G.R. No.

80718 January 29, 1988

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA
BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA
BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and
LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.

CASE DIGEST (1):
The firewall of a burned out building owned by
petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring
shop occupied by the family of the private
respondents resulting in injuries to private
respondents had been warned by petitioners to
vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the
weakened wall but the former failed to do. In the
RTC, petitioners were found guilty of gross
negligence. On the last day of the 15 days period to
file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration which was again denied. The
Supreme Court finds that Court of Appeal did not
commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration. It correctly
applied the rule laid down in Habulayas vs Japzon.
Counsel for petitioner contends that the said case
should not be applied non-publication in the Official
Gazette.

ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions
must be published in the Official Gazette before they
can be binding.

HELD: There is no law requiring the publication of
Supreme Court decision in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to
their becoming effective. It is bounden duty of
counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep
abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court
particularly where issues have been clarified,
consistently reiterated and published in the advance
reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such
publications as the SCRA and law journals.

CASE DIGEST (2):
De Roy was the owner of a burnt building. The
firewall of said building collapsed on the house of
Luis Bernal thereby killing his daughter. Bernal sued
De Roy. Bernal won in the trial court. Eventually, De
Roy appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court. De Roy received a copy of
the decision on August 25, 1987. Under the Rules,
they have 15 days to file a motion for
reconsideration.

On September 9, 1987, the last day for them to file
said MFR, De Roys counsel filed a motion for
extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled that pursuant to
the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August
1985), the fifteen-day period for appealing or for
filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be
extended.

De Roy assailed the denial as she alleged that her
counsel was ignorant of the rule laid down in the
Habaluyas Case; that said rule should not be made to
apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication
of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE: Whether or not De Roys contention is
correct.
HELD: No. It is the bounden duty of counsel as
lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of
decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where
issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated,
and published in the advance reports of Supreme
Court decisions (G.R.s) and in such publications as
the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and
law journals.

MARBELLA-BOBIS VS. BOBIS
GR. No. 138509 July 31, 2000
336 SCRA 747

CASE DIGEST (1):
PARTIES:
Petitioner: IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS
Respondent: ISAGANI D. BOBIS

FACTS:
1. October 21, 1985, first marriage with one
Maria Dulce B. Javier. Not annulled,
nullified or terminated
2. January 25, 1996, second marriage with
petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis
3. Third marriage with a certain Julia Sally
Hernandez
4. February 25, 1998, Imelda Bobis filed
bigamy
5. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated
a civil action for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of his first marriage on the
ground that it was celebrated without a
marriage license
6. Petitioner argues that respondent should
have first obtained a judicial declaration of
nullity of his first marriage before entering
into the second marriage
7. After petitioner sued for bigamy, its just
when the respondent filed a declaration of
absolute nullity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action
for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case
for bigamy

HELD:
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case
the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein.3It is a question based on a
fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused. Its two essential
elements are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may
proceed

In Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without
first having obtained the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage, cannot be said to have
validly entered into the second marriage. In the
current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still
needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any
party can marry again; otherwise the second
marriage will also be void. The reason is that,
without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first
marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at
bar, respondent was for all legal intents and
purposes regarded as a married man at the time he
contracted his second marriage with petitioner.

Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not
erase the fact that respondent entered into a second
marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage.
Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to
the determination of the criminal charge. It is,
therefore, not a prejudicial question

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, only competent
courts having such authority. Prior to such
declaration of nullity, the validity of the first
marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts
a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy (Landicho v. Relova)

CASE DIGEST (2):

FACTS:
1. In October 1985, private respondent Isagani Bobis
contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce
Javier.
2. Without said marriage having been annulled,
nullified or terminated, the same respondent
contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda
Marbella-Bobis on January 1996 and allegedly a third
marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez.
3. An information for bigamy was filed
4. Sometime, thereafter, respondent initiated a civil
action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity
of his first marriage on the ground that it was
celebrated without a marriage license.
5. Respondent then filed a Motion to Suspend the
proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking
the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage
as a prejudicial question to the criminal case.
6. The trial court granted the motion to suspend the
criminal case.
7. Petitioner filed a Motion for reconsideration, but
the same was denied.
8. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Does the subsequent filing of a civil action for
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case
for Bigamy?

HELD:
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case
the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein. It is a question based on a
fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimate connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused. It must appear not
only that the civil case involves facts upon which the
criminal action is based, but also that the relocation
of the issues raised in the civil action would
necessarily be determinative of the criminal case.
Consequently, the defense must involve an issue
similar or intimately related to the same issue raised
in the criminal action and its resolution
determinative of whether or not the latter action
may proceed.

Its two elements are: a) the civil action involves an
issue similarly or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.

A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed
to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential
elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in
the information, considering that the prosecution
has not yet presented its case.

Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at
the time of celebration of the second marriage,
requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage before a party may remarry. The
clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties
particularly the accused, to determine the validity or
invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first
marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of
defense because there is still no judicial declaration
of its nullity at the time the second marriage was
contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy
can successfully be prosecuted provided all its
elements concur two of which are a previous
marriage and a subsequent marriage which would
have been valid had it not been for the existence at
the material time of the first marriage.

As ruled in LANDICHO VS. RELOVA (22 SCRA 731), he
who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such
a case the criminal case may not be suspended on
the ground of the pendency of a civil case for
declaration of nullity. In a recent case for
concubinage, the SC held the pendency of a civil case
for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a
prejudicial question (BELTRAN VS. PEOPLE, 334
SCRA 106). This ruling applies here by analogy since
both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a
marriage.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs. Court of Tax
Appeals [G.R. No. L-52306. October 12, 1981]

Facts: During the period pertinent to this case,
petitioner Corporation was engaged in the business
of telecasting local as well as foreign films acquired
from foreign corporations not engaged in trade or
business within the Philippines. For which petitioner
paid rentals after withholding income tax of 30%of
one-half of the film rentals. In implementing Section
4(b) of the Tax Code, the Commissioner issued
General Circular V-334. Pursuant thereto, ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corp. dutifully withheld and turned
over to the BIR 30% of of the film rentals paid by it
to foreign corporations not engaged in trade or
business in the Philippines. The last year that the
company withheld taxes pursuant to the Circular
was in 1968. On 27 June 1908, RA 5431 amended
Section 24 (b) of the Tax Code increasing the tax rate
from 30% to 35% and revising the tax basis from
such amount referring to rents, etc. to gross
income. In 1971, the Commissioner issued a letter
of assessment and demand for deficiency
withholding income tax for years 1965 to 1968. The
company requested for reconsideration; where the
Commissioner did not act upon.

Issue: Whether Revenue Memorandum Circular 4-
71, revoking General Circular V-334, may be
retroactively applied.

Held: Rulings or circulars promulgated by the
Commissioner have no retroactive application where
to so apply them would be prejudicial to taxpayers.
Herein, the prejudice the company of the retroactive
application of Memorandum Circular 4-71 is beyond
question. It was issued only in 1971, or three years
after 1968, the last year that petitioner had withheld
taxes under General Circular No. V-334. The
assessment and demand on petitioner to pay
deficiency withholding income tax was also made
three years after 1968 for a period of time
commencing in 1965. The company was no longer in
a position to withhold taxes due from foreign
corporations because it had already remitted all film
rentals and had no longer control over them when
the new circular was issued. Insofar as the
enumerated exceptions are concerned, the company
does not fall under any of them.

LORENZO VS. POSADAS
64 PHIL 353

Facts:
On 27 May 1922, Thomas Hanley died in
Zamboanga, leaving a will and considerable amount
of real and personal properties. Hanleys will
provides the following: his money will be given to his
nephew, Matthew Hanley, as well as the real estate
owned by him. It further provided that the property
will only be given ten years after Thomas Hanleys
death. Thus, in the testamentary proceedings, the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga appointed
P.J.M. Moore as trustee of the estate. Moore took
oath of office on March 10, 1924, and resigned on
Feb. 29, 1932. Pablo Lorenzo was appointed in his
stead. Juan Posadas, Collector of Internal Revenue,
assessed inheritance tax against the estate
amounting to P2,057.74 which includes penalty and
surcharge. He filed a motion in the testamentary
proceedings so that Lorenzo will be ordered to pay
the amount due. Lorenzo paid the amount in protest
after CFI granted Posadas motion. He claimed that
the inheritance tax should have been assessed after
10 years. He asked for a refund but Posadas declined
to do so. The latter counterclaimed for the
additional amount of P1,191.27 which represents
interest due on the tax and which was not included
in the original assessment. However, CFI dismissed
this counterclaim. It also denied Lorenzos claim for
refund against Posadas. Hence, both appealed.

Issue: Whether the estate was delinquent in paying
the inheritance tax and therefore liable for the
P1,191.27 that Posadas is asking for?
Held: Yes. It was delinquent because according to
Sec. 1544 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code,
payment of the inheritance tax shall be made before
delivering to each beneficiary his share. This
payment should have been made before March 10,
1924, the date when P.J.M. Moore formally assumed
the function of trustee.

Although the property was only to be given after 10
years from the death of Hanley, the court considered
that delivery to the trustee is delivery to cestui que
trust, the beneficiary within the meaning of Sec.
1544 (b).

Even though there was no express mention of the
word trust in the will, the court of first instance
was correct in appointing a trustee because no
particular or technical words are required to create a
testamentary trust (69 C.J.,p. 711). The requisites of
a valid testamentary trust are: 1) sufficient words to
raise a trust, 2) a definite subject, 3) a certain or
ascertained object. There is no doubt that Hanley
intended to create a trust since he ordered in his will
that certain of his properties be kept together
undisposed during a fixed period or for a stated
purpose.

EMETERIO CUI vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY May 30,
1961 G.R. No. L-15127
Emeterio Cui vs. Arellano University
G.R. No. 15172
May 30, 1961

FACTS: Before the school year 1948-1949 Emeterio
Cui took up preparatory law course in the Arellano
University. After Finishing his preparatory law course
plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the
defendant from school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff
finished his law studies in the defendant university
up to and including the first semester of the fourth
year. During all the school years in which plaintiff
was studying law in defendant law college, Francisco
R. Capistrano, brother of mother of plaintiff, was the
dean of college of law and legal counsel of the
defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for last
semester of his law studies in the defendant
university but failed to pay tuition fees because his
uncle Dean Francisco R. Capistrano, having severed
his connection with defendant and having accepted
the deanship and chancellorship of the college of law
of the Abad Santos University graduating from the
college of law of the latter university. Plaintiff,
during all the time he has studying law in Defendant
University was awarded scholarship grants, for
scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees
were returned to him after the end of semester and
when his scholarship grants were awarded to him.
The whole amount of tuition fees paid by the
plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him by the
latter from the first semester up to and including the
first semester of his last year in college of law or the
fourth year, is in total P1, 003.87. After Graduating in
law from Abad Santos University he applied to take
the bar examination. To secure permission to take
the bar, he needed the transcript of his records in
defendant Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned
the latter to issue to him the needed transcripts. The
defendant refused until after he paid back the P1,
003.87 which defendant refunded him. As he could
not take the bar examination without those
transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum
under protest.

ISSUE: Whether the provision of the contract
between plaintiff and defendant, whereby the
former waived his right to transfer to another school
without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his
scholarship in cash, is valid or not.

HELD: Memorandum No. 38 issued by the Director of
Private Schools provides that When students are
given full or partial scholarship, it is understood that
such scholarship are merited and earned. The
amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to
these scholarship should not be subsequently
charged to recipient students when they decide to
quit school or to transfer to another institution.
Scholarship should not be offered merely to attract
and keep students in a school.

Memorandum No. 38 merely incorporates a sound
principle of public policy. The defendant uses the
scholarship as a business scheme designed to
increase the business potential of an education
institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent
with sound policy but also good morals. The practice
of awarding scholarship to attract students and keep
them in school is not Good custom nor has it
received some kind of social and practical
confirmation except in some private institution as in
Arellano University.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby
reversed and another one shall be entered
sentencing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P1, 033.87, with interest thereon at the legal
rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution
of this case, as well as the costs, and dismissing the
defendants counterclaim. It is so ordered.

LICHAUCO & COMPANY., PETITIONER, VS. SILVERIO
APOSTOL, AS DIRECTOR OF AGRICULTURE, AND
RAFAEL CORPUS, AS SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, RESPONDENTS

FACTS: Lichauco & Co. petitioned for the writs of
mandamus and injunction against Silverio Apostol
and Rafael Corpus allegedly refusing Lichauco & Co
to import from Pnom-Pehn, in French Indo-China, a
shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the
manufacture of serum except upon the condition,
stated in AO No. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture
contending that said cattle shall have been
immunized from the rinderpest before embarkation
at Pnom-Pehn.

The petitioner asserted that under the first provision
to section 1762 of the Administrative Code
(amended by Act no. 3052), the petitioner has an
absolute and unrestricted right to import Carabao
and other draft animals and bovine cattle for the
manufacture of serum from Pnom-Pehn, Indo-China,
into the Philippine Islands and that the respondents
have no authority to impose upon the petitioner
previous said restrictions.

Respondents relied upon section 1770 of the
Administrative Code and AO no. 21 of the Bureau of
Agriculture in relation with Dept. Order No. 6.

ISSUE: Whether section 1770 has been repealed by
implication, in so far as it relates to draft animals and
bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum?


HELD: Section 1762 is for the general rule, while
section 1770 is for particular contingency and not
inconsistent with Section 1762.

Petition does not show sufficient ground for granting
the writs of mandamus and injunction.

DISPOSITION: We are of the opinion that the
contention of the petitioner is untenable, for the
reason that section 1762, as amended, is obviously
of a general nature, while section 1770 deals with a
particular contingency not made the subject of
legislation in section 1762. Section 1770 is therefore
not to be considered as inconsistent with section
1762, as amended; on the other hand, it must be
treated as a special qualification of section 1762. Of
course the two provisions are different, in the sense
that if section 1762, as amended, is considered
alone, the cattle which the petitioner wishes to bring
in can be imported without restriction, while if
section 1770 is still in force the cattle, under the
conditions stated in the petition, can be brought in
only upon compliance with the requirements of
Administrative Order No. 21. But this difference
between the practical effect of the two provisions
does not make then inconsistent in the sense that
the earlier provision (sec. 1770) should be deemed
repealed by the amendatory Act (3052).

That section 1770 is special, in the sense of dealing
with a special contingency not dealt with in section
1762, is readily apparent upon comparing the two
provisions. Thus, we find that while section 1762
relates generally to the subject of the bringing of
animals into the Island at any time and from any
place, section 1770 confers on the Department Head
a special power to deal with the situation which
arises when a dangerous communicable disease
prevails in some defined foreign country, and the
provision is intended to operate only so long as that
situation continues. Section 1770 is the backbone of
the power to enforce animal quarantine in these
Islands in the special emergency therein
contemplated; and if that section should be
obliterated, the administrative authorities here
would be powerless to protect the agricultural
industry of the Islands from the spread of animal
infection originating abroad.

PHIL. ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC.
VS. TORRES, 212 SCRA 298; G.R. NO. 101279,
AUGUST 6, 1992
Facts: DOLE Dept. Order No. 16 temporarily
suspends the recruitment by private employment
agencies of Filipino DH going to Hong Kong in view of
the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance
the protection for the same.
The DOLE, through POEA took over the business of
deploying such HK-bound workers. Pursuant to the
above order, POEA issued memorandum circular no.
30 providing guidelines on the government
processing and deployment of Filipino domestic
helpers to HK and the accreditation of HK
recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino
domestic helpers, and the memorandum circular No.
30, pertaining to the processing of employment
contracts of domestic workers for HK.
Petitioner contends that respondents acted with
grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their
rule-making authority in issuing said circulars.
Issue: WON the take-over of the business deploying
DH to HK by DOLE and POEA through an
administrative order and circular is valid.

Held: Yes. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the
Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate
recruitment and placement activities. The challenge
administrative issuance discloses that the same fall
within the administrative and police powers
expressly or by necessary implication conferred
upon the respondents.

FLORESCA VS. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION
G.R. NO. L-30642 (APRIL 30, 1985)
FLORESCA VS. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION

FACTS:
Several miners, who, while working at its copper
mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on
June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that
buried them in the tunnels of the mine. The heirs of
the deceased claimed their benefits pursuant to the
Workmens Compensation Act before the
Workmens Compensation Commission. They also
petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex
for additional damages, pointing out that the
complaint alleges gross and brazen negligence on
the part of Philex in failing to take necessary security
for the protection of the lives of its employees
working underground. Philex invoked that they can
no longer be sued because the petitioners have
already claimed benefits under the Workmens
Compensation Act, which, Philex insists, holds
jurisdiction over provisions for remedies.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of the deceased have a
right of selection between availing themselves of the
workers right under the Workmens Compensation
Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil
Code for higher damages (actual, moral and
exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that
negligence or fault of the employers or whether they
may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions.

RULING:
The court held that although the other petitioners
had received the benefits under the Workmens
Compensation Act, such may not preclude them
from bringing an action before the regular court
because they became cognizant of the fact that
Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations
with the deceased miners only after receiving
compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been
aware of said violation of government rules and
regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they
would not have sought redress under the
Workmens Compensation Commission which
awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The
choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or
a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was
not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore
be remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings. However, should the petitioners be
successful in their bid before the lower court, the
payments made under the Workmens
Compensation Act should be deducted from the
damages that may be decreed in their favor.

Martinez v Van Buskirk Digest
Facts:

1. On the 11th day of September, 1908, Carmen
Ong de Martinez, was riding a carromata in Ermita,
Manila when a delivery wagon owned by the
defendant (used for the transportation of fodder and
to which two horses are attached), came from the
opposite direction, while their carromata went close
to the sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon
pass by. However, instead of merely passing by,
the horses ran into the carromata occupied by the
plaintiff with her child and overturned it, causing a
serious cut upon the plaintiffs head.

3. The defendant contends that the cochero, who
was driving his delivery wagon at the time of the
accident, was actually a good servant and was
considered a safe and reliable cochero. He also
claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some
forage at Calle Herran, and for that purpose the
defendants employee tied the driving lines of the
horses to the front end of the delivery wagon for the
purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered.
However, a vehicle passed by the driver and made
noises that frightened the horses causing them to
run. The employee failed to stop the horses since he
was thrown upon the ground.

4. From the stated facts, the court ruled that the
defendant was guilty of negligence. The court
specifically cited a paragraph of Article 1903 of the
Civil Code. Hence, this is appeal to reverse such
decision.

Issue: Whether or not the employer, who has
furnished a gentle and tractable team (of horses)
and a trusty and capable driver, is liable for the
negligence of such driver.

NO. The cochero of the defendant was not negligent
in leaving the horses in the manner described by the
evidence in this case. It is believed that acts or
performances which, in a long time, have not been
destructive and which are approved by the society
are considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be
considered as unreasonable or imprudent.

The reason why they have been permitted by the
society is that they are beneficial rather that
prejudicial. One could not easily hold someone
negligent because of some act that led to an injury
or accident. It would be unfair therefore to render
the cochero negligent because of such
circumstances.

The court further held that it is a universal practice
of merchants during that time to deliver products
through horse-drawn vehicles; and it is also
considered universal practice to leave the horses in
the manner in which they were left during the
accident. It has been practiced for a long time and
generally has not been the cause of accidents or
injuries the judgment is therefore reversed.