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G.R. No.

L-59731 January 11, 1990


ALFREDO CHING, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS & PEDRO ASEDILLO, respondents.
Joaquin E. Chipeco & Lorenzo D. Fuggan for petitioners.
Edgardo Salandanan for private respondent.

PARAS, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals (penned by Hon. Rodolfo A. Nocon with the concurrence of Hon. Crisolito Pascual and Juan
A. Sison) in CA-G.R. No. 12358-SP entitled Alfredo Ching v. Hon. M. V. Romillo, et al. which in
effect affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, now Regional Trial Court (penned
by Judge Manuel V. Romillo, Jr. then District Judge, Branch XXVII Pasay City) granting ex-parte the
cancellation of title registered in the name of Ching Leng in favor of Pedro Asedillo in Civil Case No.
6888-P entitled Pedro Asedillo v. Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng.
The facts as culled from the records disclose that:
In May 1960, Decree No. N-78716 was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and Dominga
Lumandan in Land Registration Case No. N-2579 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and Original
Certificate of Title No. 2433 correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal
covering a parcel of land situated at Sitio of Kay-Biga Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of
Paranaque, Province of Rizal, with an area of 51,852 square meters (Exhibit "7", p. 80, CA, Rollo).
In August 1960, 5/6 portion of the property was reconveyed by said spouses to Francisco, Regina,
Perfects, Constancio and Matilde all surnamed Nofuente and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 78633
was issued on August 10, 1960 accordingly (Exhibit "8", pp. 81 and 82, Ibid.).
By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng with postal address at No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 91137 was issued on September 18, 1961 and T.C.T. No. 78633 was deemed
cancelled. (Exhibit "5-2", pp. 76-77 and 83, Ibid.).
On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America. His
legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC) Branch III,
Pasay City a petition for administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng docketed as Sp. Proc.
No. 1956-P. Notice of hearing on the petition was duly published in the "Daily Mirror", a newspaper
of general circulation on November 23 and 30 and December 7, 1965. No oppositors appeared at
the hearing on December 16, 1965, consequently after presentation of evidence petitioner Alfredo
Ching was appointed administrator of Ching Leng's estate on December 28, 1965 and letters of
administration issued on January 3, 1966 (pp. 51-53, Rollo). The land covered by T.C.T. No. 91137
was among those included in the inventory submitted to the court (p. 75, Ibid.).
Thirteen (13) years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was commenced on December 27,
1978 by private respondent Pedro Asedillo with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC),
Branch XXVII, Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No. 6888-P for reconveyance of the abovesaid
property and cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on possession (p. 33, Ibid.). Ching
Leng's last known address is No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City which appears on the face of T.C.T.
No. 91137 (not No. 441 Libertad Street, Pasay City, as alleged in private respondent's complaint).
(Order dated May 29, 1980, p. 55, Ibid.). An amended complaint was filed by private respondent
against Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng on January 30, 1979 alleging "That on account of
the fact that the defendant has been residing abroad up to the present, and it is not known
whether the defendant is still alive or dead, he or his estate may be served by summons and other
processes only by publication;" (p. 38, Ibid.). Summons by publication to Ching Leng and/or his
estate was directed by the trial court in its order dated February 7, 1979. The summons and the
complaint were published in the "Economic Monitor", a newspaper of general circulation in the
province of Rizal including Pasay City on March 5, 12 and 19, 1979. Despite the lapse of the sixty
(60) day period within which to answer defendant failed to file a responsive pleading and on motion
of counsel for the private respondent, the court a quo in its order dated May 25, 1979, allowed the
presentation of evidence ex-parte. A judgment by default was rendered on June 15, 1979, the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding plaintiffs causes of action in the complaint to be duly
substantiated by the evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant declaring the former (Pedro Asedillo) to be the true and
absolute owner of the property covered by T.C.T. No. 91137; ordering the defendant
to reconvey the said property in favor of the plaintiff; sentencing the defendant Ching
Leng and/or the administrator of his estate to surrender to the Register of Deeds of
the Province of Rizal the owner's copy of T.C.T. No. 91137 so that the same may be
cancelled failing in which the said T.C.T. No. 91137 is hereby cancelled and the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal is hereby ordered to issue, in lieu thereof,
a new transfer certificate of title over the said property in the name of the plaintiff
Pedro Asedillo of legal age, and a resident of Estrella Street, Makati, Metro Manila,
upon payment of the fees that may be required therefor, including the realty taxes
due the Government.
IT IS SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-44, Ibid.)
Said decision was likewise served by publication on July 2, 9 and 16, 1979 pursuant to Section 7 of
Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court (CA Decision, pp. 83-84, Ibid.). The title over the property in
the name of Ching Leng was cancelled and a new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in favor of
Pedro Asedillo (p. 77, CA Rollo) who subsequently sold the property to Villa Esperanza
Development, Inc. on September 3, 1979 (pp. 125-126, Ibid.).
On October 29, 1979 petitioner Alfredo Ching learned of the abovestated decision. He filed a verified
petition on November 10, 1979 to set it aside as null and void for lack of jurisdiction which was
granted by the court on May 29, 1980 (penned by Hon. Florentino de la Pena, Vacation Judge, pp.
54-59, Rollo).
On motion of counsel for private respondent the said order of May 29, 1980 was reconsidered and
set aside, the decision dated June 15, 1979 aforequoted reinstated in the order dated September 2,
1980. (pp. 60-63, Ibid.)
On October 30, 1980, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said latter order but the
same was denied by the trial court on April 12, 1981 (pp. 77-79, Ibid.)
Petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but the same was
dismissed on September 30, 1981. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on February
10, 1982 (pp. 81-90, Ibid.)
Private respondent Pedro Asedillo died on June 7, 1981 at Makati, Metro Manila during the
pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals (p. 106, CA Rollo).
Hence, the instant petition.
Private respondent's comment was filed on June 1, 1982 (p. 117, Ibid.) in compliance with the
resolution dated April 26, 1982 (p. 109, Ibid.) Petitioner filed a reply to comment on June 18, 1982
(p. 159, Ibid ), and the Court gave due course to the petition in the resolution of June 28, 1982 (p.
191, Ibid.)
Petitioner raised the following:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I
WHETHER OR NOT A DEAD MAN CHING LENG AND/OR HIS ESTATE MAY BE
VALIDLY SERVED WITH SUMMONS AND DECISION BY PUBLICATION.
II
WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY AND
CANCELLATION OF TITLE IS IN PERSONAM, AND IF SO, WOULD A DEAD MAN
AND/OR HIS ESTATE BE BOUND BY SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND DECISION
BY PUBLICATION.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDINGS FOR RECONVEYANCE AND
CANCELLATION OF TITLE CAN BE HELD EX-PARTE.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER AND THE PARTIES.
V
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF LACHES IN
INSTITUTING THE ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE AFTER THE LAPSE OF 19
YEARS FROM THE TIME THE DECREE OF REGISTRATION WAS ISSUED.
Petitioner's appeal hinges on whether or not the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
substance in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court.
Petitioner avers that an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title is in personam and the
court a quonever acquired jurisdiction over the deceased Ching Leng and/or his estate by means of
service of summons by publication in accordance with the ruling laid down in Ang Lam v. Rosillosa
et al., 86 Phil. 448 [1950].
On the other hand, private respondent argues that an action for cancellation of title is quasi in rem,
for while the judgment that may be rendered therein is not strictly a judgment in in rem, it fixes and
settles the title to the property in controversy and to that extent partakes of the nature of the
judgment in rem, hence, service of summons by publication may be allowed unto Ching Leng who
on the face of the complaint was a non-resident of the Philippines in line with the doctrine enunciated
in Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186 [1939].
The petition is impressed with merit.
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an action in rem or an
action against the whole world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an
action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly
impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Actions in personam and actions in
rem differ in that the former are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments,
while the latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments
with respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action
but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to
a tangible thing (Ang Lam v. Rosillosa, supra).
Private respondent's action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being in personam, the
judgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased
defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13) years after the latter's death.
As ruled by this Court in Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products, Inc. (70 SCRA 475 [1976]) the decision
of the lower court insofar as the deceased is concerned, is void for lack of jurisdiction over his
person. He was not, and he could not have been validly served with summons. He had no more civil
personality. His juridical personality, that is fitness to be subject of legal relations, was lost through
death (Arts. 37 and 42 Civil Code).
The same conclusion would still inevitably be reached notwithstanding joinder of Ching Leng's estate
as co-defendant. it is a well-settled rule that an estate can sue or be sued through an executor or
administrator in his representative capacity (21 Am. Jr. 872). Contrary to private respondent's claims,
deceased Ching Leng is a resident of 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City as shown in his death certificate
and T. C. T. No. 91137 and there is an on-going intestate proceedings in the same court, Branch III
commenced in 1965, and notice of hearing thereof duly published in the same year. Such misleading
and misstatement of facts demonstrate lack of candor on the part of private respondent and his
counsel, which is censurable.
The complaint for cancellation of Ching Leng's Torrens Title must be filed in the original land
registration case, RTC, Pasig, Rizal, sitting as a land registration court in accordance with Section
112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) not in CFI Pasay City in connection
with, or as a mere incident in Civil Case No. 6888-P (Estanislao v. Honrado, 114 SCRA 748 [1982]).
Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties in interest." Since Ching Leng was already
in the other world when the summons was published he could not have been notified at all and the
trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person. The ex-parte proceedings for cancellation of
title could not have been held (Estanislao v. Honrado, supra).
The cited case of Perkins v. Dizon, supra is inapplicable to the case at bar since petitioner Perkins
was a non-resident defendant sued in Philippine courts and sought to be excluded from whatever
interest she has in 52,874 shares of stocks with Benguet Consolidated Mining Company. The action
being a quasi in rem summons by publication satisfied the constitutional requirement of due process.
The petition to set aside the judgment for lack of jurisdiction should have been granted and the
amended complaint of private respondent based on possession and filed only in 1978 dismissed
outrightly. Ching Leng is an innocent purchaser for value as shown by the evidence adduced in his
behalf by petitioner herein, tracing back the roots of his title since 1960, from the time the decree of
registration was issued.
The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another's nameafter one year from the date of the decreeis not to set aside the decree, but
respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in
the ordinary court of justice for damages if the property has passed unto the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value (Sy, Sr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66742; Teoville Development
Corporation v. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 75011, June 16, 1988).
Failure to take steps to assert any rights over a disputed land for 19 years from the date of
registration of title is fatal to the private respondent's cause of action on the ground of laches.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by exercising
due diligence could or should have been done, earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it (Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78178, April 15,
1988; Villamor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41508, June 27, 1988).
The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to
its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in
the portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land
(National Grains Authority v. IAC, 157 SCRA 388 [1988]).
A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein
(Section 49, Act 496). A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued and that
they are valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any "information possessoria" or title existing
prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the title (Salamat Vda. de Medina v. Cruz, G.R. No.
39272, May 4, 1988).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (1) the instant petition is hereby GRANTED; (2) the appealed decision
of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; (3) the trial court's decision dated
June 15, 1979 and the Order dated September 2, 1980 reinstating the same are hereby declared
NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction and (4) the complaint in Civil Case No. 6888-P is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-49475 September 28, 1993
JORGE C. PADERANGA, petitioner,
vs.
Hon. DIMALANES B. BUISSAN, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del
Norte, Branch III and ELUMBA INDUSTRIES COMPANY, represented by its General Manager,
JOSE J. ELUMBA, respondents.
A.E. Dacanay for petitioner.
Uldarico Mejorada & Associates for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J .:
We are called upon in this case to determine the proper venue of an action to fix the period of a
contract of lease which, in the main, also prays for damages.
Sometime in 1973, petitioner JORGE C. PADERANGA and private respondent ELUMBA
INDUSTRIES COMPANY, a partnership represented by its General Manager JOSE J.
ELUMBA, entered into an oral contract of lease for the use of a commercial space within a
building owned by petition in Ozamiz City.
1
The lease was for an indefinite period although the
rent of P150.00 per month was paid on a month-to-month basis. ELUMBA INDUSTRIES
COMPANY utilized the area under lease as the Sales Office of Allied Air Freight in Ozamiz City.
On 4 April 1977, PADERANGA subdivided the leased premises into two (2) by constructing a
partition wall in between. He then took possession of the other half, which repossession was
said to have been undertaken with the acquiescence of the local manager of
ELUMBA,
2
although private respondent maintains that this is not the case.
3
At any rate, the
validity of the repossession is not here in issue.
On 18 July 1977, private respondent instituted an action for damages
4
which, at the same time,
prayed for the fixing of the period of lease at five (5) years, before the then court of First
Instance of Zamboanga del Norte based in Dipolog City.
5
Petitioner, a resident of Ozamiz City,
moved for its dismissal contending that the action was a real action which should have been
filed with the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental stationed in Ozamiz City where the
property in question was situated.
On 6 November 1978, respondent Judge Dimalanes B. Buissan denied the Motion to Dismiss
and held that Civil Case No. 2901 merely involved the enforcement of the contract of lease, and
while affecting a portion of real property, there was no question of ownership raised.
6
Hence,
venue was properly laid.
Petitioner pleaded for reconsideration of the order denying his Motion to Dismiss. He contended
that while the action did not involve a question of ownership, it was nevertheless seeking
recovery of possession; thus, it was a real action which, consequently, must be filed in Ozamiz
City.
7

On 4 December 1978, respondent judge denied reconsideration.
8
While admitting that Civil
Case No. 2901 did pray for recovery of possession, he nonetheless ruled that this matter was
not the main issue at hand; neither was the question of ownership raised. Not satisfied,
petitioner instituted the present recourse.
PADERANGA argues that inasmuch as ELUMBA seeks to recover possession of the portion
surrendered to him by the local manager of private respondent, as well as to fix the period of lease
at five (5) years, Dipolog City could not be the proper venue of the action. it being a real action,
venue is laid in the court having jurisdiction over the territory in which the property lies.
ELUMBA counters that the present action is chiefly for damages arising from an alleged breach in
the lease contract; hence, the issue of recovery of possession is merely incidental. ELUMBA further
argues that the action is one in personam and not in rem. Therefore venue may be laid in the place
where plaintiff or defendant resides at the option of plaintiff.
Private respondent appears to be confused over the difference between personal and real
actions vis-a-visactions in personam and in rem. The former determines venue; the latter, the
binding effect of a decision the court may render over the party, whether impleaded or not.
In the case before us, it is indubitable that the action instituted by private respondent against
petitioner affects the parties alone, not the whole world. Hence, it is an action in personam, i.e.,
any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.
9
However, this does
not automatically mean that the action for damages and to fix the period of the lease contract is
also a personal action. For, a personal action may not at the same time be an action in rem.
In Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc.,
10
we held thus
In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the
enforcement of a contract or the recovery of damages. In a real action, the plaintiff
seeks the recovery of real property, or, as indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4, a real
action is an action affecting title to real property or for the recovery of possession, or
for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on, real property.
An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal
liability, while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of against
the person. Hence, a real action may at the same time be an action in personam and
not necessarily an action in rem.
Consequently, the distinction between an action in personam and an action in rem for purposes
of determining venue is irrelevant. Instead, it is imperative to find out if the action filed is a
personal action or real action. After all, personal actions may be instituted in the Regional Trial
Court (then Court of First Instance) where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or
may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.
11
On the other hand, real actions should be brought before the Regional Trial Court
having jurisdiction over the territory in which the subject property or part thereof lies.
12

While the instant action is for damages arising from alleged breach of the lease contract, it likewise
prays for the fixing of the period of lease at five (5) years. If found meritorious, private respondent
will be entitled to remain not only as lessee for another five (5) years but also to the recovery of the
portion earlier taken from him as well. This is because the leased premises under the original
contract was the whole commercial space itself and not just the subdivided portion thereof.
While it may be that the instant complaint does not explicitly pray for recovery of possession,
such is the necessary consequence thereof.
13
The instant action therefore does not operate to
efface the fundamental and prime objective of the nature of the case which is to recover the
one-half portion repossessed by the lessor, herein petitioner.
14
Indeed, where the ultimate
purpose of an action involves title to or seeks recovery of possession, partition or condemnation
of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property,
15
such an action must be deemed a real action
and must perforce be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part
thereof lies.
Respondent judge, therefore, in denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss gravely abused his discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Prohibition is GRANTED. The Orders of 6 November 1978 and 4
December 1978 of respondent Judge Dimalanes B. Buissan are SET ASIDE. The branch of the
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City where Civil Case No. 2901 may be presently assigned is
DIRECTED to DISMISS the case for improper venue. This decision is immediately executory.
Costs against private respondent ELUMBA INDUSTRIES COMPANY.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Grio-Aquino, J., is on leave.













G.R. No. L-17299 July 31, 1963
JOSEFINA POTESTAS CABRERA and CRESENCIA POTESTAS OMULON, plaintiffs-
appellees,
vs.
MARIANO T. TIANO, defendant-appellant.
Pablito C. Pielago for plaintiffs-appellees.
Prud. V. Villafuerte for defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J .:
Ciriaco Potestas and Gregoria Blanco, were parents of five children, Isabelo, Lourdes,
Clemente, Josefina, and Cresencia. Gregoria died before the second world war, together with
Clemente, single. During their lifetime, the spouses acquired properties, among which was a
parcel of agricultural land, of about seven (7) hectares, located at barrio Manga, municipality of
Tangub, Misamis Occidental, planted to coconuts and fruit-bearing trees. On July 2, 1947,
Ciriaco, the surviving husband and three (3) children (Isabelo, Lourdes and Cresencia),
purportedly sold the above mentioned parcel to herein defendant Mariano T. Tiano, for
P3,500.00. At the time of the sale, Cresencia was a minor, and the other child, Josefina, did not
sign the deed of sale, and did not know about the transaction.
Under date of June 20, 1957, in action for "Partition and Recovery of Real Estate, with
Damages" was filed by Josefina and Cresencia against Tiano. In the complaint, it was alleged
that they were entitled to a portion of the land, since Josefina did not sign the sale and
Crescencia was a minor; that defendant Tiano had usurped the portions belonging to them, to
their damage and prejudice in the amount of P7,000.00, which consisted of their share in the
produce of the property, during the period of defendant's possession.
In answer, defendant claimed that the plaintiffs herein knew of the sale and that he was not
aware of any defect in the title of his vendors. As a Special Defense, defendant alleged that he
was the absolute owner of the land by acquisitive prescription of ten (10) years, from the date of
purchase. Before the trial, the parties agreed to a stipulation of facts, parts of which recite
x x x x x x x x x
3. That at the time of the sale, appearing in Doc. No. 54, Page 81, Book No. 7, S. 1947, in
the book of Notary Public Basilio Binaoro of Tangub, Mis. Occ., Cresencia was a minor being
only 16 years old, while Josefina who was long married and of legal age did not know about
the sale and/or did not give her consent to the same;
4. That the plaintiffs commenced this case against the defendant on June 20, 1957 and the
judicial summons was issued by the Clerk of Court on June 21, 1957, but defendant received
the same on July 2, 1957.
After the hearing, the court a quo rendered the following judgment
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby renders judgment declaring that the
plaintiffs are entitled each to 1/8 of the property in question and therefore Judgment is
hereby ordered declaring them entitled to partition the property in question in proportion of
1/8 each of them, plus damages for both of them in the amount of P1,000.00 and attorney's
fees in the amount of P200.00.
The trial court in the same decision, commissioned the Deputy Provincial Sheriff, to partition the
property in question and render a report within 30 days. Defendant moved for a reconsideration
of the decision, contending that prescription had already set in, and his (defendant's) title, had
become irrevocable, and that the award of damages had no factual and legal basis. The motion
for reconsideration was denied on March 5, 1960. The Commissioner's report, partitioning the
property was submitted on April 11, 1960. Defendant perfected his appeal on May 9, 1960, and
on May 14, 1960, the same was given due course and elevated to this Court.
In claiming that prescription had taken place, appellant insists that the period should be counted
from the date the summons was served on him, which was on July 2, 1957. It was agreed,
however, that the complaint for the recovery of the land in question was presented on June 20,
1957, and the summons was sent out the following day. The Civil Code, provides that
The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a
written extra-judicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written
acknowledgment of the debt of the debtor. (Art. 1155)
Since the sale of the property took place on July 2, 1947, the ten (10) year period within which
to file the action had not yet elapsed on June 20, 1957, when the complaint was presented.
While it is true that the sale in question had taken place before the effectivity of the new Civil
Code and the law then on matter of prescription was Act No. 190, said law, however, contained
no specific provision on the interruption of the prescriptive period; and the established rule then,
as it is the rule now, is that the commencement of the suit prior to the expiration of the
applicable limitation period, interrupts the running of the statute, as to all parties to the action
(34 Am. Jur., Sec. 247, pp. 202-203; Peralta, et al. v. Alipio, G. R. No. L-8273, Oct. 24, 1955).
The fact that summons was only served on defendant on July 2, 1957, which incidentally and/or
coincidentally was the end of the ten (10) year period, is of no moment, since civil actions are
deemed commenced from date of the filing and docketing of the complaint with the Clerk of
Court, without taking into account the issuance and service of summons (Sotelo v. Dizon, et al.,
67 Phil. 573). The contention that the period was not interrupted, until after defendant received
the summons is, therefore, without legal basis.
Defendant-appellant claims that he had already acquired full ownership of the property in
question because the judicial summons, which could civilly interrupt his possession (Art. 1123,
N.C.C.), was received by him only on July 2, 1957. Conceding, for the purposes of argument,
that the article cited is applicable, still appellant cannot avail himself of acquisitive prescription,
for the simple reason that no finding was made by the trial court that his possession from the
time of the sale (July 2, 1947), was with just title, in good faith, in the concept of an owner,
public, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted (Arts. 1117 & 1118, N.C.C.). Good faith is a
question of fact which must be proved (Art. 1127, N.C.C.). For the purposes of acquisitive
prescription, just title must also be proved, it is never presumed (Art. 1131, N.C.C.). The factual
requisite of adverse possession do not appear in the stipulation of facts and the trial court did
not make findings to this effect. These circumstances could and/or should have been ventilated,
had the appeal been taken to the Court of Appeals. Defendant, however, having chosen to
appeal the decision directly to this Court, he is deemed to have waived questions of fact and
raised only questions of law. There being no factual finding by the lower court of the presence of
the requisites of acquisitive prescription this Court has to reject, as did the trial court, said
defense. Moreover, on July 2, 1957, when the summons was received, the ten (10) years
necessary for acquisitive prescription had not yet elapsed. In fact, said period terminated on that
very day.1wph1.t
As to the award of damages, We find Ourselves devoid of ample authority to review the same,
since it involves appreciation of facts. It cannot be denied, as found by the lower court, that
plaintiffs herein are entitled to a share in the land. Verily, they should also share in the produce,
which, admittedly, was enjoyed by the defendant-appellant herein.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed. Costs against
appellant in both instances.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal,
JJ., concur.
[G.R. Nos. 79937-38. February 13, 1989]
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS AND D.J.
WARBY, petitioners, vs. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION,
Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA
UY PO TIONG, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GANCAYCO, J .:
Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a court
acquires jurisdiction aver a case when the correct and proper docket fee has
not been paid.
On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for
brevity) filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila
for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a
prayer for the judicial declaration of its NULlity against private respondent
Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent was declared in default for failure to
file the required answer within the reglementary period.
On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a
complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the refund of
premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment which was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially against petitioner SIOL, and
thereafter including E.B. Philips and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The
complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual, compensatory, moral,
exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and
costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the
amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the
complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee
which prompted petitioners counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was
disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presiding
over said case.
Upon the order of this Court, the records of said case together with twenty-
two other cases assigned to different branches of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City which were under investigation for under-assessment of
docket fees were transmitted to this Court. The Court thereafter returned the
said records to the trial court with the directive that they be re-raffled to the
other judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of Judge Castro. Civil Case No.
Q-41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was then vacant.
On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in
Administrative Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the judges in said cases to
reassess the docket fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its
payment. The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue certificates
of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify
in their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their complaints.
On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala Civil
Case No. Q-41177 was temporarily assigned, issued an order to the Clerk of
Court instructing him to issue a certificate of assessment of the docket fee
paid by private respondent and, in case of deficiency, to include the same in
said certificate.
On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed
by petitioners. On August 30, 1984, an amended complaint was filed by
private respondent including the two additional defendants aforestated.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q-41177 was
thereafter assigned, after his assumption into office on January 16, 1986,
issued a Supplemental Order requiring the parties in the case to comment on
the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying with the
Resolution of this Court of October 15, 1985 since the pleadings filed by
private respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered.
On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-
Amended Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00
as actual and compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said
second amended complaint however, private respondent alleges actual and
compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of about
P44,601,623.70.
On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the
second amended complaint and stating therein that the same constituted
proper compliance with the Resolution of this Court and that a copy thereof
should be furnished the Clerk of Court for the reassessment of the docket
fees. The reassessment by the Clerk of Court based on private respondent's
claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages"
amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private
respondent.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
questioning the said order of Judge Asuncion dated January 24, 1986.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint
alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as damages so the total claim
amounts to about P64,601,623.70. On October 16, 1986, or some seven
months after filing the supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid
the additional docket fee of P80,396.00.
[1]

On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision ruling,
among others, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 09715 insofar as it seeks
anNULment of the order
(a) denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint, as amended, and
(b) granting the writ of preliminary attachment, but giving due course to the portion
thereof questioning the reassessment of the docketing fee, and requiring the
Honorable respondent Court to reassess the docketing fee to be paid by private
respondent on the basis of the amount of P25,401,707.00."
[2]

Hence, the instant petition.
During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the said
judgment of respondent court, private respondent paid the additional docket
fee of P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988.
[3]

The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred in not
finding that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-
41177 on the ground of non-payment of the correct and proper docket fee.
Petitioners allege that while it may be true that private respondent had paid
the amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee as herein-above related, and
considering that the total amount sought to be recovered in the amended and
supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70, the docket fee that should be paid
by private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the
same, petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed and all
incidents arising therefrom should be anNULled. In support of their theory,
petitioners cite the latest ruling of the Court
in Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA,
[4]
as follows:
"The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based
on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi Case in so
far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed."
On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling
in Manchester cannot apply retroactively to Civil Case No. Q-41177 for at the
time said civil case was filed in court there was no suchManchester ruling as
yet. Further, private respondent avers that what is applicable is the ruling of
this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete,
[5]
wherein this Court held that the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient.
The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is
untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
[6]

In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres,
[7]
this Court held that the payment of
the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of
an appeal. In a forcible entry and detainercase before the justice of the peace
court of Manaoag, Pangasinan, after notice of a judgment dismissing the
case, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with said court but he deposited only
P8.00 for the docket fee, instead of P16.00 as required, within
the reglementary period of appeal of five (5) days after receiving notice of
judgment. Plaintiff deposited the additional P8.00 to complete the amount of
the docket fee only fourteen (14) days later. On the basis of these facts, this
Court held that the Court of First Instance did not acquire jurisdiction to hear
and determine the appeal as the appeal was not thereby perfected.
In Lee vs. Republic,
[8]
the petitioner filed a verified declaration of intention
to become a Filipino citizen by sending it through registered mail to the Office
of the Solicitor General in 1953 but the required filing fee was paid only in
1956, barely 5-1/2 months prior to the filing of the petition for citizenship. This
Court ruled that the declaration was not filed in accordance with the legal
requirement that such declaration should be filed at least one year before the
filing of the petition for citizenship. Citing Lazaro, this Court concluded that
the filing of petitioner's declaration of intention on October 23, 1953 produced
no legal effect until the required filing fee was paid on May 23, 1956.
In Malimit vs. Degamo,
[9]
the same principles enunciated
in Lazaro and Lee were applied. It was an original petition
for quo warranto contesting the right to office of proclaimed candidates which
was mailed, addressed to the clerk of the Court of First Instance, within the
one-week period after the proclamation as provided therefor by
law.
[10]
However, the required docket fees were paid only after the expiration of
said period. Consequently, this Court held that the date of such payment must
be deemed to be the real date of filing of aforesaid petition and not the date
when it was mailed.
Again, in Garcia vs. Vasquez,
[11]
this Court reiterated the rule that the
docket fee must be paid before a court will act on a petition or
complaint. However, We also held that said rule is not applicable when
petitioner seeks the probate of several wills of the same decedent as he is not
required to file a separate action for each will but instead he may have the
other wills probated in the same special proceeding then pending before the
same court.
Then in Magaspi,
[12]
this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimit and Lee that a
case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the
actual date of its filing in court. Said case involved a complaint for recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages filed in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu. Upon the payment of P60.00 for the docket fee and
P10.00 for the sheriff's fee, the complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R-
11882. The prayer of the complaint sought that the Transfer Certificate of Title
issued in the name of the defendant be declared as NULl and void. It was
also prayed that plaintiff be declared as owner thereof to whom the proper title
should be issued, and that defendant be made to pay monthly rentals of
P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948 up to the time the property is delivered to
plaintiff, P500,000.00 as moral damages, attorney's fees in the amount of
P250,000.00, the costs of the action and exemplary damages in the amount of
P500,000.00.
The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay the correct
amount of the docket fee to which an opposition was filed by the plaintiff
alleging that the action was for the recovery of a parcel of land so the docket
fee must be based on its assessed value and that the amount of P60.00 was
the correct docketing fee. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay P3,104.00
as filing fee.
The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended complaint to include
the Republic as the defendant. In the prayer of the amended complaint the
exemplary damages earlier sought was eliminated. The amended prayer
merely sought moral damages as the court may determine, attorney's fees of
P100,000.00 and the costs of the action. The defendant filed an opposition to
the amended complaint. The opposition notwithstanding, the amended
complaint was admitted by the trial court. The trial court reiterated its order for
the payment of the additional docket fee which plaintiff assailed and then
challenged before this Court. Plaintiff alleged that he paid the total docket fee
in the amount of P60.00 and that if he has to pay the additional fee it must be
based on the amended complaint.
The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff may be
considered to have filed the case even if the docketing fee paid was not
sufficient. In Magaspi, We reiterated the rule that the case was deemed filed
only upon the payment of the correct amount for the docket fee regardless of
the actual date of the filing of the complaint; that there was an honest
difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee in that
as the action appears to be one for the recovery of property the docket fee of
P60.00 was correct; and that as the action is also one for damages, We
upheld the assessment of the additional docket fee based on the damages
alleged in the amended complaint as against the assessment of the trial court
which was based on the damages alleged in the original complaint.
However, as aforecited, this Court
overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchester involves an action for torts
and damages and specific performance with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, etc. The prayer in said case is for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action
against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by
the plaintiffs for the property in question, the attachment of such property of
defendants that may be sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may be
rendered, and, after hearing, the issuance of an order requiring defendants to
execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject property and anNUL
defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff. It was also prayed that
the defendants be made to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, actual,
compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as
may be proved during the trial for attorney's fees. The plaintiff also asked the
trial court to declare the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff
valid and sufficient for purposes of payment, and to make the injunction
permanent. The amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer
although the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78
Million allegedly suffered by plaintiff.
Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount of only
P410.00 for the docket fee based on the nature of the action for specific
performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary
estimation. However, it was obvious from the allegations of the complaint as
well as its designation that the action was one for damages and specific
performance. Thus, this Court held that plaintiff must be assessed the correct
docket fee computed against the amount of damages of about P78 Million,
although the same was not spelled out in the prayer of the complaint.
Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of court, filed an
amended complaint on September 12, 1985 by the inclusion of another co-
plaintiff and eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of
the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained.
On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of the docket
fee in the said case and other cases that were investigated. On November
12, 1985, the trial court directed the plaintiff to rectify the amended complaint
by stating the amounts which they were asking for. This plaintiff did as
instructed. In the body of the complaint the amount of damages alleged was
reduced to P10,000,000.00 but still no amount of damages was specified in
the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court," this
Court held that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by
payment of only P410.00 for the docket fee. Neither can the amendment of
the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes
there was no such original complaint duly filed which could be
amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all
subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court were declared
NULl and void.
[13]

The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases of
under-assessment of docket fee which were investigated by this Court
together with Manchester. The facts and circumstances of this case are
similar to Manchester. In the body of the original complaint, the total amount
of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount
of damages asked for was not stated. The action was for the refund of
premium and the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment with damages.
The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. OnJanuary 23,
1986, private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayer it
is asked that he be awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and
exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the amount of his
pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint
was admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the additional
docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less than P10,000,000.00
in damages, which he paid.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint
alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total
claim is approximately P64,601,620.70. OnOctober 16, 1986, private
respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the
promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on August 31,
1987 wherein private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional
docket fee, and during the pendency of this petition, and after the
promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid an
additional docket fee of P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to
have paid a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the
total amount of his claim in the amended and supplemental complaint
amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private respondent
must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49.
The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present
case. The pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee
due it is obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the
filing of the second amended complaint.
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee
until the case was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus,
in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this Court held
that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the
amended complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original
complaint was NULl and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for
considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as
required. The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had that
sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional docket
fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change of stance by
manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be
ordered.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still
insufficient considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which
the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or
clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due,
he must require the private respondent to pay the same.
Thus, the Court rules as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court
with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the
filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims
and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the
filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of
said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of
the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce
said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of
Court of the court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and determine the
additional filing fee that should be paid by private respondent considering the
total amount of the claim sought in the original complaint and the
supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the
prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency, if any,
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-
Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS,
ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta and Tanjuatco for petitioners.
Pecabar Law Offices for private respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N

GANCAYCO, J .:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Second Division of January 28,1987
and another motion to refer the case to and to be heard in oral argument by the Court En Banc filed
by petitioners, the motion to refer the case to the Court en banc is granted but the motion to set the
case for oral argument is denied.
Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must be assessed on the basis of the
amended complaint cite the case of Magaspi vs. Ramolete. 1 They contend that the Court of
Appeals erred in that the filing fee should be levied by considering the amount of damages
sought in the original complaint.
The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in that
1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of
land with damages.
2
While the present case is an action for torts and damages and specific
performance with prayer for temporary restraining order, etc.
3

2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only the annulment of title of the
defendant to the property, the declaration of ownership and delivery of possession thereof to
plaintiffs but also asks for the payment of actual moral, exemplary damages and attorney's fees
arising therefrom in the amounts specified therein.
4
However, in the present case, the prayer is
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action
against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for
the property in question, to attach such property of defendants that maybe sufficient to satisfy
any judgment that maybe rendered, and after hearing, to order defendants to execute a contract
of purchase and sale of the subject property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the
money of plaintiff, ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff actual, compensatory
and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as maybe proved during the trial as
attorney's fees and declaring the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and
producing the effect of payment and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of damages
sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint alleges the total amount
of over P78 Million as damages suffered by plaintiff.
5

3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference of opinion as to the nature of
the action in the Magaspi case. The complaint was considered as primarily an action for
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The damages stated were treated as
merely to the main cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of only P60.00 and P10.00 for the
sheriff's fee were paid.
6

In the present case there can be no such honest difference of opinion. As maybe gleaned from the
allegations of the complaint as well as the designation thereof, it is both an action for damages and
specific performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in the amount only of P410.00 by
considering the action to be merely one for specific performance where the amount involved is not
capable of pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the total amount of damages
sought is not stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of the complaint
totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee.
4. When this under-re assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought to the attention of
this Court together with similar other cases an investigation was immediately ordered by the
Court. Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with leave of court filed an amended
complaint on September 12, 1985 for the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as co-
plaintiff and by emanating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the complaint.
The prayer in the original complaint was maintained. After this Court issued an order on October
15, 1985 ordering the re- assessment of the docket fee in the present case and other cases that
were investigated, on November 12, 1985 the trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended
complaint by stating the amounts which they are asking for. It was only then that plaintiffs
specified the amount of damages in the body of the complaint in the reduced amount of
P10,000,000.00.
7
Still no amount of damages were specified in the prayer. Said amended
complaint was admitted.
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the amount
of P3,104.00 as filing fee covering the damages alleged in the original complaint as it did not
consider the damages to be merely an or incidental to the action for recovery of ownership and
possession of real property.
8
An amended complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of court to
include the government of the Republic as defendant and reducing the amount of damages, and
attorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said amended complaint was also admitted.
9

In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for recovery of ownership but also
for damages, so that the filing fee for the damages should be the basis of assessment. Although
the payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was
held that since the payment was the result of an "honest difference of opinion as to the correct
amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired jurisdiction over the case and the
proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular." 10 Hence, as the amended complaint
superseded the original complaint, the allegations of damages in the amended complaint should
be the basis of the computation of the filing fee. 11
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the allegations of the
complaint, the designation and the prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages and specific
performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by considering the amount of damages as
alleged in the original complaint.
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court . 12 Thus, in the present
case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only P410.00 as
docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the
Court. 13 For an legal purposes there is no such original complaint that was duly filed which
could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all
subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and void.
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of assessment of the
docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in the
amended complaint.
The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the practice of
counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of
damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the
complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct
filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent
practice was compounded when, even as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and
ordered an investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting all
mention of the amount of damages being asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only when in
obedience to the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the amount of
damages be specified in the amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the damages sought
in the much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer
thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required docket fee is obvious.
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of this unethical practice.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing
fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket
fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the
Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended
pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case 14 in so far as it is inconsistent with this
pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., took no part.



[G.R. No. 85200. February 19, 1991]
ARTURO Q. SALIENTES, in his capacity as receiver of and
representing the Heirs of the Registered Co-Owners of
the Maysilo Estate, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
PACITA CANIZARES-NYE, as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92; DESTILLERIA LIMTUACO
& CO. and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALOOCAN
CITY, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PARAS, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the July 19, 1988 decision
*
of the
Court of Appeals, Thirteenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 14811 entitled Arturo
Q. Salientes, petitioner v. Hon.Pacita C. Nye, et al., respondents, dismissing the
petition filed by petitioner before this Court and referred to the Court of Appeals for
disposition. The latter petition challenged the January 4, 1988decision as well as the
subsequent orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92
**
in Civil Case
No. Q-52034, Arturo Salientes, et al., plaintiff v. Destilleria Limtuaco & Co., Inc.,
defendants, likewise dismissing the complaint filed by herein petitioner for failure to pay
the proper docket fees.
On September 29, 1987, petitioner Arturo Q. Salientes, in his capacity as receiver of
and representing the heirs of the registered co-owners of Maysilo Estate, filed a
complaint before the Regional Trial Court, seeking to recover possession of a portion of
said estate allegedly occupied illegally by Destilleria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. to the extent
of 6,885 square meters, more or less, valued at P500,000.00 and praying among others
for an Order to said company to pay Salientes actual or compensatory damages in the
amount of not less than P500,000.00 and such other exemplary damages as the
Honorable Court may allow x x x.
Respondent company moved to dismiss or suspend the proceedings for failure to
pay proper fees which motion was opposed
by Salientes. After Destilleria Limtuaco filed an answer ad cautelam, the Clerk of Court
of RTC Quezon City, Branch 92, filed a comment on the motion to dismiss. In her
Comment, the Clerk of Court stated that the filing fee was assessed and collected
based on the value of the land (P500,000.00) and the damages (P500,000.00) in the
total amount of P1,000,000.00 (p. 112, Rollo). Judge Pacita Nye of the same court
dismissed the complaint as follows:
Hence, the failure of the complaint to specify the amount of compensatory damages
in the prayer, the phrase in the amount of not less than P500,000.00 (par. 3, prayer)
not being a fixed amount for purposes of computing the payment of the prescribed
docket fee, the assessment and payment of docket fee based on P500,000.00 was not
proper. Consequently, in line with the foregoing ruling in
the Manchester DevelopmentCorporation case (supra), this Court has not acquired
jurisdiction over the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. (Rollo, pp. 53-54).
Salientes motion and supplementary motion for reconsideration were both denied.
On March 25, 1988, Salientes then filed a petition with this Court which was
eventually referred to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. The appellate court
dismissed the petition holding that:
The doctrine in the Magaspi case relied upon by petitioner is no longer
controlling. In the Manchester case, it was held that the ruling in the Magaspi case in
so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. (Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 102).
The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by Salientes was likewise denied,
hence, this petition. The sole issue in the case at bar is plain and simple, i.e., whether
the court acquires jurisdiction over a case when there is an alleged failure to pay the
proper and correct docket fees.
The petition is impressed with merit.
This Court has already laid this issue to rest in the recent case of Maximo Tacay, et
al. v. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, et al., G.R. Nos. 88075-77, December 20, 1989,
which held among others as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Circular No. 7 of this Court, dated March 24, 1988, cannot thus be invoked, as the
petitioner does, as authority for the dismissal of the actions at bar. That circular
avowedly inspired by the doctrine laid down inManchester Development Corporation
v. Court of Appeals, has but limited application to said actions xxx. Moreover, the
rules therein laid down have since been clarified and amplified by the Courts
subsequent decision in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, et al., G.R.
Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989.
xxx xxx xxx
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion, supra, read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as well, the
legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of the property and (b)
the total amount of related damages sought. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the
action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by the payment of the
requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of
the time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable time as the court may
grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in in the meantime. But where -
as in the case at bar -
the fees prescribed action involving real property havebeen paid, but the amounts of c
ertain related damages (actual, moral and
nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the action may not be dismissed. The Court
undeniably has jurisdiction over the action involving the realproperty, acquiring it up
on the filing of the complaint or similar pleading and payment of the prescribed fee.
And is not divested of that authority by the circumstance that it may not have acquired
jurisdiction over theaccompanying claims for damages because of lack of specificatio
n thereof. What should be done is simply to expunge those claims for damages as to w
hich no amounts are stated, x x x or allow, on motion, a reasonabletime for the amend
ment of the complaints so as to allege the precise amount of each item
of damages and accept payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant presc
riptive period. (Underscoring supplied).
In the light of the foregoing, it is very clear that the courts below erred in
peremptorily dismissing the complaint filed by Salientes.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals and to REMAND Civil Case No. Q-52034 to the
Regional Trial Court for further proceedings, so that among other things, the prayer in
the complaint can on motion be amended to make specific the amount of damages
prayed for, the assessed fee can then be completely paid within the period of
prescription, and the case can be fully tried on the merits.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Hererra, (Chairman), Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.



[G.R. No. 89747. July 20, 1990]
MAERSK-TABACALERA SHIPPING AGENCY (FILIPINAS),
INC., petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MONET'S
EXPORT AND MANUFACTURING CORPORATION AND/OR
VICENTE TAGLE, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GRINO-AQUINO, J .:
This is petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated July 12, 1989
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 18124 affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City in Civil Case No. 7480 which awarded
damages to the plaintiff, now private respondent, Monet's Export and
Manufacturing (Monet for short) against the petitioner Maersk-
Tabacalera Shipping Agency (Filipinas), Inc., (Maersk for short) for breach of
a contract of carriage.
The facts are stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
"On May 21, 1985, a complaint for damages was filed by plaintiff Monet's Export and
Manufacturing Corporation (Monet's) and/or Vicente Tagle against
defendants Maersk Tabacalera Shipping (Maersk) and the New Asia Enterprises (New
Asia) and/or Manuel Ranola, alleging, among other things, that plaintiff, like
defendant New Asia, is engaged in the export of locally-made handicrafts and
products, while defendant Maersk Line is engaged in furnishing containerized
services through which Monet's and New Asia normally ship their goods; that on
March 11, 1984, plaintiff, after complying with all the export and custom
requirements, loaded its goods in Maersk's container to be delivered on or before
March 15, 1984 to Manila for immediate transshipment to its port of destination; that
through fraud and malice, and without prior notice to Monet's, Maerskunloaded the
goods at New Asia's factory site at Tagas, Daraga, Albay to give way to the latter's
own export shipment; that Monet's shipment was later returned to its warehouse
at Banag, Daraga, Albay; and that because of this occurrence, Monet's had to secure
another shipper, thereby incurring unnecessary expenses as well as suffering mental
anguish, worry and sleepless nights thinking of the possibility of losing its trading
partners which would seriously doubt Monet's capacity as a respectable exporter.
Monet's likewise alleged having suffered actual, moral and exemplary damages (p. 1,
Record).
"Answering the complaint, Maersk contended that contrary to Monet's allegations, the
latter's shipment was loaded on March 10, 1984 in Maersk container subject to the
condition that the bill of lading would be issued upon Monet's compliance with all the
necessary export papers prior to the departure of the truck bearing said container for
Manila on March 11, 1984. Maersk further alleged that Monet's knew that the subject
goods would not be brought to Manila without submitting all the necessary export
papers, as without them, Maersk would incur charges on the cargo when deposited at
the customs warehouse in Manila and would subsequently be not allowed to export
the goods by custom authorities (p. 16, Record).
"Defendant New Asia, for its part, denied any liability in favor of Monet's, alleging
that Monet's has no cause of action against it not being a party to the contract of
carriage between Monet and Maersk (p. 24, Record).
"Defendants during the hearing of February 17, 1986 were considered as in default for
their failure to attend the scheduled pre-trial conference despite proper notice.
Subsequently, the order of default in regard to defendant Maersk was lifted and the
latter was allowed to cross-examine all the witnesses of Monet's. Defendant New
Asia did not move for the lifting of the order of default and accordingly remained as
in default." (p. 204, Record.)
On March 28, 1988, the appealed judgment was rendered:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant Maersk Shipping Line is found to be
liable to plaintiff for damages in the following amounts: For breach of contract of
carriage, P50,000.00; for moral damages brought about by the wanton bad faith
employed by defendant shipping line in the performance of its contractual obligation,
P50,000.00; and as exemplary damages, another P50,000.00 and for attorney's fees,
P20,000.00.
"Defendant New Asia Enterprises is exonerated of any liability, there being no valid
cause of action by plaintiff against it. New Asia Enterprises cannot be made
answerable for whatever action or violation of contracted obligation
defendant Maersk Line may have committed against plaintiff because they are 2
separate corporations and there is no proof of any collusion between them." (pp. 27-
28, Rollo.)
Maersk appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of
the trial court on July 12, 1989.
Hence, the instant petition wherein Maersk raises the following issues:
1. Respondent court erred in affirming the judgment of the trial court despite the
obvious fact that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the subject-matter of
the action because private respondents did not specify their claims for damages and
the correct filing fees were not paid.
2. It was error for respondent court to have awarded P50,000.00 for "breach of
contract" because this is not a form of damage and petitioner has a right to know for
what it is being made to pay.
3. Respondent court erred also in awarding moral damages to a corporation that was
not shown to have a good reputation that was damaged.
4. Again, respondent court erred in awarding exemplary damages in the absence of
evidence that petitioner acted in a wanton or malevolent manner.
5. Finally, respondent court erred in awarding attorney's fees without any explanation
for such an award. (pp. 13-14, Rollo.)
Petitioner's allegation that the decisions of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals were void for lack of jurisdiction (p. 75, Rollo) as Monet did not pay
the correct filing fee on its claims for actual, moral and exemplary damages,
the amounts of which were not specified in the body and prayer of its
complaint, is anchored in the following ruling of this Court
in Manchester DevelopmentCorporation vs. CA (149 SCRA 562 [1987]) --
"x x x the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only
P410.00 as docket fee. x x x
"To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and
other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body
of the pleading but also in theprayer, and said damages shall be considered in the asse
ssment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with the requir
ement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expungedfrom the rec
ord.
"The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee based
on the amounts sought in the amended pleading." (Underscoring supplied; pp. 568-
569.)
Unlike Manchester, however, where the jurisdictional issue arising from
insufficiency of the docket fee paid, was seasonably raised in the answer of
the defendant in the trial court, in this case the issue is being raised for the
first time in this Court. Petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court
without question. It filed a counterclaim seeking affirmative reliefs, and
actively took part in the trial (p. 53, Rollo). A party who voluntarily participates
in the trial cannot later on raise the issue of the court's lack of jurisdiction (Tan
Boon Bee & Co. v. Judge Jarencio, 163 SCRA 205).
Maersk should have raised its objection to the trial court's jurisdiction when
the case was still in that court. It should not have waited for an adverse
decision by the Court of Appeals before waking up to raise the question of
jurisdiction. As this Court remarked in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 37:
"Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be
declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was
commenced x x x and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary
once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but
revolting." "A party may be barred by laches from invoking his plea (of lack of
jurisdiction) for the first time on appeal for the purpose of anNULling
everything done in the case with the active participation of said party invoking
the plea." (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 34.)
Since this is a case where some of the claims (for moral and exemplary
damages) were not specified in the plaintiff's pleading and were left for
determination by the court, the applicable rule is the third rule set out in the
decision of this Court in Sun Insurance Office Ltd., et al. vs.
Hon. Maximiano Asuncion, et al., 170 SCRA 274, to wit:
"3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has
been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or
his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional
fee."
The Clerk of Court of the trial court shall assess and collect the proper
additional fees on the totality of the judgment for the private respondent (Id.)
Monet's counsel in the trial court, Attorney Jesus Salazar, is hereby
reprimanded for his unethical practice of not specifying the amount of
damages sought in the body and prayer of his complaint in order to defraud
the Government of the proper fee for docketing said complaint. He is warned
that a repetition of that malpractice will be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit.
However, the Clerk of Court of the trial court shall assess and collect the fees
due on the judgment as if the same amounts were specified in the
complaint. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 87617. April 6, 1990]
JOE HODGES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF LEON
P. GELLADA, plaintiff-appellee, in Civil Case No. 6512, ROMEO
MEDIODIA,plaintiff-appellant, in Civil Case No. 6513, and HEIRS
OF FERNANDO MIRASOL, plaintiff-appellee, in Civil Case No.
6516, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GANCAYCO, J .:
What is the legal effect of the non-payment of the docket fees even before the
promulgation of Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals?
[1]
This
is the decisive issue in this petition.
On April 7, 1964 Leon P. Gellada, a practicing lawyer, filed an action for damages
against Joe Hodges in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo City, wherein plaintiff claimed
damages against defendant for some alleged defamatory statement of defendant
against plaintiff and his associates thus entitling him to moral damages of P400,000.00,
damage to his law practice of P30,000.00, attorneys fees of P30,000.00, and
exemplary damages as well as temperate damages. A special appearance questioning
the jurisdiction of the court on the subject matter and the mode of extrajudicial service of
summons dated June 24, 1964 was filed by defendant. The defendant pointed out that
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case unless the corresponding docket fee
is paid. The defendant maintained that considering the amount of damages claimed by
the plaintiff, the docket fee to be paid should be no less than P770.00 which is way
beyond the P32.00 docket fee paid by plaintiff.
An answer, amended answer and a reply thereto were filed. The amended answer
was admitted.
On March 31, 1964, Romeo H. Mediodia, also a practicing lawyer, filed in the same
court a similar action for damages against Joe Hodges for alleged defamatory
statements of defendant against plaintiff, wherein plaintiff claimed for moral damages of
not less than P300,000.00, damage to his law practice of not less than P20,000.00,
attorneys fee of P40,000.00 and exemplary damages as well as temperate
damages. A special appearance questioning the jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the mode of extrajudicial service of summons dated June 25, 1964 was also filed by
defendant pointing that the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case when plaintiff
claimed damages of P360,000.00 and he paid a docket fee of only P32.00 when it
should not be less than P570.00. After an answer, amended answer, and a reply thereto
were filed, the amended answer was admitted by the trial court.
On April 8, 1964, another complaint for damages was filed by Fernando P. Mirasol,
another practicing lawyer, against Joe Hodges, for alleged defamatory statements of
defendant against plaintiff, wherein plaintiff claimed moral damages of not less than
P350,000.00, damage to his law practice of not less than P25,000.00, attorneys fees of
P35,000.00, and exemplary damages as well as temperate damages. A similar special
appearance for the defendant questioning the jurisdiction on the subject matter of the
court and the mode of extrajudicial service of summons dated June 25, 1964 and
pointing out that the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case as the plaintiff
claimed damages of P410,000.00 but he paid a docket fee of only P32.00 when it
should not be less than P670.00. After an answer, an amended answer and a reply
thereto was filed, the amended answer were admitted by the trial court.
On August 31, 1972, these three cases were ordered consolidated by the trial
court. On the same date another order was issued directing the plaintiffs to pay the
docket fee commensurate to their respective demands. This was reiterated in another
order dated March 11, 1982.
On March 16, 1982 plaintiff Gellada paid the amount of P168.00 bringing his total
payment of docket fees to P200.00. On September 5, 1972 plaintiff Mediodia paid
P168.00 so he had paid a total of P200.00 for docket fees. Plaintiff Mirasol failed to
comply with the said orders.
Plaintiff Gellada died on February 4, 1974 so an order was (issued for the
substitution of his heirs. Plaintiff Mirasol also died on March 29, 1979, so another order
was issued by the trial court for the substitution of his heirs.
After trial on the merits, a judgment was rendered by the trial court on February 18,
1988, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant Joe Hodges -
In Civil Case No. 6512, to pay the heirs of plaintiff Leon Gellada, the sums of
P50,000.00 and P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, respectively;
P20,000.00 for and as attorneys fees and P10,000.00 asexpenses of litigation, plus
costs;
In Civil Case No. 6513, to pay the plaintiff Romeo Mediodia the sums of P50,000.00
and P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, respectively; P20,000.00 for
and as attorney's fees and P10,000.00 as expenses of litigation, plus costs; and
In Civil Case No. 6516, to pay the heirs of plaintiff Fernando Mirasol, with the
exception of Ferdinand Mirasol, the sums of P50,000.00 and P10,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages, respectively; P20,000.00 for and as attorneys fees and
P10.000.00 as expenses of litigation, plus costs."
[2]

Not satisfied therewith, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, wherein in due
course a decision was rendered on October 28, 1988 affirming the decision appealed
from, with costs against petitioner.
[3]

A motion for reconsideration of the said decision having been denied in a resolution
of March 8, 1989, the instant petition was then filed in this Court, wherein nine (9) errors
are alleged to have been committed by the appellate court. The Court finds it
necessary to dispose of the first assigned error on the question of non-payment of
docket fees.
As early as Lazaro vs. Endencia,
[4]
this Court held that an appeal is not deemed
perfected if the appellate court docket fee is not fully paid. In Lee vs. Republic,
[5]
this
Court ruled that a declaration of intention to be a Filipino citizen produced no legal effect
until the required filing fee is paid. In Malimit vs. Degamo,
[6]
We held that the date of
payment of the docket fee must be considered the real date of filing of a petition
for quo warranto and not the date it was mailed. In Magaspi vs. Ramolete,
[7]
the well-
settled rule was reiterated that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket
fee regardless of the actual date of its filing in court.
[8]

At the time, therefore, that the three (3) cases subject of the herein petition were
filed, the rule was already clear that the court does not acquire jurisdiction over a case
until after the prescribed docket is paid.
In Manchester, this rule was emphasized when this Court stated "The court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket
fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby
vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee based
on the amount sought in the amended pleading."
[9]

The rule in Manchester was relaxed in Sun Insurance vs.
Hon. Maximiano Asuncion,
[10]
whereby this Court declared that the trial court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. Nevertheless, in Sun Insurance, this Court
reiterated the rule that it is the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests the trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the case.
[11]

In the present petition, it appears that in the case of Gellada vs. Hodges the total
amount of the claim for damages is about P460,000.00, the estimated docket fee due is
P770.00 but what was paid only was P32.00. Despite the order of the trial court on
August 31, 1972 and another order ten years later, that is on March 11, 1982,
requiring plaintiff to pay the correct docket fee, Gelladapaid the amount of P168.00 only.
Thus his total payment amounts to just P200.00, which is still much less than the
amount of P770.00 due.
Similarly, in Mediodia vs. Hodges where the claim is approximately P360,000.00
and the appropriate filing fee would be about P570.00, the plaintiff paid only P32.00
upon filing the complaint. After the two aforesaid orders of the trial court were
issued, Mediodea paid on September 5,1982 the amount of P168.00 bringing his
payment to a total of P200.00 which is also much less than the amount of P570.00 due
for docket fee.
In the case of Mirasol vs. Hodges, the total claim is for P410,000.00 and the amount
of filing fee due is P670.00. Mirasol paid only P32.00 upon filing the complaint. He did
not pay any additional sum even after the two orders of the court had been issued.
No doubt, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter in said
three (3) cases due to the failure to pay in full the prescribed docket fee. Thus, the
entire proceedings undertaken in said cases are NULl and void. The plaintiffs in said
cases are practicing lawyers who are expected to know this mandatory requirement in
the filing of any complaint or similar pleading. Their non-payment of the prescribed
docket fee was deliberate and inexcusable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals dated October 28, 1988 and its resolution dated February 8, 1989 are hereby
reversed and set aside and another judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the
complaints in said three (3) cases. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Grio-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 88421. January 30, 1990]
AYALA CORPORATION, LAS PIAS VENTURES, INC., AND FILIPINAS
LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL
REGION, BRANCH 145 and THE SPOUSES CAMILO AND MA.
MARLENE SABIO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GANCAYCO, J .:
Once more the issue relating to the payment of filing fees in an action for
specific performance with damages is presented by this petition for
prohibition.
Private respondents filed against petitioners an action for specific
performance with damages in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the lower court has not acquired
jurisdiction over the case as private respondents failed to pay the prescribed
docket fee and to specify the amount of exemplary damages both in the body
and prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint. The trial court
denied the motion in an order dated April 5, 1989. A motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners was likewise denied in an order datedMay
18, 1989. Hence this petition.
The main thrust of the petition is that private respondent paid only the total
amount of P1,616.00 as docket fees instead of the amount of P13,061.35
based on the assessed value of the real properties involved as evidenced by
its tax declaration. Further, petitioners contend that private respondents failed
to specify the amount of exemplary damages sought both in the body and the
prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint.
In Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
[1]
a similar
case involving an action for specific performance with damages, this Court
held that the docket fee should be assessed by considering the amount of
damages as alleged in the original complaint.
However, the contention of petitioners is that since the action concerns
real estate, the assessed value thereof should be considered in computing the
fees pursuant to Section 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Such rule cannot
apply to this case which is an action for specific performance with damages
although it is in relation to a transaction involving real estate. Pursuant
to Manchester,the amount of the docket fees to be paid should be computed
on the basis of the amount of damages stated in the complaint.
Petitioners also allege that because of the failure of the private
respondents to state the amount of exemplary damages being sought, the
complaint must nevertheless be dismissed in accordance to Manchester. The
trial court denied the motion stating that the determination of the exemplary
damages is within the sound discretion of the court and that it would be
unwarrantedly presumptuous on the part of the private respondents to fix the
amount of exemplary damages being prayed for. The trial court cited the
subsequent case of Sun Insurance vs. Judge Asuncion
[2]
in support of its
ruling.
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance are as
follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but
(also) the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction
over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive orreglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a
reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive
or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has
been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or
his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional
fee."
Apparently, the trial court misinterpreted paragraph 3 of the above ruling of
this Court wherein it is stated that "where the judgment awards a
claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for
the determination of the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute
a lien on the judgment" by considering it to mean that where in the body and
prayer of the complaint there is a prayer, say for exemplary or corrective
damages, the amount of which is left to the discretion of the Court, there is no
need to specify the amount being sought, and that any award thereafter shall
constitute a lien on the judgment.
In the latest case of Tacay vs. Regional Trial Court of Tagum,
[3]
this
Court had occasion to make the clarification that the phrase "awards of claims
not specified in the pleading" refers only to "damages arising after the filing of
the complaint or similar pleading x x x x as to which the additional filing
fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment." The amount of any claim
for damages, therefore, arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any
pleading should be specified. While it is true that the determination of certain
damages as exemplary or corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of
the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the
amount sought on the basis of which the court may make a proper
determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees.
The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although
specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages
that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will
not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount
thereof.
The amended and supplemental complaint in the present case, therefore,
suffers from the material defect in failing to state the amount of exemplary
damages prayed for.
As ruled in Tacay the trial court may either order said claim to be
expunged from the record as it did not acquire jurisdiction over the same or on
motion, it may allow, within a reasonable time, the amendment of the
amended and supplemental complaint so as to state the precise amount of
the exemplary damages sought and require the payment of the
requisite fees therefor within the relevant prescriptive period.
[4]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The trial court is directed either
to expunge from the record the claim for exemplary damages in the amended
and supplemental complaint, the amount of which is not specified, or it may
otherwise, upon motion, give reasonable time to private respondents to
amend their pleading by specifying its amount and paying the corresponding
docketing fees within the appropriate reglementary or prescriptive period. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Grio-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.








[G.R. No. 94677. October 15, 1991]
ORIGINAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY
CORPORATION, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PARAS, J .:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the decision

of the Court of
Appeals dated July 31, 1990 in CA G.R. SP No. 18462 entitled "Home
Insurance and Guaranty Corporation v. Hon. Adriano R. Osorio and
Original Development and Construction Corporation" ordering that the
complaint in Civil Case No. 3020-V-89 be expunged from the record and
declaring the orders dated June 1 and 29, 1989 of the court a quo as NULl
and void for having been issued without jurisdiction.
The factual background of the case appears undisputed, to wit:
On December 19, 1988, herein petitioner Original Development and
Construction Corporation (ODECOR for brevity) filed a complaint for breach of
contract and damages against private respondent Home Insurance and
Guaranty Corporation (HIGC for short), National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC for short) and Caloocan City Public School Teachers
Association (CCPSTA for brevity). The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
3020-V-89 and assigned to Branch 171 of the Regional Trial Court in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
The questioned allegations in the body of the complaint, among others,
are as follows:
16. The organization, as earlier stated, of the Third District Public School
Teachers Homeowners Association, under the sponsorship and patronage
of HIGC, unjustly deprived ODECOR of not less than 10,000 committed
buyers, and as a consequence suffered a big financial loss;
17. As part of its scheme to destroy the viability of ODECOR's Housing
project, HIGC maliciously and unreasonably; (a) delayed action on
ODECOR's request for the issuance of Certificate of Completion of
houses which have already been completed; (b) froze ODECOR's
requests for 'take-out' appraisals of the value of its houses and lots,
instead, approved very low appraisal values; (c) refused to allow
ODECOR to construct smaller and cheaper house and lot packages, and
unreasonably required ODECOR to secure prior clearance from the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corp. before it (HIGC) will allow
ODECOR to construct smaller packages; and (d) delayed countersigning
the checks, which were issued by ODECOR to pay the suppliers of
construction materials used in the project, which delay resulted in the
pilferage of valuable construction materials and (e) delayed action of
ODECOR's labor payrolls, thus, demoralizing the employees of the
ODECOR;
xxx xxx xxx
19. HIGC's aforementioned acts not only resulted in ODECOR's financial
crises and/or reversal's, but also brought about almost the total loss of its
market; and such loss of market renders HIGC liable for the actual and
consequential damages suffered by ODECOR;
20. In order to prevent the total collapse of the Dona Helen Subdivision
project, to rescue ODECOR from its financial straits, and to enable the
ODECOR to continue its distressed operations, ODECOR's President, for
the account of ODECOR, had to secure personal loans from sympathetic
friends, in which loans ODECOR bound itself to pay monthly a high rate
of interest; and accordingly, the principal and the interests should be
charged to or considered as a liability of the HIGC, by way of reparation
for actual and consequential damages, to ODECOR;
xxx xxx xxx
24. Notwithstanding insistent demands by ODECOR, NHMFC has
delivered to the former, is staggered and delayed installments in a period
of five (5) years, the amount of P5,366,727.80 only, which malicious
delays have caused ODECOR to incur unnecessary expenses in the form
of interests on its loans, unexpected administrative and operational
requirements, which interest payments and other expenses could have
been avoided had the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
promptly paid over to ODECOR the moneys which it (NHMFC) had
guaranteed to pay;
25. Notwithstanding ODECOR's repeated demands on NHMFC for the
latter to effect payment and delivery to it of the remaining balance of the
originating banks' transmitted loan proceed in the amount of
P2,272,193.10 which amount represents the take out proceeds of
twenty-two (22) House and lot buyers, NHMFC has maliciously refused
or rejected such demands; and this malicious non-payment aggravated the
financial difficulties and the deterioration of ODECOR and forced it to
curtail its development operations and to abandon its program to
construct 10,000 units;
26. NHMFC's aforestated unjust, if not illegal, acts subject NHMFC to
liability to pay ODECOR for actual, consequential and exemplary
damages for the losses and injuries which were sustained by it (plaintiff);
"27. ODECOR, as a result of the aforedescribed illegal and unlawful acts
committed by the several defendants, and to protect its financial interests,
good name and reputation, and to recover its huge losses, has been
needlessly compelled to file this action in Court, and for this purpose, had
to engage the professional services of a reputable law counsel for which it
agreed to pay 25% of its total money claims as attorney's fees excluding
trial honorarium of P3,000.00 per hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
The prayer states:
"WHEREFORE, the plaintiff to this Honorable Court respectfully prays that judgment
be rendered:
1. Adjudging all the defendants guilty of breach of contracts and/or bad faith
and/or unfair business practice and, accordingly, liable for their unlawful
acts which sabotaged and ruined the financial resources and
housing development enterprise of the plaintiff;
2. Adjudging all the defendants, solidarily liable to compensate the plaintiff
for actual, consequential, exemplary and moral damages, the amount of
which will be proved at the trial;
3. Requiring National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation to deliver
and/or to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P2,272,193.10 which sum is
due and payable to the plaintiff and is in its possession and custody;
4. Declaring the defendants liable to the plaintiff for attorney's fees and other
expenses of litigation and the costs of this suit; and
5. Granting to the plaintiff such other reliefs and remedies which are just and
equitable in the premises." (Emphasis supplied)
Simultaneous with the filing of the said complaint, ODECOR paid the
following: P4,344.00 under O.R. No. 1772201-H; P4,344.00 under O.R. No.
007830; and P86.00; based on the one numerical figure appearing in the
complaint as P2,272,193.10 for alleged "loan take out proceeds" which the
other defendant NHMFC allegedly failed to remit to ODECOR. The rest
appears to be an unspecified amount of damages which the trial court could
not assess (Rollo, p. 71).
On March 4, 1989, HIGC filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
court did not acquire jurisdiction due to non-payment of the proper docket
fees, citing the case of ManchesterDevelopment Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals (149 SCRA 56 [1987]). NHMFC, on the other hand, filed its answer
while CCPSTA was declared in default (Petition, Rollo, pp. 6-7). The court, in
its order dated June 1, 1989 denied the motion to dismiss and directed the
Clerk of Court in this wise:
"x x x to issue the Certificate of Reassessment of the proper docket fee to include in
the Certificate the deficiency, if any. In case the payment is insufficient, plaintiff
must pay the deficiency within Five (5) days from receipt of the certificate of
reassessment to the Clerk of Court.
In the event that the judgment awards claim not specified in the complaint or such
claim left for determination by the court as proved at the trial, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien in the judgment and the Clerk of Court or her duly
authorized deputy will enforce said liens and after assessment to collect the additional
fee.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED. (Annex "D" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 37).
Pursuant to the above order, the Clerk of Court filed an Ex-Parte motion
dated June 6, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 38-39) stating that she has already issued the
required certificate of reassessment but the deficiency could not be included
therein because the claim for attorney's fee manifested in the body of the
complaint was not reiterated in the prayer. Hence, the docket fees paid by
ODECOR did not include the demand for attorney's fees. The Clerk of Court,
therefore, moved that the complaint be amended accordingly. This prompted
HIGC to move for a reconsideration of the aforecited order of the court,
praying that the complaint be dismissed or in the alternative, to amend
ODECOR's complaint to reflect the specific amount of damages both in the
body as well as in the prayer (Rollo, p. 43). But the same was denied in the
subsequent order dated June 29, 1989. ODECOR thereafter filed its
amended complaint dated July 6, 1989 containing substantially all its
allegations in the first complaint except that it specified its claim for attorney's
fees as equivalent to 25% of the total monthly liability and other expenses of
litigation and costs of the suit. Such amended complaint was admitted by the
court on July 11, 1989. HIGC then filed its answer thereto, but after the
issues had been joined and the case had been set for pre-trial conference,
HIGC filed a petition for certiorariwith the appellate court questioning the
jurisdiction of the lower court over the case on the same ground of failure to
pay the proper docket fees. The appellate court, in turn, restrained the lower
court from taking further cognizance of the case and on July 31, 1990,
rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"In view of the foregoing, We find and so hold that the respondent court did not
acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 3020-V-89. The complaint in the said Civil
Case is ordered expunged from the record and the orders dated June 1 and 29, 1989
having been issued without jurisdiction, are declared NULl and void.
SO ORDERED.' (Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 19).
ODECOR moved for a reconsideration of this decision but later withdrew
the same and filed instead the present petition.
The issue now at hand is whether the court acquires jurisdiction over a
case even if the complaint does not specify the amount of damages.
The petition is devoid of merit.
ODECOR's first complaint as well as its amended complaint vaguely
asserted its claim for actual, consequential, exemplary and moral damages,
"the amount of which will be proved at the trial" and the demand for attorney's
fees as "equivalent to 25% of the total monetary liability and other expenses of
litigation and costs of this suit". Such terms are certainly not definite enough
to support the computation of the proper docket fees. While it is not required
that the exact amounts be stated, the plaintiff must ascertain, in his
estimation, the sums he wants and the sums required to determine the
amount of such docket and other fees. Thus, it is evident that the complaint
did not state enough facts and sums to enable the Clerk of Court of the lower
court to compute the docket fees payable and left to the judge "mere
guesswork" as to these amounts, which is fatal. (Spouses Belen Gregorio v.
The Honorable Judge Zosimo Z. Angeles, et al., G.R. No. 85847, December
21, 1989, 180 SCRA 490). The intent to defraud the government appears
obvious, not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of
the amended complaint.
In any event, the requirement in Circular No. 7 that complaints, petitions,
answers, and similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being
prayed for not only in the body of the pleadings but also in the prayer has not
been altered (Tacay v. RTC of Tagum, Davao del Norte, 180 SCRA 443-444
[1989]).
What has been revised is the rule that subsequent amendment of the
complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction on the Court,
much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the
amended pleading. The trial court how is authorized to allow payment of the
fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive
orreglementary period (Ibid).
Thus, where a complaint purely for money or damages did not specify the
amounts being claimed, the Court may allow amendment of the pleading and
payment of the proper fees or where the pleading specified the amount of
every claim but the fees paid are insufficient, the defect may be cured and the
Court may take cognizance of the action by payment of the proper fees
provided that in both cases, prescription has not set in the meantime. Similarly
where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages and
the prescribed fees for an action involving real property have been paid but
the amounts of the unrelated damages are unspecified, the Court undeniably
has jurisdiction over the action on the real property but may not have acquired
jurisdiction over the accompanying claim for damages. Accordingly, the Court
may expunge the claims for damages or allow the amendment of the
complaint so as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages within
the prescriptive period (Ibid.).
Coming back to the case at bar, it is readily evident that none of the
foregoing requisites was complied with.
Petitioners invoke the liberal interpretation of the rules as enumerated by
this Court in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion 170
SCRA 284-285 [1989] which is not, however, applicable as in said case,
private respondent amended his complaint several times, stating the amount
claimed and paying each time the required docket fees. While it is true that
eventually the docket fees paid are still insufficient, he nevertheless
manifested his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be
ordered.
The same is not true in the case at bar where in line with the foregoing
pronouncements, the trial court allowed the amendment of the complaint for
the determination of the fees, but such amendment did not, however, in
anyway help in specifying the amount of damages claimed. At most, the
demand for attorney's fees was stated as 25% of the total monetary liability,
another unspecified amount which cannot be the basis of computation.
As to awards of claims not specified in the pleadings - this Court had
already clarified that they refer only to damages arising after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading, to which the additional filing fee shall constitute
a lien on the judgment. The amount of any claim for damages, therefore,
arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any pleading, should be
specified. The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims
although specified are left for the determination of the court is limited only to
any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading
for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to
the amount thereof (Tacay v. RTC of Tagum, supra; Ayala Corporation, et al.
v. The Honorable Job Maddayag, et al., G.R. No. 88421, 181 SCRA 687
[1990]) (Emphasis supplied).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., (Chairman), on leave.








[G.R. No. 66620. September 24, 1986]
REMEGIO V. FLORES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE HEILIA S.
MALLARE-PHILLIPPS, IGNACIO BINONGCAL & FERNANDO
CALION, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
FERIA, J .:
The Court rules that the application of the totality rule under Section 33(1)
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules is subject to
the requirements for the permissivejoinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule 3
which provides as follows:
"Permissive joinder of parties. - All persons in whom or against whom any right to
relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is
alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as
otherwise provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one
complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all
such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may
be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense
in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest."
Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order of
Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps of
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Benguet Province which
dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner did not attach
to his petition a copy of his complaint in the erroneous belief that the entire
original record of the case shall be transmitted to this Court pursuant to the
second paragraph of Section 39 of BP 129. This provision applies only to
ordinary appeals from the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals (Section
20 of the Interim Rules). Appeals to this Court by petition for review
on certiorari are governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Section 25 of the
Interim Rules).
However, the order appealed from states that the first cause of action
alleged in the complaint was against respondent Ignacio Binongcal for
refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires
which he purchased on credit from petitioner on various occasions from
August to October, 1981; and the second cause of action was against
respondent FernandoCalion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of
P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from
petitioner on several occasions from March, 1981 to January, 1982.
On December 15, 1983, counsel for respondent Binongcal filed a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the
demand against said respondent was only P11,643.00, and under Section
19(8) of BP 129 the regional trial court shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00). It was further averred in said motion that although another
person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount of
P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other
respondent. At the hearing of said Motion to Dismiss, counsel for
respondent Calion joined in moving for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. Counsel for petitioner opposed the Motion to
Dismiss. As above stated, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.
Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction over the case
following the "novel" totality rule introduced in Section 33(1) of BP 129 and
Section 11 of the Interim Rules.
The pertinent portion of Section 33(1) of BP 129 reads as follows:
"x x x Provided, That where there are several claims or causes of action between the
same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand
shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions x x x."
Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides thus:
"Application of the totality rule. - In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is
dependent on the amount involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum
of all the money demands, exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of whether
or not the separate claims are owned by or due to different parties. If any demand is
for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be specifically alleged."
Petitioner compares the above-quoted provisions with the pertinent portion
of the former rule under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended
which reads as follows:
"x x x Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same parties
embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
demand in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose
out of the same or different transactions; but where the claims or causes of action
joined in a single complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties, each
separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test x x x"
and argues that with the deletion of the proviso in the former rule, the totality
rule was reduced to clarity and brevity and the jurisdictional test is the totality
of the claims in all, not in each, of the causes of action, irrespective of whether
the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions.
This argument is partly correct. There is no difference between the former
and present rules in cases where a plaintiff sues a defendant on two or more
separate causes of action. In such cases, the amount of the demand shall be
the totality of the claims in all the causes of action irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. If the total
demand exceeds twenty thousand pesos, then the regional trial court has
jurisdiction. Needless to state, if the causes of action are separate and
independent, their joinder in one complaint is permissive and not mandatory,
and any cause of action where the amount of the demand is twenty thousand
pesos or less may be the subject of a separate complaint filed with a
metropolitan or municipal trial court.
On the other hand, there is a difference between the former and present
rules in cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action
against a defendant join in a single complaint. Under the former rule, "where
the claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are separately
owned by or due to different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the
jurisdictional test" (Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as
amended, supra). This was based on the ruling in the case
of Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace, 99 Phil. 693. As worded, the
former rule applied only to cases of
permissive joinder of parties plaintiff. However, it was also applicable to
cases of permissive joinder of parties defendant, as may be deduced from the
ruling in the case of Brillo vs. Buklatan, thus:
"Furthermore, the first cause of action is composed of separate claims against several
defendants of different amounts each of which is not more than P2,000 and falls under
the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court under section 88 of Republic Act No.
296. The several claims do not seem to arise from the same transaction or series of
transactions and there seem to be no questions of law or of fact common to all the
defendants as may warrant their joinder under Rule 3, section 6. Therefore, if new
complaints are to be filed in the name of the real party in interest they should be filed
in the justice of the peace court." (87 Phil. 519, 520, reiterated in Gacula vs. Martinez,
88 Phil. 142, 146)
Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where two
or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant join in
a single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has separate causes
of action against two or more defendants joined in a single complaint.
However, the causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against
the two or more defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series
of transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact, as
provided in Section 6 of Rule 3.
The difference between the former and present rules in cases of
permissive joinder of parties may be illustrated by the two cases which were
cited in the case of Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace (supra) as
exceptions to the totality rule. In the case of Soriano y Cia vs. Jose (86 Phil.
523), where twenty-nine dismissed employees joined in a complaint against
the defendant to collect their respective claims, each of which was within the
jurisdiction of the municipal court, although the total exceeded the
jurisdictional amount, this Court held that under the law then the municipal
court had jurisdiction. In said case, although the plaintiffs' demands were
separate, distinct and independent of one another, their joint suit was
authorized under Section 6 of Rule 3 and each separate claim furnished the
jurisdictional test. In the case of International Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza (90
Phil. 470), where twenty-five dismissed teachers jointly sued the defendant for
unpaid salaries, this Court also held that the municipal court had jurisdiction
because the amount of each claim was within, although the total exceeded, its
jurisdiction and it was a case of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff under
Section 6 of Rule 3.
Under the present law, the two cases above cited (assuming they do not
fall under the Labor Code) would be under the jurisdiction of the regional trial
court. Similarly, in the above-cited cases
ofBrillo vs. Buklatan and Gacula vs. Martinez (supra), if the separate claims
against the several defendants arose out of the same transaction or series of
transactions and there is a common question of law or fact, they would now
be under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
In other words, in cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as
plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims
shall now furnish the jurisdictional test.Needless to state also, if instead of
joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or
against the parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the
jurisdictional test.
In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test
is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and
Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that after a careful scrutiny of
the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason
that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and
distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur.
.

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