39.

People vs. Andre Marti

GR 81561 (193 SCRA 57)
18 January 1991

Facts:
On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them 4 gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the
proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. Marti informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a
friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Marti filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number,
the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland.
Anita Reyes did not inspect the packages as Marti refused, who assured the former that the packages simply contained books,
cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of Martis representation, the 4 packages were then placed inside a
brown corrugated box, with styro-foam placed at the bottom and on top of the packages, and sealed with masking tape. Before
delivery of Martis box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes),
following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection, where a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. Job pulled
out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves, and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job
Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he
extracted from the cellophane wrapper. At the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the box containing
Martis packages was opened, yielding dried marijuana leaves, or cake-like (bricks) dried marijuana leaves. The NBI agents made an
inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a Receipt acknowledging custody of the said
effects. Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail, inasmuch as the latters stated address was the Manila
Central Post Office. Thereafter, an Information was filed against Marti for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act. After trial, the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) rendered the decision, convicting Marti
of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e)(i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti appealed.

Issue:
Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accuseds constitutional rights, be invoked against the State.

Held:
In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The
contraband herein, having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing the accuseds rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the
prosecution of the offense charged. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes
into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not
a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search. Where the
contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by
the constitution. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to
whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the search is made upon the request of law
enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the
behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without
the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended
to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

40.
Bache & Co. (Phil.) Inc. vs. Ruiz
GR L-32409 (37 SCRA 323)
27 February 1971

Facts:
On 24 February 1970, Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz
requesting the issuance of a search warrant against Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. and Frederick E. Seggerman for violation of Section 46(a)
of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73,
208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the application for search warrant which was
attached to the letter. In the afternoon of the following day, De Leon and his witness, Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: Veras letter-request; an application for search warrant already
filled up but still unsigned by De Leon; an affidavit of Logronio subscribed before De Leon; a deposition in printed form of Logronio
already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by
Judge. At that time the Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the
depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, the Judge was informed that the depositions had already
been taken. The stenographer, upon request of the Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, the Judge asked
Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged
for perjury. The Judge signed de Leons application for search warrant and Logronios deposition. Search Warrant 2-M-70 was then
signed by Judge and accordingly issued. 3 days later (a Saturday), the BIR agents served the search warrant to the corporation and
Seggerman at the offices of the corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. The corporations lawyers protested the search on the
ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with
their search which yielded 6 boxes of documents. On 3 March 1970, the corporation and Seggerman filed a petition with the Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal praying that the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void, and that Vera, Logronio, de Leon, et. al.,
be ordered to pay the corporation and Seggerman, jointly and severally, damages and attorneys fees. After hearing and on 29 July
1970, the court issued an order dismissing the petition for dissolution of the search warrant. In the meantime, or on 16 April 1970,
the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on the corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely,
based on the documents thus seized. The corporation and Seggerman filed an action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

Issue:
Whether the corporation has the right to contest the legality of the seizure of documents from its office.

Held:
The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. In Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al. (GR L-
19550, 19 June 1967; 20 SCRA 383) the Supreme Court impliedly recognized the right of a corporation to object against
unreasonable searches and seizures; holding that the corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from
the personality of the corporate officers, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the interest of each of them in said
corporations, whatever, the offices they hold therein may be; and that the corporate officers therefore may not validly object to the
use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations, since
the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. The distinction
between the Stonehill case and the present case is that: in the former case, only the officers of the various corporations in whose
offices documents, papers and effects were searched and seized were the petitioners; while in the latter, the corporation to whom
the seized documents belong, and whose rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a petitioner. On that score, the corporation
herein stands on a different footing from the corporations in Stonehill. Moreover, herein, the search warrant was void inasmuch as
First, there was no personal examination conducted by the Judge of the complainant (De Leon) and his witness (Logronio). The Judge
did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there was
probable cause against Bache & Co. and Seggerman. The participation of the Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of
Search Warrant 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographers readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against
the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be consider a personal
examination. Second, the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. The search warrant was issued for at least 4
distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the violation of Section 46(a), Section 72 and Section 73 (the filing of income tax
returns), which are interrelated. The second is the violation of Section 53 (withholding of income taxes at source). The third is the
violation of Section 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth is the violation of Section 209 (failure to make a
return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their
classification the 6 provisions are embraced in 2 different titles: Sections 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while
Sections 208 and 209 are under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation). Lastly, the search warrant does not particularly
describe the things to be seized. Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the
elimination of general warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing as to include all conceivable records of the
corporation, which, if seized, could possibly render its business inoperative. Thus, Search Warrant 2-M-70 is null and void.