Professional Documents
Culture Documents
of the Court of
Appeals dated July 31, 1990 in CA G.R. SP No. 18462 entitled "Home
Insurance and Guaranty Corporation v. Hon. Adriano R. Osorio and
Original Development and Construction Corporation" ordering that the
complaint in Civil Case No. 3020-V-89 be expunged from the record and
declaring the orders dated June 1 and 29, 1989 of the court a quo as NULl
and void for having been issued without jurisdiction.
The factual background of the case appears undisputed, to wit:
On December 19, 1988, herein petitioner Original Development and
Construction Corporation (ODECOR for brevity) filed a complaint for breach of
contract and damages against private respondent Home Insurance and
Guaranty Corporation (HIGC for short), National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC for short) and Caloocan City Public School Teachers
Association (CCPSTA for brevity). The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
3020-V-89 and assigned to Branch 171 of the Regional Trial Court in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
The questioned allegations in the body of the complaint, among others,
are as follows:
16. The organization, as earlier stated, of the Third District Public School
Teachers Homeowners Association, under the sponsorship and patronage
of HIGC, unjustly deprived ODECOR of not less than 10,000 committed
buyers, and as a consequence suffered a big financial loss;
17. As part of its scheme to destroy the viability of ODECOR's Housing
project, HIGC maliciously and unreasonably; (a) delayed action on
ODECOR's request for the issuance of Certificate of Completion of
houses which have already been completed; (b) froze ODECOR's
requests for 'take-out' appraisals of the value of its houses and lots,
instead, approved very low appraisal values; (c) refused to allow
ODECOR to construct smaller and cheaper house and lot packages, and
unreasonably required ODECOR to secure prior clearance from the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corp. before it (HIGC) will allow
ODECOR to construct smaller packages; and (d) delayed countersigning
the checks, which were issued by ODECOR to pay the suppliers of
construction materials used in the project, which delay resulted in the
pilferage of valuable construction materials and (e) delayed action of
ODECOR's labor payrolls, thus, demoralizing the employees of the
ODECOR;
xxx xxx xxx
19. HIGC's aforementioned acts not only resulted in ODECOR's financial
crises and/or reversal's, but also brought about almost the total loss of its
market; and such loss of market renders HIGC liable for the actual and
consequential damages suffered by ODECOR;
20. In order to prevent the total collapse of the Dona Helen Subdivision
project, to rescue ODECOR from its financial straits, and to enable the
ODECOR to continue its distressed operations, ODECOR's President, for
the account of ODECOR, had to secure personal loans from sympathetic
friends, in which loans ODECOR bound itself to pay monthly a high rate
of interest; and accordingly, the principal and the interests should be
charged to or considered as a liability of the HIGC, by way of reparation
for actual and consequential damages, to ODECOR;
xxx xxx xxx
24. Notwithstanding insistent demands by ODECOR, NHMFC has
delivered to the former, is staggered and delayed installments in a period
of five (5) years, the amount of P5,366,727.80 only, which malicious
delays have caused ODECOR to incur unnecessary expenses in the form
of interests on its loans, unexpected administrative and operational
requirements, which interest payments and other expenses could have
been avoided had the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
promptly paid over to ODECOR the moneys which it (NHMFC) had
guaranteed to pay;
25. Notwithstanding ODECOR's repeated demands on NHMFC for the
latter to effect payment and delivery to it of the remaining balance of the
originating banks' transmitted loan proceed in the amount of
P2,272,193.10 which amount represents the take out proceeds of
twenty-two (22) House and lot buyers, NHMFC has maliciously refused
or rejected such demands; and this malicious non-payment aggravated the
financial difficulties and the deterioration of ODECOR and forced it to
curtail its development operations and to abandon its program to
construct 10,000 units;
26. NHMFC's aforestated unjust, if not illegal, acts subject NHMFC to
liability to pay ODECOR for actual, consequential and exemplary
damages for the losses and injuries which were sustained by it (plaintiff);
"27. ODECOR, as a result of the aforedescribed illegal and unlawful acts
committed by the several defendants, and to protect its financial interests,
good name and reputation, and to recover its huge losses, has been
needlessly compelled to file this action in Court, and for this purpose, had
to engage the professional services of a reputable law counsel for which it
agreed to pay 25% of its total money claims as attorney's fees excluding
trial honorarium of P3,000.00 per hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
The prayer states:
"WHEREFORE, the plaintiff to this Honorable Court respectfully prays that judgment
be rendered:
1. Adjudging all the defendants guilty of breach of contracts and/or bad faith
and/or unfair business practice and, accordingly, liable for their unlawful
acts which sabotaged and ruined the financial resources and
housing development enterprise of the plaintiff;
2. Adjudging all the defendants, solidarily liable to compensate the plaintiff
for actual, consequential, exemplary and moral damages, the amount of
which will be proved at the trial;
3. Requiring National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation to deliver
and/or to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P2,272,193.10 which sum is
due and payable to the plaintiff and is in its possession and custody;
4. Declaring the defendants liable to the plaintiff for attorney's fees and other
expenses of litigation and the costs of this suit; and
5. Granting to the plaintiff such other reliefs and remedies which are just and
equitable in the premises." (Emphasis supplied)
Simultaneous with the filing of the said complaint, ODECOR paid the
following: P4,344.00 under O.R. No. 1772201-H; P4,344.00 under O.R. No.
007830; and P86.00; based on the one numerical figure appearing in the
complaint as P2,272,193.10 for alleged "loan take out proceeds" which the
other defendant NHMFC allegedly failed to remit to ODECOR. The rest
appears to be an unspecified amount of damages which the trial court could
not assess (Rollo, p. 71).
On March 4, 1989, HIGC filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
court did not acquire jurisdiction due to non-payment of the proper docket
fees, citing the case of ManchesterDevelopment Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals (149 SCRA 56 [1987]). NHMFC, on the other hand, filed its answer
while CCPSTA was declared in default (Petition, Rollo, pp. 6-7). The court, in
its order dated June 1, 1989 denied the motion to dismiss and directed the
Clerk of Court in this wise:
"x x x to issue the Certificate of Reassessment of the proper docket fee to include in
the Certificate the deficiency, if any. In case the payment is insufficient, plaintiff
must pay the deficiency within Five (5) days from receipt of the certificate of
reassessment to the Clerk of Court.
In the event that the judgment awards claim not specified in the complaint or such
claim left for determination by the court as proved at the trial, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien in the judgment and the Clerk of Court or her duly
authorized deputy will enforce said liens and after assessment to collect the additional
fee.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED. (Annex "D" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 37).
Pursuant to the above order, the Clerk of Court filed an Ex-Parte motion
dated June 6, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 38-39) stating that she has already issued the
required certificate of reassessment but the deficiency could not be included
therein because the claim for attorney's fee manifested in the body of the
complaint was not reiterated in the prayer. Hence, the docket fees paid by
ODECOR did not include the demand for attorney's fees. The Clerk of Court,
therefore, moved that the complaint be amended accordingly. This prompted
HIGC to move for a reconsideration of the aforecited order of the court,
praying that the complaint be dismissed or in the alternative, to amend
ODECOR's complaint to reflect the specific amount of damages both in the
body as well as in the prayer (Rollo, p. 43). But the same was denied in the
subsequent order dated June 29, 1989. ODECOR thereafter filed its
amended complaint dated July 6, 1989 containing substantially all its
allegations in the first complaint except that it specified its claim for attorney's
fees as equivalent to 25% of the total monthly liability and other expenses of
litigation and costs of the suit. Such amended complaint was admitted by the
court on July 11, 1989. HIGC then filed its answer thereto, but after the
issues had been joined and the case had been set for pre-trial conference,
HIGC filed a petition for certiorariwith the appellate court questioning the
jurisdiction of the lower court over the case on the same ground of failure to
pay the proper docket fees. The appellate court, in turn, restrained the lower
court from taking further cognizance of the case and on July 31, 1990,
rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"In view of the foregoing, We find and so hold that the respondent court did not
acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 3020-V-89. The complaint in the said Civil
Case is ordered expunged from the record and the orders dated June 1 and 29, 1989
having been issued without jurisdiction, are declared NULl and void.
SO ORDERED.' (Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 19).
ODECOR moved for a reconsideration of this decision but later withdrew
the same and filed instead the present petition.
The issue now at hand is whether the court acquires jurisdiction over a
case even if the complaint does not specify the amount of damages.
The petition is devoid of merit.
ODECOR's first complaint as well as its amended complaint vaguely
asserted its claim for actual, consequential, exemplary and moral damages,
"the amount of which will be proved at the trial" and the demand for attorney's
fees as "equivalent to 25% of the total monetary liability and other expenses of
litigation and costs of this suit". Such terms are certainly not definite enough
to support the computation of the proper docket fees. While it is not required
that the exact amounts be stated, the plaintiff must ascertain, in his
estimation, the sums he wants and the sums required to determine the
amount of such docket and other fees. Thus, it is evident that the complaint
did not state enough facts and sums to enable the Clerk of Court of the lower
court to compute the docket fees payable and left to the judge "mere
guesswork" as to these amounts, which is fatal. (Spouses Belen Gregorio v.
The Honorable Judge Zosimo Z. Angeles, et al., G.R. No. 85847, December
21, 1989, 180 SCRA 490). The intent to defraud the government appears
obvious, not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of
the amended complaint.
In any event, the requirement in Circular No. 7 that complaints, petitions,
answers, and similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being
prayed for not only in the body of the pleadings but also in the prayer has not
been altered (Tacay v. RTC of Tagum, Davao del Norte, 180 SCRA 443-444
[1989]).
What has been revised is the rule that subsequent amendment of the
complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction on the Court,
much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the
amended pleading. The trial court how is authorized to allow payment of the
fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive
orreglementary period (Ibid).
Thus, where a complaint purely for money or damages did not specify the
amounts being claimed, the Court may allow amendment of the pleading and
payment of the proper fees or where the pleading specified the amount of
every claim but the fees paid are insufficient, the defect may be cured and the
Court may take cognizance of the action by payment of the proper fees
provided that in both cases, prescription has not set in the meantime. Similarly
where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages and
the prescribed fees for an action involving real property have been paid but
the amounts of the unrelated damages are unspecified, the Court undeniably
has jurisdiction over the action on the real property but may not have acquired
jurisdiction over the accompanying claim for damages. Accordingly, the Court
may expunge the claims for damages or allow the amendment of the
complaint so as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages within
the prescriptive period (Ibid.).
Coming back to the case at bar, it is readily evident that none of the
foregoing requisites was complied with.
Petitioners invoke the liberal interpretation of the rules as enumerated by
this Court in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion 170
SCRA 284-285 [1989] which is not, however, applicable as in said case,
private respondent amended his complaint several times, stating the amount
claimed and paying each time the required docket fees. While it is true that
eventually the docket fees paid are still insufficient, he nevertheless
manifested his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be
ordered.
The same is not true in the case at bar where in line with the foregoing
pronouncements, the trial court allowed the amendment of the complaint for
the determination of the fees, but such amendment did not, however, in
anyway help in specifying the amount of damages claimed. At most, the
demand for attorney's fees was stated as 25% of the total monetary liability,
another unspecified amount which cannot be the basis of computation.
As to awards of claims not specified in the pleadings - this Court had
already clarified that they refer only to damages arising after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading, to which the additional filing fee shall constitute
a lien on the judgment. The amount of any claim for damages, therefore,
arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any pleading, should be
specified. The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims
although specified are left for the determination of the court is limited only to
any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading
for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to
the amount thereof (Tacay v. RTC of Tagum, supra; Ayala Corporation, et al.
v. The Honorable Job Maddayag, et al., G.R. No. 88421, 181 SCRA 687
[1990]) (Emphasis supplied).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., (Chairman), on leave.
[G.R. No. 66620. September 24, 1986]
REMEGIO V. FLORES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE HEILIA S.
MALLARE-PHILLIPPS, IGNACIO BINONGCAL & FERNANDO
CALION, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
FERIA, J .:
The Court rules that the application of the totality rule under Section 33(1)
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules is subject to
the requirements for the permissivejoinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule 3
which provides as follows:
"Permissive joinder of parties. - All persons in whom or against whom any right to
relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is
alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as
otherwise provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one
complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all
such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may
be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense
in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest."
Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order of
Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps of
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Benguet Province which
dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner did not attach
to his petition a copy of his complaint in the erroneous belief that the entire
original record of the case shall be transmitted to this Court pursuant to the
second paragraph of Section 39 of BP 129. This provision applies only to
ordinary appeals from the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals (Section
20 of the Interim Rules). Appeals to this Court by petition for review
on certiorari are governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Section 25 of the
Interim Rules).
However, the order appealed from states that the first cause of action
alleged in the complaint was against respondent Ignacio Binongcal for
refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires
which he purchased on credit from petitioner on various occasions from
August to October, 1981; and the second cause of action was against
respondent FernandoCalion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of
P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from
petitioner on several occasions from March, 1981 to January, 1982.
On December 15, 1983, counsel for respondent Binongcal filed a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the
demand against said respondent was only P11,643.00, and under Section
19(8) of BP 129 the regional trial court shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00). It was further averred in said motion that although another
person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount of
P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other
respondent. At the hearing of said Motion to Dismiss, counsel for
respondent Calion joined in moving for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. Counsel for petitioner opposed the Motion to
Dismiss. As above stated, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.
Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction over the case
following the "novel" totality rule introduced in Section 33(1) of BP 129 and
Section 11 of the Interim Rules.
The pertinent portion of Section 33(1) of BP 129 reads as follows:
"x x x Provided, That where there are several claims or causes of action between the
same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand
shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions x x x."
Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides thus:
"Application of the totality rule. - In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is
dependent on the amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum
of all the money demands, exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of whether
or not the separate claims are owned by or due to different parties. If any demand is
for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be specifically alleged."
Petitioner compares the above-quoted provisions with the pertinent portion
of the former rule under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended
which reads as follows:
"x x x Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same parties
embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
demand in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose
out of the same or different transactions; but where the claims or causes of action
joined in a single complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties, each
separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test x x x"
and argues that with the deletion of the proviso in the former rule, the totality
rule was reduced to clarity and brevity and the jurisdictional test is the totality
of the claims in all, not in each, of the causes of action, irrespective of whether
the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions.
This argument is partly correct. There is no difference between the former
and present rules in cases where a plaintiff sues a defendant on two or more
separate causes of action. In such cases, the amount of the demand shall be
the totality of the claims in all the causes of action irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. If the total
demand exceeds twenty thousand pesos, then the regional trial court has
jurisdiction. Needless to state, if the causes of action are separate and
independent, their joinder in one complaint is permissive and not mandatory,
and any cause of action where the amount of the demand is twenty thousand
pesos or less may be the subject of a separate complaint filed with a
metropolitan or municipal trial court.
On the other hand, there is a difference between the former and present
rules in cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action
against a defendant join in a single complaint. Under the former rule, "where
the claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are separately
owned by or due to different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the
jurisdictional test" (Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as
amended, supra). This was based on the ruling in the case
of Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace, 99 Phil. 693. As worded, the
former rule applied only to cases of
permissive joinder of parties plaintiff. However, it was also applicable to
cases of permissive joinder of parties defendant, as may be deduced from the
ruling in the case of Brillo vs. Buklatan, thus:
"Furthermore, the first cause of action is composed of separate claims against several
defendants of different amounts each of which is not more than P2,000 and falls under
the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court under section 88 of Republic Act No.
296. The several claims do not seem to arise from the same transaction or series of
transactions and there seem to be no questions of law or of fact common to all the
defendants as may warrant their joinder under Rule 3, section 6. Therefore, if new
complaints are to be filed in the name of the real party in interest they should be filed
in the justice of the peace court." (87 Phil. 519, 520, reiterated in Gacula vs. Martinez,
88 Phil. 142, 146)
Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where two
or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant join in
a single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has separate causes
of action against two or more defendants joined in a single complaint.
However, the causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against
the two or more defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series
of transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact, as
provided in Section 6 of Rule 3.
The difference between the former and present rules in cases of
permissive joinder of parties may be illustrated by the two cases which were
cited in the case of Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace (supra) as
exceptions to the totality rule. In the case of Soriano y Cia vs. Jose (86 Phil.
523), where twenty-nine dismissed employees joined in a complaint against
the defendant to collect their respective claims, each of which was within the
jurisdiction of the municipal court, although the total exceeded the
jurisdictional amount, this Court held that under the law then the municipal
court had jurisdiction. In said case, although the plaintiffs' demands were
separate, distinct and independent of one another, their joint suit was
authorized under Section 6 of Rule 3 and each separate claim furnished the
jurisdictional test. In the case of International Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza (90
Phil. 470), where twenty-five dismissed teachers jointly sued the defendant for
unpaid salaries, this Court also held that the municipal court had jurisdiction
because the amount of each claim was within, although the total exceeded, its
jurisdiction and it was a case of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff under
Section 6 of Rule 3.
Under the present law, the two cases above cited (assuming they do not
fall under the Labor Code) would be under the jurisdiction of the regional trial
court. Similarly, in the above-cited cases
ofBrillo vs. Buklatan and Gacula vs. Martinez (supra), if the separate claims
against the several defendants arose out of the same transaction or series of
transactions and there is a common question of law or fact, they would now
be under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
In other words, in cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as
plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims
shall now furnish the jurisdictional test.Needless to state also, if instead of
joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or
against the parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the
jurisdictional test.
In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test
is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and
Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that after a careful scrutiny of
the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason
that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and
distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur.
.