendants should there ;e noncompliance with the o;ligation
to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.
Again" the contention is without merit.
0u;stitution is the designation ;1 the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir
or heirs first instituted. Cnder su;stitutions in general" the testator ma1 either (!) provide for the
designation of another heir to whom the propert1 shall pass in case the original heir should die
;efore himEher" renounce the inheritance or ;e incapacitated to inherit" as in a simple su;stitution"
or (,) leave hisEher propert1 to one person with the e?press charge that it ;e transmitted
su;se=uentl1 to another or others" as in a fideicommissar1 su;stitution. The Codicil sued upon
contemplates neither of the two.
In simple su;stitutions" the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir ;1 reason
of incapacit1" predecease or renunciation. In the case under consideration" the provisions of
su;5ect Codicil do not provide that should Dr. .orge 'a;adilla default due to predecease"
incapacit1 or renunciation" the testatri?<s near descendants would su;stitute him. Ahat the Codicil
provides is that" should Dr. .orge 'a;adilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the
Codicil" the propert1 referred to shall ;e seiBed and turned over to the testatri?<s near
descendants.
)either is there a fideicommissar1 su;stitution here and on this point" petitioner is correct. In a
fideicommissar1 su;stitution" the first heir is strictl1 mandated to preserve the 2,o2/,.y and .o
.,an*7-. the same later to the second heir. In the case under consideration" the instituted heir is
in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the propert1 provided the negotiation is with the near
descendants or the sister of the testatri?. Thus" a ver1 important element of a fideicommissar1
su;stitution is lackingD the o;ligation clearl1 imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the
propert1 and its transmission to the second heir. -Aithout this o;ligation to preserve clearl1
imposed ;1 the testator in his will" there is no fideicommissar1 su;stitution.- Also" the near
descendants< right to inherit from the testatri? is not definite. The propert1 will onl1 pass to them
should Dr. .orge 'a;adilla or his heirs not fulfill the o;ligation to deliver part of the usufruct to
private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissar1 su;stitution is also missing here. Cnder Article
$+" the second heir or the fideicommissar1 to whom the propert1 is transmitted must not ;e
;e1ond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciar1. A fideicommissar1 su;stitution is therefore"
void if the first heir is not related ;1 first degree to the second heir. In the case under scrutin1" the
near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir" Dr. .orge 'a;adilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. .orge 'a;adilla under su;5ect
Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore" Article $$, of the )ew Civil Code is
the provision of law in point. Articles $$, and $$ of the )ew Civil Code provide:
Art. $$,. The statement of the o;5ect of the institution or the application of the propert1
left ;1 the testator" or the charge imposed on him" shall not ;e considered as a condition
unless it appears that such was his intention.
That which has ;een left in this manner ma1 ;e claimed at once provided that the
instituted heir or his heirs give securit1 for compliance with the wishes of the testator and
for the return of an1thing he or the1 ma1 receive" together with its fruits and interests" if
he or the1 should disregard this o;ligation.
Art. $$. Ahen without the fault of the heir" an institution referred to in the preceding
article cannot take effect in the e?act manner stated ;1 the testator" it shall ;e complied
with in a manner most analogous to and in conformit1 with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescri;ed in Article $$, is what is known in the law of
succession as an institucion su modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution" the testator
states (!) the o;5ect of the institution" (,) the purpose or application of the propert1 left ;1 the
testator" or () the charge imposed ;1 the testator upon the heir. A -mode- imposes an o;ligation
upon the heir or legatee ;ut it does not affect the efficac1 of his rights to the succession. 4n the
other hand" in a conditional testamentar1 disposition" the condition must happen or ;e fulfilled in
order for the heir to ;e entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends ;ut does not
o;ligateD and the mode o;ligates ;ut does not suspend. To some e?tent" it is similar to a
resolutor1 condition.
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon" it can ;e gleaned unerringl1 that the testatri?
intended that su;5ect propert1 ;e inherited ;1 Dr. .orge 'a;adilla. It is likewise clearl1 worded
that the testatri? imposed an o;ligation on the said instituted heir and his successors%in%interest to
deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent" :arlena Coscolluela
9elleBa" during the lifetime of the latter. @owever" the testatri? did not make Dr. .orge 'a;adilla<s
inheritance and the effectivit1 of his institution as a devisee" dependent on the performance of the
said o;ligation. It is clear" though" that should the o;ligation ;e not complied with" the propert1
shall ;e turned over to the testatri?<s near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. .orge
'a;adilla under su;5ect Codicil is evidentl1 modal in nature ;ecause it imposes a charge upon
the instituted heir without" however" affecting the efficac1 of such institution.
Then too" since testamentar1 dispositions are generall1 acts of li;eralit1" an o;ligation imposed
upon the heir should not ;e considered a condition unless it clearl1 appears from the Aill itself
that such was the intention of the testator. In case of dou;t" the institution should ;e considered
as modal and not conditional.
)either is there tena;ilit1 in the other contention of petitioner that the private respondent has onl1
a right of usufruct ;ut not the right to seiBe the propert1 itself from the instituted heir ;ecause the
right to seiBe was e?pressl1 limited to violations ;1 the ;u1er" lessee or mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Aills" when an uncertaint1 arises on the face of the Aill" as to the
application of an1 of its provisions" the testator<s intention is to ;e ascertained from the words of
the Aill" taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made. 0uch construction
as will sustain and uphold the Aill in all its parts must ;e adopted.
0u;5ect Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under o;ligation to deliver 4ne @undred (!77)
piculs of sugar 1earl1 to :arlena 9elleBa Coscuella. 0uch o;ligation is imposed on the instituted
heir" Dr. .orge 'a;adilla" his heirs" and their ;u1er" lessee" or mortgagee should the1 sell" lease"
mortgage or otherwise negotiate the propert1 involved. The Codicil further provides that in the
event that the o;ligation to deliver the sugar is not respected" :arlena 9elleBa Coscuella shall
seiBe the propert1 and turn it over to the testatri?<s near descendants. The non%performance of
the said o;ligation is thus with the sanction of seiBure of the propert1 and reversion thereof to the
testatri?<s near descendants. 0ince the said o;ligation is clearl1 imposed ;1 the testatri?" not onl1
on the instituted heir ;ut also on his successors%in%interest" the sanction imposed ;1 the testatri?
in case of non%fulfillment of said o;ligation should e=uall1 appl1 to the instituted heir and his
successors%in%interest.
0imilarl1 unsustaina;le is petitioner<s su;mission that ;1 virtue of the amica;le settlement" the
said o;ligation imposed ;1 the Codicil has ;een assumed ;1 the lessee" and whatever o;ligation
petitioner had ;ecome the o;ligation of the lesseeD that petitioner is deemed to have made a
su;stantial and constructive compliance of his o;ligation through the consummated settlement
;etween the lessee and the private respondent" and having consummated a settlement with the
petitioner" the recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of the o;ligation under the
amica;le settlement and not the seiBure of su;5ect propert1.
0uffice it to state that a Aill is a personal" solemn" revoca;le and free act ;1 which a person
disposes of his propert1" to take effect after his death. 0ince the Aill e?presses the manner in
which a person intends how his properties ;e disposed" the wishes and desires of the testator
must ;e strictl1 followed. Thus" a Aill cannot ;e the su;5ect of a compromise agreement which
would there;1 defeat the ver1 purpose of making a Aill.
9!EREFORE, the petition is here;1 DI0:I00>D and the decision of the Court of Appeals" dated
Decem;er ," !##" in CA%&.'. )o. C(%**** AFFI':>D. )o pronouncement as to costs
'O ORDERED.
G.R. No. 10))8( &an+a,y ((, 1996
"EL#NDA A<EDO, =o, 1/,*/3= and -n ,/2,/*/n.a.-on o= 1/, 0,o.1/,* and *-*./,*, and EOF#LA
%OR$UZ A<EDO, ,/2,/*/n.-n5 1/, 7-no, da+51./, VERNA A<EDO, vs. !E %OUR OF
A$$EAL', '$OU'E' R#%ARDO M. A<EDO AND ERE'#A "ARERA A<EDO,
Is a sale of future inheritance validK In multiple sales of the same real propert1" who has preference in
ownershipK Ahat is the pro;ative value of the lower court<s finding of good faith in registration of such
sales in the registr1 of propert1K These are the main =uestions raised in this 6etition for review on
certiorari under 'ule 3* of the 'ules of Court to set aside and reverse the Decision
!
of the Court of
Appeals
,
in CA%&.'. C( )4. ,3#$2 promulgated on 0eptem;er ,+" !##! affirming the decision of the
'egional Trial Court" 9ranch +" Third .udicial 'egion" Tarlac" Tarlac in Civil Case )o. +,$" and its
'esolution den1ing reconsideration thereof" promulgated on :a1 ,2" !##,.
91 the Court<s 'esolution on 4cto;er ,*" !##*" this case (along with several others) was transferred from
the First to the Third Division and after due deli;eration" the Court assigned it to the undersigned ponente
for the writing of this Decision.
/$e >acts
4n 4cto;er ,7" !#+," 8aBardo TaFedo e?ecuted a notariBed deed of a;solute sale in favor of his eldest
;rother" 'icardo TaFedo" and the latter<s wife" Teresita 9arera" private respondents herein" where;1 he
conve1ed to the latter in consideration of 6!"*77.77" -one hectare of whatever share I shall have over 8ot
)o. !#! of the cadastral surve1 of &erona" 6rovince of Tarlac and covered ;1 Title T%!$,# of the
'egister of Deeds of Tarlac-" the said propert1 ;eing his -future inheritance- from his parents (>?h. !).
Cpon the death of his father :atias" 8aBaro e?ecuted an -Affidavit of Conformit1- dated Fe;ruar1 ,$"
!#$7 (>?h. ) to -re%affirm" respect" acknowledge and validate the sale I made in !#+,.- 4n .anuar1 !"
!#$!" 8aBaro e?ecuted another notariBed deed of sale in favor of private respondents covering his
-undivided 4)> TA>8(> (!E!,) of a parcel of land known as 8ot !#! . . . - (>?h. 3). @e acknowledged
therein his receipt of 6!7"777.77 as consideration therefor. In Fe;ruar1 !#$!" 'icardo learned that 8aBaro
sold the same propert1 to his children" petitioners herein" through a deed of sale dated Decem;er ,#"
!#$7 (>?h. >). 4n .une 2" !#$," private respondents recorded the Deed of 0ale (>?h. 3) in their favor in
the 'egistr1 of Deeds and the corresponding entr1 was made in Transfer Certificate of Title )o. !++3*!
(>?h. *).
6etitioners on .ul1 !+" !#$, filed a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the deeds of sale e?ecuted
;1 8aBaro in favor of private respondents covering the propert1 inherited ;1 8aBaro from his father.
6etitioners claimed that their father" 8aBaro" e?ecuted an -A;solute Deed of 0ale- dated Decem;er ,#"
!#$7 (>?it. >). Conve1ing to his ten children his allotted portion tinder the e?tra5udicial partition e?ecuted
;1 the heirs of :atias" which deed included the land in litigation (8ot !#!).
6etitioners also presented in evidence: (!) a private writing purportedl1 prepared and signed ;1 :atias
dated Decem;er ,$" !#2$" stating that it was his desire that whatever inheritance 8aBaro would receive
from him should ;e given to his (8aBaro<s) children (>?h. A)D (,) a t1pewritten document dated :arch !7"
!#2# signed ;1 8aBaro in the presence of two witnesses" wherein he confirmed that he would voluntaril1
a;ide ;1 the wishes of his father" :atias" to give to his (8aBaro<s) children all the propert1 he would inherit
from the latter (>?h. 9)D and () a letter dated .anuar1 !" !#$7 of 8aBaro to his daughter" Carmela" stating
that his share in the e?tra5udicial settlement of the estate of his father was intended for his children"
petitioners herein (>?h. C).
6rivate respondents" however presented in evidence a -Deed of 'evocation of a Deed of 0ale- dated
:arch !," !#$! (>?h. +)" wherein 8aBaro revoked the sale in favor of petitioners for the reason that it was
-simulated or fictitious without an1 consideration whatsoever-.
0hortl1 after the case a !uo was filed" 8aBaro e?ecuted a sworn statement (>?h. &) which virtuall1
repudiated the contents of the Deed of 'evocation of a Deed of 0ale (>?h. +) and the Deed of 0ale (>?h.
3) in favor of private respondents. @owever" 8aBaro testified that he sold the propert1 to 'icardo" and that
it was a law1er who induced him to e?ecute a deed of sale in favor of his children after giving him five
pesos (6*.77) to ;u1 a -drink- (T0) 0eptem;er !$" !#$*" pp. ,73%,7*).
The trial court decided in favor of private respondents" holding that petitioners failed -to adduce a
proponderance of evidence to support (their) claim.- 4n appeal" the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court" ruling that the Deed of 0ale dated .anuar1 !" !#$! (>?h. #) was valid and that
its registration in good faith vested title in said respondents.
/$e Issues
6etitioners raised the following -errors- in the respondent Court" which the1 also now allege in the instant
6etition:
I. The trial court erred in concluding that the Contract of 0ale of 4cto;er ,7" !#+, (>?hi;it 2"
Answer) is merel1 voida;le or annula;le and not void a initio pursuant to paragraph , of Article
!32 of the )ew Civil Code involving as it does a -future inheritance-.
II. The trial court erred in holding that defendants%appellees acted in good faith in registering the
deed of sale of .anuar1 !" !#$! (>?hi;it #) with the 'egister of Deeds of Tarlac and therefore
ownership of the land in =uestion passed on to defendants%appellees.
III. The trial court erred in ignoring and failing to consider the testimonial and documentar1
evidence of plaintiffs%appellants which clearl1 esta;lished ;1 preponderance of evidence that the1
are indeed the legitimate and lawful owners of the propert1 in =uestion.
I(. The decision is contrar1 to law and the facts of the case and the conclusions drawn from the
esta;lished facts are illogical and off%tangent.
From the foregoing" the issues ma1 ;e restated as follows:
!. Is the sale of a future inheritance validK
,. Aas the su;se=uent e?ecution on .anuar1 !" !#$! (and registration with the 'egistr1 of
6ropert1) of a deed of sale covering the same propert1 to the same ;u1ers validK
. :a1 this Court review the findings of the respondent Court (a) holding that the ;u1ers acted in
good faith in registering the said su;se=uent deed of sale and (;) in -failing to consider
petitioners< evidence-K Are the conclusions of the respondent Court -illogical and off%tangent-K
/$e Court9s -uling
At the outset" let it ;e clear that the -errors- which are reviewa;le ;1 this Court in this petition for review
on certiorari are onl1 those allegedl1 committed ;1 the respondent Court of Appeals and not directl1 those
of the trial court" which is not a part1 here. The -assignment of errors- in the petition =uoted a;ove are
therefore totall1 misplaced" and for that reason" the petition should ;e dismissed. 9ut in order to give the
parties su;stantial 5ustice we have decided to delve into the issues as a;ove re%stated. The errors
attri;uted ;1 petitioners to the latter (trial) court will ;e discussed onl1 insofar as the1 are relevant to the
appellate court<s assailed Decision and 'esolution.
The sale made in !#+, involving future inheritance is not reall1 at issue here. In conte?t" the assailed
Decision conceded -it ma1 ;e legall1 correct that a contract of sale of anticipated future inheritance is null
and void.-
9ut to remove all dou;ts" we here;1 categoricall1 rule that" pursuant to Article !32 of the Civil Code"
-(n)o contract ma1 ;e entered into upon a future inheritance e?cept in cases e?pressl1 authoriBed ;1 law.-
Conse=uentl1" said contract made in !#+, is not valid and cannot ;e the source of an1 right nor the
creator of an1 o;ligation ;etween the parties.
@ence" the -affidavit of conformit1- dated Fe;ruar1 ,$" !#$7" insofar as it sought to validate or ratif1 the
!#+, sale" is also useless and" in the words of the respondent Court" -suffers from the same infirmit1.-
>ven private respondents in their memorandum
3
concede this.
@owever" the documents that are critical to the resolution of this case are: (a) the deed of sale of .anuar1
!" !#$! in favor of private respondents covering 8aBaro<s undivided inheritance of one%twelfth (!E!,)
share in 8ot )o. !#!" which was su;se=uentl1 registered on .une 2" !#$,D and (;) the deed of sale dated
Decem;er ,#" !#$7 in favor of petitioners covering the same propert1. These two documents were
e?ecuted after the death of :atias (and his spouse) and after a deed of e?tra%5udicial settlement of his
(:atias<) estate was e?ecuted" thus vesting in 8aBaro actual title over said propert1. In other words" these
dispositions" though conflicting" were no longer infected with the infirmities of the !#+, sale.
6etitioners contend that what was sold on .anuar1 !" !#$! was onl1 one%half hectare out of 8ot )o. !#!"
citing as authorit1 the trial court<s decision. As earlier pointed out" what is on review in these proceedings
;1 this Court is the Court of Appeals< decision J which correctl1 identified the su;5ect matter of the
.anuar1 !" !#$! sale to ;e the entire undivided !E!, share of 8aBaro in 8ot )o. !#! and which is the
same propert1 disposed of on Decem;er ,#" !#$7 in favor of petitioners.
Critical in determining which of these two deeds should ;e given effect is the registration of the sale in
favor of private respondents with the register of deeds on .une 2" !#$,.
Article !*33 of the Civil Code governs the preferential rights of vendees in cases of multiple sales" as
follows:
Art. !*33. If the same thing should have ;een sold to different vendees" the ownership shall ;e
transferred to the person who ma1 have first taken possession thereof in good faith" if it should ;e
mova;le propert1.
0hould it ;e immova;le propert1" the ownership shall ;elong to the person ac=uiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in the 'egistr1 of 6ropert1.
0hould there ;e no inscription" the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was
first in the possessionD and" in the a;sence thereof" to the person who presents the oldest title"
provided there is good faith.
The propert1 in =uestion is land" an immova;le" and following the a;ove%=uoted law" ownership shall
;elong to the ;u1er who in good faith registers it first in the registr1 of propert1. Thus" although the deed
of sale in favor of private respondents was later than the one in favor of petitioners" ownership would vest
in the former ;ecause of the undisputed fact of registration. 4n the other hand" petitioners have not
registered the sale to them at all.
6etitioners contend that the1 were in possession of the propert1 and that private respondents never took
possession thereof. As ;etween two purchasers" the one who registered the sale in his favor has a
preferred right over the other who has not registered his title" even if the latter is in actual possession of
the immova;le propert1.
*
As to third issue" while petitioners conceded the fact of registration" the1 nevertheless contended that it
was done in ;ad faith. 4n this issue" the respondent Court ruledD
Cnder the second assignment of error" plaintiffs%appellants contend that defendants%appellees
acted in ;ad faith when the1 registered the Deed of 0ale in their favor as appellee 'icardo
alread1 knew of the e?ecution of the deed of sale in favor of the plaintiffsD appellants cite the
testimon1 of plaintiff 9elinda TaFedo to the effect that defendant 'icardo TaFedo called her up on
.anuar1 3 or *" !#$! to tell her that he was alread1 the owner of the land in =uestion -;ut the
contract of sale ;etween our father and us were (sic) alread1 consumated- (pp. #%!7" tsn" .anuar1
+" !#$3). This testimon1 is o;viousl1 self%serving" and ;ecause it was a telephone conversation"
the deed of sale dated Decem;er ,#" !#$7 was not shownD 9elinda merel1 told her uncle that
there was alread1 a document showing that plaintiffs are the owners (p. $7). 'icardo TaFedo
controverted this and testified that he learned for the first time of the deed of sale e?ecuted ;1
8aBaro in favor of his children -a;out a month or sometime in Fe;ruar1 !#$!- (p. !!!" tsn" )ov.
,$" !#$3). . . .
+
The respondent Court" reviewing the trial court<s findings" refused to overturn the latter<s assessment of
the testimonial evidence" as followsD
Ae are not prepared to set aside the finding of the lower court upholding 'icardo TaFedo<s
testimon1" as it involves a matter of credi;ilit1 of witnesses which the trial 5udge" who presided at
the hearing" was in a ;etter position to resolve. (Court of Appeals< Decision" p. +.)
In this connection" we note the tenacious allegations made ;1 petitioners" ;oth in their ;asic petition and
in their memorandum" as follows:
!. The respondent Court allegedl1 ignored the claimed fact that respondent 'icardo -;1 fraud and
deceit and with foreknowledge- that the propert1 in =uestion had alread1 ;een sold to petitioners"
made 8aBaro e?ecute the deed of .anuar1 !" !#$!D
,. There is allegedl1 ade=uate evidence to show that onl1 !E, of the purchase price of
6!7"777.77 was paid at the time of the e?ecution of the deed of sale" contrar1 to the written
acknowledgment" thus showing ;ad faithD
. There is allegedl1 sufficient evidence showing that the deed of revocation of the sale in favor of
petitioners -was tainted with fraud or deceit.-
3. There is allegedl1 enough evidence to show that private respondents -took undue advantage
over the weakness and unschooled and pitiful situation of 8aBaro TaFedo . . .- and that
respondent 'icardo TaFedo -e?ercised moral ascendanc1 over his 1ounger ;rother he ;eing the
eldest ;rother and who reached fourth 1ear college of law and at one time a former (ice%
&overnor of Tarlac" while his 1ounger ;rother onl1 attained first 1ear high school . . . D
*. The respondent Court erred in not giving credence to petitioners< evidence" especiall1 8aBaro
TaFedo<s Sinumpaang Salaysay dated .ul1 ,2" !#$, stating that 'icardo TaFedo deceived the
former in e?ecuting the deed of sale in favor of private respondents.
To ;e sure" there are indeed man1 conflicting documents and testimonies as well as arguments over their
pro;ative value and significance. 0uffice it to sa1" however" that all the a;ove contentions involve
=uestions of fact" appreciation of evidence and credi;ilit1 of witnesses" which are not proper in this
review. It is well%settled that the 0upreme Court is not a trier of facts. In petitions for review under 'ule 3*
of the 'evised 'ules of Court" onl1 =uestions of law ma1 ;e raised and passed upon. A;sent an1
whimsical or capricious e?ercise of 5udgment" and unless the lack of an1 ;asis for the conclusions made
;1 the lower courts ;e ampl1 demonstrated" the 0upreme Court will not distur; their findings. At most" it
appears that petitioners have shown that their evidence was not ;elieved ;1 ;oth the trial and the
appellate courts" and that the said courts tended to give more credence to the evidence presented ;1
private respondents. 9ut this in itself is not a reason for setting aside such findings. Ae are far from
convinced that ;oth courts gravel1 a;used their respective authorities and 5udicial prerogatives.
As held in the recent case of C$ua /iong /ay vs. Court of "ppeals and Boldroc# Construction and
&evelopment Corp.
2
The Court has consistentl1 held that the factual findings of the trial court" as well as the Court of Appeals"
are final and conclusive and ma1 not ;e reviewed on appeal. Among the e?ceptional circumstances
where a reassessment of facts found ;1 the lower courts is allowed are when the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirel1 on speculation" surmises or con5ecturesD when the inference made is manifestl1 a;surd"
mistaken or impossi;leD when there is grave a;use of discretion in the appreciation of factsD when the
5udgment is premised on a misapprehension of factsD when the findings went ;e1ond the issues of the
case and the same are contrar1 to the admissions of ;oth appellant and appellee. After a careful stud1 of
the case at ;ench" we find none of the a;ove grounds present to 5ustif1 the re%evaluation of the findings of
fact made ;1 the courts ;elow.
In the same vein" the ruling in the recent case of Sout$ Sea Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Hon.
Court of "ppeals, et al.
$
is e=uall1 applica;le to the present case:
Ae see no valid reason to discard the factual conclusions of the appellate court. . . . (I)t is not the
function of this Court to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence" testimonial and
documentar1" adduced ;1 the parties" particularl1 where" such as here" the findings of ;oth the
trial court and the appellate court on the matter coincide. (emphasis supplied)
A@>'>F4'>" the petition is D>)I>D and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFI':>D.
)o Costs.
04 4'D>'>D.
G.R. No. L-)(75 Ma,>1 (3, 1909
$AULA %ONDE vs. ROMAN A"AYA
From the hearing of the appeal interposed ;1 'oman A;a1a in the special proceedings ;rought in the
Court of First Instance of 8a 8aguna for the settlement of the intestate estate and the distri;ution of the
propert1 of Casiano A;a1a it appears:
I. As antecedents: that Casiano A;a1a" unmarried" the son of 'omualdo A;a1a and 0a;rina 8a;adia"
died on the +th of April" !$##D that 6aula Conde" as the mother of the natural children .ose and Teopista
Conde" whom the states she had ;1 Casiano A;a1a" on the +th of )ovem;er" !#7*" moved the
settlement of the said intestate successionD that an administrator having ;een appointed for the said
estate on the ,*th of )ovem;er" !#7*" 'oman A;a1a" a son of the said 'omualdo A;a1a and 0a;rina
8a;adia" the parents of the late Casiano A;a1a" came forward and opposed said appointment and
claimed it for himself as ;eing the nearest relative of the deceasedD that this was granted ;1 the court
;elow on the #th of .anuar1" !#7+D that on the !2th of )ovem;er" !#7+" 'oman A;a1a moved that" after
due process of law" the court declare him to ;e the sole heir of Casiano A;a1a" to the e?clusion of all
other persons" especiall1 of 6aula Conde" and to ;e therefore entitled to take possession of all the
propert1 of said estate" and that it ;e ad5udicated to himD and that on )ovem;er ,," !#7+" the court
ordered the pu;lication of notices for the declaration of heirs and distri;ution of the propert1 of the estate.
II. That on the ,$th of )ovem;er" !#7+" 6aula Conde" in repl1ing to the foregoing motion of 'oman
A;a1a" filed a petition wherein she stated that she acknowledged the relationship alleged ;1 'oman
A;a1a" ;ut that she considered that her right was superior to his and moved for a hearing of the matter"
and" in conse=uence of the evidence that she intended to present she pra1ed that she ;e declared to
have preferential rights to the propert1 left ;1 Casiano A;a1a" and that the same ;e ad5udicated to her
together with the corresponding products thereof.
III. That the trial was held" ;oth parties presenting documentar1 and oral evidence" and the court ;elow
entered the following 5udgment:
That the administrator of the estate of Casiano A;a1a should recogniBe Teopista and .ose Conde
as ;eing natural children of Casiano A;a1aD that the petitioner 6aula Conde should succeed to
the hereditar1 rights of her children with respect to the inheritance of their deceased natural father
Casiano A;a1aD and therefore" it is here;1 declared that she is the onl1 heir to the propert1 of the
said intestate estate" to the e?clusion of the administrator" 'oman A;a1a.
I(. That 'oman A;a1a e?cepted to the foregoing 5udgment" appealed to this court" and presented the
following statement of errors:
!. The fact that the court ;elow found that an ordinar1 action for the acknowledgment of natural children
under articles !* and !2 of the Civil Code" might ;e ;rought in special pro;ate proceedings.
,. The finding that after the death of a person claimed to ;e an unacknowledged natural child" the mother
of such presumed natural child" as heir to the latter" ma1 ;ring an action to enforce the acknowledgment
of her deceased child in accordance with articles !* and !2 of the Civil Code.
. The finding in the 5udgment that the alleged continuos possession of the deceased children of 6aula
Conde of the status of natural children of the late Casiano A;a1a" has ;een full1 proven in these
proceedingsD and
3. 4n the h1pothesis that it was proper to ad5udicate the propert1 of this intestate estate to 6aula Conde"
as improperl1 found ;1 the court ;elow" the court erred in not having declared that said propert1 should
;e reserved in favor of relatives of Casiano A;a1a to the third degree" and in not having previousl1
demanded securities from 6aula Conde to guarantee the transmission of the propert1 to those who might
fall within the reservation.
As to the first error assigned" the =uestion is set up as to whether in special proceedings for the
administration and distri;ution of an intestate estate" an action might ;e ;rought to enforce the
acknowledgment of the natural child of the person from whom the inheritance is derived" that is to sa1"
whether one might appear as heir on the ground that he is a recogniBed natural child of the deceased" not
having ;een so recogniBed ;1 the deceased either voluntaril1 or compulsoril1 ;1 reason of a pree?isting
5udicial decision" ;ut asking at the same time that" in the special proceeding itself" he ;e recogniBed ;1
the presumed legitimate heirs of the deceased who claim to ;e entitled to the succession opened in the
special proceeding.
According to section 2$, of the Code of Civil 6rocedure J
If there shall ;e a controvers1 ;efore the Court of First Instance as to who the lawful heirs of the
deceased person are" or as to the distri;utive share to which each person is entitled under the
law" the testimon1 as to such controvers1 shall ;e taken in writing ;1 the 5udge" under oath" and
signed ;1 the witness. An1 part1 in interest whose distri;utive share is affected ;1 the
determination of such controvers1" ma1 appeal from the 5udgment of the Court of First Instance
determining such controvers1 to the 0upreme Court" within the time and in the manner provided
in the last preceding section.
This court has decided the present =uestion in the manner shown in the case of @uana *imentel vs.
Engracio *alanca (* 6hil. 'ep." 3+.)
The main =uestion with regard to the second error assigned" is whether or not the mother of a natural
child now deceased" ;ut who survived the person who" it is claimed" was his natural father" also
deceased" ma1 ;ring an action for the acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of such child in
order to appear in his ;ehalf to receive the inheritance from the person who is supposed to ;e his natural
father.
In order to decide in the affirmative the court ;elow has assigned the following as the onl1 foundation:
In resolving a similar =uestion :anresa sa1s: -An acknowledgment can onl1 ;e demanded ;1 the
natural child and his descendants whom it shall ;enefit" and should the1 ;e minors or otherwise
incapacitated" such person as legall1 represents themD the mother ma1 ask it in ;ehalf of her child
so long as he is under her authorit1.- 4n this point no positive declaration has ;een made"
undou;tedl1 ;ecause it was not considered necessar1. A private action is in =uestion and the
general rule must ;e followed. >lsewhere the same author adds: -It ma1 so happen that the child
dies ;efore four 1ears have e?pired after attaining ma5orit1" or that the document supporting his
petition for acknowledgment is discovered after his death" such death perhaps occurring after his
parents had died" as is supposed ;1 article !2" or during their lifetime. In an1 case such right of
action shall pertain to the descendants of the child whom the acknowledgment ma1 interest.-
(0ee Commentaries to arts. !* and !2" Civil Code" (ol. I.)
The a;ove doctrine" advanced ;1 one of the most eminent commentators of the Civil Code" lacks legal
and doctrinal foundation. The power to transmit the right of such action ;1 the natural child to his
descendants can not ;e sustained under the law" and still less to his mother.
It is without an1 support in law ;ecause the rule laid down in the code is most positive" limiting in form"
when esta;lishing the e?ception for the e?ercise of such right of action after the death of the presumed
parents" as is shown hereafter. It is not supported ;1 an1 doctrine" ;ecause up to the present time no
argument has ;een presented" upon which even an appro?imate conclusion could ;e ;ased.
Although the Civil Code considera;l1 improved the condition of recogniBed natural children" granting them
rights and actions that the1 did not possess under the former laws" the1 were not" however" placed upon
the same place as legitimate ones. The difference that separates these two classes of children is still
great" as proven ;1 so man1 articles dealing with the rights of the famil1 and the succession in relation to
the mem;ers thereof. It ma1 ;e laid down as legal ma?im" that whatever the code does not grant to the
legitimate children" or in connection with their rights" must still less ;e understood as granted to
recogniBed natural children or in connection with their rights. There is not a single e?ception in its
provisions.
If legitimac1 is the attri;ute that constitutes the ;asis of the a;solute famil1 rights of the child" the
acknowledgment of the natural child is" among illegitimate ones" that which unites him to the famil1 of the
father or the mother who recogniBed him" and affords him a participation in the rights of the famil1"
relativel1 advantageous according to whether the1 are alone or whether the1 concur with other individuals
of the famil1 of his purel1 natural father or mother.
Thus" in order to consider the spirit of the Civil Code" nothing is more logical than to esta;lish a
comparison ;etween an action to claim the legitimac1" and one to enforce acknowledgment.
A'T. !!$. The action to claim its legitimac1 ma1 ;e ;rought ;1 the child at an1 time of its lifetime
and shall ;e transmitted to its heirs" should it die during minorit1 or in a state of insanit1. In such
cases the heirs shall ;e allowed a period of five 1ears in which to institute the action.
The action alread1 instituted ;1 the child is transmitted ;1 its death to the heirs" if it has not lapsed ;efore
then.
A'T. !2. The actions for the acknowledgment of natural children can ;e instituted only during
the life of the presumed parents" e?cept in the following cases:
!. If the father or mother died during the maturit1 of the child" in which case t$e latter ma1 institute
the action ;efore the e?piration of the first four 1ears of its maturit1.
,. If" after the death of the father or mother" some instrument" ;efore unknown" should ;e
discovered in which the child is e?pressl1 acknowledged.
In this case the action must ;e instituted with the si? months following the discover1 of such
instrument.
4n this supposition the first difference that results ;etween one action and the other consists in that the
right of action for legitimac1 lasts during the whole lifetime of the child" that is" it can alwa1s ;e ;rought
against the presumed parents or their heirs ;1 the child itself" while the right of action for the
acknowledgment of a natural child does not last his whole lifetime" and" as a general rule" it can not ;e
instituted against the heirs of the presumed parents" inasmuch as it can ;e e?ercised only during the life
of the presumed parents.
Aith regard to the =uestion at issue" that is" the transmission to the heirs of the presumed parents of the
o;ligation to admit the legitimate filiation" or to recogniBe the natural filiation" there e?ists the most radical
difference in that the former continues during the life of the child who claims to ;e legitimate" and he ma1
demand it either directl1 and primaril1 from the said presumed parents" or indirectl1 and secondaril1 from
the heirs of the latterD while the second does not endure for lifeD as a general rule" it only lasts during the
life of the presumed parents. @ence the other difference" derived as a conse=uence" that an action for
legitimac1 is alwa1s ;rought against the heirs of the presumed parents in case of the death of the latter"
while the action for acknowledgment is not ;rought against the heirs of such parents" with the e?ception
of the two cases prescri;ed ;1 article !2 transcri;ed a;ove.
0o much for the passive transmission of the o;ligation to admit the legitimate filiation" or to acknowledge
the natural filiation.
As to the transmission to the heirs of the child of the latter9s action to claim his legitimac1" or to o;tain the
acknowledgment of his natural filiation" it is seen that the code grants it in the first case" ;ut not in the
second. It contains provisions for the transmission of the right of action which" for the purpose claiming his
legitimac1 inheres in the child" ;ut it does not sa1 a word with regard to the transmission of the right to
o;tain the acknowledgment of the natural filiation.
Therefore" the respective corollar1 of each of the two a;ove%cited articles is: (!) That the right of action
which devolves upon the child to claim his legitimac1 under article !!$" ma1 ;e transmitted to his heirs in
certain cases designated in the said articleD (,) That the right of action for the acknowledgment of natural
children to which article !2 refers" can never ;e transmitted" for the reason that the code makes no
mention of it in an1 case" not even as an e?ception.
It is most illogical and contrar1 to ever1 rule of correct interpretation" that the right of action to secure
acknowledgment ;1 the natural child should ;e presumed to ;e transmitted" independentl1" as a rule" to
his heirs" while the right of action to claim legitimac1 from his predecessor is not e?pressl1" independentl1"
or" as a general rule" conceded to the heirs of the legitimate child" ;ut onl1 relativel1 and as an e?ception.
Conse=uentl1" the pretension that the right of action on the part of the child to o;tain the acknowledgment
of his natural filiation is transmitted to his descendants is altogether unfounded. )o legal provision e?ists
to sustain such pretension" nor can an argument of presumption ;e ;ased on the lesser claim when there
is no ;asis for the greater one" and when it is onl1 given as an e?ception in well%defined cases. It is
placing the heirs of the natural child on a ;etter footing than the heirs of the legitimate one" when" as a
matter of fact" the position of a natural child is no ;etter than" no even e=ual to" that of a legitimate child.
From the e?press and precise precepts of the code the following conclusions are derived:
The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimac1 lasts during his whole life" while the
right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts onl1 during the life of his presumed parents.
Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his legitimac1 lasts during his whole life" he
ma1 e?ercise it either against the presumed parents" or their heirsD while the right of action to secure the
acknowledgment of a natural child" since it does not last during his whole life" ;ut depends on that of the
presumed parents" as a general rule can onl1 ;e e?ercised against the latter.
Csuall1 the right of action for legitimac1 devolving upon the child is of a personal character and pertains
e?clusivel1 to him" onl1 the child ma1 e?ercise it at an1 time during his lifetime. As an e?ception" and in
three cases onl1" it ma1 ;e transmitted to the heirs of the child" to wit" if he died during his minorit1" or
while insane" or after action had ;een alread1 instituted.
An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child ma1" as an e?ception" ;e e?ercised against the heirs
of the presumed parents in two cases: first" in the event of the death of the latter during the minorit1 of the
child" and second" upon the discover1 of some instrument of e?press acknowledgment of the child"
e?ecuted ;1 the father or mother" the e?istence of which was unknown during the life of the latter.
9ut such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can onl1 ;e e?ercised ;1 $im. It can not ;e
transmitted to his descendants" or his ascendants.
In support of the foregoing the following authorities ma1 ;e cited:
0ancheB 'oman" in his Treatise of Civil 8aw" propounds the =uestion as to whether said action should ;e
considered transmissive to the heirs or descendants of the natural child" whether he had or had not
e?ercised it up to the time of his death" and decides it as follows:
There is an entire a;sence of legal provisions" and at most" it might ;e deemed admissi;le as a
solution" that the right of action to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child is transmitted ;1
the analog1 to his heirs on the same conditions and terms that it is transmitted to the
descendants of a legitimate child" to claim his legitimac1" under article !!$" ;ut nothing moreD
;ecause on this point nothing warrants placing the heirs of a natural child on a ;etter footing than
those of the legitimate child" and even to compare them %ould not fail to e a strained and
!uestionale matter" and one of great difficulty for decision ;1 the courts" for the simple reason
that for the heirs of the legitimate child" the said article !!$ e?ists" while for those of the natural
child" as we have said" there is no provision in the code authoriBing the same" although on the
other hand there is none that prohi;its it. ((ol. (.)
DiaB &ui5arro and :artineB 'uiB in their work on -The Civil Code as construed ;1 the supreme court of
0pain"- commenting upon article !2" sa1:
Article !!$" taking into account the privileges due to the legitimac1 of children" grants them the
right to claim said legitimac1 during their lifetime" and even authoriBes the transmission of said
right for the space of five 1ears to the heirs thereof" if the child die during his minorit1 or in a state
of insanit1. 9ut as article !2 is ;ased on the consideration that in the case of a natural child" ties
are less strong and sacred in the e1es of the law" it does not fi? such a long and indefinite period
for the e?ercise of the actionD it limits it to the life of the parents" e?cepting in the two cases
mentioned in said articleD and it does not allo%" as does article !!$" the action to pass on to the
heirs" inasmuch as" although it does not prohi;it it" and for that reason it might ;e deemed on
general principles of law to consent to it" suc$ a supposition is inadmissile for the reason that a
comparison of ;oth articles shows that the silence of the law in the latter case is not" nor it can
;e" an omission" ;ut a deli;erate intent to esta;lish a wide difference ;etween the advantages
granted to a legitimate child and to a natural one.
(Iid." (ol. II" !2!.)
)avarro Amandi (Cuestionario del CCdigo Civil) raises the =uestion: -Can the heirs of a natural child claim
the acknowledgment in those cases wherein the father or mother are under o;ligation to acknowledge-K
And sa1s:
4pinions are widel1 divergent. The court of 'ennes held (on April !" !$33) that the right of
investigation forms a part of the estate of the child" and along with his patrimon1 is transmitted to
his heirs. The affirmation is altogether too categorical to ;e admissi;le. If it were correct the same
thing would happen as when the legitimac1 of a child is claimed" and as alread1 seen" the right of
action to demand the legitimac1 is not transmitted to the heirs in ever1 case and as an a;solute
right" ;ut under certain limitations and circumstances. )ow" were we to admit the doctrine of the
court of 'ennes" the result would ;e that the claim for natural filiation would ;e more favored than
one for legitimate filiation. This would ;e a;surd" ;ecause it can not ;e conceived that the
legislator should have granted a right of action to the heirs of the natural child" which is onl1
granted under great limitations and in ver1 few cases to those of a legitimate one. 0ome persons
insist that the same rules that govern legitimate filiation appl1 ;1 analog1 to natural child are
entitled to claim it in the cases prescri;ed ;1 the article !!$. The ma5orit1" however" are inclined
to consider the right to claim acknowledgment as a personal right" and conse=uentl1" not
transmissive to the heirs. 'eall1 there are no legal grounds to warrant the transmission. ((ol. ,"
,,#.)
In a decision like the present one it is impossi;le to ;ring forward the argument of analog1 for the purpose
of considering that the heirs of the natural child are entitled to the right of action which article !!$
concedes to the heirs of the legitimate child. The e?istence of a provision for the one case and the
a;sence thereof for the other is a conclusive argument that inclusio unius est exclusio alterius" and it can
not ;e understood that the provision of law should ;e the same when the same reason does not hold in
the one case as in the other.
The theor1 of law of transmission is also entirel1 inapplica;le in this case. This theor1" which in the
'oman 8aw e?pressed the general rule than an heir who did not accept an inheritance during his lifetime
was incapacitated from transmitting it to his own heirs" included at the same time the idea that if the
inheritance was not transmitted ;ecause the heir did not possess it" there were" however" certain things
which the heir held and could transmit. 0uch was the law and the right to accept the inheritance" for the
e?isting reason that all rights" ;oth real and personal" shall pass to the heirD !uia $aeres representat
defunctum in omnius et per omnia. According to the article +*# of the Civil Code" -the inheritance
includes all the propert1" rights" and o;ligations of a person" which are not e?tinguished ;1 his death.- If
the mother is the heir of her natural child" and the latter" among other rights during his lifetime was entitled
to e?ercise an action of his acknowledgment against his father" during the life of the latter" if after his
death in some of the e?cepting cases of article !2" such right" which is a portion of his inheritance" is
transmitted to his mother as ;eing his heir" and it was so understood ;1 the court of 'ennes when it
considered the right in =uestion" not as a personal and e?clusive right of the child which is e?tinguished
;1 his death" ;ut a an1 other right which might ;e transmitted after his death. This right of supposed
transmission is even less tena;le than that sought to ;e sustained ;1 the argument of analog1.
The right of action pertaining to the child to claim his legitimac1 is in all respects superior to that of the
child who claims acknowledgment as a natural child. And it is evident that the right of action to claim his
legitimac1 is not one of those rights which the legitimate child ma1 transmit ;1 inheritance to his heirsD it
forms no part of the component rights of his inheritance. If it were so" there would have ;een no necessit1
to esta;lish its transmissi;ilit1 to heirs as an e?ception in the terms and conditions of article !!$ of the
code. 0o that" in order that it ma1 constitute a portion of the child<s inheritance" it is necessar1 that the
conditions and the terms contained in article !!$ shall ;e present" since without them" the right that the
child held during his lifetime" ;eing personal and e?clusive in principle" and therefore" as a general rule
not suscepti;le of transmission" would and should have ;een e?tinguished ;1 his death. Therefore" where
no e?press provision like that of article !!$ e?ists" the right of action for the acknowledgment of a natural
child is" in principle and without e?ception" e?tinguished ;1 his death" and can not ;e transmitted as a
portion of the inheritance of the deceased child.
4n the other hand" if said right of action formed a part of the child<s inheritance" it would ;e necessar1 to
esta;lish the doctrine that the right to claim such an acknowledgment from the presumed natural father
and from his heirs is an a;solute right of the heirs of the child" not limited ;1 certain circumstances as in
the case of the heirs of a natural child with a legitimate one to place the heirs of a natural child and his
inheritance on a ;etter footing than those of a legitimate child would not onl1 ;e unreasona;le" ;ut" as
stated in one of the a;ove citations" most a;surd and illegal in the present state of the law and in
accordance with the general principles thereof.
For all of the foregoing reasons we here;1 reverse the 5udgment appealed from in all its parts" without an1
special ruling as to the costs of this instance.
6apa, @o$nson, Carson, and 7illard, @@., concur.
G.R. No. L-33187 Ma,>1 31, 1980
%ORNEL#O $AM$LONA a3-a* GEM#N#ANO $AM$LONA and A$OLON#A ONE, vs. V#VEN%#O
MOREO, V#%OR MOREO, EL#G#O MOREO, MAR%ELO MOREO, $AUL#NA MOREO,
RO'AR#O MOREO, MARA MOREO, 'EVER#NA MENDOZA, $A"LO MENDOZA, LAZARO
MENDOZA, V#%OR#A U#ZA, &O'EF#NA MOREO, LEANDRO MOREO and LORENZO
MENDOZA,
This is a petition for certiorari ;1 wa1 of appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals
1
in CA%&.'. )o.
*#+,%'" entitled -?ivencio 6oreto, et al." 6laintiff%Appellees vs. Cornelio *amplona, et al." Defendants%
Appellants"- affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of 8aguna" 9ranch I at 9iFan.
The facts" as stated in the decision appealed from" show that:
Flaviano :oreto and :onica :aniega were hus;and and wife. During their marriage" the1 ac=uired
ad5acent lots )os. !3#*" 3*3*" and !3#+ of the Calam;a Friar 8and >state" situated in Calam;a" 8aguna"
containing 2$!%*33 and !"7,! s=uare meters respectivel1 and covered ;1 certificates of title issued in the
name of -Flaviano :oreto" married to :onica :aniega.-
The spouses Flaviano :oreto and :onica :aniega ;egot during their marriage si? (+) children" namel1"
Crsulo" :arta" 8a 6aB" Alipio" 6a;lo" and 8eandro" all surnamed :oreto.
Crsulo :oreto died intestate on :a1 ,3" !#*# leaving as his heirs herein plaintiffs (ivencio" :arcelo"
'osario" (ictor" 6aulina" :arta and >ligio" all surnamed :oreto.
:arta :oreto died also intestate on April 7" !#$ leaving as her heir plaintiff (ictoria TuiBa.
8a 6aB :oreto died intestate on .ul1 !2" !#*3 leaving the following heirs" namel1" herein plaintiffs 6a;lo"
0everina" 8aBaro" and 8orenBo" all surnamed :endoBa.
Alipio :oreto died intestate on .une 7" !#3 leaving as his heir herein plaintiff .osefina :oreto.
6a;lo :oreto died intestate on April ,*" !#3, leaving no issue and as his heirs his ;rother plaintiff
8eandro :oreto and the other plaintiffs herein.
4n :a1 +" !#3+" :onica :aniega died intestate in Calam;a" 8aguna.
4n .ul1 7" !#*," or more than si? (+) 1ears after the death of his wife :onica :aniega" Flaviano :oreto"
without the consent of the heirs of his said deceased wife :onica" and ;efore an1 li=uidation of the
con5ugal partnership of :onica and Flaviano could ;e effected" e?ecuted in favor of &eminiano
6amplona" married to defendant Apolonia 4nte" the deed of a;solute sale (>?h. -!-) covering lot )o.
!3#* for 6#77.77. The deed of sale (>?h. -!-) contained a description of lot )o. !3#* as having an area
of 2$! s=uare meters and covered ;1 transfer certificate of title )o. !3*27 issued in the name of Flaviano
:oreto" married to :onica :aniega" although the lot was ac=uired during their marriage. As a result of
the sale" the said certificate of title was cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title )o. T%*+2! was
issued in the name of &eminiano 6amplona married to Apolonia 4nte (>?h. -A-).
After the e?ecution of the a;ove%mentioned deed of sale (>?h. -!-)" the spouses &eminiano 6amplona
and Apolonia 4nte constructed their house on the eastern part of lot !3#+ as Flaviano :oreto" at the time
of the sale" pointed to it as the land which he sold to &eminiano 6amplona. 0hortl1 thereafter" 'afael
6amplona" son of the spouses &eminiano 6amplona and Apolonia 4nte" also ;uilt his house within lot
!3#+ a;out one meter from its ;oundar1 with the ad5oining lot. The vendor Flaviano :oreto and the
vendee &eminiano 6amplona thought all the time that the portion of 2$! s=uare meters which was the
su;5ect matter of their sale transaction was )o. !3#* and so lot )o. !3#* appears to ;e the su;5ect
matter in the deed of sale (>?h. -!-) although the fact is that the said portion sold thought of ;1 the parties
to ;e lot )o. !3#* is a part of lot )o. !3#+.
From !#*+ to !#+7" the spouses &eminiano 6amplona and Apolonio 4nte enlarged their house and the1
even constructed a pigger1 corral at the ;ack of their said house a;out one and one%half meters from the
eastern ;oundar1 of lot !3#+.
4n August !," !#*+" Flaviano :oreto died intestate. In !#+!" the plaintiffs demanded on the defendants
to vacate the premises where the1 had their house and pigger1 on the ground that Flaviano :oreto had
no right to sell the lot which he sold to &eminiano 6amplona as the same ;elongs to the con5ugal
partnership of Flaviano and his deceased wife and the latter was alread1 dead when the sale was
e?ecuted without the consent of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of :onica. The spouses &eminiano
6amplona and Apolonia 4nte refused to vacate the premises occupied ;1 them and hence" this suit was
instituted ;1 the heirs of :onica :aniega seeking for the declaration of the nullit1 of the deed of sale of
.ul1 7" !#*, a;ove%mentioned as regards one%half of the propert1 su;5ect matter of said deedD to declare
the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the other half of said lotD to allow the plaintiffs to redeem the one%half
portion thereof sold to the defendants. -After pa1ment of the other half of the purchase price-D to order the
defendants to vacate the portions occupied ;1 themD to order the defendants to pa1 actual and moral
damages and attorne1<s fees to the plaintiffsD to order the defendants to pa1 plaintiffs 6!,7.77 a 1ear from
August !#*$ until the1 have vacated the premises occupied ;1 them for the use and occupanc1 of the
same.
The defendants claim that the sale made ;1 Flaviano :oreto in their favor is valid as the lot sold is
registered in the name of Flaviano :oreto and the1 are purchasers ;elieving in good faith that the vendor
was the sole owner of the lot sold.
After a relocation of lots !3#*" !3#+ and 3*3* made ;1 agreement of the parties" it was found out that
there was mutual error ;etween Flaviano :oreto and the defendants in the e?ecution of the deed of sale
;ecause while the said deed recited that the lot sold is lot )o. !3#*" the real intention of the parties is that
it was a portion consisting of 2$! s=uare meters of lot )o. !3#+ which was the su;5ect matter of their sale
transaction.
After trial" the lower court rendered 5udgment" the dispositive part thereof ;eing as follows:
A@>'>F4'>" 5udgment is here;1 rendered for the plaintiffs declaring the deed of
a;solute sale dated .ul1 7" !#*, pertaining to the eastern portion of 8ot !3#+ covering
an area of 2$! s=uare meters null and void as regards the #7.* s=uare meters of which
plaintiffs are here;1 declared the rightful owners and entitled to its possession.
The sale is ordered valid with respect to the eastern one%half (!E,) of !2$! s=uare meters
of 8ot !3#+ measuring #7.* s=uare meters of which defendants are declared lawful
owners and entitled to its possession.
After proper surve1 segregating the eastern one%half portion with an area of #7.* s=uare
meters of 8ot !3#+" the defendants shall ;e entitled to a certificate of title covering said
portion and Transfer Certificate of Title )o. #$3 of the office of the 'egister of Deeds of
8aguna shall ;e cancelled accordingl1 and new titles issued to the plaintiffs and to the
defendants covering their respective portions.
Transfer Certificate of Title )o. *+2! of the office of the 'egister of Deeds of 8aguna
covering 8ot )o. !3#* and registered in the name of Cornelio 6amplona" married to
Apolonia 4nte" is ;1 virtue of this decision ordered cancelled. The defendants are
ordered to surrender to the office of the 'egister of Deeds of 8aguna the owner<s
duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title )o. *+2! within thirt1 (7) da1s after this decision
shall have ;ecome final for cancellation in accordance with this decision.
8et cop1 of this decision ;e furnished the 'egister of Deeds for the province of 8aguna
for his information and guidance.
Aith costs against the defendants.
(
The defendants%appellants" not ;eing satisfied with said 5udgment" appealed to the Court of Appeals"
which affirmed the 5udgment" hence the1 now come to this Court.
The fundamental and crucial issue in the case at ;ar is whether under the facts and circumstances dul1
esta;lished ;1 the evidence" petitioners are entitled to the full ownership of the propert1 in litigation" or
onl1 one%half of the same.
There is no =uestion that when the petitioners purchased the propert1 on .ul1 7" !#*, from Flaviano
:oreto for the price of 6#77.77" his wife :onica :aniega had alread1 ;een dead si? 1ears ;efore"
:onica having died on :a1 +" !#3+. @ence" the con5ugal partnership of the spouses Flaviano :oreto and
:onica :aniega had alread1 ;een dissolved. (Article !2*" (!) )ew Civil CodeD Article !3!2" 4ld Civil
Code). The records show that the con5ugal estate had not ;een inventoried" li=uidated" settled and
divided ;1 the heirs thereto in accordance with law. The necessar1 proceedings for the li=uidation of the
con5ugal partnership were not instituted ;1 the heirs either in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse pursuant to Act !2+ amending 0ection +$* of Act !#7. )either was there an e?tra%
5udicial partition ;etween the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse nor was an ordinar1
action for partition ;rought for the purpose. Accordingl1" the estate ;ecame the propert1 of a communit1
;etween the surviving hus;and" Flaviano :oreto" and his children with the deceased :onica :aniega in
the concept of a co%ownership.
The communit1 propert1 of the marriage" at the dissolution of this ;ond ;1 the death of
one of the spouses" ceases to ;elong to the legal partnership and ;ecomes the propert1
of a communit1" ;1 operation of law" ;etween the surviving spouse and the heirs of the
deceased spouse" or the e?clusive propert1 of the widower or the widow" it he or she ;e
the heir of the deceased spouse. >ver1 co%owner shall have full ownership of his part and
in the fruits and ;enefits derived therefrom" and he therefore ma1 alienate" assign or
mortgage it" and even su;stitute another person in its en5o1ment" unless personal rights
are in =uestion. (:arigsa vs. :aca;untoc" !2 6hil. !72)
In 2orja vs. "ddision" 33 6hil. $#*" #7+" the 0upreme Court said that -(t)here is no reason in law wh1 the
heirs of the deceased wife ma1 not form a partnership with the surviving hus;and for the management
and control of the communit1 propert1 of the marriage and conceiva;l1 such a partnership" or rather
communit1 of propert1" ;etween the heirs and the surviving hus;and might ;e formed without a written
agreement.- In *rades vs. /ecson" 3# 6hil. ,7" the 0upreme Court held that -(a)lthough" when the wife
dies" the surviving hus;and" as administrator of the communit1 propert1" has authorit1 to sell the propert1
with ut the concurrence of the children of the marriage" nevertheless this power can ;e waived in favor
of the children" with the result of ;ringing a;out a conventional ownership in common ;etween the father
and children as to such propert1D and an1 one purchasing with knowledge of the changed status of the
propert1 will ac=uire onl1 the undivided interest of those mem;ers of the famil1 who 5oin in the act of
conve1ance.
It is also not disputed that immediatel1 after the e?ecution of the sale in !#*," the vendees constructed
their house on the eastern part of 8ot !3#+ which the vendor pointed out to them as the area sold" and
two weeks thereafter" 'afael who is a son of the vendees" also ;uilt his house within 8ot !3#+.
0u;se=uentl1" a cemented pigger1 coral was constructed ;1 the vendees at the ;ack of their house a;out
one and one%half meters from the eastern ;oundar1 of 8ot !3#+. 9oth vendor and vendees ;elieved all
the time that the area of 2$! s=. meters su;5ect of the sale was 8ot )o. !3#* which according to its title
(T.C.T. )o. !3*27) contains an area of 2$! s=. meters so that the deed of sale ;etween the parties
Identified and descri;ed the land sold as 8ot !3#*. 9ut actuall1" as verified later ;1 a surve1or upon
agreement of the parties during the proceedings of the case ;elow" the area sold was within 8ot !3#+.
Again" there is no dispute that the houses of the spouses Cornelio 6amplona and Apolonia 4nte as well
as that of their son 'afael 6amplona" including the concrete pigger1 coral ad5acent thereto" stood on the
land from !#*, up to the filing of the complaint ;1 the private respondents on .ul1 ,*" !#+!" or a period of
over nine (#) 1ears. And during said period" the private respondents who are the heirs of :onica :aniega
as well as of Flaviano :oreto who also died intestate on August !," !#*+" lived as neigh;ors to the
petitioner%vendees" 1et lifted no finger to =uestion the occupation" possession and ownership of the land
purchased ;1 the 6amplonas" so that Ae are persuaded and convinced to rule that private respondents
are in estoppel ;1 laches to claim half of the propert1" in dispute as null and void. >stoppel ;1 laches is a
rule of e=uit1 which ;ars a claimant from presenting his claim when" ;1 reason of a;andonment and
negligence" he allowed a long time to elapse without presenting the same. (International 9anking
Corporation vs. /ared" *# 6hil. #,)
Ae have ruled that at the time of the sale in !#*," the con5ugal partnership was alread1 dissolved si?
1ears ;efore and therefore" the estate ;ecame a co%ownership ;etween Flaviano :oreto" the surviving
hus;and" and the heirs of his deceased wife" :onica :aniega. Article 3# of the )ew Civil Code is
applica;le and it provides a follows:
Art. 3#. >ach co%owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
;enefits pertaining thereto" and he ma1 therefore alienate" assign or mortgage it" and
even su;stitute another person in its en5o1ment" e?cept when personal rights are involve.
9ut the effect of the alienation or the mortgage" with respect to the co%owners" shall ;e
limited to the portion which ma1 ;e allotted to him in the division upon the termination of
the co%ownership.
Ae agree with the petitioner that there was a partial partition of the co%ownership when at the time of the
sale Flaviano :oreto pointed out the area and location of the 2$! s=. meters sold ;1 him to the
petitioners%vendees on which the latter ;uilt their house and also that whereon 'afael" the son of
petitioners likewise erected his house and an ad5acent coral for pigger1.
6etitioners point to the fact that spouses Flaviano :oreto and :onica :aniega owned three parcels of
land denominated as 8ot !3#* having an area of 2$! s=. meters" 8ot !3#+ with an area of !"7,! s=.
meters" and 8ot 3*3* with an area of *33 s=. meters. The three lots have a total area of ,"3+ s=. meters.
These three parcels of lots are contiguous with one another as each is ;ounded on one side ;1 the other"
thus: 8ot 3*3* is ;ounded on the northeast ;1 8ot !3#* and on the southeast ;1 8ot !3#+. 8ot !3#* is
;ounded on the west ;1 8ot 3*3*. 8ot !3#+ is ;ounded on the west ;1 8ot 3*3*. It is therefore" clear that
the three lots constitute one ;ig land. The1 are not separate properties located in different places ;ut the1
a;ut each other. This is not disputed ;1 private respondents. @ence" at the time of the sale" the co%
ownership constituted or covered these three lots ad5acent to each other. And since Flaviano :oreto was
entitled to one%half pro%indiviso of the entire land area or !"!2 s=. meters as his share" he had a perfect
legal and lawful right to dispose of 2$! s=. meters of his share to the 6amplona spouses. Indeed" there
was still a remainder of some #, s=. meters ;elonging to him at the time of the sale.
Ae re5ect respondent Court<s ruling that the sale was valid as to one%half and invalid as to the other half
for the ver1 simple reason that Flaviano :oreto" the vendor" had the legal right to more than 2$! s=.
meters of the communal estate" a title which he could dispose" alienate in favor of the vendees%
petitioners. The title ma1 ;e pro%indiviso or inchoate ;ut the moment the co%owner as vendor pointed out
its location and even indicated the ;oundaries over which the fences were to ;e erectd without o;5ection"
protest or complaint ;1 the other co%owners" on the contrar1 the1 ac=uiesced and tolerated such
alienation" occupation and possession" Ae rule that a factual partition or termination of the co%ownership"
although partial" was created" and ;arred not onl1 the vendor" Flaviano :oreto" ;ut also his heirs" the
private respondents herein from asserting as against the vendees%petitioners an1 right or title in
derogation of the deed of sale e?ecuted ;1 said vendor Flaiano :oreto.
>=uit1 commands that the private respondents" the successors of ;oth the deceased spouses" Flaviano
:oreto and :onica :aniega ;e not allowed to impugn the sale e?ecuted ;1 Flaviano :oreto who
indisputa;l1 received the consideration of 6#77.77 and which he" including his children" ;enefitted from
the same. :oreover" as the heirs of ;oth :onica :aniega and Flaviano :oreto" private respondents are
dut1%;ound to compl1 with the provisions of Articles !3*$ and !3#*" Civil Code" which is the o;ligation of
the vendor of the propert1 of delivering and transfering the ownership of the whole propert1 sold" which is
transmitted on his death to his heirs" the herein private respondents. The articles cited provide" thus:
Art. !3*$. 91 the contract of sale one of the contracting parties o;ligates himself to
transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing" and the other part to pa1
therefore a price certain in mone1 or its e=uivalent.
A contract of sale ma1 ;e a;solute or conditionial.
Art. !3#*. The vendor is ;ound to transfer the ownership of and deliver" as well as
warrant the thing which is the o;5ect of the sale.
Cnder Article 22+" )ew Civil Code" the inheritance which private respondents received from their
deceased parents andEor predecessors%in%interest included all the propert1 rights and o;ligations which
were not e?tinguished ;1 their parents< death. And under Art. !!!" paragraph !" )ew Civil Code" the
contract of sale e?ecuted ;1 the deceased Flaviano :oreto took effect ;etween the parties" their assigns
and heirs" who are the private respondents herein. Accordingl1" to the private respondents is transmitted
the o;ligation to deliver in full ownership the whole area of 2$! s=. meters to the petitioners (which was
the original o;ligation of their predecessor Flaviano :oreto) and not onl1 one%half thereof. 6rivate
respondents must compl1 with said o;ligation.
The records reveal that the area of 2$! s=. meters sold to and occupied ;1 petitioners for more than #
1ears alread1 as of the filing of the complaint in !#+! had ;een re%surve1ed ;1 private land surve1or
Daniel Aranas. 6etitioners are entitled to a segregation of the area from Transfer Certificate of Title )o. T%
#$3 covering 8ot !3#+ and the1 are also entitled to the issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title in
their name ;ased on the relocation surve1.
A@>'>F4'>" I) (I>A 4F T@> F4'>&4I)&" the 5udgment appealed from is here;1 AFFI':>D with
modification in the sense that the sale made and e?ecuted ;1 Flaviano :oreto in favor of the petitioners%
vendees is here;1 declared legal and valid in its entirel1.
6etitioners are here;1 declared owners in full ownership of the 2$! s=. meters at the eastern portion of
8ot !3#+ now occupied ;1 said petitioners and whereon their houses and pigger1 coral stand.
The 'egister of Deeds of 8aguna is here;1 ordered to segregate the area of 2$! s=. meters from
Certificate of Title )o. #$3 and to issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title to the petitioners covering the
segregated area of 2$! s=. meters.
)o costs.
04 4'D>'>D.
G.R. No. L-33365 D/>/70/, (0, 1930
E*.a./ o= .1/ d/>/a*/d $a+3-no D-an>-n. EO$#'A DOLAR, proponent%appellant" vs. F#DEL
D#AN%#N, E AL., oppositors%appellees.
The will of the deceased 6aulino Diancin was denied pro;ate in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo on the
sole ground that the thum;marks appearing thereon were not the thum;marks of the testator.
Disregarding the other errors assigned ;1 the proponent of the will" we would direct attention to the third
error which challenges s=uarel1 the correctness of this finding.
The will in =uestion is alleged to have ;een e?ecuted ;1 6aulino Diancin at Dumangas" Iloilo" on
)ovem;er !" !#,2. A thum;mark appears at the end of the will and on the left hand margin of each of its
pages in the following manner: -6aulino Diancin" 0u 0igno" 6or 6edro Diamante.- The witnesses to the
will were the same 6edro Diamante" Inocentes Deocampo" and .uan Dominado. The will is detailed in
nature" and disposes of an estate amounting appro?imatel1 to 6*7"777.
For comparative purposes" >?hi;it $" a document of sale containing an admittedl1 genuine thum;mark of
6aulino Diancin" was presented. 6hotographs of the thum;marks on the will and of the thum;mark on
>?hi;it $ were also offered in evidence. 4ne" Carlos .. .aena" attempted to =ualif1 as an -e?pert"- and
thereafter gave as his opinion that the thum;marks had not ;een made ;1 the same person .4ne" .ose
&. (illanueva" likewise attempted to =ualif1 as were authentic. The petition of the proponent of the will to
permit the will to ;e sent to :anila to ;e e?amined ;1 an e?pert was denied. 4n one fact onl1 were the
opposing witnesses agreed" and this was that the ink used to make the thum;marks on the will was of the
ordinar1 t1pe which ;lurred the characteristics of the marks" whereas the thum;mark on >?hi;it $ was
formed clearl1 ;1 the use of the special ink re=uired for this purpose. The trial 5udge e?pressed his
personal view as ;eing that great differences e?isted ;etween the =uestioned marks and the genuine
mar.la%p$i'Dnet
The re=uirement of the statute that the will shall ;e -signed- is satisfied not onl1 the customar1 written
signature ;ut also ;1 the testator<s or testatri?< thum;mark .>?pert testimon1 as to the identit1 of
thum;marks or fingerprints is of course admissi;le. The method of identification of fingerprints is a
science re=uiring close stud1 .Ahere thum; impressions are ;lurred and man1 of the characteristic marks
far from clear" thus rendering it difficult to trace the features enumerated ;1 e?perts as showing the
identit1 or lack of identit1 of the impressions" the court is 5ustified in refusing to accept the opinions of
alleged e?perts and in su;stituting its own opinion that a distinct similarit1 in some respects ;etween the
admittedl1 genuine thum;mark and the =uestioned thum;marks" is evident .This we do here. (>mperor
vs. A;dul @amid G!#7*H" , Indian 8. 'ep." 2*#" cited in Cham;erla1ne on the :odern 8aw of >vidence"
sec. ,*+!" notes .)
There is another means of approach to the =uestion and an o;vious one. The three instrumental
witnesses united in testif1ing concerning the circumstances surrounding the e?ecution of the will. It was
stated that in addition to the testator and themselves" on other person" Diosdado Dominado" was present.
This latter individual was called as a witness ;1 the oppositors to the will to identif1 >?hi;it $. @e was later
placed on the witness stand ;1 the proponent on re;uttal" and thereupon declared positivel1 that he was
the one who prepared the will for the signature of 6aulino DiancinD that the thum;marks appearing on the
will were those of 6aulino Diancin" and that he saw 6aulino Diancin make these impressions. The
testimon1 of a witness called ;1 ;oth parties is worth1 of credit.
Ae reach the ver1 definite conclusion that the document presented for pro;ate as the last will of the
deceased 6aulino Diancin was" in truth" his will" and that the thum;marks appearing thereon were the
thum;marks of the testator .Accordingl1" error is found" which means that the 5udgment appealed from
must ;e" as it is here;1" reversed" and the will ordered admitted to pro;ate" without special finding as to
costs in this instance.
"vance+a, C.@., @o$nson, Street, ?illamor, Astand, @o$ns, -omualdez and ?illa--eal, @@., concur.
G.R. No. 68)5 '/2./70/, 1, 191)
YA$ UA, petitioner%appellee" vs. YA$ %A 4UAN and YA$ %A 4UAN, o;5ectors%appellants.
It appears from the record that on the ,d da1 of August" !#7#" one 6erfecto &a;riel" representing the
petitioner" /ap Tua" presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the cit1 of :anila" asking that the
will of Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong ;e admitted to pro;ate" as the last will and testament of Tomasa
>liBaga /ap Caong" deceased. It appears that the said Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong died in the cit1 of
:anila on the !!th da1 of August" !#7#. Accompan1ing said petition and attached thereto was the alleged
will of the deceased. It appears that the will was signed ;1 the deceased" as well as Anselmo Oacarias"
0evero Ta;ora" and Timoteo 6aeB.
0aid petition" after due notice was given" was ;rought on for hearing on the !$th da1 of 0eptem;er" !#7#.
Timoteo 6aeB declared that he was 3$ 1ears of ageD that he had known the said Tomasa >liBaga /ap
CaongD that she had died on the !!th da1 of August" !#7#D that ;efore her death she had e?ecuted a last
will and testamentD that he was present at the time of the e?ecution of the sameD that he had signed the
will as a witnessD that Anselmo Oacarias and 0evero Ta;ora had also signed said will as witnesses and
that the1 had signed the will in the presence of the deceased.
6a;lo Agustin also declared as a witness and said that he was 37 1ears of ageD that he knew Tomasa
>liBaga /ap Caong during her lifetimeD that she died on the !!th da1 of August" !#7#" in the cit1 of
:anilaD that ;efore her death she had e?ecuted a last will and testamentD that he was present at the time
said last will was e?ecutedD that there were also present Timoteo 6aeB and 0evero Ta;ora and a person
called AnselmoD that the said Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong signed the will in the presence of the
witnessesD that he had seen her sign the will with his own e1esD that the witnesses had signed the will in
the presence of the said Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong and in the presence of each otherD that the said
Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong signed the will voluntaril1" and in his 5udgment" she was in the possession of
her facultiesD that there were no threats or intimidation used to induce her to sign the willD that she signed
it voluntaril1.
)o further witnesses were called and there was no further opposition presented to the legaliBation of the
said will.
After hearing the foregoing witnesses" the @onora;le A. 0. Crossfield" 5udge" on the ,#th da1 of
0eptem;er" !#7#" ordered that the last will and testament of Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong ;e allowed and
admitted to pro;ate. The will was attached to the record and marked >?hi;it A. The court further ordered
that one /ap Tua ;e appointed as e?ecutor of the will" upon the giving of a ;ond" the amount of which
was to ;e fi?ed later.
From the record it appears that no further proceedings were had until the ,$th of Fe;ruar1" !#!7" when
/ap Ca Luan and /ap Ca 8lu appeared and presented a petition" alleging that the1 were interested in the
matters of the said will and desired to intervene and asked that a guardian ad litem ;e appointed to
represent them in the cause.
4n the !st da1 of :arch" !#!7" the court appointed &a;riel 8a 4 as guardian ad litem of said parties.
&a;riel 8a 4 accepted said appointment" took the oath of office and entered upon the performance of his
duties as guardian ad litem of said parties. 4n the ,d da1 of :arch" !#!7" the said &a;riel 8a 4 appeared
in court and presented a motion in which he alleged" in su;stance:
First. That the will dated the !!th da1 of August" !#7#" and admitted to pro;ate ;1 order of the court on
the ,#th da1 of 0eptem;er" !#7#" was null" for the following reasons:
(a) 9ecause the same had not ;een authoriBed nor signed ;1 the witnesses as the law
prescri;es.
(;) 9ecause at the time of the e?ecution of the will" the said Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong was not
then mentall1 capacitated to e?ecute the same" due to her sickness.
(c) 9ecause her signature to the will had ;een o;tained through fraud and illegal influence upon
the part of persons who were to receive a ;enefit from the same" and ;ecause the said Tomasa
>liBaga /ap Caong had no intention of e?ecuting the same.
0econd. That ;efore the e?ecution of the said will" which the1 alleged to ;e null" the said Tomasa >liBaga
/ap Caong had e?ecuted another will" with all the formalities re=uired ;1 law" upon the +th da1 of August"
!#7#.
Third. That the said /ap Ca Luan and /ap Ca 8lu were minors and that" even though the1 had ;een
negligent in presenting their opposition to the legaliBation of the will" said negligence was e?cusa;le" on
account of their age.
Cpon the foregoing facts the court was re=uested to annul and set aside the order of the ,#th da1 of
0eptem;er" !#7#" and to grant to said minors an opportunit1 to present new proof relating to the due
e?ecution of said will. 0aid petition was ;ased upon the provisions of section !! of the Code of
6rocedure in Civil Actions.
Ahile it is not clear from the record" apparentl1 the said minors in their petition for a new trial" attached to
said petition the alleged will of August +" !#7#" of the said Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong" and the affidavits
of 0evero Ta;ora" Clotilde and Cornelia 0errano.
Cpon the !7th da1 of :arch" !#!7" upon the hearing of said motion for a rehearing" the @onora;le A. 0.
Crossfield" 5udge" granted said motion and ordered that the rehearing should take place upon the !$th
da1 of :arch" !#!7" and directed that notice should ;e given to the petitioners of said rehearing and to all
other persons interested in the will. At the rehearing a num;er of witnesses were e?amined.
It will ;e remem;ered that one of the grounds upon which the new trial was re=uested was that the
deceased" Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong" had not signed the will (>?hi;it A) of the !!th of August" !#7#D
that in support of that allegation" the protestants" during the rehearing" presented a witness called Tomas
6uBon. 6uBon testified that he was a professor and an e?pert in handwriting" and upon ;eing shown the
will (of August !!" !#7#) >?hi;it A" testified that the name and surname on >?hi;it A" in his 5udgment were
written ;1 two different hands" though the given name is the same as that upon >?hi;it ! (the will of
August +" !#7#)" ;ecause he found in the name -Tomasa- on >?hi;it A a similarit1 in the tracing to the
-Tomasa- in >?hi;it !D that comparing the surname on >?hi;it A with the surname on >?hi;it ! he found
that the character of the writing was thoroughl1 distinguished and different ;1 the tracing and ;1 the
direction of the letters in the said two e?hi;itsD that from his e?perience and o;servation he ;elieved that
the name -Tomasa- and -/ap Caong"- appearing in the signature on >?hi;it A were written ;1 different
person.
6uBon" ;eing cross%e?amined with reference to his capacit1 as an e?pert in handwriting" testified that
while he was a student in the Ateneo de :anila" he had studied penmanshipD that he could not tell e?actl1
when that was" e?cept that he had concluded his course in the 1ear !$$,D that since that time he had
;een a telegraph operator for seventeen 1ears and that he had acted as an e?pert in hand% writing in the
courts in the provinces.
&a;riel 8a 4 was called as a witness during the rehearing and testified that he had drawn the will of the
+th of August" !#7#" at the re=uest of Tomasa >liBaga /ap CaongD that it was drawn in accordance with
her re=uest and under her directionsD that she had signed itD that the same had ;een signed ;1 three
witnesses in her presence and in the presence of each otherD that the will was written in her houseD that
she was sick and was l1ing in her ;ed" ;ut that she sat up to sign the willD that she signed the will with
great difficult1D that she was signed in her right mind.
The said 0evero Ta;ora was also called as a witness again during the rehearing. @e testified that he
knew Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong during her lifetimeD that she was deadD that his signature as a witness
to >?hi;it A (the will of August !!" !#7#) was placed there ;1 himD that the deceased" Tomasa >liBaga
/ap Caong" ;ecame familiar with the contents of the will ;ecause she signed it ;efore he (the witness)
didD that he did not know whether an1;od1 there told her to sign the will or notD that he signed two ;illsD
that he did not know 8a 4D that he did not ;elieve that Tomasa had signed the will (>?hi;it A) ;efore he
arrived at the houseD that he was not sure that he had seen Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong sign >?hi;it A
;ecause there were man1 people and there was a screen at the door and he could not seeD that he was
called a a witness to sign the second will and was told ;1 the people there that it was the same as the
firstD that the will (>?hi;it A) was on a ta;le" far from the patient" in the house ;ut outside the room where
the patient wasD that the will was signed ;1 6aeB and himselfD that Anselmo Oacarias was thereD that he
was not sure whether Anselmo Oacarias signed the will or notD that he was not sure whether Tomasa
>liBaga /ap Caong could see the ta;le on which the will was written at the time it was signed or notD that
there were man1 people in the houseD that he remem;ered the names of 6edro and 8orenBoD that he
could not remem;er the names of an1 othersD that the will remained on the ta;le after he signed itD that
after he signed the will he went to the room where Tomasa was l1ingD that the will was left on the ta;le
outsideD that Tomasa was ver1 illD that he heard the people asking Tomasa to sign the will after he was
(the witness) had signed itD that he saw 6aeB sign the will" that he could not remem;er whether Anselmo
Oacarias had signed the will" ;ecause immediatel1 after he and 6aeB signed it" he left ;ecause he was
hungr1D that the place where the ta;le was located was in the same house" on the floor" a;out two steps
down from the floor on which Tomasa was.
'ufino '. 6apa" was called as a witness for the purpose of supporting the allegation that Tomasa >liBaga
/ap Caong was mentall1 incapacitated to make the will dated August !!" !#7# (>?hi;it A). 6apa declared
that he was a ph1sicianD that he knew Tomasa >liBaga /ap CaongD that he had treated her in the month
of AugustD that he visited her first on the $th da1 of AugustD that he visited her again on the #th and !7th
da1s of AugustD that on the first visit he found the sick woman completel1 weak J ver1 weak from her
sickness" in the third stage of tu;erculosisD that she was l1ing in ;edD that on the first visit he found her
with ;ut little sense" the second da1 also" and on the third da1 she had lost all her intelligenceD that she
died on the !!th of AugustD tat he was re=uested to issue the death certificateD that when he asked her
(Tomasa) whether she was feeling an1 pain or an1thing of that kind" she did not answer at allD that she
was in a condition of stupor" induced" as he ;elieved" ;1 the stage of uraemia from which she was
suffering.
Anselmo Oacarias" who had signed the will of August !!" !#7#" was also called as a witnesses during the
rehearing. @e testified that he had known Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong since he was a childD that Tomasa
was deadD that he had written the will e?hi;it AD that it was all in his writing e?cept the last part" which was
written ;1 Carlos 0o;acoD that he had written the will >?hi;it A at the re=uest of the uncle of TomasaD that
8orenBo" the ;rother of the deceased" was the one who had instructed him as to the terms of the will D that
the deceased had not spoken to him concerning the terms of the willD that the will was written in the dining
room of the residence of the deceasedD that Tomasa was in another room different from that in which the
will was writtenD that the will was not written in the presence of TomasaD that he signed the will as a
witness in the room where Tomasa was l1ingD that the other witnesses signed the will in the same room
that when he went into the room where the sick woman was (Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong) 8orenBo had
the will in his handsD that when 8orenBo came to the ;ed he showed the will to his sister (Tomasa) and
re=uested her to sign itD that she was l1ing stretched out on the ;ed and two women" who were taking
care of her" helped her to sit up" supporting her ;1 lacing their hands at her ;ackD that when she started to
write her name" he withdrew from the ;ed on account of the ;est inside the roomD when he came ;ack
again to the sick ;ed the will was signed and was again in the hands of 8orenBoD that he did not see
Tomasa sign the will ;ecause he withdrew from the roomD that he did not know whether Tomasa had
;een informed of the contents of the will or notD he supposed she must have read it ;ecause 8orenBo
turned the will over to herD that when 8orenBo asked her to sign the will" he did not know what she said J
he could not hear her voiceD that he did not know whether the sick woman was him sign the will or notD
that he ;elieved that Tomasa died the ne?t da1 after the will had ;een signedD that the other two
witnesses" Timoteo 6aeB and 0evero Ta;ora" had signed the will in the room with the sick womanD that
he saw them sign the will and that the1 saw him sign itD that he was not sure whether the testatri? could
have seen them at the time the1 signed the will or notD that there was a screen ;efore the ;edD that he did
not think that 8orenBo had ;een giving instructions as to the contents of the willD that a;out ten or fifteen
minutes elapsed from the time 8orenBo handed the will to Tomasa ;efore she started to sign itD that the
pen with which she signed the will as given to her and she held it.
Clotilde :ariano testified that he was a cigarette makerD that he knew Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong and
that she was deadD that she had made two willsD that the first one was written ;1 8a 4 and the second ;1
OacariasD that he was present at the time Oacarias wrote the second oneD that he was present when the
second will was taken to Tomasa for signatureD that 8orenBo had told Tomasa that the second will was
e?actl1 like the firstD that Tomasa said she could not sign it.
4n cross e?amination he testified that there was a lot of visitors thereD that Oacarias was not thereD that
6aeB and Ta;ora were thereD that he had told Tomasa that the second will was e?actl1 like the first.
During the rehearing Cornelia 0errano and 6edro Francisco were also e?amined as witnesses. There is
nothing in their testimon1" however" which in our opinion is important.
In re;uttal .ulia e la CruB was called as a witness. 0he testified that she was !# 1ears of ageD that she
knew Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong during her lifetimeD that she lived in the house of Tomasa during the
last week of her illnessD that Tomasa had made two willsD that she was present when the second one was
e?ecutedD that a law1er had drawn the will in the dining room and after it had ;een drawn and ever1thing
finished " it was taken to where DoFa Tomasa was" for her signatureD that it was taken to her ;1 Anselmo
OacariasD that she was present at the time Tomasa signed the will that there were man1 other people
present alsoD that she did not see Timoteo 6aeB thereD that she saw 0evero Ta;oraD that Anselmo
Oacarias was presentD that she did not hear Clotilde :ariano ask Tomasa to sign the willD that she did not
hear 8orenBo sa1 to Tomasa that the second will was the same sa the firstD that Tomasa asked her to
help her to sit up and to put a pillow to her ;ack when Oacarias gave her some paper or document and
asked her to sign itD that she saw Tomasa take hold of the pen and tr1 to sign it ;ut she did not see the
place she signed the document" for the reason that she left the roomD that she saw Tomasa sign the
document ;ut did not see on what place on the document she signedD and that a notar1 pu;lic came the
ne?t morningD that Tomasa was a;le to move a;out in the ;edD that she had seen Tomasa in the act of
starting to write her signature when she told her to get her some water.
/ap Cao Iuiang was also called as a witness in re;uttal. @e testified that he knew Tomasa >liBaga /ap
Caong and knew that she had made a willD that he saw the will at the time it was writtenD that he saw
Tomasa sign it on her headD that he did not hear 8orenBo ask Tomasa to sign the willD that 8orenBo had
handed the will to Tomasa to signD that he saw the witnesses sign the will on a ta;le near the ;edD that the
ta;le was outside the curtain or screen and near the entrance to the room where Tomasa was l1ing.
8orenBo /ap Caong testified as a witness on re;uttal. @e said that he knew Anselmo Oacarias and that
Oacarias wrote the will of Tomasa >liBaga /ap CaongD that Tomasa had given him instructionsD that
Tomasa had said that she sign the willD that the will was on a ta;le near the ;ed of TomasaD that Tomasa"
from where she was l1ing in the ;ed" could seethe ta;le where the witnesses had signed the will.
During the rehearing certain other witnesses were also e?aminedD in our opinion" however" it is necessar1
to =uote from them for the reason that their testimon1 in no wa1 affects the preponderance of proof a;ove
=uoted.
At the close of the rehearing the @onora;le A. 0. Crossfield" 5udge" in an e?tended opinion" reached the
conclusion that the last will and testament of Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong" which was attached to the
record and marked >?hi;it A was the last will and testament of the said Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong and
admitted it to pro;ate and ordered that the administrator therefore appointed should continue as such
administrator. From that order the protestants appealed to this court" and made the following assignments
of error:
I. The court erred in declaring that the will" >?hi;it A" was e?ecuted ;1 the deceased Tomasa /ap
Caong" without the intervention of an1 e?ternal influence on the part of other persons.
II. The court erred in declaring that the testator had clear knowledge and knew what she was
doing at the time of signing the will.
III. The court erred in declaring that the signature of the deceased Tomasa /ap Caong in the first
will" >?hi;it !" is identical with that which appears in the second will" >?hi;it A.
I(. The court erred in declaring that the will" >?hi;it A" was e?ecuted in accordance with the law.
Aith reference to the first assignment of error" to wit" that undue influence was ;rought to ;ear upon
Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong in the e?ecution of her will of August !!th" !#7# (>?hi;it A)" the lower court
found that no undue influence had ;een e?ercised over the mind of the said Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong.
Ahile it is true that some of the witnesses testified that the ;rother of Tomasa" one 8orenBo" had
attempted to undul1 influence her mind in the e?ecution of he will" upon the other hand" there were
several witnesses who testified that 8orenBo did not attempt" at the time of the e?ecution of the will" to
influence her mind in an1 wa1. The lower court having had an opportunit1 to see" to hear" and to note the
witnesses during their e?amination reached the conclusion that a preponderance of the evidence showed
that no undue influence had ;een used. we find no good reason in the record for reversing his
conclusions upon that =uestion.
Aith reference to the second assignment of error to wit" that Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong was not of
sound mind and memor1 at the time of the e?ecution of the will" we find the same conflict in the
declarations of the witnesses which we found with reference to the undue influence. Ahile the testimon1
of Dr. 6apa is ver1 strong relating to the mental condition of Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong" 1et"
nevertheless" his testimon1 related to a time perhaps twent1%four hours ;efore the e?ecution of the will in
=uestion (>?hi;it A). 0everal witnesses testified that at the time the will was presented to her for her
signature" she was of sound mind and memor1 and asked for a pen and ink and kept the will in her
possession for ten or fifteen minutes and finall1 signed it. The lower court found that there was a
preponderance of evidence sustaining the conclusion that Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong was of sound
mind and memor1 and in the possession of her faculties at the time she signed this will. In view of the
conflict in the testimon1 of the witnesses and the finding of the lower court" we do not feel 5ustified in
reversing his conclusions upon that =uestion.
Aith reference to the third assignment of error" to wit" that the lower court committed an error in declaring
that the signature of Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong" on her first will (August +" !#7#" >?hi;it !)" is identical
with that which appears in the second will (August !!" !#7#" >?hi;it A)" it ma1 ;e said:
First. That whether or not Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong e?ecuted the will of August +" !#7# (>?hi;it !)" was
not the =uestion presented to the court. The =uestion presented was whether or not she had dul1
e?ecuted the will of August !!" !#7# (>?hi;it A).
0econd. There appears to ;e ;ut little dou;t that Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong did e?ecute the will of
August +" !#7#. 0everal witnesses testified to that fact. The mere fact" however" that she e?ecuted a
former will is no proof that she did not e?ecute a later will. 0he had a perfect right" ;1 will" to dispose of
her propert1" in accordance with the provisions of law" up to the ver1 last of moment her life. 0he had a
perfect right to change" alter" modif1 or revoke an1 and all of her former wills and to make a new one.
)either will the fact that the new will fails to e?pressl1 revoke all former wills" in an1 wa1 sustain the
charge that she did not make the new will.
Third. In said third assignment of error there is involved in the statement that -The signature of Tomasa
>liBaga /ap Caong" in her first will (>?hi;it !) was not identical with that which appears in her second will
(>?hi;it A)- the inference that she had not signed the second will and all the argument of the appellants
relating to said third assignment of error is ;ased upon the alleged fact that Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong
did not sign >?hi;it A. 0everal witnesses testified that the1 saw her write the name -Tomasa.- 4ne of the
witnesses testified that she had written her full name. Ae are of the opinion" and we think the law sustains
our conclusion" that if Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong signed an1 portion of her name tot he will" with the
intention to sign the same" that the will amount to a signature. It has ;een held time and time again that
one who makes a will ma1 sign the same ;1 using a mark" the name having ;een written ;1 others. If
writing a mark simpl1 upon a will is sufficient indication of the intention of the person to make and e?ecute
a will" then certainl1 the writing of a portion or all of her name ought to ;e accepted as a clear indication of
her intention to e?ecute the will. (-e &oods of 0avor1" !* .ur." !73,D Add1 vs. &ri?" $ (es. .r." *73D 9aker
vs. Dening" $ Ad. and >l." #3 8ong vs. Oook" ! 6enn." 377D (ernon vs. Lirk" 7 6enn." ,!$D CoBBen<s
Aill" +! 6enn." !#+D -e &oods of >merson" 8. '. # Ir." 33D :ain vs. '1der" $3 6enn." ,!2.)
Ae find a ver1 interesting case reported in !! 6enns1lvania 0tate" ,,7 (+ 8. '. A." *)" and cited ;1 the
appellees" which was known as -Lno?<s Appeal.- In this case one @arriett 0. Lno? died ver1 suddenl1 on
the !2th of 4cto;er" !$$$" at the residence of her father. After her death a paper was found in her room"
wholl1 in her handwriting" written with a lead pencil" upon three sides of an ordinar1 folded sheet of note
paper and ;earing the signature simpl1 of -@arriett.- In this paper the deceased attempted to make
certain disposition of her propert1. The will was presented for pro;ate. The pro;ation was opposed upon
the ground that the same did not contain the signature of the deceased. That was the onl1 =uestion
presented to the court" whether the signature" in the form a;ove indicated" was a sufficient signature to
constitute said paper the last will and testament of @arriett 0. Lno?. It was admitted that the entire paper
was in the handwriting of the deceased. In deciding that =uestion" .ustice :itchell said:
The precise case of a signature y t$e first name only" does not appear to have arisen either in
>ngland or the Cnited 0tatesD ;ut the principle on which the decisions alread1 referred to were
;ased" especiall1 those in regard to signing ;1 initials onl1" are e=uall1 applica;le to the present
case" and additional force is given to them ;1 the decisions as to what constitutes a ;inding
signature to a contract. (6almer vs. 0tephens" ! Denio" 32$D 0an;orne vs. Flager" # Alle" 323D
Aeston vs. :1ers" Ill." 3,3D 0almon Falls" etc. Co. vs. &oddard" !3 @ow. (C. 0.)" 33+.)
The man who cannot write and who is o;liged to make his mark simpl1 therefor" upon the will" is held to
-sign- as effectuall1 as if he had written his initials or his full name. It would seem to ;e sufficient" under
the law re=uiring a signature ;1 the person making a will" to make his mark" to place his initials or all or
an1 part of his name thereon. In the present case we think the proof shows" ;1 a large preponderance"
that Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong" if she did not sign her full name" did at least sign her given name
-Tomasa"- and that is sufficient to satisf1 the statute.
Aith reference to the fourth assignment of error" it ma1 ;e said that the argument which was preceded is
sufficient to answer it also.
During the trial of the cause the protestants made a strong effort to show that Tomasa >liBaga /ap Caong
did not sign her name in the presence of the witnesses and that the1 did not sign their names in their
presence nor in the presence of each other. Cpon that =uestion there is considera;le conflict of proof. An
effort was made to show that the will was signed ;1 the witnesses in one room and ;1 Tomasa in another.
A plan of the room or rooms in which the will was signed was presented as proof and it was shown that
there was ;ut one roomD that one part of the room was one or two steps ;elow the floor of the otherD that
the ta;le on which the witnesses signed the will was located upon the lower floor of the room. It was also
shown that from the ;ed in which Tomasa was l1ing" it was possi;le for her to see the ta;le on which the
witnesses signed the will. Ahile the rule is a;solute that one who makes a will must sign the same in the
presence of the witnesses and that the witnesses must sign in the presence of each other" as well as in
the presence of the one making the will" 1et" nevertheless" the actual seeing of the signatures made is not
necessar1. It is sufficient if the signatures are made where it is possi;le for each of the necessar1 parties"
if the1 desire to see" ma1 see the signatures placed upon the will.
In cases like the present where there is so much conflict in the proof" it is ver1 difficult for the courts to
reach conclusions that are a;solutel1 free from dou;t. &reat weight must ;e given ;1 appellate courts
who do not see or hear the witnesses" to the conclusions of the trial courts who had that opportunit1.
Cpon a full consideration of the record" we find that a preponderance of the proof shows that Tomasa
>liBaga /ap Caong did e?ecute" freel1 and voluntaril1" while she was in the right use of all her faculties"
the will dated August !!" !#7# (>?hi;it A). Therefore the 5udgment of the lower court admitting said will to
pro;ate is here;1 affirmed with costs.
"rellano, C. @., /orres, Carson, 6oreland and "raullo, @@., concur.
G.R. No. 15566 '/2./70/, 1), 19(1
EU#6U#A AVERA, vs. MAR#NO GAR%#A, and &UAN RODR#GUEZ, a* 5+a,d-an o= .1/ 7-no,* %/*a,
Ga,>-a and &o*/ Ga,>-a,
In proceedings in the court ;elow" instituted ;1 >uti=uia Avera for pro;ate of the will of one >ste;an
&arcia" contest was made ;1 :arino &arcia and .uan 'odrigueB" the latter in the capacit1 of guardian for
the minors .ose &arcia and Cesar &arcia. Cpon the date appointed for the hearing" the proponent of the
will introduced one of the three attesting witnesses who testified J with details not necessar1 to ;e here
specified J that the will was e?ecuted with all necessar1 e?ternal formalities" and that the testator was at
the time in full possession of disposing faculties. Cpon the latter point the witness was corro;orated ;1
the person who wrote the will at the re=uest of the testator. Two of the attesting witnesses were not
introduced" nor was their a;sence accounted for ;1 the proponent of the will.
Ahen the proponent rested the attorne1 for the opposition introduced a single witness whose testimon1
tended to show in a vague and indecisive manner that at the time the will was made the testator was so
de;ilitated as to ;e una;le to comprehend what he was a;out.
After the cause had ;een su;mitted for determination upon the proof thus presented" the trial 5udge found
that the testator at the time of the making of the will was of sound mind and disposing memor1 and that
the will had ;een properl1 e?ecuted. @e accordingl1 admitted the will to pro;ate.
From this 5udgment an appeal was taken in ;ehalf of the persons contesting the will" and the onl1 errors
here assigned have reference to the two following points" namel1" first" whether a will can ;e admitted to
pro;ate" where opposition is made" upon the proof of a single attesting witness" without producing or
accounting for the a;sence of the other twoD and" secondl1" whether the will in =uestion is rendered
invalid ;1 reason of the fact that the signature of the testator and of the three attesting witnesses are
written on the right margin of each page of the will instead of the left margin.
Cpon the first point" while it is undou;tedl1 true that an uncontested will ;a1 ;e proved ;1 the testimon1 of
onl1 one of the three attesting witnesses" nevertheless in Ca;ang vs. Delfinado (3 6hil." ,#!)" this court
declared after an ela;orate e?amination of the American and >nglish authorities that when a contest is
instituted" all of the attesting witnesses must ;e e?amined" if alive and within reach of the process of the
court.
In the present case no e?planation was made at the trial as to wh1 all three of the attesting witnesses
were not produced" ;ut the pro;a;le reason is found in the fact that" although the petition for the pro;ate
of this will had ;een pending from Decem;er ,!" !#!2" until the date set for the hearing" which was April
*" !#!#" no formal contest was entered until the ver1 da1 set for the hearingD and it is pro;a;le that the
attorne1 for the proponent" ;elieving in good faith the pro;ate would not ;e contested" repaired to the
court with onl1 one of the three attesting witnesses at hand" and upon finding that the will was contested"
incautiousl1 permitted the case to go to proof without asking for a postponement of the trial in order that
he might produce all the attesting witnesses.
Although this circumstance ma1 e?plain wh1 the three witnesses were not produced" it does not in itself
suppl1 an1 ;asis for changing the rule e?pounded in the case a;ove referred toD and were it not for a fact
now to ;e mentioned" this court would pro;a;l1 ;e compelled to reverse this case on the ground that the
e?ecution of the will had not ;een proved ;1 a sufficient num;er of attesting witnesses.
It appears" however" that this point was not raised ;1 the appellant in the lower court either upon the
su;mission of the cause for determination in that court or upon the occasion of the filing of the motion for
a new trial. Accordingl1 it is insisted for the appellee that this =uestion cannot now ;e raised for the first
time in this court. Ae ;elieve this point is well taken" and the first assignment of error must ;e declared
not ;e well taken. This e?act =uestion has ;een decided ;1 the 0upreme Court of California adversel1 to
the contention of the appellant" and we see no reason wh1 the same rule of practice should not ;e
o;served ;1 us. (>state of :cCart1" *$ Cal." *" 2.)
There are at least two reason wh1 the appellate tri;unals are disinclined to permit certain =uestions to ;e
raised for the first time in the second instance. In the first place it eliminates the 5udicial criterion of the
Court of First Instance upon the point there presented and makes the appellate court in effect a court of
first instance with reference to that point" unless the case is remanded for a new trial. In the second place"
it permits" if it does not encourage" attorne1s to trifle with the administration of 5ustice ;1 concealing from
the trial court and from their opponent the actual point upon which reliance is placed" while the1 are
engaged in other discussions more simulated than real. These considerations are" we think" decisive.
In ruling upon the point a;ove presented we do not wish to ;e understood as la1ing down an1 hard and
fast rule that would prove an em;arrassment to this court in the administration of 5ustice in the future. In
one wa1 or another we are constantl1 here considering aspects of cases and appl1ing doctrines which
have escaped the attention of all persons concerned in the litigation ;elowD and this is necessar1 if this
court is to contri;ute the part due from it in the correct decision of the cases ;rought ;efore it. Ahat we
mean to declare is that when we ;elieve that su;stantial 5ustice has ;een done in the Court of First
Instance" and the point relied on for reversal in this court appears to ;e one which ought properl1 to have
;een presented in that court" we will in the e?ercise of a sound discretion ignore such =uestion relates a
defect which might have ;een cured in the Court of First Instance if attention had ;een called to it there.
In the present case" if the appellant had raised this =uestion in the lower court" either at the hearing or
upon a motion for a new trial" that court would have had the power" and it would have ;een is dut1"
considering the tard1 institution of the contest" to have granted a new trial in order that all the witnesses to
the will might ;e ;rought into court. 9ut instead of thus calling the error to the attention of the court and
his adversar1" the point is first raised ;1 the appellant in this court. Ae hold that this is too late.
6roperl1 understood" the case of Ca;ang vs. Delfinado" supra" contains nothing inconsistent with the
ruling we now make" for it appears from the opinion in that case that the proponent of the will had
o;tained an order for a repu;lication and new trial for the avowed purpose of presenting the two
additional attesting witnesses who had not ;een previousl1 e?amined" ;ut nevertheless su;se=uentl1
failed without an1 apparent reason to take their testimon1. 9oth parties in that case were therefore full1
apprised that the =uestion of the num;er of witnesses necessar1 to prove the will was in issue in the
lower court.
The second point involved in this case is whether" under section +!$ of the Code of Civil 6rocedure" as
amended ;1 Act )o. ,+3*" it is essential to the validit1 of a will in this 5urisdiction that the names of the
testator and the instrumental witnesses should ;e written on the left margin of each page" as re=uired in
said Act" and not upon the right margin" as in the will now ;efore usD and upon this we are of the opinion
that the will in =uestion is valid. It is true that the statute sa1s that the testator and the instrumental
witnesses shall sign their names on the left margin of each and ever1 pageD and it is undenia;le that the
general doctrine is to the effect that all statutor1 re=uirements as to the e?ecution of wills must ;e full1
complied with. The same doctrine is also deduci;le from cases heretofore decided ;1 this court.
0till some details at times creep into legislative enactments which are so trivial it would ;e a;surd to
suppose that the 8egislature could have attached an1 decisive importance to them. The provision to the
effect that the signatures of the testator and witnesses shall ;e written on the left margin of each page J
rather than on the right margin J seems to ;e this character. 0o far as concerns the authentication of the
will" and of ever1 part thereof" it can make no possi;le difference whether the names appear on the left or
no the right margin" provided the1 are on one or the other. In Caraig vs. Tatlonghari ('. &. )o. !,**$"
decided :arch ," !#!$" not reported)" this court declared a will void which was totall1 lacking in the
signatures re=uired to ;e written on its several pagesD and in the case of 'e estate of 0aguinsin (3! 6hil."
$2*)" a will was likewise declared void which contained the necessar1 signatures on the margin of each
leaf ( folio)" ;ut not in the margin of each page containing written matter.
The instrument now ;efore us contains the necessar1 signatures on ever1 page" and the onl1 point of
deviation from the re=uirement of the statute is that these signatures appear in the right margin instead of
the left. 91 the mode of signing adopted ever1 page and provision of the will is authenticated and guarded
from possi;le alteration in e?actl1 the same degree that it would have ;een protected ;1 ;eing signed in
the left marginD and the resources of casuistr1 could ;e e?hausted without discovering the slightest
difference ;etween the conse=uences of affi?ing the signatures in one margin or the other.
The same could not ;e said of a case like that of >state of 0aguinsin" supra" where onl1 the leaves" or
alternate pages" were signed and not each written pageD for as o;served in that case ;1 our late lamented
Chief .ustice" it was possi;le that in the will as there originall1 e?ecuted ;1 the testratri? onl1 the
alternative pages had ;een used" leaving ;lanks on the reverse sides" which conceiva;l1 might have
;een filled in su;se=uentl1.
The controlling considerations on the point now ;efore us were well stated In -e will of A;angan (37 6hil."
32+" 32#)" where the court" speaking through :r. .ustice AvanceFa" in a case where the signatures were
placed at the ;ottom of the page and not in the margin" said:
The o;5ect of the solemnities surrounding the e?ecution of wills is to close the door against ;ad
faith and fraud" to avoid su;stitution o will and testaments and to guarantee their truth and
authenticit1. Therefore the laws on this su;5ect should ;e interpreted in such a wa1 as to attain
these primordial ends. 9ut" on the other hand" also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not
the o;5ect of the law to restrain and curtail the e?ercise of the right to make a will. 0o when an
interpretation alread1 given assures such ends" an1 other interpretation whatsoever" that adds
nothing ;ut demands more re=uisites entirel1 unnecessar1" useless and frustrative of the
testator<s last will" must ;e disregarded.
In the case ;efore us" where ingenuit1 could not suggest an1 possi;le pre5udice to an1 person" as
attendant upon the actual deviation from the letter of the law" such deviation must ;e considered too trivial
to invalidate the instrument.
It results that the legal errors assigned are not sustaina;le" and the 5udgment appealed from will ;e
affirmed. It is so ordered" with costs against the appellants.
@o$nson, "raullo, "vance+a and ?illamor, @@., concur.
G.R. No. L-(1755 D/>/70/, (9, 19()
#n .1/ 7a../, o= .1/ ./*.a./ /*.a./ o= An.on-o Mo?a3, d/>/a*/d. F#LOMENA NAYVE, vs. LEONA
MO&AL and LU%#ANA AGU#LAR, opponents%appellants.
This is a proceeding for the pro;ate of the will of the deceased Antonio :o5al instituted ;1 his surviving
spouse" Filomena )a1ve. The pro;ate is opposed ;1 8eona :o5al and 8uciana Aguilar" sister and niece"
respectivel1" of the deceased.
The Court of First Instance of Al;a1" which tried the case" overruled the o;5ections to the will" and ordered
the pro;ate thereof" holding that the document in controvers1 was the last will and testament of Antonio
:o5al" e?ecuted in accordance with law. From this 5udgment the opponents appeal" assigning error to the
decree of the court allowing the will to pro;ate and overruling their opposition.
The will in =uestion" >?hi;it A" is composed of four sheets with written matter on onl1 side of each" that is"
four pages written on four sheets. The four sides or pages containing written matter are paged -6ag. !"-
-6ag. ,"- -6ag. "- -6ag. 3"- successivel1. >ach of the first two sides or pages" which was issued" was
signed ;1 the testator and the three witnesses on the margin" left side of the reader. 4n the third page
actuall1 used" the signatures of the three witnesses appear also on the margin" left side of the reader" ;ut
the signature of the testator is not on the margin" ;ut a;out the middle of the page" at the end of the will
and ;efore the attestation clause. 4n the fourth page" the signatures of the witnesses do not appear on
the margin" ;ut at the ;ottom of the attestation clause" it ;eing the signature of the testator that is on the
margin" left side of the reader.
The defects attri;uted to the will are:
(a) The fact of not having ;een signed ;1 the testator and the witnesses on each and ever1 sheet on the
left marginD () the fact of the sheets of the document not ;eing paged with lettersD (c) the fact that the
attestation clause does not state the num;er of sheets or pages actuall1 used of the willD and (d) the fact
that the testator does not appear to have signed all the sheets in the presence of the three witnesses" and
the latter to have attested and signed all the sheets in the presence of the testator and of each other.
As to the signatures on the margin" it is true" as a;ove stated" that the third page actuall1 used was
signed ;1 the testator" not on the left margin" as it was ;1 the witnesses" ;ut a;out the middle of the page
and the end of the willD and that the fourth page was signed ;1 the witnesses" not on the left margin" as it
was ;1 the testator" ;ut a;out the middle of the page and at the end of the attestation clause.
In this respect the holding of this court in the case of "vera vs. Barcia and -odriguez (3, 6hil." !3*)" is
applica;le" wherein the will in =uestion was signed ;1 the testator and the witnesses" not on the left" ;ut
right" margin. The rule laid down in that case is that the document contained the necessar1 signatures on
each page" where;1 each page of the will was authenticated and safeguarded against an1 possi;le
alteration. In that case" the validit1 of the will was sustained" and conse=uentl1 it was allowed to pro;ate.
Appl1ing that doctrine to the instant case" we hold that" as each and ever1 page used of the will ;ears the
signatures of the testator and the witnesses" the fact that said signatures do not all appear on the left
margin of each page does not detract from the validit1 of the will.la%p$i'.net
Turning to the second defect alleged" that is to sa1" the fact that the sheets of the document are not
paged with letters" suffice it to cite the case of 3nson vs. "ella (3 6hil." 3#3)" where this court held that
paging with Ara;ic numerals and not with letters" as in the case ;efore us" is within the spirit of the law
and is 5ust as valid as paging with letters.
As to the proposition that the attestation clause does not state the num;er of sheets or pages of the will"
which is the third defect assigned" it must ;e noted that the last paragraph of the will here in =uestion and
the attestation clause" coming ne?t to it" are of the following tenor:
In witness whereof" I set m1 hand unto this will here in the town of Camalig"
Al;a1" 6hilippine Islands" this ,+th da1 of )ovem;er" nineteen hundred and
eighteen" composed of four sheets" including the ne?t:
A)T4)I4 :4.A8
(0igned and declared ;1 the testator Don Antonio :o5al to ;e his last will and
testament in the presence of each of us" and at the re=uest of said testator Don
Antonio :o5al" we signed this will in the presence of each other and of the
testator.)
6>D'4 CA'4
0I8(>'I4 :4'C4
O4I84 :A0I)A0
As ma1 ;e seen" the num;er of sheets is stated in said last paragraph of the will. It is true that in the case
of 3y Co!ue vs. 0avas L. Sioca (3 6hil." 37*)" it was held that the attestation clause must state the
num;er of sheets or pages composing the willD ;ut when" as in the case ;efore us" such fact" while it is
not stated in the attestation clause" appears at the end of the will proper" so that no proof aliunde is
necessar1 of the num;er of the sheets of the will" then there can ;e no dou;t that it complies with the
intention of the law that the num;er of sheets of which the will is composed ;e shown ;1 the document
itself" to prevent the num;er of the sheets of the will from ;eing undul1 increased or decreased.
Aith regard to the last defect pointed out" namel1" that the testator does not appear to have signed on all
the sheets of the will in the presence of the three witnesses" and the latter to have attested and signed on
all the sheets in the presence of the testator and of each other" it must ;e noted that in the attestation
clause a;ove set out it is said that the testator signed the will .in t$e presence of eac$ of t$e %itnesses.
and the latter signed .in t$e presence of eac$ ot$er and of t$e testator.. 0o that" as to whether the
testator and the attesting witnesses saw each other sign the will" such a re=uirement was clearl1 and
sufficientl1 complied with. Ahat is not stated in this clause is whether the testator and the witnesses
signed all the sheets of the will.
The act of the testator and the witnesses seeing reciprocall1 the signing of the will is one which cannot ;e
proven ;1 the mere e?hi;ition of the will unless it is stated in the document. And this fact is e?pressl1
stated in the attestation clause now ;efore us. 9ut the fact of the testator and the witnesses having signed
all the sheets of the will ma1 ;e proven ;1 the mere e?amination of the document" although it does not
sa1 an1thing a;out this" and if that is the fact" as it is in the instant case" the danger of fraud in this
respect" which is what the law tries to avoid" does not e?ist.
Therefore" as in the instant case the fact that the testator and the witnesses signed each and ever1 page
of the will is proven ;1 the mere e?amination of the signatures in the will" the omission to e?pressl1 state
such evident fact does not invalidate the will nor prevent its pro;ate.
The order appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellants. 0o ordered.
@o$nson, 6alcolm, and ?illamor, @@., concur.
G.R. No. 1)71)5 &an+a,y 31, (005
E'AE E'AE OF !E LAE AL#$#O A"ADA, "EL#NDA %A$ONONG-NO"LE, vs. AL#$#O
A"A&A and NOEL A"ELLAR,
The Case
9efore the Court is a petition for review
!
assailing the Decision
,
of the Court of Appeals of !, .anuar1
,77! in CA%&.'. C( )o. 32+33. The Court of Appeals sustained the 'esolution
'aGH4p$i'.net
Ae rule to appl1 the li;eral construction in the pro;ate of A;adaRs will. A;adaRs will clearl1 shows four
signatures: that of A;ada and of three other persons. It is reasona;le to conclude that there are three
witnesses to the will. The =uestion on the num;er of the witnesses is answered ;1 an e?amination of the
will itself and without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde. The Court e?plained the e?tent and
limits of the rule on li;eral construction" thus:
GTHhe so%called li;eral rule does not offer an1 puBBle or difficult1" nor does it open the door to serious
conse=uences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stopD the1 draw the dividing line with
precision. 1/y do no. a33o@ /8-d/n>/ aliunde .o =-33 a 8o-d -n any 2a,. o= .1/ do>+7/n. o, *+223y
7-**-n5 d/.a-3* .1a. *1o+3d a22/a, -n .1/ @-33 -.*/3=.l^vvphi1.net 1/y on3y 2/,7-. a 2,o0/ -n.o .1/
@-33, an /A23o,a.-on @-.1-n -.* >on=-n/*, .o a*>/,.a-n -.* 7/an-n5 o, .o d/./,7-n/ .1/ /A-*./n>/ o,
a0*/n>/ o= .1/ ,/B+-*-./ =o,7a3-.-/* o= 3a@. This clear" sharp limitation eliminates uncertaint1 and ought
to ;anish an1 fear of dire results.
3
(>mphasis supplied)
The phrase -en presencia de nosotros- or -in our presence- coupled with the signatures appearing on the
will itself and after the attestation clause could onl1 mean that: (!) A;ada su;scri;ed to and professed
;efore the three witnesses that the document was his last will" and (,) A;ada signed the will and the left
margin of each page of the will in the presence of these three witnesses.
Finall1" Caponong%)o;le alleges that the attestation clause does not e?pressl1 state the circumstances
that the witnesses @-.n/**/d and signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the testator and of
each other. This Court has ruled:
6recision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desira;le. @owever" it is not imperative
that a parrot%like cop1 of the words of the statute ;e made. It is sufficient if from the language emplo1ed it
can reasona;l1 ;e deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law e?pects of it.
*
The last part of the attestation clause states -en testimonio de ello, cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos en
presencia de nosotros y del testador.- In >nglish" this means -in its witness" ever1 one of us also signed
in our presence and of the testator.- This clearl1 shows that the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing
of the will of the testator" and that each witness signed the will in the presence of one another and of the
testator.
9!EREFORE" we AFFI': the Decision of the Court of Appeals of !, .anuar1 ,77! in CA%&.'. C( )o.
32+33.
04 4'D>'>D.
G.R. No. 10355) May (8, 1993
EODORO %ANEDA, LORENZA %ANEDA, ERE'A %ANEDA, &UAN %A"ALLERO, AUREA
%A"ALLERO, O'%AR LARO'A, !ELEN %A"ALLERO, 'ANO' %A"ALLERO, $A"LO
%A"ALLERO, V#%OR RAGA, MAUR#%#A RAGA, 6U#R#%A RAGA, RU$ERO A"A$O, ,/2,/*/n./d
1/,/-n 0y 1-* A..o,n/y--n-Fa>., ARM'#%#A C A"A$O VELANO, and %ON'E'O %ANEDA,
,/2,/*/n./d 1/,/-n 0y 1-* 1/-,*, &E'U' %ANEDA, NA#V#DAD %ANEDA and ARURO %ANEDA,
vs. !ON. %OUR OF A$$EAL' and 9#LL#AM %A"RERA, a* '2/>-a3 Ad7-n-*.,a.o, o= .1/ E*.a./ o=
Ma./o %a0a33/,o,
6resented for resolution ;1 this Court in the present petition for review on certiorari is the issue of whether
or not the attestation clause contained in the last will and testament of the late :ateo Ca;allero complies
with the re=uirements of Article $7*" in relation to Article $7#" of the Civil Code.
The records show that on Decem;er *" !#2$" :ateo Ca;allero" a widower without an1 children and
alread1 in the twilight 1ears of his life" e?ecuted a last will and testament at his residence in Talisa1" Ce;u
;efore three attesting witnesses" namel1" Cipriano 8a;uca" ®orio Ca;ando and Flaviano Toregosa.
The said testator was dul1 assisted ;1 his law1er" Att1. >milio 8umontad" and a notar1 pu;lic" Att1. Filoteo
:anigos" in the preparation of that last will.
1
It was declared therein" among other things" that the testator
was leaving ;1 wa1 of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to 6resentacion &aviola"
Angel A;ata1o" 'ogelio A;ata1o" Isa;elito A;ata1o" 9enoni &. Ca;rera and :arcosa Alcantara" all of
whom do not appear to ;e related to the testator.
(
Four months later" or on April 3" !#2#" :ateo Ca;allero himself filed a petition docketed as 0pecial
6roceeding )o. $##%' ;efore 9ranch II of the then Court of First Instance of Ce;u seeking the pro;ate
of his last will and testament. The pro;ate court set the petition for hearing on August ,7" !#2# ;ut the
same and su;se=uent scheduled hearings were postponed for one reason to another. 4n :a1 ,#" !#$7"
the testator passed awa1 ;efore his petition could finall1 ;e heard ;1 the pro;ate court.
3
4n Fe;ruar1 ,*"
!#$!" 9enoni Ca;rera" on of the legatees named in the will" sough his appointment as special
administrator of the testator<s estate" the estimated value of which was 6,3"777.77" and he was so
appointed ;1 the pro;ate court in its order of :arch +" !#$!.
)
Thereafter" herein petitioners" claiming to ;e nephews and nieces of the testator" instituted a second
petition" entitled -In the :atter of the Intestate >state of :ateo Ca;allero- and docketed as 0pecial
6roceeding )o. #+*%'" ;efore 9ranch IM of the aforesaid Court of First Instance of Ce;u. 4n 4cto;er
!$" !#$," herein petitioners had their said petition intestate proceeding consolidated with 0pecial
6roceeding )o. $##%' in 9ranch II of the Court of First Instance of Ce;u and opposed thereat the
pro;ate of the Testator<s will and the appointment of a special administrator for his estate.
5
9enoni Ca;rera died on Fe;ruar1 $" !#$, hence the pro;ate court" now known as 9ranch M( of the
'egional Trial Court of Ce;u" appointed Ailliam Ca;rera as special administrator on .une ,!" !#$.
Thereafter" on .ul1 ,7" !#$" it issued an order for the return of the records of 0pecial 6roceeding )o.
#+*%' to the archives since the testate proceeding for the pro;ate of the will had to ;e heard and
resolved first. 4n :arch ,+" !#$3 the case was reraffled and eventuall1 assigned to 9ranch MII of the
'egional Trial Court of Ce;u where it remained until the conclusion of the pro;ate proceedings.
6
In the course of the hearing in 0pecial 6roceeding )o. $##%'" herein petitioners appeared as oppositors
and o;5ected to the allowance of the testator<s will on the ground that on the alleged date of its e?ecution"
the testator was alread1 in the poor state of health such that he could not have possi;l1 e?ecuted the
same. 6etitioners likewise reiterated the issue as to the genuineness of the signature of the testator
therein.
7
4n the other hand" one of the attesting witnesses" Cipriano 8a;uca" and the notar1 pu;lic Att1. Filoteo
:anigos" testified that the testator e?ecuted the will in =uestion in their presence while he was of sound
and disposing mind and that" contrar1 to the assertions of the oppositors" :ateo Ca;allero was in good
health and was not undul1 influenced in an1 wa1 in the e?ecution of his will. 8a;uca also testified that he
and the other witnesses attested and signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The
other two attesting witnesses were not presented in the pro;ate hearing as the had died ;1 then.
8
4n April *" !#$$" the pro;ate court rendered a decision declaring the will in =uestion as the last will and
testament of the late :ateo Ca;allero" on the ratiocination that:
. . . The self%serving testimon1 of the two witnesses of the oppositors cannot overcome
the positive testimonies of Att1. Filoteo :anigos and Cipriano 8a;uca who clearl1 told the
Court that indeed :ateo Ca;allero e?ecuted the 8ast Aill and Testament now marked
>?hi;it -C- on Decem;er *" !#2$. :oreover" the fact that it was :ateo Ca;allero who
initiated the pro;ate of his Aill during his lifetime when he caused the filing of the original
petition now marked >?hi;it -D- clearl1 underscores the fact that this was indeed his 8ast
Aill. At the start" counsel for the oppositors manifested that he would want the signature
of :ateo Ca;allero in >?hi;it -C- e?amined ;1 a handwriting e?pert of the )9I ;ut it
would seem that despite their avowal and intention for the e?amination of this signature
of :ateo Ca;allero in >?hi;it -C-" nothing came out of it ;ecause the1 a;andoned the
idea and instead presented Aurea Ca;allero and @elen Ca;allero Campo as witnesses
for the oppositors.
All told" it is the finding of this Court that >?hi;it -C- is the 8ast Aill and Testament of
:ateo Ca;allero and that it was e?ecuted in accordance with all the re=uisites of the law.
9
Cndaunted ;1 the said 5udgment of the pro;ate court" petitioners elevated the case in the Court of
Appeals in CA%&.'. C( )o. !#++#. The1 asserted therein that the will in =uestion is null and void for the
reason that its attestation clause is fatall1 defective since it fails to specificall1 state that the instrumental
witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that the1 also signed the
will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
4n 4cto;er !*" !##!" respondent court promulgated its decision
10
affirming that of the trial court" and
ruling that the attestation clause in the last will of :ateo Ca;allero su;stantiall1 complies with Article $7*
of the Civil Code" thus:
The =uestion therefore is whether the attestation clause in =uestion ma1 ;e considered
as having su;stantial1 complied with the re=uirements of Art. $7* of the Civil Code. Ahat
appears in the attestation clause which the oppositors claim to ;e defective is -we do
certif1 that the testament was read ;1 him and the attestator" :ateo Ca;allero" has
pu;lished unto us the foregoing will consisting of T@'>> 6A&>0" including the
acknowledgment" each page num;ered correlativel1 in letters of the upper part of each
page" as his 8ast Aill and Testament" and $e $as signed t$e same and every page
t$ereof, on t$e spaces provided for $is signature and on t$e left $and margin in t$e
presence of t$e said testator and in t$e presence of eac$ and all of us (emphasis
supplied).
To our thinking" this is sufficient compliance and no evidence need ;e presented to
indicate the meaning that the said will was signed ;1 the testator and ;1 them (the
witnesses) in the presence of all of them and of one another. 4r as the language of the
law would have it that the testator signed the will -in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses" and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in
the presence of the testator and of one another.- If not completel1 or ideall1 perfect in
accordance with the wordings of Art. $7* ;ut (sic) the phrase as formulated is in
su;stantial compliance with the re=uirement of the law.-
11
6etitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said ruling of respondent court" ;ut the same was denied
in the latter<s resolution of .anuar1 !3" !##,"
1(
hence this appeal now ;efore us. 6etitioners assert that
respondent court has ruled upon said issue in a manner not in accord with the law and settled
5urisprudence on the matter and are now =uestioning once more" on the same ground as that raised
;efore respondent court" the validit1 of the attestation clause in the last will of :ateo Ca;allero.
Ae find the present petition to ;e meritorious" as we shall shortl1 hereafter" after some prefator1
o;servations which we feel should ;e made in aid of the rationale for our resolution of the controvers1.
!. A will has ;een defined as a species of conve1ance where;1 a person is permitted" with the formalities
prescri;ed ;1 law" to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate after his death.
13
Cnder the
Civil Code" there are two kinds of wills which a testator ma1 e?ecute.
1)
the first kind is the ordinar1 or
attested will" the e?ecution of which is governed ;1 Articles $73 to $7# of the Code. Article $7* re=uires
that:
Art. $7*. >ver1 will" other than a holographic will" must ;e su;scri;ed at the end thereof
;1 the testator himself or ;1 the testator<s name written ;1 some other person in his
presence" and ;1 his e?press direction" and attested and su;scri;ed ;1 three or more
credi;le witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person re=uested ;1 him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will" shall also sign" as aforesaid" each and ever1 page thereof" e?cept
the last" on the left margin" and all the pages shall ;e num;ered correlativel1 in letters
placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation should state the num;er of pages used upon which the will is written" and
the fact that the testator signed the will and ever1 page thereof" or caused some other
person to write his name" under his e?press direction" in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses" and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in
the presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witness" it shall ;e interpreted
to them.
In addition" the ordinar1 will must ;e acknowledged ;efore a notar1 pu;lic ;1 a testator and the attesting
witness.
15
hence it is likewise known as notarial will. Ahere the attestator is deaf or deaf%mute" Article
$72 re=uires that he must personall1 read the will" if a;le to do so. 4therwise" he should designate two
persons who would read the will and communicate its contents to him in a practica;le manner. 4n the
other hand" if the testator is ;lind" the will should ;e read to him twiceD once" ;1 an1one of the witnesses
thereto" and then again" ;1 the notar1 pu;lic ;efore whom it is acknowledged.
16
The other kind of will is the holographic will" which Article $!7 defines as one that is entirel1 written"
dated" and signed ;1 the testator himself. This kind of will" unlike the ordinar1 t1pe" re=uires no attestation
;1 witnesses. A common re=uirement in ;oth kinds of will is that the1 should ;e in writing and must have
;een e?ecuted in a language or dialect known to the testator.
17
@owever" in the case of an ordinar1 or attested will" its attestation clause need not ;e written in a
language or dialect known to the testator since it does not form part of the testamentar1 disposition.
Furthermore" the language used in the attestation clause likewise need not even ;e known to the
attesting witnesses.
18
The last paragraph of Article $7* merel1 re=uires that" in such a case" the
attestation clause shall ;e interpreted to said witnesses.
An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinar1 will where;1 the attesting witnesses certif1 that the
instrument has ;een e?ecuted ;efore them and to the manner of the e?ecution the same.
19
It is a
separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of e?ecution and once signed ;1
the witnesses" it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential formalities re=uired ;1 law
has ;een o;served.
(0
It is made for the purpose of preserving in a permanent form a record of the facts
that attended the e?ecution of a particular will" so that in case of failure of the memor1 of the attesting
witnesses" or other casualt1" such facts ma1 still ;e proved.
(1
Cnder the third paragraph of Article $7*" such a clause" the complete lack of which would result in the
invalidit1 of the will"
((
should state (!) t$e numer of t$e pages used upon which the will is writtenD (,)
that the testator signed" or e?pressl1 caused another to sign" the will and ever1 page thereof in t$e
presence of t$e attesting %itnessesD and () that the attesting %itnesses %itnessed t$e signing y t$e
testator of t$e %ill and all its pages" and that said %itnesses also signed t$e %ill and ever1 page thereof in
t$e presence of t$e testator and of one anot$er.
The purpose of the law in re=uiring the clause to state the num;er of pages on which the will is written is
to safeguard against possi;le interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent an1
increase or decrease in the pagesD
(3
whereas the su;scription of the signature of the testator and the
attesting witnesses is made for the purpose of authentication and identification" and thus indicates that
the will is the ver1 same instrument e?ecuted ;1 the testator and attested to ;1 the witnesses.
()
Further" ;1 attesting and su;scri;ing to the will" the witnesses there;1 declare the due e?ecution of the
will as em;odied in the attestation clause.
(5
The attestation clause" therefore" provide strong legal
guaranties for the due e?ecution of a will and to insure the authenticit1 thereof.
(6
As it appertains onl1 to
the witnesses and not to the testator" it need ;e signed onl1 ;1 them.
(7
Ahere it is left unsigned" it would
result in the invalidation of the will as it would ;e possi;le and eas1 to add the clause on a su;se=uent
occasion in the a;sence of the testator and its witnesses.
(8
In its report" the Code Commission commented on the reasons of the law for re=uiring the formalities to
;e followed in the e?ecution of wills" in the following manner:
The underl1ing and fundamental o;5ectives permeating the provisions on the law on wills
in this 6ro5ect consists in the li;eraliBation of the manner of their e?ecution with the end in
view of giving the testator more freedom in e?pressing his last wishes" ;ut with sufficient
safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the e?ercise of undue
and improper pressure and influence upon the testator.
This o;5ective is in accord with the modern tendenc1 with respect to the formalities in the
e?ecution of wills. . . .
(9
,. An e?amination of the last will and testament of :ateo Ca;allero shows that it is comprised of three
sheets all of which have ;een num;ered correlativel1" with the left margin of each page thereof ;earing
the respective signatures of the testator and the three attesting witnesses. The part of the will containing
the testamentar1 dispositions is e?pressed in the Ce;uano%(isa1an dialect and is signed at the foot
thereof ;1 the testator. The attestation clause in =uestion" on the other hand" is recited in the >nglish
language and is likewise signed at the end thereof ;1 the three attesting witnesses hereto.
30
0ince it is
the prover;ial ;one of contention" we reproduce it again for facilit1 of reference:
Ae" the undersigned attesting Aitnesses" whose 'esidences and postal addresses
appear on the 4pposite of our respective names" we do here;1 certif1 that the Testament
was read ;1 him and the testator" :AT>4 CA9A88>'4D has pu;lished unto us the
foregoing Aill consisting of T@'>> 6A&>0" including the Acknowledgment" each page
num;ered correlativel1 in the letters on the upper part of each page" as his 8ast Aill and
Testament and he has the same and ever1 page thereof" on the spaces provided for his
signature and on the left hand margin" in the presence of the said testator and in the
presence of each and all of us.
It will ;e noted that Article $7* re=uires that the witness should ;oth attest and su;scri;e to the will in the
presence of the testator and of one another. -Attestation- and -su;scription- differ in meaning. Attestation
is the act of senses" while su;scription is the act of the hand. The former is mental" the latter mechanical"
and to attest a will is to know that it was pu;lished as such" and to certif1 the facts re=uired to constitute
an actual and legal pu;licationD ;ut to su;scri;e a paper pu;lished as a will is onl1 to write on the same
paper the names of the witnesses" for the sole purpose of identification.
31
In /aoada vs. -izal"
3(
we clarified that attestation consists in witnessing the testator<s e?ecution of the
will in order to see and take note mentall1 that those things are done which the statute re=uires for the
e?ecution of a will and that the signature of the testator e?ists as a fact. 4n the other hand" su;scription is
the signing of the witnesses< names upon the same paper for the purpose of identification of such paper
as the will which was e?ecuted ;1 the testator. As it involves a mental act" there would ;e no means"
therefore" of ascertaining ;1 a ph1sical e?amination of the will whether the witnesses had indeed signed
in the presence of the testator and of each other unless this is su;stantiall1 e?pressed in the attestation.
It is contended ;1 petitioners that the afore=uoted attestation clause" in contravention of the e?press
re=uirements of the third paragraph of Article $7* of the Civil Code for attestation clauses" fails to
specificall1 state the fact that the attesting witnesses the testator sign the will and all its pages in their
presence and that the1" the witnesses" likewise signed the will and ever1 page thereof in the presence of
the testator and of each other. Ae agree.
Ahat is fairl1 apparent upon a careful reading of the attestation clause herein assailed is the fact that
while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the three
attesting witnesses and states as well the num;er of pages that were used" the same does not e?pressl1
state therein the circumstance that said witnesses su;scri;ed their respective signatures to the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other.
The phrase -and he has signed the same and ever1 page thereof" on the spaces provided for his
signature and on the left hand margin"- o;viousl1 refers to the testator and not the instrumental witnesses
as it is immediatel1 preceded ;1 the words -as his 8ast Aill and Testament.- 4n the other hand" although
the words -in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each and all of us- ma1" at first ;lush"
appear to likewise signif1 and refer to the witnesses" it must" however" ;e interpreted as referring onl1 to
the testator signing in the presence of the witnesses since said phrase immediatel1 follows the words -$e
has signed the same and ever1 page thereof" on the spaces provided for $is signature and on the left
hand margin.- Ahat is then clearl1 lacking" in the final logical anal1sis " is t$e statement t$at t$e
%itnesses signed t$e %ill and every page t$ereof in t$e presence of t$e testator and of one anot$er.
It is our considered view that the a;sence of that statement re=uired ;1 law is a fatal defect or
imperfection which must necessaril1 result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to ;e
admitted to pro;ate. 6etitioners are correct in pointing out that the aforestated defect in the attestation
clause o;viousl1 cannot ;e characteriBed as merel1 involving the form of the will or the language used
therein which would warrant the application of the su;stantial compliance rule" as contemplated in the
pertinent provision thereon in the Civil Code" to wit:
Art. $7#. In the a;sence of ;ad faith" forger1" or fraud" or undue and improper pressure
and influence" defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in t$e language
used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is not proved that the will was in fact
e?ecuted and attested in su;stantial compliance with all the re=uirements of article $7*-
(>mphasis supplied.)
Ahile it ma1 ;e true that the attestation clause is indeed su;scri;ed at the end thereof and at the left
margin of each page ;1 the three attesting witnesses" it certainl1 cannot ;e conclusivel1 inferred
therefrom that the said witness affi?ed their respective signatures in the presence of the testator and of
each other since" as petitioners correctl1 o;served" the presence of said signatures onl1 esta;lishes the
fact that it was indeed signed" ;ut it does not prove that the attesting witnesses did su;scri;e to the will in
the presence of the testator and of each other. The e?ecution of a will is supposed to ;e one act so that
where the testator and the witnesses sign on various da1s or occasions and in various com;inations" the
will cannot ;e stamped with the imprimatur of effectivit1.
33
Ae ;elieve that the further comment of former .ustice ..9.8. 'e1es
3)
regarding Article $7#" wherein he
urged caution in the application of the su;stantial compliance rule therein" is correct and should ;e
applied in the case under consideration" as well as to future cases with similar =uestions:
. . . The rule must ;e limited to disregarding those defects that can ;e supplied ;1 an
e?amination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutivel1 num;eredD whether
the signatures appear in each and ever1 pageD whether the su;scri;ing witnesses are
three or the will was notariBed. All theses are facts that the will itself can reveal" and
defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can ;e safel1
disregarded. 9ut the total num;er of pages" and %$et$er all persons re!uired to sign did
so in t$e presence of eac$ ot$er must sustantially appear in t$e attestation clause,
eing t$e only c$ec# against perjury in t$e proate proceedings. (>mphasis ours.)
. Ae stress once more that under Article $7#" the defects and imperfections must onl1 ;e with respect to
the form of the attestation or the language emplo1ed therein. 0uch defects or imperfections would not
render a will invalid should it ;e proved that the will was reall1 e?ecuted and attested in compliance with
Article $7*. In this regard" however" the manner of proving the due e?ecution and attestation has ;een
held to ;e limited to merel1 an e?amination of the will itself without resorting to evidence aliunde" whether
oral or written.
The foregoing considerations do not appl1 where the attestation clause totall1 omits the fact that the
attesting witnesses signed each and ever1 page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other.
35
In such a situation" the defect is not onl1 in the form or language of the attestation clause ;ut the
total a;sence of a specific element re=uired ;1 Article $7* to ;e specificall1 stated in the attestation
clause of a will. That is precisel1 the defect complained of in the present case since there is no plausi;le
wa1 ;1 which we can read into the =uestioned attestation clause statement" or an implication thereof" that
the attesting witness did actuall1 ;ear witness to the signing ;1 the testator of the will and all of its pages
and that said instrumental witnesses also signed the will and ever1 page thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
Furthermore" the rule on su;stantial compliance in Article $7# cannot ;e revoked or relied on ;1
respondents since it presupposes that the defects in the attestation clause can ;e cured or supplied ;1
the te?t of the will or a consideration of matters apparent therefrom which would provide the data not
e?pressed in the attestation clause or from which it ma1 necessaril1 ;e gleaned or clearl1 inferred that the
acts not stated in the omitted te?tual re=uirements were actuall1 complied within the e?ecution of the will.
In other words" defects must ;e remedied ;1 intrinsic evidence supplied ;1 the will itself.
In the case at ;ar" contraril1" proof of the acts re=uired to have ;een performed ;1 the attesting witnesses
can ;e supplied ;1 onl1 e?trinsic evidence thereof" since an overall appreciation of the contents of the will
1ields no ;asis whatsoever from with such facts ma1 ;e plausi;l1 deduced. Ahat private respondent
insists on are the testimonies of his witnesses alleging that the1 saw the compliance with such
re=uirements ;1 the instrumental witnesses" o;livious of the fact that he is there;1 resorting to e?trinsic
evidence to prove the same and would accordingl1 ;e doing ;1 the indirection what in law he cannot do
directl1.
3. 6rior to the advent of the Civil Code on August 7" !#*7" there was a divergence of views as to which
manner of interpretation should ;e followed in resolving issues centering on compliance with the legal
formalities re=uired in the e?ecution of wills. The formal re=uirements were at that time em;odied
primaril1 in 0ection +!$ of Act )o. !#7" the Code of Civil 6rocedure. 0aid section was later amended ;1
Act )o. ,+3*" ;ut the provisions respecting said formalities found in Act. )o. !#7 and the amendment
thereto were practicall1 reproduced and adopted in the Civil Code.
4ne view advance the li;eral or su;stantial compliance rule. This was first laid down in the case of
"angan vs. "angan"
36
where it was held that the o;5ect of the solemnities surrounding the e?ecution of
wills is to close the door against ;ad faith and fraud" to avoid su;stitution of wills and testaments and to
guarantee their truth and authenticit1. Therefore" the laws on this su;5ect should ;e interpreted in such a
wa1 as to attain these primordial ends. )onetheless" it was also emphasiBed that one must not lose sight
of the fact that it is not the o;5ect of the law to restrain and curtail the e?ercise of the right to make a will"
hence when an interpretation alread1 given assures such ends" an1 other interpretation whatsoever that
adds nothing ;ut demands more re=uisites entirel1 unnecessar1" useless and frustrative of the testator<s
last will" must ;e disregarded. The su;se=uent cases of "vera vs. Barcia"
37
"ldaa vs. -o!ue"
38
3nson
vs. "ella"
39
*ecson vs. Coronel"
)0
>ernandez vs. ?ergel de &ios, et al."
)1
and 0ayve vs. 6ojal, et al.
)(
all adhered to this position.
The other view which advocated the rule that statutes which prescri;e the formalities that should ;e
o;served in the e?ecution of wills are mandator1 in nature and are to ;e strictl1 construed was followed in
the su;se=uent cases of In t$e 6atter of t$e Estate of Saguinsin"
)3
In re 7ill of "ndrada"
))
3y Co!ue vs.
Sioca"
)5
In re Estate of 0eumar#"
)6
and Sano vs. 5uintana.
)7
Buman vs. Borec$o, et al."
)8
provided the Court with the occasion to clarif1 the seemingl1 conflicting
decisions in the aforementioned cases. In said case of Buman" the attestation clause had failed to state
that the witnesses signed the will and each and ever1 page thereof on the left margin in the presence of
the testator. The will in =uestion was disallowed" with these reasons therefor:
In support of their argument on the assignment of error a;ove%mentioned" appellants rel1
on a series of cases of this court ;eginning with (I)n the :atter of the (>)state of
0aguinsin (G!#,7H" 3! 6hil." $2*)" continuing with In re Aill of Andrada G!#,!H" 3, 6hil."
!$7)" C1 Co=ue vs. )avas 8. 0ioca G!#,,H" 3 6hil." 37*)" and In re >state of )eumark
(G!#,H" 3+ 6hil." $3!)" and ending with Sano vs. 5uintana (G!#,*H" 3$ 6hil." *7+).
Appellee counters with the citation of a series of cases ;eginning with "angan vs.
"angan (G!#!#H" 37 6hil." 32+)" continuing through "ldaa vs. -o!ue (G!#,,H" 3 6hil."
2$)" and >ernandez vs. ?ergel de &ios (G!#,3H" 3+ 6hil." #,,)" and culminating in 0ayve
vs. 6ojal and "guilar (G!#,3H" 32 6hil." !*,). In its last anal1sis" our task is to contrast
and" if possi;le" conciliate the last two decisions cited ;1 opposing counsel" namel1"
those of Sano vs. 5uintana" supra" and 0ayve vs. 6ojal and "guilar" supra.
In the case of Sano vs. 5uintana" supra" it was decided that an attestation clause which
does not recite that the witnesses signed the will and each and ever1 page thereof on the
left margin in the presence of the testator is defective" and such a defect annuls the will.
The case of 3y Co!ue vs. Sioca" supra" was cited" ;ut the case of 0ayve vs. 6ojal and
"guilar" supra" was not mentioned. In contrast" is the decision in 0ayve vs. 6ojal and
"guilar" supra" wherein it was held that the attestation clause must estate the fact that the
testator and the witnesses reciprocall1 saw the signing of the will" for such an act cannot
;e proved ;1 the mere e?hi;ition of the will" if it is not stated therein. It was also held that
the fact that the testator and the witnesses signed each and ever1 page of the will can ;e
proved also ;1 the mere e?amination of the signatures appearing on the document itself"
and the omission to state such evident facts does not invalidate the will.
It is a ha;it of courts to reaffirm or distinguish previous casesD seldom do the1 admit
inconsistenc1 in doctrine. /et here" unless aided impossi;le to reconcile the :o5al and
Iuintana decisions. The1 are fundamentall1 at variance. If we rel1 on one" we affirm. If
we rel1 on the other" we reverse.
In resolving this puBBling =uestion of authorit1" three outstanding points ma1 ;e
mentioned. In the first place" the :o5al" decision was concurred in ;1 onl1 four mem;ers
of the court" less than a ma5orit1" with two strong dissenting opinionsD the Iuintana
decision was concurred in ;1 seven mem;ers of the court" a clear ma5orit1" with one
formal dissent. In the second place" the :o5al decision was promulgated in Decem;er"
!#,3" while the Iuintana decision was promulgated in Decem;er" !#,*D the Iuintana
decision was thus su;se=uent in point of time. And in the third place" the Iuintana
decision is ;elieved more nearl1 to conform to the applica;le provisions of the law.
The right to dispose of propert1 ;1 will is governed entirel1 ;1 statute. The law of the
case is here found in section +! of the Code of Civil 6rocedure as amended ;1 Act )o.
,+3*" and in section +3 of the same Code" as unamended. It is in part provided in
section +!" as amended that -)o %ill . . . s$all e valid . . . unless . . ..- It is further
provided in the same section that -The attestation s$all state the num;er of sheets or
pages used" upon which the will is written" and the fact that the testator signed the will
and ever1 page thereof" or caused some other person to write his name" under his
e?press direction" in the presence of three witnesses" and the latter witnessed and signed
the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.- Codal
section +3 provides that -The will s$all ;e disallowed in either of the following case: !. If
not e?ecuted and attested as in this Act provided.- The law not alone carefull1 makes use
of the imperative" ;ut cautiousl1 goes further and makes use of the negative" to enforce
legislative intention. It is not within the province of the courts to disregard the legislative
purpose so emphaticall1 and clearl1 e?pressed.
Ae adopt and reaffirm the decision in the case of Sano vs. 5uintana" supra" and" to the
e?tent necessar1" modif1 the decision in the case of 0ayve vs. 6ojal and "guilar" supra.
(>mphases in the original te?t).
9ut after the Buman clarificator1 pronouncement" there were decisions of the Court that once more
appeared to revive the seeming diversit1 of views that was earlier threshed out therein. The cases of
5uinto vs. 6orata"
)9
-odriguez vs. "lcala"
50
Enc$evarria vs. Sarmiento"
51
and /estate Estate of /oray
5(
went the wa1 of the ruling as restated in Buman. 9ut &e Bala vs. Bonzales, et al."
53
-ey vs. Cartagena"
5)
&e /icson vs. &e Borostiza"
55
Seastian vs. *anganian"
56
-odriguez vs. Iap"
57
Brey vs. >aia"
58
Leynez vs. Leynez"
59
6artir vs. 6artir"
60
"lcala vs. &e ?illa"
61
Saado vs.
>ernandez"
6(
6endoza vs. *ilapil"
63
and Lopez vs. Lioro"
6)
veered awa1 from the strict interpretation
rule and esta;lished a trend toward an application of the li;eral view.
The Code Commission" cogniBant of such a conflicting welter of views and of the undenia;le inclination
towards a li;eral construction" recommended the codification of the su;stantial compliance rule" as it
;elieved this rule to ;e in accord with the modern tendenc1 to give a li;eral approach to the interpretation
of wills. 0aid rule thus ;ecame what is now Article $7# of the Civil Code" with this e?planation of the Code
Commission:
The present law provides for onl1 one form of e?ecuting a will" and that is" in accordance
with the formalities prescri;ed ;1 0ection +!$ of the Code of Civil 6rocedure as amended
;1 Act )o. ,+3*. The 0upreme Court of the 6hilippines had previousl1 upheld the strict
compliance with the legal formalities and had even said that the provisions of 0ection +!$
of the Code of Civil 6rocedure" as amended regarding the contents of the attestation
clause were mandator1" and non%compliance therewith invalidated the will (C1 Co=ue vs.
0ioca" 3 6hil. 37*). These decisions necessaril1 restrained the freedom of the testator in
disposing of his propert1.
@owever" in recent 1ears the 0upreme Court changed its attitude and has ;ecome more
li;eral in the interpretation of the formalities in the e?ecution of wills. This li;eral view is
enunciated in the cases of -odriguez vs. Iap" &.'. )o. 3*#,3" :a1 !$" !##D Leynez vs.
Leynez" &.'. )o. 3+7#2" 4cto;er !$" !##D 6artir vs. 6artir" &.'. )o. 3+##*" .une ,!"
!#37D and "lcala vs. ?illa" &.'. )o. 32*!" April !$" !#3!.
In the a;ove mentioned decisions of our 0upreme Court" it has practicall1 gone ;ack to
the original provisions of 0ection +!$ of the Code of Civil 6rocedure ;efore its
amendment ;1 Act )o. ,+3* in the 1ear !#!+. To turn this attitude into a legislative
declaration and to attain the main o;5ective of the proposed Code in the li;eraliBation of
the manner of e?ecuting wills" article $,# of the 6ro5ect is recommended" which reads:
-Art. $,#. In the a;sence of ;ad faith" forger1" or fraud" or undue and
improper pressure and influence" defects and imperfections in the form of
attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid
if it is proved that the will was in fact e?ecuted and attested in su;stantial
compliance with all the re=uirements of article $,#.-
65
The so%called li;eral rule" the Court said in Bil vs. 6urciano"
66
-does not offer an1 puBBle or difficult1" nor
does it open the door to serious conse=uences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stopD
the1 draw the dividing line with precision. The1 do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in an1 part of
the document or suppl1 missing details that should appear in the will itself. The1 onl1 permit a pro;e into
the will" an e?ploration into its confines" to ascertain its meaning or to determine the e?istence or a;sence
of the re=uisite formalities of law. This clear" sharp limitation eliminates uncertaint1 and ought to ;anish
an1 fear of dire results.-
It ma1 thus ;e stated that the rule" as it now stands" is that omissions which can ;e supplied ;1 an
e?amination of the will itself" without the need of resorting to e?trinsic evidence" will not ;e fatal and"
correspondingl1" would not o;struct the allowance to pro;ate of the will ;eing assailed. @owever" those
omissions which cannot ;e supplied e?cept ;1 evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the
attestation clause and ultimatel1" of the will itself.
67
A@>'>F4'>" the petition is here;1 &'A)T>D and the impugned decision of respondent court is
here;1 '>(>'0>D and 0>T A0ID>. The court a !uo is accordingl1 directed to forthwith DI0:I00 its
0pecial 6roceeding )o. $##%' (6etition for the 6ro;ate of the 8ast Aill and Testament of :ateo
Ca;allero) and to '>(I(> 0pecial 6roceeding )o. #+*%' (In the matter of the Intestate >state of :ateo
Ca;allero) as an active case and thereafter dul1 proceed with the settlement of the estate of the said
decedent.
04 4'D>'>D.
G.R. No. 1(3)86 A+5+*. 1(, 1999
EUGEN#A RAMONAL %ODOY, and MANUEL RAMONAL, vs. EVANGEL#NE R. %ALUGAY,
&O'E$!#NE 'AL%EDO, and UEFEM#A $A#GA',
9efore us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
!
and its resolution
den1ing reconsideration" ruling:
Cpon the unre;utted testimon1 of appellant >vangeline Caluga1 and witness :atilde 'amonal
9inana1" the authenticit1 of testators holographic will has ;een esta;lished and the handwriting
and signature therein (e?hi;it 0) are hers" enough to pro;ate said will. 'eversal of the 5udgment
appealed from and the pro;ate of the holographic will in =uestion ;e called for. The rule is that
after plaintiff has completed presentation of his evidence and the defendant files a motion for
5udgment on demurrer to evidence on the ground that upon the facts and the law plaintiff has
shown no right to relief" if the motion is granted and the order to dismissal is reversed on appeal"
the movant loses his right to present evidence in his ;ehalf (0ec" ! 'ule * 'evised 'ules of
Court). .udgment ma1" therefore" ;e rendered for appellant in the instant case.
Aherefore" the order appealed from is '>(>'0>D and 5udgment rendered allowing the pro;ate
of the holographic will of the testator :atilde 0eFo (da. de 'amonal.
,
The facts are as follows:
4n April +" !##7" >vangeline Caluga1" .osephine 0alcedo and >ufemia 6atigas" devisees and legatees of
the holographic will of the deceased :atilde 0eFo (da. de 'amonal" filed with the 'egional Trial Court"
:isamis 4riental" 9ranch !$" a petition
0urprisingl1" >dmond
opposed the petition on the ground that the will was e?ecuted under undue influence.
4n )ovem;er ," !##," one of the properties of the estate J the house and lot at )o. , 4liva 0treet" (alle
(erde I(" 6asig which the testator ;e=ueathed to :aria Cathr1n" Candice Al;ertine and :aria Angeline
3
J was leased out ;1 >dmond 'uiB to third persons.
4n .anuar1 !#" !##" the pro;ate court ordered >dmond to deposit with the 9ranch Clerk of Court the
rental deposit and pa1ments totalling 6*37"777.77 representing the one%1ear lease of the (alle (erde
propert1. In compliance" on .anuar1 ,*" !##" >dmond turned over the amount of 63$"*$.*+"
representing the ;alance of the rent after deducting 6!#!"3!+.!3 for repair and maintenance e?penses on
the estate.
*
In :arch !##" >dmond moved for the release of 6*7"777.77 to pa1 the real estate ta?es on the real
properties of the estate. The pro;ate court approved the release of 62"2,,.77.
+
4n :a1 !3" !##" >dmond withdrew his opposition to the pro;ate of the will. Conse=uentl1" the pro;ate
court" on :a1 !$" !##" admitted the will to pro;ate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentar1 to
>dmond conditioned upon the filing of a ;ond in the amount of 6*7"777.77. The letters testamentar1 were
issued on .une ," !##.
4n .ul1 ,$" !##" petitioner Testate >state of @ilario 'uiB" with >dmond 'uiB as e?ecutor" filed an ->?%
6arte :otion for 'elease of Funds.- It pra1ed for the release of the rent pa1ments deposited with the
9ranch Clerk of Court. 'espondent :ontes opposed the motion and concurrentl1 filed a -:otion for
'elease of Funds to Certain @eirs- and -:otion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of 6ro;ate Aill.-
:ontes pra1ed for the release of the said rent pa1ments to :aria Cathr1n" Candice Al;ertine and :aria
Angeline and for the distri;ution of the testator<s properties" specificall1 the (alle (erde propert1 and the
9lue 'idge apartments" in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.
4n August ,+" !##" the pro;ate court denied petitioner<s motion for release of funds ;ut granted
respondent :ontes< motion in view of petitioner<s lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release of the rent
pa1ments to the decedent<s three granddaughters. It further ordered the deliver1 of the titles to and
possession of the properties ;e=ueathed to the three granddaughters and respondent :ontes upon the
filing of a ;ond of 6*7"777.77.
6etitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actuall1 filed his opposition to respondent :ontes<s
motion for release of rent pa1ments which opposition the court failed to consider. 6etitioner likewise
reiterated his previous motion for release of funds.
4n )ovem;er ," !##" petitioner" through counsel" manifested that he was withdrawing his motion for
release of funds in view of the fact that the lease contract over the (alle (erde propert1 had ;een
renewed for another 1ear.
2
Despite petitioner<s manifestation" the pro;ate court" on Decem;er ,," !##" ordered the release of the
funds to >dmond ;ut onl1 -such amount as ma1 ;e necessar1 to cover the e?penses of administration
and allowances for support- of the testator<s three granddaughters su;5ect to collation and deducti;le from
their share in the inheritance. The court" however" held in a;e1ance the release of the titles to respondent
:ontes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of si? months from the date of first pu;lication of the
notice to creditors.
$
The court stated thus:
??? ??? ???
After consideration of the arguments set forth thereon ;1 the parties the court resolves to allow
Administrator >dmond :. 'uiB to take possession of the rental pa1ments deposited with the
Clerk of Court" 6asig 'egional Trial Court" ;ut onl1 such amount as ma1 ;e necessary to cover
the e?penses of administration and allowances for support of :aria Cathr1n (eroni=ue" Candice
Al;ertine and :aria Angeli" which are su;5ect to collation and deducti;le from the share in the
inheritance of said heirs and insofar as the1 e?ceed the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
As to the release of the titles ;e=ueathed to petitioner :aria 6ilar 'uiB%:ontes and the a;ove%
named heirs" the same is here;1 reconsidered and $eld in aeyance until the lapse of si? (+)
months from the date of first pu;lication of )otice to Creditors.
A@>'>F4'>" Administrator >dmond :. 'uiB is here;1 ordered to su;mit an accounting of the
e?penses necessar1 for administration including provisions for the support 4f :aria Cathr1n
(eroni=ue 'uiB" Candice Al;ertine 'uiB and :aria Angeli 'uiB ;efore the amount re=uired can
;e withdrawn and cause the pu;lication of the notice to creditors with reasona;le dispatch.
#
6etitioner assailed this order ;efore the Court of Appeals. Finding no grave a;use of discretion on the
part of respondent 5udge" the appellate court dismissed the petition and sustained the pro;ate court<s
order in a decision dated )ovem;er !7" !##3
!7
and a resolution dated .anuar1 *" !##*.
!!
@ence" this petition.
6etitioner claims that:
T@> 6C98IC '>064)D>)T C4C'T 4F A66>A80 C4::ITT>D &'A(> A9C0> 4F
DI0C'>TI4) A:4C)TI)& T4 8ACL 4' >MC>00 4F .C'I0DICTI4) I) AFFI':I)& A)D
C4)FI':I)& T@> 4'D>' 4F '>064)D>)T '>&I4)A8 T'IA8 C4C'T 4F 6A0I&"
9'A)C@ !*+" DAT>D D>C>:9>' ,," !##" A@IC@ A@>) &I(>) DC> C4C'0> A)D I0
>FF>CT>D A4C8D: (!) DI0A884A T@> >M>CCT4'EAD:I)I0T'AT4' 4F T@> >0TAT> 4F
T@> 8AT> @I8A'I4 :. 'CIO T4 TAL> 6400>00I4) 4F A88 T@> '>A8 A)D 6>'04)A8
6'46>'TI>0 4F T@> >0TAT>D (,) &'A)T 0C664'T" DC'I)& T@> 6>)D>)C/ 4F T@>
0>TT8>:>)T 4F A) >0TAT>" T4 C>'TAI) 6>'04)0 )4T >)TIT8>D T@>'>T4D A)D ()
6'>:ATC'>8/ 6A'TITI4) A)D DI0T'I9CT> T@> >0TAT> 6C'0CA)T T4 T@>
6'4(I0I4)0 4F T@> @484&'A6@IC AI88 >(>) 9>F4'> IT0 I)T'I)0IC (A8IDIT/ @A0
9>>) D>T>':I)>D" A)D D>06IT> T@> >MI0T>)C> 4F C)6AID D>9T0 A)D
498I&ATI4)0 4F T@> >0TAT>.
!,
The issue for resolution is whether the pro;ate court" after admitting the will to pro;ate ;ut ;efore
pa1ment of the estate<s de;ts and o;ligations" has the authorit1: (!) to grant an allowance from the funds
of the estate for the support of the testator<s grandchildrenD (,) to order the release of the titles to certain
heirsD and () to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the e?ecutor of the will.
4n the matter of allowance" 0ection of 'ule $ of the 'evised 'ules of Court provides:
0ec. . "llo%ance to %ido% and family. J The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a
deceased person" during the settlement of the estate" shall receive therefrom under the direction
of the court" such allowance as are provided ;1 law.
6etitioner alleges that this provision onl1 gives the widow and the minor or incapacitated children of the
deceased the right to receive allowances for support during the settlement of estate proceedings. @e
contends that the testator<s three granddaughters do not =ualif1 for an allowance ;ecause the1 are not
incapacitated and are no longer minors ;ut of legal age" married and gainfull1 emplo1ed. In addition" the
provision e?pressl1 states -children- of the deceased which e?cludes the latter<s grandchildren.
It is settled that allowances for support under 0ection of 'ule $ should not ;e limited to the -minor or
incapacitated- children of the deceased. Article !$$
!
of the Civil Code of the 6hilippines" the su;stantive
law in force at the time of the testator<s death" provides that during the li=uidation of the con5ugal
partnership" the deceased<s legitimate spouse and children" regardless of their age" civil status or gainful
emplo1ment" are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate.
!3
The law is rooted on the
fact that the right and dut1 to support" especiall1 the right to education" su;sist even ;e1ond the age of
ma5orit1.
!*
9e that as it ma1" grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent<s
estate. The law clearl1 limits the allowance to -widow and children- and does not e?tend it to the
deceased<s grandchildren" regardless of their minorit1 or incapacit1.
!+
It was error" therefore" for the
appellate court to sustain the pro;ate court<s order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the
testator pending settlement of his estate.
'espondent courts also erred when the1 ordered the release of the titles of the ;e=ueathed properties to
private respondents si? months after the date of first pu;lication of notice to creditors. An order releasing
titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance distri;ution of the estate which is allowed onl1
under the following conditions:
0ec. ,. "dvance distriution in special proceedings. J )othwithstanding a pending controvers1
or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent" the court ma1" in its discretion and
upon such terms as it ma1 deem proper and 5ust" permit that such part of the estate as ma1 not
;e affected ;1 the controvers1 or appeal ;e distri;uted among the heirs or legatees" upon
compliance with the conditions set forth in 'ule #7 of these 'ules.
!2
And 'ule #7 provides that:
0ec. !. 7$en order for distriution of residue made. J 7$en t$e dets, funeral c$arges, and
expenses of administration t$e allo%ance to t$e %ido%, and in$eritance tax if any, c$argeale to
t$e estate in accordance %it$ la%, $ave een paid, t$e court, on t$e application of t$e executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in t$e estate, and after $earing upon notice s$all assign
t$e residue of t$e estate to t$e persons entitled to t$e same" naming them and the proportions or
parts" to which each is entitled" and such persons ma1 demand and recover their respective
shares from the e?ecutor or administrator" or an1 other person having the same in his
possession. If there is a controvers1 ;efore the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distri;utive shares to which each person is entitled under the law"
the controvers1 shall ;e heard and decided as in ordinar1 cases.
)o distri;ution shall ;e allowed until the pa1ment of the o;ligations a;ove%mentioned has ;een
made or provided for" unless the distri;utees" or an1 of them" give a ;ond" in a sum to ;e fi?ed ;1
the court" conditioned for the pa1ment of said o;ligations within such time as the court directs.
!$
In settlement of estate proceedings" the distri;ution of the estate properties can onl1 ;e made: (!) after all
the de;ts" funeral charges" e?penses of administration" allowance to the widow" and estate ta? have ;een
paidD or (,) ;efore pa1ment of said o;ligations onl1 if the distri;utees or an1 of them gives a ;ond in a
sum fi?ed ;1 the court conditioned upon the pa1ment of said o;ligations within such time as the court
directs" or when provision is made to meet those o;ligations.
!#
In the case at ;ar" the pro;ate court ordered the release of the titles to the (alle (erde propert1 and the
9lue 'idge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of si? months from the date of first
pu;lication of the notice to creditors. The =uestioned order speaks of -notice- to creditors" not pa1ment of
de;ts and o;ligations. @ilario 'uiB allegedl1 left no de;ts when he died ;ut the ta?es on his estate had
not hitherto ;een paid" much less ascertained. The estate ta? is one of those o;ligations that must ;e
paid ;efore distri;ution of the estate. If not 1et paid" the rule re=uires that the distri;utees post a ;ond or
make such provisions as to meet the said ta? o;ligation in proportion to their respective shares in the
inheritance.
,7
)ota;l1" at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not 1et ;een
inventoried and appraised.
It was also too earl1 in the da1 for the pro;ate court to order the release of the titles si? months after
admitting the will to pro;ate. The pro;ate of a will is conclusive as to its due e?ecution and e?trinsic
validit1
,!
and settles onl1 the =uestion of whether the testator" ;eing of sound mind" freel1 e?ecuted it in
accordance with the formalities prescri;ed ;1 law.
,,
Iuestions as to the intrinsic validit1 and efficac1 of
the provisions of the will" the legalit1 of an1 devise or legac1 ma1 ;e raised even after the will has ;een
authenticated.
,
The intrinsic validit1 of @ilario<s holographic will was controverted ;1 petitioner ;efore the pro;ate court in
his 'epl1 to :ontes< 4pposition to his motion for release of funds
,3
and his motion for reconsideration of
the August ,+" !## order of the said court.
,*
Therein" petitioner assailed the distri;utive shares of the
devisees and legatees inasmuch as his father<s will included the estate of his mother and allegedl1
impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother. The 'ules provide that if there is a controvers1 as
to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their distri;utive shares in his estate" the pro;ate court
shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinar1 cases.
,+
0till and all" petitioner cannot correctl1 claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right to take
possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an e?ecutor or administrator
to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not a;solute
and can onl1 ;e e?ercised -so long as it is necessar1 for the pa1ment of the de;ts and e?penses of
administration"-
,2
0ection of 'ule $3 of the 'evised 'ules of Court e?plicitl1 provides:
0ec. . Executor or administrator to retain %$ole estate to pay dets, and to administer estate not
%illed. J An e?ecutor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of
the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for t$e payment
of t$e dets and expenses for administration.
,$
Ahen petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of court" he had ;een
previousl1 granted ;1 the pro;ate court certain amounts for repair and maintenance e?penses on the
properties of the estate" and pa1ment of the real estate ta?es thereon. 9ut petitioner moved again for the
release of additional funds for the same reasons he previousl1 cited. It was correct for the pro;ate court to
re=uire him to su;mit an accounting of the necessar1 e?penses for administration ;efore releasing an1
further mone1 in his favor.
It was relevantl1 noted ;1 the pro;ate court that petitioner had deposited with it onl1 a portion of the one%
1ear rental income from the (alle (erde propert1. 6etitioner did not deposit its succeeding rents after
renewal of the lease.
,#
)either did he render an accounting of such funds.
6etitioner must ;e reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is merel1 inchoate
as long as the estate has not ;een full1 settled and partitioned.
7
As e?ecutor" he is a mere trustee of his
father<s estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties and
responsi;ilities of a trustee of the highest order.
!
@e cannot unilaterall1 assign to himself and possess all
his parents< properties and the fruits thereof without first su;mitting an inventor1 and appraisal of all real
and personal properties of the deceased" rendering a true account of his administration" the e?penses of
administration" the amount of the o;ligations and estate ta?" all of which are su;5ect to a determination ;1
the court as to their veracit1" propriet1 and 5ustness.
,
I) (I>A A@>'>4F" the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA%&.'. 06 )o. 73*
affirming the order dated Decem;er ,," !## of the 'egional Trial Court" 9ranch !*+" 6asig in 06 6roc.
)o. !7,*# are affirmed with the modification that those portions of the order granting an allowance to the
testator<s grandchildren and ordering the release of the titles to the private respondents upon notice to
creditors are annulled and set aside.
'espondent 5udge is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the proceedings ;elow.
04 4'D>'>D.
G.R. No. 8(0(7 Ma,>1 (9, 1990
ROMAR#%O G. V#UG, vs. !E !ONORA"LE %OUR OF A$$EAL' and RO9ENA FAU'#NO-
%ORONA,
This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided ;1 this Court
1
involving the pro;ate of the two wills of the
late Dolores 8uchangco (itug" who died in )ew /ork" C. 0.A." on )ovem;er !7" !#$7" naming private
respondent 'owena Faustino%Corona e?ecutri?. In our said decision" we upheld the appointment of
)enita Alonte as co%special administrator of :rs. (itug<s estate with her (:rs. (itug<s) widower" petitioner
'omarico &. (itug" pending pro;ate.
4n .anuar1 !" !#$*" 'omarico &. (itug filed a motion asking for authorit1 from the pro;ate court to sell
certain shares of stock and real properties ;elonging to the estate to cover allegedl1 his advances to the
estate in the sum of 6++2"2!.++" plus interests" which he claimed were personal funds. As found ;1 the
Court of Appeals"
(
the alleged advances consisted of 6*$"!32.37 spent for the pa1ment of estate ta?"
6*!$"$3.,2 as deficienc1 estate ta?" and 6#7"23#.## as -increment thereto.-
3
According to :r. (itug" he
withdrew the sums of 6*!$"$3.,2 and 6#7"23#.## from savings account )o. *3,%7$ of the 9ank of
America" :akati" :etro :anila.
4n April !," !#$*" 'owena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same funds
withdrawn from savings account )o. *3,%7$ were con5ugal partnership properties and part of the
estate" and hence" there was allegedl1 no ground for reim;ursement. 0he also sought his ouster for
failure to include the sums in =uestion for inventor1 and for -concealment of funds ;elonging to the
estate.-
)
(itug insists that the said funds are his e?clusive propert1 having ac=uired the same through a
survivorship agreement e?ecuted with his late wife and the ;ank on .une !#" !#27. The agreement
provides:
Ae here;1 agree with each other and with the 9A)L 4F A:>'ICA) )ATI4)A8 T'C0T
A)D 0A(I)&0 A004CIATI4) (hereinafter referred to as the 9A)L)" that all mone1 now
or hereafter deposited ;1 us or an1 or either of us with the 9A)L in our 5oint savings
current account shall ;e the propert1 of all or ;oth of us and shall ;e pa1a;le to and
collecti;le or withdrawa;le ;1 either or an1 of us during our lifetime" and after the death of
either or an1 of us shall ;elong to and ;e the sole propert1 of the survivor or survivors"
and shall ;e pa1a;le to and collecti;le or withdrawa;le ;1 such survivor or survivors.
Ae further agree with each other and the 9A)L that the receipt or check of either" an1 or
all of us during our lifetime" or the receipt or check of the survivor or survivors" for an1
pa1ment or withdrawal made for our a;ove%mentioned account shall ;e valid and
sufficient release and discharge of the 9A)L for such pa1ment or withdrawal.
5
The trial courts
6
upheld the validit1 of this agreement and granted -the motion to sell some of the estate
of Dolores 8. (itug" the proceeds of which shall ;e used to pa1 the personal funds of 'omarico (itug in
the total sum of 6++2"2!.++ ... .-
7
4n the other hand" the Court of Appeals" in the petition for certiorari filed ;1 the herein private
respondent" held that the a;ove%=uoted survivorship agreement constitutes a conve1ance mortis causa
which -did not compl1 with the formalities of a valid will as prescri;ed ;1 Article $7* of the Civil Code"-
8
and secondl1" assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohi;ited donation under the
provisions of Article ! of the Civil Code.
9
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals states:
A@>'>F4'>" the order of respondent .udge dated )ovem;er ,+" !#$* (Anne? II"
petition) is here;1 set aside insofar as it granted private respondent<s motion to sell
certain properties of the estate of Dolores 8. (itug for reim;ursement of his alleged
advances to the estate" ;ut the same order is sustained in all other respects. In addition"
respondent .udge is directed to include provisionall1 the deposits in 0avings Account )o.
*3,%7$ with the 9ank of America" :akati" in the inventor1 of actual properties
possessed ;1 the spouses at the time of the decedent<s death. Aith costs against private
respondent.
10
In his petition" (itug" the surviving spouse" assails the appellate court<s ruling on the strength of our
decisions in -ivera v. *eople9s 2an# and /rust Co.
11
and 6acam v. Batmaitan
1(
in which we sustained
the validit1 of -survivorship agreements- and considering them as aleator1 contracts.
13
The petition is meritorious.
The conve1ance in =uestion is not" first of all" one of mortis causa, which should ;e em;odied in a will. A
will has ;een defined as -a personal" solemn" revoca;le and free act ;1 which a capacitated person
disposes of his propert1 and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death.-
1)
In other words" the ;e=uest or device must pertain to the testator.
15
In this case" the monies su;5ect of
savings account )o. *3,%7$ were in the nature of con5ugal funds In the case relied on" -ivera v.
*eople9s 2an# and /rust Co.,
16
we re5ected claims that a survivorship agreement purports to deliver one
part1<s separate properties in favor of the other" ;ut simpl1" their 5oint holdings:
??? ??? ???
... 0uch conclusion is evidentl1 predicated on the assumption that 0tephenson was the
e?clusive owner of the funds%deposited in the ;ank" which assumption was in turn ;ased
on the facts (!) that the account was originall1 opened in the name of 0tephenson alone
and (,) that Ana 'ivera -served onl1 as housemaid of the deceased.- 9ut it not
infre=uentl1 happens that a person deposits mone1 in the ;ank in the name of anotherD
and in the instant case it also appears that Ana 'ivera served her master for a;out
nineteen 1ears without actuall1 receiving her salar1 from him. The fact that su;se=uentl1
0tephenson transferred the account to the name of himself andEor Ana 'ivera and
e?ecuted with the latter the survivorship agreement in =uestion although there was no
relation of kinship ;etween them ;ut onl1 that of master and servant" nullifies the
assumption that 0tephenson was the e?clusive owner of the ;ank account. In the
a;sence" then" of clear proof to the contrar1" we must give full faith and credit to the
certificate of deposit which recites in effect that the funds in =uestion ;elonged to >dgar
0tephenson and Ana 'iveraD that the1 were 5oint (and several) owners thereofD and that
either of them could withdraw an1 part or the whole of said account during the lifetime of
;oth" and the ;alance" if an1" upon the death of either" ;elonged to the survivor.
17
??? ??? ???
In 6acam v. Batmaitan,
18
it was held:
??? ??? ???
This Court is of the opinion that >?hi;it C is an aleator1 contract where;1" according to
article !2#7 of the Civil Code" one of the parties or ;oth reciprocall1 ;ind themselves to
give or do something as an e=uivalent for that which the other part1 is to give or do in
case of the occurrence of an event which is uncertain or will happen at an indeterminate
time. As alread1 stated" 8eonarda was the owner of the house and .uana of the 9uick
automo;ile and most of the furniture. 91 virtue of >?hi;it C" .uana would ;ecome the
owner of the house in case 8eonarda died first" and 8eonarda would ;ecome the owner
of the automo;ile and the furniture if .uana were to die first. In this manner 8eonarda and
.uana reciprocall1 assigned their respective propert1 to one another conditioned upon
who might die first" the time of death determining the event upon which the ac=uisition of
such right ;1 the one or the other depended. This contract" as an1 other contract" is
;inding upon the parties thereto. Inasmuch as 8eonarda had died ;efore .uana" the latter
thereupon ac=uired the ownership of the house" in the same manner as 8eonarda would
have ac=uired the ownership of the automo;ile and of the furniture if .uana had died first.
19
??? ??? ???
There is no showing that the funds e?clusivel1 ;elonged to one part1" and hence it must ;e presumed to
;e con5ugal" having ;een ac=uired during the e?istence of the marita. relations.
(0
)either is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for o;vious reasons" ;ecause it was to take
effect after the death of one part1. 0econdl1" it is not a donation ;etween the spouses ;ecause it involved
no conve1ance of a spouse<s own properties to the other.
It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the con5ugal partnership" as
held ;1 the Court of Appeals"
(1
;1 -mere stipulation-
((
and that it is no -cloak-
(3
to circumvent the law on
con5ugal propert1 relations. Certainl1" the spouses are not prohi;ited ;1 law to invest con5ugal propert1"
sa1" ;1 wa1 of a 5oint and several ;ank account" more commonl1 denominated in ;anking parlance as an
-andEor- account. In the case at ;ar" when the spouses (itug opened savings account )o. *3,%7$"
the1 merel1 put what rightfull1 ;elonged to them in a mone1%making venture. The1 did not dispose of it in
favor of the other" which would have argua;l1 ;een sanctiona;le as a prohi;ited donation. And since the
funds were con5ugal" it can not ;e said that one spouse could have pressured the other in placing his or
her deposits in the mone1 pool.
The validit1 of the contract seems de;ata;le ;1 reason of its -survivor%take%all- feature" ;ut in realit1" that
contract imposed a mere o;ligation with a term" the term ;eing death. 0uch agreements are permitted ;1
the Civil Code.
()
Cnder Article ,7!7 of the Code:
A'T. ,7!7. 91 an aleator1 contract" one of the parties or ;oth reciprocall1 ;ind
themselves to give or to do something in consideration of what the other shall give or do
upon the happening of an event which is uncertain" or which is to occur at an
indeterminate time.
Cnder the afore=uoted provision" the fulfillment of an aleator1 contract depends on either the happening
of an event which is (!) -uncertain"- (,) -which is to occur at an indeterminate time.- A survivorship
agreement" the sale of a sweepstake ticket" a transaction stipulating on the value of currenc1" and
insurance have ;een held to fall under the first categor1" while a contract for life annuit1 or pension under
Article ,7,!" et se!uentia" has ;een categoriBed under the second.
(5
In either case" the element of risk is
present. In the case at ;ar" the risk was the death of one part1 and survivorship of the other.
@owever" as we have warned:
??? ??? ???
9ut although the survivorship agreement is per se not contrar1 to law its operation or
effect ma1 ;e violative of the law. For instance" if it ;e shown in a given case that such
agreement is a mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation" to transfer propert1 in fraud of
creditors" or to defeat the legitime of a forced heir" it ma1 ;e assailed and annulled upon
such grounds. )o such vice has ;een imputed and esta;lished against the agreement
involved in this case.
(6
??? ??? ???
There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had ;een e?ecuted for such unlawful
purposes" or" as held ;1 the respondent court" in order to frustrate our laws on wills" donations" and
con5ugal partnership.
The conclusion is accordingl1 unavoida;le that :rs. (itug having predeceased her hus;and" the latter
has ac=uired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account )o. *3,%7$ of
the 9ank of America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the inventor1 of assets left
;1 :rs. (itug" we hold that the court was in error. 9eing the separate propert1 of petitioner" it forms no
more part of the estate of the deceased.
A@>'>F4'>" the decision of the respondent appellate court" dated .une ,#" !#$2" and its resolution"
dated Fe;ruar1 #" !#$$" are 0>T A0ID>.
)o costs.
04 4'D>'>D.
G.R. No*. 838)3-)) A2,-3 5, 1990
#N !E MAER OF !E $E##ON O A$$ROVE !E 9#LL OF MELE%#O LA"RADOR. 'AGRADO
LA"RADOR DD/>/a*/dE, *+0*.-.+./d 0y RO'#A LA"RADOR, ENR#%A LA"RADOR, and
%R#'O"AL LA"RADOR, vs. %OUR OF A$$EAL',
1
GAUDEN%#O LA"RADOR, and &E'U'
LA"RADOR,
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the alleged holographic will of one :elecio 8a;rador is dated"
as provided for in Article $!7
(
of the )ew Civil Code.
The antecedent and relevant facts are as follows: 4n .une !7" !#2," :elecio 8a;rador died in the
:unicipalit1 of I;a" province of Oam;ales" where he was residing" leaving ;ehind a parcel of land
designated as 8ot )o. !#!+ under 4riginal Certificate of Title )o. 6%!+*," and the following heirs" namel1:
0agrado" >nrica" Cristo;al" .esus" &audencio" .osefina" .uliana" @ilaria and .ovita" all surnamed
8a;rador" and a holographic will.
4n .ul1 ,$" !#2*" 0agrado 8a;rador (now deceased ;ut su;stituted ;1 his heirs)" >nrica 8a;rador and
Cristo;al 8a;rador" filed in the court a !uo a petition for the pro;ate docketed as 0pecial 6roceeding )o.
#,,%I of the alleged holographic will of the late :elecio 8a;rador.
0u;se=uentl1" on 0eptem;er 7" !#2*" .esus 8a;rador (now deceased ;ut su;stituted ;1 his heirs)" and
&audencio 8a;rador filed an opposition to the petition on the ground that the will has ;een e?tinguished
or revoked ;1 implication of law" alleging therein that on 0eptem;er 7" !#2!" that is" ;efore :elecio<s
death" for the consideration of 0i? Thousand (6+"777) 6esos" testator :elecio e?ecuted a Deed of
A;solute 0ale" selling" transferring and conve1ing in favor of oppositors .esus and &audencio 8ot )o.
!#!+ and that as a matter of fact" 4.C.T. )o. 6%!+*, had ;een cancelled ;1 T.C.T. )o. T%,!!2$. >arlier
however" in !#2" .esus 8a;rador sold said parcel of land to )avat for onl1 Five Thousand (6*"777)
6esos. (-ollo" p. 2)
0agrado thereupon filed" on )ovem;er ,$" !#2*" against his ;rothers" &audencio and .esus" for the
annulment of said purported Deed of A;solute 0ale over a parcel of land which 0agrado allegedl1 had
alread1 ac=uired ;1 devise from their father :elecio 8a;rador under a holographic will e?ecuted on :arch
!2" !#+$" the complaint for annulment docketed as Civil Case )o. #3%I" ;eing premised on the fact that
the aforesaid Deed of A;solute 0ale is fictitious.
After ;oth parties had rested and su;mitted their respective evidence" the trial court rendered a 5oint
decision dated Fe;ruar1 ,$" !#$*" allowing the pro;ate of the holographic will and declaring null and void
the Deed of A;solute sale. The court a !uo had also directed the respondents (the defendants in Civil
Case )o. #3%I) to reim;urse to the petitioners the sum of 6*"777.77 representing the redemption price
for the propert1 paid ;1 the plaintiff%petitioner 0agrado with legal interest thereon from Decem;er ,7"
!#2+" when it was paid to vendee a retro.
'espondents appealed the 5oint decision to the Court of Appeals" which on :arch !7" !#$$ modified said
5oint decision of the court a !uo ;1 den1ing the allowance of the pro;ate of the will for ;eing undated and
reversing the order of reim;ursement. 6etitioners< :otion for 'econsideration of the aforesaid decision
was denied ;1 the Court of Appeals" in the resolution of .une !" !#$$. @ence" this petition.
6etitioners now assign the following errors committed ;1 respondent court" to wit:
I
T@> C4C'T 4F A66>A80 >''>D I) )4T A884AI)& A)D A66'4(I)& T@>
6'49AT> 4F T@> @484&'A6@IC AI88 4F T@> T>0TAT4' :>8>CI4 8A9'AD4'D
and
II
T@> C4C'T 4F A66>A80 >''>D I) FI)DI)& T@AT T@> 4'D>' 4F T@> 84A>'
C4C'T DI'>CTI)& T@> '>I:9C'0>:>)T 4F T@> FI(> T@4C0A)D 6>040
'>6'>0>)TI)& T@> '>D>:6TI4) 6'IC> AA0 >''4)>4C0.
The alleged undated holographic will written in Ilocano translated into >nglish" is =uoted as follows:
>)&8I0@ I)T>'6'>TATI4) 4F T@> AI88 4F T@>
8AT> :>8>CI4 8A9'AD4' A'ITT>) I) I84CA)4
9/ ATT/. FID>)CI4 8. F>')A)D>O
I J First 6age
This is also where it appears in writing of the place which is assigned and shared or the
partition in favor of 0A&'AD4 8A9'AD4' which is the fishpond located and known
place as Tagale.
And this place that is given as the share to him" there is a measurement of more or less
one hectare" and the ;oundar1 at the 0outh is the propert1 and assignment share of
>)'ICA 8A9'AD4'" also their sister" and the ;oundar1 in the Aest is the sea" known
as the 0>A as it is" and the ;oundar1 on the )4'T@ is assignment ;elonging to
C'I0T49A8 8A9'AD4'" who likewise is also their ;rother. That ;ecause it is now the
time for me ;eing now ninet1 three (#) 1ears" then I feel it is the right time for me to
partition the fishponds which were and had ;een ;ought or ac=uired ;1 us" meaning with
their two mothers" hence there shall ;e no differences among themselves" those among
;rothers and sisters" for it is I m1self their father who am making the apportionment and
delivering to each and ever1one of them the said portion and assignment so that there
shall not ;e an1 cause of trou;les or differences among the ;rothers and sisters.
II J 0econd 6age
And this is the da1 in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning
the respective assignment of the said fishpond" and this ;eing in the month of :arch"
!2th da1" in the 1ear !#+$" and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to ;e
followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than :>8>CI4 8A9'AD4'"
their father.
)ow" this is the final disposition that I am making in writing and it is this that should ;e
followed and complied with in order that an1 differences or trou;les ma1 ;e forestalled
and nothing will happen along these trou;les among m1 children" and that the1 will ;e in
good relations among themselves" ;rothers and sistersD
And those improvements and fruits of the landD mangoes" ;am;oos and all coconut trees
and all others like the other kind of ;am;oo ;1 name of 9a1og" it is their right to get if
the1 so need" in order that there shall ;e nothing that an1one of them shall complain
against the other" and against an1one of the ;rothers and sisters.
III J T@I'D 6A&>
And that referring to the other places of propert1" where the said propert1 is located" the
same ;eing the fruits of our earnings of the two mothers of m1 children" there shall ;e
e=ual portion of each share among themselves" and or to ;e ;enefitted with all those
propert1" which propert1 we have ;een a;le to ac=uire.
That in order that there shall ;e ;asis of the truth of this writing (AI88) which I am here
hereof manifesting of the truth and of the fruits of our la;or which their two mothers" I am
signing m1 signature ;elow hereof" and that this is what should ;e complied with" ;1 all
the ;rothers and sisters" the children of their two mothers J .C8IA)A ICI)T>'4
6I8A'I0A and CA0IA)A AICI)4 (I88A)C>(A /our father who made this writing
(AI88)" and he is" :>8>CI4 8A9'AD4' 1 'A8CTI) (p. 3+" -ollo)
The petition" which principall1 alleges that the holographic will is reall1 dated" although the date is not in
its usual place" is impressed with merit.
The will has ;een dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance with Article $!7. It is
worth1 of note to =uote the first paragraph of the second page of the holographic will" viz:
And this is the da1 in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning
the respective assignment of the said fishpond" and this ;eing in the month of 6arc$,
'=t$ day, in t$e year ';KL" and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to ;e
followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than :>8>CI4 8A9'AD4'"
their father. (emphasis supplied) (p. 3+" -ollo)
The law does not specif1 a particular location where the date should ;e placed in the will. The onl1
re=uirements are that the date ;e in the will itself and e?ecuted in the hand of the testator. These
re=uirements are present in the su;5ect will.
'espondents claim that the date !2 :arch !#+$ in the will was when the testator and his ;eneficiaries
entered into an agreement among themselves a;out -the partitioning and assigning the respective
assignments of the said fishpond"- and was not the date of e?ecution of the holographic willD hence" the
will is more of an -agreement- ;etween the testator and the ;eneficiaries thereof to the pre5udice of other
compulsor1 heirs like the respondents. This was thus a failure to compl1 with Article 2$ which defines a
will as -an act where;1 a person is permitted" with the formalities prescri;ed ;1 law" to control to a certain
degree the disposition of his estate" to take effect after his death.-
'espondents are in error. The intention to show '= 6arc$ ';KL as the date of the e?ecution of the will is
plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. As aptl1 put ;1 petitioner" the will was not
an agreement ;ut a unilateral act of :elecio 8a;rador who plainl1 knew that what he was e?ecuting was a
will. The act of partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as the testator<s instruction or
decision to ;e followed reveal that :elecio 8a;rador was full1 aware of the nature of the estate propert1
to ;e disposed of and of the character of the testamentar1 act as a means to control the disposition of his
estate.
Anent the second issue of finding the reim;ursement of the 6*"777 representing the redemption price as
erroneous" respondent court<s conclusion is incorrect. Ahen private respondents sold the propert1
(fishpond) with right to repurchase to )avat for 6*"777" the1 were actuall1 selling propert1 ;elonging to
another and which the1 had no authorit1 to sell" rendering such sale null and void. 6etitioners" thus
-redeemed- the propert1 from )avat for 6*"777" to immediatel1 regain possession of the propert1 for its
disposition in accordance with the will. 6etitioners therefore deserve to ;e reim;ursed the 6*"777.
6'>:I0>0 C4)0ID>'>D" the decision of the Court of Appeals dated :arch !7" !#$$ is here;1
'>(>'0>D. The holographic will of :elecio 8a;rador is A66'4(>D and A884A>D pro;ate. The
private respondents are directed to '>I:9C'0> the petitioners the sum of Five Thousand 6esos
(6*"777.77).
04 4'D>'>D.
G.R. No. L-58509 D/>/70/, 7, 198(
#N !E MAER OF !E $E##ON O A$$ROVE !E 9#LL OF R#%ARDO ". "ON#LLA d/>/a*/d,
MAR%ELA RODELA', vs. AM$ARO ARANZA, E AL., oppositors%appellees" AY. LORENZO
'UMULONG, intervenor.
This case was certified to this Tri;unal ;1 the Court of Appeals for final determination pursuant to 0ection
" 'ule *7 of the 'ules of Court.
As found ;1 the Court of Appeals:
... 4n .anuar1 !!" !#22" appellant filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of 'iBal
for the pro;ate of the holographic will of 'icardo 9. 9onilla and the issuance of letters
testamentar1 in her favor. The petition" docketed as 0p. 6roc. )o. $3," was opposed ;1
the appellees Amparo AranBa 9onilla" Ailferine 9onilla Tre1es >?pedita 9onilla Frias and
>phraim 9onilla on the following grounds:
(!) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will ;1 failing to
produce the will within twent1 da1s of the death of the testator as re=uired ;1 'ule 2*"
section , of the 'ules of CourtD
(,) The alleged cop1 of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of
propert1 after death and was not intended to take effect after death" and therefore it was
not a will
() The alleged hollographic will itself"and not an alleged cop1 thereof" must ;e produced"
otherwise it would produce no effect" as held in &am v. /ap" !73 6hil. *7#D and
(3 ) The deceased did not leave an1 will" holographic or otherwise" e?ecuted and attested
as re=uired ;1 law.
The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the case with another case 0p.
6roc. )o" $,2*). Their motion was granted ;1 the court in an order dated April 3" !#22.
4n )ovem;er !" !#2$" following the consolidation of the cases" the appellees moved
again to dismiss the petition for the pro;ate of the will. The1 argued that:
(!) The alleged holographic was not a last will ;ut merel1 an instruction as to the
management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded ;1 decedent 'icardo
9. 9onillaD and
(,) 8ost or destro1ed holographic wills cannot ;e proved ;1 secondar1 evidence unlike
ordinar1 wills.
Cpon opposition of the appellant" the motion to dismiss was denied ;1 the court in its
order of Fe;ruar1 ," !#2#.
The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the order was
contrar1 to law and settled pronouncements and rulings of the 0upreme Court" to which
the appellant in turn filed an opposition. 4n .ul1 ," !#2#" the court set aside its order of
Fe;ruar1 ," !#2# and dismissed the petition for the pro;ate of the will of 'icardo 9.
9onilla. The court said:
... It is our considered opinion that once the original cop1 of the holographic will is lost" a
cop1 thereof cannot stand in lieu of the original.
In the case of &am vs. /ap" !73 6hil. *7#" *,," the 0upreme Court held that <in the
matter of holographic wills the law" it is reasona;le to suppose" regards the document
itself as the material proof of authenticit1 of said wills.
:4'>4(>'" this Court notes that the alleged holographic will was e?ecuted on .anuar1
,*" !#+, while 'icardo 9. 9onilla died on :a1 !" !#2+. In view of the lapse of more than
!3 1ears from the time of the e?ecution of the will to the death of the decedent" the fact
that the original of the will could not ;e located shows to our mind that the decedent had
discarded ;efore his death his allegedl1 missing @olographic Aill.
Appellant<s motion for reconsideration was denied. @ence" an appeal to the Court of Appeals in which it is
contended that the dismissal of appellant<s petition is contrar1 to law and well%settled 5urisprudence.
4n .ul1 2" !#$7" appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on the ground that the appeal does
not involve =uestion of fact and alleged that the trial court committed the following assigned errors:
I. T@> 84A>' C4C'T >''>D I) @48DI)& T@AT A 840T @484&'A6@IC AI88
:A/ )4T 9> 6'4(>D 9/ A C46/ T@>'>4FD
II. T@> 84A>' C4C'T >''>D I) @48DI)& T@AT T@> D>C>D>)T @A0
DI0CA'D>D 9>F4'> @I0 D>AT@ T@> :I00I)& @484&'A6@IC AI88D
III. T@> 84A>' C4C'T >''>D I) DI0:I00I)& A66>88A)T<0 AI88.
The onl1 =uestion here is whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot ;e found can ;e proved ;1
means of a photostatic cop1. 6ursuant to Article $!! of the Civil Code" pro;ate of holographic wills is the
allowance of the will ;1 the court after its due e?ecution has ;een proved. The pro;ate ma1 ;e
uncontested or not. If uncontested" at least one Identif1ing witness is re=uired and" if no witness is
availa;le" e?perts ma1 ;e resorted to. If contested" at least three Identif1ing witnesses are re=uired.
@owever" if the holographic will has ;een lost or destro1ed and no other cop1 is availa;le" the will can not
;e pro;ated ;ecause the ;est and onl1 evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is
necessar1 that there ;e a comparison ;etween sample handwritten statements of the testator and the
handwritten will. 9ut" a photostatic cop1 or ?ero? cop1 of the holographic will ma1 ;e allowed ;ecause
comparison can ;e made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of &am vs. /ap" !73 6@I8.
*7#" the Court ruled that -the e?ecution and the contents of a lost or destro1ed holographic will ma1 not
;e proved ;1 the ;are testimon1 of witnesses who have seen andEor read such will. The will itself must ;e
presentedD otherwise" it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of
authenticit1.- 9ut" in Footnote $ of said decision" it sa1s that -6erhaps it ma1 ;e proved ;1 a photographic
or photostatic cop1. >ven a mimeographed or car;on cop1D or ;1 other similar means" if an1" where;1 the
authenticit1 of the handwriting of the deceased ma1 ;e e?hi;ited and tested ;efore the pro;ate court"-
>videntl1" the photostatic or ?ero? cop1 of the lost or destro1ed holographic will ma1 ;e admitted ;ecause
then the authenticit1 of the handwriting of the deceased can ;e determined ;1 the pro;ate court.
A@>'>F4'>" the order of the lower court dated 4cto;er " !#2#" den1ing appellant<s motion for
reconsideration dated August #" !#2#" of the 4rder dated .ul1 ," !#2#" dismissing her petition to
approve the will of the late 'icardo 9. 9onilla" is here;1 0>T A0ID>.
04 4'D>'>D.
G.R. No. 1067(0 '/2./70/, 15, 199)
'$OU'E' RO"ERO AND !ELMA A&ERO, vs. !E %OUR OF A$$EAL' AND %LEMENE
'AND,
This is an appeal ;1 certiorari from the Decision of the Court of
Appeals
1
in CA%&.'. C( )o. ,,$37" dated :arch 7" !##," the dispositive portion of which readsD
6'>:I0>0 C4)0ID>'>D" the =uestioned decision of )ovem;er !#" !#$$ of the trial
court is here;1 '>(>'0>D and 0>T A0ID>" and the petition for pro;ate is here;1
DI0:I00>D. )o costs.
The earlier Decision was rendered ;1 the 'TC of IueBon Cit1" 9ranch #3"
(
in 0p. 6roc. )o. I%
2!2!" and the instrument su;mitted for pro;ate is the holographic will of the late Annie 0and"
who died on )ovem;er ,*" !#$,.
In the will" decedent named as devisees" the following: petitioners 'o;erto and Thelma A5ero" private
respondent Clemente 0and" :eriam 0. Arong" 8eah 0and" 8ilia 0and" >dgar 0and" Fe 0and" 8isa 0.
0and" and Dr. .ose A5ero" 0r." and their children.
4n .anuar1 ,7" !#$" petitioners instituted 0p. 6roc. )o. I%2!2!" for allowance of decedent<s
holographic will. The1 alleged that at the time of its e?ecution" she was of sound and disposing mind" not
acting under duress" fraud or undue influence" and was in ever1 respect capacitated to dispose of her
estate ;1 will.
6rivate respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament<s ;od1 nor the
signature therein was in decedent<s handwritingD it contained alterations and corrections which were not
dul1 signed ;1 decedentD and" the will was procured ;1 petitioners through improper pressure and undue
influence. The petition was likewise opposed ;1 Dr. .ose A5ero. @e contested the disposition in the will of
a house and lot located in Ca;ad;aran" Agusan Del )orte. @e claimed that said propert1 could not ;e
conve1ed ;1 decedent in its entiret1" as she was not its sole owner.
)otwithstanding the oppositions" the trial court admitted the decedent<s holographic will to pro;ate. It
found" inter alia:
Considering then that the pro;ate proceedings herein must decide onl1 the =uestion of
identit1 of the will" its due e?ecution and the testamentar1 capacit1 of the testatri?" this
pro;ate court finds no reason at all for the disallowance of the will for its failure to compl1
with the formalities prescri;ed ;1 law nor for lack of testamentar1 capacit1 of the testatri?.
For one" no evidence was presented to show that the will in =uestion is different from the
will actuall1 e?ecuted ;1 the testatri?. The onl1 o;5ections raised ;1 the oppositors . . .
are that the will was not written in the handwriting of the testatri? which properl1 refers to
the =uestion of its due e?ecution" and not to the =uestion of identit1 of will. )o other will
was alleged to have ;een e?ecuted ;1 the testatri? other than the will herein presented.
@ence" in the light of the evidence adduced" the identit1 of the will presented for pro;ate
must ;e accepted" i.e." the will su;mitted in Court must ;e deemed to ;e the will actuall1
e?ecuted ;1 the testatri?.
??? ??? ???
Ahile the fact that it was entirel1 written" dated and signed in the handwriting of the
testatri? has ;een disputed" the petitioners" however" have satisfactoril1 shown in Court
that the holographic will in =uestion was indeed written entirel1" dated and signed in the
handwriting of the testatri?. Three () witnesses who have convincingl1 shown knowledge
of the handwriting of the testatri? have ;een presented and have e?plicitl1 and
categoricall1 identified the handwriting with which the holographic will in =uestion was
written to ;e the genuine handwriting and signature of the testatri?. &iven then the
aforesaid evidence" the re=uirement of the law that the holographic will ;e entirel1
written" dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatri? has ;een complied with.
??? ??? ???
As to the =uestion of the testamentar1 capacit1 of the testrati?" (private respondent)
Clemente 0and himself has testified in Court that the testatri? was completel1 in her
sound mind when he visited her during her ;irthda1 cele;ration in !#$!" at or around
which time the holographic will in =uestion was e?ecuted ;1 the testatri?. To ;e of sound
mind" it is sufficient that the testatri?" at the time of making the will" knew the value of the
estate to ;e disposed of" the proper oject of her ;ount1" and the c$aracter of the
testamentar1 act . . . The will itself shows that the testatri? even had detailed knowledge
of the nature of her estate. 0he even identified the lot num;er and s=uare meters of the
lots she had conve1ed ;1 will. The o;5ects of her ;ount1 were likewise identified
e?plicitl1. And considering that she had even written a nursing ;ook which contained the
law and 5urisprudence on will and succession" there is more than sufficient showing that
she knows the character of the testamentar1 act.
In this wise" the =uestion of identit1 of the will" its due e?ecution and the testamentar1
capacit1 of the testatri? has to ;e resolved in favor of the allowance of pro;ate of the will
su;mitted herein.
8ikewise" no evidence was presented to show sufficient reason for the disallowance of
herein holographic will. Ahile it was alleged that the said will was procured ;1 undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the ;eneficiar1 or of some other person"
the evidence adduced have not shown an1 instance where improper pressure or
influence was e?erted on the testatri?. (6rivate respondent) Clemente 0and has testified
that the testatri? was still alert at the time of the e?ecution of the will" i.e." at or around the
time of her ;irth anniversar1 cele;ration in !#$!. It was also esta;lished that she is a ver1
intelligent person and has a mind of her own. @er independence of character and to
some e?tent" her sense of superiorit1" which has ;een testified to in Court" all show the
unlikelihood of her ;eing undul1 influenced or improperl1 pressured to make the
aforesaid will. It must ;e noted that the undue influence or improper pressure in =uestion
herein onl1 refer to the making of a will and not as to the specific testamentar1 provisions
therein which is the proper su;5ect of another proceeding. @ence" under the
circumstances" this Court cannot find convincing reason for the disallowance of the will
herein.
Considering then that it is a well%esta;lished doctrine in the law on succession that in
case of dou;t" testate succession should ;e preferred over intestate succession" and the
fact that no convincing grounds were presented and proven for the disallowance of the
holographic will of the late Annie 0and" the aforesaid will su;mitted herein must ;e
admitted to pro;ate.
3
(Citations omitted.)
4n appeal" said Decision was reversed" and the petition for pro;ate of decedent<s will was dismissed. The
Court of Appeals found that" -the holographic will fails to meet the re=uirements for its validit1.-
)
It held
that the decedent did not compl1 with Articles $! and $!3 of the )ew Civil Code" which read" as follows:
Art. $!: Ahen a num;er of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed
without ;eing dated" and the last disposition has a signature and date" such date
validates the dispositions preceding it" whatever ;e the time of prior dispositions.
Art. $!3: In case of insertion" cancellation" erasure or alteration in a holographic will" the
testator must authenticate the same ;1 his full signature.
It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated" or signed ;ut not
dated. It also found that the erasures" alterations and cancellations made thereon had not ;een
authenticated ;1 decedent.
Thus" this appeal which is impressed with merit.
0ection #" 'ule 2+ of the 'ules of Court provides that will shall ;e disallowed in an1 of the following
cases:
(a) If not e?ecuted and attested as re=uired ;1 lawD
(;) If the testator was insane" or otherwise mentall1 incapa;le to make a will" at the time
of its e?ecutionD
(c) If it was e?ecuted under duress" or the influence of fear" or threatsD
(d) If it was procured ;1 undue and improper pressure and influence" on the part of the
;eneficiar1" or of some other person for his ;enefitD
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured ;1 fraud or trick" and he did not intend
that the instrument should ;e his will at the time of fi?ing his signature thereto.
In the same vein" Article $# of the )ew Civil Code reads:
Art. $#: The will shall ;e disallowed in an1 of the following casesD
(!) If the formalities re=uired ;1 law have not ;een complied withD
(,) If the testator was insane" or otherwise mentall1 incapa;le of making
a will" at the time of its e?ecutionD
() If it was e?ecuted through force or under duress" or the influence of
fear" or threatsD
(3) If it was procured ;1 undue and improper pressure and influence" on
the part of the ;eneficiar1 or of some other personD
(*) If the signature of the testator was procured ;1 fraudD
(+) If the testator acted ;1 mistake or did not intend that the instrument
he signed should ;e his will at the time of affi?ing his signature thereto.
These lists are e?clusiveD no other grounds can serve to disallow a will.
5
Thus" in a petition to admit a
holographic will to pro;ate" the onl1 issues to ;e resolved are: (!) whether the instrument su;mitted is"
indeed" the decedent<s last will and testamentD (,) whether said will was e?ecuted in accordance with the
formalities prescri;ed ;1 lawD () whether the decedent had the necessar1 testamentar1 capacit1 at the
time the will was e?ecutedD and" (3) whether the e?ecution of the will and its signing were the voluntar1
acts of the decedent.
6
In the case at ;ench" respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne 0and was not e?ecuted in
accordance with the formalities prescri;ed ;1 law. It held that Articles $! and $!3 of the )ew Civil Code"
ante" were not complied with" hence" it disallowed the pro;ate of said will. This is erroneous.
Ae reiterate what we held in "angan vs. "angan" 37 6hil. 32+" 32# (!#!#)" that:
The o;5ect of the solemnities surrounding the e?ecution of wills is to close the door
against ;ad faith and fraud" to avoid su;stitution of wills and testaments and to guarant1
their truth and authenticit1. Therefore" the laws on this su;5ect should ;e interpreted in
such a wa1 as to attain these primordial ends. 9ut" on the other hand" also one must not
lose sight of the fact that it is not the o;5ect of the law to restrain and curtail the e?ercise
of the right to make a will. 0o when an interpretation alread1 given assures such ends"
an1 other interpretation whatsoever" that adds nothing ;ut demands more re=uisites
entirel1 unnecessar1" useless and frustrative of the testator<s last will" must ;e
disregarded.
For purposes of pro;ating non%holographic wills" these formal solemnities include the su;scription"
attestation" and acknowledgment re=uirements under Articles $7* and $7+ of the )ew Civil Code.
In the case of holographic wills" on the other hand" what assures authenticit1 is the re=uirement that the1
;e totall1 autographic or handwritten ;1 the testator himself"
7
as provided under Article $!7 of the )ew
Civil Code" thus:
A person ma1 e?ecute a holographic will which must ;e entirel1 written" dated" and
signed ;1 the hand of the testator himself. It is suject to no ot$er form" and ma1 ;e
made in or out of the 6hilippines" and need not ;e witnessed. (>mphasis supplied.)
Failure to strictl1 o;serve other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will
that is un=uestiona;l1 handwritten ;1 the testator.
A reading of Article $! of the )ew Civil Code shows that its re=uirement affects the validit1 of the
dispositions contained in the holographic will" ;ut not its pro;ate. If the testator fails to sign and date some
of the dispositions" the result is that these dispositions cannot ;e effectuated. 0uch failure" however" does
not render the whole testament void.
8ikewise" a holographic will can still ;e admitted to pro;ate" notwithstanding non%compliance with the
provisions of Article $!3. In the case of ,ala% vs. -elova !, 0C'A ,2 ,3, (!#$3)" this Court held:
4rdinaril1" when a num;er of erasures" corrections" and interlineations made ;1 the
testator in a holographic Aill have not ;een noted under his signature" . . . the Aill is not
there;1 invalidated as a whole" ;ut at most onl1 as respects the particular words erased"
corrected or interlined. :anresa gave an identical commentar1 when he said -la omission
de la salvedad no anula el testamento" segun la regla de 5urisprudencia esta;lecida en la
sentencia de 3 de A;ril de !#$*.-
8
(Citations omitted.)
Thus" unless the unauthenticated alterations" cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the
holographic will or on testator<s signature"
9
their presence does not invalidate the will itself.
10
The lack of
authentication will onl1 result in disallowance of such changes.
It is also proper to note that the re=uirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of
dispositions appear in provisions (Articles $! and $!3) separate from that which provides for the
necessar1 conditions for the validit1 of the holographic will (Article $!7). The distinction can ;e traced to
Articles +2$ and +$$ of the 0panish Civil Code" from which the present provisions covering holographic
wills are taken. The1 read as follows:
Art. +2$: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it himself in the form and
with the re=uisites re=uired in Article +$$.
Art. +$$: @olographic wills ma1 ;e e?ecuted onl1 ;1 persons of full age.
In order that the will ;e valid it must ;e drawn on stamped paper corresponding to the
1ear of its e?ecution" written in its entiret1 ;1 the testator and signed ;1 him" and must
contain a statement of the 1ear" month and da1 of its e?ecution.
If it should contain an1 erased" corrected" or interlined words" the testator must identif1
them over his signature.
Foreigners ma1 e?ecute holographic wills in their own language.
This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that onl1 the re=uirements of Article $!7
of the )ew Civil Code J and not those found in Articles $! and $!3 of the same Code J are essential
to the pro;ate of a holographic will.
The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie 0and could not validl1 dispose of the house and lot
located in Ca;ad;aran" Agusan del )orte" in its entiret1. This is correct and must ;e affirmed.
As a general rule" courts in pro;ate proceedings are limited to pass onl1 upon the e?trinsic validit1 of the
will sought to ;e pro;ated. @owever" in e?ceptional instances" courts are not powerless to do what the
situation constrains them to do" and pass upon certain provisions of the will.
11
In the case at ;ench"
decedent herself indu;ita;l1 stated in her holographic will that the Ca;ad;aran propert1 is in the name of
her late father" .ohn @. 0and (which led oppositor Dr. .ose A5ero to =uestion her conve1ance of the same
in its entiret1). Thus" as correctl1 held ;1 respondent court" she cannot validl1 dispose of the whole
propert1" which she shares with her father<s other heirs.
I) (I>A A@>'>4F" the instant petition is &'A)T>D. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA%&.'.
C( )o. ,,$37" dated :arch 7" !##," is '>(>'0>D and 0>T A0ID>" e?cept with respect to the
invalidit1 of the disposition of the entire house and lot in Ca;ad;aran" Agusan del )orte. The Decision of
the 'egional Trial Court of IueBon Cit1" 9ranch #3 in 0p. 6roc. )o. I%2!2!" dated )ovem;er !#" !#$$"
admitting to pro;ate the holographic will of decedent Annie 0and" is here;1 '>I)0TAT>D" with the a;ove
=ualification as regards the Ca;ad;aran propert1. )o costs.
04 4'D>'>D.
G.R. No. L-6(95( O>.o0/, 9, 1985
'OF#A &. NE$OMU%ENO, vs. !E !ONORA"LE %OUR OF A$$EAL', RUF#NA GOMEZ, O'%AR
&UGO ANG, %ARMEL#A &UGO,
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
(now intermediate Appellate Court) dated .une " !#$," as amended ;1 the resolution dated August !7"
!#$," declaring as null and void the devise in favor of the petitioner and the resolution dated Decem;er
,$" !#$, den1ing petitioner<s motion for reconsideration.
:artin .ugo died on .ul1 !+" !#23 in :ala;on" 'iBal. @e left a last Aill and Testament dul1 signed ;1 him
at the end of the Aill on page three and on the left margin of pages !" , and 3 thereof in the presence of
Celestina Ale5andro" :1rna C. CorteB" and 8eandro 8eano" who in turn" affi?ed their signatures ;elow the
attestation clause and on the left margin of pages !" , and 3 of the Aill in the presence of the testator and
of each other and the )otar1 6u;lic. The Aill was acknowledged ;efore the )otar1 6u;lic 'omeo
>scareal ;1 the testator and his three attesting witnesses.
In the said Aill" the testator named and appointed herein petitioner 0ofia .. )epomuceno as his sole and
onl1 e?ecutor of his estate. It is clearl1 stated in the Aill that the testator was legall1 married to a certain
'ufina &omeB ;1 whom he had two legitimate children" 4scar and Carmelita" ;ut since !#*," he had
;een estranged from his lawfull1 wedded wife and had ;een living with petitioner as hus;and and wife. In
fact" on Decem;er *" !#*," the testator :artin .ugo and the petitioner herein" 0ofia .. )epomuceno were
married in (ictoria" Tarlac ;efore the .ustice of the 6eace. The testator devised to his forced heirs"
namel1" his legal wife 'ufina &omeB and his children 4scar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free
portion thereof to herein petitioner. The Aill reads in part:
Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs" namel1: m1 aforementioned legal wife"
'ufina &omeB" and our son" 4scar" and daughter Carmelita" ;oth surnamed .ugo" whom
I declare and admit to ;e legall1 and properl1 entitled to inherit from meD that while I have
;een estranged from m1 a;ove%named wife for so man1 1ears" I cannot den1 that I was
legall1 married to her or that we have ;een separated up to the present for reasons and
5ustifications known full1 well ;1 them:
Art. I(. That since !#*," ! have ;een living" as man and %ife with one 0ofia ..
)epomuceno" whom I declare and avow to ;e entitled to m1 love and affection" for all the
things which she has done for me" now and in the pastD that while 0ofia .. )epomuceno
has with m1 full knowledge and consent" did comport and represent m1self as her own
hus;and" in truth and in fact" as well as in the e1es of the law" I could not ;ind her to me
in the hol1 ;onds of matrimon1 ;ecause of m1 aforementioned previous marriageD
4n August ,!" !#23" the petitioner filed a petition for the pro;ate of the last Aill and Testament of the
deceased :artin .ugo in the Court of First Instance of 'iBal" 9ranch MMMI(" Caloocan Cit1 and asked for
the issuance to her of letters testamentar1.
4n :a1 !" !#2*" the legal wife of the testator" 'ufina &omeB and her children filed an opposition
alleging inter alia that the e?ecution of the Aill was procured ;1 undue and improper influence on the part
of the petitionerD that at the time of the e?ecution of the Aill" the testator was alread1 ver1 sick and that
petitioner having admitted her living in concu;inage with the testator" she is wanting in integrit1 and thus"
letters testamentar1 should not ;e issued to her.
4n .anuar1 +" !#2+" the lower court denied the pro;ate of the Aill on the ground that as the testator
admitted in his Aill to coha;iting with the petitioner from Decem;er !#*, until his death on .ul1 !+" !#23"
the Aill<s admission to pro;ate will ;e an Idle e?ercise ;ecause on the face of the Aill" the invalidit1 of its
intrinsic provisions is evident.
The petitioner appealed to the respondent%appellate court.
4n .une ," !#$," the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of 'iBal
den1ing the pro;ate of the will. The respondent court declared the Aill to ;e valid e?cept that the devise
in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 2# in relation with Article !7,$ of the Civil
Code of the 6hilippines. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
A@>'>F4'>" the decision a !uo is here;1 set aside" the will in =uestion declared valid
e?cept the devise in favor of the appellant which is declared null and void. The properties
so devised are instead passed on in intestac1 to the appellant in e=ual shares" without
pronouncement as to cost.
4n .une !*" !#$," oppositors 'ufina &omeB and her children filed a -:otion for Correction of Clerical
>rror- pra1ing that the word -appellant- in the last sentence of the dispositive portion of the decision ;e
changed to -appellees- so as to read: -The properties so devised are instead passed on intestac1 to the
appellees in e=ual shares" without pronouncement as to costs.- The motion was granted ;1 the
respondent court on August !7" !#$,.
4n August ," !#$," the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This was denied ;1 the respondent
court in a resolution dated Decem;er ,$" !#$,.
The main issue raised ;1 the petitioner is whether or not the respondent court acted in e?cess of its
5urisdiction when after declaring the last Aill and Testament of the deceased :artin .ugo validl1 drawn" it
went on to pass upon the intrinsic validit1 of the testamentar1 provision in favor of herein petitioner.
The petitioner su;mits that the validit1 of the testamentar1 provision in her favor cannot ;e passed upon
and decided in the pro;ate proceedings ;ut in some other proceedings ;ecause the onl1 purpose of the
pro;ate of a Aill is to esta;lish conclusivel1 as against ever1one that a Aill was e?ecuted with the
formalities re=uired ;1 law and that the testator has the mental capacit1 to e?ecute the same. The
petitioner further contends that even if the provisions of paragraph ! of Article 2# of the Civil Code of the
6hilippines were applica;le" the declaration of its nullit1 could onl1 ;e made ;1 the proper court in a
separate action ;rought ;1 the legal wife for the specific purpose of o;taining a declaration of the nullit1 of
the testamentar1 provision in the Aill in favor of the person with whom the testator was allegedl1 guilt1 of
adulter1 or concu;inage.
The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the last Aill and Testament itself e?pressl1
admits indu;ita;l1 on its face the meretricious relationship ;etween the testator and the petitioner and the
fact that petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil
status of the testator" which led private respondents to present contrar1 evidence" merits the application
of the doctrine enunciated in 0uguid v. >elix 0uguid, et al. (!2 0C'A 33#) and >elix 2alanay, @r. v. Hon.
"ntonio 6artinez, et al. (&.'. )o. 8% #,32" .une ,2" !#2*). 'espondents also su;mit that the admission
of the testator of the illicit relationship ;etween him and the petitioner put in issue the legalit1 of the
devise. Ae agree with the respondents.
The respondent court acted within its 5urisdiction when after declaring the Aill to ;e validl1 drawn" it went
on to pass upon the intrinsic validit1 of the Aill and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and
void.
The general rule is that in pro;ate proceedings" the court<s area of in=uir1 is limited to an e?amination and
resolution of the e?trinsic validit1 of the Aill. The rule is e?pressed thus:
??? ??? ???
... It is elementar1 that a pro;ate decree finall1 and definitivel1 settles all =uestions
concerning capacit1 of the testator and the proper e?ecution and witnessing of his last
Aill and testament" irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforcea;le or
otherwise. 8>ernandez v. &imagia, ,! 0C'A 3,$)
The petition ;elow ;eing for the pro;ate of a Aill" the court<s area of in=uir1 is limited to
the e?trinsic validit1 thereof. The testators testamentar1 capacit1 and the compliance with
the formal re=uisites or solemnities prescri;ed ;1 law are the onl1 =uestions presented
for the resolution of the court. An1 in=uir1 into the intrinsic validit1 or efficac1 of the
provisions of the will or the legalit1 of an1 devise or legac1 is premature.
??? ??? ???
True or not" the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for pro;ate.
6ro;ate is one thingD the validit1 of the testamentar1 provisions is another. The first
decides the e?ecution of the document and the testamentar1 capacit1 of the testatorD the
second relates to descent and distri;ution (Sumilang v. -amagosa, ,! 0C'A !+#)
??? ??? ???
To esta;lish conclusivel1 as against ever1one" and once for all" the facts that a will was
e?ecuted with the formalities re=uired ;1 law and that the testator was in a condition to
make a will" is the onl1 purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the pro;ate of
a will. (0ec. +,*). The 5udgment in such proceedings determines and can determine
nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validit1 of an1 provisions
made in the will. It can not decide" for e?ample" that a certain legac1 is void and another
one valid. ... (Castaneda v. "lemany, 6hil. 3,+)
The rule" however" is not infle?i;le and a;solute. &iven e?ceptional circumstances" the pro;ate court is
not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Aill.
In 0uguid v. 0uguid (!2 0C'A 33#) cited ;1 the trial court" the testator instituted the petitioner as
universal heir and completel1 preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature" no matter how
valid it ma1 appear e?trinsicall1" would ;e null and void. 0eparate or latter proceedings to determine the
intrinsic validit1 of the testamentar1 provisions would ;e superfluous.
>ven ;efore esta;lishing the formal validit1 of the will" the Court in 2alanay .@r. v. 6artinez (+3 0C'A
3*,) passed upon the validit1 of its intrinsic provisions.
Invoking -practical considerations-" we stated:
The ;asic issue is whether the pro;ate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validit1 of
the will" ;efore ruling on its allowance or formal validit1" and in declaring it void.
Ae are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will" which are of
du;ious legalit1" and ;ecause of the motion to withdraw the petition for pro;ate (which
the lower court assumed to have ;een filed with the petitioner<s authoriBation) the trial
court acted correctl1 in passing upon the will<s intrinsic validit1 even ;efore its formal
validit1 had ;een esta;lished. The pro;ate of a will might ;ecome an Idle ceremon1 if on
its face it appears to ;e intrinsicall1 void. Ahere practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validit1 of the will ;e passed upon" even ;efore it is pro;ated" the court should
meet the issue ()uguid v. )uguid" +3 4.&. !*,2" !2 0C'A 33#. Compare with 0umilang
vs. 'amagosa 8%,!*" Decem;er ,+" !#+2" ,! 0C'A !+#D Cacho v. Cdan 8%!###+"
April 7" !#+*" ! 0C'A +#).
There appears to ;e no more dispute at this time over the e?trinsic validit1 of the Aill. 9oth parties are
agreed that the Aill of :artin .ugo was e?ecuted with all the formalities re=uired ;1 law and that the
testator had the mental capacit1 to e?ecute his Aill. The petitioner states that she completel1 agrees with
the respondent court when in resolving the =uestion of whether or not the pro;ate court correctl1 denied
the pro;ate of :artin .ugo<s last Aill and Testament" it ruled:
This ;eing so" the will is declared validl1 drawn. (6age 3" Decision" Anne? A of 6etition.)
4n the other hand the respondents pra1 for the affirmance of the Court of Appeals< decision in toto.
The onl1 issue" therefore" is the 5urisdiction of the respondent court to declare the testamentar1 provision
in favor of the petitioner as null and void.
Ae sustain the respondent court<s 5urisdiction. As stated in 0uguid v. 0uguid, 8supra:M
Ae pause to reflect. If the case were to ;e remanded for pro;ate of the will" nothing will
;e gained. 4n the contrar1" this litigation will ;e protracted. And for aught that appears in
the record" in the record" in the event of pro;ate or if the court re5ects the will" pro;a;ilit1
e?ists that the case will come up once again ;efore us on the same issue of the intrinsic
validit1 or nullit1 of the will. 'esult" waste of time" effort" e?pense" plus added an?iet1.
These are the practical considerations that induce us to a ;elief that we might as well
meet head%on the issue of the validit1 of the provisions of the will in =uestion. (0ection ,"
'ule !" 'ules of Court. Case" et al. v. .ugo" et al." 22 6hil. *!2" *,,). After all" there
e?ists a 5usticia;le controvers1 cr1ing for solution.
Ae see no useful purpose that would ;e served if we remand the nullified provision to the proper court in
a separate action for that purpose simpl1 ;ecause" in the pro;ate of a will" the court does not ordinaril1
look into the intrinsic validit1 of its provisions.
Article 2# of the Civil Code provides:
The following donations shall ;e void:
(!) Those made ;etween persons who were guilt1 of adulter1 or concu;inage at the time
of the donationD
(,) Those made ;etween persons found guilt1 of the same criminal offense" in
consideration thereofD
() Those made to a pu;lic officer or his wife" descendants and ascendants" ;1 reason of
his office.
In the case referred to in )o. !" the action for declaration of nullit1 ma1 ;e ;rought ;1 the
spouse of the donor or doneeD and the guilt of the donor and donee ma1 ;e proved ;1
preponderance of evidence in the same action.
Article !7,$ of the Civil Code provides:
The prohi;itions mentioned in Article 2#" concerning donations inter vivos shall appl1 to
testamentar1 provisions.
In Article III of the disputed Aill" e?ecuted on August !*" !#+$" or almost si? 1ears ;efore the testator<s
death on .ul1 !+" !#23" :artin .ugo stated that respondent 'ufina &omeB was his legal wife from whom
he had ;een estranged -for so man1 1ears.- @e also declared that respondents Carmelita .ugo and
4scar .ugo were his legitimate children. In Article I(" he stated that he had ;een living as man and wife
with the petitioner since !#*,. Testator .ugo declared that the petitioner was entitled to his love and
affection. @e stated that )epomuceno represented .ugo as her own hus;and ;ut -in truth and in fact" as
well as in the e1es of the law" I could not ;ind her to me in the hol1 ;onds of matrimon1 ;ecause of m1
aforementioned previous marriage.
There is no =uestion from the records a;out the fact of a prior e?isting marriage when :artin .ugo
e?ecuted his Aill. There is also no dispute that the petitioner and :r. .ugo lived together in an ostensi;le
marital relationship for ,, 1ears until his death.
It is also a fact that on Decem;er ," !#*," :artin .ugo and 0ofia .. )epomuceno contracted a marriage
;efore the .ustice of the 6eace of (ictoria" Tarlac. The man was then *! 1ears old while the woman was
3$. )epomuceno now contends that she acted in good faith for ,, 1ears in the ;elief that she was legall1
married to the testator.
The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued ;1 the private respondents:
First. The last will and testament itself e?pressl1 admits indu;ita;l1 on its face the
meretricious relationship ;etween the testator and petitioner" the devisee.
0econd. 6etitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance
of the true civil status of the testator" which led private respondents to present contrar1
evidence.
In short" the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validit1 of the legac1 given in the
will to petitioner ;1 the deceased testator at the start of the proceedings.
Ahether or not petitioner knew that testator :artin .ugo" the man he had lived with as
man and wife" as alread1 married" was an important and specific issue ;rought ;1 the
parties ;efore the trial court" and passed upon ;1 the Court of Appeals.
Instead of limiting herself to proving the e?trinsic validit1 of the will" it was petitioner who
opted to present evidence on her alleged good faith in marr1ing the testator. (Testimon1
of 6etitioner" T0) of August !" !#$," pp. *+%*2 and pp. +,%+3).
6rivate respondents" naturall1" presented evidence that would refute the testimon1 of
petitioner on the point.
0e;astian .ugo" 1ounger ;rother of the deceased testator" testified at length on the
meretricious relationship of his ;rother and petitioner. (T0) of August !$"!#2*).
Clearl1" the good faith of petitioner was ;1 option of the parties made a decisive issue
right at the inception of the case.
Confronted ;1 the situation" the trial court had to make a ruling on the =uestion.
Ahen the court a !uo held that the testator :artin .ugo and petitioner <were deemed
guilt1 of adulter1 or concu;inage<" it was a finding that petitioner was not the innocent
woman she pretended to ;e.
??? ??? ???
. If a review of the evidence must ;e made nonetheless" then private respondents
respectfull1 offer the following anal1sis:
FI'0T: The secrec1 of the marriage of petitioner with the deceased testator in a town in
Tarlac where neither she nor the testator ever resided. If there was nothing to hide from"
wh1 the concealment< K 4f course" it ma1;e argued that the marriage of the deceased
with private respondent 'ufina &omeB was likewise done in secrec1. 9ut it should ;e
remem;ered that 'ufina &omeB was alread1 in the famil1 wa1 at that time and it would
seem that the parents of :artin .ugo were not in favor of the marriage so much so that
an action in court was ;rought concerning the marriage. (Testimon1 of 0e;astian .ugo"
T0) of August !$" !#2*" pp. ,#%7)
0>C4)D: 6etitioner was a sweetheart of the deceased testator when the1 were still ;oth
single. That would ;e in !#,, as :artin .ugo married respondent 'ufina &omeB on
)ovem;er ,#" !#, (>?h. ). 6etitioner married the testator onl1 on Decem;er *" !#*,.
There was a space of a;out 7 1ears in ;etween. During those 7 1ears" could it ;e
;elieved that she did not even wonder wh1 :artin .ugo did not marr1 her nor contact her
an1more after )ovem;er" !#, % facts that should impel her to ask her groom ;efore she
married him in secrec1" especiall1 so when she was alread1 a;out *7 1ears old at the
time of marriage.
T@I'D: The fact that petitioner ;roke off from :artin .ugo in !#, is ;1 itself conclusive
demonstration that she new that the man she had openl1 lived for ,, 1ears as man and
wife was a married man with alread1 two children.
F4C'T@: @aving admitted that she knew the children of respondent 'ufina &omeB" is it
possi;le that she would not have asked :artin .ugo whether or not the1 were his
illegitimate or legitimate children and ;1 whomK That is un%Filipino.
FIFT@: @aving often gone to 6asig to the residence of the parents of the deceased
testator" is it possi;le that she would not have known that the mother of private
respondent 4scar .ugo and Carmelita .ugo was respondent 'ufina &omeB" considering
that the houses of the parents of :artin .ugo (where he had lived for man1 1ears) and
that of respondent 'ufina &omeB were 5ust a few meters awa1K
0uch pretentions of petitioner 0ofia )epomuceno are un;elieva;le. The1 are" to sa1 the
least" inherentl1 impro;a;le" for the1 are against the e?perience in common life and the
ordinar1 instincts and promptings of human nature that a woman would not ;other at all
to ask the man she was going to marr1 whether or not he was alread1 married to another"
knowing that her groom had children. It would ;e a stor1 that would strain human
credulit1 to the limit if petitioner did not know that :artin .ugo was alread1 a married man
in view of the irrefuta;le fact that it was precisel1 his marriage to respondent 'ufina
&omeB that led petitioner to ;reak off with the deceased during their 1ounger 1ears.
:oreover" the prohi;ition in Article 2# of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation ;etween
persons who are living in adulter1 or concu;inage. It is the donation which ;ecomes void. The giver
cannot give even assuming that the recipient ma1 receive. The ver1 wordings of the Aill invalidate the
legac1 ;ecause the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had ;een
living in concu;inage.
A@>'>F4'>" the petition is DI0:I00>D for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals" now
Intermediate Appellate Court" is AFFI':>D. )o costs.
04 4'D>'>D.
G.R. No. 8((33 Ma,>1 ((, 1990
&O'E "AR#UA and EDGAR "#AN%OR, vs. !ONORA"LE %OUR OF A$$EAL', N#%OLA'
NA%AR#O and V#%OR#A RONDA NA%AR#O,
This petition for review on certiorari assails as erroneous and contrar1 to e?isting relevant laws and
applica;le 5urisprudence the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals dated Decem;er !!" !#$2 which reversed
and set aside that of the 'egional Trial Court" 9ranch MMMII" at 6ili" Camarines 0ur.
(
The challenged
decision ad5udged the petitioners lia;le to the private respondents in the total amount of 6,7"*7*.77 and
for costs.
The facts are as follows:
In the evening of )ovem;er 2" !#2#" the tric1cle then ;eing driven ;1 9ienvenido )acario along the
national highwa1 at 9aranga1 0an Ca1etano" in 9aao" Camarines 0ur" figured in an accident with .9 9us
)o. $7 driven ;1 petitioner >dgar 9itancor and owned and operated ;1 petitioner .ose 9aritua.
3
As a
result of that accident 9ienvenido and his passenger died
)
and the tric1cle was damaged.
5
)o criminal
case arising from the incident was ever instituted.
6
0u;se=uentl1" on :arch ,2" !#$7" as a conse=uence of the e?tra%5udicial settlement of the matter
negotiated ;1 the petitioners and the ;us insurer J 6hilippine First Insurance Compan1" Incorporated
(6FICI for ;revit1) J 9ienvenido )acario<s widow" Alicia 9aracena (da. de )acario" received
6!$"*77.77. In consideration of the amount she received" Alicia e?ecuted on :arch ,2" !#$7 a -'elease
of Claim- in favor of the petitioners and 6FICI" releasing and forever discharging them from all actions"
claims" and demands arising from the accident which resulted in her hus;and<s death and the damage to
the tric1cle which the deceased was then driving. Alicia likewise e?ecuted an affidavit of desistance in
which she formall1 manifested her lack of interest in instituting an1 case" either civil or criminal" against
the petitioners.
7
4n 0eptem;er ," !#$!" or a;out one 1ear and ten months from the date of the accident on )ovem;er 2"
!#2#" the private respondents" who are the parents of 9ienvenido )acario" filed a complaint for damages
against the petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines 0ur.
8
In their complaint" the
private respondents alleged that during the vigil for their deceased son" the petitioners through their
representatives promised them (the private respondents) that as e?tra%5udicial settlement" the1 shall ;e
indemnified for the death of their son" for the funeral e?penses incurred ;1 reason thereof" and for the
damage for the tric1cle the purchase price of which the1 (the private respondents) onl1 loaned to the
victim. The petitioners" however" reneged on their promise and instead negotiated and settled their
o;ligations with the long%estranged wife of their late son. The )acario spouses pra1ed that the
defendants" petitioners herein" ;e ordered to indemnif1 them in the amount of 6,*"777.77 for the death of
their son 9ienvenido" 6!7"777.77 for the damaged tric1cle" 6,*"777.77 for compensator1 and e?emplar1
damages" 6*"777.77 for attorne1<s fees" and for moral damages.
9
After trial" the court a !uo dismissed the complaint" holding that the pa1ment ;1 the defendants (herein
petitioners) to the widow and her child" who are the preferred heirs and successors%in%interest of the
deceased 9ienvenido to the e?clusion of his parents" the plaintiffs (herein private respondents)"
e?tinguished an1 claim against the defendants (petitioners).
10
The parents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the 5udgment of the trial court. The
appellate court ruled that the release e?ecuted ;1 Alicia 9aracena (da. de )acario did not discharge the
lia;ilit1 of the petitioners ;ecause the case was instituted ;1 the private respondents in their own capacit1
and not as -heirs" representatives" successors" and assigns- of AliciaD and Alicia could not have validl1
waived the damages ;eing pra1ed for (;1 the private respondents) since she was not the one who
suffered these damages arising from the death of their son. Furthermore" the appellate court said that the
petitioners -failed to re;ut the testimon1 of the appellants (private respondents) that the1 were the ones
who ;ought the tric1cle that was damaged in the incident. Appellants had the ;urden of proof of such fact"
and the1 did esta;lish such fact in their testimon1 . . .
11
Anent the funeral e?penses" -(T)he e?penses for
the funeral were likewise shouldered ;1 the appellants (the private respondents). This was never
contradicted ;1 the appellees (petitioners). . . . 6a1ment (for these) were made ;1 the appellants"
therefore" the reim;ursement must accrue in their favor.
1(
Conse=uentl1" the respondent appellate court ordered the petitioners to pa1 the private respondents
6!7"777.77 for the damage of the tric1cle" 6*"777.77 for -complete- funeral services" 63*7.77 for
cemeter1 lot" 6**.77 for oracion adulto" and 6*"777.77 for attorne1<s fees.
13
The petitioners moved for
a reconsideration of the appellate court<s decision
1)
;ut their motion was denied.
15
@ence" this petition.
The issue here is whether or not the respondent appellate court erred in holding that the petitioners are
still lia;le to pa1 the private respondents the aggregate amount of 6,7"*7*.77 despite the agreement of
e?tra5udicial settlement ;etween the petitioners and the victim<s compulsor1 heirs.
The petition is meritorious.
4;ligations are e?tinguished ;1 various modes among them ;eing ;1 pa1ment. Article !,! of the Civil
Code of the 6hilippines provides:
Art. !,!. 4;ligations are e?tinguished:
(!) 2y payment or performanceD
(,) 91 the loss of the thing dueD
() 91 the condonation or remission of the de;tD
(3) 91 the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and de;torD
(*) 91 compensationD
(+) 91 novation.
(>mphasis ours.)
There is no den1ing that the petitioners had paid their o;ligation petition arising from the accident that
occurred on )ovem;er 2" !#2#. The onl1 =uestion now is whether or not Alicia" the spouse and the one
who received the petitioners< pa1ment" is entitled to it.
Article !,37 of the Civil Code of the 6hilippines enumerates the persons to whom pa1ment to e?tinguish
an o;ligation should ;e made.
Art !,37. 6a1ment shall ;e made to the person in whose favor the o;ligation has ;een
constituted" or his successor in interest" or an1 person authoriBed to receive it.
Certainl1 there can ;e no =uestion that Alicia and her son with the deceased are the successors in
interest referred to in law as the persons authoriBed to receive pa1ment. The Civil Code states:
Article $$2. The following are compulsor1 heirs:
!. 8egitimate children and descendants" with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendantsD
,. In default of t$e foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants with respect to their
legitimate children and decendantsD
. The widow or widowerD
3. Acknowledged natural children and natural children ;1 legal fictionD
*. 4ther illegitimate children referred to in Article ,$2.
Compulsor1 heirs mentioned in )os. " 3 and * are not e?cluded ;1 those in )os. ! and
,. )either do the1 e?clude one another. (>mphasis ours.)
Article #$*. In default of legitimate c$ildren and descendants of the deceased" his parents
and ascendants shall inherit from him" to the e?clusion of collateral relatives.
(>mphasis ours.)
It is patentl1 clear that the parents of the deceased succeed onl1 when the latter dies without a legitimate
descendant. 4n the other hand" the surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. As it has ;een
esta;lished that 9ienvenido was married to Alicia and that the1 ;egot a child" the private respondents are
not successors%in%interest of 9ienvenidoD the1 are not compulsor1 heirs. The petitioners therefore acted
correctl1 in settling their o;ligation with Alicia as the widow of 9ienvenido and as the natural guardian of
their lone child. This is so even if Alicia had ;een estranged from 9ienvenido. :ere estrangement is not a
legal ground for the dis=ualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.
)either could the private respondents" as alleged creditors of 9ienvenido" seek relief and compensation
from the petitioners. Ahile it ma1 ;e true that the private respondents loaned to 9ienvenido the purchase
price of the damaged tric1cle and shouldered the e?penses for his funeral" the said purchase price and
e?penses are ;ut mone1 claims against the estate of their deceased son.
16
These mone1 claims are not
the lia;ilities of the petitioners who" as we have said" had ;een released ;1 the agreement of the e?tra%
5udicial settlement the1 concluded with Alicia 9aracena (da. de )acario" the victim<s widow and heir" as
well as the natural guardian of their child" her co%heir. As a matter of fact" she e?ecuted a -'elease 4f
Claim- in favor of the petitioners.
A@>'>F4'>" the petition is &'A)T>DD the decision of the Court of Appeals is '>(>'0>D and 0>T
A0ID> and the decision of the 'egional Trial Court is here;1 '>I)0TAT>D. Costs against the private
respondents.
04 4'D>'>D.
G.R. No. 13877) Ma,>1 8, (001
REG#NA FRAN%#'%O AND ZENA#DA $A'%UAL, vs. A#DA FRAN%#'%O-ALFON'O,
:a1 a legitimate daughter ;e deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased father ;1 a simulated
contract transferring the propert1 of her father to his illegitimate childrenK
The case ;efore the Court is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals
!
declaring
void the deed of sale of two parcels of land conve1ed to petitioners who are illegitimate children of the
deceased to the e?clusion of respondent" his sole legitimate daughter.
The facts
,
are:
'espondent Aida Francisco%Alfonso (hereafter Aida) is the onl1 daughter of spouses ®orio Francisco
and Cirila de la CruB" who are now ;oth deceased.
6etitioners" on the other hand" are daughters of the late ®orio Francisco with his common law wife
.ulia :endoBa" with whom he ;egot seven (2) children.
®orio Francisco (hereafter ®orio) owned two parcels of residential land" situated in 9aranga1
8olom;o1" 9ocaue" 9ulacan" covered ;1 TCT )os. T%,237 and T%!!2!+7. Ahen ®orio was confined
in a hospital in !##7" he confided to his daughter Aida that the certificates of title of his propert1 were in
the possession of 'egina Francisco and Oenaida 6ascual.
After ®orio died on .ul1 ,7" !##7"
Aida in=uired a;out the certificates of title from her half sisters.
The1 informed her that ®orio had sold the land to them on August !*" !#$. After verification" Aida
learned that there was indeed a deed of a;solute sale in favor of 'egina Francisco and Oenaida 6ascual.
Thus" on August !*" !#$" ®orio e?ecuted a -Lasulatan sa &anap na 9ilihan" where;1 for
6,*"777.77" he sold the two parcels of land to 'egina Francisco and Oenaida 6ascual. 91 virtue of the
sale" the 'egister of Deeds of 9ulacan issued TCT )o. T%*#.*$* to 'egina Francisco and TCT T%*#.*$+
to Oenaida 6ascual.
3
4n April !" !##!" Aida filed with the 'egional Trial Court" 9ulacan a complaint against petitioners for
annulment of sale with damages.
*
0he alleged that the signature of her late father" ®orio Francisco" on
the ,asulatan sa Banap na 2ili$an dated August !*" !#$" was a forger1.
In their 5oint answer to the complaint" petitioners denied the alleged forger1 or simulation of the deed of
sale. After due proceedings" on .ul1 ,!" !##3" the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint. The dispositive portion reads:
-A@>'>F4'>" on the ;asis of the evidence adduced and the law applica;le thereon" the Court
here;1 renders 5udgment:
-a) sustaining the validit1 of the -Lasulatan 0a &anap )a 9ilihan- (>?h.-&-) e?ecuted on !*
August !## ;1 the late ®orio Francisco in favor of the defendantsD
-;) affirming the validit1 of the Transfer Certificates of Title )o. T%*#.*$* (>?h. -I-) issued to
defendant 'egina Francisco and )o. T%*#.$+ (>?h. -@-) issued to defendant Oenaida 6ascualD
and
-c) dismissing the complaint as well as the defendants< counterclaim for damages and attorne1<s
fees for lack of merit.-
+
In time
2
" respondent Alfonso appealed to the Court of Appeals.
$
After due proceedings" on April 7" !###" the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing that of
the trial court" the dispositive portion of which reads:
-A@>'>F4'>" the Decision dated .ul1 ,!" !##3 of the court a =uo is '>(>'0>D and 0>T
A0ID> and another rendered as follows:
-!. The Lasulatan 0a &anap na 9ilihan dated August !*" !#$ (>?hi;it -&-) is declared null and
void from the ;eginning and TCT )os. T%*#.*$* (:) and T%*#%*$+ (:)" ;oth of the 'egistr1 of
Deeds of 9ulacan (:e1caua1an 9ranch) in the names of 'egina Francisco and Oenaida 6ascual"
respectivel1" are annulled and cancelledD
-,. The 'egister of Deeds of 9ulacan (:e1caua1an 9ranch) is ordered to cancel the
aforementioned TCT )os. T%*#.*$* (:) and T%*#.*$+ (:) and to reinstate Transfer Certificates of
Title )os. T%!,237 and T%!!2!+7 ;oth in the name of ®orio Francisco.
-. Defendants%appellees 'egina Francisco and Oenaida 6ascual 5ointl1 and solidaril1 are
ordered to pa1 plaintiff%appellant Alfonso the amount of 6*"777.77 as moral damages" 6*"777.77
as e?emplar1 damages and 6*"777.77 as attorne1<s fees.
-3. The counterclaim of defendants%appellees is dismissed for lack of merit.
-Costs of suit against said defendants%appellees.-
#
@ence" this petition.
!7
The main issue raised is whether the 0upreme Court ma1 review the factual findings of the appellate
court. The 5urisdiction of this Court in cases ;rought ;efore it from the Court of Appeals under 'ule 3* of
the 'evised 'ules of Court is limited to review of pure errors of law. It is not the function of this Court to
anal1Be or weigh evidence all over again" unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are
totall1 devoid of support or are glaringl1 erroneous as to constitute grave a;use of discretion.
!!
The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals supported ;1 su;stantial evidence are conclusive and ;inding
on the parties and are not reviewa;le ;1 this Court"
!,
unless the case falls under an1 of the recogniBed
e?ceptions to the rule.
!
6etitioner has failed to prove that the case falls within the e?ceptions.
!3
Ae affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals ;ecause:
>irst: The #asulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for the contract of sale. Felicitas de la
CruB" a famil1 friend of the Franciscos" testified that Oenaida 6ascual and 'egina Francisco did not have
an1 source of income in !#$" when the1 ;ought the propert1" until the time when Felicitas testified in
!##!.
!*
As proof of income" however" Oenaida 6ascual testified that she was engaged in operating a canteen"
working as cashier in :a1on )ight Clu; as well as ;u1ing and selling 'TA ('ead1 to Aear) items in
August of !#$ and prior thereto.
Oenaida alleged that she paid her father the amount of 6!7"777.77. 0he did not withdraw mone1 from her
;ank account at the 'ural 9ank of :e1caua1an" 9ulacan" to pa1 for the propert1. 0he had personal
savings other than those deposited in the ;ank. @er gross earnings from the 'TA for three 1ears was
6#"777.77" and she earned 6*7.77 a night at the clu;.
!+
'egina Francisco" on the other hand" was a market vendor" selling niluga%" earning a net income of
677.77 a da1 in !#$. 0he ;ought the propert1 from the deceased for 6!*"777.77.
!2
0he had no other
source of income.
Ae find it incredi;le that engaging in ;u1 and sell could raise the amount of 6!7"777.77" or that earnings
in selling goto could save enough to pa1 6!*"777.77" in cash for the land.
The testimonies of petitioners were incredi;le considering their inconsistent statements as to whether
there was consideration for the sale and also as to whether the propert1 was ;ought ;elow or a;ove its
supposed market value. The1 could not even present a single witness to the #asulatan that would prove
receipt of the purchase price.
0ince there was no cause or consideration for the sale" the same was a simulation and hence" null and
void.
!$
Second: >ven if the #asulatan was not simulated" it still violated the Civil Code
!#
provisions insofar as the
transaction affected respondent<s legitime. The sale was e?ecuted in !#$" when the applica;le law was
the Civil Code" not the Famil1 Code.
4;viousl1" the sale was ®orio<s wa1 to transfer the propert1 to his illegitimate daughters
,7
at the
e?pense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was e?ecuted to prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming
her legitime and rightful share in said propert1. 9efore his death" ®orio had a change of heart and
informed his daughter a;out the titles to the propert1.
According to Article $$$" Civil Code:
-The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one%half of the hereditar1 estate
of the father and of the mother.
-The latter ma1 freel1 dispose of the remaining half su;5ect to the rights of illegitimate children
and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided.-
®orio Francisco did not own an1 other propert1. If indeed the parcels of land involved were the onl1
propert1 left ;1 their father" the sale in fact would deprive respondent of her share in her father<s estate.
91 law" she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his onl1 legitimate child.
,!
The legal heirs of the late ®orio Francisco must ;e determined in proper testate or intestate
proceedings for settlement of the estate. @is compulsor1 heir can not ;e deprived of her share in the
estate save ;1 disinheritance as prescri;ed ;1 law.
,,
A@>'>F4'>" the petition is here;1 D>)I>D. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA%&. '. C( )o.
3$*3* is AFFI':>D" in toto.
)o costs.
04 4'D>'>D.
G.R. No. 83)8) F/0,+a,y 1(, 1990
%ELEDON#A 'OL#V#O, vs. !E !ONORA"LE %OUR OF A$$EAL' and %ON%ORD#A &AVELLANA
V#LLANUEVA,
This is a petition for review of the decision dated .anuar1 ,+" !#$$ of the Court of Appeals in CA &' C(
)o. 7#7!7 (Concordia (illanueva v. Celedonia 0olivio) affirming the decision of the trial court in Civil Case
)o. !,72 for partition" reconve1ance of ownership and possession and damages" the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
A@>'>F4'>" 5udgment is here;1 rendered for the plaintiff and against defendant:
a) 4rdering that the estate of the late >ste;an .avellana" .r. ;e divided into two (,)
shares: one%half for the plaintiff and one%half for defendant. From ;oth shares shall ;e
e=uall1 deducted the e?penses for the ;urial" mausoleum and related e?penditures.
Against the share of defendants shall ;e charged the e?penses for scholarship" awards"
donations and the <0alustia 0olivio (da. de .avellana :emorial FoundationD<
;) Directing the defendant to su;mit an inventor1 of the entire estate propert1" including
;ut not limited to" specific items alread1 mentioned in this decision and to render an
accounting of the propert1 of the estate" within thirt1 (7) da1s from receipt of this
5udgmentD one%half (!E,) of this produce shall ;elong to plaintiffD
c) 4rdering defendant to pa1 plaintiff 6*"777.77 as e?penses of litigationD 6!7"777.77 for
and as attorne1<s fees plus costs.
04 4'D>'>D. (pp. 3,%3" 'ollo)
This case involves the estate of the late novelist" >ste;an .avellana" .r." author of the first post%war
Filipino novel -Aithout 0eeing the Dawn"- who died a ;achelor" without descendants" ascendants"
;rothers" sisters" nephews or nieces. @is onl1 surviving relatives are: (!) his maternal aunt" petitioner
Celedonia 0olivio" the spinster half%sister of his mother" 0alustia 0olivioD and (,) the private respondent"
Concordia .avellana%(illanueva" sister of his deceased father" >ste;an .avellana" 0r.
@e was a posthumous child. @is father died ;arel1 ten (!7) months after his marriage in Decem;er" !#!+
to 0alustia 0olivio and four months ;efore >ste;an" .r. was ;orn.
0alustia and her sister" Celedonia (daughter of >ngracio 0olivio and his second wife .osefa FernandeB)"
a teacher in the Iloilo 6rovincial @igh 0chool" ;rought up >ste;an" .r.
0alustia ;rought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog" Iloilo covered
;1 ,3 titles) which she had inherited from her mother" ®oria Celo" >ngracio 0olivio<s first wife (p. ,*"
'ecord)" ;ut no con5ugal propert1 was ac=uired during her short%lived marriage to >ste;an" 0r.
4n 4cto;er !!" !#*#" 0alustia died" leaving all her properties to her onl1 child" >ste;an" .r." including a
house and lot in 8a 6aB" Iloilo Cit1" where she" her son" and her sister lived. In due time" the titles of all
these properties were transferred in the name of >ste;an" .r.
During his lifetime" >ste;an" .r. had" more than once" e?pressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close
friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor ;ut deserving
students o;tain a college education. Cnfortunatel1" he died of a heart attack on Fe;ruar1 ,+"!#22 without
having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral" Concordia and Celedonia talked a;out what to do with >ste;an<s properties.
Celedonia told Concordia a;out >ste;an<s desire to place his estate in a foundation to ;e named after his
mother" from whom his properties came" for the purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling.
Concordia agreed to carr1 out the plan of the deceased. This fact was admitted ;1 her in her -:otion to
'eopen andEor 'econsider the 4rder dated April " !#2$- which she filed on .ul1 ,2" !#2$ in 0pecial
6roceeding )o. ,*37" where she stated:
3. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediatel1 preceding
paragraph Gthat herein movant is also the relative of the deceased within the third degree"
she ;eing the 1ounger sister of the late >ste;an .avellana" father of the decedent hereinH"
;ecause prior to t$e filing of t$e petition t$ey 8petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant
Concordia @avellana: $ave agreed to ma#e t$e estate of t$e decedent a foundation,
;esides the1 have closel1 known each other due to their filiation to the decedent and the1
have ;een visiting each other<s house which are not far awa1 for (sic) each other. (p. ,3"
'ecordD >mphasis supplied.)
6ursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of
the foundation" Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel" filed on :arch $" !#22 0pl.
6roceeding )o. ,*37 for her appointment as special administratri? of the estate of >ste;an .avellana" .r.
(>?h. ,). 8ater" she filed an amended petition (>?h. *) pra1ing that letters of administration ;e issued to
herD that she ;e declared sole heir of the deceasedD and that after pa1ment of all claims and rendition of
inventor1 and accounting" the estate ;e ad5udicated to her (p. !!*" 'ollo).
After due pu;lication and hearing of her petition" as well as her amended petition" she was declared sole
heir of the estate of >ste;an .avellana" .r. 0he e?plained that this was done for three reasons: (!)
;ecause the properties of the estate had come from her sister" 0alustia 0olivioD (,) that she is the
decedent<s nearest relative on his mother<s sideD and () with her as sole heir" the disposition of the
properties of the estate to fund the foundation would ;e facilitated.
4n April " !#2$" the court (9ranch II" CFI" now 9ranch ," 'TC) declared her the sole heir of >ste;an"
.r. Thereafter" she sold properties of the estate to pa1 the ta?es and other o;ligations of the deceased
and proceeded to set up the .S"L3S/I" SALI?IA ?&". &E @"?ELL"0" >A30&"/IA0. which she
caused to ;e registered in the 0ecurities and >?change Commission on .ul1 !2"!#$! under 'eg. )o.
7!777,2 (p. #$" 'ollo).
Four months later" or on August 2" !#2$" Concordia .avellana (illanueva filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court<s order declaring Celedonia as -sole heir- of >ste;an" .r." ;ecause she too
was an heir of the deceased. 4n 4cto;er ,2" !#2$" her motion was denied ;1 the court for tardiness (pp.
$7%$!" 'ecord). Instead of appealing the denial" Concordia filed on .anuar1 2" !#$7 (or one 1ear and two
months later)" Civil Case )o. !,72 in the 'egional Trial Court of Iloilo" 9ranch ,+" entitled .Concordia
@avellana- ?illanueva v. Celedonia Solivio. for partition" recover1 of possession" ownership and damages.
4n 0eptem;er " !#$3" the said trial court rendered 5udgment in Civil Case )o. !,72" in favor of
Concordia .avellana%(illanueva.
4n Concordia<s motion" the trial court ordered the e?ecution of its 5udgment pending appeal and re=uired
Celedonia to su;mit an inventor1 and accounting of the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those
orders" Celedonia averred that the properties of the deceased had alread1 ;een transferred to" and were
in the possession of" the <0alustia 0olivio (da. de .avellana Foundation.- The trial court denied her
motions for reconsideration.
In the meantime" Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA &' C( )o. 7#7!7). 4n
.anuar1 ,+" !#$$" the Court of Appeals" >leventh Division" rendered 5udgment affirming the decision of
the trial court in toto. @ence" this petition for review wherein she raised the following legal issues:
!. whether 9ranch ,+ of the 'TC of Iloilo had 5urisdiction to entertain Civil Case )o.
!,72 for partition and recover1 of Concordia (illanueva<s share of the estate of >ste;an
.avellana" .r. even while the pro;ate proceedings (0pl. 6roc. )o. ,*37) were still pending
in 9ranch , of the same courtD
,. whether Concordia (illanueva was prevented from intervening in 0pl. 6roc. )o. ,*37
through e?trinsic fraudD
. whether the decedent<s properties were su;5ect to reserva troncal in favor of
Celedonia" his relative within the third degree on his mother<s side from whom he had
inherited themD and
3. whether Concordia ma1 recover her share of the estate after she had agreed to place
the same in the 0alustia 0olivio (da. de .avellana Foundation" and notwithstanding the
fact that conforma;l1 with said agreement" the Foundation has ;een formed and
properties of the estate have alread1 ;een transferred to it.
I. /$e !uestion of jurisdictionN
After a careful review of the records" we find merit in the petitioner<s contention that the 'egional Trial
Court" 9ranch ,+" lacked 5urisdiction to entertain Concordia (illanueva<s action for partition and recover1
of her share of the estate of >ste;an .avellana" .r. while the pro;ate proceedings (0pl" 6roc. )o. ,*37)
for the settlement of said estate are still pending in 9ranch , of the same court" there ;eing as 1et no
orders for the su;mission and approval of the administrati?<s inventor1 and accounting" distri;uting the
residue of the estate to the heir" and terminating the proceedings (p. !" 'ecord).
It is the order of distri;ution directing the deliver1 of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled
thereto that ;rings to a close the intestate proceedings" puts an end to the administration and thus far
relieves the administrator from his duties (0antieste;an v. 0antieste;an" +$ 6hil. +2" 6hilippine
Commercial and Industrial 9ank v. >scolin" et al." 8%,2$+7" :arch ,#" !#23" *+ 0C'A ,++).
The assailed order of .udge Adil in 0pl. 6roc. )o. ,*37 declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate
of >ste;an .avellana" .r. did not toll the end of the proceedings. As a matter of fact" the last paragraph of
the order directed the administratri? to -hurr1 up the settlement of the estate.- The pertinent portions of
the order are =uoted ;elow:
,. As regards the second incident G:otion for Declaration of :iss Celedonia 0olivio as
0ole @eir" dated :arch 2" !#2$H" it appears from the record that despite the notices
posted and the pu;lication of these proceedings as re=uired ;1 law" no other heirs came
out to interpose an1 opposition to the instant proceeding. It further appears that herein
Administratri? is the onl1 claimant%heir to the estate of the late >ste;an .avellana who
died on Fe;ruar1 ,+" !#22.
During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on :arch !2" !#2$" it was
esta;lished that the late >ste;an .avellana died single" without an1 known issue" and
without an1 surviving parents. @is nearest relative is the herein Administratri?" an elder
GsicH sister of his late mother who reared him and with whom he had alwa1s ;een living
with GsicH during his lifetime.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
,. :iss Celedonia 0olivio" Administratri? of this estate" is here;1 declared as the sole and
legal heir of the late >ste;an 0. .avellana" who died intestate on Fe;ruar1 ,+" !#22 at 8a
6aB" Iloilo Cit1.
The Administratri? is here;1 instructed to hurr1 up with the settlement of this estate so
that it can ;e terminated. (pp" !3%!+" 'ecord)
In view of the pendenc1 of the pro;ate proceedings in 9ranch !! of the Court of First Instance (now 'TC"
9ranch ,)" Concordia<s motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of >ste;an" and to
have herself (Concordia) declared as co%heir and recover her share of the properties of the deceased"
was properl1 filed ;1 her in 0pl. 6roc. )o. ,*37. @er remed1 when the court denied her motion" was to
elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for review on certiorari. @owever" instead of availing of that
remed1" she filed more than one 1ear later" a separate action for the same purpose in 9ranch ,+ of the
court. Ae hold that the separate action was improperl1 filed for it is the pro;ate court that has exclusive
5urisdiction to make a 5ust and legal distri;ution of the estate.
In the interest of orderl1 procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent<s
estate" a court should not interfere with pro;ate proceedings pending in a co%e=ual court. Thus" did we
rule in Builas v. @udge of t$e Court of >irst Instance of *ampanga, L-OKK;<, @anuary P', ';=O, 3 0C'A
!!!" !!2" where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a pro5ect of partition e?ecuted ;etween her
and her father in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of her mother:
The pro;ate court loses 5urisdiction of an estate under administration onl1 after the
pa1ment of all the de;ts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive
the same. The finalit1 of the approval of the pro5ect of The pro;ate court" in the e?ercise
of its 5urisdiction to make distri;ution" has power to determine the proportion or parts to
which each distri;uted is entitled. ... The power to determine the legalit1 or illegalit1 of the
testamentar1 provision is inherent in the 5urisdiction of the court making a 5ust and legal
distri;ution of the inheritance. ... To hold that a separate and independent action is
necessar1 to that effect" would ;e contrar1 to the general tendenc1 of the 5urisprudence
of avoiding multiplicit1 of suitsD and is further" e?pensive" dilator1" and impractical.
(:arcelino v. Antonio" 27 6hil. $$)
A 5udicial declaration that a certain person is the onl1 heir of the decedent is e?clusivel1
within the range of the administratri? proceedings and can not properl1 ;e made an
independent action. (8itam v. >spiritu" !77 6hil. +3)
A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper. (6imentel v. 6alanca" * 6hil.
3+)
partition ;1 itself alone does not terminate the pro;ate proceeding (Tim;ol v. Cano" !
0C'A !,2!" !,2+" 8%!*33*" April ,#" !#+!D 0iguiong v. Tecson" $# 6hil. pp. ,$" 7). As
long as the order of the distri;ution of the estate has not ;een complied with" the pro;ate
proceedings cannot ;e deemed closed and terminated 0iguiong v. Tecson" supra)D
;ecause a 5udicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heirs from
;ringing an action to o;tain his share" provided the prescriptive period therefore has not
elapsed (:ari v. 9onilia" $ 6hil. !2). /$e etter practice, $o%ever, for t$e $eir %$o $as
not received $is s$are, is to demand $is s$are t$roug$ a proper motion in t$e same
proate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of t$e proate or administrative
proceedings if it $ad already een closed, and not t$roug$ an independent action, which
would ;e tried ;1 another court or .udge which ma1 thus reverse a decision or order of
the pro;ate or intestate court alread1 final and e?ecuted and re%shuffle properties long
ago distri;uted and disposed of. ('amos v. 4rtuBar" $# 6hil. 27" 23!%23,D Tim;ol v.
Cano" supraQ .ingco v. DaluB" 8%*!72" April ,3" !#*" #, 6hil. !7$,D 'oman Catholic v.
Agustines" 8%!32!7" :arch ,#" !#+7" !72 6hil. 3**" 3+7%3+!D >mphasis supplied)
In Litam et al., v. -ivera, !77 6hil. +3" where despite the pendenc1 of the special proceedings for the
settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased 'afael 8itam the plaintiffs%appellants filed a civil action
in which the1 claimed that the1 were the children ;1 a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese
woman" hence" entitled to inherit his one%half share of the con5ugal properties ac=uired during his
marriage to :arcosa 'ivera" the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs%appellants were not
children of the deceased" that the properties in =uestion were paraphernal properties of his wife" :arcosa
'ivera" and that the latter was his onl1 heir. 4n appeal to this Court" we ruled that -such declarations (that
:arcosa 'ivera was the onl1 heir of the decedent) is improper" in Civil Case )o. ,72!" it eing %it$in t$e
exclusive competence of t$e court in Special *roceedings 0o. '<P=, in which it is not as 1et" in issue"
and" will not ;e" ordinaril1" in issue until the presentation of the pro5ect of partition. (p. 2$).
@owever" in the &uilas case" supra, since the estate proceedings had ;een closed and terminated for
over three 1ears" the action for annulment of the pro5ect of partition was allowed to continue. Considering
that in the instant case" the estate proceedings are still pending" ;ut nonetheless" Concordia had lost her
right to have herself declared as co%heir in said proceedings" Ae have opted likewise to proceed to
discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of 5ustice.
The orders of the 'egional Trial Court" 9ranch ,+" in Civil Case )o. !,72 setting aside the pro;ate
proceedings in 9ranch , (formerl1 9ranch !!) on the ground of e?trinsic fraud" and declaring Concordia
(illanueva to ;e a co%heir of Celedonia to the estate of >ste;an" .r." ordering the partition of the estate"
and re=uiring the administratri?" Celedonia" to su;mit an inventor1 and accounting of the estate" were
improper and officious, to sa1 the least" for these matters he within the e?clusive competence of the
pro;ate court.
II. /$e !uestion of extrinsic fraudN
Aas Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings ;1 extrinsic fraud emplo1ed ;1
CeledoniaK It is noteworth1 that e?trinsic fraud was not alleged in Concordia<s original complaint in Civil
Case )o. !,72. It was onl1 in her amended complaint of :arch +" !#$7" that e?trinsic fraud was alleged
for the first time.
>?trinsic fraud" as a ground for annulment of 5udgment" is an1 act or conduct of the
prevailing part1 which prevented a fair su;mission of the controvers1 (Francisco v. David"
$ 4.&. 2!3). A fraud <which prevents a part1 from having a trial or presenting all of his
case to the court" or one which operates upon matters pertaining" not to the 5udgment
itself" ;ut to the manner ;1 which such 5udgment was procured so much so that there
was no fair su;mission of the controvers1. For instance" if through fraudulent machination
;1 one Ghis adversar1H" a litigant was induced to withdraw his defense or was prevented
from presenting an availa;le defense or cause of action in the case wherein the 5udgment
was o;tained" such that the aggrieved part1 was deprived of his da1 in court through no
fault of his own" the e=uita;le relief against such 5udgment ma1 ;e availed of. (/atco v.
0umagui" 33+,%'" .ul1 !" !#2!). (cited in 6hilippine 8aw Dictionar1" !#2, >d. ;1
:orenoD (arela v. (illanueva" et al." #+ 6hil. ,3$)
A 5udgment ma1 ;e annulled on the ground of e?trinsic or collateral fraud" as
distinguished from intrinsic fraud" which connotes an1 fraudulent scheme e?ecuted ;1 a
prevailing litigant <outside the trial of a case against the defeated part1" or his agents"
attorne1s or witnesses" where;1 said defeated part1 is prevented from presenting full1
and fairl1 his side of the case. ... The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent
scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a part1 from having his da1 in court or from
presenting his case. The fraud" therefore" is one that affects and goes into the 5urisdiction
of the court. (8i;udan v. &il" 8%,!!+" :a1 !2" !#2," 3* 0C'A !2" ,2%,#D 0terling
Investment Corp. v. 'uiB" 8%7+#3" 4cto;er !" !#+#" 7 0C'A !$" ,)
The charge of e?trinsic fraud is" however" unwarranted for the following reasons:
!. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding intended to ;e filed ;1
Celedonia. 0he admitted in her complaint that she and Celedonia had agreed that the
latter would -initiate the necessar1 proceeding- and pa1 the ta?es and o;ligations of the
estate. Thus paragraph + of her complaint alleged:
+. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate of the late >ste;an
.avellana" .r. at the lowest possi;le cost and the least effort" t$e plaintiff and t$e
defendant agreed t$at t$e defendant s$all initiate t$e necessary proceeding, cause the
pa1ment of ta?es and other o;ligations" and to do ever1thing else re=uired ;1 law" and
thereafter" secure the partition of the estate ;etween her and the plaintiff" Galthough
Celedonia denied that the1 agreed to partition the estate" for their agreement was to
place the estate in a foundation.H (p. ," 'ecordD emphasis supplied)
>videntl1" Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings. 0he sta1ed awa1 y c$oice.
9esides" she knew that the estate came e?clusivel1 from >ste;an<s mother" 0alustia 0olivio" and she had
agreed with Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the deceased had planned to do.
,. The pro;ate proceedings are proceedings in rem. )otice of the time and place of
hearing of the petition is re=uired to ;e pu;lished (0ec. " 'ule 2+ in relation to 0ec. "
'ule 2#" 'ules of Court). )otice of the hearing of Celedonia<s original petition was
pu;lished in the -(isa1an Tri;une- on April ,*" :a1 , and #" !#22 (>?h 3" p. !#2"
'ecord). 0imilarl1" notice of the hearing of her amended petition of :a1 ,+" !#22 for the
settlement of the estate was" ;1 order of the court" pu;lished in -9agong Lasanag- ()ew
8ight) issues of :a1 ,2" .une and !7" !#22 (pp. !$,%7*" 'ecord). The pu;lication of
the notice of the proceedings was constructive notice to the whole world. Concordia was
not deprived of her right to intervene in the proceedings for she had actual" as well as
constructive notice of the same. As pointed out ;1 the pro;ate court in its order of
4cto;er ,2" !#2$:
... . The move of Concordia .avellana" however" was filed a;out five months after
Celedonia 0olivio was declared as the sole heir. ... .
Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had ;een dul1 pu;lished as re=uired
;1 law" despite which the present movant onl1 came to court now" then she is guilt1 of
laches for sleeping on her alleged right. (p. ,," 'ecord)
The court noted that Concordia<s motion did not compl1 with the re=uisites of a petition for relief from
5udgment nor a motion for new trial.
The rule is stated in 3# Corpus .uris 0ecundum $77 as follows:
Ahere petition was sufficient to invoke statutor1 5urisdiction of pro;ate court and
proceeding %as in rem no su;se=uent errors or irregularities are availa;le on collateral
attack. (9edwell v. Dean !, 0o. ,7)
Celedonia<s allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of >ste;an within the third degree on his
mot$er9s side was not false. :oreover" it was made in good faith and in the honest ;elief that ;ecause the
properties of >ste;an had come from his mother" not his father" she" as >ste;an<s nearest surviving
relative on his mother<s side" is the rightful heir to them. It would have ;een self%defeating and
inconsistent with her claim of sole $eirs$ip if she stated in her petition that Concordia was her co%heir. @er
omission to so state did not constitute e?trinsic fraud.
Failure to disclose to the adversar1" or to the court" matters which would defeat one<s
own claim or defense is not such e?trinsic fraud as will 5ustif1 or re=uire vacation of the
5udgment. (3# C...0. 3$#" citing /oung v. /oung" , 0> ,d +,,D First )ational 9ank P
Trust Co. of Ling Cit1 v. 9owman" !* 0A ,d $3,D 6rice v. 0mith" !7# 0A ,d !!33" !!3#)
It should ;e remem;ered that a petition for administration of a decedent<s estate ma1 ;e filed ;1 an1
-interested person- (0ec. ," 'ule 2#" 'ules of Court). The filing of Celedonia<s petition did not preclude
Concordia from filing her own.
III. An t$e !uestion of reserva troncalN
Ae find no merit in the petitioner<s argument that the estate of the deceased was su;5ect to reserva
troncal and that it pertains to her as his onl1 relative within the third degree on his mother<s side. The
reserva troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article $#! which reads as follows:
A'T. $#!. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant an1 propert1 which the latter
ma1 have ac=uired ;1 gratuitous title from another ascendant" or a ;rother or sister" is
o;liged to reserve such propert1 as he ma1 have ac=uired ;1 operation of law for the
;enefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who ;elong to the line from which
said propert1 came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
!. The person o;liged to reserve is the reservor 8reservista:Jthe ascendant who inherits
;1 operation of law propert1 from his descendants.
,. The persons for whom the propert1 is reserved are the reservees 8reservatarios:J
relatives within the third degree counted from the descendant 8propositus:, and ;elonging
to the line from which the propert1 came.
. The propositusJthe descendant who received ;1 gratuitous title and died without
issue" making his other ascendant inherit ;1 operation of law. (p. +#," Civil 8aw ;1
6adilla" (ol. II" !#*+ >d.)
Clearl1" the propert1 of the deceased" >ste;an .avellana" .r." is not reserva;le propert1" for >ste;an" .r.
was not an ascendant" ;ut the descendant of his mother" 0alustia 0olivio" from whom he inherited the
properties in =uestion. Therefore" he did not hold his inheritance su;5ect to a reservation in favor of his
aunt" Celedonia 0olivio" who is his relative within the third degree on his mother<s side. The reserva
troncal applies to properties inherited ;1 an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another
ascendant or # ;rother or sister. It does not appl1 to propert1 inherited ;1 a descendant from his
ascendant" the reverse of the situation covered ;1 Article $#!.
0ince the deceased" >ste;an .avellana" .r." died without descendants" ascendants" illegitimate children"
surviving spouse" ;rothers" sisters" nephews or nieces" what should appl1 in the distri;ution of his estate
are Articles !77 and !77# of the Civil Code which provide:
A'T. !77. If there are no descendants" ascendants" illegitimate children" or a surviving
spouse" the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles.
A'T. !77#. 0hould there ;e neither ;rothers nor sisters" nor children of ;rothers or
sisters" the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them ;1 reason
of relationship ;1 the whole ;lood.
Therefore" the Court of Appeals correctl1 held that:
9oth plaintiff%appellee and defendant%appellant ;eing relatives of the decedent within the
third degree in the collateral line" each" therefore" shall succeed to the su;5ect estate
<without distinction of line or preference among them ;1 reason of relationship ;1 the
whole ;lood"< and is entitled one%half (!E,) share and share alike of the estate. (p. *2"
'ollo)
I(. /$e !uestion of Concordia9s one-$alf s$areN
@owever" inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the foundation in
honor of his mother" 0alustia 0olivio (da. de .avellana (from whom the estate came)" an agreement
which she ratified and confirmed in her -:otion to 'eopen andEor 'econsider 4rder dated April " !#2$-
which she filed in 0pl. 6roceeding )o. ,*37:
3. That ... prior to t$e filing of t$e petition t$ey 8petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant
Concordia @avellana: $ave agreed to ma#e t$e estate of t$e decedent a foundation,
;esides the1 have closel1 known each other due to their filiation to the decedent and the1
have ;een visiting each other<s house which are not far awa1 for (sic) each other. (p. ,3"
'ecordD >mphasis supplied)
she is ;ound ;1 that agreement. It is true that ;1 that agreement" she did not waive her inheritance in
favor of Celedonia" ;ut she did agree to place all of >ste;an<s estate in the -0alustia 0olivio (da. de
.avellana Foundation- which >ste;an" .r." during his lifetime" planned to set up to honor his mother and
to finance the education of indigent ;ut deserving students as well.
@er admission ma1 not ;e taken lightl1 as the lower court did. 9eing a 5udicial admission" it is conclusive
and no evidence need ;e presented to prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo" $7 6hil. ,,2D &ranada
v. 6hilippine )ational 9ank" 8%,723*" 0ept. ," !#++" !$ 0C'A !D 0ta. Ana v. :aliwat" 8%,7," Aug. !"
!#+$" ,3 0C'A !7!$D 6eople v. >ncipido" &.'.277#!" Dec. ,#" !#$+" !3+ 0C'A 32$D and 'odillas v.
0andigan;a1an" &.'. *$+*," :a1 ,7" !#$$" !+! 0C'A 32).
The admission was never withdrawn or impugned ;1 Concordia who" significantl1" did not even testif1 in
the case" although she could have done so ;1 deposition if she were supposedl1 indisposed to attend the
trial. 4nl1 her hus;and" )arciso" and son%in%law" .uanito Domin" activel1 participated in the trial. @er
hus;and confirmed the agreement ;etween his wife and Celedonia" ;ut he endeavored to dilute it ;1
alleging that his wife did not intend to give all" ;ut onl1 one%half" of her share to the foundation (p. ,"
'ecord).
The records show that the -0alustia 0olivio (da. de .avellana Foundation- was esta;lished and dul1
registered in the 0ecurities and >?change Commission under 'eg. )o. 7!777,2 for the following principal
purposes:
!. To provide for the esta;lishment andEor setting up of scholarships for such deserving
students as the 9oard of Trustees of the Foundation ma1 decide of at least one scholar
each to stud1 at Aest (isa1as 0tate College" and the Cniversit1 of the 6hilippines in the
(isa1as ;oth located in Iloilo Cit1.
,. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for 0t. Clements 'edemptorist
Communit1 for a deserving student who has the religious vocation to ;ecome a priest.
. To foster" develop" and encourage activities that will promote the advancement and
enrichment of the various fields of educational endeavors" especiall1 in literar1 arts.
0cholarships provided for ;1 this foundation ma1 ;e named after its ;enevolent
;enefactors as a token of gratitude for their contri;utions.
3. To direct or undertake surve1s and studies in the communit1 to determine communit1
needs and ;e a;le to alleviate partiall1 or totall1 said needs.
*. To maintain and provide the necessar1 activities for the proper care of the 0olivio%
.avellana mausoleum at Christ the Ling :emorial 6ark" .aro" Iloilo Cit1" and the
.avellana :emorial at the Aest (isa1as 0tate College" as a token of appreciation for the
contri;ution of the estate of the late >ste;an 0. .avellana which has made this foundation
possi;le. Also" in perpetuation of his 'oman Catholic ;eliefs and those of his mother"
®orian masses or their e=uivalents will ;e offered ever1 Fe;ruar1 and 4cto;er" and
'e=uiem masses ever1 Fe;ruar1 ,*th and 4cto;er llth" their death anniversaries" as part
of this provision.
+. To receive gifts" legacies" donations" contri;utions" endowments and financial aids or
loans from whatever source" to invest and reinvest the funds" collect the income thereof
and pa1 or appl1 onl1 the income or such part thereof as shall ;e determined ;1 the
Trustees for such endeavors as ma1 ;e necessar1 to carr1 out the o;5ectives of the
Foundation.
2. To ac=uire" purchase" own" hold" operate" develop" lease" mortgage" pledge"
e?change" sell" transfer" or otherwise" invest" trade" or deal" in an1 manner permitted ;1
law" in real and personal propert1 of ever1 kind and description or an1 interest herein.
$. To do and perform all acts and things necessar1" suita;le or proper for the
accomplishments of an1 of the purposes herein enumerated or which shall at an1 time
appear conducive to the protection or ;enefit of the corporation" including the e?ercise of
the powers" authorities and attri;utes concerned upon the corporation organiBed under
the laws of the 6hilippines in general" and upon domestic corporation of like nature in
particular. (pp. #%!7" 'ollo)
As alleged without contradiction in the petition< for review:
The Foundation ;egan to function in .une" !#$," and three () of its eight >ste;an
.avellana scholars graduated in !#$+" one (!) from C6( graduated Cum 8aude and two
(,) from A(0C graduated with honorsD one was a Cum 8aude and the other was a
recipient of 8agos 8opeB award for teaching for ;eing the most outstanding student
teacher.
The Foundation has four (3) high school scholars in &uiso 9aranga1 @igh 0chool" the
site of which was donated ;1 the Foundation. The 0chool has ;een selected as the 6ilot
9aranga1 @igh 0chool for 'egion (I.
The Foundation has a special scholar" Fr. >l;ert (as=ueB" who would ;e ordained this
1ear. @e studied at 0t. Francis Mavier :a5or 'egional 0eminar1 at Davao Cit1. The
Foundation likewise is a mem;er of the 'edemptorist Association that gives 1earl1
donations to help poor students who want to ;ecome 'edemptorist priests or ;rothers. It
gives 1earl1 awards for Creative writing known as the >ste;an .avellana Award.
Further" the Foundation had constructed the >ste;an 0. .avellana :ulti%purpose Center
at the Aest (isa1as 0tate Cniversit1 for teachers< and students< use" and has likewise
contri;uted to religious civic and cultural fund%raising drives" amongst other<s. (p. !7"
'ollo)
@aving agreed to contri;ute her share of the decedent<s estate to the Foundation" Concordia is o;ligated
to honor her commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.
A@>'>F4'>" the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
are here;1 0>T A0ID>. Concordia .. (illanueva is declared an heir of the late >ste;an .avellana" .r.
entitled to one%half of his estate. @owever" comforma;l1 with the agreement ;etween her and her co%heir"
Celedonia 0olivio" the entire estate of the deceased should ;e conve1ed to the -0alustia 0olivio (da. de
.avallana Foundation"- of which ;oth the petitioner and the private respondent shall ;e trustees" and each
shall ;e entitled to nominate an e=ual num;er of trustees to constitute the 9oard of Trustees of the
Foundation which shall administer the same for the purposes set forth in its charter. The petitioner" as
administratri? of the estate" shall su;mit to the pro;ate court an inventor1 and accounting of the estate of
the deceased preparator1 to terminating the proceedings therein.
04 4'D>'>D.
G.R. No. L-6657) F/0,+a,y (1, 1990
AN'ELMA D#AZ, 5+a,d-an o= V#%OR, RODR#GO, AN'ELM#NA and M#GUEL, a33 *+,na7/d
'ANERO, and FEL#F"ERA $A%UR'A, 5+a,d-an o= FEDER#%O 'ANERO, /. a3., vs.
#NERMED#AE A$$ELLAE %OUR and FEL#'A $AMU# &ARD#N,
The decision of the 0econd Division of this Court in the case of Anselma DiaB" et al. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court" et al." &.'. )o. +*23" promulgated .une !2" !#$2 declaring Felisa 6amuti%.ardin to ;e
the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late 0imona 6amuti (da. de 0antero" and its
'esolution of Fe;ruar1 ,3" !#$$ den1ing the :otion for 'econsideration dated .ul1 ," !#$2" are ;eing
challenged in this 0econd :otion for 'econsideration dated .ul1 *" !#$$. After the parties had filed their
respective pleadings" the Court" in a resolution dated 4cto;er ,2" !#$$" resolved to grant the re=uest of
the petitioners for oral argument ;efore the court en anc, and the case was set for hearing on )ovem;er
!2" !#$$ to resolve the =uestion: Does the term -relatives- in Article ##, of the )ew Civil Code which
reads:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit a intestato from the legitimate children or
relatives of his father or motherD nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child.
include the legitimate parents of the father or mother of the illegitimate childrenK Invited to discuss as
amici curiae during the hearing were the following: .ustice .ose 9.8. 'e1es" former .ustice :inister
'icardo C. 6uno" Dr. Arturo Tolentino" former .ustice >duardo Caguioa" and 6rofessor 'u;en 9alane.
The facts of the case" as s1nthesiBed in the assailed decision" are as follows:
It is undisputed: !) that Felisa 6amuti .ardin is a niece of 0imona 6amuti (da. de
0antero who together with Felisa<s mother .uliana were the onl1 legitimate children of the
spouses Felipe 6amuti and 6etronila AsuncionD ,) that .uliana married 0imon .ardin and
out of their union were ;orn Felisa 6amuti and another child who died during infanc1D )
that 0imona 6amuti (da. de 0antero is the widow of 6ascual 0antero and the mother of
6a;lo 0anteroD 3) that 6a;lo 0antero was the onl1 legitimate son of his parents 6ascual
0antero and 0imona 6amuti (da. de 0anteroD *) that 6ascual 0antero died in !#27D
6a;lo 0antero in !#2 and 0imona 0antero in !#2+D +) that 6a;lo 0antero" at the time of
his death was survived ;1 his mother 0imona 0antero and his si? minor natural children
to wit: four minor children with Anselma DiaB and two minor children with Feli?;erta
6acursa.
(pp. !%," DecisionD pp. !#7%!#!" 'ollo)
9riefl1 stated" the real issue in the instant case is this J who are the legal heirs of 0imona 6amuti (da.
de 0antero J her niece Felisa 6amuti%.ardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of 6a;lo
0antero)K
The present controvers1 is confined solel1 to the intestate estate of 0imona 6amuti (da. de 0antero. In
connection therewith" Ae are tasked with determining anew whether petitioners as illegitimate children of
6a;lo 0antero could inherit from 0imona 6amuti (da. de 0antero" ;1 right of representation of their father
6a;lo 0antero who is a legitimate child of 0imona 6amuti (da. de 0antero.
6etitioners claim that the amendment of Articles #3! and #3 of the old Civil Code (Civil Code of 0pain)
;1 Articles ##7 and ##, of the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the 6hilippines) constitute a su;stantial and
not merel1 a formal change" which grants illegitimate children certain successional rights. Ae do not
dispute the fact that the )ew Civil Code has given illegitimate children successional rights" which rights
were never ;efore en5o1ed ;1 them under the 4ld Civil Code. The1 were during that time merel1 entitled
to support. In fact" the1 are now considered as compulsor1 primar1 heirs under Article $$2 of the new
Civil Code ()o. * in the order of intestate succession). Again" Ae do not den1 that fact. These are onl1
some of the man1 rights granted ;1 the new Code to illegitimate children. 9ut that is all. A careful
evaluation of the )ew Civil Code provisions" especiall1 Articles #7," #$," #$#" and ##7" claimed ;1
petitioners to have conferred illegitimate children the right to represent their parents in the inheritance of
their legitimate grandparents" would in point of fact reveal that such right to this time does not e?ist.
8et Cs take a closer look at the a;ove%cited provisions.
Art.#7,. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are
transmitted upon their death to their descendants" whether legitimate or illegitimate.
Art. #$,. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit ;1 right of representation
and if an1 one of them should have died" leaving several heirs" the portion pertaining to
him shall ;e divided among the latter in e=ual portions. (#)
Art. #$#. If" together with illegitimate children" there should survive descendants of
another illegitimate child who is dead" the former shall succeed in their own right and the
latter ;1 right of representation. (#37a)
Art. ##7. The hereditar1 rights granted ;1 the two preceding articles to illegitimate
children shall ;e transmitted upon their death to their descendants" who shall inherit ;1
right of representation from their deceased grandparent. (#3!a) >mphasis supplied).
Articles #7," #$#" and ##7 clearl1 speak of successional rights of illegitimate children" which rights are
transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who
ma1 inherit ;1 virtue of the right of representation ma1 ;e legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner"
one should not overlook the fact that the persons to ;e represented are themselves illegitimate. The three
named provisions are ver1 clear on this matter. The right of representation is not availa;le to illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It ma1 ;e argued" as
done ;1 petitioners" that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent ;1 virtue
of the provisions of Article #$," which provides that -the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit
;1 right of representation.- 0uch a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession ;1 an
illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother" a situation which would set at naught the
provisions of Article ##,. Article #$, is inapplica;le to instant case ;ecause Article ##, prohi;its
a;solutel1 a succession a intestato ;etween the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother. It ma1 not ;e amiss to state that Article #$, is the general rule and
Article ##, the e?ception.
-The rules laid down in Article #$, that <grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit ;1 right of
representation and in Article #7, that the rights of illegitimate children ... are transmitted upon their death
to their descendants" whether legitimate or illegitimate are suject to t$e limitation prescri;ed ;1 Article
##, to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit a intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother.-< (Amicus Curiae<s 4pinion ;1 former .ustice :inister 'icardo C. 6uno" p.
!,)
-Article ##, of the )ew Civil Code provides a ;arrier or iron curtain in that it prohi;its a;solutel1 a
succession a intestato ;etween the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said illegitimate child. The1 ma1 have a natural tie of ;lood" ;ut this is not recogniBed
;1 law for the purpose of Article ##,. 9etween the legitimate famil1 and the illegitimate famil1 there is
presumed to ;e an intervening antagonism and incompati;ilit1. The illegitimate child is disgracefull1
looked down upon ;1 the legitimate famil1D and the famil1 is in turn" hated ;1 the illegitimate childD the
latter considers the privileged condition of the former" and the resources of which it is there;1 deprivedD
the former" in turn" sees in the illegitimate child nothing ;ut the product of sin" palpa;le evidence of a
;lemish ;roken in lifeD the law does no more than recogniBe this truth" ;1 avoiding further ground of
resentment.- (2 :anresa !!7 cited in &re1 v. Fa;le 37 4& (First 0) )o. " p. !#+).
According to petitioners" the commentaries of :anresa as a;ove% =uoted are ;ased on Articles ## to
#33 of the old Civil Code and are therefore inapplica;le to the )ew Civil Code and to the case at ;ar.
6etitioners further argue that the consistent doctrine adopted ;1 this Court in the cases of Llorente vs.
-odriguez, et al., !7 6hil." *$*D Centeno vs. Centeno" *, 6hil. ,," and Ayao vs. Ayao" #3 6hil. ,73" cited
;1 former .ustice :inister .ustice 6uno" .ustice Caguioa" and 6rof. 9alane" which identicall1 held that an
illegitimate child has no right to succeed a intestato the legitimate father or mother of his natural parent
(also a legitimate child himself is alread1 a;rogated ;1 the amendments made ;1 the )ow Civil Code and
thus cannot ;e made to appl1 to the instant case.
4nce more" Ae decline to agree with petitioner. Ae are full1 aware of certain su;stantial changes in our
law of succcession" ;ut there is no change whatsoever with respect to the provision of Article ##, of the
Civil Code. 4therwise" ;1 the said su;stantial change" Article ##," which was a reproduction f Article
#3 of the Civil Code of 0pain" should have ;een suppressed or at least modified to clarif1 the matters
which are now the su;5ect of the present controvers1. Ahile the )ew Civil Code ma1 have granted
successional rights to illegitimate children" those articles" however" in con5unction with Article ##," prohi;it
the right of representation from ;eing e?ercised where the person to ;e represented is a legitimate child.
)eedless to sa1" the determining factor is the legitimac1 or illegitimac1 of the person to ;e represented. If
the person to ;e represented is an illegitimate child" then his descendants" whether legitimate or
illegitimate" ma1 represent himD however" if the person to ;e represented is legitimate" his illegitimate
descendants cannot represent him ;ecause the law provides that onl1 his legitimate descendants ma1
e?ercise the right of representation ;1 reason of the ;arrier imposed Article ##,. In this wise" the
commentaries of :anresa on the matter in issue" even though ;ased on the old Civil Code" are still ver1
much applica;le to the )ew Civil Code ;ecause the amendment" although su;stantial" did not consist of
giving illegitimate children the right to represent their natural parents (legitimate) in the intestate
succession of their grandparents (legitimate). It is with the same line of reasoning that the three aforecited
cases ma1 ;e said to ;e still applica;le to the instant case.
>=uall1 important are the reflections of the Illustrious @on. .ustice .ose 9.8. 'e1es which also find
support from other civilists. Ae =uote:
In the 0panish Civil Code of !$$# the right of representation was admitted onl1 within the
legitimate famil1D so much so that Article #3 of that Code prescri;ed that an illegitimate
child can not inherit a intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father
and mother. The Civil Code of the 6hilippines apparentl1 adhered to this principle since it
reproduced Article #3 of the 0panish Code in its own Art. ##," ;ut with fine
inconsistenc1" in su;se=uent articles (##7" ##* and ##$) our Code allows the hereditar1
portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants" whether legitimate or
illegitimate. 0o that while Art. ##, prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from
representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent" the illegitimates of an
illegitimate child can now do so. This difference ;eing indefensi;le and unwarranted" in
the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either
that the illegitimate issue en5o1s in all cases the right of representation" in which case Art.
##, must ;e suppressedD or contrariwise maintain said article and modif1 Articles ##,
and ##$. The first solution would ;e more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis%a%vis
illegitimate children. (-eflections on t$e -eform of $ereditary Succession, .4C')A8 of
the Integrated 9ar of the 6hilippines" First Iuartet !#2+" (olume 3" )um;er !" pp. 37%
3!). (p. 2" DecisionD p. !#+" 'ollo)
It is therefore clear from Article ##, of the )ew Civil Code that the phrase -legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother- includes 0imona 6amuti (da. de 0antero as the word -relative- is ;road
enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of. (Comment" p. !# 'ollo citing p. ,$+,
9ouvier<s 8aw Dictionar1 vol. !!" Third 'evision" >ight >dition) The record reveals that from the
commencement of this case the onl1 parties who claimed to ;e the legitimate heirs of the late 0imona
6amuti (da. de 0antero are Felisa 6amuti .ardin and the si? minor natural or illegitimate children of 6a;lo
0antero. 0ince petitioners herein are ;arred ;1 the provisions of Article ##," the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court did not commit an1 error in holding Felisa 6amuti .ardin to ;e the sole legitimate heir to
the intestate estate of the late 0imona 6amuti (da. de 0antero.
It is 4ur shared view that the word -relatives- should ;e construed in its general acceptation. "micus
curiae 6rof. 'u;en 9alane has this to sa1:
The term relatives, although used man1 times in the Code" is not defined ;1 it. In
accordance therefore with the canons of statutor1 interpretation" it should ;e understood
to have a general and inclusive scope" inasmuch as the term is a general one. Beneralia
vera sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction prevents us
from making one: 3i lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera deemus. >srinche" in his
&iccionario de Legislacion y @urisprudencia defines parientes as -los =ue estan
relacionados por los vinculos de la sangre" ya sea por proceder unos de otros, como los
descendientes y ascendientes, 1a sea por proceder de una misma raiB o tronco" como
los colaterales. (cited in 0caevola" op. cit." p. 3*2). (p. 22" 'ollo)
According to 6rof. 9alane" to interpret the term relatives in Article ##, in a more restrictive sense than it is
used and intended is not warranted ;1 an1 rule of interpretation. 9esides" he further states that when the
law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense" it =ualifies the term with the word collateral" as in
Articles !77 and !77# of the )ew Civil Code.
Thus" the word -relatives- is a general term and when used in a statute it em;races not onl1 collateral
relatives ;ut also all the kindred of the person spoken of" unless the conte?t indicates that it was used in a
more restrictive or limited sense J which as alread1 discussed earlier" is not so in the case at ;ar.
To recapitulate" Ae =uote this:
The lines of this distinction ;etween legitimates and illegitimates. which goes ;ack ver1
far in legal histor1" have ;een softened ;ut not erased ;1 present law. 4ur legislation has
not gone so far as to place legitimate and illegitimate children on e?actl1 the same
footing. >ven the Famil1 Code of !#$2 (>4 ,7#) has not a;olished the gradation
;etween legitimate and illegitimate children (although it has done awa1 with the su;%
classification of illegitimates into natural and <spurious<). It would thus ;e correct to sa1
that illegitimate children have onl1 those rights which are e?pressl1 or clearl1 granted to
them ;1 law (vide Tolentino" Civil Code of the 6hilippines" !#2 ed." vol. III" p. ,#!).
(Amicus Curiae<s 4pinion ;1 6rof. 'u;en 9alane" p. !,).
In the light of the foregoing" Ae conclude that until Article ##, is suppressed or at least amended to clarif1
the term -relatives- there is no other alternative ;ut to appl1 the law literall1. Thus" Ae here;1 reiterate
the decision of .une !2" !#$2 and declare Felisa 6amuti%.ardin to ;e the sole heir to the intestate estate
of 0imona 6amuti (da. de 0antero" to the e?clusion of petitioners.
A@>'>F4'>" the second :otion for 'econsideration is D>)I>D" and the assailed decision is here;1
AFFI':>D.
04 4'D>'>D.
G.R. No. 10997( A2,-3 (9, 1996
ZO'#MA VERDAD, vs. !E !ON. %OUR OF A$$EAL', 'O%ORRO %. RO'ALE', AURORA
RO'ALE', NA$OLEON RO'ALE', ANON#O RO'ALE', FLORENDA RO'ALE', ELENA RO'ALE'
AND V#RG#N#A RO'ALE',
The petitioner" Oosima (erdad" is the purchaser of a ,3$%s=uare meter residential lot (identified to ;e 8ot
)o. *,#" Ts%+* of the 9utuan Cadastre" located along :agallanes 0treet" now :arcos :. Calo 0t."
9utuan Cit1). 6rivate respondent" 0ocorro Cordero (da. de 'osales" seeks to e?ercise a right of legal
redemption over the su;5ect propert1 and traces her title to the late :acaria Atega" her mother%in%law"
who died intestate on 7$ :arch !#*+.
During her lifetime" :acaria contracted two marriages: the first with Angel 9urdeos and the second"
following the latter<s death" with Canuto 'osales. At the time of her own death" :acaria was survived ;1
her son 'amon A. 9urdeos and her grandchild (;1 her daughter Felicidad A. 9urdeos) >stela 8oBada of
the first marriage and her children of the second marriage" namel1" David 'osales" .usto 'osales"
'omulo 'osales" and Aurora 'osales.
0ocorro 'osales is the widow of David 'osales who himself" some time after :acaria<s death" died
intestate without an issue.
In an instrument" dated !3 .une !#$," the heirs of 'amon 9urdeos" namel1" his widow :anuela 8egaspi
9urdeos and children Felicidad and 'amon" .r." sold to petitioner Oosima (erdad (their interest on) the
disputed lot supposedl1 for the price of 6**"3+7.77. In a dul1 notariBed deed of sale" dated !3 )ovem;er
!#$," it would appear" however" that the lot was sold for onl1 6,"777.77. 6etitioner e?plained that the
second deed was intended merel1 to save on the ta? on capital gains.
0ocorro discovered the sale on 7 :arch !#$2 while she was at the Cit1 Treasurer<s 4ffice. 4n ! :arch
!#$2" she sought the intervention of the 8upong Tagapa1apa of 9aranga1 #" 6rincess Crdu5a" for the
redemption of the propert1. 0he tendered the sum of 6,"777.77 to Oosima. The latter refused to accept
the amount for ;eing much less than the lot<s current value of 6$7"777.77. )o settlement having ;een
reached ;efore the 8upong Tagapa1apa" private respondents" on !+ 4cto;er !#$2" initiated against
petitioner an action for -8egal 'edemption with 6reliminar1 In5unction- ;efore the 'egional Trial Court of
9utuan Cit1.
4n ,# .une !##7" following the reception of evidence" the trial court handed down its decision holding" in
fine" that private respondents< right to redeem the propert1 had alread1 lapsed.
An appeal to the Court of Appeals was interposed ;1 private respondents. The appellate court" in its
decision of ,, April !##" reversed the court a !uoD thus:
A@>'>F4'>" premises considered" the 5udgment appealed from is here;1
'>(>'0>D" and a new one is accordingl1 entered declaring plaintiff%appellant" 0ocorro
C. 'osales" entitled to redeem the inheritance rights (Art. !7$$" )CC) or pro indiviso
share (Art. !+,7" )CC) of the @eirs of 'amon 9urdeos" 0r. in 8ot *,#" Ts%+* of the
9utuan Cadastre" within the remaining >8>(>) (!!) DA/0 from finalit1 hereon" unless
written notice of the sale and its terms are received in the interim" under the same terms
and conditions appearing under >?hi;it -.- and after returning the purchase price of
6,"777.77 within the foregoing period. )o cost.
1
In her recourse to this Court" petitioner assigned the following -errors:- That J
The @onora;le Court of Appeals erred in declaring 0ocorro C. 'osales is entitled to
redeem the inheritance rights (Article !7$$" )CC) or pro-indiviso share (Article !+,7"
)CC) of the heirs of 'amon 9urdeos" 0r. in 8ot *,#" Ts%+* of the 9utuan Cadastre" for
;eing contrar1 to law and evidence.
The @onora;le Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the peculiar circumstance" in that" the
respondents< actual knowledge" as a factor in the dela1 constitutes laches.
The @onora;le Court of Appeals erred in concluding that 0ocorro C. 'osales" in effect"
timel1 e?ercised the right of legal redemption when referral to 9aranga1 ;1 respondent
signifies ;ona fide intention to redeem andD that" redemption is properl1 made even if
there is no offer of redemption in legal tender.
The @onora;le Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the running of the statutor1
redemption period is sta1ed upon commencement of 9aranga1 proceedings.
(
0till" the thrust of the petition ;efore us is the alleged incapacit1 of private respondent 0ocorro C. 'osales
to redeem the propert1" she ;eing merel1 the spouse of David 'osales" a son of :acaria" and not ;eing a
co%heir herself in the intestate estate of :acaria.
Ae rule that 0ocorro can. It is true that 0ocorro" a daughter%in%law (or" for that matter" a mere relative ;1
affinit1)" is not an intestate heir of her parents%in%lawD
3
however" 0ocorro<s right to the propert1 is not
;ecause she rightfull1 can claim heirship in :acaria<s estate ;ut that she is a legal heir of her hus;and"
David 'osales" part of whose estate is a share in his mother<s inheritance.
David 'osales" incontroverti;l1" survived his mother<s death. Ahen :acaria died on 7$ :arch !#*+ her
estate passed on to her surviving children" among them David 'osales" who thereupon ;ecame co%
owners of the propert1. Ahen David 'osales himself later died" his own estate" which included his
undivided interest over the propert1 inherited from :acaria" passed on to his widow 0ocorro and her co%
heirs pursuant to the law on succession.
Art. ##*. In the a;sence of legitimate descendants and ascendants" and illegitimate
children and their descendants" whether legitimate or illegitimate" the surviving spouse
shall inherit the entire estate" without pre5udice to the rights of ;rothers and sisters"
nephews and nieces" should there ;e an1" under article !77!.
??? ??? ???
Art. !77!. 0hould ;rothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower"
the latter shall ;e entitled to one%half of the inheritance and the ;rothers and sisters or
their children to the other half.
)
0ocorro and herein private respondents" along with the co%heirs of David 'osales" thereupon
;ecame co-o%ners of the propert1 that originall1 descended from :acaria.
Ahen their interest in the propert1 was sold ;1 the 9urdeos heirs to petitioner" a right of redemption arose
in favor of private respondentsD thus:
Art. !+!#. 8egal redemption is the right to ;e su;rogated" upon the same terms and
conditions stipulated in the contract" in the place of one who ac=uires a thing ;1 purchase
or dation in pa1ment" or ;1 an1 other transaction where;1 ownership is transmitted ;1
onerous title.
Art. !+,7. A co%owner of a thing ma1 e?ercise the right of redemption in case the shares
of all the other co%owners or of an1 of them" are sold to a third person. If the price of the
alienation is grossl1 e?cessive" the redemptioner shall pa1 onl1 a reasona;le one.
Ae hold that the right of redemption was timel1 e?ercised ;1 private respondents. Concededl1" no written
notice of the sale was given ;1 the 9urdeos heirs (vendors) to the co%owners
5
re=uired under Article !+,
of the Civil
Code J
Art. !+,. The right of legal pre%emption or redemption shall not ;e e?ercised e?cept
within thirt1 da1s from the notice in writing ;1 the prospective vendor" or ;1 the vendor"
as the case ma1 ;e. The deed of safe shall not ;e recorded in the 'egistr1 of 6ropert1"
unless accompanied ;1 an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof
to all possi;le redemptioners.
@ence" the thirt1%da1 period of redemption had 1et to commence when private respondent
'osales sought to e?ercise the right of redemption on ! :arch !#$2" a da1 after she discovered
the sale from the 4ffice of the Cit1 Treasurer of 9utuan Cit1" or when the case was initiated" on
!+ 4cto;er !#$2" ;efore the trial court.
The written notice of sale is mandator1. This Court has long esta;lished the rule that notwithstanding
actual knowledge of a co%owner" the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co%owner in
order to remove all uncertainties a;out the sale" its terms and conditions" as well as its efficac1 and
status.
6
>ven in "lonzo vs. Intermediate "ppellate Court"
7
relied upon ;1 petitioner in contending that actual
knowledge should ;e an e=uivalent to a written notice of sale" the Court made it clear that it was not
reversing the prevailing 5urisprudenceD said the Court:
Ae realiBe that in arriving at our conclusion toda1" we are deviating from the strict letter
of the law" which the respondent court understanda;l1 applied pursuant to e?isting
5urisprudence. The said court acted properl1 as it had no competence to reverse the
doctrines laid down ;1 this Court in the a;ove%cited cases. In fact" and this should ;e
clearl1 stressed" we ourselves are not a;andoning the De Cone5ero and 9uttle doctrines.
Ahat we are doing simpl1 is adopting an e?ception to the general rule" in view of the
peculiar circumstances of this case.
8
In "lonzo" the right of legal redemption was invoked several 1ears" not 5ust da1s or months" after
the consummation of the contracts of sale. The complaint for legal redemption itself was there
filed more than thirteen 1ears after the sales were concluded.
'elative to the =uestion posed ;1 petitioner on private respondents< tender of pa1ment" it is enough that
we =uote" with approval" the appellate courtD viz.:
In contrast" records dearl1 show that an amount was offered" as re=uired in Sempio vs.
&el -osario" 33 6hil. ! and &aza vs. /omacruz" *$ 6hil. 3!3" ;1 the redemptioner%
appellant during the ;aranga1 conciliation proceedings (Answer" par. $) ;ut was flatl1
re5ected ;1 the appellee" not on the ground that it was not the purchase price (though it
appeared on the face of the deed of sale" >?h. -.%!-)" nor that it was offered as partial
pa1ment thereof" ;ut rather that it was
All given" we find no error in the appellate court<s finding that private respondents are entitled to the
redemption of the su;5ect propert1.
A@>'>F4'>" the petition is D>)I>D and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFI':>D.
Costs against petitioner.
04 4'D>'>D.
G.R. No. 108581 D/>/70/, 8, 1999
LOURDE' L. DORO!EO, vs. %OUR OF A$$EAL', N#LDA D. 6U#NANA, =o, !/,*/3= and a*
A..o,n/y--n-Fa>. o= V#%ENE DORO!EO and &O'E DORO!EO,
:a1 a last will and testament admitted to pro;ate ;ut declared intrinsicall1 void in an order that has
;ecome final and e?ecutor1 still ;e given effectK This is the issue that arose from the following
antecedents:
6rivate respondents were the legitimate children of Ale5andro Dorotheo and Aniceta 'e1es. The latter
died in !#+# without her estate ;eing settled. Ale5andro died thereafter. 0ometime in !#22" after
Ale5andro<s death" petitioner" who claims to have taken care of Ale5andro ;efore he died" filed a special
proceeding for the pro;ate of the latter<s last will and testament. In !#$!" the court issued an order
admitting Ale5andro<s will to pro;ate. 6rivate respondents did not appeal from said order. In !#$" the1
filed a -:otion To Declare The Aill Intrinsicall1 (oid.- The trial court granted the motion and issued an
order" the dispositive portion of which reads:
A@>'>F4'>" in view of the foregoing" 4rder is here;1 issued declaring 8ourdes
8egaspi not the wife of the late Ale5andro Dorotheo" the provisions of the last will and
testament of Ale5andro Dorotheo as intrinsicall1 void" and declaring the oppositors
(icente Dorotheo" .ose Dorotheo and )ilda Dorotheo Iuintana as the onl1 heirs of the
late spouses Ale5andro Dorotheo and Aniceta 'e1es" whose respective estates shall ;e
li=uidated and distri;uted according to the laws on intestac1 upon pa1ment of estate and
other ta?es due to the government.
1
6etitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she took
care of Ale5andro prior to his death although she admitted that the1 were not married to each other. Cpon
denial of her motion for reconsideration" petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals" ;ut the same was
dismissed for failure to file appellant<s ;rief within the e?tended period
granted.
(
This dismissal ;ecame final and e?ecutor1 on Fe;ruar1 " !#$# and a corresponding entr1 of
5udgment was forthwith issued ;1 the Court of Appeals on :a1 !+" !#$#. A writ of e?ecution was issued
;1 the lower court to implement the final and e?ecutor1 4rder. Conse=uentl1" private respondents filed
several motions including a motion to compel petitioner to surrender to them the Transfer Certificates of
Titles (TCT) covering the properties of the late Ale5andro. Ahen petitioner refused to surrender the TCT<s"
private respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said titles and for issuance of new titles in their
names. 6etitioner opposed the motion.
An 4rder was issued on )ovem;er ,#" !##7 ;1 .udge Oain 9. Angas setting aside the final and
e?ecutor1 4rder dated .anuar1 7" !#$+" as well as the 4rder directing the issuance of the writ of
e?ecution" on the ground that the order was merel1 -interlocutor1-" hence not final in character. The court
added that the dispositive portion of the said 4rder even directs the distri;ution of the estate of the
deceased spouses. 6rivate respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an 4rder
dated Fe;ruar1 !" !##!. Thus" private respondents filed a petition ;efore the Court of Appeals" which
nullified the two assailed 4rders dated )ovem;er ,#" !##7 and Fe;ruar1 !" !##!.
Aggrieved" petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed ;1 private respondents
;efore the Court of Appeals was a petition under 'ule +* on the ground of grave a;use of discretion or
lack of 5urisdiction. 6etitioner contends that in issuing the two assailed orders" .udge Angas cannot ;e
said to have no 5urisdiction ;ecause he was particularl1 designated to hear the case. 6etitioner likewise
assails the 4rder of the Court of Appeals upholding the validit1 of the .anuar1 7" !#$+ 4rder which
declared the intrinsic invalidit1 of Ale5andro<s will that was earlier admitted to pro;ate.
6etitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as e?ecutri? of the estate of the late Ale5andro and to
maintain the status !uo or lease of the premises thereon to third parties.
3
6rivate respondents opposed
the motion on the ground that petitioner has no interest in the estate since she is not the lawful wife of the
late Ale5andro.
The petition is without merit. A final and e?ecutor1 decision or order can no longer ;e distur;ed or
reopened no matter how erroneous it ma1 ;e. In setting aside the .anuar1 7" !#$+ 4rder that has
attained finalit1" the trial court in effect nullified the entr1 of 5udgment made ;1 the Court of Appeals. It is
well settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court" for to do
so would ;e to negate the hierarch1 of courts and nullif1 the essence of review. It has ;een ruled that a
final 5udgment on pro;ated will" al;eit erroneous" is ;inding on the whole world.
)
It has ;een consistentl1 held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a 5udgment or order of the trial
court" the same attains finalit1 ;1 mere lapse of time. Thus" the order allowing the will ;ecame final and
the =uestion determined ;1 the court in such order can no longer ;e raised anew" either in the same
proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of due e?ecution of the will and the capacit1 of the
testator ac=uired the character of res judicata and cannot again ;e ;rought into =uestion" all 5uridical
=uestions in connection therewith ;eing for once and forever closed.
5
0uch final order makes the will
conclusive against the whole world as to its e?trinsic validit1 and due e?ecution.
6
It should ;e noted that pro;ate proceedings deals generall1 with the e?trinsic validit1 of the will sought to
;e pro;ated"
7
particularl1 on three aspects:
n whether the will su;mitted is indeed" the decedent<s
last will and testamentD
n compliance with the prescri;ed formalities for the
e?ecution of willsD
n the testamentar1 capacit1 of the testatorD
8
n and the due e?ecution of the last will and testament.
9
Cnder the Civil Code" due e?ecution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound and
disposing mind at the time of its e?ecution" that he had freel1 e?ecuted the will and was not acting under
duress" fraud" menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and not a forger1"
10
that he was of
the proper testamentar1 age and that he is a person not e?pressl1 prohi;ited ;1 law from making a will.
11
The intrinsic validit1 is another matter and =uestions regarding the same ma1 still ;e raised even after the
will has ;een authenticated.
1(
Thus" it does not necessaril1 follow that an e?trinsicall1 valid last will and
testament is alwa1s intrinsicall1 valid. >ven if the will was validl1 e?ecuted" if the testator provides for
dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to
the laws on succession"
13
the unlawful provisionsEdispositions thereof cannot ;e given effect. This is
speciall1 so when the courts had alread1 determined in a final and e?ecutor1 decision that the will is
intrinsicall1 void. 0uch determination having attained that character of finalit1 is ;inding on this Court
which will no longer ;e distur;ed. )ot that this Court finds the will to ;e intrinsicall1 valid" ;ut that a final
and e?ecutor1 decision of which the part1 had the opportunit1 to challenge ;efore the higher tri;unals
must stand and should no longer ;e reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided ;1 law
constitutes waiver. And if the part1 does not avail of other remedies despite its ;elief that it was aggrieved
;1 a decision or court action" then it is deemed to have full1 agreed and is satisfied with the decision or
order. As earl1 as !#!$" it has ;een declared that pu;lic polic1 and sound practice demand that" at the
risk of occasional errors" 5udgments of courts must at some point of time fi?ed ;1 law
1)
;ecome final
otherwise there will ;e no end to litigation. Interes rei pulicae ut finis sit litium J the ver1 o;5ect of which
the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies.
15
To fulfill this purpose and to do so
speedil1" certain time limits" more or less ar;itrar1" have to ;e set up to spur on the slothful.
16
The onl1
instance where a part1 interested in a pro;ate proceeding ma1 have a final li=uidation set aside is when
he is left out ;1 reason of circumstances ;e1ond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputa;le to negligence"
17
which circumstances do not concur herein.
6etitioner was priv1 to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidit1 of the will" as she
precisel1 appealed from an unfavora;le order therefrom. Although the final and e?ecutor1 4rder of
.anuar1 7" !#$+ wherein private respondents were declared as the onl1 heirs do not ;ind those who are
not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the testator" the same constitutes res judicata
with respect to those who were parties to the pro;ate proceedings. 6etitioner cannot again raise those
matters anew for relitigation otherwise that would amount to forum%shopping. It should ;e remem;ered
that forum shopping also occurs when the same issue had alread1 ;een resolved adversel1 ;1 some
other court.
18
It is clear from the e?ecutor1 order that the estates of Ale5andro and his spouse should ;e
distri;uted according to the laws of intestate succession.
6etitioner posits that the .anuar1 7" !#$+ 4rder is merel1 interlocutor1" hence it can still ;e set aside ;1
the trial court. In support thereof" petitioner argues that -an order merel1 declaring who are heirs and the
shares to which set of heirs is entitled cannot ;e the ;asis of e?ecution to re=uire deliver1 of shares from
one person to another particularl1 when no pro5ect of partition has ;een filed.-
19
The trial court declared in
the .anuar1 7" !#$+ 4rder that petitioner is not the legal wife of Ale5andro" whose onl1 heirs are his three
legitimate children (petitioners herein)" and at the same time it nullified the will. 9ut it should ;e noted that
in the same 4rder" the trial court also said that the estate of the late spouses ;e distri;uted according to
the laws of intestac1. Accordingl1" it has no option ;ut to implement that order of intestate distri;ution and
not to reopen and again re%e?amine the intrinsic provisions of the same will.
It can ;e clearl1 inferred from Article #+7 of the Civil Code" on the law of successional rights that testac1
is preferred to intestac1.
(0
9ut ;efore there could ;e testate distri;ution" the will must pass the
scrutiniBing test and safeguards provided ;1 law considering that the deceased testator is no longer
availa;le to prove the voluntariness of his actions" aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is
usuall1 onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to give J 0emo praesumitur donare.
(1
)o
intestate distri;ution of the estate can ;e done until and unless the will had failed to pass ;oth its e?trinsic
and intrinsic validit1. If the will is e?trinsicall1 void" the rules of intestac1 appl1 regardless of the intrinsic
validit1 thereof. If it is e?trinsicall1 valid" the ne?t test is to determine its intrinsic validit1 J that is whether
the provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this case" the court had ruled
that the will of Ale5andro was e?trinsicall1 valid ;ut the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus" the
rules of intestac1 appl1 as correctl1 held ;1 the trial court.
Furthermore" Ale5andro<s disposition in his will of the alleged share in the con5ugal properties of his late
spouse" whom he descri;ed as his -onl1 ;eloved wife-" is not a valid reason to reverse a final and
e?ecutor1 order. Testamentar1 dispositions of properties not ;elonging e?clusivel1 to the testator or
properties which are part of the con5ugal regime cannot ;e given effect. :atters with respect to who owns
the properties that were disposed of ;1 Ale5andro in the void will ma1 still ;e properl1 ventilated and
determined in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late spouse<s estate.
6etitioner<s motion for appointment as administratri? is rendered moot considering that she was not
married to the late Ale5andro and" therefore" is not an heir.
A@>'>F4'>" the petition is D>)I>D and the decision appealed from is AFFI':>D.
04 4'D>'>D.
G.R. No. L-5)919 May 30, 198)
$OLLY %AYEANO, vs. !ON. OMA' . LEON#DA', -n 1-* >a2a>-.y a* .1/ $,/*-d-n5 &+d5/ o=
",an>1 FFFV###, %o+,. o= F-,*. #n*.an>/ o= Man-3a and NEN#A %AM$O' $AGU#A,
This is a petition for review on certiorari" seeking to annul the order of the respondent 5udge of the Court
of First Instance of :anila" 9ranch MMM(III" which admitted to and allowed the pro;ate of the last will and
testament of Adoracion C. Campos" after an e?%parte presentation of evidence ;1 herein private
respondent.
4n .anuar1 !" !#22" Adoracion C. Campos died" leaving her father" petitioner @ermogenes Campos and
her sisters" private respondent )enita C. 6aguia" 'emedios C. 8opeB and :arieta C. :edina as the
surviving heirs. As @ermogenes Campos was the onl1 compulsor1 heir" he e?ecuted an Affidavit of
Ad5udication under 'ule 23" 0ection I of the 'ules of Court where;1 he ad5udicated unto himself the
ownership of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
>leven months after" on )ovem;er ,*" !#22" )enita C. 6aguia filed a petition for the repro;ate of a will of
the deceased" Adoracion Campos" which was allegedl1 e?ecuted in the Cnited 0tates and for her
appointment as administratri? of the estate of the deceased testatri?.
In her petition" )enita alleged that the testatri? was an American citiBen at the time of her death and was
a permanent resident of 3+ Ditman 0treet" 6hiladelphia" 6enns1lvania" C.0.A.D that the testatri? died in
:anila on .anuar1 !" !#22 while temporaril1 residing with her sister at ,!+2 8everiBa" :alate" :anilaD
that during her lifetime" the testatri? made her last wig and testament on .ul1 !7" !#2*" according to the
laws of 6enns1lvania" C.0.A." nominating Ailfredo 9arBaga of )ew .erse1 as e?ecutorD that after the
testatri? death" her last will and testament was presented" pro;ated" allowed" and registered with the
'egistr1 of Ains at the Count1 of 6hiladelphia" C.0.A." that Clement 8. :c8aughlin" the administrator who
was appointed after Dr. 9arBaga had declined and waived his appointment as e?ecutor in favor of the
former" is also a resident of 6hiladelphia" C.0.A." and that therefore" there is an urgent need for the
appointment of an administratri? to administer and eventuall1 distri;ute the properties of the estate
located in the 6hilippines.
4n .anuar1 !!" !#2$" an opposition to the repro;ate of the will was filed ;1 herein petitioner alleging
among other things" that he has ever1 reason to ;elieve that the will in =uestion is a forger1D that the
intrinsic provisions of the will are null and voidD and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic
provisions are invoked" the same could not appl1 inasmuch as the1 would work in5ustice and in5ur1 to him.
4n Decem;er !" !#2$" however" the petitioner through his counsel" Att1. Franco 8o1ola" filed a :otion to
Dismiss 4pposition (Aith Aaiver of 'ights or Interests) stating that he -has ;een a;le to verif1 the
veracit1 thereof (of the will) and now confirms the same to ;e trul1 the pro;ated will of his daughter
Adoracion.- @ence" an ex-parte presentation of evidence for the repro;ate of the =uestioned will was
made.
4n .anuar1 !7" !#2#" the respondent 5udge issued an order" to wit:
At the hearing" it has ;een satisfactoril1 esta;lished that Adoracion C. Campos" in her
lifetime" was a citiBen of the Cnited 0tates of America with a permanent residence at
3+ Ditman 0treet" 6hiladelphia" 6A !#!,3" (>?hi;it D) that when alive" Adoracion C.
Campos e?ecuted a 8ast Aill and Testament in the count1 of 6hiladelphia" 6enns1lvania"
C.0.A." according to the laws thereat (>?hi;its >% to >%%;) that while in temporar1
so5ourn in the 6hilippines" Adoracion C. Campos died in the Cit1 of :anila (>?hi;it C)
leaving propert1 ;oth in the 6hilippines and in the Cnited 0tates of AmericaD that the 8ast
Aill and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos was admitted and granted pro;ate
;1 the 4rphan<s Court Division of the Court of Common 6leas" the pro;ate court of the
Commonwealth of 6enns1lvania" Count1 of 6hiladelphia" C.0.A." and letters of
administration were issued in favor of Clement .. :c8aughlin all in accordance with the
laws of the said foreign countr1 on procedure and allowance of wills (>?hi;its > to >%!7)D
and that the petitioner is not suffering from an1 dis=ualification which would render her
unfit as administratri? of the estate in the 6hilippines of the late Adoracion C. Campos.
A@>'>F4'>" the 8ast Aill and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos is here;1
admitted to and allowed pro;ate in the 6hilippines" and )enita Campos 6aguia is here;1
appointed Administratri? of the estate of said decedentD let 8etters of Administration with
the Aill anne?ed issue in favor of said Administratri? upon her filing of a ;ond in the
amount of 6*"777.77 conditioned under the provisions of 0ection I" 'ule $! of the 'ules
of Court.
Another manifestation was filed ;1 the petitioner on April !3" !#2#" confirming the withdrawal of his
opposition" acknowledging the same to ;e his voluntar1 act and deed.
4n :a1 ,*" !#2#" @ermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief" pra1ing that the order allowing the will
;e set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of his opposition to the same was secured through
fraudulent means. According to him" the -:otion to Dismiss 4pposition- was inserted among the papers
which he signed in connection with two Deeds of Conditional 0ales which he e?ecuted with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the 6hilippines (CDC6). @e also alleged that the law1er
who filed the withdrawal of the opposition was not his counsel%of%record in the special proceedings case.
The petition for relief was set for hearing ;ut the petitioner failed to appear. @e made several motions for
postponement until the hearing was set on :a1 ,#" !#$7.
4n :a1 !$" !#$7" petitioner filed another motion entitled -:otion to (acate andEor 0et Aside the 4rder of
.anuar1 !7" !#2#" andEor dismiss the case for lack of 5urisdiction. In this motion" the notice of hearing
provided:
6lease include this motion in 1our calendar for hearing on :a1 ,#" !#$7 at $:7 in the
morning for su;mission for reconsideration and resolution of the @onora;le Court. Cntil
this :otion is resolved" ma1 I also re=uest for the future setting of the case for hearing on
the 4ppositor<s motion to set aside previousl1 filed.
The hearing of :a1 ,#" !#$7 was re%set ;1 the court for .une !#" !#$7. Ahen the case was called for
hearing on this date" the counsel for petitioner tried to argue his motion to vacate instead of adducing
evidence in support of the petition for relief. Thus" the respondent 5udge issued an order dismissing the
petition for relief for failure to present evidence in support thereof. 6etitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration ;ut the same was denied. In the same order" respondent 5udge also denied the motion to
vacate for lack of merit. @ence" this petition.
:eanwhile" on .une +"!#$," petitioner @ermogenes Campos died and left a will" which" incidentall1 has
;een =uestioned ;1 the respondent" his children and forced heirs as" on its face" patentl1 null and void"
and a fa;rication" appointing 6oll1 Ca1etano as the e?ecutri? of his last will and testament. Ca1etano"
therefore" filed a motion to su;stitute herself as petitioner in the instant case which was granted ;1 the
court on 0eptem;er !" !#$,.
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner @ermogenes Campos
merged upon his death with the rights of the respondent and her sisters" onl1 remaining children and
forced heirs was denied on 0eptem;er !," !#$.
6etitioner Ca1etano persists with the allegations that the respondent 5udge acted without or in e?cess of
his 5urisdiction when:
!) @e ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived the 'ight to )otice (sic) upon
the filing of the :otion to Dismiss opposition with waiver of rights or interests against the
estate of deceased Adoracion C. Campos" thus" paving the wa1 for the hearing ex-parte
of the petition for the pro;ate of decedent will.
,) @e ruled that petitioner can waive" renounce or repudiate (not made in a pu;lic or
authenticated instrument)" or ;1 wa1 of a petition presented to the court ;ut ;1 wa1 of a
motion presented prior to an order for the distri;ution of the estate%the law especiall1
providing that repudiation of an inheritance must ;e presented" within 7 da1s after it has
issued an order for the distri;ution of the estate in accordance with the rules of Court.
) @e ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can ;e divested ;1 a decree
admitting a will to pro;ate in which no provision is made for the forced heir in complete
disregard of 8aw of 0uccession
3) @e denied petitioner<s petition for 'elief on the ground that no evidence was adduced
to support the 6etition for 'elief when no )otice nor hearing was set to afford petitioner
to prove the merit of his petition J a denial of the due process and a grave a;use of
discretion amounting to lack of 5urisdiction.
*) @e ac=uired no 5urisdiction over the testate case" the fact that the Testator at the time
of death was a usual resident of DasmariFas" Cavite" conse=uentl1 Cavite Court of First
Instance has e?clusive 5urisdiction over the case (De 9or5a vs. Tan" &.'. )o. 8%22#," .ul1
!#**).
The first two issues raised ;1 the petitioner are anchored on the allegation that the respondent 5udge
acted with grave a;use of discretion when he allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner<s opposition to the
repro;ate of the will.
Ae find no grave a;use of discretion on the part of the respondent 5udge. )o proof was adduced to
support petitioner<s contention that the motion to withdraw was secured through fraudulent means and
that Att1. Franco 8o1ola was not his counsel of record. The records show that after the firing of the
contested motion" the petitioner at a later date" filed a manifestation wherein he confirmed that the :otion
to Dismiss 4pposition was his voluntar1 act and deed. :oreover" at the time the motion was filed" the
petitioner<s former counsel" Att1. .ose 6. 8agrosa had long withdrawn from the case and had ;een
su;stituted ;1 Att1. Franco 8o1ola who in turn filed the motion. The present petitioner cannot" therefore"
maintain that the old man<s attorne1 of record was Att1. 8agrosa at the time of filing the motion. 0ince the
withdrawal was in order" the respondent 5udge acted correctl1 in hearing the pro;ate of the will ex-parte,
there ;eing no other opposition to the same.
The third issue raised deals with the validit1 of the provisions of the will. As a general rule" the pro;ate
court<s authorit1 is limited onl1 to the e?trinsic validit1 of the will" the due e?ecution thereof" the testatri?<s
testamentar1 capacit1 and the compliance with the re=uisites or solemnities prescri;ed ;1 law. The
intrinsic validit1 of the will normall1 comes onl1 after the court has declared that the will has ;een dul1
authenticated. @owever" where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validit1 of the will ;e
passed upon" even ;efore it is pro;ated" the court should meet the issue. (:aninang vs. Court of
Appeals" !!3 0C'A 32$).
In the case at ;ar" the petitioner maintains that since the respondent 5udge allowed the repro;ate of
Adoracion<s will" @ermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved ;1 the law for
him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face" the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus" the respondent 5udge
should have denied its repro;ate outright" the private respondents have sufficientl1 esta;lished that
Adoracion was" at the time of her death" an American citiBen and a permanent resident of 6hiladelphia"
6enns1lvania" C.0.A. Therefore" under Article !+ par. (,) and !7# of the Civil Code which respectivel1
provide:
Art. !+ par. (,).
??? ??? ???
@owever" intestate and testamentar1 successions" ;oth with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validit1 of
testamentar1 provisions" shall ;e regulated ;1 the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration" whatever ma1 ;e the nature of the propert1 and
regardless of the countr1 wherein said propert1 ma1 ;e found.
Art. !7#.
Capacit1 to succeed is governed ;1 the law of the nation of the decedent.
the law which governs Adoracion Campo<s will is the law of 6enns1lvania" C.0.A." which is the national
law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the 6enns1lvania law does not provide for legitimes
and that all the estate ma1 ;e given awa1 ;1 the testatri? to a complete stranger" the petitioner argues
that such law should not appl1 ;ecause it would ;e contrar1 to the sound and esta;lished pu;lic polic1
and would run counter to the specific provisions of 6hilippine 8aw.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validit1 of the provisions of the will" as provided for ;1 Article
!+(,) and !7# of the Civil Code" the national law of the decedent must appl1. This was s=uarel1 applied
in the case of 2ellis v. 2ellis (,7 0C'A *$) wherein we ruled:
It is therefore evident that whatever pu;lic polic1 or good customs ma1 ;e involved in our
s1stem of legitimes" Congress has not intended to e?tend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. For it has specificall1 chosen to leave" inter alia" the amount of
successional rights" to the decedent<s national law. 0pecific provisions must prevail over
general ones.
??? ??? ???
The parties admit that the decedent" Amos &. 9ellis" was a citiBen of the 0tate of Te?as"
C.0.A." and under the law of Te?as" there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingl1"
since the intrinsic validit1 of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights
are to ;e determined under Te?as law" the 6hilippine 8aw on legitimes cannot ;e applied
to the testac1 of Amos &. 9ellis.
As regards the alleged a;sence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief" the records wig ;ear the fact
that what was repeatedl1 scheduled for hearing on separate dates until .une !#" !#$7 was the petitioner<s
petition for relief and not his motion to vacate the order of .anuar1 !7" !#2#. There is no reason wh1 the
petitioner should have ;een led to ;elieve otherwise. The court even admonished the petitioner<s failing to
adduce evidence when his petition for relief was repeatedl1 set for hearing. There was no denial of due
process. The fact that he re=uested -for the future setting of the case for hearing . . .- did not mean that at
the ne?t hearing" the motion to vacate would ;e heard and given preference in lieu of the petition for
relief. Furthermore" such re=uest should ;e em;odied in a motion and not in a mere notice of hearing.
Finall1" we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of 5urisdiction utterl1 devoid of merit. Cnder
'ule 2" 0ection !" of the 'ules of Court" it is provided that:
0>CTI4) !. 7$ere estate of deceased persons settled. J If the decedent is an
inha;itant of the 6hilippines at the time of his death" whether a citiBen or an alien" his will
shall ;e proved" or letters of administration granted" and his estate settled" in the Court of
First Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death" and if he is an
inha;itant of a foreign countr1" the Court of First Instance of an1 province in which he had
estate. The court first taking cogniBance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent"
shall e?ercise 5urisdiction to the e?clusion of all other courts. The 5urisdiction assumed ;1
a court" so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent" or of the location
of his estate" shall not ;e contested in a suit or proceeding" e?cept in an appeal from that
court" in the original case" or when the want of 5urisdiction appears on the record.
Therefore" the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctl1 filed with the Court of First
Instance of :anila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of
her death was a citiBen and permanent resident of 6enns1lvania" Cnited 0tates of America and not a
-usual resident of Cavite- as alleged ;1 the petitioner. :oreover" petitioner is now estopped from
=uestioning the 5urisdiction of the pro;ate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a part1
cannot invoke the 5urisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief" against his opponent and after failing
to o;tain such relief" repudiate or =uestion that same 5urisdiction. (0ee 0aulog Transit" Inc. vs. @on.
:anuel 8aBaro" et al." &. '. )o. + ,$3" April 3" !#$3).
A@>'>F4'>" the petition for certiorari and prohi;ition is here;1 dismissed for lack of merit.
04 4'D>'>D.
MOLO VS. MOLO
90 Phil 37
FACTS:
1. Mariano Molo died on January 2! 191 "i#hou# lea$in% any &or'ed heir ei#her in #he
de('endin% or a('endin% line.
2. )i( "i&e Juana Molo *+e#i#ioner, (ur$i$ed hi-! and .y hi( nie'e( and ne+he" Lu/! 0li'eria
and Cornelio! all (urna-ed Molo *o++o(i#or(1a++ellan#(,.
3. O++o(i#or( 2 a++ellan#( "ere #he le%i#i-a#e 'hildren o& a de'ea(ed .ro#her o& #he #e(#a#or.
. Mariano le&# #"o "ill(! one e3e'u#ed on Au%u(# 17! 1914 and ano#her e3e'u#ed on June 20!
1939!
5. 6n .o#h #he 1914 and 1939 "ill( Juana "a( in(#i#u#ed a( hi( uni$er(al heir.
7. The la##er "ill 'on#ain( a 'lau(e! "hi'h e3+re((ly re$o8e( #he "ill e3e'u#ed in 1914.
7. Juana Molo &iled in #he CF6 a +e#i#ion (ee8in% #he +ro.a#e o& #he "ill e3e'u#ed in 1939.
4. The 'our# rendered a de'i(ion denyin% #he +ro.a#e o& (aid "ill on #he %round #ha# #he
+e#i#ioner &ailed #o +ro$e #ha# #he (a-e "a( e3e'u#ed in a''ordan'e "i#h la".
9. 6n $ie" o& #he di(allo"an'e o& #he "ill! #he "ido" &iled ano#her +e#i#ion &or #he +ro.a#e o& #he
"ill e3e'u#ed .y #he de'ea(ed on Au%u(# 14! 1914.
10. The o++o(i#or( &iled an o++o(i#ion #o #he +e#i#ion 'on#endin% #ha#! no#"i#h(#andin% #he
di(allo"an'e o& #he 1939 "ill! #he re$o'a#ory 'lau(e i( $alid and (#ill ha( #he e&&e'# o& nulli&yin%
#he +rior "ill o& 1914.
11. Li8e"i(e! re%ardle(( o& #he re$o'a#ory 'lau(e! (aid "ill o& 1914 'anno# (#ill .e %i$en e&&e'#
.e'au(e o& #he +re(u-+#ion #ha# #he #e(#a#or hi-(el& deli.era#ely re$o8ed i#.
12. The "ill o& 1914 "a( ad-i##ed #o +ro.a#e.
13. )en'e #hi( a++eal.
6SS9::
;a( #he ad-i##an'e in#o +ro.a#e +ro+er<
;ha# i( #he do'#rine o& de+enden# rela#i$e re$o'a#ion<
):L=:
A (u.(e>uen# "ill 'on#ainin% a 'lau(e re$o8in% a +re$iou( "ill! ha$in% .een di(allo"ed! &or #he
rea(on #ha# i# "a( no# e3e'u#ed in 'on&or-i#y "i#h #he +ro$i(ion( o& la" a( #o #he -a8in% o& "ill(!
'anno# +rodu'e #he e&&e'# o& annullin% #he +re$iou( "ill! ina(-u'h a( (aid re$o'a#ory 'lau(e i(
$oid.
The do'#rine o& de+enden# rela#i$e re$o'a#ion i( u(ually a++lied "here #he #e(#a#or 'an'el( or
de(#roy( a "ill or e3e'u#ed an in(#ru-en# in#ended #o re$o8e a "ill "i#h a +re(en# in#en#ion #o
-a8e a ne" #e(#a-en#ary di(+o(i#ion a( a (u.(#i#u#e &or #he old! and #he ne" di(+o(i#ion i( no#
-ade or! i& -ade! &ail( #o e&&e'# &or (a-e rea(on.
The &ailure o& #he ne" #e(#a-en#ary di(+o(i#ion! u+on "ho(e $alidi#y #he re$o'a#ion de+end(! i(
e>ui$alen# #o #he non1&ul&ill-en# o& a (u(+en(i$e 'ondi#ion! and hen'e +re$en#( #he re$o'a#ion o&
#he ori%inal "ill. ?u# a -ere in#en# #o -a8e a# (o-e #i-e a "ill in +la'e o& #ha# de(#royed "ill no#
render #he de(#ru'#ion 'ondi#ional. 6# -u(# a++ear #ha# #he re$o'a#ion i( de+enden# u+on #he
$alid e3e'u#ion o& a ne" "ill.
:$en in #he (u++o(i#ion #ha# #he de(#ru'#ion o& #he ori%inal "ill .y #he #e(#a#or 'ould .e +re(u-ed
&ro- #he &ailure o& #he +e#i#ioner #o +rodu'e i# in 'our#! (u'h de(#ru'#ion 'anno# ha$e #he e&&e'# o&
de&ea#in% #he +rior "ill o& 1914 .e'au(e o& #he &a'# #ha# i# i( &ounded on #he -i(#a8en .elie& #ha#
#he "ill o& 1939 ha( .een $alidly e3e'u#ed and "ould .e %i$en due e&&e'#.
The #heory on "hi'h #he @+rin'i+le o& de+enden# rela#i$e re$o'a#ion @ i( +redi'a#ed in #ha# #he
#e(#a#or did no# in#end #o die in#e(#a#e. And #hi( in#en#ion i( 'learly -ani&e(# "hen he e3e'u#ed
#"o "ill( on di&&eren# o''a(ion( and in(#i#u#ed hi( "i&e a( hi( uni$er(al heir. There 'an #here&ore
.e no -i(#a8e a( #o hi( in#en#ion o& dyin% #e(#a#e.