1

G.R. No. L-58184, Free Telephone Workers Union v. Hon. Minister of Labor, NLRC
and PLDT, 108 SCRA 757
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
October 30, 1981
G.R. No. L-58184
FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, and THE PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY, respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:The constitutionality of the amendment to the Article of the Labor
Code regarding strikes "affecting the national interest" 1 is assailed in this petition
which partakes of the nature of a prohibition proceeding filed by the Free
Telephone Workers Union. As amended, the Article now reads: "In labor disputes
causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national
interest, such as may occur in but not limited to public utilities, companies engaged
in the generation or distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and those within
export processing zones, the Minister of Labor and Employment may assume
jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of
automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout. If one has
already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked
out employees shall immediately return to work and the employers shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Minister may seek the
assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as
well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same." 2 It is the submission
of petitioner labor union that "Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 in so far as it amends
article 264 of the Labor Code delegating to the Honorable Minister of Labor and
Employment the power and discretion to assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes
for compulsory arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission, and in
effect make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining, is an undue delegation
of legislative powers. 3 There is likewise the assertion that such conferment of
authority "may also ran (sic) contrary to the assurance of the State to the workers'
right to self-organization and collective bargaining. 4
Fernando, J.:
The constitutionality of the amendment to the Article of the Labor Code regarding
strikes "affecting the national interest" 1 is assailed in this petition which partakes
of the nature of a prohibition proceeding filed by the Free Telephone Workers
Union. As amended, the Article now reads: "In labor disputes causing or likely to
cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest, such as may
occur in but not limited to public utilities, companies engaged in the generation or
distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and those within export processing zones,
2

the Minister of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute
and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration.
Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the
intended or impending strike or lockout. If one has already taken place at the time
of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall
immediately return to work and the employers shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing
before the strike or lockout. The Minister may seek the assistance of law
enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such
orders as he may issue to enforce the same." 2 It is the submission of petitioner
labor union that "Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 in so far as it amends article 264 of the
Labor Code delegating to the Honorable Minister of Labor and Employment the
power and discretion to assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory
arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission, and in effect make or
unmake the law on free collective bargaining, is an undue delegation of legislative
powers. 3 There is likewise the assertion that such conferment of authority "may
also ran (sic) contrary to the assurance of the State to the workers' right to self-
organization and collective bargaining. 4
On the CRUCIAL ISSUE PRESENTED; THE Court holds that petitioner was not able to
make out a case of an undue delegation of legislative power. There could be,
however, an unconstitutional application. For while the Constitution allows
compulsory arbitration, it must be stressed that the exercise of such competence
cannot ignore the basic fundamental principle and state policy that the state should
afford protection to labor. 5 Whenever, therefore, it is resorted to in labor disputes
causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts affecting national interest, the State
still is required to "assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. 6 At this
stage of the litigation, however, in the absence of factual determination by the
Ministry of Labor and the National Labor Relations Commission, this Court is not in
a position to rule on whether or not there is an unconstitutional application. There
was not even a categorical assertion to that effect by petitioner's counsel which was
indicative of the care in his choice of words. He only assumed that the conferment
of such authority may run counter to the right of the workers to self-organization
and collective bargaining. The petition then cannot prosper.
The facts alleged in the petition relevant for the purpose of determining whether or
not there is an undue delegation of legislative power do not sustain the claim of
petitioner union. On September 14, 1981, there was a notice of strike with the
Ministry of Labor for unfair labor practices stating the following grounds " 1)
Unilateral and arbitrary implementation of a Code of Conduct, a copy of which is
attached, to the detriment of the interest of our members; 2) Illegal terminations
and suspensions of our officers and members as a result of the implementation of
said Code of Conduct; and 3) Unconfirmation (sic) of call sick leaves and its
automatic treatment as Absence Without Official Leave of Absence (AWOL) with
corresponding suspensions, in violation of our Collective Bargaining Agreement." 7
After which came, on September 15, 1981, the notification to the Ministry that
there was compliance with the two-thirds strike vote and other formal
requirements of the law and Implementing Rules. 8 Several conciliation meetings
called by the Ministry followed, with petitioner manifesting its willingness to have a
revised Code of Conduct that would be fair to all concerned but with a plea that in
the meanwhile the Code of Conduct being imposed be suspended a position that
failed to meet the approval of private respondent. Subsequently, respondent, 9 on
3

September 25, 1981, certified the labor dispute to the National Labor Relations
Commission for compulsory arbitration and enjoined any strike at the private
respondent's establishment. 10 The labor dispute was set for hearing by
respondent National Labor Relations Commission on September 28,
1981. 11 There was in the main an admission of the above relevant facts by public
respondents. Private respondent, following the lead of petitioner labor union,
explained its side on the controversy regarding the Code of Conduct, the provisions
of which as alleged in the petition were quite harsh, resulting in what it deemed
indefinite preventive suspension apparently the principal cause of the labor
dispute. At this stage, as mentioned, it would be premature to discuss the merits, or
lack of it, of such claim, the matter being properly for the Ministry of Labor to
determine.
The very next day after the filing of the petition, to be exact on September 29,
1981, this Court issued the following resolution: "Considering the allegations
contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition
for certiorari with prayer for a restraining order, the Court Resolved to (a) require
the respondents to file an [answer], not a motion to dismiss, on or before
Wednesday, October 7, 1981; and (b) [Set] this case for hearing on Thursday,
October 8, 1981 at 11:00 o'clock in the morning. 12 After the parties were duly
heard, Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza 13 appearing for the public
respondents, the case was considered ripe for decision. 14
To repeat, while the unconstitutionality of the amendatory act has not been
demonstrated, there is no ruling on the question of unconstitutional application,
especially so as to any alleged infringement in the exercise of the power of
compulsory arbitration of the specific modes provided in the Constitution to assure
compliance with the constitutional mandate to "afford protection to labor" being at
this stage premature.
1. The allegation that there is undue delegation of legislative powers cannot stand
the test of scrutiny. The power which he would deny the Minister of Labor by virtue
of such principle is for petitioner labor union within the competence of the
President, who in its opinion can best determine national interests, but only when a
strike is in progress. 15 Such admission is qualified by the assumption that the
President "can make law," " an assertion which need not be passed upon in this
petition.'What possesses significance for the purpose of this litigation is that it is the
President who "Shall have control of the ministries. 16 It may happen, therefore,
that a single person may occupy a dual position of Minister and Assemblyman. To
the extent, however, that what is involved is the execution or enforcement of
legislation, the Minister is an official of the executive branch of the government.
The adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended
Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential character. Article VII on the
presidency starts with this provision: "The President shall be the head of state and
chief executive of the Republic of the Philippines. 17 Its last section is an even more
emphatic affirmation that it is a presidential system that obtains in our government.
Thus: "All powers vested in the President of the Philippines under the 1935
Constitution and the laws of the land which are not herein provided for or
conferred upon any official shall be deemed and are hereby vested in the President
unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise. 18 There is a provision, of
course, on the Prime Minister, but the Constitution is explicit that while he shall be
the head of the Cabinet, it is the President who nominates him from among the
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members of the Batasang Pambansa, thereafter being "elected by a majority of all
the members thereof. 19 He is primarily, therefore, a Presidential choice. He need
not even come from its elected members. He is responsible, along with the Cabinet,
to the Batasang Pambansa for the program of government but as "approved by the
President. 20 His term of office as Prime Minister "shall commence from the date of
his election by the Batasang Pambansa and shall end on the date that the
nomination of his successor is submitted by the President to the Batasang
Pambansa. Any other member of the Cabinet or the Executive Committee may be
removed at the discretion of the President. 21 Even the duration of his term then
depends on the Presidential pleasure, not on legislative approval or lack of it.
During his incumbency, he exercises supervision over all ministries, 22 a recognition
of the important role he plays in the implementation of the policy of the
government, the legislation duly enacted in pursuance thereof, and the decrees and
orders of the President. To the Prime Minister can thus be delegated the
performance of the administrative functions of the President, who can then devote
more time and energy in the fulfillment of his exacting role as the national leader.
23 As the only one whose constituency is national it is the President who, by virtue
of his election by the entire electorate, has an indisputable claim to speak for the
country as a whole. Moreover, it is he who is explicitly granted the greater power of
control of such ministries. He continues to be the Executive, the amplitude and
scope of the functions entrusted to him in the formulation of policy and its
execution leading to the apt observation by Laski that there is not one aspect of
which that does not affect the lives of all. The Prime Minister can be of valuable
assistance indeed to the President in the discharge of his awesome responsibility,
but it is the latter who is vested with powers, aptly characterized by Justice Laurel in
Planas v. Gil 24 as "broad and extraordinary [being] expected to govern with a firm
and steady hand without vexation or embarrassing interference and much less
dictation from any source. 25 It may be said that Justice Laurel was referring to his
powers under the 1935 Constitution. It suffices to refer anew to the last section of
the article of the present Constitution on the presidency to the effect that all
powers vested in the President of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution
remain with him. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that under the 1935
Constitution. "The Executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines. 26
2. A later decision, Villena v. Secretary of Interior 27 greater relevance to this case.
The opinion of Justice Laurel, again the ponente, made clear that under the
presidential system, "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive. 28 At the time of the adoption of the present Constitution on
January 17, 1973, this Court had cited with approval the above ruling of Villena in
twelve cases. 29 It is particularly noteworthy that the first decision promulgated
under the present Constitution reiterating the above doctrine is Philippine
American Management Co. v. Philippine American Management Employees
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Association. 30 For the question therein involved, as in this case, is the statutory
grant of authority to the then Secretary of Labor, now Minister of Labor, by the
Minimum Wage Law to refer to the then existing Court of Industrial Relations for
arbitration the dispute that led to a strike. It is indisputable, according to the
opinion, that in the very petition, the Secretary of Labor on January 6, 1972,
pursuant to the Minimum Wage Law, "endorsed the controversy on the precise
question of whether or not petitioner Philippine American Management Company
was complying with its mandatory terms. What was done by him, as a department
head, in the regular course of business and conformably to a statutory provision is,
according to settled jurisprudence that dates back to an authoritative
pronouncement by Justice Laurel in 1939 in Villena v. Secretary of the Interior,
presumptively the act of the President, who is the only dignitary who could,
paraphrasing the language of the decision, disapprove or reprobate it. What other
response could be legitimately expected from respondent Court then? It could not
just simply fold its hands and refuse to pass on the dispute. 31 The Villena doctrine
was stressed even more in denying a motion for reconsideration by a more
extensive citation from the ponencia of Justice Laurel: "Without minimizing the
importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality
but the projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly
characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, "each
head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of
that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority." ...
Secretaries of departments, of course, exercise certain powers under the law but
the law cannot impair or in any way affect the constitutional power of control and
direction of the President. As a matter of executive policy, they may be granted
departmental autonomy as to certain matters but this is by mere concession of the
executive, in the absence of valid legislation in the particular field. If the President,
then, is the authority in the Executive Department, he assumes the corresponding
responsibility. The head of a department is a man of his confidence; he control and
directs his acts; he appoints him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the
executive, not any of his secretaries. It is therefore logical that he, the President,
should be answerable for the acts of administration of the entire Executive
Department before his own conscience no less than before that undefined power of
public opinion which, in the language of Daniel Webster, is the last repository of
popular government. 32 So it should be in this case.
3. Even on the assumption, indulged in solely because of the claim earnestly and
vigorously pressed by counsel for petitioner, that the authority conferred to the
Minister of Labor partakes of a legislative character, still no case of an unlawful
delegation of such power may be discerned. That is the teaching from Edu v. Ericta
33 Thus: "What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to
make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute
in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature, To
determine whether or riot there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the
inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The
legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done,
who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that
may indeed be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A
distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally
may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be
6

made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the
necessary resources of flexibility and practicability. To avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the
legislature itself determines matters principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard
thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies
the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose
may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated
may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and
regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-
delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled
out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as a whole. ... This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by
Justice Laurel in a decision [Pangasinan Transportation v. Public Service
Commission] announced not-too-long after the Constitution came into force and
effect that the principle of non-delegation 'has been made to adapt itself to the
complexities of modem governments giving rise to the adoption, within certain
limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and
England but in practically all modern governments He continued: 'Accordingly, with
the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws,
there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by
the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.' Consistency
with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is
authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it
leaves the hands of Congress being assumed. Our later decisions speak to the same
effect. Thus from Justice J.B.L. Reyes in People v. Exconde; 'It is well established in
this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that
corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may constitutionally
delegate authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds
it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious
and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is
required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of
the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the
standards that the law prescribes.' 34 Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 cannot be any
clearer, the coverage being limited to "strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the
national interest."
4. The strict rule on non-delegation was enunciated by Justice Laurel in People v.
Vera, 35 Which declared unconstitutional the then Probation Act. 36 Such an
approach, conceded, by some constitutionalists to be both scholarly and erudite
nonetheless aroused apprehension for being too rigid and inflexible. While no
doubt appropriate in that particular case, the institution of a new mode of treating
offenders, it may pose difficulty for social and economic legislation needed by the
times. Even prior to the above-cited Pangasinan Transportation decision, Justice
Laurel himself in an earlier decision, People v. Rosenthal in 1939, promulgated less
than two years after Vera, pointed out that such doctrine of non-delegation "has
been made to adopt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise
to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of 'subordinate legislation' not
only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments.
The difficulty lies in the fixing of the limit and extent of the authority. While courts
7

have undertaken to lay down general principles, the safest is to decide each case
according to its peculiar environment, having in mind the wholesome legislative
purpose intended to be achieved. 37 After which, in came the even more explicit
formulation in Pangasinan Transportation appearing in the quoted excerpt from
Edu v. Ericta. There is no question therefore that there is a marked drift in the
direction of a more liberal approach. It is partly in recognition of the ever increasing
needs for the type of legislation allowing rule-making in accordance with standards,
explicit or implicit, discernible from a perusal of the entire enactment that in
Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration v. Confederation of
Unions in Government Corporations and Offices" 38 the then Justice, now the
retired Chief Justice and presently Speaker, Makalintal had occasion to refer to "the
growing complexities of society" as well as "the increasing social challenges of the
times. 39 It would be self-defeating in the extreme if the legislation intended to
cope with the grave social and economic problems of the present and foreseeable
future would founder on the rock of an unduly restrictive and decidedly unrealistic
meaning to be affixed to the doctrine of non-delegation. Fortunately with the
retention in the amended Constitution of some features of the 1973 Constitution as
originally adopted leading to an appreciable measure of concord and harmony
between the policy-making branches of the government, executive and legislative,
the objection on the grounds of non- delegation would be even less persuasive. It is
worth repeating that the Prime Minister, while the choice of the President, must
have the approval of all members of the Batasang Pambansa. 40 At least the
majority of the cabinet members, the Ministers being appointed by the President, if
heads of ministries, shall come from its regional representatives. 41 So, also, while
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet are responsible to the Batasang Pambansa for
the program of government, it must be one "approved by the President. 42 While
conceptually, there still exists a distinction between the enactment of legislation
and its execution, between formulation and implementation, the fundamental
principle of separation of powers of which non-delegation is a logical corollary
becomes even more flexible and malleable. Even in the case of the United States,
with its adherence to the Madisonian concept of separation of powers, President
Kennedy could state that its Constitution did not make "the Presidency and
Congress rivals for power but partners for progress [with the two branches] being
trustees for the people, custodians of their
heritage. 43 With the closer relationship provided for by the amended Constitution
in our case, there is likely to be even more promptitude and dispatch in framing the
policies and thereafter unity and vigor in their execution. A rigid application of the
non-delegation doctrine, therefore, would be an obstacle to national efforts at
development and progress. There is accordingly more receptivity to laws leaving to
administrative and executive agencies the adoption of such means as may be
necessary to effectuate a valid legislative purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-
respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe as early as 1947, could speak of delegation
as the "dynamo of modern government. 44 He then went on to state that "the
occasions for delegating power to administrative offices [could be] compassed by a
single generalization. 45 Thus: "Power should be delegated where there is
agreement that a task must be performed and it cannot be effectively performed by
the legislature without the assistance of a delegate or without an expenditure of
time so great as to lead to the neglect of equally important business. Delegation is
most commonly indicated where the relations to be regulated are highly technical
or where their regulation requires a course of continuous decision. 46 His
perceptive study could rightfully conclude that even in a strictly presidential system
8

like that of the United States, the doctrine of non-delegation reflects the American
"political philosophy that insofar as possible issues be settled [by legislative bodies],
an essentially restrictive approach" may ignore "deep currents of social force. 47 In
plainer terms, and as applied to the Philippines under the amended Constitution
with the close ties that bind the executive and legislative departments, certain
features of parliamentarism having been retained, it may be a deterrent factor to
much needed legislation. The spectre of the non-delegation concept need not
haunt, therefore, party caucuses, cabinet sessions or legislative chambers.
5. By way of summary, this Court holds that Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 insofar as it
empowers the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes causing
or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest and
thereafter decide it or certify the same the National Labor Relations Commission is
not on its face unconstitutional for being violative of the doctrine of non-delegation
of legislative power. To repeat, there is no ruling on the question of whether or not
it has been unconstitutionally applied in this case, for being repugnant to the
regime of self-organization and free collective bargaining, as on the facts alleged,
disputed by private respondent, the matter is not ripe for judicial determination. It
must be stressed anew, however, that the power of compulsory arbitration, while
allowable under the Constitution and quite understandable in labor disputes
affected with a national interest, to be free from the taint of unconstitutionality,
must be exercised in accordance with the constitutional mandate of protection to
labor. The arbiter then is called upon to take due care that in the decision to be
reached, there is no violation of "the rights of workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.
48 It is of course manifest that there is such unconstitutional application if a law
"fair on its face and impartial in appearance (is) applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand. 49 It does not even have to go that
far. An instance of unconstitutional application would be discernible if what is
ordained by the fundamental law, the protection of labor, is ignored or disregarded.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. During the pendency of the
compulsory arbitration proceedings, both petitioner labor union and private
respondent are enjoined to good faith compliance with the provisions of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130. No costs.
Barredo, Makasiar, Concepci
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Baguio City

EN BANC

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY G.R. No. 190582
represented herein by its Chair,
DANTON REMOTO,
Petitioner, Present:

PUNO, C. J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
9


COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:
Respondent. April 8, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much.
That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the
right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.

Justice Robert A. Jackson
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette
[1]


One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that
others may make different choices choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we
may disapprove of, even choices that may shock or offend or anger us. However, choices are
not to be legally prohibited merely because they are different, and the right to disagree and
debate about important questions of public policy is a core value protected by our Bill of
Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity
and difference in opinion.

Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the
definitions and demands of morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are
concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet
herein lies the paradox philosophical justifications about what is moral are indispensable
and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court recognizes,
however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates; accommodation is
better than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This will allow persons of
diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.

Factual Background

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party
(Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated
November 11, 2009
[2]
(the First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009
[3]
(the Second
Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case
has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization
under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.
[4]


Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated
in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application
for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial
membership base. OnAugust 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition
[5]
for registration
with the COMELEC.

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized
and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and
violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their
sexual orientation; and thatAng Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by
this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.
[6]
Ang
Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and
organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.
[7]


10

On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC
(Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner
defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT)
Community, thus:

x x x a marginalized and under-represented
sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of
their sexual orientation and gender identity.

and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:

x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound
emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and
intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a
different gender, of the same gender, or more than
one gender.

This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that
petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs. In Romans
1:26, 27, Paul wrote:

For this cause God gave them up into vile
affections, for even their women did change the
natural use into that which is against nature: And
likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the
woman, burned in their lust one toward another;
men with men working that which is unseemly, and
receiving in themselves that recompense of their
error which was meet.

In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:

For ye practice your lusts on men in
preference to women ye are indeed a people
transgressing beyond bounds. (7.81) And we rained
down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see
what was the end of those who indulged in sin and
crime! (7:84) He said: O my Lord! Help Thou me
against people who do mischief (29:30).

As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment
dated October 2, 2008:

The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates
sexual immorality as indicated in the Petitions par.
6F: Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays
and lesbians who are already of age. It is further
indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for
the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or
MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000
(Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom andGomorrah).

Laws are deemed incorporated in every
contract, permit, license, relationship, or
accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of
the requirement to be complied with for
accreditation.

ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the
Civil Code which defines nuisance as Any act,
omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks,
defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x

It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil
Code: The contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they
may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides
that Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy are inexistent and void from the
beginning.

Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene
publications and exhibitions and indecent shows as follows:

Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene
publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows.
11

The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from
six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such
imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:

1. Those who shall publicly expound or
proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;

2. (a) The authors of obscene literature,
published with their knowledge in any form; the
editors publishing such literature; and the
owners/operators of the establishment selling the
same;

(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs,
cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent
or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being
understood that the obscene literature or indecent or
immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live or
in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall
include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone
crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the
market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend
any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use
of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law,
public order, morals, good customs, established
policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.

3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit
films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which
are offensive to morals.

Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for
advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it
said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not
violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the
elections.

Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be
exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform to the
teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer
in the U.S.A.said in one article that older practicing homosexuals are a
threat to the youth. As an agency of the government, ours too is the
States avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to
protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation.
[8]



When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,
[9]
three commissioners voted to
overturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V.
Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang
Ladlads Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle,
and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority
in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:

I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941

Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the
party-list system. Even assuming that it has properly proven its under-
representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlads
expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.

Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the
purpose of the party-list system of electing congressional representatives
is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-
represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives.

If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the
ability of an organization to represent its constituencies, then all
representative organizations would have found themselves into the
party-list race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the law. The
party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of
misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list
system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized
individuals whose interests are also the nations only that their
interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation because
of their under representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able
to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender
12

identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation
under the party-list system will remain just that.

II. No substantial differentiation

In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades
Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not recognize lesbians, gays,
homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a special class of individuals. x x
x Significantly, it has also been held that homosexuality is not a
constitutionally protected fundamental right, and that nothing in the
U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable intent to protect or promote
the social or legal equality of homosexual relations, as in the case of
race or religion or belief.

x x x x

Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance
of LGBTs is elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies
are still males and females, and they will remain either male or female
protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.

x x x x

IV. Public Morals

x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian
or Muslim religious practices. Neither is there any attempt to any
particular religious groups moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being
adopted as moral parameters and precepts are generally accepted public
morals. They are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines
cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian
upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions
have sipped [sic] into society and these are not publicly accepted moral
norms.

V. Legal Provisions

But above morality and social norms, they have become part of
the law of the land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the
penalty of prision mayor upon Those who shall publicly expound or
proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals. It penalizes
immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and indecent
shows. Ang Ladlad apparently falls under these legal provisions. This is
clear from its Petitions paragraph 6F: Consensual partnerships or
relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age It is further
indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: In
2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were
estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines
nuisance as any act, omission x x x or anything else x x x which shocks,
defies or disregards decency or morality x x x. These are all unlawful.
[10]



On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the
Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads application for
accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory
injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin
printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.

On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its
Comment on behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010.
[11]
Instead
of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be
given until January 16, 2010 to Comment.
[12]
Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a
Comment in support of petitioners application.
[13]
Thus, in order to give COMELEC the
opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we required it to file its own comment.
[14]
The
COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its Comment on February 2, 2010.
[15]


In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary
restraining order on January 12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until further
orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the
Assailed Resolutions.
[16]


Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion
to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-
13

Intervention.
[17]
The CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladlads petition on moral grounds
violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHRs motion to intervene.

On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene
[18]
which
motion was granted on February 2, 2010.
[19]


The Parties Arguments

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened
its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of
laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.

The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in
denying petitioners application for registration since there was no basis for COMELECs
allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own special interests and
concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate
classification. However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioners freedom of
speech, expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that there had been
no restrictions on these rights.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete
and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not
among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made
untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual
verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.

Our Ruling

We grant the petition.

Compliance with the
Requirements of the Constitution
and Republic Act No. 7941


The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground that
the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated
with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said
sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be
registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,
[20]
the enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition
when it alleged that it had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate
organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field personnel, it was
14

shown that save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in almost
all provinces in the country.
[21]

This argument that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it
alleged its national existence is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner
was not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives
have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the
elections. Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioners accreditation mentioned or
even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious, considering that
the reports of petitioners alleged non-existence were already available to the COMELEC
prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at
worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondents theory, and a serious violation of
petitioners right to procedural due process.

Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal
of Ang Ladlads initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of
the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was
estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members
around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group.
[22]
Ang Ladlad also
represented itself to be a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around
the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:

Abra Gay Association
Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan
Albay Gay Association
Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija
Boys Legion Metro Manila
Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
Cant Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) Metro Manila
Cebu Pride Cebu City
Circle of Friends
Dipolog Gay Association Zamboanga del Norte
Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality
(GALANG) Metro Manila
Gay Mens Support Group (GMSG) Metro Manila
Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) Lanao del
Norte
Iloilo City Gay Association Iloilo City
Kabulig Writers Group Camarines Sur
Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
LUMINA Baguio City
Marikina Gay Association Metro Manila
Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) Metro Manila
Naga City Gay Association Naga City
ONE BACARDI
Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) Metro Manila
PUP LAKAN
RADAR PRIDEWEAR
Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. Metro Manila
San Jose del Monte Gay Association Bulacan
Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family Rizal
Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP)
Metro Manila
Soul Jive Antipolo, Rizal
The Link Davao City
Tayabas Gay Association Quezon
Womens Bisexual Network Metro Manila
Zamboanga Gay Association Zamboanga City
[23]



Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT
or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of
these regions. In fact, if COMELECs findings are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist
in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlads principal place of business.

Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs
moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the
respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list
15

organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong
Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof.

Religion as the Basis for Refusal to
Accept Ang Ladlads Petition for
Registration


Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom,
what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious
matters.
[24]
Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this
policy of neutrality.
[25]
We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment
clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad.

Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions
should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for
its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government
must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held
in Estrada v. Escritor:
[26]


x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily
secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious
teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public
order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds
articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon
religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting
policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard
as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be
compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious
belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom.
Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would
tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove
contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the
policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for
all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are
disapproved are second-class citizens.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of
immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a
secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because
it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend
the existence and progress of human society" and not because the
conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although
admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling
influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions
would be considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all,
they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious
opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the
human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual
institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with
heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or
utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and
discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the
religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and
the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine
constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent
neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must
pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to
uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible
constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is
secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.
[27]



Public Morals as a Ground to
Deny Ang Ladlads Petition for
Registration


Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and
homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally
accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues:
16


Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily because
their group consists of LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the
people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a
sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in having sexual
relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will
bring down the standard of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any
society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own
existence.
[28]



We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and
perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not
difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure religious beliefs, convictions about the
preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals
themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not
seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these generally accepted
public morals have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.
[29]


The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed
by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that there should have been a finding by the COMELEC
that the groups members have committed or are committing immoral acts.
[30]
The OSG
argues:

x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same
gender, of a different gender, or more than one gender, but mere
attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide
between thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral
thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of
disqualification cases against both the straights and the gays. Certainly
this is not the intendment of the law.
[31]



Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or
why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to
justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so harmful
as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the
state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and
sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will and should continue to restrict
behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance
advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of an
argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and
explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare
invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.

We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and
civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a
nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which
shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution
under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without
judicial proceedings.
[32]
A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other
hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly
needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere
blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal
proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list
system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a
statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest. Respondents blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable
17

conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any
particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal
protection clause.

Equal Protection

Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides
nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws, courts have never interpreted
the provision as an absolute prohibition on classification. Equality, said Aristotle, consists
in the same treatment of similar persons.
[33]
The equal protection clause guarantees that no
person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed
by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.
[34]


Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right
nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end.
[35]
In Central Bank Employees Association,
Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
[36]
we declared that [i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of
analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have followed the rational basis test, coupled
with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law
unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
[37]


The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers
homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to
disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has
expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or
parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion
is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here that is, moral disapproval of
an unpopular minority is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational
basis review under the equal protection clause. The COMELECs differentiation, and its
unsubstantiated claim thatAng Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation
that would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of
or dislike for a disfavored group.

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis
as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally
burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and
they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized
and under-represented sectors.

It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs from
heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law
distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances
would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSGs position that homosexuals are a class in
themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause.
[38]
We are not prepared to single
out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have
not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a
ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized under the same
basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made an unwarranted
and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case.

Freedom of Expression and
Association

Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and
attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic
18

means.
[39]
It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should
be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:
[40]


In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral
ideas is distilled in the public square. Where citizens are free, every
opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment
has access to the public square where people deliberate the order of
their life together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion
shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these citizens have equal
access to the public square. In this representative democracy, the state is
prohibited from determining which convictions and moral judgments
may be proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally
designed process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a
necessary principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when public
deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws
will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the
mainstream or median groups.Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting
and accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies including
protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority, however small
not only for a majority, however large but for each of us" the majority
imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what
it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.


Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received
but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must
be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is
not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated,
the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than
promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.

This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is
not illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions concerning ones homosexuality
and the activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected
as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming
public perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify
criminalizing same-sex conduct.
[41]
European and United Nations judicial decisions have
ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality grounds, citing general
privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and international texts.
[42]
To the extent
that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we face
here, such jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not
formally binding on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the
Courts analysis.

In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled
that existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In
order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions must
show that their actions were caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.
[43]


With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in
Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
has repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a change in the law or the
constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it
proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political
ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means
must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of
association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the
majority of the population.
[44]
A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks
to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying
19

everyone concerned.
[45]
Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that
are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of
association guarantee.
[46]


We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual
conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that
view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal
fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to
heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view. However,
as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or moral views
of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of other members of
the community.

Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights
litigants. It well may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy
between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more complex moral
sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect
a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor
expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this Decision.

The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent
punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right
to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or
association. The OSG argues that:

There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or
any assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to review
and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party applying to
participate in the party-list system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be
said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.

x x x x

A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the
members of the petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of elections.
Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to
vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.

As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election,
petitioner contends that the denial of Ang Ladlads petition has the clear
and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of
its members to fully and equally participate in public life through
engagement in the party list elections.

This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a
right but a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. x x x
[47]

The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to
participate in the party-list system, and as advanced by the OSG itself the moral objection
offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that
the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELECs action, from publicly expressing its
views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other
equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of
petitioners fundamental rights.

Non-Discrimination and
International Law


In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and
promise, international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt
to bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and groups struggling
with inadequate structural and governmental support, international human rights norms are
particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that
such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.
20


Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect
and promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-
discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and
the ICCPR.

The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:

Article 26

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.


In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general
application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual
orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for
discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that
the reference to sex in Article 26 should be construed to include sexual
orientation.
[48]
Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international
agreements.
[49]


The UDHR provides:

Article 21.

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of
his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

Likewise, the ICCPR states:

Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without
any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable
restrictions:

(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or
through freely chosen representatives;

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret
ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;

(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public
service in his country.


As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to
electoral participation is elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General
Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:

1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the
right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right
to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public service.
Whatever form of constitution or government is in force, the Covenant
requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy
the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government
based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles
of the Covenant.

x x x x

15. The effective implementation of the right and the
opportunity to stand for elective office ensures that persons entitled to
vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to
stand for election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on objective
21

and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for
election should not be excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory
requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason of
political affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or
disadvantage of any kind because of that person's candidacy. States
parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which
exclude any group or category of persons from elective office.
[50]


We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the
responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines international law obligations, the blanket
invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the
petitioners invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human
Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity),
[51]
which petitioner
declares to reflect binding principles of international law.

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta
Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and
obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of
international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law
enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.
[52]
Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged
principles of international law to ascertain their true status.

We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain segment of
society wants or demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human
intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of
what passes for human rights today is a much broader context of needs that identifies many
social desires as rights in order to further claims that international law obliges states to
sanction these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human rights, and is a result of
the notion that if wants are couched in rights language, then they are no longer
controversial.

Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a
declaration formulated by various international law professors, are at best de lege
ferenda and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of
contemporary international law is characterized by the soft law nomenclature, i.e.,
international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and
respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires,
without the support of either State practice oropinio juris.
[53]


As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this
case are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious
communities are divided in opinion. This Courts role is not to impose its own view of
acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can,
uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is
resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are
hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners
application for party-list accreditation.
SO ORDERED.

22

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000]
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA,
GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO
REYES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional
grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the
deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to join the Philippine
National Police (the PNP) in visibility patrols around the metropolis.
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like
robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive,
ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose
of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the AFP), the Chief of the PNP and
the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and
implement the said order. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP
Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of
Instruction 02/2000
[1]
(the LOI) which detailed the manner by which the joint
visibility patrols, called Task ForceTulungan, would be conducted.
[2]
Task
Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro
Manila.
Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the
deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed
to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief.
[3]
In the Memorandum, the
President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro
Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including increased
police patrols.
[4]
The President further stated that to heighten police visibility in the
metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary.
[5]
Invoking his powers as
Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or
suppressing criminal or lawless violence.
[6]
Finally, the President declared that the
services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature
and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have
improved.
[7]

The LOI explains the concept of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility
patrols as follows:
x x x
2. PURPOSE:
The Joint Implementing Police Visibility Patrols between the PNP NCRPO and the
Philippine Marines partnership in the conduct of visibility patrols in Metro Manila
for the suppression of crime prevention and other serious threats to national
security.
3. SITUATION:
Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated not only by ordinary
criminals but also by organized syndicates whose members include active and
former police/military personnel whose training, skill, discipline and firepower
prove well-above the present capability of the local police alone to handle. The
deployment of a joint PNP NCRPO-Philippine Marines in the conduct of police
visibility patrol in urban areas will reduce the incidence of crimes specially those
perpetrated by active or former police/military personnel.
4. MISSION:
The PNP NCRPO will organize a provisional Task Force to conduct joint NCRPO-PM
visibility patrols to keep Metro Manila streets crime-free, through a sustained street
patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes especially those
perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include those that are
well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/Military personnel.
5. CONCEPT IN JOINT VISIBILITY PATROL OPERATIONS:
a. The visibility patrols shall be conducted jointly by the NCRPO [National Capital
Regional Police Office] and the Philippine Marines to curb criminality in Metro
23

Manila and to preserve the internal security of the state against insurgents and
other serious threat to national security, although the primary responsibility over
Internal Security Operations still rests upon the AFP.
b. The principle of integration of efforts shall be applied to eradicate all forms of
high-profile crimes perpetrated by organized crime syndicates operating in Metro
Manila. This concept requires the military and police to work cohesively and unify
efforts to ensure a focused, effective and holistic approach in addressing crime
prevention. Along this line, the role of the military and police aside from
neutralizing crime syndicates is to bring a wholesome atmosphere wherein delivery
of basic services to the people and development is achieved. Hand-in-hand with this
joint NCRPO-Philippine Marines visibility patrols, local Police Units are responsible
for the maintenance of peace and order in their locality.
c. To ensure the effective implementation of this project, a provisional Task Force
TULUNGAN shall be organized to provide the mechanism, structure, and
procedures for the integrated planning, coordinating, monitoring and assessing the
security situation.
xxx.
[8]

The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle,
North Edsa (SM City), Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati
Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic Airport.
[9]

On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the IBP) filed the
instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the
Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that:
I
THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF
THE CONSTITUTION, IN THAT:
A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY,
EVEN ONLY REMOTELY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
WORK; HENCE, SAID DEPLOYMENT IS IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF
THE CONSTITUTION;
B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN
A CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF
ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF THE CONSTITUTION;
C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE
MILITARY TO PERFORM THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.
II
IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS
UNWITTINGLY MAKING THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD
REALLY BE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.
[10]

Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the
bounden duty to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, the IBP questions the
validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law
enforcement.
Without granting due course to the petition, the Court in a
Resolution,
[11]
dated 25 January 2000, required the Solicitor General to file his
Comment on the petition. On 8 February 2000, the Solicitor General submitted his
Comment.
The Solicitor General vigorously defends the constitutionality of the act of the
President in deploying the Marines, contending, among others, that petitioner has
no legal standing; that the question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for
judicial scrutiny since the same involves a political question; that the organization
and conduct of police visibility patrols, which feature the team-up of one police
officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not violate the civilian supremacy
clause in the Constitution.
The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has
legal standing; (2) Whether or not the Presidents factual determination of the
necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review; and, (3) Whether
or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and
the civilian character of the PNP.
The petition has no merit.
First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the
requisites of standing to raise the issues in the petition. Second, the President did
not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor
did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the Constitution.
The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, to wit:
24

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied
with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal
and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
[12]

The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
[13]
The
term interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest.
[14]
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
[15]

In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged
responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this
declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus
standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and
nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in
this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the
whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present
a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental
purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the
standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of justice is alien
to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines. It should also be
noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the petition,
is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present
action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have
varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly
authorized the National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific
injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental
act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has
sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility
patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their
civil liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP
projects as injurious is the supposed militarization of law enforcement which
might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than
good in the long run. Not only is the presumed injury not personal in character, it
is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of
standing. Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal
injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess the personality
to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however, does
not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise constitutional
issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy
this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.
Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the
discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of
legal standing when paramount interest is involved.
[16]
In not a few cases, the Court
has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people.
[17]
Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public,
the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.
[18]
In this case, a reading of
the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve
the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and
lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the
Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost
certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves
the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than
later.
The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.

In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns the factual determination
of the President of the necessity of calling the armed forces, particularly the
25

Marines, to aid the PNP in visibility patrols. In this regard, the IBP admits that the
deployment of the military personnel falls under the Commander-in-Chief powers
of the President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically,
the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. What the IBP questions, however, is the basis for the calling
of the Marines under the aforestated provision. According to the IBP, no emergency
exists that would justify the need for the calling of the military to assist the police
force. It contends that no lawless violence, invasion or rebellion exist to warrant
the calling of the Marines. Thus, the IBP prays that this Court review the
sufficiency of the factual basis for said troop [Marine] deployment.
[19]

The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the issue pertaining to
the necessity of calling the armed forces is not proper for judicial scrutiny since it
involves a political question and the resolution of factual issues which are beyond
the review powers of this Court.
As framed by the parties, the underlying issues are the scope of presidential
powers and limits, and the extent of judicial review. But, while this Court gives
considerable weight to the parties formulation of the issues, the resolution of the
controversy may warrant a creative approach that goes beyond the narrow confines
of the issues raised. Thus, while the parties are in agreement that the power
exercised by the President is the power to call out the armed forces, the Court is of
the view that the power involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace
and order and promotion of the general welfare.
[20]
For one, the realities on the
ground do not show that there exist a state of warfare, widespread civil unrest or
anarchy. Secondly, the full brunt of the military is not brought upon the citizenry, a
point discussed in the latter part of this decision. In the words of the late Justice
Irene Cortes in Marcos v. Manglapus:
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the Presidents powers as
protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The American Presidency]. The power of the
President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-
chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and
internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with
extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to
the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic
tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion,
within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in
any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the
commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the
enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the Presidents
exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces,
or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in
order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.
xxx
[21]

Nonetheless, even if it is conceded that the power involved is the Presidents
power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion, the resolution of the controversy will reach a similar result.
We now address the Solicitor Generals argument that the issue involved is not
susceptible to review by the judiciary because it involves a political question, and
thus, not justiciable.
As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter
which is appropriate for court review.
[22]
It pertains to issues which are inherently
susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless, the Court
does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought
before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein
the Court hesitates to rule on are political questions. The reason is that political
questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality,
of a particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question
being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere
with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need
for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.
As Taada v. Cuenco
[23]
puts it, political questions refer to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of government. Thus, if an issue is clearly identified
by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular
branch of government or to the people themselves then it is held to be a political
question. In the classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v.
Carr,
[24]
[p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question
is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
courts undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one question.
26

The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that
(T)he Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
[25]
Under this definition, the Court cannot
agree with the Solicitor General that the issue involved is a political question
beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. When the grant of power is
qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed
qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is
justiciable - the problem being one of legality or validity, not its
wisdom.
[26]
Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been
given to this Court.
[27]
When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits
the determination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is
being questioned.
[28]

By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility.
[29]
Under this definition, a court is without power to
directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been
delegated. But while this Court has no power to substitute its judgment for that of
Congress or of the President, it may look into the question of whether such exercise
has been made in grave abuse of discretion.
[30]
A showing that plenary power is
granted either department of government, may not be an obstacle to judicial
inquiry, for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable
controversy.
[31]

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely
vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text
of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the
Presidents wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional
limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full
discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is
incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally
bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as
there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for
calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the
proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was
exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian
supremacy over the military. In the performance of this Courts duty of purposeful
hesitation
[32]
before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only
where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with
the Presidents judgment. To doubt is to sustain.
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the
President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the
necessity for the exercise of such power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
which embodies the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, provides in
part:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding
sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
x x x
The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for
the exercise of the calling out power is also implied and further reinforced in the
rest of Section 18, Article VII which reads, thus:
x x x
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in
person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at
least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by
the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call.
27

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize
the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.
Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or
suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis
thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation
or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction
places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare
martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the
three powers and provided for their revocation and review without any
qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to other matters.
[33]
That the intent of the Constitution is exactly what its
letter says, i.e., that the power to call is fully discretionary to the President, is extant
in the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission, to wit:
FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a graduated
power of the President as Commander-in-Chief. First, he can call out such Armed
Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless violence; then he can suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then he can impose martial law. This is a
graduated sequence.
When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, his judgment is subject to review. We are making it
subject to review by the Supreme Court and subject to concurrence by the National
Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser power of calling on the Armed Forces,
when he says it is necessary, it is my opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed
by anybody.
x x x
FR. BERNAS. Let me just add that when we only have imminent danger, the matter
can be handled by the first sentence: The President may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. So we feel that that
is sufficient for handling imminent danger.
MR. DE LOS REYES. So actually, if a President feels that there is imminent danger,
the matter can be handled by the First Sentence: The President....may call out such
Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. So we
feel that that is sufficient for handling imminent danger, of invasion or rebellion,
instead of imposing martial law or suspending the writ ofhabeas corpus, he must
necessarily have to call the Armed Forces of the Philippines as their Commander-in-
Chief. Is that the idea?
MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it
subject to judicial review.
[34]

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers
highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest
discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and
more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the
curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms,
and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by this Court.
Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose
martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or
rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not required in
the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that
whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The implication is that
the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power
to call as compared to the two other powers.
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the
President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an
independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling
28

out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established
since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors
which are not always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual
standards that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to
arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain
pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the
courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide
that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting
technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast
intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as
highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the
power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency
situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of
property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless
violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at
all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present situation in
Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the
country. The determination of the necessity for the calling out power if subjected
to unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for disaster, as such
power may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary restraining
order every time it is exercised.
Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President,
as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military
when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of
such discretion was gravely abused, the Presidents exercise of judgment deserves
to be accorded respect from this Court.
The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for
calling the armed forces. In his Memorandum, he categorically asserted that,
[V]iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and carnappings
continue to occur in Metro Manila...
[35]
We do not doubt the veracity of the
Presidents assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present
developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated
by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other public
places. These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI
2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that the President has sufficient factual
basis to call for military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of this
constitutional power.
The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor
does it infringe the civilian character of the police force.
Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation exists to justify the
calling of the Marines, the IBP asserts that by the deployment of the Marines, the
civilian task of law enforcement is militarized in violation of Section 3, Article
II
[36]
of the Constitution.
We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of
the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes
permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of
the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions
of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines
authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the
visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the
Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint
visibility patrols.
[37]
Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the
soldiers on police patrol procedures.
[38]
It is their responsibility to direct and
manage the deployment of the Marines.
[39]
It is, likewise, their duty to provide the
necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these
soldiers.
[40]
In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military
authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the
Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police
force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military in the task
of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
[41]

In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff
of the AFP, by his alleged involvement in civilian law enforcement, has been
virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited provision. The
real authority in these operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with the head of a
civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Such being the case, it does
not matter whether the AFP Chief actually participates in the Task
Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any authority or control over the
same. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the
PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the
deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian
character of the PNP.
Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than
assistance required in conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no insidious
29

incursion of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian
supremacy clause in the Constitution.
It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various
forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction. The Philippine experience reveals that it is
not averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the implementation and
execution of certain traditionally civil functions. As correctly pointed out by the
Solicitor General, some of the multifarious activities wherein military aid has been
rendered, exemplifying the activities that bring both the civilian and the military
together in a relationship of cooperation, are:
1. Elections;
[42]

2. Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross;
[43]

3. Relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters;
[44]

4. Amateur sports promotion and development;
[45]

5. Development of the culture and the arts;
[46]

6. Conservation of natural resources;
[47]

7. Implementation of the agrarian reform program;
[48]

8. Enforcement of customs laws;
[49]

9. Composite civilian-military law enforcement activities;
[50]

10. Conduct of licensure examinations;
[51]

11. Conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and high school
students;
[52]

12. Anti-drug enforcement activities;
[53]

13. Sanitary inspections;
[54]

14. Conduct of census work;
[55]

15. Administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board;
[56]

16. Assistance in installation of weather forecasting devices;
[57]

17. Peace and order policy formulation in local government units.
[58]

This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power resulting from a
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of
Congress and, yet, never before questioned.
[59]
What we have here is mutual
support and cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, not
derogation of civilian supremacy.
In the United States, where a long tradition of suspicion and hostility towards
the use of military force for domestic purposes has persisted,
[60]
and whose
Constitution, unlike ours, does not expressly provide for the power to call, the use
of military personnel by civilian law enforcement officers is allowed under
circumstances similar to those surrounding the present deployment of the
Philippine Marines. Under the Posse Comitatus Act
[61]
of the US, the use of the
military in civilian law enforcement is generally prohibited, except in certain
allowable circumstances. A provision of the Act states:
1385. Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the
Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force
as posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
[62]

To determine whether there is a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act in the
use of military personnel, the US courts
[63]
apply the following standards, to wit:
Were Army or Air Force personnel used by the civilian law enforcement officers at
Wounded Knee in such a manner that the military personnel subjected the citizens
to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, proscriptive, or
compulsory
[64]
George Washington Law Review, pp. 404-433 (1986), which
discusses the four divergent standards for assessing acceptable involvement of
military personnel in civil law enforcement. See likewise HONORED IN THE BREECH:
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE THE LAWS WITH MILITARY FORCE, 83 Yale
Law Journal, pp. 130-152, 1973. 64 in nature, either presently or prospectively?
x x x
When this concept is transplanted into the present legal context, we take it to mean
that military involvement, even when not expressly authorized by the Constitution
or a statute, does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act unless it actually regulates,
forbids or compels some conduct on the part of those claiming relief. A mere threat
of some future injury would be insufficient. (emphasis supplied)
Even if the Court were to apply the above rigid standards to the present case
to determine whether there is permissible use of the military in civilian law
30

enforcement, the conclusion is inevitable that no violation of the civilian supremacy
clause in the Constitution is committed. On this point, the Court agrees with the
observation of the Solicitor General:
3. The designation of tasks in Annex A
[65]
does not constitute the exercise of
regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory military power. First, the soldiers do
not control or direct the operation. This is evident from Nos. 6,
[66]
8(k)
[67]
and
9(a)
[68]
of Annex A. These soldiers, second, also have no power to prohibit or
condemn. In No. 9(d)
[69]
of Annex A, all arrested persons are brought to the
nearest police stations for proper disposition. And last, these soldiers apply
no coercive force. The materials or equipment issued to them, as shown in
No. 8(c)
[70]
of Annex A, are all low impact and defensive in character. The
conclusion is that there being no exercise of regulatory, proscriptive or
compulsory military power, the deployment of a handful of Philippine Marines
constitutes no impermissible use of military power for civilian law
enforcement.
[71]

It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed
forces are deployed, the military will gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril our
cherished liberties. Such apprehensions, however, are unfounded. The power to
call the armed forces is just that - calling out the armed forces. Unless, petitioner
IBP can show, which it has not, that in the deployment of the Marines, the
President has violated the fundamental law, exceeded his authority or jeopardized
the civil liberties of the people, this Court is not inclined to overrule the Presidents
determination of the factual basis for the calling of the Marines to prevent or
suppress lawless violence.
One last point. Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in January,
2000, not a single citizen has complained that his political or civil rights have been
violated as a result of the deployment of the Marines. It was precisely to safeguard
peace, tranquility and the civil liberties of the people that the joint visibility patrol
was conceived. Freedom and democracy will be in full bloom only when people feel
secure in their homes and in the streets, not when the shadows of violence and
anarchy constantly lurk in their midst.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-
Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., on official leave.
Puno, J., see separate opinion.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Panganiban, J., in the result.
Quisumbing, J., joins the opinion of J. Mendoza.
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO, J.:
If the case at bar is significant, it is because of the government attempt to foist
the political question doctrine to shield an executive act done in the exercise of the
commander-in-chief powers from judicial scrutiny. If the attempt succeeded, it
would have diminished the power of judicial review and weakened the checking
authority of this Court over the Chief Executive when he exercises his commander-
in-chief powers. The attempt should remind us of the tragedy that befell the
country when this Court sought refuge in the political question doctrine and
forfeited its most important role as protector of the civil and political rights of our
people. The ongoing conflict in Mindanao may worsen and can force the Chief
Executive to resort to the use of his greater commander-in-chief powers, hence,
this Court should be extra cautious in assaying similar attempts. A laid back posture
may not sit well with our people considering that the 1987 Constitution
strengthened the checking powers of this Court and expanded its jurisdiction
precisely to stop any act constituting xxx grave abuse of jurisdiction xxx on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
1

The importance of the issue at bar includes this humble separate opinion. We
can best perceive the different intersecting dimensions of the political question
doctrine by viewing them from the broader canvass of history. Political questions
are defined as those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
government.
2
They have two aspects: (1) those matters that are to be exercised by
the people in their primary political capacity and (2) matters which have been
specifically delegated to some other department or particular office of the
government, with discretionary power to act.
3
The exercise of the discretionary
power of the legislative or executive branch of government was often the area
where the Court had to wrestle with the political question doctrine.
4

A brief review of some of our case law will thus give us a sharper perspective
of the political question doctrine. This question confronted the Court as early as
31

1905 in the case of Barcelon v. Baker.
5
The Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands, pursuant to a resolution of the Philippine Commission, suspended the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Cavite and Batangas based on a finding of
open insurrection in said provinces. Felix Barcelon, who was detained by
constabulary officers in Batangas, filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus alleging that there was no open insurrection in Batangas. The issue
to resolve was whether or not the judicial department may investigate the facts
upon which the legislative (the Philippine Commission) and executive (the
Governor-General) branches of government acted in suspending the privilege of the
writ.
The Court ruled that under our form of government, one department has no
authority to inquire into the acts of another, which acts are performed within the
discretion of the other department.
6
Surveying American law and jurisprudence, it
held that whenever a statute gives discretionary power to any person, to be
exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, the statute constitutes him
the sole judge of the existence of those facts.
7
Since the Philippine Bill of 1902
empowered the Philippine Commission and the Governor-General to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, this power is exclusively within the discretion
of the legislative and executive branches of government. The exercise of this
discretion is conclusive upon the courts.
8

The Court further held that once a determination is made by the executive
and legislative departments that the conditions justifying the assailed acts exists, it
will presume that the conditions continue until the same authority decide that they
no longer exist.
9
It adopted the rationale that the executive branch, thru its civil and
military branches, are better situated to obtain information about peace and order
from every corner of the nation, in contrast with the judicial department, with its
very limited machinery.
10
The seed of the political question doctrine was thus
planted in Philippine soil.
The doctrine barring judicial review because of the political question doctrine
was next applied to the internal affairs of the legislature. The Court refused to
interfere in the legislative exercise of disciplinary power over its own members. In
the 1924 case of Alejandrino v. Quezon,
11
Alejandrino, who was appointed Senator
by the Governor-General, was declared by Senate Resolution as guilty of disorderly
conduct for assaulting another Senator in the course of a debate, and was
suspended from office for one year. Senator Alejandrino filed a petition for
mandamus and injunction to compel the Senate to reinstate him. The Court held
that under the Jones Law, the power of the Senate to punish its members for
disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend an appointive member from
the exercise of his office. While the Court found that the suspension was illegal, it
refused to issue the writ of mandamus on the ground that "the Supreme Court does
not possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular
action. [T]he Philippine Legislature or any branch thereof cannot be directly
controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process."
12

The issue revisited the Court twenty-two (22) years later. In 1946, in Vera v.
Avelino,
13
three senators-elect who had been prevented from taking their oaths of
office by a Senate resolution repaired to this Court to compel their colleagues to
allow them to occupy their seats contending that only the Electoral Tribunal had
jurisdiction over contests relating to their election, returns and
qualifications. Again, the Court refused to intervene citing Alejandrino and affirmed
the inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its
membership.
In the 1947 case of Mabanag v. Lopez-Vito,
14
three Senators and eight
representatives who were proclaimed elected by Comelec were not allowed by
Congress to take part in the voting for the passage of the Parity amendment to the
Constitution. If their votes had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the
proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote
in either House of Congress to pass the amendment. The amendment was
eventually submitted to the people for ratification. The Court declined to intervene
and held that a proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function
performed by Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity.
15

In the 1955 case of Arnault v. Balagtas,
16
petitioner, a private citizen, assailed
the legality of his detention ordered by the Senate for his refusal to answer
questions put to him by members of one of its investigating committees. This Court
refused to order his release holding that the process by which a contumacious
witness is dealt with by the legislature is a necessary concomitant of the legislative
process and the legislature's exercise of its discretionary authority is not subject to
judicial interference.
In the 1960 case of Osmena v. Pendatun,
17
the Court followed the traditional
line. Congressman Sergio Osmena, Jr. was suspended by the House of
Representatives for serious disorderly behavior for making a privilege speech
imputing "malicious charges" against the President of the Philippines. Osmena, Jr.
invoked the power of review of this Court but the Court once more did not interfere
with Congress' power to discipline its members.
The contours of the political question doctrine have always been tricky. To be
sure, the Court did not always stay its hand whenever the doctrine is invoked. In
the 1949 case of Avelino v. Cuenco,
18
Senate President Jose Avelino, who was
deposed and replaced, questioned his successor's title claiming that the latter had
been elected without a quorum. The petition was initially dismissed on the ground
that the selection of Senate President was an internal matter and not subject to
32

judicial review.
19
On reconsideration, however, the Court ruled that it could assume
jurisdiction over the controversy in light of subsequent events justifying
intervention among which was the existence of a quorum.
20
Though the petition
was ultimately dismissed, the Court declared respondent Cuenco as the legally
elected Senate President.
In the 1957 case of Tanada v. Cuenco,
21
the Court assumed jurisdiction over a
dispute involving the formation and composition of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. It
rejected the Solicitor General's claim that the dispute involved a political question.
Instead, it declared that the Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority"
in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the exercise of its
power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are mandatory in
nature.
22
It held that under the Constitution, the membership of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal was designed to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the
disposition of election contests affecting members of the lawmaking body.
23
The
Court then nullified the election to the Senate Electoral Tribunal made by Senators
belonging to the party having the largest number of votes of two of their party
members but purporting to act on behalf of the party having the second highest
number of votes.
In the 1962 case of Cunanan v. Tan, Jr.,
24
the Court passed judgment on
whether Congress had formed the Commission on Appointments in accordance
with the Constitution and found that it did not. It declared that the Commission on
Appointments is a creature of the Constitution and its power does not come from
Congress but from the Constitution.
The 1967 case of Gonzales v. Comelec
25
and the 1971 case of Tolentino v.
Comelec
26
abandoned Mabanag v. Lopez-Vito. The question of whether or not
Congress, acting as a constituent assembly in proposing amendments to the
Constitution violates the Constitution was held to be a justiciable and not a political
issue. In Gonzales, the Court ruled:
"It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez-Vito, this Court characterizing the issue
submitted thereto as a political one, declined to pass upon the question whether or
not a given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to
the Constitution-which was being submitted to the people for ratification-satisfied
the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force of this
precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the
Senate, Avelino v. Cuenco, Tanada v. Cuenco, and Macias v. Commission on
Elections. In the first, we held that the officers and employees of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal are under its supervision and control, not of that of the Senate
President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to
determine the number of Senators necessary for a quorum in the Senate; in the
third, we nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party having the
largest number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act on behalf of the party
having the second largest number of votes therein, of two (2) Senators belonging to
the first party, as members, for the second party, of the Senate Electoral Tribunal;
and in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to
apportion the representative districts for the House of Representatives upon the
ground that the apportionment had not been made as may be possible according to
the number of inhabitants of each province. Thus, we rejected the theory,
advanced in these four cases, that the issues therein raised were political questions
the determination of which is beyond judicial review.
27

The Court explained that the power to amend the Constitution or to propose
amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to
Congress. As a constituent assembly, the members of Congress derive their
authority from the fundamental law and they do not have the final say on whether
their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits.
28
This ruling was reiterated
in Tolentino which held that acts of a constitutional convention called for the
purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution are at par with acts of
Congress acting as a constituent assembly.
29

In sum, this Court brushed aside the political question doctrine and assumed
jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of
powers conferred upon the Legislature.
30

The Court hewed to the same line as regards the exercise of Executive
power. Thus, the respect accorded executive discretion was observed in Severino v.
Governor-General,
31
where it was held that the Governor-General, as head of the
executive department, could not be compelled by mandamus to call a special
election in the town of Silay for the purpose of electing a municipal
president. Mandamus and injunction could not lie to enforce or restrain a duty
which is discretionary. It was held that when the Legislature conferred upon the
Governor-General powers and duties, it did so for the reason that he was in a better
position to know the needs of the country than any other member of the executive
department, and with full confidence that he will perform such duties as his best
judgment dictates.
32

Similarly, in Abueva v. Wood,
33
the Court held that the Governor-General
could not be compelled by mandamus to produce certain vouchers showing the
various expenditures of the Independence Commission. Under the principle of
separation of powers, it ruled that it was not intended by the Constitution that one
branch of government could encroach upon the field of duty of the other. Each
department has an exclusive field within which it can perform its part within certain
discretionary limits.
34
It observed that "the executive and legislative departments of
33

government are frequently called upon to deal with what are known as political
questions, with which the judicial department of government has no
intervention. In all such questions, the courts uniformly refused to intervene for
the purpose of directing or controlling the actions of the other department; such
questions being many times reserved to those departments in the organic law of
the state."
35

In Forties v. Tiaco,
36
the Court also refused to take cognizance of a case
enjoining the Chief Executive from deporting an obnoxious alien whose continued
presence in the Philippines was found by him to be injurious to the public
interest. It noted that sudden and unexpected conditions may arise, growing out of
the presence of untrustworthy aliens, which demand immediate action. The
President's inherent power to deport undesirable aliens is universally denominated
as political, and this power continues to exist for the preservation of the peace and
domestic tranquility of the nation.
37

In Manalang v. Quitoriano,
38
the Court also declined to interfere in the
exercise of the President's appointing power. It held that the appointing power is
the exclusive prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations may be
imposed by Congress, except those resulting from the need of securing concurrence
of the Commission on Appointments and from the exercise of the limited legislative
power to prescribe qualifications to a given appointive office.
We now come to the exercise by the President of his powers as Commander-
in-Chief vis-a-vis the political question doctrine. In the 1940's, this Court has held
that as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the President has the power to
determine whether war, in the legal sense, still continues or has terminated. It
ruled that it is within the province of the political department and not of the judicial
department of government to determine when war is at end.
39

In 1952, the Court decided the landmark case of Montenegro v.
Castaneda.
40
President Quirino suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
for persons detained or to be detained for crimes of sedition, insurrection or
rebellion. The Court, citing Barcelon, declared that the authority to decide whether
the exigency has arisen requiring the suspension of the privilege belongs to the
President and his decision is final and conclusive on the courts.
41

Barcelon was the ruling case law until the 1971 case of Lansang v.
Garcia came.
42
Lansang reversed the previous cases and held that the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was not a political question. According to
the Court, the weight of Barcelon was diluted by two factors: (1) it relied heavily
on Martin v. Mott, which involved the U.S. President's power to call out the militia
which is a much broader power than suspension of the privilege of the writ; and (2)
the privilege was suspended by the American Governor-General whose act, as
representative of the sovereign affecting the freedom of its subjects, could not be
equated with that of the President of the Philippines dealing with the freedom of
the sovereign Filipino people.
The Court declared that the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is neither absolute nor unqualified because the Constitution sets
limits on the exercise of executive discretion on the matter. These limits are: (1)
that the privilege must not be suspended except only in cases of invasion,
insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof; and (2) when the public
safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever
during such period the necessity for the suspension shall exist. The extent of the
power which may be inquired into by courts is defined by these limitations.
43

On the vital issue of how the Court may inquire into the President's exercise of
power, it ruled that the function of the Court is not to supplant but merely to check
the Executive; to ascertain whether the President has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to
determine the wisdom of his act. Judicial inquiry is confined to the question of
whether the President did not act arbitrarily.
44
Using this yardstick, the Court found
that the President did not.
The emergency period of the 1970's flooded the Court with cases which raised
the political question defense. The issue divided the Court down the
middle. Javellana v. Executive Secretary
45
showed that while a majority of the Court
held that the issue of whether or not the 1973 Constitution had been ratified in
accordance with the 1935 Constitution was justiciable, a majority also ruled that the
decisive issue of whether the 1973 Constitution had come into force and effect,
with or without constitutional ratification, was a political question.
46

The validity of the declaration of martial law by then President Marcos was
next litigated before the Court. In Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,
47
it upheld the President's
declaration of martial law. On whether the validity of the imposition of martial law
was a political or justiciable question, the Court was almost evenly divided. One-
half embraced the political question position and the other half subscribed to the
justiciable position in Lansang. Those adhering to the political question doctrine
used different methods of approach to it.
48

In 1983, the Lansang ruling was weakened by the Court in Garcia-Padilla v.
Enrile.
49
The petitioners therein were arrested and detained by the Philippine
Constabulary by virtue of a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO). Petitioners
sought the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The Court found that the PCO had
the function of validating a person's detention for any of the offenses covered in
Proclamation No. 2045 which continued in force the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. It held that the issuance of the PCO by the President was
34

not subject to judicial inquiry.
50
It went further by declaring that there was a need
to re-examine Lansang with a view to reverting to Barcelon and Montenegro. It
observed that in times of war or national emergency, the President must be given
absolute control for the very life of the nation and government is in great peril. The
President, it intoned, is answerable only to his conscience, the people, and God.
51

But barely six (6) days after Garcia-Padilla, the Court promulgated Morales, Jr.
v. Enrile
52
reiterating Lansang. It held that by the power of judicial review, the
Court must inquire into every phase and aspect of a person's detention from the
moment he was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the
merits of the petition. Only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the
due process clause of the Constitution has been met.
53

It is now history that the improper reliance by the Court on the political
question doctrine eroded the people's faith in its capacity to check abuses
committed by the then Executive in the exercise of his commander-in-chief powers,
particularly violations against human rights. The refusal of courts to be pro-active
in the exercise of its checking power drove the people to the streets to resort to
extralegal remedies. They gave birth to EDSA.
Two lessons were not lost to the members of the Constitutional Commission
that drafted the 1987 Constitution. The first was the need to grant this Court the
express power to review the exercise of the powers as commander-in-chief by the
President and deny it of any discretion to decline its exercise. The second was the
need to compel the Court to be pro-active by expanding its jurisdiction and, thus,
reject its laid back stance against acts constituting grave abuse of discretion on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Then Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, a member of the Constitutional Commission, worked for the insertion
of the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII in the draft Constitution,
54
which
reads:
"Sec. 1. x x x.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
The language of the provision clearly gives the Court the power to strike down acts
amounting to grave abuse of discretion of both the legislative and executive
branches of government.
We should interpret Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in light of
our constitutional history. The provision states:
"Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding
sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to Congress. The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular
or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation
shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a
period to be determined by Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
x x x."
It is clear from the foregoing that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces of the Philippines, may call out the armed forces subject to two
conditions: (1) whenever it becomes necessary; and (2) to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Undeniably, these conditions lay down
the sine qua requirement for the exercise of the power and the objective sought to
be attained by the exercise of the power. They define the constitutional
parameters of the calling out power. Whether or not there is compliance with
these parameters is a justiciable issue and is not a political question.
I am not unaware that in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission,
Commissioner Bernas opined that the President's exercise of the "calling out
power," unlike the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the
35

declaration of martial law, is not a justiciable issue but a political question and
therefore not subject to judicial review.
It must be borne in mind, however, that while a member's opinion expressed
on the floor of the Constitutional Convention is valuable, it is not necessarily
expressive of the people's intent.
55
The proceedings of the Convention are less
conclusive on the proper construction of the fundamental law than are legislative
proceedings of the proper construction of a statute, for in the latter case it is the
intent of the legislature the courts seek, while in the former, courts seek to arrive at
the intent of the people through the discussions and deliberations of their
representatives.
56
The conventional wisdom is that the Constitution does not derive
its force from the convention which framed it, but from the people who ratified it,
the intent to be arrived at is that of the people.
57

It is true that the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution expressly gives the Court the power to review the sufficiency of the
factual bases used by the President in the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and the declaration of martial law. It does not follow, however, that
just because the same provision did not grant to this Court the power to review the
exercise of the calling out power by the President, ergo, this Court cannot pass
upon the validity of its exercise.
Given the light of our constitutional history, this express grant of power
merely means that the Court cannot decline the exercise of its power because of
the political question doctrine as it did in the past. In fine, the express grant simply
stresses the mandatory duty of this Court to check the exercise of the commander-
in-chief powers of the President. It eliminated the discretion of the Court not to
wield its power of review thru the use of the political question doctrine.
It may be conceded that the calling out power may be a "lesser power"
compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
the power to declare martial law. Even then, its exercise cannot be left to the
absolute discretion of the Chief Executive as Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces, as its impact on the rights of our people protected by the Constitution
cannot be downgraded. We cannot hold that acts of the commander-in-chief
cannot be reviewed on the ground that they have lesser impact on the civil and
political rights of our people. The exercise of the calling out power may be "benign"
in the case at bar but may not be so in future cases.
The counsel of Mr. Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in his Dissenting and
Concurring Opinion in Lansang that it would be dangerous and misleading to push
the political question doctrine too far, is apropos. It will not be complementary to
the Court if it handcuffs itself to helplessness when a grievously injured citizen
seeks relief from a palpably unwarranted use of presidential or military power,
especially when the question at issue falls in the penumbra between the "political"
and the "justiciable. "
58

We should not water down the ruling that deciding whether a matter has
been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether
the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is a
delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of the Court
as ultimate interpreter of the fundamental law.
59
When private justiciable rights are
involved in a suit, the Court must not refuse to assume jurisdiction even though
questions of extreme political importance are necessarily involved.
60
Every officer
under a constitutional government must act according to law and subject to the
controlling power of the people, acting through the courts, as well as through the
executive and legislative. One department is just as representative of the other,
and the judiciary is the department which is charged with the special duty of
determining the limitations which the law places upon all official
action.
61
Thishistoric role of the Court is the foundation stone of a government of
laws and not of men.
62

I join the Decision in its result.
EN BANC

PROVINCE OF RIZAL, MUNICIPALITY OF
SAN MATEO, PINTONG BOCAUE
MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE,
CONCERNED CITIZENS OF RIZAL, INC.,
ROLANDO E. VILLACORTE, BERNARDO
HIDALGO, ANANIAS EBUENGA, VILMA T.
MONTAJES, FEDERICO MUNAR, JR.,
ROLANDO BEAS, SR., ET AL., and
KILOSBAYAN, INC.,
P e t i t i o n e r s,


- versus -

G.R. No. 129546


Present:

DAVIDE, JR., C. J.,
PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
36


EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF
ENVIRONMENT & NATURAL RESOURCES,
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, SECRETARY OF PUBLIC
WORKS & HIGHWAYS, SECRETARY OF
BUDGET & MANAGEMENT, METRO
MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
R e s p o n d e n t s.
MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ.





Promulgated:


December 13, 2005
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

D E C I S I O N


CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:



The earth belongs in usufruct to the living.
[1]


At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its environs,
parts of the Marikina Watershed Reservation were set aside by the Office of the
President, through Proclamation No. 635 dated 28 August 1995, for use as a
sanitary landfill and similar waste disposal applications. In fact, this site, extending
to more or less 18 hectares, had already been in operation since 19 February
1990
[2]
for the solid wastes of Quezon City, Marikina, San Juan, Mandaluyong,
Pateros, Pasig, and Taguig.
[3]


This is a petition filed by the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San Mateo,
and various concerned citizens for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41330, denying, for lack of cause of action, the petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary
37

restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction assailing the legality and
constitutionality of Proclamation No. 635.

The facts are documented in painstaking detail.

On 17 November 1988, the respondent Secretaries of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and the Governor of the Metropolitan Manila
Commission (MMC) entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),
[4]
which
provides in part:
1. The DENR agrees to immediately
allow the utilization by the Metropolitan Manila
Commission of its land property located at Pintong
Bocaue in San Mateo, Rizal as a sanitary landfill site,
subject to whatever restrictions that the government
impact assessment might require.

2. Upon signing of this Agreement,
the DPWH shall commence the
construction/development of said dumpsite.

3. The MMC shall: a) take charge of
the relocation of the families within and around the site;
b) oversee the development of the areas as a sanitary
landfill; c) coordinate/monitor the construction of
infrastructure facilities by the DPWH in the said site; and
d) ensure that the necessary civil works are properly
undertaken to safeguard against any negative
environmental impact in the area.



On 7, 8 and 10 February 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo wrote
Gov. Elfren Cruz of the MMC, Sec. Fiorello Estuar of the DPWH, the Presidential
Task Force on Solid Waste Management, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig,
and Sec. Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., pointing out that it had recently passed a
Resolution banning the creation of dumpsites for Metro Manila garbage within its
jurisdiction, asking that their side be heard, and that the addressees suspend and
temporarily hold in abeyance all and any part of your operations with respect to the
San Mateo Landfill Dumpsite. No action was taken on these letters.

It turns out that the land subject of the MOA of 17 November 1988 and
owned by the DENR was part of the Marikina Watershed Reservation Area. Thus,
on 31 May 1989, forest officers of the Forest Engineering and Infrastructure Unit of
the Community Environment and Natural Resource Office, (CENRO) DENR-IV, Rizal
38

Province, submitted a Memorandum
[5]
on the On-going Dumping Site Operation of
the MMC inside (the) Upper Portion of Marikina Watershed Reservation, located at
Barangay Pintong Bocaue, San Mateo, Rizal, and nearby localities. Said
Memorandum reads in part:
Observations:

3.1 The subject area is arable and agricultural in
nature;
3.2 Soil type and its topography are favorable for
agricultural and forestry productions;

. . .

3.5 Said Dumping Site is observed to be confined
within the said Watershed Reservation, bearing
in the northeastern part of Lungsod Silangan
Townsite Reservation. Such illegal Dumping Site
operation inside (the) Watershed Reservation is
in violation of P.D. 705, otherwise known as the
Revised Forestry Code, as amended. . .

Recommendations:

5.1 The MMC Dumping Site Inside Marikina Watershed
Reservation, particularly at Brgy. Pintong
Bocaue, San Mateo, Rizal and at Bo. Pinugay,
Baras/Antipolo, Rizal which are the present
garbage zones must totally be stopped and
discouraged without any political intervention
and delay in order to save our healthy
ecosystems found therein, to avoid much
destruction, useless efforts and lost (sic) of
millions of public funds over the land in
question; (Emphasis ours)



On 19 June 1989, the CENRO submitted another Investigation Report
[6]
to
the Regional Executive Director which states in part that:
1. About two (2) hectares had been excavated by bulldozers
and garbage dumping operations are going on.

2. The dumping site is without the concurrence of the
Provincial Governor, Rizal Province and without any
permit from DENR who has functional jurisdiction over
the Watershed Reservation; and

3. About 1,192 families residing and cultivating areas covered
by four (4) Barangays surrounding the dumping site will
adversely be affected by the dumping operations of
MMC including their sources of domestic water supply. x
x x x

39



On 22 January 1990, the CENRO submitted still another Investigation
Report
[7]
to the Regional Executive Director which states that:
Findings show that the areas used as Dumping Site of the
MMC are found to be within the Marikina Watershed which are
part of the Integrated Social Forestry Project (ISF) as per recorded
inventory of Forest Occupancy of this office.

It also appears that as per record, there was no permit
issued to the MMC to utilize these portions of land for dumping
purposes.

It is further observed that the use of the areas as
dumping site greatly affects the ecological balance and
environmental factors in this community.



On 19 February 1990, the DENR Environmental Management Bureau,
through Undersecretary for Environment and Research Celso R. Roque, granted the
Metro Manila Authority (MMA [formerly MMC]) an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) for the operation of a two-and-a-half-hectare garbage dumpsite.

The ECC was sought and granted to comply with the requirement of
Presidential Decree No. 1586 Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement
System, Section 4 of which states in part that, No persons, partnership or
corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical
project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate.
Proclamation No. 2146, passed on 14 December 1981, designates all areas
declared by law as national parks, watershed reserves, wildlife preserves, and
sanctuaries as Environmentally Critical Areas.

On 09 March 1990, respondent Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA), through its Acting General Manager, sent a letter
[8]
to the MMA, which
reads in part:
Through this letter we would like to convey our
reservation on the choice of the sites for solid waste disposal
inside the watershed of Laguna Lake. As you may already
know,the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS) has scheduled the abstraction of water from the lake to
serve the needs of about 1.2 million residents of Muntinlupa,
Paranaque, Las Pinas and Bacoor, Cavite by 1992. Accordingly,
the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) is accelerating
its environmental management program to upgrade the water
quality of the lake in order to make it suitable as a source of
domestic water supply the whole year round. The said program
40

regards dumpsites as incompatible within the watershed because
of the heavy pollution, including the risk of diseases, generated by
such activities which would negate the governments efforts to
upgrade the water quality of the lake. Consequently, please
consider our objection to the proposed location of the dumpsites
within the watershed. (Emphasis supplied by petitioners)



On 31 July 1990, less than six months after the issuance of the ECC,
Undersecretary Roque suspended the ECC in a letter
[9]
addressed to the respondent
Secretary of DPWH, stating in part that:
Upon site investigation conducted by Environmental
Management Bureau staff on development activities at the San
Mateo Landfill Site, it was ascertained that ground slumping and
erosion have resulted from improper development of the site.
We believe that this will adversely affect the environmental
quality in the area if the proper remedial measures are not
instituted in the design of the landfill site. This is therefore
contradictory to statements made in the Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) submitted that above occurrences will be
properly mitigated.

In view of this, we are forced to suspend the
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued until
appropriate modified plans are submitted and approved by this
Office for implementation. (Emphasis ours)


On 21 June 1993, the Acting Mayor of San Mateo, Enrique Rodriguez, Jr.,
Barangay Captain Dominador Vergara, and petitioner Rolando E. Villacorte,
Chairman of the Pintong Bocaue Multipurpose Cooperative (PBMC) wrote
[10]
then
President Fidel V. Ramos expressing their objections to the continued operation of
the MMA dumpsite for causing unabated pollution and degradation of the
Marikina Watershed Reservation.

On 14 July 1993, another Investigation Report
[11]
submitted by the Regional
Technical Director to the DENR Undersecretary for Environment and Research
contained the following findings and recommendations:
Remarks and Findings:

. . . .

5. Interview with Mr. Dayrit, whose lot is now being
endangered because soil erosion have (sic) caused severe siltation
and sedimentation of the Dayrit Creek which water is greatly
polluted by the dumping of soil bulldozed to the creek;

6. Also interview with Mrs. Vilma Montajes, the
multi-grade teacher of Pintong Bocaue Primary School which is
41

located only about 100 meters from the landfill site. She
disclosed that bad odor have (sic) greatly affected the pupils who
are sometimes sick with respiratory illnesses. These odors show
that MMA have (sic) not instituted/sprayed any disinfectant
chemicals to prevent air pollution in the area. Besides large flies
(Bangaw) are swarming all over the playground of the school. The
teacher also informed the undersigned that plastic debris are
being blown whenever the wind blows in their direction.

7. As per investigation report there are now 15
hectares being used as landfill disposal sites by the MMA. The
MMA is intending to expand its operation within the 50 hectares.

8. Lots occupied within 50 hectares are fully planted
with fruit bearing trees like Mangoes, Santol, Jackfruit, Kasoy,
Guyabano, Kalamansi and Citrus which are now bearing fruits and
being harvested and marketed to nearby San Mateo Market and
Masinag Market in Antipolo.

. . . .

Recommendations:

1. As previously recommended, the undersigned also
strongly recommend(s) that the MMA be made to relocate the
landfill site because the area is within the Marikina Watershed
Reservation and Lungsod Silangan. The leachate treatment plant
ha(s) been eroded twice already and contaminated the nearby
creeks which is the source of potable water of the residents. The
contaminated water also flows to Wawa Dam and Boso-boso
River which also flows to Laguna de Bay.

2. The proposed Integrated Social Forestry Project
be pushed through or be approved. ISF project will not only uplift
the socio-economic conditions of the participants but will
enhance the rehabilitation of the Watershed considering that fruit
bearing trees are vigorously growing in the area. Some timber
producing species are also planted like Mahogany and Gmelina
Arboiea. There are also portions where dipterocarp residuals
abound in the area.

3. The sanitary landfill should be relocated to some
other area, in order to avoid any conflict with the local
government of San Mateo and the nearby affected residents who
have been in the area for almost 10-20 years.



On 16 November 1993, DENR Secretary Angel C. Alcala sent MMA
Chairman Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. a letter
[12]
stating that after a series of
investigations by field officials of the DENR, the agency realized that the MOA
entered into on 17 November 1988 is a very costly error because the area agreed
to be a garbage dumpsite is inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation. He then
strongly recommended that all facilities and infrastructure in the garbage dumpsite
42

in Pintong Bocaue be dismantled, and the garbage disposal operations be
transferred to another area outside the Marikina Watershed Reservation to protect
the health and general welfare of the residents of San Mateo in particular and the
residents of Metro Manila in general.

On 06 June 1995, petitioner Villacorte, Chairman of the PBMC,
wrote
[13]
President Ramos, through the Executive Secretary, informing the President
of the issues involved, that the dumpsite is located near three public elementary
schools, the closest of which is only fifty meters away, and that its location violates
the municipal zoning ordinance of San Mateo and, in truth, the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board had denied the then MMA chairmans application for a
locational clearance on this ground.

On 21 August 1995, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo issued a
Resolution
[14]
expressing a strong objection to the planned expansion of the landfill
operation in Pintong Bocaue and requesting President Ramos to disapprove the
draft Presidential Proclamation segregating 71.6 Hectares from Marikina Watershed
Reservation for the landfill site in Pintong Bocaue, San Mateo, Rizal.

Despite the various objections and recommendations raised by the
government agencies aforementioned, the Office of the President, through
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, signed and issued Proclamation No. 635 on 28
August 1995, Excluding from the Marikina Watershed Reservation Certain Parcels
of Land Embraced Therein for Use as Sanitary Landfill Sites and Similar Waste
Disposal Under the Administration of the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority. The pertinent portions thereof state:
WHEREAS, to cope with the requirements of the growing
population in Metro Manila and the adjoining provinces and
municipalities, certain developed and open portions of the
Marikina Watershed Reservation, upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources should now be excluded form the scope of the
reservation;

WHEREAS, while the areas delineated as part of the
Watershed Reservations are intended primarily for use in projects
and/or activities designed to contain and preserve the
underground water supply, other peripheral areas had been
included within the scope of the reservation to provide for such
space as may be needed for the construction of the necessary
structures, other related facilities, as well as other priority
projects of government as may be eventually determined;

WHEREAS, there is now an urgent need to provide for,
and develop, the necessary facilities for the disposal of the waste
generated by the population of Metro Manila and the adjoining
43

provinces and municipalities, to ensure their sanitary and /or
hygienic disposal;

WHEREAS, to cope with the requirements for the
development of the waste disposal facilities that may be used,
portions of the peripheral areas of the Marikina Watershed
Reservation, after due consideration and study, have now been
identified as suitable sites that may be used for the purpose;

WHEREAS, the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources has recommended the
exclusion of these areas that have been so identified from the
Marikina Watershed Reservation so that they may then be
developed for the purpose;

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the
aforecited premises, I, Fidel V. Ramos, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do
hereby ordain:

Section 1. General That certain parcels of land,
embraced by the Marikina Watershed Reservation, were found
needed for use in the solid waste disposal program of the
government in Metropolitan Manila, are hereby excluded from
that which is held in reserve and are now made available for use
as sanitary landfill and such other related waste disposal
applications.

Section 2. Purpose The areas being excluded from the
Marikina Watershed Reservation are hereby placed under the
administration of the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority, for development as Sanitary Landfill, and/or for use in
the development of such other related waste disposal facilities
that may be used by the cities and municipalities of Metro Manila
and the adjoining province of Rizal and its municipalities.

Section 3. Technical Description Specifically, the areas
being hereby excluded from the Marikina Watershed Reservation
consist of two (2) parcels, with an aggregate area of
approximately ONE MILLION SIXTY THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
TWENTY NINE (1,060,529) square meters more or less, as follows:
x x x x

Section 4. Reservations The development,
construction, use and/or operation of any facility that may be
established within the parcel of land herein excluded from the
Marikina Watershed Reservation shall be governed by existing
laws, rules and regulations pertaining to environmental control
and management. When no longer needed for sanitary landfill
purposes or the related waste disposal activities, the parcels of
land subject of this proclamation shall revert back as part of the
Marikina Watershed Reservation, unless otherwise authorized.



On 06 September 1995, Director Wilfrido S. Pollisco of the Protected Areas
and Wildlife Bureau wrote the DENR Secretary to express the bureaus stand
44

against the dumpsite at Pintong Bocaue, and that it is our view . . . that the mere
presence of a garbage dumpsite inside a watershed reservation is definitely not
compatible with the very purpose and objectives for which the reservation was
established.

On 24 November 1995, the petitioners Municipality of San Mateo and the
residents of Pintong Bocaue, represented by former Senator Jovito Salonga, sent a
letter to President Ramos requesting him to reconsider Proclamation No. 635.
Receiving no reply, they sent another letter on 02 January 1996 reiterating their
previous request.

On 04 March 1996, then chairman of the Metro Manila Development
Authority (MMDA [formerly MMA]) Prospero I. Oreta addressed a letter to Senator
Salonga, stating in part that:
.

2. Considering the circumstances under which we are
pursuing the project, we are certain you will agree that,
unless we are prepared with a better alternative, the
project simply has to be pursued in the best interest of the
greater majority of the population, particularly their health
and welfare.

2.1 The San Mateo Sanitary Landfill services, at least, 38%
of the waste disposal site requirements of Metro
Manila where an estimated 9 million population
reside.

2.2 Metro Manila is presently estimated to be generating,
at least, 15,700 cubic meters of household or
municipal waste, a 1.57 hectare of land area will be
filled in a months time with a pile 31 meters high of
garbage, or in a year, the accumulated volume will
require 18.2 hectares.

. . . .

4. The sanitary landfill projects are now on their fifth year of
implementation. The amount of effort and money already
invested in the project by the government cannot easily be
disregarded, much more set aside in favor of the few
settlers/squatters who chose to ignore the earlier notice
given to them that the area would be used precisely for the
development of waste disposal sites, and are now
attempting to arouse opposition to the project.

4.2 There is no place within the jurisdiction of Metro
Manila, with an area big enough to accommodate at
45

least 3 to 5 years of waste disposal requirements. x x x
x

4.21 The present site at San Mateo was selected because, at
the time consideration was being made, and up to the
present, it is found to have the attributes that positively
respond to the criteria established:

4.21.1 The site was a government property and would
not require any outlay for it to be acquired.

4.21.2 It is far from any sizeable community/settlements
that could be affected by the development that
would be introduced and yet, was within
economic hauling distance from the areas they
are designed to serve.

4.21.21 At the time it was originally decided to
locate the landfills at the present
site, there were not more that fifteen
(15) settlers in the area and they had
hardly established themselves. The
community settlements were located
far from the site.

4.21.22 The area was hardly accessible,
especially to any public transport.
The area was being served by a
public utility jeep that usually made
only two (2) trips daily. During the
rainy season, it could only be
reached by equipping the vehicle
with tire chains to traverse the
slippery muddy trail roads.

4.21.3 There was, at least, seventy-three (73) hectares
available at the site.

4.3 While the site was within the Marikina Watershed Reservation
under the administration of the DENR, the site was located at
the lower periphery of the buffer zone; was evaluated to be
least likely to affect the underground water supply; and could,
in fact, be excluded from the reservation.

4.31 It was determined to be far from the main water
containment area for it to pose any immediate danger of
contaminating the underground water, in case of a
failure in any of the mitigating measures that would be
installed.

4.32 It was likewise too far from the nearest body of water, the
Laguna Lake, and the distance, plus the increasing
accumulation of water from other tributaries toward the
lake, would serve to dilute and mitigate any
contamination it may emit, in case one happened.

4.33 To resolve the recurring issue regarding its being
located within the Marikina Watershed Reservation, the
46

site had been recommended by the DENR, and approved
by the President, to already be excluded from the
Marikina Watershed reservation and placed under the
administration of MMDA, since the site was deemed to
form part of the land resource reserve then commonly
referred to as buffer zone.

5. Contrary to the impression that you had been given, relocating the
site at this point and time would not be easy, if not impracticable,
because aside from the investments that had been made in
locating the present site, further investments have been incurred
in:

5.1 The conduct of the technical studies for the development
being implemented. Through a grant-in-aid from the World
Bank, US$600,000 was initially spent for the conduct of the
necessary studies on the area and the design of the landfill.
This was augmented by, at least, another P1.5 million from the
government for the studies to be completed, or a total cost at
the time (1990) of approximately P20 million.

5.2. Additionally, the government has spent approximately P33
million in improving on the roadway to make the site accessible
from the main road/highway.

5.3 To achieve the necessary economies in the development of
the site, the utilities had been planned so that their use could
be maximized. These include the access roads, the drainage
system, the leacheate collection system, the gas collection
system, and the waste water treatment system. Their
construction are designed so that instead of having to construct
independent units for each area, the use of existing facilities
can be maximized through a system of interconnection. On the
average, the government is spending P14.8 million to develop a
hectare of sanitary landfill area.

6. Despite the preparations and the investments that are now being
made on the project, it is estimated that the total available area,
at an accelerated rate of disposal, assuming that all open dump
sites were to be closed, will only last for 39 months.

6.1 We are still hard pressed to achieve advanced development on
the sites to assure against any possible crisis in garbage from
again being experienced in Metro Manila, aside from having to
look for the additional sites that may be used after the
capacities shall have been exhausted.

6.2 Faced with the prospects of having the 15,700 cubic meters of
garbage generated daily strewn all over Metro Manila, we are
certain you will agree that it would be futile to even as much as
consider a suspension of the waste disposal operations at the
sanitary landfills.



On 22 July 1996, the petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a civil
action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary
47

restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction. The hearing on the prayer for
preliminary injunction was held on 14 August 1996.

On 13 June 1997, the court a quo rendered a Decision,
[15]
the dispositive
part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with application for a temporary restraining
order/writ of preliminary injunction for lack of cause of action, is
hereby DENIED.
[16]




Hence, this petition for review on certiorari of the above decision on the
following grounds:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DELIBERATELY IGNORING THE SIGNIFICANT FACT THAT
PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 635 WAS BASED ON A
BRAZEN FORGERY IT WAS SUPPOSEDLY ISSUED, AS STATED IN
THE PROCLAMATION ITSELF AND REPEATEDLY ASSERTED BY
RESPONDENTS IN THEIR COMMENT, ON THE BASIS OF THE
ALLEGED RECOMMENDATION OF THE DENR SECRETARY DATED
JUNE 26, 1995 BUT WHICH ASSERTION WAS DENOUNCED BY THE
THEN SECRETARY ANGEL C. ALCALA HIMSELF IN A SWORN
STATEMENT DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 1996 AND AGAIN DURING
THE SPECIAL HEARING OF THE CASE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ON NOVEMBER 13, 1996 AS A FORGERY SINCE HIS SIGNATURE
ON THE ALLEGED RECOMMENDATION HAD BEEN FALSIFIED, AS
NOW ADMITTED BY RESPONDENTS THEMSELVES IN THEIR
COMMENT FILED WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS, THROUGH THE
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
COMPLETELY IGNORING THE SIGNIFICANT FACT THAT THE
RESPONDENTS ARE OPERATING THE LANDFILL BASED ON A
SPURIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE R.A. 7586 WHEN THEY ISSUED
AND IMPLEMENTED PROCLAMATION NO. 635 CONSIDERING
THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OR DISESTABLISHMENT OF A
PROTECTED AREA OR THE MODIFICATION OF THE MARIKINA
WATERSHED CAN ONLY BE DONE BY AN ACT OF CONGRESS.

IV
48


THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT DELIBERATELY AND WILLFULLY BRUSHED ASIDE THE
UNANIMOUS FINDINGS AND ADVERSE RECOMMENDATIONS OF
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND NON-PARTISAN
OFFICIALS CONCERNED WITH ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN
FAVOR OF THE SELF-SERVING, GRATUITOUS ASSERTIONS FOUND
IN THE UNSOLICITED, PARTISAN LETTER OF FORMER MALABON
MAYOR, NOW CHAIRMAN PROSPERO ORETA OF THE MMDA WHO
IS AN INTERESTED PARTY IN THIS CASE.


V

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT READILY SWALLOWED
RESPONDENTS ASSERTION THAT THE SAN MATEO DUMPSITE IS
LOCATED IN THE BUFFER ZONE OF THE RESERVATION AND IS
THEREFORE OUTSIDE OF ITS BOUNDARIES, AND EVEN DECLARED
IN ITS DECISION THAT IT TOOK SERIOUS NOTE OF THIS
PARTICULAR ARGUMENT.

VI

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT ENCROACHED ON THE FUNCTION OF CONGRESS BY
EXPRESSING ITS UNJUSTIFIED FEAR OF MINI-SMOKEY
MOUNTAINS PROLIFERATING IN METRO MANILA AND JUSTIFYING
ITS DECISION IN FAVOR OF AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM OF SOLID
WASTE MANAGEMENT LIKE THE SAN MATEO LANDFILL.



On 05 January 1998, while the appeal was pending, the petitioners filed a
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order,
[17]
pointing out that the effects of the El
Niophenomenon would be aggravated by the relentless destruction of the
Marikina Watershed Reservation. They noted that respondent MMDA had, in the
meantime, continued to expand the area of the dumpsite inside the Marikina
Watershed Reservation, cutting down thousands of mature fruit trees and forest
trees, and leveling hills and mountains to clear the dumping area. Garbage disposal
operations were also being conducted on a 24-hour basis, with hundreds of metric
tons of wastes being dumped daily, including toxic and infectious hospital wastes,
intensifying the air, ground and water pollution.
[18]


The petitioners reiterated their prayer that respondent MMDA be
temporarily enjoined from further dumping waste into the site and from
encroaching into the area beyond its existing perimeter fence so as not to render
the case moot and academic.

49

On 28 January 1999, the petitioners filed a Motion for Early
Resolution,
[19]
calling attention to the continued expansion of the dumpsite by the
MMDA that caused the people of Antipolo to stage a rally and barricade the Marcos
Highway to stop the dump trucks from reaching the site for five successive days
from 16 January 1999. On the second day of the barricade, all the municipal
mayors of the province of Rizal openly declared their full support for the rally, and
notified the MMDA that they would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage
in their province.
[20]


As a result, MMDA officials, headed by then Chairman Jejomar Binay,
agreed to abandon the dumpsite after six months. Thus, the municipal mayors of
Rizal, particularly the mayors of Antipolo and San Mateo, agreed to the use of the
dumpsite until that period, which would end on 20 July 1999.
[21]


On 13 July 1999, the petitioners filed an Urgent Second Motion for Early
Resolution
[22]
in anticipation of violence between the conflicting parties as the date
of the scheduled closure of the dumpsite neared.

On 19 July 1999, then President Joseph E. Estrada, taking cognizance of the
gravity of the problems in the affected areas and the likelihood that violence would
erupt among the parties involved, issued a Memorandum ordering the closure of
the dumpsite on 31 December 2000.
[23]
Accordingly, on 20 July 1999, the
Presidential Committee on Flagship Programs and Projects and the MMDA entered
into a MOA with the Provincial Government of Rizal, the Municipality of San Mateo,
and the City of Antipolo, wherein the latter agreed to further extend the use of the
dumpsite until its permanent closure on 31 December 2000.
[24]


On 11 January 2001, President Estrada directed Department of Interior and
Local Government Secretary Alfredo Lim and MMDA Chairman Binay to reopen the
San Mateo dumpsite in view of the emergency situation of uncollected garbage in
Metro Manila, resulting in a critical and imminent health and sanitation
epidemic.
[25]


Claiming the above events constituted a clear and present danger of
violence erupting in the affected areas, the petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for
Restraining Order
[26]
on 19 January 2001.

50

On 24 January 2001, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order
prayed for, effective immediately and until further orders.
[27]

Meanwhile, on 26 January 2001, Republic Act No. 9003, otherwise known
as The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, was signed into law by
President Estrada.

Thus, the petitioners raised only two issues in their Memorandum
[28]
of 08
February 2005: 1) whether or not respondent MMDA agreed to the permanent
closure of the San Mateo Landfill as of December 2000, and 2) whether or not the
permanent closure of the San Mateo landfill is mandated by Rep. Act No. 9003.

We hold that the San Mateo Landfill will remain permanently closed.

Although the petitioners may be deemed to have waived or abandoned
the issues raised in their previous pleadings but not included in the
memorandum,
[29]
certain events we shall relate below have inclined us to address
some of the more pertinent issues raised in the petition for the guidance of the
herein respondents, and pursuant to our symbolic function to educate the bench
and bar.
[30]


The law and the facts indicate that a mere MOA does not guarantee the
dumpsites permanent closure.

The rally and barricade staged by the people of Antipolo on 28 January
1999, with the full support of all the mayors of Rizal Province caused the MMDA to
agree that it would abandon the dumpsite after six months. In return, the
municipal mayors allowed the use of the dumpsite until 20 July 1999.

On 20 July 1999, with much fanfare and rhetoric, the Presidential
Committee on Flagship Programs and Projects and the MMDA entered into a MOA
with the Provincial Government of Rizal, the Municipality of San Mateo, and the
City of Antipolo, whereby the latter agreed to an extension for the use of the
dumpsite until 31 December 2000, at which time it would be permanently closed.

51

Despite this agreement, President Estrada directed Department of Interior
and Local Government Secretary Alfredo Lim and MMDA Chairman Binay
to reopen the San Mateo dumpsite on 11 January 2001, in view of the emergency
situation of uncollected garbage in Metro Manila, resulting in a critical and
imminent health and sanitation epidemic; our issuance of a TRO on 24 January
2001 prevented the dumpsites reopening.

Were it not for the TRO, then President Estradas instructions would have
been lawfully carried out, for as we observed in Oposa v. Factoran, the freedom of
contract is not absolute. Thus:

.. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., this Court stated: "The
freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not
meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to
reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public
health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the
constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the
State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general
welfare." The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs.
New York, quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs.
Auditor General, to wit: "'Under our form of government the use
of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of
private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both
shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property
rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot
exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of
his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them
harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the
public to regulate it in the common interest.'" In short, the non-
impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.
(Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

We thus feel there is also the added need to reassure the residents of the
Province of Rizal that this is indeed a final resolution of this controversy, for a brief
review of the records of this case indicates two self-evident facts. First, the San
Mateo site has adversely affected its environs, and second, sources of water should
always be protected.

As to the first point, the adverse effects of the site were reported as early
as 19 June 1989, when the Investigation Report of the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer of DENR-IV-1 stated that the sources of domestic water
supply of over one thousand families would be adversely affected by the dumping
operations.
[31]
The succeeding report included the observation that the use of the
areas as dumping site greatly affected the ecological balance and environmental
factors of the community.
[32]
Respondent LLDA in fact informed the MMA that the
heavy pollution and risk of disease generated by dumpsites rendered the location of
52

a dumpsite within the Marikina Watershed Reservation incompatible with its
program of upgrading the water quality of the Laguna Lake.
[33]


The DENR suspended the sites ECC after investigations revealed ground
slumping and erosion had resulted from improper development of the
site.
[34]
Another Investigation Report
[35]
submitted by the Regional Technical
Director to the DENR reported respiratory illnesses among pupils of a primary
school located approximately 100 meters from the site, as well as the constant
presence of large flies and windblown debris all over the schools playground. It
further reiterated reports that the leachate treatment plant had been eroded twice
already, contaminating the nearby creeks that were sources of potable water for
the residents. The contaminated water was also found to flow to the Wawa Dam
and Boso-boso River, which in turn empties into Laguna de Bay.

This brings us to the second self-evident point. Water is life, and must be
saved at all costs. In Collado v. Court of Appeals,
[36]
we had occasion to reaffirm our
previous discussion in Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,
[37]
on the primordial importance of watershed areas, thus: The most
important product of a watershed is water, which is one of the most important
human necessities. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of
water for future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage
property but also cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an
intergenerational responsibility that needs to be answered now.
[38]


Three short months before Proclamation No. 635 was passed to avert the
garbage crisis, Congress had enacted the National Water Crisis Act
[39]
to adopt
urgent and effective measures to address the nationwide water crisis which
adversely affects the health and well-being of the population, food production, and
industrialization process. One of the issues the law sought to address was the
protection and conservation of watersheds.
[40]


In other words, while respondents were blandly declaring that the reason for
the creation of the Marikina Watershed Reservation, i.e., to protect Marikina River
as the source of water supply of the City of Manila, no longer exists, the rest of the
country was gripped by a shortage of potable water so serious, it necessitated its
own legislation.

53

Respondents actions in the face of such grave environmental
consequences defy all logic. The petitioners rightly noted that instead of
providing solutions, they have, with unmitigated callousness, worsened the
problem. It is this readiness to wreak irrevocable damage on our natural
heritage in pursuit of what is expedient that has compelled us to rule at length
on this issue. We ignore the unrelenting depletion of our natural heritage at
our peril.

I.

THE REORGANIZATION ACT OF THE DENR DEFINES AND
LIMITS ITS POWERS OVER THE COUNTRYS NATURAL RESOURCES



The respondents next point out that the Marikina Watershed
Reservation, and thus the San Mateo Site, is located in the public domain. They
allege that as such, neither the Province of Rizal nor the municipality of San
Mateo has the power to control or regulate its use since properties of this
nature belong to the national, and not to the local governments.

It is ironic that the respondents should pursue this line of reasoning.

In Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
[41]
we had
occasion to observe that (o)ne of the fixed and dominating objectives of the
1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of
the natural resources of the country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in
the convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources
and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural
resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the
states power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization.
[42]


The Regalian doctrine was embodied in the 1935 Constitution, in
Section 1 of Article XIII on Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources.
This was reiterated in the 1973 Constitution under Article XIV on the National
Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation, and reaffirmed in the 1987
54

Constitution in Section 2 of Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony,
to wit:
Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall
not be alienated. The exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision
of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities or it
may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-
sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned
by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be
provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.
[43]




Clearly, the state is, and always has been, zealous in preserving as
much of our natural and national heritage as it can, enshrining as it did the
obligation to preserve and protect the same within the text of our fundamental
law.

It was with this objective in mind that the respondent DENR was
mandated by then President Corazon C. Aquino, under Section 4 of Executive
Order No. 192,
[44]
otherwise known as The Reorganization Act of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, to be the primary
government agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development and proper use of the countrys environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral resources, including
those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain. It is
also responsible for the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may
be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits
derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of
Filipinos.

We expounded on this matter in the landmark case of Oposa v.
Factoran,
[45]
where we held that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
is a fundamental legal right that carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment. This right implies, among other things, the
judicious management and conservation of the countrys resources, which duty
is reposed in the DENR under the aforequoted Section 4 of Executive Order No.
192. Moreover:
55

Section 3 (of E. O. No. 192) makes the following
statement of policy:

SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy. - It is
hereby declared the policy of the State to
ensure the sustainable use, development,
management, renewal, and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas
and other natural resources, including the
protection and enhancement of the quality of
the environment, and equitable access of the
different segments of the population to the
development and use of the country's natural
resources, not only for the present generation
but for future generations as well. It is also the
policy of the state to recognize and apply a true
value system including social and environmental
cost implications relative to their utilization;
development and conservation of our natural
resources. (Emphasis ours)

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated in Title
XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, specifically in
Section 1 thereof which reads:

SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy. - (1) The
State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino
people, the full exploration and development as
well as the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, consistent with the necessity of
maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of making the
exploration, development and utilization of such
natural resources equitably accessible to the
different segments of the present as well as
future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize
and apply a true value system that takes into
account social and environmental cost
implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural
resources.

The above provision stresses the necessity of
maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and
enhancing the quality of the environment.
[46]
(Emphasis ours.)



In sum, the Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No. 192
entrust the DENR with the guardianship and safekeeping of the Marikina
Watershed Reservation and our other natural treasures. However, although
the DENR, an agency of the government, owns the Marikina Reserve and has
56

jurisdiction over the same, this power is not absolute, but is defined by the
declared policies of the state, and is subject to the law and higher authority.
Section 2, Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, while
specifically referring to the mandate of the DENR, makes particular reference
to the agencys being subject to law and higher authority, thus:

SEC. 2. Mandate. - (1) The Department of Environment and
Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in
charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization,
and conservation of the country's natural resources.



With great power comes great responsibility. It is the height of irony that
the public respondents have vigorously arrogated to themselves the power to
control the San Mateo site, but have deftly ignored their corresponding
responsibility as guardians and protectors of this tormented piece of land.


II.

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE GIVES TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS ALL THE
NECESSARY POWERS TO PROMOTE THE GENERAL WELFARE OF THEIR INHABITANTS


The circumstances under which Proclamation No. 635 was passed also
violates Rep. Act No. 7160, or the Local Government Code.

Contrary to the averment of the respondents, Proclamation No. 635,
which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the Local
Government Code, which was approved four years earlier, on 10 October
1991.

Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state to
require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with
appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's
organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any
57

project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. Likewise,
Section 27 requires prior consultations before a program shall be implemented
by government authorities and the prior approval of the sanggunian is
obtained.

During the oral arguments at the hearing for the temporary restraining
order, Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task Force
declared before the Court of Appeals that they had conducted the required
consultations. However, he added that (t)his is the problem, sir, the officials
we may have been talking with at the time this was established may no longer
be incumbent and this is our difficulty now. That is what we are trying to do
now, a continuing dialogue.
[47]


The ambivalent reply of Director Uranza was brought to the fore
when, at the height of the protest rally and barricade along Marcos Highway to
stop dump trucks from reaching the site, all the municipal mayors of the
province of Rizal openly declared their full support for the rally and notified the
MMDA that they would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their
province.
[48]


The municipal mayors acted within the scope of their powers, and were in
fact fulfilling their mandate, when they did this. Section 16 allows every local
government unit to exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its
efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion
of the general welfare, which involve, among other things, promot(ing) health
and safety, enhance(ing) the right of the people to a balanced ecology, and
preserv(ing) the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

In Lina , Jr. v. Pao,
[49]
we held that Section 2 (c), requiring consultations
with the appropriate local government units, should apply to national government
projects affecting the environmental or ecological balance of the particular
community implementing the project. Rejecting the petitioners contention that
Sections 2(c) and 27 of the Local Government Code applied mandatorily in the
setting up of lotto outlets around the country, we held that:
From a careful reading of said provisions, we find that
these apply only to national programs and/or projects which are
to be implemented in a particular local community. Lotto is
neither a program nor a project of the national government, but
of a charitable institution, the PCSO. Though sanctioned by the
58

national government, it is far fetched to say that lotto falls within
the contemplation of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the Local
Government Code.

Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with
Section 26 thereof. Section 26 reads:

SECTION 26. Duty of National Government Agencies
in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. It shall be the
duty of every national agency or government-owned or
controlled corporation authorizing or involved in the
planning and implementation of any project or program
that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of
non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, range-land,
or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species,
to consult with the local government units,
nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors
concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the
project or program, its impact upon the people and the
community in terms of environmental or ecological
balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to
prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.

Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27
should be interpreted to mean projects and programs whose
effects are among those enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to wit,
those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic
change; (3) may cause the depletion of non-renewable resources;
(4) may result in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover; (5)
may eradicate certain animal or plant species from the face of the
planet; and (6) other projects or programs that may call for the
eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality
where these will be implemented. Obviously, none of these
effects will be produced by the introduction of lotto in the
province of Laguna. (emphasis supplied)

We reiterated this doctrine in the recent case of Bangus Fry Fisherfolk v.
Lanzanas,
[50]
where we held that there was no statutory requirement for
the sangguniang bayanof Puerto Galera to approve the construction of a mooring
facility, as Sections 26 and 27 are inapplicable to projects which are not
environmentally critical.

Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and
functions of the municipality, grants the sangguniang bayan the power to, among
other things, enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of
th(e) Code. These include:
(1) Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect
the environment and impose appropriate penalties for
acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite
fishing and other forms of destructive fishing, illegal
logging and smuggling of logs, smuggling of natural
resources products and of endangered species of flora
and fauna, slash and burn farming, and such other
activities which result in pollution, acceleration of
eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological
imbalance; [Section 447 (1)(vi)]
(2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of
property within the jurisdiction of the
municipality, adopting a comprehensive land use plan for
59

the municipality, reclassifying land within the jurisdiction
of the city, subject to the pertinent provisions of this
Code, enacting integrated zoning ordinances in
consonance with the approved comprehensive land use
plan, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations;
establishing fire limits or zones, particularly in populous
centers; and regulating the construction, repair or
modification of buildings within said fire limits or zones in
accordance with the provisions of this Code; [Section 447
(2)(vi-ix)]

(3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and
effective delivery of the basic services and facilities as
provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in
addition to said services and facilities, providing for the
establishment, maintenance, protection, and
conservation of communal forests and watersheds, tree
parks, greenbelts, mangroves, and other similar forest
development projects .and, subject to existing laws,
establishing and providing for the maintenance, repair
and operation of an efficient waterworks system to
supply water for the inhabitants and purifying the source
of the water supply; regulating the construction,
maintenance, repair and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns
and reservoirs; protecting the purity and quantity of the
water supply of the municipality and, for this
purpose, extending the coverage of appropriate
ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of
said water supply and within one hundred (100) meters
of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct, pumping
station, or watershed used in connection with the water
service; and regulating the consumption, use or wastage
of water. [Section 447 (5)(i) & (vii)]



Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be
met before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological
balance of local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the
affected local communities, and prior approval of the project by the
appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the
projects implementation is illegal.

III.

WASTE DISPOSAL IS REGULATED BY THE ECOLOGICAL
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT ACT OF 2000



The respondents would have us overlook all the abovecited laws
because the San Mateo site is a very expensive - and necessary - fait
accompli. The respondents cite the millions of pesos and hundreds of
thousands of dollars the government has already expended in its development
and construction, and the lack of any viable alternative sites.

The Court of Appeals agreed, thus:
During the hearing on the injunction, questions were also
asked. What will happen if the San Mateo Sanitary Landfill is
60

closed? Where will the daily collections of garbage be disposed of
and dumped? Atty. Mendoza, one of the lawyers of the
petitioners, answered that each city/municipality must take care
of its own. Reflecting on that answer, we are troubled: will not
the proliferation of separate open dumpsites be a more serious
health hazard (which ha(s) to be addressed) to the residents of
the community? What with the galloping population growth and
the constricting available land area in Metro Manila? There could
be a mini-Smokey Mountain in each of the ten citiescomprising
Metro Manila, placing in danger the health and safety of more
people. Damage to the environment could be aggravated by the
increase in number of open dumpsites. An integrated system of
solid waste management, like the San Mateo Sanitary Landfill,
appears advisable to a populous metropolis like the Greater
Metro Manila Area absent access to better technology.
[51]



We acknowledge that these are valid concerns. Nevertheless, the
lower court should have been mindful of the legal truism that it is the
legislature, by its very nature, which is the primary judge of the necessity,
adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law.
[52]


Moreover, these concerns are addressed by Rep. Act No. 9003.
Approved on 26 January 2001, The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of
2000 was enacted pursuant to the declared policy of the state to adopt a
systematic, comprehensive and ecological solid waste management system
which shall ensure the protection of public health and environment, and utilize
environmentally sound methods that maximize the utilization of valuable
resources and encourage resource conservation and recovery.
[53]
It requires
the adherence to a Local Government Solid Waste Management Plan with
regard to the collection and transfer, processing, source reduction, recycling,
composting and final disposal of solid wastes, the handling and disposal of
special wastes, education and public information, and the funding of solid
waste management projects.

The said law mandates the formulation of a National Solid Waste
Management Framework, which should include, among other things, the
method and procedure for the phaseout and the eventual closure within
eighteen months from effectivity of the Act in case of existing open dumps
and/or sanitary landfills located within an aquifer, groundwater reservoir or
watershed area.
[54]
Any landfills subsequently developed must comply with the
minimum requirements laid down in Section 40, specifically that the site
selected must be consistent with the overall land use plan of the local
government unit, and that the site must be located in an area where the
61

landfills operation will not detrimentally affect environmentally sensitive
resources such as aquifers, groundwater reservoirs or watershed areas.
[55]


This writes finis to any remaining aspirations respondents may have of
reopening the San Mateo Site. Having declared Proclamation No. 635 illegal,
we see no compelling need to tackle the remaining issues raised in the petition
and the parties respective memoranda.

A final word. Laws pertaining to the protection of the environment were not
drafted in a vacuum. Congress passed these laws fully aware of the perilous state
of both our economic and natural wealth. It was precisely to minimize the adverse
impact humanitys actions on all aspects of the natural world, at the same time
maintaining and ensuring an environment under which man and nature can thrive
in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, that these legal safeguards
were put in place. They should thus not be so lightly cast aside in the face of what
is easy and expedient.
Petition granted

SECOND DIVISION

CARLOS T. GO, SR., G.R. No. 167569
Petitioner,

- versus -

LUIS T. RAMOS,
Respondent.
x----------------------------------------x

Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
*

CARPIO MORALES,
DEL CASTILLO, and
ABAD, JJ.
JIMMY T. GO,
Petitioner,

- versus -

LUIS T. RAMOS,
G.R. No. 167570


Respondent.
x----------------------------------------x
HON. ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., in his capacity as the
Commissioner of the BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION; ATTY.
FAISAL HUSSIN and ANSARI M. MACAAYAN, in their
capacity as Intelligence Officers of the BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION,
Petitioners,

- versus -

JIMMY T. GO a.k.a. JAIME T. GAISANO,
Respondent.


G.R. No. 171946










Promulgated:

September 4, 2009
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us are three petitions. G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 are petitions
for review on certiorari to set aside the October 25, 2004 Decision
[1]
and February
16, 2005 Resolution
[2]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85143 that affirmed
62

the Decision
[3]
dated January 6, 2004 and Order
[4]
dated May 3, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 167 in SCA No. 2218 upholding the
preparation and filing of deportation charges against Jimmy T. Go, the
corresponding Charge Sheet
[5]
dated July 3, 2001, and the deportation proceedings
thereunder conducted.
On the other hand, G.R. No. 171946, also a petition for review on
certiorari, seeks to set aside the December 8, 2005 Decision
[6]
and March 13,
2006 Resolution
[7]
of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 88277.
Considering that the three cases arose from the same factual milieu, the
Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 167570 and 167569 with G.R. No. 171946
per Resolution
[8]
dated February 26, 2007.
These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit
[9]
for deportation
initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now
Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and
undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino
citizen, Jimmys personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not
so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmys citizenship as
FChinese. Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmys birth certificate that
his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be
tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while
all the other entries were typewritten. He also averred that in September 1989 or
thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming managed to cover
up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and untruthful
declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department of
Foreign Affairs.
Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit,
[10]
averring that the
complaint for deportation initiated by Luis was merely a harassment case designed
to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings. Jimmy maintained that
there is no truth to the allegation that he is an alien, and insisted that he is a
natural-born Filipino. Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a
Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance
with Article IV, Section 1, paragraph 4
[11]
of the 1935 Constitution and
Commonwealth Act No. 625
[12]
(Com. Act No. 625), as evidenced by his having taken
the Oath of Allegiance on July 11, 1950 and having executed an Affidavit of Election
of Philippine citizenship on July 12, 1950. Although the said oath and affidavit were
registered only on September 11, 1956, the reason behind such late registration
was sufficiently explained in an affidavit. Jimmy added that he had even voted in
the 1952 and 1955 elections.
[13]
He denied that his father arrived in the Philippines
as an undocumented alien, alleging that his father has no record of arrival in this
country as alleged in the complaint-affidavit precisely because his father was born
and raised in the Philippines, and in fact, speaks fluent Ilonggo and Tagalog.
[14]

With regard to the erroneous entry in his birth certificate that he is
FChinese, he maintained that such was not of his own doing, but may be
attributed to the employees of the Local Civil Registrars Office who might have
relied on his Chinese-sounding surname when making the said entry. He asserted
that the said office has control over his birth certificate; thus, if his fathers
citizenship appears to be handwritten, it may have been changed when the
employees of that office realized that his father has already taken his oath as a
Filipino.
[15]
As regards the entry in his siblings certificates of birth, particularly Juliet
Go and Carlos Go, Jr., that their father is Chinese, Jimmy averred that the entry was
erroneous because it was made without prior consultation with his father.
[16]

63

In a Resolution
[17]
dated February 14, 2001, Associate Commissioner Linda
L. Malenab-Hornilla dismissed the complaint for deportation against
Jimmy. Associate Commissioner Hornilla affirmed the findings of the National
Bureau of Investigation tasked to investigate the case that Jimmys father elected
Filipino citizenship in accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution. By operation of law, therefore, the citizenship of Carlos was
transmitted to Jimmy, making him a Filipino as well.
On March 8, 2001,
[18]
the Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed said
dismissal, holding that Carlos election of Philippine citizenship was made out of
time. Finding Jimmys claim to Philippine citizenship in serious doubt by reason of his
fathers questionable election thereof, the Board directed the preparation and filing of
the appropriate deportation charges against Jimmy.
On July 3, 2001, the corresponding Charge Sheet was filed against Jimmy,
charging him of violating Section 37(a)(9)
[19]
in relation to Section 45(c)
[20]
of Com. Act No.
613, otherwise known as The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940,
[21]
as amended,
committed as follows:
x x x x
1. That Respondent was born on October 25,
1952 in Iloilo City, as evidenced by a copy of his birth certificate
wherein his citizenship was recorded as Chinese;
2. That Respondent through some stealth machinations
was able to subsequently cover up his true and actual citizenship
as Chinese and illegally acquired a Philippine Passport under the
name JAIME T. GAISANO, with the use of falsified documents and
untruthful declarations, in violation of the above-cited provisions
of the Immigration Act[;]
3. That [R]espondent being an alien, has formally and
officially represent[ed] and introduce[d] himself as a citizen of the
Philippines, for fraudulent purposes and in order to evade any
requirements of the immigration laws, also in violation of said
law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[22]

On November 9, 2001, Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition
[23]
with application for injunctive reliefs before the RTC of Pasig City,
Branch 167, docketed as SCA No. 2218, seeking to annul and set aside the March 8,
2001 Resolution of the Board of Commissioners, the Charge Sheet, and the
proceedings had therein. In essence, they challenged the jurisdiction of the Board
to continue with the deportation proceedings.
In the interim, the Board issued a Decision
[24]
dated April 17, 2002, in BSI-
D.C. No. ADD-01-117, ordering the apprehension and deportation of Jimmy. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Board of
Commissioners hereby Orders the apprehension of respondent
JIMMY T. GO @ JAIME T. GAISANO and that he be then deported to
CHINA of which he is a citizen, without prejudice, however, to the
continuation of any and all criminal and other proceedings that are
pending in court or before the prosecution arm of the Philippine
Government, if any. And that upon expulsion, he is thereby ordered
barred from entry into the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
[25]

In view of the said Decision, Carlos and Jimmy filed on June 13, 2002 a
supplemental petition for certiorari and prohibition
[26]
before the trial court and
reiterated their application for injunctive reliefs. The trial court issued a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction pending litigation on the main issue, enjoining
the Bureau from enforcing the April 17, 2002 Decision.
[27]
Later, however, the trial
64

court dissolved the writ in a Decision
[28]
dated January 6, 2004 as a consequence of
the dismissal of the petition.
Carlos and Jimmy moved for reconsideration. But their motion was
likewise denied.
[29]

Following the dismissal of the petition in SCA No. 2218, the Board issued a
warrant of deportation
[30]
which led to the apprehension of Jimmy. Jimmy
commenced a petition for habeas corpus, but the same was eventually dismissed by
reason of his provisional release on bail.
[31]

Carlos and Jimmy then questioned the Decision in SCA No. 2218 as well as
the Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration by way of a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85143. They
imputed grave abuse of discretion by the trial court for passing upon their
citizenship, claiming that what they asked for in their petition was merely the
nullification of the March 8, 2001 Resolution and the charge sheet.
The appellate tribunal dismissed the petition.
[32]
It did not find merit in
their argument that the issue of citizenship should proceed only before the proper
court in an independent action, and that neither the Bureau nor the Board has
jurisdiction over individuals who were born in the Philippines and have exercised
the rights of Filipino citizens. The appellate tribunal also rejected their claim that
they enjoy the presumption of being Filipino citizens.
The Court of Appeals held that the Board has the exclusive authority and
jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process,
determine their citizenship.
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the principle of jus
soli was never extended to the Philippines; hence, could not be made a ground to
ones claim of Philippine citizenship. Like the trial court, the appellate tribunal
found that Carlos failed to elect Philippine citizenship within the reasonable period
of three years upon reaching the age of majority. Furthermore, it held that the
belated submission to the local civil registry of the affidavit of election and oath of
allegiance in September 1956 was defective because the affidavit of election was
executed after the oath of allegiance, and the delay of several years before their
filing with the proper office was not satisfactorily explained.
The course of action taken by the trial court was also approved by the
appellate tribunal. The Court of Appeals stated that the trial court necessarily had
to rule on the substantial and legal bases warranting the deportation proceeding in
order to determine whether the Board acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, the appellate court found that due
process was properly observed in the proceedings before the Board, contrary to the
claim of Jimmy.
Unfazed with the said ruling, they moved for reconsideration. Their
motion having been denied,
[33]
Carlos and Jimmy each filed a petition for review on
certiorari before this Court, respectively docketed as G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570.
Meanwhile, in view of the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP. No. 85143, Bureau of
Immigration Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr. issued Warrant of Deportation
No. AFF-04-003
[34]
dated November 16, 2004 to carry out the April 17,
2002 Decision in BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-117. This resulted in the apprehension and
detention of Jimmy at the Bureau of Immigration Bicutan Detention Center,
pending his deportation to China.
[35]

65

On account of his detention, Jimmy once again filed a petition for habeas
corpus
[36]
before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 167, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 11507
assailing his apprehension and detention despite the pendency of his appeal and his
release on recognizance.
In an Order
[37]
dated December 6, 2004, the trial court dismissed the said
petition ruling that the remedy of habeas corpus cannot be availed of to obtain an
order of release once a deportation order has already been issued by the
Bureau. Jimmy moved for reconsideration of the Order, but this was also denied by
the trial court in an Order
[38]
datedDecember 28, 2004.
Jimmy assailed the Orders of the trial court in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the appellate court, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 88277. The Court
of Appeals granted the petition and enjoined the deportation of Jimmy until the
issue of his citizenship is settled with finality by the court. The Court of Appeals
held as follows:
x x x x
the issuance of a warrant to arrest and deport the
petitioner without any proof whatsoever of his violation of the
bail conditions [that he was previously granted] is arbitrary,
inequitable and unjust, for the policies governing the grant of his
bail should likewise apply in the cancellation of the said
bail. Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the
nature of a criminal action, yet considering that it is such a harsh
and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the
freedom and liberty of a person who all his life has always lived in
the Philippines, where he has established his family and business
interests, one who appears to be not completely devoid of any
claim to Filipino citizenship, being the son of a Filipina, whose
father is alleged to also have elected to be a Filipino, the
constitutional right of such person to due process cannot be
peremptorily dismissed or ignored altogether, and indeed should
not be denied. If it later turns out that the petitioner is a Filipino
after all, then the overly eager Immigration authorities would
have expelled and relegated to statelessness one who might in
fact be a Filipino by blood.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition with
reference to the Warrant of Deportation issued by the BID is
hereby GRANTED. The Bureau of Immigration and Deportation,
through Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr., Atty. Faizal Hussin
and Ansari Maca Ayan, and any of their deputized agents,
are ENJOINED from deporting petitioner Jimmy T. Go, a.k.a. Jaime
T. Gaisano, until the issue of petitioners citizenship is finally
settled by the courts of justice.
SO ORDERED.
[39]

Their motion for reconsideration
[40]
having been denied on March 13,
2006, Hon. Alipio Fernandez, in his capacity as the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Immigration, and Atty. Faisal Hussin and Ansari M. Macaayan, in their capacity as
Intelligence Officers of the Bureau of Immigration, are before this Court as
petitioners in G.R. No. 171946.
The parties have raised the following grounds for their respective
petitions:
G.R. No. 167569
I.
THE PROCEEDINGS HAD BEFORE THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION
AND DEPORTATION (B.I.D.) ARE NULL AND VOID FOR ITS FAILURE
TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN THE PERSON OF
PETITIONER CARLOS GO, SR.
II.
GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE HEREIN
PETITIONER CARLOS GO SR.S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, A FULL BLOWN
66

TRIAL UNDER THE MORE RIGID RULES OF EVIDENCE PRESCRIBED IN
COURT PROCEEDINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED TO
DETERMINE HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AND NOT THROUGH MERE
SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS SUCH AS THE ONE HAD BEFORE THE
B.I.D. AS WELL AS IN THE COURT A QUO.
III.
A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS NOT REQUIRED TO ELECT PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP.
IV.
ASSUMING CARLOS GO, SR. STILL NEEDS TO ELECT PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP, HE HAD COMPLIED WITH ALL THE REQUIREMENTS
OF COM. ACT NO. 625.
V.
PETITIONER CARLOS GO, SR. ENJOYS THE PRESUMPTION OF
CITIZENSHIP.
VI.
RESPONDENTS CAUSE OF ACTION HAD LONG PRESCRIBED.
[41]

G.R. No. 167570
I.
THE PROCEEDINGS HAD BEFORE THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION
AND DEPORTATION (B.I.D.) ARE NULL AND VOID FOR ITS FAILURE
TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN THE PERSON OF
PETITIONERS FATHER, CARLOS GO, SR.
II.
THE DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE B.I.D. ARE NULL
AND VOID FOR ITS FAILURE TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS.
III.
THE B.I.D.S CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER
JIMMY T. GO HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
IV.
GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE HEREIN
PETITIONERS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, A FULL BLOWN TRIAL UNDER
THE MORE RIGID RULES OF EVIDENCE PRESCRIBED IN COURT
PROCEEDINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE
HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AND NOT THROUGH MERE SUMMARY
PROCEEDINGS SUCH AS THE ONE HAD BEFORE THE B.I.D.
[42]

G.R. No. 171946
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
ENJOINING RESPONDENTS DEPORTATION.
[43]

Succinctly stated, the issues for our resolution are: (a) whether the cause
of action of the Bureau against Carlos and Jimmy had prescribed; (b) whether the
deportation proceedings are null and void for failure to implead Carlos as an
indispensable party therein; (c) whether the evidence adduced by Carlos and
Jimmy to prove their claim to Philippine citizenship is substantial and sufficient to
oust the Board of its jurisdiction from continuing with the deportation proceedings
in order to give way to a formal judicial action to pass upon the issue of alienage;
(d) whether due process was properly observed in the proceedings before the
Board; and (e) whether the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed.
The arguments raised by Carlos and Jimmy in their respective petitions are
merely a rehash of the arguments they adduced before the appellate tribunal and
the trial court. Once again, they raised the same argument of prescription. As to
Carlos, it is his position that being recognized by the government to have acquired
Philippine citizenship, evidenced by the Certificate of Election issued to him
on September 11, 1956, his citizenship could no longer be questioned at this late
date. As for Jimmy, he contends that the Boards cause of action to deport him has
prescribed for the simple reason that his arrest was not made within five (5) years
67

from the time the cause of action arose, which according to him commenced in
1989 when he was alleged to have illegally acquired a Philippine passport.
In any event, they argue that the deportation proceeding should be
nullified altogether for failure to implead Carlos as an indispensable party
therein. Jimmy posits that the deportation case against him was made to depend
upon the citizenship of his father, Carlos, in that the Board found justification to
order his deportation by declaring that his father is a Chinese citizen even though
the latter was never made a party in the deportation proceedings. They argue that
the Board could not simply strip Carlos of his citizenship just so they could question
the citizenship of Jimmy. To do so without affording Carlos the opportunity to
adduce evidence to prove his claim to Philippine citizenship would be the height of
injustice. For failing to accord him the requisite due process, the whole proceeding
should perforce be stuck down.
While they concede that the Board has jurisdiction to hear cases against an
alleged alien, they insist that judicial intervention may be resorted to when the
claim to citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the claim is correct, like in this case. Their claim to Philippine citizenship, they
said, is clearly shown by the fact that they were born, had been raised and had lived
in this country all their lives; they speak fluent Tagalog and Ilonggo; they engage in
businesses reserved solely for Filipinos; they exercise their right to suffrage; they
enjoy the rights and privileges accorded only to citizens; and they have no record of
any Alien Certificate of Registration. More importantly, they contend that they
were validly issued Philippine passports. They further posit that the judicial
intervention required is not merely a judicial review of the proceedings below, but a
full-blown, adversarial, trial-type proceedings where the rules of evidence are
strictly observed.
Considering that his citizenship affects that of his son, Carlos opted to
present controverting arguments to sustain his claim to Philippine citizenship,
notwithstanding the fact that according to him, he was never impleaded in the
deportation proceedings.
Carlos takes exception to the ruling of the appellate court that the doctrine
of jus soli failed to accord him Philippine citizenship for the reason that the same
was never extended to the Philippines. He insists that if his Philippine citizenship is
not recognized by said doctrine, it is nonetheless recognized by the laws enforced
prior to the 1935 Constitution, particularly the Philippine Bill of 1902
[44]
and the
Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916 (Jones Law of 1916).
[45]

According to Carlos, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916
deemed all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands as well as their children born after
the passage of said laws to be citizens of the Philippines. Because his father, Go Yin
An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of the Jones Law of
1916, he (Carlos) undoubtedly acquired his fathers citizenship. Article IV, first
paragraph, of the 1935 Constitution therefore applies to him. Said constitutional
provision reads:
ARTICLE IV. Citizenship
SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution.
x x x x
Even assuming that his father remained as a Chinese, Carlos also claims
that he followed the citizenship of his Filipina mother, being an illegitimate son, and
that he even validly elected Philippine citizenship when he complied with all the
68

requirements of Com. Act No. 625. He submits that what is being disputed is not
whether he complied with Com. Act No. 625, but rather, the timeliness of his
compliance. He stresses that the 3-year compliance period following the
interpretation given by Cuenco v. Secretary of Justice
[46]
to Article IV, Section 1(4) of
the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 when election must be made, is not an
inflexible rule. He reasoned that the same decision held that such period may be
extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always
considered himself a Filipino, like in his case.
[47]

We deny the appeal of Carlos and Jimmy for lack of merit.
Carlos and Jimmys claim that the cause of action of the Bureau has
prescribed is untenable. Cases involving issues on citizenship are sui generis. Once
the citizenship of an individual is put into question, it necessarily has to be threshed
out and decided upon. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,
[48]
we
said that decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a
persons future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently
reacquire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship under any of the modes recognized
by law for the purpose.
[49]
Indeed, if the issue of ones citizenship, after it has been
passed upon by the courts, leaves it still open to future adjudication, then there is
more reason why the government should not be precluded from questioning ones
claim to Philippine citizenship, especially so when the same has never been
threshed out by any tribunal.
Jimmys invocation of prescription also does not persuade us. Section 37
(b) of Com. Act No. 613 states:
Section 37.
x x x x
(b) Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11
and 12 of this section at any time after entry, but shall not be
effected under any other clause unless the arrest in the
deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause
of deportation arises.
x x x x
As shown in the Charge Sheet, Jimmy was charged for violation of Section
37(a)(9),
[50]
in relation to Section 45(e)
[51]
of Com. Act No. 613. From the foregoing
provision, his deportation may be effected only if his arrest is made within 5 years
from the time the cause for deportation arose. The court a quo is correct when it
ruled that the 5-year period should be counted only from July 18, 2000, the time
when Luis filed his complaint for deportation. It is the legal possibility of bringing
the action which determines the starting point for the computation of the period of
prescription.
[52]
Additionally, Section 2 of Act No. 3326,
[53]
as amended, entitled An
Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run,
provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
x x x x
The counting could not logically start in 1989 when his passport was issued
because the government was unaware that he was not a Filipino citizen. Had the
government been aware at such time that he was not a Filipino citizen or there
were certain anomalies attending his application for such passport, it would have
denied his application.
69

As to the issue of whether Carlos is an indispensable party, we reiterate
that an indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiff or
defendant.
[54]
To be indispensable, a person must first be a real party in interest,
that is, one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
[55]
Carlos clearly is not an indispensable
party as he does not stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the
suit. What is sought is the deportation of Jimmy on the ground that he is an
alien. Hence, the principal issue that will be decided on is the propriety of his
deportation. To recall, Jimmy claims that he is a Filipino under Section
1(3),
[56]
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution because Carlos, his father, is allegedly a
citizen.
[57]
Since his citizenship hinges on that of his fathers, it becomes necessary
to pass upon the citizenship of the latter. However, whatever will be the findings as
to Carlos citizenship will in no way prejudice him.
Citizenship proceedings, as aforestated, are a class of its own, in that,
unlike other cases, res judicata does not obtain as a matter of course. In a long line
of decisions, this Court said that every time the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court
or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered as res judicata; hence, it has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand.
[58]
Res judicatamay be applied in cases of citizenship only if
the following concur:
1. a persons citizenship must be raised as a material
issue in a controversy where said person is a party;
2. the Solicitor General or his authorized
representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and
3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this
Court.
[59]

In the event that the citizenship of Carlos will be questioned, or his
deportation sought, the same has to be ascertained once again as the decision
which will be rendered hereinafter shall have no preclusive effect upon his
citizenship. As neither injury nor benefit will redound upon Carlos, he cannot be
said to be an indispensable party in this case.
There can be no question that the Board has the authority to hear and
determine the deportation case against a deportee and in the process determine also
the question of citizenship raised by him.
[60]
However, this Court, following American
jurisprudence, laid down the exception to the primary jurisdiction enjoyed by the
deportation board in the case of Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board
[61]
wherein we
stressed that judicial determination is permitted in cases when the courts themselves
believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so
substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is
correct.
[62]
Moreover, when the evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive of his
citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the courts
shall promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings.
[63]

While we are mindful that resort to the courts may be had, the same
should be allowed only in the sound discretion of a competent court in proper
proceedings.
[64]
After all, the Boards jurisdiction is not divested by the mere claim
of citizenship.
[65]
Moreover, a deportee who claims to be a citizen and not
therefore subject to deportation has the right to have his citizenship reviewed by
the courts, after the deportation proceedings.
[66]
The decision of the Board on the
question is, of course, not final but subject to review by the courts.
[67]

70

After a careful evaluation of the evidence, the appellate court was not
convinced that the same was sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction to
continue with the deportation proceedings considering that what were presented
particularly the birth certificates of Jimmy, as well as those of his siblings, Juliet Go
and Carlos Go, Jr. indicate that they are Chinese citizens. Furthermore, like the
Board, it found the election of Carlos of Philippine citizenship, which was offered as
additional proof of his claim, irregular as it was not made on time.
We find no cogent reason to overturn the above findings of the appellate
tribunal. The question of whether substantial evidence had been presented to
allow immediate recourse to the regular courts is a question of fact which is beyond
this Courts power of review for it is not a trier of facts.
[68]
None of the
exceptions
[69]
in which this Court may resolve factual issues has been shown to exist
in this case. Even if we evaluate their arguments and the evidence they presented
once again, the same conclusion will still be reached.
One of the arguments raised to sustain Carlos claim to Philippine
citizenship is the doctrine of jus soli, or the doctrine or principle of citizenship by
place of birth. To recall, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that the
doctrine of jus soli was never extended to the Philippines. We agree. The doctrine
of jus soli was for a time the prevailing rule in the acquisition of ones
citizenship.
[70]
However, the Supreme Court abandoned the principle of jus soli in
the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor.
[71]
Since then, said doctrine only
benefited those who were individually declared to be citizens of the Philippines by a
final court decision on the mistaken application of jus soli.
[72]

Neither will the Philippine Bill of 1902
[73]
nor the Jones Law of
1916
[74]
make Carlos a citizen of the Philippines. His bare claim that his father, Go
Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of the said laws,
without any supporting evidence whatsoever will not suffice.
It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the
father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother
and follow her nationality.
[75]
Moreover, we have also ruled that an illegitimate
child of a Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and
privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen
himself.
[76]
However, it is our considered view that absent any evidence proving
that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina, the aforestated established
rule could not be applied to him.
As to the question of whether the election of Philippine citizenship
conferred on Carlos Filipino citizenship, we find that the appellate court correctly
found that it did not.
Com. Act No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of
the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to
make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate
children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such
intention in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before
any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
[77]

However, the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 did not prescribe a
time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The
1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made upon reaching the
71

age of majority. The age of majority then commenced upon reaching 21 years. In
the opinions of the then Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of
election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time
period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine
citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State
of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made
within a reasonable time after attaining the age of majority. The phrase
reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made
within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.
[78]

It is true that we said that the 3-year period for electing Philippine
citizenship may be extended as when the person has always regarded himself as a
Filipino. Be that as it may, it is our considered view that not a single circumstance
was sufficiently shown meriting the extension of the 3-year period. The fact that
Carlos exercised his right of suffrage in 1952 and 1955 does not demonstrate such
belief, considering that the acts were done after he elected Philippine
citizenship. On the other hand, the mere fact that he was able to vote does not
validate his irregular election of Philippine citizenship. At most, his registration as a
voter indicates his desire to exercise a right appertaining exclusively to Filipino
citizens but does not alter his real citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction, is
determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise of the rights and privileges
granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person
may misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and privileges of
citizens of this country.
[79]

It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the
satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged
in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding
citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state.
[80]

As Carlos and Jimmy neither showed conclusive proof of their citizenship
nor presented substantial proof of the same, we have no choice but to sustain the
Boards jurisdiction over the deportation proceedings. This is not to say that we are
ruling that they are not Filipinos, for that is not what we are called upon to do. This
Court necessarily has to pass upon the issue of citizenship only to determine
whether the proceedings may be enjoined in order to give way to a judicial
determination of the same. And we are of the opinion that said proceedings should
not be enjoined.
In our considered view, the allegation of Jimmy that due process was not
observed in the deportation proceedings must likewise fail.
Deportation proceedings are administrative in character, summary in
nature, and need not be conducted strictly in accordance with the rules of ordinary
court proceedings.
[81]
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones
side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.
[82]
As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment
is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.
[83]
Although Jimmy
was not furnished with a copy of the subject Resolution and Charge Sheet as alleged
by him, the trial court found that he was given ample opportunity to explain his side
and present controverting evidence, thus:
x x x It must be stressed that after receiving the Order
dated September 11, 2001 signed by BSI Chief Ronaldo P.
Ledesma on October 4, 2001, petitioner Jimmy T. Go admitted
that when his representative went to the B.I.D. to inquire about
72

the said Order, the latter chanced upon the Resolution
dated February 14, 2001 and March 8, 2001 as well as the Charge
Sheet dated July 3, 2001. Hence on October 5, 2001, he filed a
Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum and as such,
was allowed by Ronaldo P. Ledesma an extension of ten (10) days
to submit his required memorandum. x x x
[84]

This circumstance satisfies the demands of administrative due process.
As regards the petition in G.R. No. 171946, petitioners contend that the
appellate tribunal erred in enjoining Jimmys deportation.
[85]

Petitioners question the remedy availed of by Jimmy. They argue that the
existence of the remedy of an ordinary appeal proscribes the filing of the petition
for certiorari as was done in this case. They point out that the appeal period in
habeas corpus cases is only 48 hours, compared to a special civil action under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court which is 60 days. This clearly shows that an ordinary appeal
is the more plain, speedy and adequate remedy; hence, it must be the one availed
of.
[86]
Since the decision of the trial court was not properly appealed, the same may
be said to have attained finality, and may no longer be disturbed.
[87]

They maintain that the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus by the
trial court was proper. A petition for habeas corpus has for its purpose only the
determination of whether or not there is a lawful ground for Jimmys apprehension
and continued detention. They urge that the decision of the Board dated April 17,
2002 that ordered Jimmys deportation has already attained finality by reason of
the belated appeal taken by Jimmy from the said decision on April 2, 2004 before
the Office of the President, or after almost two years from the time the decision
was rendered. Said decision of the Board, they insist, is the lawful ground that
sanctions Jimmys apprehension and detention.
[88]

Petitioners in G.R. No. 171946 also argue that Jimmy cannot rely on the
bail on recognizance he was previously granted to question his subsequent
apprehension and detention. Under the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, the
power to grant bail can only be exercised while the alien is still under investigation,
and not when the order of deportation had already been issued by the
Board.
[89]
Hence, the bail granted was irregular as it has no legal
basis. Furthermore, they said the petition for habeas corpus necessarily has to be
dismissed because the same is no longer proper once the applicant thereof has
been charged before the Board, which is the case with Jimmy.
[90]
Nonetheless, they
claim that the habeas corpus case is rendered moot and academic as Jimmy is no
longer being detained.
[91]

On the other hand, Jimmy counters that the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition is the most appropriate, speedy and adequate remedy in spite of the
availability of ordinary appeal considering that what is involved in this case is his
cherished liberty. Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the petitioners in ordering his
arrest and detention, he argues, all the more justifies the avails of the extraordinary
writ.
[92]
Contrary to the petitioners stand, Jimmy argues that the April 17, 2002
Decision of the Board has not attained finality owing to the availability of various
remedies, one of which is an appeal, and in fact is actually void because it was rendered
without due process.
[93]
He also insists that the bail issued to him is valid and effective
until the final determination of his citizenship before the proper courts.
[94]
Moreover,
he maintains that the petition for habeas corpus was proper since its object is to inquire
into the legality of ones detention, and if found illegal, to order the release of the
detainee.
[95]
As in his petition in G.R. No. 167570, Jimmy also contends that the
proceedings before the Board is void for failure to implead therein his father, and that
he should have been given a full blown trial before a regular court where he can prove
his citizenship.
[96]

73

Considering the arguments and contentions of the parties, we find the
petition in G.R. No. 171946 meritorious.
We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are available only when there is no appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The writ of
certiorari does not lie where an appeal may be taken or where another adequate
remedy is available for the correction of the error.
[97]

The petitioners correctly argue that appeal should have been the remedy
availed of as it is more plain, speedy and adequate. The 48-hour appeal period
demonstrates the adequacy of such remedy in that no unnecessary time will be
wasted before the decision will be re-evaluated.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special
proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of
the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If
it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a
persons detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of
habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason
of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4
[98]
of
Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.
[99]

Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer
question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest
duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought
to be released had been charged before any court. The term court in this context
includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the
persons confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of
Immigration.
[100]
Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a
petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration
for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the
Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas
corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.
[101]

Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact
ordered arrested pending his deportation, coupled by this Courts pronouncement
that the Board was not ousted of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation
proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. This
being so, we find it unnecessary to touch on the other arguments advanced by
respondents regarding the same subject.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570
are DENIED. The Decision dated October 25, 2004 and Resolution dated February
16, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85143 are AFFIRMED. The
petition in G.R. No. 171946 is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated December 8,
2005 and Resolution datedMarch 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
88277 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 6, 2004 and December 28,
2004 Orders of the RegionalTrial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167 are
hereby REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
74

Carlos vs Ramos
Carlos vs Ramos

These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by
Luis T. Ramos against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and
undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino
citizen, Jimmys personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so.
Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents,
Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because
only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries
were typewritten.

ISSUE: Did we adopt the jus soli or jus sanguinins principle? Does the principle of res
adjudicata apply to decisions on citizenship?

HELD: We adopted the jus sanguinis principle. The doctrine of jus soli was never
extended to the Philippines. The doctrine of jus soli was for a time the prevailing
rule in the acquisition of ones citizenship. However, the Supreme Court abandoned
the principle of jus soli in the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor. Since then,
said doctrine only benefited those who were individually declared to be citizens of
the Philippines by a final court decision on the mistaken application of jus soli.
In citizenship proceedings, res judicata does not obtain as a matter of course. Res
judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following concur: 1. a
persons citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said
person is a party; 2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took
active part in the resolution thereof; and 3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by
this Court.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG,
JR., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991
SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG,
JR., respondents.
Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a
decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen
and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before
us is whether or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with grave
abuse of discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern
Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and
Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second
district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on
the following grounds:
75

1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern
Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989.
This was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualificationsof their respective
members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The
use of the word soleemphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that
under the 1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and
exclusive, viz:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of
the jurisdiction conferred (Angara v. Electoral
Commission, supra at p. 162). The exercise of power by the
Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been
described as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it
had originally remained in the legislature." (id., at p. 175) Earlier
this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice
Malcolm as "full, clear and complete; (Veloso v. Board of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the
amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed
upon the Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and
complete as that previously granted the Legislature and the
Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968]) The
same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunal under the 1987 Constitution. (p. 401)
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the
power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken
by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by
this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete
and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in
any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." (pp. 403-404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our
constitutional grants of power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated
that the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in the
exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a
determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero,
upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its
power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a
very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the
power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any
event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will
constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not venture into the perilous
area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches of the
Government, It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or
correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution
calls for remedial action.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded
jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies
of the government to determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds
of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
76

Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing
that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it
will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide.
(See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what
it thinks is apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals,
although not powers in the tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the
exercise of their functions independent organs independent of Congress and the
Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. (Angara
v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the
balance of powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain
where the Sovereign authority has place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of
Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the
situation may exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political
composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the Constitution,
however, that makes the HRET because of its composition any less independent
from the Court or its constitutional functions any less exclusive. The degree of
judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how many legislative
members of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test remains the same-
manifest grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due
process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of
judicial review by the Supreme Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong
Te, arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the
municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard
work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from
the then Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He
was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was
able to establish an enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy
assimilation into the community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he
absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As
the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two
fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and
practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was
born in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to
put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-
up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private respondent,
unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life
and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for
naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino
citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the
decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may
already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance;
correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of
nine years was finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is
77

nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the
customs and practices of the local populace were concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang,
Samar was burned to the ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another
one in place of their ruined house. Again, there is no showing other than that
Laoang was their abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for
better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college
education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire
gutted their second house in Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family constructed
still another house, this time a 16-door apartment building, two doors of which
were reserved for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the
CPA Board Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for
work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner.
Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. In
1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the
Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment
given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and
solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino.
The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born
citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up
and spent his childhood days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of
Laoang, Samar, and correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of
their family business decided to be of greater service to his province and ran for
public office. Hence, when the opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the elections for
representative in the second district of Northern Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their
representative in Congress. Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are
combined, Ong would still lead the two by more than 7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those
who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who,
having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which
discriminates against Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of
section 4, would this refer only to those who
elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity
78

of the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover
those who elected it under the 1973
Constitution?
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who
elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the
provision of the 1935 Constitution whether the
election was done before or after January 17,
1973. (Records of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill
of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations and
Human Rights has more or less decided to
extend the interpretation of who is a natural-
born citizen as provided in section 4 of the 1973
Constitution by adding that persons who have
elected Philippine Citizenship under the 1935
Constitution shall be natural-born? Am I right
Mr. Presiding Officer?
Fr. Bernas: yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in
the Reverend Father Bernas' well written book,
he said that the decision was designed merely to
accommodate former delegate Ernesto Ang and
that the definition on natural-born has no
retroactive effect. Now it seems that the
Reverend Father Bernas is going against this
intention by supporting the amendment?
Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there
has been an evolution in my thinking. (Records
of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very
important because his election of Philippine
citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen
but a natural-born Filipino citizen entitling him
to run for Congress. . .
Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that
and for that reason we will leave it to the body
to approve that provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the
provision because it strikes me as unfair that the
Filipino citizen who was born a day before
January 17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or a
natural-born citizen. (Records of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to
remedy an inequitable situation. Between 1935
and 1973 when we were under the 1935
Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but
alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos.
However, those born of Filipino mothers but
alien fathers would have to elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
and if they do elect, they become Filipino
citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens.
(Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol.
1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision
prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an
inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be
hedged in by the literal meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment thereof,
79

must prevail over the letter, especially where adherence to the latter would result
in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation
and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision
which should prevail over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our
Constitution, any constitution is not to be construed narrowly or
pedantically for the prescriptions therein contained, to
paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas having
their essence in their form but are organic living institutions, the
significance of which is vital not formal. . . . (p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where
one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the
status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not,
under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of
Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both
considered as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend
on the fleeting accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of
essentially the same similarly situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy
this accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the
effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The
enactment was meant to correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then
prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which would have been nil at the time
had it not been for the curative provisions. (See Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the
time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the
respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution
accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17,
1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he
came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He
was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father
had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could
not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution
would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing
citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election
through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary
procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal
process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the
exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact
pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age,
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship (p.
52; emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to
have elected citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re
Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no
alien enclaves and no racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a
Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalization when the child was still a
80

small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive government
agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and getting a
license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always
considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he
does not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of
alien-ness no acts to show that this country is not his natural homeland. The mass
of voters of Northern Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They should
know him better than any member of this Court will ever know him. They voted by
overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in Congress. Because of his
acts since childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who
still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect
came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering
a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a
qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other
categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for
these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an
alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no
doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted
in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship.
It observed that "when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong
Chuan became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act
squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this country.
Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for
protestee by declaring him as such." (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized
citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of
his citizenship after his death and at this very late date just so we can go after the
son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach.
This can not be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may
only be done through a direct action for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA
52 [1970])
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as
null and void would run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has
already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself.
A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words of the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have
long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously he could not use
beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this matter to be
made a central issue in this case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong
Chuan. Our function is to determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse of
authority in the exercise of its powers. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural
born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The
citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the
respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to
the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have
elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine
citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a
problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his father which he could
possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed
manifest grave abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship has
already been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang
Pambansa convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by that Convention.
Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared and accepted as a
natural born citizen by both bodies.
Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention,
the Batasang Pambansa, and the respondent HRET, such a difference could only be
characterized as error. There would be no basis to call the HRET decision so
arbitrary and whimsical as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural
born citizen?
81

Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
subjects on the 11th day of April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their
children born subsequent thereto were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered
Spanish Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they
were born out of Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in
any town in the Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile,
once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new
one is established. (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v.
Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around
1895. Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of
his being a resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election
Protests and Credentials of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972,
p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even
went beyond the turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up
his business and acquired his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of
sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to
the Philippines. The fact that he died in China, during one of his visits in said
country, was of no moment. This will not change the fact that he already had his
domicile fixed in the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had
become a Spanish subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a
town under the Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of
the Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as one who has actual fixed
residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary,
Vol. II) Apriori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to educe that Ong Te
qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill
of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private
respondent was a natural-born Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to
prove it were not in compliance with the best the evidence rule. The petitioners
allege that the private respondent failed to present the original of the documentary
evidence, testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the proceedings of the body
which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was
predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the
exceptions to the best evidence rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the
Committee Report No. 12, the minutes of the plenary session of 1971 Constitutional
Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention; by Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and
by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P Law Center, in their respective
testimonies given before the HRET to the effect that there is no governmental
agency which is the official custodian of the records of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. 30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35;
TSN, February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)
82

The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the
Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was the proper party to
testify to such execution. (TSN, December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as
aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the
inability to produce, the law does not require the degree of proof to be of sufficient
certainty; it is enough that it be shown that after a bona fide diligent search, the
same cannot be found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 [1918])
Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately
established, the contents of the questioned documents can be proven by a copy
thereof or by the recollection of witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence
cited in the Committee Report, the former member of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, Atty. Nolledo, when he was presented as a witness in the hearing of
the protest against the private respondent, categorically stated that he saw the
disputed documents presented during the hearing of the election protest against
the brother of the private respondent. (TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the
Constitutional Convention, states that he was presiding officer of the plenary
session which deliberated on the report on the election protest against Delegate
Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of delegates present. Among them are Mr.
Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could have
presented any one of the long list of delegates to refute Mr. Ong's having been
declared a natural-born citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they demur to the
contents of the documents presented by the private respondent. They merely relied
on the procedural objections respecting the admissibility of the evidence
presented.
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong
to be a member of that body. The HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is
the sole judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congress.
Both bodies deliberated at length on the controversies over which they were sole
judges. Decisions were arrived at only after a full presentation of all relevant factors
which the parties wished to present. Even assuming that we disagree with their
conclusions, we cannot declare their acts as committed with grave abuse of
discretion. We have to keep clear the line between error and grave abuse.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The
term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under
the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of
residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to
remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I
remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the elections.
So my question is: What is the Committee's
concept of residence of a candidate for the
legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the
concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the
regular members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely
provides, among others, and a resident thereof,
that is, in the district, for a period of not less
than one year preceding the day of the election.
This was in effect lifted from the 1973
Constitution, the interpretation given to it was
domicile. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional
Convention, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p. 87)
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on
Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo
has raised the same point that "resident" has
been interpreted at times as a matter of
intention rather than actual residence.
83

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen
consider at the proper time to go back to actual
residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some
difficulty especially considering that a provision
in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage
says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as
enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the
original concept that it should be by domicile
and not physical and actual residence. (Records
of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 11,
July 22, 1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word
"residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966
[1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how
long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. In other
words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA
147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his
parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose
Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the
present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established
that after the fire that gutted their house in 1961, another one was constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-
door apartment was built by their family, two doors of which were reserved as their
family residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November 18,1988, p. 8)
The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in
Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private
respondent's parents. Upon the demise of his parents, necessarily, the private
respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession, became the co-owner thereof (as a
co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar,
the Supreme Court in the case ofDe los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held
that it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his
residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a
rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for
Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only
requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence
requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate should
also own property in order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil.
412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a
profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected,
does not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of
finishing his studies and later to practice his profession, There was no intention to
abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys
made to his home province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.
The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an
interracial evolution. Throughout our history, there has been a continuing influx of
Malays, Chinese, Americans, Japanese, Spaniards and other nationalities. This racial
diversity gives strength to our country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a
person, for there is none. To mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part Chinese,
the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee was part Chinese, and of course our own
President, Corazon Aquino is also part Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of whom we
are proud were ethnically more Chinese than the private respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a
special privilege which one must forever cherish.
84

However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the
basis of too harsh an interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who
qualify to share in its richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization
laws only the very affluent backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer
the indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of
clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew how to overcome so
many technical traps of the judicial process were able to acquire citizenship. It is
time for the naturalization law to be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative,
and meaningful examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more
humane, more indubitable and less technical approach to citizenship problems is
essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr.
is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Gancayco, JJ., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-26467 July 15, 1981
FLORENCIO T. MALLARI (As Receiver in Civil Case No. 58734, Court of First Instance
of Manila), Go Tin and Julian Lee, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JOHN C. LEE, JESUS C. LEE, JOSEPH C. LEE and LEE TEK
HONG, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
At the outset, it should be stated that among the petitioners was originally included
"Judge Agustin P. Montesa in his capacity as Judge of Branch XIX, Court of First
Instance of Manila". Since he need not be impleaded as a petitioner', even as a
formal party, his name has been dropped.
1

This case originated from the civil action instituted by Go Tin and Julian Lee, mother
and son, on August 28, 1964, against Lee Tek Hong and the latter's sons, docketed
as Civil Case No. 58734 in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIX, presided
by the Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, for Reconveyance and Accounting with
Receivership. They sought to recover their share, as widow and child, in the estate
of the deceased Lee Tay, who had died in Manila in 1935, leaving property
conservatively valued at P100,000.00, consisting of an interest in a partnership of
Lee Tay and Lee Chay. The partnership had been liquidated and Lee Tay's share was
taken over managed and administered, allegedly in trust for the benefit of the
widow and children of the deceased, by Lee Tek Hong, second eldest son of Lee Tay,
the eldest being sickly. Lee Tek Hong then invested the assets of the estate in the
corporation known as Lee Tay and Lee Chay, Inc. (the Corporation, for brevity).
The Complaint expressly alleged "that in breach of his trust and in grave abuse of
the confidence reposed on him by the plaintiffs (widow and son), defendant Lee Tek
Hong clandestinely maneuvered and manipulated the affairs of Lee Tay and Lee
Chay, Inc., by forming a partnership known as Alaska Lumber Co. making it appear
in the records of the partnership that he and his deceased wife (Mina S. Capistrano)
alone were parties in said partnership ... " that Alaska Lumber Co. and the other
firms organized by Lee Tek Hong were mere "fronts" to enable him to siphon the
assets of Lee Tay and Lee Chay, Inc. to his exclusive personal benefit to the
exclusion and prejudice of plaintiffs mother and son and other heirs of the
deceased Lee Tay; that "all the assets of Lee Tay and Lee Chay, Inc., the Alaska
Lumber Co., the Uno Lumber Co., the New Venus Lumber, the Era Incorporated
operating the Paris Motel, and Parkway Trading should be impressed with a
constructive trust as being part of the conjugal estate of the deceased Lee Tay and
plaintiff Go Tin, since 11/20 thereof rightfully and legally belongs to plaintiff Go Tin
and a proportionate 1/20 share thereof belongs to plaintiff Julian Lee. "
The Complaint then prayed, considering plaintiffs' actual and existing legal and
beneficial interest, for the appointment of a receiver of the assets, properties and
funds of all the firms serving as "fronts" for the fraudulent acts and manipulations
of defendant Lee Tek Hong and his children, namely, defendants Jesus Lee, Joseph
85

C. Lee and John C. Lee, as the most convenient and feasible means of preserving
and protecting these properties and funds.
The case is still pending trial in the Court below, now unfortunately delayed
because of the controversy over the appointment of a Receiver during the
pendency of the action.
Defendants-respondents, Lee Tek Hong and sons (the LEES, for short), deny widow
and son's interest in the properties and funds involved alleging that Go Tin is not
the legitimate wife of Lee Tay and, therefore, is not entitled to share in the latter's
estate; and that the properties left by Lee Tay are all under the control and
administration of the Corporation with its own duly constituted officers charged
with safeguarding and protecting the assets thereof. It is emphasized further that of
the nine children of Lee Tay, only plaintiff Julian Lee filed the Complaint against
their elder brother, Lee Tek Hong.
When Lee Tek Hong's wife, Mina S. Capistrano, died in 1963, their son, John C. Lee,
was appointed administrator of her estate consisting of about 80% of the assets and
properties of Alaska Lumber Co., in Special Proceeding No. 54999 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch IV.
As prayed for in the Complaint, and after due hearing, the trial Court, on November
13, 1964, issued an Order (hereinafter referred to as the Receivership
Order)
2
authorizing the appointment of Atty. Florencio T Mallari as Receiver, upon
the filing of a bond of P50,000.00.
to take custody of the assets, properties and funds claimed by the
parties in this case, as well as the management of the business
involved herein (1) Lee Tay and Lee Chay, Inc. ... ; (2) Alaska
Lumber Co. (3) Uno Lumber Co. (4) New Venus Lumber (5) Era
Incorporated operating the Paris Motel, and (6) Parkway Trading
...
The LEES then filed a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 35009-R (First certiorari Petition), seeking to
annul and set aside the said Receivership Order; to command the Receiver to desist
from carrying out the Order complained of, and respondent from enforcing in any
way the said Order. After proper proceeding, the Court of Appeals, on March 19,
1965, rendered a Decision
3
denying the Petition and affirming the Receivership
Order.
In the meantime, on December 4, 1964, while the First certiorari Petition was
pending before the Court of Appeals, the trial Court issued another
Order
4
directing the Sheriff of Manila or any of his deputies to take over the
custody of the assets, properties and funds as well as the management of the
business of (1) Lee Tay and Lee Chay, Inc., (2) Alaska Lumber Co., (3) Uno Lumber
Co., (4) New Venus Lumber, (5) Era Incorporated which operates Paris Motel, and
(6) Parkway Trading, and to turn them over to the Receiver.
On December 14, 1964, the trial Court denied the LEES' offer for a counterbond in
order to discharge the Receiver.
Also, on June 30, 1965, this time after the Decision in (CA-G.R. No. 35009-R had
been rendered, the trial Court denied the Urgent Motion of John C. Lee, in his
capacity as administrator of the intestate estate of Mina S. Capistrano, (SP
Proceeding No. 54999, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV)
5
to order the
Receiver to surrender to him all the properties of Alaska Lumber Co. contending
that they were in custodia legis in the intestate case.
Instead of moving for reconsideration, the LEES filed on July 26, 1965, a second
Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 36093-R (Second certiorari Petition), seeking to
nullify the aforementioned Orders including the Receivership Order, which had
already been passed upon in the First certiorari Petition. A temporary Restraining
Order was issued on August 3, 1965 in favor of the LEES.
In the meantime, upon examination under oath of Lee Tek Hong by the trial Court,
it was discovered that Alaska Lumber Co. was indebted to the Corporation in the
amount of P402,000.00 consisting of monthly rentals, first of P1,000.00, which was
later raised to P4,000.00 for the use of its 2-1/2 hectares of land in Juan Luna
Street, Manila, together with its sawmill, machineries and equipment. In view
thereof, the trial Court in its Order of August 2, 1965 authorized the Receiver to pay
the Corporation the amount of P 402,000.00 out of Alaska Lumber Co.'s deposit in
the Philippine Bank of Commerce and China Banking Corporation and from the
proceeds of the sale of its properties.
On November 29, 1965, a Decision by a Special Division of Five
6
was rendered in
the Second certiorari Petition (CA-G.R. No. 36093-R) denying certiorari once more
on the ground that the validity of the Receivership Order was assailed and fully
litigated in the First certiorari Petition (CA-G.R. No. 35009-R), and since no appeal
therefrom was duly perfected, it has become final and no longer open to further
litigation pursuant to the "law of the case" doctrine. "Right or wrong, it is binding
86

on both the trial Court and the appellate Court, and is not subject to re-examination
by either." "Apart from these," the Court continued, "the principle of res judicata
has also spread its mantle over the present litigation, the parties, the subject-
matter and the cause of action in the previous case and in this one, being exactly
the same. ... " Said Decision also lifted the Restraining Order of August 3, 1965.
However, upon a Motion for Reconsideration, an Amendatory Decision, dated April
11, 1966, was rendered by a three to two vote, setting aside the original Decision.
The dispositive portion of the Amendatory Decision reads:
In the light of the foregoing considerations, the judgment of this
Court of November 29, 1965 is set aside and a new one entered
under which the Alaska Lumber Co. and/or the estate of Mina S.
Capistrano is hereby allowed to file a counterbond of P50,000.00
to dissolve the receivership over the assets, funds, properties and
management of the said company. The order of August 2, 1966
ordering the receiver to pay to Lee Tay and Lee Chay, Inc. the sum
of P402,000.00 and to sell and dispose of the assets of the Alaska
Lumber Company as may be necessary to settle the said
obligation is revoked and the withdrawn deposits be returned to
the Alaska lumber Company within 15 days from the time this
decision becomes final. In order to terminate all the issues
involved in Civil Case 58724, it is suggested that Lee Tay and Lee
Chay, Inc. and Alaska Lumber Company be impleaded as party-
defendants therein. No pronouncement is made as to Costs.
7

A Motion for Reconsideration of the Amendatory Decision was denied,
8
hence, the
instant Petition for Review by certiorari fi1ed by mother and son.
The following are the assigned errors:
I. The Court of Appeals erred in reviewing by writ of certiorari
alleged errors of the trial court which, if true, were, at most, mere
errors of Judgment and not errors of jurisdiction.
II. The Court of Appeals, in the Amendatory Decision, committed
an error of law in ignoring and not applying the well-settled
doctrine that the petitioners' failure to file with the Court below a
motion for reconsideration of the order subject of the certiorari
proceeding is a fatal and insurmountable barrier' (Collector of
Internal Revenue vs. Reyes, G.R. No. L-8685, January 11, 1957;
Plaza vs. Mencias, G.R. No. L-18253, October 31, 1962; Sy It vs.
Tiangco, G.R. No. L-18375, February 27, 1962); and that under the
said doctrine the petition for review by certiorari of the Orders of
December 4, 1964, December 14, 1964, June 30, 1965 and August
2, 1965, without first presenting the proper motions for
reconsideration before the trial court was fatally defective.
III. The Court of Appeals, in the same Amendatory Decision,
committed a similar serious error of law in taking cognizance in
CA-G.R. No. 36093-R, and as a matter of fact, resolving in a
diametrically opposite manner in said proceeding the question of
receivership, which was the principal question raised and
adjudicated in the previous certiorari proceeding, CA-G.R. No.
35009-R, after the decision therein had become final and
executory for failure of the petitioners to appeal therefrom.
IV. The Court of Appeals, in the same Amendatory Decision,
committed an error of law in failing to consider the clear nature
and scope of the Order of November 13, 1964, and in not holding
that the Orders of December 4, 1964 and June 30, 1965, were
mere implementing orders issued to carry out the basic Order of
November 13, 1964, which Order was upheld in the decision in
CA-G.R. No. 35009-R, the last mentioned decision having already
become final and executory and that, as a matter of fact, the
receiver, under the Order of November 13, 1964, could take
custody and management of the assets of Alaska Lumber Co.
independently of the Orders of December 4, 1964 and June 30,
1965; and that the appointment of the receiver could not be
divorced from his duty and right to take over custody of the
management of the assets of the firm placed under receivership.
V. The Court of Appeals, in the Amendatory Decision, clearly
committed a serious error of law in disturbing and, as a matter of
fact, reversing a final and executory finding in the decision in CA-
G.R. No. 35009-R, in utter disregard of the principle of res
judicata or that of bar by former judgment, when it held that "at
this stage of the said case (Civil Case No. 58734) the legal interest
of plaintiffs (herein petitioners) Go Tin and Julian Lee in the
properties held by Lee Tay and Lee Chay, Inc. and/or Alaska
Lumber Company is non-existent."
87

VI. The Court of Appeals has similarly committed a grave error of
law in taking cognizance, in CA-G.R. No. 36093, of the following
other questions, which were squarely raised and definitely
adjudicated in the previous proceeding, CA-G.R. No. 35009-R:
a. Whether or not the assets of Alaska Lumber
Company were in custodia legis,
b. Whether or not Alaska Lumber Company, not
being a party in Civil Case No. 58734, could be
placed under receivership.
VII. The Court of Appeals, in its Amendatory Decision, erred in
assuming jurisdiction over the Order of August 2, 1965, which
involved the sum of P 402,000.00; in not holding that the said
order was final and not interlocutory and, therefore, could not be
reviewed by certiorari; and in not holding that the issuance of said
order was strictly in accordance with law and equity.
9

Upon the facts and recorded evidence, we are constrained to set aside the
Amendatory Decision and to reinstate the original Decision in the Second certiorari
Petition (CA-G.R. No. 36093-R).
1. Section 49(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 49. Effect of judgments. - The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could
have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for
the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;
xxx xxx xxx
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in the First certiorari
Petition reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion by the respondent
Judge in authorizing the appointment of a receiver under his
order of November 13, 1964. as affirmed in his order of
November 25, 1964, the petition is hereby denied.
It is plain from the foregoing that the Appellate Court had sustained the validity of
the Receivership Order issued on November 13, 1964. That issue was fully litigated
and resolved in the First certiorari Petition (CA-G.R. No. 35009-R). And yet, in the
Second certiorari Petition (CA-G.R. No. 36093-R), one of the ultimate goals of the
action was again "to nullify the order of the respondent Judge of November 13,
1964."
Assailing the Receivership Order on jurisdictional grounds can no longer be
successfully done. The principle of bar by prior judgment, one of the aspects of the
doctrine of res judicata or estoppel by judgment as known to Anglo-American
jurisprudence, comes into play and precludes the re-litigation in another certiorari
proceeding of the specific question actually litigated and resolved in the First
certiorari Petition, which is, the validity of the Receivership Order which included
"taking custody" of the properties and funds and "managing" the businesses
involved. The Second certiorari Petition must be held to be barred by the prior
judgment in the First certiorari Petition, there being Identity of parties, subject
matter and cause of action between the First certiorari Petition where the original
Decision was rendered, and the Second certiorari Petition which sought to assail
again the Receivership Order. Further, the judgment in the First certiorari Petition is
a final one rendered by a Court of competent jurisdiction upon the merits, there
having been no appeal perfected.
And even under the "law of the case" doctrine, as aptly held in the original Decision
in the Second certiorari Petition (CA-G.R. No. 36093-R), the Receivership Order is no
longer open to further litigation. It constitutes the controlling legal rule between
the parties and can not be modified or amended.
10

By "law of the case" is meant that whatever is once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the
same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case
so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
11

88

And once the decision becomes final, it is binding on all inferior
courts and hence, beyond their power and authority to alter or
modify.
12

Thus, it was erroneous for the Amendatory Decision to hold that the trial Court
"abused its discretion in authorizing the receiver to take possession and custody of
all the funds, assets and properties of the Alaska Lumber Co., as well as its
management, particularly before the final adjudication of the rights of the parties".
To contend that the Receivership Order merely "authorized" the appointment of
the Receiver as shown in the dispositive portion of the Decision in the First
certiorari Petition, and did not include "custody" nor "management" is to
conveniently close one's eyes to the basic text of the Receivership Order, to wit,
... to take custody of the assets, properties and funds claimed by
the parties in this case, as well as the management of the
businesses involved herein, such as (1) Lee Tay and Lee Chay, Inc.
... ; (2) Alaska Lumber Co., ... ; (3) Uno Lumber Co., ... ; (4) New
Venus Lumber, ... ; (5) Era Incorporated and Paris Motel, ... ; and
(6) Parkway Trading, ..., "
and to dismember the Receivership Order beyond recognition and effectiveness.
For even the general powers of a receiver include:
... to take and keep possession of the property in controversy; to
receive rents; to collect debts, due to himself as receiver or to the
fund, property, estate, person or corporation of which he is
receiver; ... to pay outstanding debts; to divide the money and
other property that shall remain among the persons legally
entitled to receive the same; and generally to do such acts
respecting the property as the court may authorize. ... "
13

It is contended, however, that a strict interpretation of the res judicata doctrine
cannot and should not apply to the present proceeding. First, because the parties
are not all the same considering the entry into the picture of the intestate estate of
Mina S. Capistrano upon the approval by the lower court of Administrator John C.
Lee's motion to intervene as defendant. Second, because the only issue in the First
certiorari Petition was the validity of the appointment of the Receiver, while the
present case involves the validity of several acts of the Receiver occurring after the
First certiorari Petition. And third, because the Decision in the First certiorari
Petition was not intended to be the final word as to subsequent acts of the Receiver
because of the Appellate Court's statement that "if at the hearing, it win be shown
that such appointment was uncalled for, the error may be corrected by promptly
asking the court to revoke the same."
14

We cannot subscribe to the foregoing views. It is fundamental that the application
of the rule of res judicata may not be evaded by simply including additional parties
in a subsequent litigation.
15
There is still Identity of parties although in the second
action there is one party who was not joined in the former action, if it appears that
such party is not a necessary party either in the first or in the second action.
16
The
intestate estate of Mina S. Capistrano is not such a necessary party.
While the non-finality of the appointment of the Receiver may be conceded in the
sense that it may be revoked during the pendency of the action, yet it cannot be
gainsaid that the Decision of the Appellate Court in the First certiorari Petition
upholding the validity of the appointment was, in legal contemplation, final, no
appeal having been perfected thereform.
The argument that the only issue in the First certiorari Petition was the validity of
the appointment of the Receiver, while in the second, it is the validity of the several
acts of the Receiver after the First certiorari Petition, is tenuous. It ignores the full
scope of the Receivership Order, which included not only the custody of the assets,
properties and funds claimed, but also the management of the businesses involved.
The Order of December 4, 1964 authorizing the Sheriff to take over custody of
properties and turn them over to the Receiver, and that of June 30, 1965 denying
the Motion for the surrender of the properties of Alaska Lumber Co. to the
intestate estate of Mina S. Capistrano, are part and parcel of the custody and
management specifically entrusted to the Receiver. They did not alter the effects of
the basic Receivership Order. They were allied Orders issued in implementation and
furtherance thereof. The Order of December 14, 1964 denying the counterbond for
the discharge of the Receiver, upholds the custody granted the Receiver, and was
within the discretion of the trial Court to grant or deny.
In so far as the Order of August 2, 1965 is concerned, which required the payment
of rentals by Alaska Lumber Co. in the sum of P402,000.00 in favor of the
Corporation, suffice it to say that this Order was -issued only after examination
under oath of Lee Tek Hong as to the rentals due from the Alaska Lumber Co. to the
Corporation. The trial Court, therefore, cannot be faulted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing said Order.
But even if the cause of action in the Second certiorari Petition were different, the
issue determined in the First certiorari Petition, to reiterate, the validity of the
89

Receivership Order, must, as between the same parties, be taken as conclusively
established so long as the judgment in the First certiorari Petition remains
unmodified. This is the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, another aspect of the
res judicata doctrine, as enunciated in section 49(c), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 49. Effects of judgments. - The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as
follows:
(c) In any other litigation between the same
parties or their successors in interest, that only
is deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment which appears upon its face to have
been so adjuged, or which was actually and
necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto.
17

2. The Amendatory Decision likewise holds that the "legal interest" of mother and
son in the properties held either by the Corporation or by Alaska Lumber Co., an
indispensable requisite for receivership (Sec. l(b), Rule 59), is non-existent. Again,
this is a matter that was passed upon and litigated in CA-G.R. No. 35009-R. In fact
the appellate Court in that case squarely held:
It appears that the respondent Judge conducted a hearing of the
respondents' motion of November 3, 11964, reiterating the
prayer of the complaint for appointment of a receiver. Although
during the hearing no evidence was presented in support of the
allegations of the complaint showing the existence of the
plaintiffs' interest in the properties and funds of the corporations,
partnerships and business enterprises abovementioned, and the
defendants had vigorously insisted that the plaintiffs have no legal
interest in the estate of Lee Tay, as shown by the fact that in
Annex A, which is the deed of partition of the estate of Lee Tay,
plaintiff Go Tin is not included among those who have a share in
the estate, the respondent Judge was satisfied, and in this we
agree with him, that the plaintiffs have an interest in the
properties of the corporations, partnerships and business
enterprises which are alleged as "fronts" for the diversion of the
assets of the estate of the deceased, Lee Tay. In other words, to
the respondent Judge there was a prima facie showing of the
existence of the plaintiffs' interest in said entities on the basis of
the allegations of the complaint, and he did not consider it
necessary for the plaintiffs to present evidence in support thereof.
In this stand of the respondent Judge, we see no abuse of
discretion.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondents' allegation that Lee Tek Hong diverted the share
of the deceased Lee Tay in the partnership, Lee Tay and Lee Chay,
to the corporation, Lee Tay and Lee Chay, Inc., where it is made to
appear that the principal stockholders are Lee Tek Hong, his wife,
M.S. Capistrano, defendant Lee. Chi Chiao and other persons
designated by Lee Tek Hong, sufficiently shows the danger of
dissipation, loss or misappropriation thereof. Their further
allegation that the share of Go Tin in the conjugal partnership or
community property, as the case may be, and her hereditary
portion, which constitute 11/20 thereof, were not to be included
as property of Lee Tay and Lee Chay, Inc., but to be administered
by Lee Tek Hong together with the 1/20 share of her son, Julian
Lee, and notwithstanding this arrangement their shares were so
included, sufficiently indicates the existence of an actual and
existing legal interest in the properties under the control of Lee
Tek Hong. If through subterfuge and clandestine manipulations
their shares are actually utilized for the exclusive personal benefit
of the defendants, such a state of affairs portrays the danger of
their being lost or materially injured. The claim that plaintiffs are
the owners of a total share of 12/20 in properties and funds of
said corporation, partnerships and business enterprises which are
actually managed, operated and controlled by Lee Tek Hong, not
for the benefit of all heirs but for him, was children and other
relatives is not flimsy or unfounded. Consequently their shares
inay be extended the protection that the law on receivership
affords. The relief sought that the defendants be ordered to
reconvey to them the said 12/20 sare in the properties and funds
of the abovementioned corporations, partnerships and business
enterprises, and to account for the fruits and income thereof from
the year 1937 up to the present when defendant Lee Tek Hong
has been the sole administrator, manager and possessor thereof,
reinforces the need for safeguarding their shares, interest and
90

participation in the estate of Lee Tay in order that a judgment to
that effect may not be rendered ineffectual and illusory.
For the Amendatory Decision, therefore, to rule anew on the presence or absence
of legal interest would be to amend a final and executory pronouncement in CA-
G.R. No. 35009-R, and to violate the doctrine of estoppel by judgment.
18

3. The Amendatory Decision further states: "considering that the Alaska Lumber Co.
and/or Lee Chay and Lee Tay, Inc. are not even parties in Civil Case 58734, it is
outright illegal to remove said assets from their custody and possession and
transfer them to the hands of a receiver specially one not appointed as such in a
direct action. involving their dissolution and liquidation." Again, the matter of
inclusion of parties was resolved in the Decision in The First certiorari Petition (CA-
G.R. No. 53009-R), thus:
The petitioners contend that as the said corporations,
partnerships and business enterprises are not parties in Civil Case
No. 58734, respondent Judge abused his discretion and acted in
disregard of due process of law by placing them under
receivership. This contention overlooks the. claim that said
corporations, partnerships and business enterprises serve merely
as "fronts" or devices for the illegal diversion and enjoyment of
the, assets of the deceased Lee Tay which should be property
distributed among his surviving spouse and heirs.
19

In other words, the appointment of the Receiver must be viewed from the
preservative standpoint. lie has been appointed not to take sides nor to mismanage
the, properties At the end of the receivership, he will be required to report and
make an accounting of his management. The Receiver is an officer of the Court, a
delegate who acts for and in behalf of nobody else but the Court.
20

In fine, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred ill promulgating the Amendatory
Decision.
WHEREFORE, the Amendatory Decision dated April 11, 1966, as well as the
Resolution of August 17, 1966, is reversed and set aside, and the original Decision in
No. 36093-R, promulgated on November 29, 1965 hereto revived.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Co v. HRET (Re: Citizenship issue only) [consti1]

Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representative
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: citizenship
Date: July 30, 1991
Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal
of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino
citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of
Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the
second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and
Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the
second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent
premised on the following grounds:
1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
91

2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern
Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private
respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12,
1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22,
1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue:
WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio:
The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's
grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence
in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of
hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of
residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in
China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong
Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community
of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into
Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino,
Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to
Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who
was born in 1948.
Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to
put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result,
a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong Chuan, unsure
of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and
family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for
naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong
Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar
issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and
that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of
Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him. During
this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old, finishing his elementary
education in the province of Samar.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as
the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned.
After completing his elementary education, the private
respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his
secondary and college education.
Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed
the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better in
Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of
the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business
of his family in Manila.
In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the
1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged.
Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the
unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's
citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a
natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the
meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on
this subject.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
92

3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not
only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to
those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that
date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation
where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted
the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not,
under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the
Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before
January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing
elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and
unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born
citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9)
years old.
He could not have divined when he came of age that in
1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a
sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a
citizen since 1957.
In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have
been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since
he was nine years old
In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the
right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act
of election of Philippine citizenship
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of
suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized
citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping
respondents father of his citizenship after his death. An attack on a persons
citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity, therefore, to ask
the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to respondents father as null
and void would run against the principle of due process because he has already
been laid to rest
EN BANC
[B.M. No. 914. October 1, 1999]
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
R E S O L U T I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino
mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14)
years after he has reached the age of majority? This is the question sought
to be resolved in the present case involving the application for admission
to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese
citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao,
La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the
Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course
at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the
1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated September
1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the
condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine
citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November
1998, the following documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of
the Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified
public accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo,
Election Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao, La
Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and
93

3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth E. Cerezo,
showing that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released
and Ching was one of the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the
successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However,
because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not
allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20
April 1999, he was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In
the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required
to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the
documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the
"legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the
1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless
upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship
[1]
in
strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625
entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect
Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a
Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that (w)hat he acquired at best was only an
inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon
reaching the age of majority."
[2]
In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two
(2) conditions must concur in order that the election of Philippine
citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making
the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must
be made 'upon reaching the age of majority.
[3]
The OSG then explains the
meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to
mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been
interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra
at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said
period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when a (sic)
person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op.
Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it
was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not made
within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected
Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the
"reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the
peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the
relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase
reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine
citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a
member of the Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his
Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance,
both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in
my school records and other official document;
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for
Filipino citizens;
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to
vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me
before a notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to
(sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
10.I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps 10.00) as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the
question raised is whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a
"reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his citizenship by election
retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935
Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age
of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.
[4]
This right to elect
Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it
provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are
citizens of the Philippines.
[5]
Likewise, this recognition by the 1973
Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that
"(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine
citizens.
[6]
It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987
94

Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should
not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the
acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution.
[7]
If
the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter,
it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial
challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new
Constitution.
[8]

C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the
1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in
order to made a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1
thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and
sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to
administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said
party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance
to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time
period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be
made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made
"upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced
upon reaching twenty-one (21) years.
[9]
In the opinions of the Secretary of
Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship,
this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of
this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these
decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn,
based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United
States Government to the effect that the election should be made within a
"reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority.
[10]
The phrase
reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should
be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority.
[11]
However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice,
[12]
that
the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period
after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has
ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine
citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which
period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person
concerned has always considered himself a Filipino.
[13]

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect
Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He
became of age on February 16,1944. His election of citizenship was made
on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over
seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that
said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority.
[14]

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already
thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A.
No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached
the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase upon
reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any
reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the
privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special
circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted
stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a
registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him
Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what
Ching erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot
find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare,
[15]
the pertinent
portion of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to
an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he cane of age,
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been
established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14,
1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban
was already participating in the elections and campaigning for certain
candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for
Philippine citizenship.
[16]

Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances
obtaining therein are very different from those in the present case, thus,
negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No.
625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935
Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not
be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as
correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for
Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a
Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the
Court stated:
95

Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore
himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all
the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong
Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42
Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs.
Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28,
1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a
non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully
entitled.
[17]

The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs.
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,
[18]
where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines 'election' as both a formal and an
informal process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]) the Court held
that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In
the exact pronouncement of the Court we held:
Esteban s exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age
constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship (p. 52: emphasis
supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of
suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be
expected to have elected Philippine citizenship as they were already
citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
x x x
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for
those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when
the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot
be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in
public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election
time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature
are themselves formal manifestations for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing
is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two
countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino
when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the
private respondent would not only have bean superfluous but would also
have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine
citizenship?
[19]

The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However,
even if we consider the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his
having lived in the Philippines, all his life and his consistent belief that he is
a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree
with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching
failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span Of fourteen (14)
years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he
finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way
beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching
the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he
delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in
electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking
process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of
election of Philippine citizenship and thereafter, file the same with the
nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in
making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be
claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient.
[20]
One who is
privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such
citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm
and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to
elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this golden privilege slipped
away from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D.
Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,



G.R. No. 187567

Present:
96


- versus -




NORA FE SAGUN,
Respondent.

CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

February 15, 2012
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Solicitor General on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, seeking the reversal of the April 3, 2009
Decision
[1]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, of Baguio City in Spcl. Pro.
Case No. 17-R. The RTC granted the petition
[2]
filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun
entitled In re: Judicial Declaration of Election of Filipino Citizenship, Nora Fe Sagun
v. The Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
The facts follow:
Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and
Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio
City
[3]
and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In
1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed an
Oath of Allegiance
[4]
to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was
notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not recorded and
registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine
passport. Her application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there
being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine
citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of
Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be
ordered to annotate the same on her birth certificate.
In her petition, respondent averred that she was raised as a Filipino,
speaks Ilocano and Tagalog fluently and attended local schools in Baguio City,
including Holy Family Academy and the Saint Louis University. Respondent claimed
that despite her part-Chinese ancestry, she always thought of herself as a
Filipino. She is a registered voter of Precinct No. 0419A of Barangay Manuel A.
Roxas in Baguio City and had voted in local and national elections as shown in the
Voter Certification
[5]
issued by Atty. Maribelle Uminga of the Commission on
Elections of Baguio City.
97

She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected
Philippine citizenship and such fact should be annotated on her record of birth so as
to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport.
On August 7, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines and authorized the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City to appear in the above mentioned case.
[6]
However, no
comment was filed by the City Prosecutor.
After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision on
April 3, 2009 granting the petition and declaring respondent a Filipino
citizen. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun y Chan is hereby DECLARED [a] FILIPINO
CITIZEN, having chosen or elected Filipino citizenship.
Upon payment of the required fees, the Local Civil
Registrar of Baguio City is hereby directed to annotate [on] her
birth certificate, this judicial declaration of Filipino citizenship of
said petitioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
[7]

Contending that the lower court erred in so ruling, petitioner, through the
OSG, directly filed the instant recourse via a petition for review on certiorari before
us. Petitioner raises the following issues:
I
Whether or not an action or proceeding for judicial
declaration of Philippine citizenship is procedurally and
jurisdictionally permissible; and,
II
Whether or not an election of Philippine citizenship, made
twelve (12) years after reaching the age of majority, is considered
to have been made within a reasonable time as interpreted by
jurisprudence.
[8]

Petitioner argues that respondents petition before the RTC was improper
on two counts: for one, law and jurisprudence clearly contemplate no judicial action
or proceeding for the declaration of Philippine citizenship; and for another, the
pleaded registration of the oath of allegiance with the local civil registry and its
annotation on respondents birth certificate are the ministerial duties of the
registrar; hence, they require no court order. Petitioner asserts that respondents
petition before the trial court seeking a judicial declaration of her election of
Philippine citizenship undeniably entails a determination and consequent
declaration of her status as a Filipino citizen which is not allowed under our legal
system. Petitioner also argues that if respondents intention in filing the petition is
ultimately to have her oath of allegiance registered with the local civil registry and
annotated on her birth certificate, then she does not have to resort to court
proceedings.
Petitioner further argues that even assuming that respondents action is
sanctioned, the trial court erred in finding respondent as having duly elected
Philippine citizenship since her purported election was not in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law and was not made within a reasonable
time. Petitioner points out that while respondent executed an oath of allegiance
98

before a notary public, there was no affidavit of her election of Philippine
citizenship. Additionally, her oath of allegiance which was not registered with the
nearest local civil registry was executed when she was already 33 years old or 12
years after she reached the age of majority. Accordingly, it was made beyond the
period allowed by law.
In her Comment,
[9]
respondent avers that notwithstanding her failure to
formally elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, she has in fact
effectively elected Filipino citizenship by her performance of positive acts, among
which is the exercise of the right of suffrage. She claims that she had voted and
participated in all local and national elections from the time she was of legal age.
She also insists that she is a Filipino citizen despite the fact that her election of
Philippine citizenship was delayed and unregistered.
In reply,
[10]
petitioner argues that the special circumstances invoked by
respondent, like her continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, her
having been educated in schools in the country, her choice of staying here despite
the naturalization of her parents as American citizens, and her being a registered
voter, cannot confer on her Philippine citizenship as the law specifically provides
the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
Essentially, the issues for our resolution are: (1) whether respondents
petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is sanctioned by
the Rules of Court and jurisprudence; (2) whether respondent has effectively
elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court
from the decisions, final resolutions and orders of the RTC may be taken where only
questions of law are raised or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt
or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does not
call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or
controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when
there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether the conclusion drawn
therefrom is correct or not, is a question of law.
[11]

In the present case, petitioner assails the propriety of the decision of the
trial court declaring respondent a Filipino citizen after finding that respondent was
able to substantiate her election of Filipino citizenship. Petitioner contends that
respondents petition for judicial declaration of election of Philippine citizenship is
procedurally and jurisdictionally impermissible. Verily, petitioner has raised
questions of law as the resolution of these issues rest solely on what the law
provides given the attendant circumstances.
In granting the petition, the trial court stated:
This Court believes that petitioner was able to fully
substantiate her petition regarding her election of Filipino
citizenship, and the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City should be
ordered to annotate in her birth certificate her election of Filipino
citizenship. This Court adds that the petitioners election of
Filipino citizenship should be welcomed by this country and
people because the petitioner has the choice to elect citizenship
of powerful countries like the United States of America and China,
however, petitioner has chosen Filipino citizenship because she
99

grew up in this country, and has learned to love the
Philippines. Her choice of electing Filipino citizenship is, in fact, a
testimony that many of our people still wish to live in the
Philippines, and are very proud of our country.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
Petitioner Nora Fe Sagun y Chan is hereby DECLARED as FILIPINO
CITIZEN, having chosen or elected Filipino citizenship.
[12]

For sure, this Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding
established by law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an
individual.
[13]
There is no specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial
proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry.
[14]
This was our
ruling in Yung Uan Chu v. Republic
[15]
citing the early case of Tan v. Republic of the
Philippines,
[16]
where we clearly stated:
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for
the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts
of justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies, which
imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or
omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or
sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of
the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the
court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to their
status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial
power. x x x
Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of
respondents Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the courts
competence.
As to the propriety of respondents petition seeking a judicial declaration
of election of Philippine citizenship, it is imperative that we determine whether
respondent is required under the law to make an election and if so, whether she
has complied with the procedural requirements in the election of Philippine
citizenship.
When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was
the 1935 Constitution, which declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose
mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
x x x x
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a
legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
100

citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in
the 1973 Constitution when it provided that [t]hose who elect Philippine
citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and
thirty-five are citizens of the Philippines.
[17]
Likewise, this recognition by the 1973
Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that [t]hose
born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority are Philippine citizens.
[18]
It should be noted,
however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of
Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any
irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935
Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old
charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial
challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new
Constitution.
[19]

Being a legitimate child, respondents citizenship followed that of her father
who is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine
citizenship. It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of
the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the
mother and follow her nationality.
[20]
An illegitimate child of Filipina need not
perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens
of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself.
[21]
But in the case of
respondent, for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625,
[22]
enacted pursuant to Section 1(4),
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be
followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with subsection (4), [S]ection 1, Article IV, of the
Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and
sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to
administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement
with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines.
Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing Philippine
citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to
the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the
statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
[23]

Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for
registration under C.A. No. 625 unless the party exercising the right of election has
complied with the requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1950. In other
words, he should first be required to register as an alien.
[24]
Pertinently, the person
electing Philippine citizenship is required to file a petition with the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) for the cancellation of
his alien certificate of registration based on his aforesaid election of Philippine
citizenship and said Office will initially decide, based on the evidence presented the
validity or invalidity of said election.
[25]
Afterwards, the same is elevated to the
Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final determination and review.
[26]

101

It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule
which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of
Philippine citizenship before the courts. The special proceeding provided under
Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
the Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to file an action for
cancellation or correction of entry in the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and
recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the respondent.
Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial
courts conclusion that respondent duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous
since the records undisputably show that respondent failed to comply with the legal
requirements for a valid election. Specifically, respondent had not executed a
sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary
evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was
her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority,
which was unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even
assuming arguendo that respondents oath of allegiance suffices, its execution was
not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority and was
not registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No.
625. The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election
should be made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority.
[27]
Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation proffered by
respondent for the delay and the failure to register with the nearest local civil
registry.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply
with the procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine
citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
citizenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of
Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship.
Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court to
confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect
Philippine citizenship. As we held in Ching,
[28]
the prescribed procedure in electing
Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is
required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship
and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply
with the foregoing requirements, respondents petition before the trial court must
be denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 3, 2009 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Baguio City in Spcl. Pro. Case No. 17-R
isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for judicial declaration of election of
Philippine citizenship filed by respondent Nora Fe Sagun is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION


102

BALGAMELO CABILING MA, FELIX CABILING MA,
JR., andVALERIANO CABILING MA,
Petitioners,





-versus-





COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR.,
ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER ARTHEL B.
CARONOGAN, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JOSE
DL. CABOCHAN, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER
TEODORO B. DELARMENTE AND ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, in their
capacities as Chairman and Members of the
Board of Commissioners (Bureau of
Immigration), and MAT G.
CATRAL,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 183133





Present:

CORONA,C.J.,
Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
PEREZ, JJ.














Promulgated:

July 26, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x


D E C I S I O N

PEREZ, J.:

Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and
an alien father, who executed an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and
took their oath of allegiance to the government upon reaching the age of majority,
but who failed to immediately file the documents of election with the nearest civil
registry, be considered foreign nationals subject to deportation as undocumented
aliens for failure to obtain alien certificates of registration?

Positioned upon the facts of this case, the question is translated into the
inquiry whether or not the omission negates their rights to Filipino citizenship as
children of a Filipino mother, and erase the years lived and spent as Filipinos.

The resolution of these questions would significantly mark a difference in
the lives of herein petitioners.

The Facts

Balgamelo Cabiling Ma (Balgamelo), Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr. (Felix, Jr.),
Valeriano Cabiling Ma (Valeriano), Lechi Ann Ma (Lechi Ann), Arceli Ma (Arceli),
Nicolas Ma (Nicolas), and Isidro Ma (Isidro) are the children of Felix (Yao Kong)
Ma,
[1]
a Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina.
[2]

Records reveal that petitioners Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano were all
born under aegis of the 1935 Philippine Constitution in the years 1948, 1951, and
1957, respectively.
[3]


They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for
almost sixty (60) years; they spent their whole lives, studied and received their
primary and secondary education in the country; they do not speak nor understand
the Chinese language, have not set foot in Taiwan, and do not know any relative of
103

their father; they have not even traveled abroad; and they have already raised their
respective families in the Philippines.
[4]


During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration
their Alien Certificates of Registration (ACRs).
[5]


Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine
citizenship in accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution,
which provides that (t)hose whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and,
upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship are citizens of the
Philippines. Thus, on15 August 1969, Felix, Jr. executed his affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and took his oath of allegiance before then Judge Jose L.
Gonzalez, Municipal Judge, Surigao, Surigao del Norte.
[6]
On 14 January 1972,
Balgamelo did the same before Atty. Patrocinio C. Filoteo, Notary
Public, Surigao City, Surigao del Norte.
[7]
In 1978, Valeriano took his oath of
allegiance before then Judge Salvador C. Sering, City Court of Surigao City, the fact
of which the latter attested to in his Affidavit of 7 March 2005.
[8]

Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners,
however, failed to have the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as
required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625 (An Act Providing the
Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a
Person whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen). It was only on 27 July 2005 or more than
thirty (30) years after they elected Philippine citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix,
Jr. did so.
[9]
On the other hand, there is no showing that Valeriano complied with
the registration requirement.

Individual certifications
[10]
all dated 3 January 2005 issued by the Office of
the City Election Officer, Commission on Elections, Surigao City, show that all of
them are registered voters of Barangay Washington, Precinct No. 0015A since June
1997, and that records on previous registrations are no longer available because of
the mandatory general registration every ten (10) years. Moreover, aside from
exercising their right of suffrage, Balgamelo is one of the incumbent Barangay
Kagawads in BarangayWashington, Surigao City.
[11]


Records further reveal that Lechi Ann and Arceli were born also
in Surigao City in 1953
[12]
and 1959,
[13]
respectively. The Office of the City Civil
Registrar issued a Certification to the effect that the documents showing that Arceli
elected Philippine citizenship on 27 January 1986 were registered in its Office on 4
February 1986. However, no other supporting documents appear to show that
Lechi Ann initially obtained an ACR nor that she subsequently elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Likewise, no document exists that will
provide information on the citizenship of Nicolas and Isidro.

The Complaint

On 16 February 2004, the Bureau of Immigration received the Complaint-
Affidavit
[14]
of a certain Mat G. Catral (Mr. Catral), alleging that Felix (Yao Kong) Ma
and his seven (7) children are undesirable and overstaying aliens. Mr. Catral,
however, did not participate in the proceedings, and the Ma family could not but
believe that the complaint against them was politically motivated because they
strongly supported a candidate in Surigao City in the 2004 National and Local
Elections.
[15]


On 9 November 2004, the Legal Department of the Bureau of Immigration
charged them for violation of Sections 37(a)(7)
[16]
and 45(e)
[17]
of Commonwealth
Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
104

amended. The Charge Sheet
[18]
docketed as BSI-D.C. No. AFF-04-574 (OC-STF-04-
09/23-1416) reads, in part:

That Respondents x x x, all Chinese nationals, failed and
continuously failed to present any valid document to show their
respective status in the Philippines. They likewise failed to produce
documents to show their election of Philippines (sic) citizenship,
hence, undocumented and overstaying foreign nationals in the
country.

That respondents, being aliens, misrepresent themselves
as Philippine citizens in order to evade the requirements of the
immigration laws.

Ruling of the Board of Commissioners, Bureau of Immigration

After Felix Ma and his seven (7) children were afforded the opportunity to
refute the allegations, the Board of Commissioners (Board) of the Bureau of
Immigration (BI), composed of the public respondents, rendered a Judgment dated
2 February 2005 finding that Felix Ma and his children violated Commonwealth Act
No. 613, Sections 37(a)(7) and 45(e) in relation to BI Memorandum Order Nos. ADD-
01-031 and ADD-01-035 dated 6 and 22 August 2001, respectively.
[19]


The Board ruled that since they elected Philippine citizenship after the
enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 625, which was approved on 7 June
1941, they were governed by the following rules and regulations:

1. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, providing that the election of
Philippine citizenship embodied in a statement sworn before any officer authorized
to administer oaths and the oath of allegiance shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry;
[20]
and Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID, now Bureau of
Immigration [BI]) Circular dated 12 April 1954,
[21]
detailing the procedural
requirements in the registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.

2. Memorandum Order dated 18 August 1956
[22]
of the CID, requiring the
filing of a petition for the cancellation of their alien certificate of registration with
the CID, in view of their election of Philippine citizenship;

3. Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 182, 19 August 1982; and DOJ
Guidelines, 27 March 1985, requiring that the records of the proceedings be
forwarded to the Ministry (now the Department) of Justice for final determination
and review.
[23]


As regards the documentation of aliens in the Philippines, Administrative
Order No. 1-93 of the Bureau of Immigration
[24]
requires that ACR, E-series, be
issued to foreign nationals who apply for initial registration, finger printing and
issuance of an ACR in accordance with the Alien Registration Act of
1950.
[25]
According to public respondents, any foreign national found in possession
of an ACR other than the E-series shall be considered improperly documented aliens
and may be proceeded against in accordance with the Immigration Act of 1940 or
the Alien Registration Act of 1950, as amended.
[26]


Supposedly for failure to comply with the procedure to prove a valid claim
to Philippine citizenship via election proceedings, public respondents concluded
that Felix, Jr. Balgamelo, Arceli, Valeriano and Lechi Ann are undocumented and/or
improperly documented aliens.
[27]


Nicolas and Isidro, on the other hand, did not submit any document to
support their claim that they are Philippine citizens. Neither did they present any
105

evidence to show that they are properly documented aliens. For these reasons,
public respondents likewise deemed them undocumented and/or improperly
documented aliens.
[28]


The dispositive portion
[29]
of the Judgment of 2 February 2005 reads:

1. Subject to the submission of appropriate
clearances, summary deportation of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma,
Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma,
Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma, Taiwanese [Chinese],
under C.A. No. 613, Sections 37(a)(7), 45(e) and 38 in relation
to BI M.O. Nos. ADD-01-031 and ADD-01-035 dated 6 and 22
August 2001, respectively;

2. Issuance of a warrant of deportation against Felix (Yao Kong)
Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma,
Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma under C.A. No. 613,
Section 37(a);

3. Inclusion of the names of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, Jr.,
Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma,
Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma in the Immigration Blacklist; and

4. Exclusion from the Philippines of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix
Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas
Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma under C.A. No. 613, Section
29(a)(15).(Emphasis supplied.)

In its Resolution
[30]
of 8 April 2005, public respondents partially
reconsidered their Judgment of 2 February 2005. They were convinced that Arceli
is an immigrant under Commonwealth Act No. 613, Section 13(g).
[31]
However, they
denied the Motion for Reconsideration with respect to Felix Ma and the rest of his
children.
[32]




Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On 3 May 2005, only Balgamelo, Felix, Jr., and Valeriano filed the Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of
Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 89532. They sought the nullification
of the issuances of the public respondents, to wit: (1) the Judgment dated 2
February 2005, ordering the summary deportation of the petitioners, issuance of a
warrant of deportation against them, inclusion of their names in the Immigration
Blacklist, and exclusion of the petitioners from the Philippines; and (2) the
Resolution dated 8 April 2005, denying the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
[33]
after
finding that the petitioners failed to comply with the exacting standards of the law
providing for the procedure and conditions for their continued stay in
the Philippines either as aliens or as its nationals.
[34]


On 29 May 2008, it issued a Resolution
[35]
denying the petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration dated 20 September 2007.

To reiterate, a persons continued and uninterrupted stay
in the Philippines, his being a registered voter or an elected public
official cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by election. The prescribed procedure in
electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and
106

painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to
execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and,
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. The
constitutional mandate concerning citizenship must be adhered to
strictly. Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a
commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed
when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine
citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such,
he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and
promptitude.
[36]


Our Ruling

The 1935 Constitution declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose
mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority. The mandate states:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) xxx;

x x x x

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of
the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship.
[37]


In 1941, Commonwealth Act No. 625 was enacted. It laid down the
manner of electing Philippine citizenship, to wit:

Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with subsection (4), Section 1, Article IV, of the
Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and
sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to
administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement
with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines.

The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a
statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
Government of thePhilippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and
of the oath with the nearest civil registry.

In Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching,
[38]
we
determined the meaning of the period of election described by phrase upon
reaching the age of majority. Our references were the Civil Code of
the Philippines, the opinions of the Secretary of Justice, and the case of Cueco v.
Secretary of Justice.
[39]
We pronounced:

x x x [T]he 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a
time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship
should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election
should be made upon reaching the age of majority. The age of
majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21)
years.
[40]
In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases
involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this
dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions
of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In
these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine
citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the
Department of State of the United States Government to the
effect that the election should be made within a reasonable time
after attaining the age of majority.
[41]
The phrase reasonable
time has been interpreted to mean that the elections should be
made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority.
[42]
However, we held in Cue[n]co vs. Secretary of
Justice,
[43]
that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible
rule. We said:

107

It is true that this clause has been
construed to mean a reasonable time after
reaching the age of majority, and that the
Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3)
years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine
citizenship under the constitutional provision
adverted to above, which period may be
extended under certain circumstances, as when
the person concerned has always considered
himself a Filipino.

However, we cautioned in Cue[n]co that the extension of
the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite.

Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner
was born on February 16, 1923. He became of
age on February 16, 1944. His election of
citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he
was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over
seven (7) years after he had reached the age of
majority. It is clear that said election has not
been made upon reaching the age of
majority.
[44]


We reiterated the above ruling in Go, Sr. v. Ramos,
[45]
a case in which we
adopted the findings of the appellate court that the father of the petitioner, whose
citizenship was in question, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within the
reasonable period of three (3) years upon reaching the age of majority; and that
the belated submission to the local civil registry of the affidavit of election and
oath of allegiance x x x was defective because the affidavit of election was executed
after the oath of allegiance, and the delay of several years before their filing with
the proper office was not satisfactorily explained.
[46]


In both cases, we ruled against the petitioners because they belatedly
complied with all the requirements. The acts of election and their registration with
the nearest civil registry were all done beyond the reasonable period of three years
upon reaching the age of majority.

The instant case presents a different factual setting. Petitioners complied
with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It was
only the registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that was
belatedly done.

We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect
Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the
statutory requirements for such election.

Such conclusion, contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, is in line
with our decisions in In Re:Florencio Mallare,
[47]
Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the
House of Representatives,
[48]
and Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine
Bar, Vicente D. Ching.
[49]


In Mallare, Estebans exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age
was deemed to be a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
[50]
The Court
of Appeals, however, said that the case cannot support herein petitioners cause,
pointing out that, unlike petitioner, Esteban is a natural child of a Filipina, hence, no
other act would be necessary to confer on him the rights and privileges of a Filipino
citizen,
[51]
and that Esteban was born in 1929
[52]
prior to the adoption of the 1935
Constitution and the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 625.
[53]


In the Co case, Jose Ong, Jr. did more than exercise his right of suffrage, as
he established his life here in the Philippines.
[54]
Again, such circumstance, while
similar to that of herein petitioners, was not appreciated because it was ruled that
108

any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of Ong would have resulted in
absurdity, because the law itself had already elected Philippine citizenship for
him
[55]
as, apparently, while he was still a minor, a certificate of naturalization was
issued to his father.
[56]


In Ching, it may be recalled that we denied his application for admission to
the Philippine Bar because, in his case, all the requirements, to wit: (1) a statement
of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and
of the oath with the nearest civil registry were complied with only fourteen (14)
years after he reached the age of majority. Ching offered no reason for the late
election of Philippine citizenship.
[57]


In all, the Court of Appeals found the petitioners argument of good faith
and informal election unacceptable and held:

Their reliance in the ruling contained in Re:Application
for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, [which was
decided on 1 October 1999], is obviously flawed. It bears
emphasis that the Supreme Court, in said case, did not adopt the
doctrine laid down in In Re: Florencio Mallare. On the contrary,
the Supreme Court was emphatic in pronouncing that the special
circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified
public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public
official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by election.
[58]



We are not prepared to state that the mere exercise of suffrage, being
elected public official, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and
other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship can take the place of
election of citizenship. What we now say is that where, as in petitioners case, the
election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented within the
constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of
election beyond the frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of
citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done. The actual
exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein petitioners, is
actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of
the election of Philippine citizenship.

For what purpose is registration?
In Pascua v. Court of Appeals,
[59]
we elucidated the principles of civil law on
registration:

To register is to record or annotate. American and
Spanish authorities are unanimous on the meaning of the term
to register as to enter in a register; to record formally and
distinctly; to enroll; to enter in a list.
[60]
In general, registration
refers to any entry made in the books of the registry, including
both registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation,
annotation, and even the marginal notes. In strict acceptation, it
pertains to the entry made in the registry which records solemnly
and permanently the right of ownership and other real
rights.
[61]
Simply stated, registration is made for the purpose
of notification.
[62]


Actual knowledge may even have the effect of registration as to the person
who has knowledge thereof. Thus, [i]ts purpose is to give notice thereof to all
persons (and it) operates as a notice of the deed, contract, or instrument to
others.
[63]
As pertinent is the holding that registration neither adds to its validity
nor converts an invalid instrument into a valid one between the parties.
[64]
It lays
emphasis on the validity of an unregistered document.
109


Comparable jurisprudence may be consulted.

In a contract of partnership, we said that the purpose of registration is to
give notice to third parties; that failure to register the contract does not affect the
liability of the partnership and of the partners to third persons; and that neither
does such failure affect the partnerships juridical personality.
[65]
An unregistered
contract of partnership is valid as among the partners, so long as it has the essential
requisites, because the main purpose of registration is to give notice to third
parties, and it can be assumed that the members themselves knew of the contents
of their contract.
[66]
The non-registration of a deed of donation does not also affect
its validity. Registration is not a requirement for the validity of the contract as
between the parties, for the effect of registration serves chiefly to bind third
persons.
[67]


Likewise relevant is the pronouncement that registration is not a mode of
acquiring a right. In an analogous case involving an unrecorded deed of sale, we
reiterated the settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.

Registration does not confer ownership. It is not a
mode of acquiring dominion, but only a means of confirming
the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large.
[68]


Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant case,
registration is the confirmation of election as such election. It is not the registration
of the act of election, although a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No.
625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of
confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed.

Indeed, we even allow the late registration of the fact of birth and of
marriage.
[69]
Thus, has it been admitted through existing rules that the late
registration of the fact of birth of a child does not erase the fact of birth. Also, the
fact of marriage cannot be declared void solely because of the failure to have the
marriage certificate registered with the designated government agency.
Notably, the petitioners timely took their oath of allegiance to
the Philippines. This was a serious undertaking. It was commitment and fidelity to
the state coupled with a pledge to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance
to any other state. This was unqualified acceptance of their identity as a Filipino
and the complete disavowal of any other nationality.

Petitioners have passed decades of their lives in the Philippines as
Filipinos. Their present status having been formed by their past, petitioners can no
longer have any national identity except that which they chose upon reaching the
age of reason.

Corollary to this fact, we cannot agree with the view of the Court of
Appeals that since the ACR presented by the petitioners are no longer valid on
account of the new requirement to present an E-series ACR, they are deemed not
properly documented.
[70]
On the contrary, petitioners should not be expected to
secure E-series ACR because it would be inconsistent with the election of citizenship
and its constructive registration through their acts made public, among others, their
exercise of suffrage, election as public official, and continued and uninterrupted
stay in the Philippines since birth. The failure to register as aliens is, obviously,
consistent with petitioners election of Philippine citizenship.

The leanings towards recognition of the citizenship of children of Filipino
mothers have been indicated not alone by the jurisprudence that liberalized the
110

requirement on time of election, and recognized positive acts of Philippine
citizenship.

The favor that is given to such children is likewise evident in the evolution
of the constitutional provision on Philippine citizenship.

Thus, while the 1935 Constitution requires that children of Filipino mothers
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching their age of majority,
[71]
upon the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, they automatically become Filipinos
[72]
and
need not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. The 1973
provision reads:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) xxx.
(2) Those whose fathers and mothers are
citizens of the Philippines.
[73]


Better than the relaxation of the requirement, the 1987 Constitution now
classifies them as natural-born citizens upon election of Philippine
citizenship. Thus, Sec. 2, Article IV thereof provides:

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those
who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof
[74]
shall be deemed natural-born
citizens. (Emphasis supplied.)


The constitutional bias is reflected in the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission.

MR. CONCEPCION. x x x.

x x x x

x x x x As regards those born of Filipino mothers, the 1935
Constitution merely gave them the option to choose Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, even, apparently, if
the father were an alien or unknown. Upon the other hand,
under the 1973 Constitution, children of mixed marriages
involving an alien father and a Filipino mother are Filipino citizens,
thus liberalizing the counterpart provision in the 1935
Constitution by dispensing with the need to make a declaration of
intention upon reaching the age of majority. I understand that
the committee would further liberalize this provision of the 1935
Constitution. The Committee seemingly proposes to further
liberalize the policy of the 1935 Constitution by making those who
became citizens of the Philippines through a declaration of
intention to choose their mothers citizenship upon reaching the
majority age by declaring that such children are natural-born
citizens of the Philippines.
[75]


x x x x

xxx Why does the draft resolution adopt the provision of the 1973
Constitution and not that of the 1935?
[76]


x x x x

FR. BERNAS. x x x Precisely, the reason behind the modification of
the 1935 rule on citizenship was a recognition of the fact that it
reflected a certain male chauvinism, and it was for the purpose of
remedying that this proposed provision was put in. The idea was
that we should not penalize the mother of a child simply because
she fell in love with a foreigner. Now, the question on what
citizenship the child would prefer arises. We really have no way
of guessing the preference of the infant. But if we recognize the
right of the child to choose, then let him choose when he reaches
the age of majority. I think dual citizenship is just a reality
imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino
111

mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another
country is something completely beyond our control. But
certainly it is within the jurisdiction of the Philippine government
to require that [at] a certain point, a child be made to choose. But
I do not think we should penalize the child before he is even able
to choose. I would, therefore, support the retention of the
modification made in 1973 of the male chauvinistic rule of the
1935 Constitution.
[77]


x x x x

MR. REGALADO. With respect to a child who became a Filipino
citizen by election, which the Committee is now planning to
consider a natural-born citizen, he will be so the moment he opts
for Philippine citizenship. Did the Committee take into account
the fact that at the time of birth, all he had was just an inchoate
right to choose Philippine citizenship, and yet, by subsequently
choosing Philippine citizenship, it would appear that his choice
retroacted to the date of his birth so much so that under the
Gentlemans proposed amendment, he would be a natural-born
citizen?
[78]


FR. BERNAS. But the difference between him and the natural-
born who lost his status is that the natural-born who lost his
status, lost it voluntarily; whereas, this individual in the situation
contemplated in Section 1, paragraph 3 never had the chance to
choose.
[79]


x x x x

[on the period within which to elect Philippine citizenship]

MR. RODRIGO. [T]his provision becomes very, very important
because his election of Philippine citizenship makes him not only a
Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino citizen, entitling him to run
for Congress, to be a Justice of the Supreme Court x x x.
[80]


We are guided by this evolvement from election of Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority under the 1935 Philippine
Constitution to dispensing with the election requirement under the 1973 Philippine
Constitution to express classification of these children as natural-born
citizens under the 1987 Constitution towards the conclusion that the omission of
the 1941 statutory requirement of registration of the documents of election should
not result in the obliteration of the right to Philippine citizenship.

Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the
petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship
in form and substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry
should not defeat the election and resultingly negate the permanent fact that they
have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject
to the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any. The documents
they submitted supporting their allegations that they have already registered with
the civil registry, although belatedly, should be examined for validation purposes by
the appropriate agency, in this case, the Bureau of Immigration. Other
requirements embodied in the administrative orders and other issuances of the
Bureau of Immigration and the Department of Justice shall be complied with within
a reasonable time.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007, and the Resolution
dated 29 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89532 affirming the
Judgment dated 2 February 2005, and the Resolution dated 8 April 2005 of the
Bureau of Immigration in BSI-D.C. No. AFF-04-574 OC-STF-04-09/23-1416 are
hereby SET ASIDE with respect to petitioners Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix Cabiling
Ma, Jr., and Valeriano Cabiling Ma. Petitioners are given ninety (90) days from
notice within which to COMPLY with the requirements of the Bureau of Immigration
embodied in its Judgment of 2 February 2005. The Bureau of Immigration
shall ENSURE that all requirements, including the payment of their financial
112

obligations to the state, if any, have been complied with subject to the imposition
of appropriate administrative fines; REVIEW the documents submitted by the
petitioners; and ACT thereon in accordance with the decision of this Court.


Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 175430
Petitioner,
Present:

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
*

Acting Chairperson,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
PERLAS-BERNABE,
*
JJ.

KERRY LAO ONG, Promulgated:
Respondent. June 18, 2012
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
x

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Naturalization laws are strictly construed in the governments favor and against the
applicant.
[1]
The applicant carries the burden of proving his full compliance with the
requirements of law.
[2]


Before the Court is the Republics appeal of the appellate courts Decision
[3]
dated
May 13, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 74794, which affirmed the trial courts grant of citizenship to
respondent Kerry Lao Ong (Ong). The Court of Appeals (CA) held:

With all the foregoing, We find no cogent reason to reverse the
decision of the court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, 7
th
Judicial Region, Branch 9 in its
Decision dated November 23, 2001, is AFFIRMED in toto and the instant
appeal is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
[4]



Factual Antecedents


On November 26, 1996, respondent Ong, then 38 years old,
[5]
filed a Petition for
Naturalization.
[6]
The case was docketed as Nat. Case No. 930 and assigned to Branch 9 of
theRegional Trial Court of Cebu City. As decreed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended by Republic Act No. 530, known as the Revised Naturalization Law,
[7]
the petition
was published in the Official Gazette
[8]
and a newspaper of general circulation,
[9]
and posted
in a public place for three consecutive weeks,
[10]
six months before the initial hearing.
[11]
The
Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance and authorized
[12]
the city prosecutor
to appear on its behalf.
[13]
Accordingly, Fiscals Ester Veloso and Perla Centino participated in
the proceedings below.
Respondent Ong was born at the Cebu General Hospital in Cebu City to Chinese
citizens Siao Hwa Uy Ong and Flora Ong on March 4, 1958.
[14]
He is registered as a resident
alien and possesses an alien certificate of registration
[15]
and a native-born certificate of
residence
[16]
from the Bureau of Immigration. He has been continuously and permanently
residing
[17]
in thePhilippines from birth up to the present.
[18]
Ong can speak
[19]
and write in
Tagalog, English, Cebuano, and Amoy.
[20]
He took his elementary
[21]
and high
school
[22]
studies at the SacredHeart School for Boys in Cebu City, where social studies,
113

Pilipino, religion, and the Philippine Constitution are taught. He then obtained a degree in
Bachelor of Science in Management from the Ateneo De Manila University on March 18,
1978.
[23]


On February 1, 1981, he married Griselda S. Yap, also a Chinese citizen.
[24]
They have
four children,
[25]
namely, Kerri Gail (born on April 15, 1983),
[26]
Kimberley Grace (born on May
15, 1984),
[27]
Kyle Gervin (born on November 4, 1986),
[28]
and Kevin Griffith (born on August
21, 1993),
[29]
who were all born and
raised in the Philippines. The children of school age were enrolled
[30]
at
the Sacred Heart School for Boys
[31]
and Sacred Heart School for Girls.
[32]
At the time of the
filing of the petition, Ong, his wife, and children were living at No. 55 Eagle Street,
Sto. Nio Village, Banilad, Cebu City.

Ong has lived at the following addresses:
[33]


1. Manalili Street, Cebu City (when Ong was in Grade 2)
[34]

2. Crystal Compound Guadalupe, Cebu City (until 1970)
[35]

3. No. 671 A.S. Fortuna Street, Cebu City (until 1992)
[36]

4. No. 55 Eagle Street, Sto. Nio Village, Banilad, Cebu City (until
1998);
[37]
and
5. No. 50 Roselle Street, North Town Homes, Nasipit,
Talamban, Cebu City (present).
[38]


Ong alleged in his petition that he has been a businessman/business manager since
1989, earning an average annual income of P150,000.00.
[39]
When he testified, however, he
said that he has been a businessman since he graduated from college in 1978.
[40]
Moreover,
Ong did not specify or describe the nature of his business.
[41]

As proof of his income, Ong presented four tax returns for the years 1994 to
1997.
[42]
Based on these returns, Ongs gross annual income was P60,000.00 for
1994; P118,000.00 for 1995; P118,000.00 for 1996; and P128,000.00 for 1997.

Respondent further testified that he socializes
[43]
with Filipinos; celebrates the Sinulog,
fiestas, birthdays, and Christmas.
[44]
He is a member of the Alert/ React VII Communications
Group and the Masonic organization.
[45]


Respondent Ong presented a health certificate to prove
[46]
that he is of sound physical
and mental health.
[47]
As shown by the clearances from the National Bureau of
Investigation,
[48]
the Philippine National Police,
[49]
the trial courts,
[50]
and the barangay,
[51]
he
has no criminal record or pending criminal charges.
[52]


Respondent presented Rudy Carvajal (Carvajal) and Bernard Sepulveda (Sepulveda) as
his character witnesses. At that time, Sepulveda was the vice-mayor of Borbon, Cebu.
[53]
He
has known Ong since 1970 because Ong is the close friend of Sepulvedas brother.
[54]
He
testified that Ong is very helpful in the community and adopts the Filipino
culture.
[55]
Meanwhile, Carvajal testified that he has known Ong since the 1970s because
they were high school classmates.
[56]
He testified that Ong is morally irreproachable and
possesses all the qualifications to be a good citizen of the Philippines.
[57]
Carvajal is a
businessman engaged in leasing office spaces.
[58]


On November 23, 2001, the trial court granted Ongs petition. Among other
things, the trial court held that:

x x x x

By the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced by the
[respondent], the following facts had been established.
[59]


x x x x

x x x [Respondent] is a businessman/business manager
engaged in lawful trade and business since 1989 from which he derives
an average annual income of more than One Hundred Fifty Thousand
Pesos (Exhibit U, V, W, and X with sub-markings); x x x
[60]



114

The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:


From the evidence presented by [respondent], this Court
believes and so holds that [respondent] possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications provided for by law to become a citizen
of thePhilippines.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, [respondent] KERRY LAO ONG is hereby
admitted as citizen of the Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
[61]



Republics Appeal


On January 31, 2003, the Republic, through the Solicitor General, appealed
to the CA. The Republic faulted the trial court for granting Ongs petition despite his failure
to prove that he possesses a known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation as
required under Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.
[62]


The Republic posited that, contrary to the trial courts finding, respondent Ong did not
prove his allegation that he is a businessman/business manager earning an average income
ofP150,000.00 since 1989. His income tax returns belie the value of his income. Moreover,
he failed to present evidence on the nature of his profession or trade, which is the source of
his income. Considering that he has four minor children (all attending exclusive private
schools), he has declared no other property and/or bank deposits, and he has not declared
owning a family home, his alleged income cannot be considered lucrative. Under the
circumstances, the Republic maintained that respondent Ong is not qualified as he does not
possess a definite and existing business or trade.
[63]


Respondent Ong conceded that the Supreme Court has adopted a higher standard of
income for applicants for naturalization.
[64]
He likewise conceded that the legal definition of
lucrative income is the existence of an appreciable margin of his income over his
expenses.
[65]
It is his position that his income, together with that of his wife, created an
appreciable margin over their expenses.
[66]
Moreover, the steady increase in his income, as
evidenced in his tax returns, proved that he is gainfully employed.
[67]


The appellate court dismissed the Republics appeal. It explained:
In the case at bar, the [respondent] chose to present [pieces of evidence]
which relates [sic] to his lucrative trade, profession or lawful
occupation. Judging from the present standard of living and the personal
circumstances of the [respondent] using the present time as the index for
the income stated by the [respondent], it may appear that the
[respondent] has no lucrative employment. However, We must be
mindful that the petition for naturalization was filed in 1996, which is
already ten years ago. It is of judicial notice that the value of the peso has
taken a considerable plunge in value since that time up to the
present. Nonetheless, if We consider the income earned at that time,
the ages of the children of the [respondent], the employment of his wife,
We can say that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his
expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support.
[68]



The appellate court denied the Republics motion for reconsideration
[69]
in its
Resolution dated November 7, 2006.
[70]


Issue

Whether respondent Ong has proved that he has some known lucrative
trade, profession or lawful occupation in accordance with Section 2,
fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.


Petitioners Arguments


Petitioner assigns as error the appellate courts ruling that there is an appreciable
margin of (respondents) income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate
115

support.
[71]
The Republic contends that the CAs conclusion is not supported by the
evidence on record and by the prevailing law.
[72]


The only pieces of evidence presented by Ong to prove that he qualifies under Section
2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law, are his tax returns for the years 1994
to 1997, which show that Ong earns from P60,000.00 to P128,000.00 annually. This declared
income is far from the legal requirement of lucrative income. It is not sufficient to provide for
the needs of a family of six, with four children of school age.
[73]


Moreover, none of these tax returns describes the source of Ongs income, much
less can they describe the lawful nature thereof.
[74]
The Republic also noted that Ong did not
even attempt to describe what business he is engaged in. Thus, the trial and appellate
courts shared conclusion that Ong is a businessman is grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures.
[75]


The Republic thus prays for the reversal of the appellate courts Decision and the
denial of Ongs petition for naturalization.
[76]


Respondents Arguments

Respondent asks for the denial of the petition as it seeks a review of factual findings,
which review is improper in a Rule 45 petition.
[77]
He further submits that his tax returns
support the conclusion that he is engaged in lucrative trade.
[78]


Our Ruling

The courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued
with the highest public interest.
[79]
Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the
applicant.
[80]
The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to show full and
complete compliance with the requirements of law.
[81]


In the case at bar, the controversy revolves around respondent Ongs compliance with
the qualification found in Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law,
which provides:

SECTION 2. Qualifications. Subject to section four of this Act,
any person having the following qualifications may become a citizen of
the Philippines by naturalization:

x x x x

Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less
than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known
lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;

x x x x
[82]



Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of some known lucrative trade, profession, or
lawful occupation means not only that the person having the employment gets enough for
his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income
such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to
provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to
work and thus avoid ones becoming the object of charity or a public charge.
[83]
His income
should permit him and the members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in
accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of
human dignity, at this stage of our civilization.
[84]


Moreover, it has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative
income, the courts should consider only the applicants income; his or her spouses income
should not be included in the assessment. The spouses additional income is immaterial for
under the law the petitioner should be the one to possess some known lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen.
[85]
Lastly, the
116

Court has consistently held that the applicants qualifications must be determined as of the
time of the filing of his petition.
[86]


Going over the decisions of the courts below, the Court finds that the foregoing
guidelines have not been observed. To recall, respondent Ong and his witnesses testified
that Ong is a businessman but none of them identified Ongs business or described its
nature. The Court finds it suspect that Ong did not even testify as to the nature of his
business, whereas his witness Carvajal did with respect to his own (leasing of office space). A
comparison of their respective testimonies is reproduced below:

Carvajals testimony

Q: You said earlier that you are a businessman?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q: How long have you been a businessman?
A: Since 1980.

Q: And what is the business you are engaged in?
A: I am into leasing of office spaces.
[87]


Kerry Lao Ongs testimony

Q: What is your present occupation, Mr. Ong?
A: Businessman.

Q: Since when have you engaged in that occupation?
A: After graduation from college.
[88]


The dearth of documentary evidence compounds the inadequacy of the testimonial
evidence. The applicant provided no documentary evidence, like business permits,
registration, official receipts, or other business records to demonstrate his proprietorship or
participation in a business. Instead, Ong relied on his general assertions to prove his
possession of someknown lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation. Bare, general
assertions cannot discharge the burden of proof that is required of an applicant for
naturalization.

The paucity of evidence is unmistakable upon a reading of the trial courts
decision. The trial court held that respondent Ong is a businessman engaged in lawful trade
and business since 1989
[89]
but did not cite the evidence, which supports such finding. After
poring over the records, the Court finds that the reason for the lack of citation is the absence
of evidence to support such conclusion. The trial courts conclusion that Ong has been a
businessman since 1989 is only an assertion found in Ongs petition for naturalization.
[90]
But,
on the witness stand, Ong did not affirm this assertion. Instead, he testified that he had been
a businessman since he graduated from college, which was in 1978.
[91]


Further, the trial court, citing Exhibits U, V, W, and X (which are Ongs tax returns),
mistakenly found that Ong derives an average annual income of more than One Hundred
Fifty Thousand Pesos.
[92]
This conclusion is not supported by the evidence. The cited tax
returns show that Ongs gross annual income for the years 1994 to 1997
were P60,000.00,P118,000.00, P118,000.00, and P128,000.00, respectively. The average
annual income from these tax returns is P106,000.00 only, not P150,000.00 as the trial court
held. It appears that the trial court again derived its conclusion from an assertion in Ongs
petition,
[93]
but not from the evidence.
As for the CA, it no longer ruled on the question whether Ong has
a known business or trade. Instead, it ruled on the issue whether Ongs income, as
evidenced by his tax returns, can be considered lucrative in 1996. In determining this issue,
the CA considered the ages of Ongs children, the income that he earned in 1996, and the
fact that Ongs wife was also employed at that time. It then concluded that there is an
appreciable margin of Ongs income over his expenses.
[94]


The Court finds the appellate courts decision erroneous. First, it should not have
included the spouses income in its assessment of Ongs lucrative income.
[95]
Second, it failed
to consider the following circumstances which have a bearing on Ongs expenses vis--vis his
income: (a) that Ong does not own real property; (b) that his proven average gross annual
income around the time of his application, which was only P106,000.00, had to provide for
the education of his four minor children; and (c) that Ongs children were all studying in
117

exclusive private schools in Cebu City. Third, the CA did not explain how it arrived at the
conclusion that Ongs income had an appreciable margin over his known expenses.

Ongs gross income might have been sufficient to meet his familys basic needs, but
there is simply no sufficient proof that it was enough to create an appreciable margin of
income over expenses. Without an appreciable margin of his income over his familys
expenses, his income cannot be expected to provide him and his family with adequate
support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work.
[96]


Clearly, therefore, respondent Ong failed to prove that he possesses the
qualification of a known lucrative trade provided in Section 2, fourth paragraph, of
the Revised Naturalization Law.
[97]


The Court finds no merit in respondents submission that a Rule 45 petition precludes a
review of the factual findings of the courts below.
[98]
In the first place, the trial court and
appellate courts decisions contain conclusions that are bereft of evidentiary support or
factual basis, which is a known exception
[99]
to the general rule that only questions of law
may be entertained in a Rule 45 petition.

Moreover, a review of the decisions involving petitions for naturalization shows
that the Court is not precluded from reviewing the factual existence of the applicants
qualifications. In fact, jurisprudence holds that the entire records of the naturalization case
are open for consideration in an appeal to this Court.
[100]
Indeed, [a] naturalization
proceeding is so infused with public interest that it has been differently categorized and
given special treatment. x x x [U]nlike in ordinary judicial contest, the granting of a petition
for naturalization does not preclude the reopening of that case and giving the government
another opportunity to present new evidence. A decision or order granting citizenship will
not even constitute res judicata to any matter or reason supporting a subsequent judgment
cancelling the certification of naturalization already granted, on the ground that it had been
illegally or fraudulently procured. For the same reason, issues even if not raised in the lower
court may be entertained on appeal. As the matters brought to the attention of this Court x x
x involve facts contained in the disputed decision of the lower court and admitted by the
parties in their pleadings, the present proceeding may be considered adequate for the
purpose of determining the correctness or incorrectness of said decision, in the light of the
law and extant jurisprudence.
[101]
In the case at bar, there is even no need to present new
evidence. A careful review of the extant records suffices to hold that respondent Ong has
not proven his possession of a known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation to
qualify for naturalization.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition of the Republic of
the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 74794 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Naturalization of Kerry Lao
Ong is DENIED for failure to comply with Section 2, fourth paragraph, of Commonwealth Act
No. 473, as amended.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents.
CONCURRING OPINION
DISSENTING OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
118

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen."
1

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then
applicable was the 1935 Constitution.
2

On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States
Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an
oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may
lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission
in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:
SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. A Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
x x x
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed of a
foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the
acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country,
and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent
of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his
Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of
alliance with said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory
with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the
Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or
acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident
thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said
foreign country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is
rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign
country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b),
shall not be Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to,
or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge
from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically
entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and politically entitled to the full
enjoyment of his civil political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was
erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his
service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.
3
He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III,
who was then running for reelection.1wphi1.nt
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that
respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
section 6 of the Constitution.
4

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision
5
dismissing the petition for quo
warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District
of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.
6

Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision
on the following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had
ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship
on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent
as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact he did not validly acquire his
Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship
was invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of
119

discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the
petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and
constitutionally restore his natural-born status.
7

The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who
became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born
Filipino since he lost h is Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the
United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that
Article citizens are those who are from birth with out having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as natural-
born citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV,
Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-
born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
8

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization.
These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the
natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his
birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.
9

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citezenship."
10

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens
through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization
Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.
11
To be naturalized, an applicant
has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications
12
and none of the
disqualification
13
provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting
Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its
promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the
applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling
or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government
promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation
or contrary to any Government announced policies.
14

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in
the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates
the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former
citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
15

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is
governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63.
16
Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to
reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications
17
and none of
the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
18

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who
lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;
19
services in the
armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
20
(3) service in the Armed Forces
of the United States at any other time,
21
(4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an
alien;
22
and (5) political economic necessity.
23

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply
consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and
registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person
concerned resides or last resided.
120

In Angat v. Republic,
24
we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and
2630], the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship
would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to
do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or
where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original.
25

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.
26
This
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior
status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to
his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service
in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering
service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United
States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States,
acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides
or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance
with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the
son of a Filipino father.
27
It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him
to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen
since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly
explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first
defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person
must be a Filipino citizen birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to
obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino
citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized
and (2) those born before January 17, 1973,
38
of Filipino mothers who, upon
reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized
citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipino
at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of
Filipino mothers before the effectively of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not
considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their
Philippines citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers
before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who re
natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are
considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who
are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of
citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to
undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is
natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate
category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire
it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-
born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and
the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As
respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceeding in
order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he
possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole
judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
121

members of the House.
29
The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check
"whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.
30
In the absence thereof, there is no
occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of the
HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgement for that of the latter for the simple
reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the
correctness of the assailed decision.
31
There is no such showing of grave abuse of
discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano
were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were as
follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275
[1]

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending
petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that
private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,
[2]
the Second Division of the COMELEC
granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under
40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified
from running for any elective position. The COMELECs Second Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of
Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City
in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the
respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of
Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that
he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien
Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen
because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born
in the United States, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is
considered an American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his
registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both
a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the
position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he
seeks to be elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship
are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios
Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.
[3]
The
motion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998,
of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of
Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.
122

On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for
disqualification.
[4]
Petitioners motion was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en
banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the
COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private
respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections.
[5]
The pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States
Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the
age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport
as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine
Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This,
however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not
renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United
States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he
registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998,
which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under
Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division,
adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the
highest number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City,
garnering one hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes
over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand
eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine
hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four
thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it
would be far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in
complex legal issues involving private international law which may well be settled
before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the
Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the
respondents certificate of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a
candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998,
elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon
proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo
Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers,
on the evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of
the City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of
the COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the
office of vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when
he was already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a
voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of
the City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division
adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be
declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold
the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent
Manzano whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit
123

considering that he was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by
Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioners motion for leave to intervene granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT

Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of
Procedure of the COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to
intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his
motion for intervention:
Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person
allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an
action or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene
in such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so
situated as to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.
. . . .
Section 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for
intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenors
rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in
litigation nor an interest to protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-
mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of
Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and
executory judgment.
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to
intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a
proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati
City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private
respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that
time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private
respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v.
COMELEC,
[6]
reiterated in several cases,
[7]
only applies to cases in which the election
of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who placed second
to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at
the time petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention on May 20, 1998,
there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioners purpose was
precisely to have private respondent disqualified from running for [an] elective
local position under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally
instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was
competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival
candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a
motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been
shown to have garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice
mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for
the disqualification against private respondent is clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry,
or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for
disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment
rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners motion for
intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing
the instant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the
merits of the case, the present petition properly deals not only with the denial of
petitioners motion for intervention but also with the substantive issues respecting
private respondents alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent
Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being
a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
124

II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40
of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as
disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual
citizenship. This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati.
[8]

Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor
General, who sides with him in this case, contends that through 40(d) of the Local
Government Code, Congress has command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of
persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states.
[9]
For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are
citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state
which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any
voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible
for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which
follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the
laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may,
without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases
are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides:
Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law. This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of
Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows:
[10]

. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I
have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual
allegiance and I reiterate a dual allegiance is larger and more threatening than
that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never
insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on
foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance
of the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the
triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce
which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket,
as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese
community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in
Taiwan. And until recently, the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the
Peoples Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for
overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin
countries were represented, which was dissolved after several years because of
diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that
Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of
allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts,
may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also
took close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday,
including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of
guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who
has always been worried about minority claims on our natural resources.
Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore,
China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial
places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of
common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have
to endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening
unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider
incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which
will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE
DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.
125

In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these
citizens with dual allegiance, thus:
[11]

. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual
citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double
sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought
would be repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to
citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the
Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that
citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the defense of the State
when it is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the
concern for national security. In the course of those debates, I think some noted
the fact that as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the decision to establish
diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China was made in 1975, a good
number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every October 10;
and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign
government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when the
anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected
a genuine and deep concern about double citizenship, with its attendant risk of
double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I
appreciate what the Committee said that this could be left to the determination of
a future legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on
the security of this country, arising from, let us say, potentially great numbers of
double citizens professing double allegiance, will the Committee entertain a
proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate
double citizenship?
Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized
citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in
R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject
to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with
dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy,
they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most
perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: [D]ual
citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But
whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is something
completely beyond our control.
[12]

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby
terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the
foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his
foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d)
between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:
[13]

SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page
17: Any person with dual citizenship is disqualified to run for any elective
local position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone
whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a
natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a
natural born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give
up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to
the country of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local
government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the
moment when he would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate
one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country
of origin or the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a
citizen? No one can renounce. There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office
would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to be considered as a
Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not
require an election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a
citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim
the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the
Gentlemans example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then
he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the
126

first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: I am
a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship.
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr.
President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship
invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that
will prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will
probably fall under this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must
renounce all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or
sovereignty
[14]
of which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be
issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v.
Republic,
[15]
it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he
renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares
that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition
imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law
lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter
should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the
Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read
into our Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what our legislative
department has deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign government has
thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all
means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will
and power of the people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco,
California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres
to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus
soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the
Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by
participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent
effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law, so that now he is
solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in
Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event,
as the alleged renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37
years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the age
of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced
his American citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that A person who is a
national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his
nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or
participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign
territory. To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk
[16]
as beyond the power given to the U.S.
Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy
when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship
and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private respondents certificate
of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements made
under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF NATURAL-BORN OR
NATURALIZED) NATURAL-BORN
. . . .
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A,
BARANGAY SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI,
PROVINCE OF NCR .
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A
FOREIGN COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL
SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL
OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY
THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF
VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF
EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE
TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
127

The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual
citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held:
[17]

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would
the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which
under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him from running for
any elective local position? We answer this question in the negative, as there is
cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said
oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his
Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he had long renounced and had long abandoned his
American citizenship long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in
the interim when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he
was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship
when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for
Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an
oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the
elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is
basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent
any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention that the oath of
allegiance contained in private respondents certificate of candidacy is insufficient
to constitute renunciation of his American citizenship. Equally without merit is
petitioners contention that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been
made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires
the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is
registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and
that he holds an American passport which he used in his last travel to the United
States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate
of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him
can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the
termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v.
COMELEC
[18]
applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an
American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not
mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American
does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities
or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine
citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said
citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine
citizenship must be express, it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of
Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either express or implied.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino
citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that
he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith
and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as
a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines,
when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received
his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections
in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking
made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for
declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago,
[19]
we sustained the denial of entry into
the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A
similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship,
renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Quisumbing,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
128

Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., on leave.
Pardo, J., no part.
MERCADO VS. MANZANO
G.R. No. 135083, May 26 1999

FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were
candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Respondent was then declared the winning candidate; however
its proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification
filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a
citizen of thePhilippines but of the United States.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted
the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy
of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code provides that persons with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective position.
Respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of
Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he
is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino
mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, on September
14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen under US Laws. But
notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino
citizenship. From these facts, respondent is a dual citizen - both a Filipino and a US
citizen.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Manzano is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.

HELD:
The petition was dismissed. Dual citizenship is different from dualallegiance. The
former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are
citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state
which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is considered as a dual
citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was born in San Francisco, USA.
Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently
considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause under Article
IV of the Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of
the Philippines to posses dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow
the principle of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws
of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.

By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private
respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American
citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a
dual citizen.

129

By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not
a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and
support the Constitution of thePhilippines and bear true faith and allegiance
thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as
far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the
other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his
education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in
this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. Read full text
Tecson/Velez vs. COMELEC and Poe

GR No. 161434

FACTS:
Fernando Poe Jr. is a candidate for presidency. His citizenship is being contested on
the theory that he is not a natural born filipino citizen. The petitioner contended
that FPJ's parents are foreigners, that his father, Allan Poe was a Spanish national,
being the son of Lorenzo Pou, and his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American.
Fernando Poe Jr was also an illegitimate son since he was born when his parents
were not yet married. Fernando Poe could not have acquired Filipino citizenship.


ISSUE:
1) Whether or not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen?

RULING:
Yes, Fernando Poe Jr. is a Filipino Citizen. His grandfather was already alive during
the en masse Filipinization that has effected in 1902. The said law has changed the
citizenship of every single person living in the archipelago to Filipino. Following this
logic, it can be presumed that the citizenship of Fernando Pou has been transmitted
to Allan F. Poe and Fernando Poe Jr. FPJ acquired Filipino Citizenship through the
1935 Constitution which confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino
citizens regardless of which such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 137000. August 9, 2000]
CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated
July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission on
Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for disqualification
filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao
Oriental.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace,
Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino
citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an
Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to
settle in the Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino
citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has
continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but
130

as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and
was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by
her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as
EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian
citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had
renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en
banc dismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:
A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned resolution
shows that respondent was able to produce documentary proofs of the Filipino
citizenship of her late father... and consequently, prove her own citizenship and
filiation by virtue of the Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the perorations of the petitioner
to the contrary notwithstanding.
On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents . . . no
other evidence substantial in nature surfaced to confirm the allegations of
petitioner that respondent is an Australian citizen and not a Filipino. Express
renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under Commonwealth
Act No. 63 is an equivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance
and consequence. The evidence adduced by petitioner are inadequate, nay
meager, to prove that respondent contemplated renunciation of her Filipino
citizenship.
[1]

In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran
for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco
Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066
before the COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino citizenship but
the said petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC, reiterating
substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.
The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an
issue when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the
May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein
petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.
On July 17, 1998, the COMELECs First Division came out with a
Resolution dismissing the petition, and disposing as follows:
Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to dispose the
instant case on the merits trying it de novo, the above table definitely shows that
petitioner herein has presented no new evidence to disturb the Resolution of this
Commission in SPA No. 95-066. The present petition merely restates the same
matters and incidents already passed upon by this Commission not just in 1995
Resolution but likewise in the Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having put forth
any new evidence and matter substantial in nature, persuasive in character or
sufficiently provocative to compel reversal of such Resolutions, the dismissal of the
present petition follows as a matter of course.
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters and issues
tendered, We find no convincing reason or impressive explanation to disturb and
reverse the Resolutions promulgated by this Commission in EPC 92-54 and SPA. 95-
066. This Commission RESOLVES as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the present
petition.
SO ORDERED.
[2]

Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
Resolution but to no avail. The same was denied by the COMELEC in
its en banc Resolution of January 15, 1999.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present
petition; questioning the citizenship of private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run
for a public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino
citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino
citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a
Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section
4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian
citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration
and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was
accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila;
and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-
54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified
to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private
respondent is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts
that:
131

a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as
an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695
dated September 19, 1988;
b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR), and
c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and
circumstances, the private respondent had renounced her Filipino
citizenship. He contends that in her application for alien certificate of
registration and immigrant certificate of residence, private respondent
expressly declared under oath that she was a citizen or subject of
Australia; and said declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship, and
operated to disqualify her to run for elective office.
As regards the COMELECs finding that private respondent had
renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her
Australian passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by the
Australian Embassy here in Manila, petitioner argues that the said acts
did not automatically restore the status of private respondent as a
Filipino citizen. According to petitioner, for the private respondent to
reacquire Philippine citizenship she must comply with the mandatory
requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and the election
of private respondent to public office did not mean the restoration of her
Filipino citizenship since the private respondent was not legally
repatriated. Coupled with her alleged renunciation of Australian
citizenship, private respondent has effectively become a stateless person
and as such, is disqualified to run for a public office in the Philippines;
petitioner concluded.
Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred
in applying the principle of res judicata to the case under consideration;
citing the ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
Immigration,
[3]
that:
xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a
judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again
as the occasion may demand. xxx
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of
the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the
doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the
basis of place of birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16,
1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses,
Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte,
and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before
the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as
the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by
which the United States governed the country. These were the
Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August
29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens
of the Philippine islands. The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine
citizens as:
SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-
nine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as
such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at
Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (underscoring ours)
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in
said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held
to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December
132

tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as have since
become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature,
herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who cannot come
within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United
States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of
the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the
laws of the United States if residing therein. (underscoring ours)
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were
Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their
children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents
father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines
Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the
Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones
Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of
the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth,
Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez,
is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has
established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship, to wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before
the adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public office in
the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue
of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973
[4]
and
1987
[5]
Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino
father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her
losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle
of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian
citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the
private respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced
her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited
private respondents application for an Alien Certificate of Registration
(ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19,
1988, and the issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3,
1988.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or
laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or
more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a
foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the
Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a
plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted: and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of
the laws in force in her husbands country, she acquires his
nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such
renunciation must be express. Petitioners contention that the
application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration,
and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest
in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC
[6]
and in the more recent case
of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC.
[7]

In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that
respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an
American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an
133

application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the
fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American
passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of
candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his American
nationality before the termination of his American citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez
was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of
registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of
citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of
citizenship, the same must be express.
[8]
As held by this court in the
aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of
registration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation
of ones citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for
an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian
passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of
assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced
the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship -
she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of
Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a
ground for losing ones Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent
did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioners claim that
respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold
water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the
private respondent had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for
governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which states:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
Again, petitioners contention is untenable.
In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified
dual citizenship as used in the Local Government Code and reconciled
the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual
allegiance.
[9]
Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may,
without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the
conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state,
the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer
to citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:
xxx the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854,
xxx 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons
with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did
not automatically disqualify her from running for a public
office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual
citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the
filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship.
[10]
The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to
renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as
a dual citizen.
[11]
This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one
declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and
defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates
as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the
herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such
fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private
respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11,
1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as
certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of
Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid
acts were enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation was effective, petitioners
claim that private respondent must go through the whole process of
repatriation holds no water.
134

Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an
issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision
thereon is generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent
proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs.
Commissioner of Immigration.
[12]
He insists that the same issue of
citizenship may be threshed out anew.
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the
principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the
issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic,
[13]
an
exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that
case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in
cases of citizenship, the following must be present:
1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy
where said person is a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part
in the resolution thereof, and
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim
Yao, the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on
citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these
antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to make the effort
easier or simpler.
[14]
Indeed, there appears sufficient basis to rely on the
prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC
92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein
private respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially
the same evidence presented in these two prior cases. Petitioner failed
to show any new evidence or supervening event to warrant a reversal of
such prior resolutions. However, the procedural issue notwithstanding,
considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC
Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, in
SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged
qualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-
Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., abroad on official business.
EN BANC


ROSELLER DE GUZMAN, G.R. No. 180048
Petitioner,
Present:

Puno, C.J.,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio,
Corona,
- versus - Carpio Morales,
Chico-Nazario,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura,
Leonardo-De Castro,
Brion,
Peralta, and
Bersamin, JJ.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
135

and ANGELINA DG. DELA CRUZ, Promulgated:
Respondents.
June 19, 2009
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:


This petition
[1]
for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order assails the June 15, 2007 Resolution
[2]
of the First
Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 07-211, disqualifying
petitioner Roseller De Guzman from running as vice-mayor in the May 14, 2007
Synchronized National and Local Elections. Also assailed is the October 9,
2007 Resolution
[3]
of the COMELEC En Banc denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

Petitioner De Guzman and private respondent Angelina DG. Dela Cruz were
candidates for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14,
2007 elections. On April 3, 2007, private respondent filed against petitioner a
petition
[4]
for disqualification docketed as SPA No. 07-211, alleging that petitioner is
not a citizen of the Philippines, but an immigrant and resident of the United States
of America.

In his answer, petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized
American. However, on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), otherwise known as the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003.
[5]
Upon approval of his application, he
took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on September 6,
2006. He argued that, having re-acquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to
exercise full civil and political rights. As such, he is qualified to run as vice-mayor of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija.

During the May 14, 2007 elections, private respondent won as vice-
mayor. Petitioner filed an election protest on grounds of irregularities and massive
cheating. The case was filed before Branch 31 of the Regional Trial Court of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija and was docketed as Election Protest No. 07-01.

Meanwhile, in SPA No. 07-211, the COMELEC First Division rendered its
June 15, 2007 Resolution disqualifying petitioner, which reads as follows:

Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 states:

Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic: x x x

136

Hence, under the provisions of the aforementioned law,
respondent has validly reacquired Filipino citizenship. By taking
this Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines on September 6, 2006 before Mary Jo
Bernardo Aragon, Deputy Consul General at the Philippine
Consulate General, Los Angeles, California respondent was
deemed a dual citizen, possessing both Filipino and American
citizenship.

However, subparagraph (2), Section 5 of the
aforementioned Act also provides:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities -- Those
who retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship under this Act shall
enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:

x x x x

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

As can be gleaned from the above cited provision,
respondent [herein petitioner] should have renounced his
American citizenship before he can run for any public elective
position. This respondent did not do. The Oath of Allegiance
taken by respondent was for the purpose of re-acquiring
Philippine citizenship. It did not, at the same time, mean that
respondent has renounced his American citizenship. Thus, at the
time respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
of Vice-Mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija he was, and still is, a dual
citizen, possessing both Philippine and American citizenship. For
this reason alone, respondent is disqualified to run for the
abovementioned elective position.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First
Division) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the instant
petition finding it IMBUED WITH MERIT. Hence, respondent
(petitioner herein) Roseller T. De Guzman is disqualified to run as
Vice-Mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007
Synchronized National and Local Elections.
[6]


Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was dismissed on
October 9, 2007 by the COMELEC En Banc for having been rendered moot in view of
private respondents victory.

Thereafter, the trial court in Election Protest No. 07-01 rendered a
Decision,
[7]
dated November 26, 2007, declaring petitioner as the winner for the
Vice-Mayoralty position. It held:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
protestant ROSELLER T. DE GUZMAN, as the winner for the Vice-
137

Mayoralty position with a plurality of 776 votes over the
protestee, ANGELINA D.G. DELA CRUZ, in the May 14, 2007 Local
Elections in Guimba, Nueva Ecija. With costs against the
protestee.

There being no evidence presented as to the damages by
both parties, the same are hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.
[8]


Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, alleging that the
COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying him from running as
Vice-Mayor because of his failure to renounce his American citizenship, and in
dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being moot.

Petitioner invokes the rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on
Elections
[9]
and Mercado v. Manzano,
[10]
that the filing by a person with dual
citizenship of a certificate of candidacy, containing an oath of allegiance,
constituted as a renunciation of his foreign citizenship. Moreover, he claims that
the COMELEC En Banc prematurely dismissed the motion for reconsideration
because at that time, there was a pending election protest which was later decided
in his favor.

Meanwhile, private respondent claims that the passage of R.A. No. 9225
effectively abandoned the Courts rulings in Frivaldo and Mercado; that the current
law requires a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship;
and that petitioner, having failed to renounce his American citizenship, remains a
dual citizen and is therefore disqualified from running for an elective public position
under Section 40
[11]
of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC).

The issues for resolution are: 1) whether the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in dismissing petitioners motion for reconsideration for being moot; and
2) whether petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva
Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his American
citizenship in accordance with R.A. No. 9225.

An issue becomes moot when it ceases to present a justifiable controversy so
that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value.
[12]
In this
case, the pendency of petitioners election protest assailing the results of the
election did not render moot the motion for reconsideration which he filed assailing
his disqualification. Stated otherwise, the issue of petitioners citizenship did not
become moot; the resolution of the issue remained relevant because it could
significantly affect the outcome of the election protest. Philippine citizenship is an
indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. As mandated by law: An
elective local official must be a citizen of thePhilippines.
[13]
It bears stressing that
the Regional Trial Court later ruled in favor of petitioner in the election protest and
declared him the winner. In view thereof, a definitive ruling on the issue of
petitioners citizenship was clearly necessary. Hence, the COMELEC committed
138

grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners motion for reconsideration
solely on the ground that the same was rendered moot because he lost to private
respondent.

Anent the second issue, we find that petitioner is disqualified from running
for public office in view of his failure to renounce his American citizenship.

R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of
Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2)
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become
citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have re-
acquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance.
[14]


Petitioner falls under the first category, being a natural-born citizen who
lost his Philippine citizenship upon his naturalization as an American citizen. In the
instant case, there is no question that petitioner re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship after taking the oath of allegiance on September 6, 2006. However, it
must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional requirement on
those who wish to seek elective public office, as follows:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine Citizenship under this
Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:

x x x x

(2) Those seeking elective public
office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws
and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.

Contrary to petitioners claims, the filing of a certificate of candidacy does
not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No.
9225. Our rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable to the
instant case because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements.

Thus, in Japzon v. COMELEC,
[15]
the Court held that Section 5(2) of R.A. No.
9225 requires the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of
Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship, viz:

139

Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural
born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1)
meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required
by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.

Further, in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC,
[16]
the Court ruled that a candidates
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and his Certificate of Candidacy
do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship. Thus:

The law categorically requires persons seeking elective
public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or
those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public
officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or
before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No.
9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized
as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained
their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking
elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute
apersonal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or
simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to
qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.

Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the
making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of
the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking
other than that which they have presumably complied with under
Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral
Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill
No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August 2003
(precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman
Franklin Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur Defensor
explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of
allegiance is different from the renunciation of foreign citizenship:

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Okay. So, No. 2. Those
seeking elective public office in the Philippines
shall meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath. I think its very good,
ha? No problem?

REP. JAVIER. I think its already covered by the
oath.

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Renouncing foreign
citizenship.

140

REP. JAVIER. Ah but he has taken his oath
already.

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Nono, renouncing foreign
citizenship.

x x x x

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Can I go back to No.
2. Whats your problem, Boy? Those seeking
elective office in the Philippines.

REP. JAVIER. They are trying to make him
renounce his citizenship thinking that ano

CHAIRMAN DRILON. His American citizenship.

REP. JAVIER. To discourage him from running?

CHAIRMAN DRILON. No.

REP. A.D. DEFENSOR. No. When he runs he will
only have one citizenship. When he runs for
office, he will have only one. (Emphasis ours.)

There is little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the
legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to
explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for
elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in
Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship,
namely, Philippine citizenship.

By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the
Certificate of Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the one
contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not
constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought under
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize that
the said oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those
who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the
renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only
for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts,
considering their special circumstance of having more than one
citizenship.

In the instant case, petitioners Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Candidacy
did not comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 which further requires those
seeking elective public office in the Philippines to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his American
citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba,
Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections.

141

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Petitioner is
declared DISQUALIFIED from running for Vice-Mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the
May 14, 2007 elections because of his failure to renounce his foreign citizenship
pursuant to Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

SO ORDERED.



CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
142

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 195649 July 2, 2013
CASAN MACODE MACQUILING, PETITIONER,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G.
BALUA. RESPONDENTS.
R E S O L U T I O N
SERENO, J.:
This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on
May 10, 2013 and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 20,
2013.
We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May
2010 elections has already ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado, therefore, has
successfully finished his term of office. While the relief sought can no longer be
granted, ruling on the motion for reconsideration is important as it will either affirm
the validity of Arnados election or affirm that Arnado never qualified to run for
public office.
Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal of
this Courts Decision dated April 16, 2013. Instead, he presented his
accomplishments as the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and reiterated that
he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only twice but six times. It must be
stressed, however, that the relevant question is the efficacy of his renunciation of
his foreign citizenship and not the taking of the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines. Neither do his accomplishments as mayor affect the question
before this Court.
Respondent cites Section 349 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of the
United States as having the effect of expatriation when he executed his Affidavit of
Renunciation of American Citizenship on April 3, 2009 and thus claims that he was
divested of his American citizenship. If indeed, respondent was divested of all the
rights of an American citizen, the fact that he was still able to use his US passport
after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation repudiates this claim.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws,
1
which must be presented as
public documents
2
of a foreign country and must be "evidenced by an official
publication thereof."
3
Mere reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice
for it to be considered in deciding a case.
Respondent likewise contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the United
States "providing that a person who is divested of American citizenship thru an
Affidavit of Renunciation will re-acquire such American citizenship by using a US
Passport issued prior to expatriation."
4

American law does not govern in this jurisdiction. Instead, Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code calls for application in the case before us, given the fact that at
the time Arnado filed his certificate of candidacy, he was not only a Filipino citizen
but, by his own declaration, also an American citizen. It is the application of this law
and not of any foreign law that serves as the basis for Arnados disqualification to
run for any local elective position.
With all due respect to the dissent, the declared policy of Republic Act No. (RA)
9225 is that "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this
Act."
5
This policy pertains to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Section
5(2)
6
requires those who have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who seek
elective public office, to renounce any and all foreign citizenship.
This requirement of renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, when read
together with Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
7
which disqualifies those
with dual citizenship from running for any elective local position, indicates a policy
that anyone who seeks to run for public office must be solely and exclusively a
Filipino citizen. To allow a former Filipino who reacquires Philippine citizenship to
continue using a foreign passport which indicates the recognition of a foreign
state of the individual as its national even after the Filipino has renounced his
foreign citizenship, is to allow a complete disregard of this policy.
Further, we respectfully disagree that the majority decision rules on a situation of
doubt.
143

Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for local elective positions.
There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that
one is a citizen of the country which issued the passport, or that a passport proves
that the country which issued it recognizes the person named therein as its
national.
It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired
American citizenship by naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his
Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and that he
renounced his American citizenship. It is also indubitable that after renouncing his
American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at least six times.
If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnados renunciation
of his American citizenship when he subsequently used his U.S. passport. The
renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and unequivocal. The
requirement that the renunciation must be made through an oath emphasizes the
solemn duty of the one making the oath of renunciation to remain true to what he
has sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is
convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues
the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality.
The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man without a
country".1wphi1 On the contrary, this Court has, in fact, found Arnado to have
more than one. Nowhere in the decision does it say that Arnado is not a Filipino
citizen. What the decision merely points out is that he also possessed another
citizenship at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy.
Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be
interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported by
substantial evidence.
8
They are accorded not only great respect but even finality,
and are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative body had
arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence before it to such an extent as
to compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly appreciated.
9

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC First Division found that
Arnado used his U.S. Passport at least six times after he renounced his American
citizenship. This was debunked by the COMELEC En Banc, which found that Arnado
only used his U.S. passport four times, and which agreed with Arnados claim that
he only used his U.S. passport on those occasions because his Philippine passport
was not yet issued. The COMELEC En Banc argued that Arnado was able to prove
that he used his Philippine passport for his travels on the following dates: 12
January 2010, 31 January 2010, 31 March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May 2010, and 4
June 2010.
None of these dates coincide with the two other dates indicated in the certification
issued by the Bureau of Immigration showing that on 21 January 2010 and on 23
March 2010, Arnado arrived in the Philippines using his U.S. Passport No.
057782700 which also indicated therein that his nationality is USA-American.
Adding these two travel dates to the travel record provided by the Bureau of
Immigration showing that Arnado also presented his U.S. passport four times (upon
departure on 14 April 2009, upon arrival on 25 June 2009, upon departure on 29
July 2009 and upon arrival on 24 November 2009), these incidents sum up to six.
The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of the US passport was because to
his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use."
10
This
conclusion, however, is not supported by the facts. Arnado claims that his
Philippine passport was issued on 18 June 2009. The records show that he
continued to use his U.S. passport even after he already received his Philippine
passport. Arnados travel records show that he presented his U.S. passport on 24
November 2009, on 21 January 2010, and on 23 March 2010. These facts were
never refuted by Arnado.
Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a misapprehension of the facts
that the use of the U.S. passport was discontinued when Arnado obtained his
Philippine passport. Arnados continued use of his U.S. passport cannot be
considered as isolated acts contrary to what the dissent wants us to believe.
It must be stressed that what is at stake here is the principle that only those who
are exclusively Filipinos are qualified to run for public office. If we allow dual
citizens who wish to run for public office to renounce their foreign citizenship and
afterwards continue using their foreign passports, we are creating a special
privilege for these dual citizens, thereby effectively junking the prohibition in
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration are hereby DENIED with finality.
SO ORDERED.
144

Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Abad, Villa
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave
to resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until
he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his
ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free
medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian
citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.
1
On that
day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines
and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether
petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he
gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2,
Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar.
Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of
the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character,
and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme
Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in
any court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the
qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
conditioned on his retaking the lawyers oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain
modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.
2
It is so delicately
affected with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through
this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare.
3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree
of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with
the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of
membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions
required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege
to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him
unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for
the continued exercise of his professional privilege.
4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted
as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with
the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in
accordance with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular
standing is entitled to practice law.
145

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates
that an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the
Philippines.
5
He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have
been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing
satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other qualifications;
7
passing the bar
examinations;
8
taking the lawyers oath
9
and signing the roll of attorneys and
receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to
practice.
10

The second requisite for the practice of law membership in good standing is a
continuing requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly,
payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;
11
payment of the annual
professional tax;
12
compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education
requirement;
13
faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession
and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.
14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice
law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall
be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.
15
Since Filipino
citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the
practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates
the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege
denied to foreigners.
16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a
citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is
because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall
be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA
9225]."
17
Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance
with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his
membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice
accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines
and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice."
18
Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship
pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this
Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the
IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal
education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners
knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his
duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but
also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the
Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED,
subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of
such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a
member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-
Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de
Castro, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
146

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 198010 August 12, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,
vs.
DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
are the Court of Appeals (CA)
1
Decision
2
dated February 18, 2011 and
Resolution
3
dated July 27, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN. The assailed decision
dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines and,
consequently, affirmed in toto the June 28, 2004 Order
4
of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 27, Gingoog City in Special Proceedings No. 230-2004 granting the
Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by respondent Dr.
Norma S. Lugsanay Uy; while the assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On March 8, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her
Certificate of Live Birth.
5
Impleaded as respondent is the Local Civil Registrar of
Gingoog City. She alleged that she was born on February 8, 1952 and is the
illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay
6
Her Certificate of Live
Birth
7
shows that her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is allegedly known to
her family and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay." She further claimed that her school
records, Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine
Certificate,
8
and passport
9
bear the name "Norma S. Lugsanay." She also alleged
that she is an illegitimate child considering that her parents were never married, so
she had to follow the surname of her mother.
10
She also contended that she is a
Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and
are all Filipinos.
11

Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the corrections on her name and
citizenship which was supposedly granted.
12
However, the National Statistics Office
(NSO) records did not bear such changes. Hence, the petition before the RTC.
On May 13, 2004, the RTC issued an Order
13
finding the petition to be sufficient in
form and substance and setting the case for hearing, with the directive that the said
Order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Gingoog and
the Province of Misamis Oriental at least once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks at the expense of respondent, and that the order and petition be furnished
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the City Prosecutors Office for their
information and guidance.
14
Pursuant to the RTC Order, respondent complied with
the publication requirement.
On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. THE
CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF GINGOOG CITY, or any person acting in his behalf is
directed and ordered to effect the correction or change of the entries in the
Certificate of Live Birth of petitioners name and citizenship so that the entries
would be:
a) As to petitioners name :
First Name : NORMA
Middle Name : SY
Last Name : LUGSANAY
b) As to petitioners nationality/citizenship :
: FILIPINO
SO ORDERED.
15

The RTC concluded that respondents petition would neither prejudice the
government nor any third party. It also held that the names "Norma Sy Lugsanay"
and "Anita Sy" refer to one and the same person, especially since the Local Civil
Registrar of Gingoog City has effected the correction. Considering that respondent
has continuously used and has been known since childhood as "Norma Sy
Lugsanay" and as a Filipino citizen, the RTC granted the petition to avoid
confusion.
16

147

On February 18, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that
respondents failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the
publication of the Order setting the case for hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to
the Local Civil Registrar, the OSG and the City Prosecutors Office.
17
As to whether
the petition is a collateral attack on respondents filiation, the CA ruled in favor of
respondent, considering that her parents were not legally married and that her
siblings birth certificates uniformly state that their surname is Lugsanay and their
citizenship is Filipino.
18
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated July 27, 2011.
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the petition is dismissible for
failure to implead indispensable parties.
Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds,
the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births;
(b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of
marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o)
changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by
an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of
such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceeding is brought may
make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction
for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an
order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified
copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall
annotate the same in his record.
19

In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate,
particularly those pertaining to her first name, surname and citizenship. She sought
the correction allegedly to reflect the name which she has been known for since
childhood, including her legal documents such as passport and school and
professional records. She likewise relied on the birth certificates of her full blood
siblings who bear the surname "Lugsanay" instead of "Sy" and citizenship of
"Filipino" instead of "Chinese." The changes, however, are obviously not mere
clerical as they touch on respondents filiation and citizenship. In changing her
surname from "Sy" (which is the surname of her father) to "Lugsanay" (which is the
surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes her status from legitimate to
illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same
affects her rights and obligations in this country. Clearly, the changes are
substantial.
It has been settled in a number of cases starting with Republic v. Valencia
20
that
even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding.
21
The pronouncement of the Court in that case is
illuminating:
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the
correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving
nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted,
affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it
is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as
long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that
even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
148

established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. x x x
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Blacks Law Dictionary
defines "adversary proceeding" as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte
application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the
other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an
adoption proceeding.
22

In sustaining the RTC decision, the CA relied on the Courts conclusion in Republic v.
Kho,
23
Alba v. Court of Appeals,
24
and Barco v. Court of Appeals,
25
that the failure to
implead indispensable parties was cured by the publication of the notice of hearing
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. In Republic v.
Kho,
26
petitioner therein appealed the RTC decision granting the petition for
correction of entries despite respondents failure to implead the minors mother as
an indispensable party. The Court, however, did not strictly apply the provisions of
Rule 108, because it opined that it was highly improbable that the mother was
unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries in her childrens birth certificates
especially since the notices, orders and decision of the trial court were all sent to
the residence she shared with them.
27

In Alba v. Court of Appeals,
28
the Court found nothing wrong with the trial courts
decision granting the petition for correction of entries filed by respondent although
the proceedings was not actually known by petitioner. In that case, petitioners
mother and guardian was impleaded in the petition for correction of entries, and
notices were sent to her address appearing in the subject birth certificate.
However, the notice was returned unserved, because apparently she no longer
lived there. Thus, when she allegedly learned of the granting of the petition, she
sought the annulment of judgment which the Court denied. Considering that the
petition for correction of entries is a proceeding in rem, the Court held that
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner is, therefore, not
required and the absence of personal service was cured by the trial courts
compliance with Rule 108 which requires notice by publication.
29

In Barco v. Court of Appeals,
30
the Court addressed the question of whether the
court acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and all other indispensable parties to the
petition for correction of entries despite the failure to implead them in said case.
While recognizing that petitioner was indeed an indispensable party, the failure to
implead her was cured by compliance with Section 4 of Rule 108 which requires
notice by publication. In so ruling, the Court pointed out that the petitioner in a
petition for correction cannot be presumed to be aware of all the parties whose
interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. It emphasized that the
petitioner therein exerted earnest effort to comply with the provisions of Rule 108.
Thus, the publication of the notice of hearing was considered to have cured the
failure to implead indispensable parties.
In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded
as respondent in the petition below. This, notwithstanding, the RTC granted her
petition and allowed the correction sought by respondent, which decision was
affirmed in toto by the CA.
We do not agree with the RTC and the CA.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue involved in this
case. Aside from Kho, Alba and Barco, the Court has addressed the same in Republic
v. Coseteng-Magpayo,
31
Ceruila v. Delantar,
32
and Labayo-Rowe v. Republic.
33

In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo,
34
claiming that his parents were never legally
married, respondent therein filed a petition to change his name from "Julian
Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo," the name appearing in his birth certificate to
"Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng." The notice setting the petition for
hearing was published and there being no opposition thereto, the trial court issued
an order of general default and eventually granted respondents petition deleting
the entry on the date and place of marriage of parties; correcting his surname from
"Magpayo" to "Coseteng"; deleting the entry "Coseteng" for middle name; and
deleting the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for his father. The
Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, assailed the RTC decision on the
grounds that the corrections made on respondents birth certificate had the effect
of changing the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate and must only be effected
through an appropriate adversary proceeding. The Court nullified the RTC decision
for respondents failure to comply strictly with the procedure laid down in Rule 108
of the Rules of Court. Aside from the wrong remedy availed of by respondent as he
filed a petition for Change of Name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, assuming
that he filed a petition under Rule 108 which is the appropriate remedy, the
petition still failed because of improper venue and failure to implead the Civil
Registrar of Makati City and all affected parties as respondents in the case.
In Ceruila v. Delantar,
35
the Ceruilas filed a petition for the cancellation and
annulment of the birth certificate of respondent on the ground that the same was
made as an instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and, therefore, invalid
149

and spurious, and it falsified all material entries therein. The RTC issued an order
setting the case for hearing with a directive that the same be published and that
any person who is interested in the petition may interpose his comment or
opposition on or before the scheduled hearing. Summons was likewise sent to the
Civil Register of Manila. After which, the trial court granted the petition and
nullified respondents birth certificate. Few months after, respondent filed a
petition for the annulment of judgment claiming that she and her guardian were
not notified of the petition and the trial courts decision, hence, the latter was
issued without jurisdiction and in violation of her right to due process. The Court
annulled the trial courts decision for failure to comply with the requirements of
Rule 108, especially the non-impleading of respondent herself whose birth
certificate was nullified.1wphi1
In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,
36
petitioner filed a petition for the correction of entries
in the birth certificates of her children, specifically to change her name from Beatriz
V. Labayu/Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo, her civil status from "married" to
"single," and the date and place of marriage from "1953-Bulan" to "No marriage."
The Court modified the trial courts decision by nullifying the portion thereof which
directs the change of petitioners civil status as well as the filiation of her child,
because it was the OSG only that was made respondent and the proceedings taken
was summary in nature which is short of what is required in cases where substantial
alterations are sought.
Respondents birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a
Chinese citizen and a legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the
petition, however, she seeks the correction of her first name and surname, her
status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her citizenship from "Chinese" to
"Filipino." Thus, respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local
Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest
and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general
circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature
of the proceedings taken.
37
A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential
oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another given to
other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be
considered interested or affected parties.
38
Summons must, therefore, be served
not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the
requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the
opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.
39

While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and
notify the affected or interested parties may be cured by the publication of the
notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all
possible interested parties.
40
Such failure was likewise excused where the
interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings;
41
when there is
no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties;
42
or
when a party is inadvertently left out.
43

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial
alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 ofthe
Rules of Court is mandated.
44
If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or
changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action
wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented,
the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which
might be detrimental and far reaching.
45

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution dated July 27, 20011 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN, are SET ASIDE. Consequently, the June 28, 2004 Order
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, in Spl. Proc. No. 230-2004
granting the Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by
respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy, is NULLIFIED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice