Maritime Piracy

Copyright 2009 by Kendall Hunt Publishing Company. Must be cited as: Shane, J.M. and Lieberman, C.A. (2009).
Criminological
theories and the problems of modern piracy. In M.R. Haberfeld and Agostino von Hassell (2009), Maritime Piracy and Maritime
Terrorism: The Challenge of Piracy for the 21
st
Century. Dubuque, IA: Kendall Hunt Publishing Company.
Criminological Theories and the Problems of Modern Piracy

By

J on M. Shane, Ph.D. and Charles A. Lieberman, Ph.D.

J une 5, 2009

J ohn J ay College of Criminal J ustice

Copyright 2009 by Kendall Hunt Publishing Company. Must be cited as: Shane, J.M. and Lieberman, C.A. (2009). Criminological
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Introduction
Piracy and other maritime attacks have occurred nearly as long as there have been vessels on
the waterways.
1
People living in this environment develop a disposition (motivation) to act in a criminal
manner as a means to fulfill basic human needs.
Among the many criminological theories, environmental and ecological theories are
most appropriate to explain the origins and opportunities for piracy. When societys norms and
institutions breakdown because of conflicting expectations, corruption, and political instability,
social control becomes ineffectual. Local institutionsschools, churches, governmentlose the
ability to exert control over people and geographical areas. When social controls wither and
conventional traditions disintegrate, society loses the ability to regulate itself, which gives way to a
culture that begins to identify with deviant behaviors that become normalized. This reversion to a
state of nature enables criminal groups to rise and propagate in an environment dominated by a
survivalist ideology. Criminal factions supplant conventional institutions and exert an influence over
the denizen that fosters tolerance for criminal behavior because the inhabitants have lost the
capacity to exercise control. Living in this environment produces social isolation, where there is
little or no contact with mainstream society. As a result, crime and violence are seen as a near
inevitable consequence of life.
2

1
May, 2008.
Piracy is predicated on rather crude operating
methods that bring offenders into contact with valuable targets that are easily converted into cash.
Because piracy typically takes place in vast ocean waters, the targets are largely unprotected. When
someone sufficiently motivated by social circumstances (e.g., inherited traits, hunger, poverty,
unemployment and lack of conventional lifestyle) comes into contact with durable goods that are
easily converted to cash and often insufficiently protected, piracy becomes a viable economic
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pursuit. Fortunately, there are ways to disrupt the intersection of motivated offenders, suitable
targets, and capable guardians that can reduce the likelihood of a piracy occurring.
Piracy Defined
In 1981, in response to increased maritime crime, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB),
a quasi-governmental organization of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) was created.
The IMB was designed to combat all types of maritime and trade crime, including documentary
credit fraud, charter party fraud, cargo theft, and piracy. According to the IMB, piracy is the act of
boarding any vessel with an intent to commit theft or any other crime, and with an intent or capacity
to use force in furtherance of that act.
3
Piracy is distinguished from simple hijacking in two respects: first, an act of piracy requires
that two vessels are involved in the incident; second, an act of piracy requires that the crime has
been undertaken for private, not political, purposes.

4
The Nature of Piracy
The IMB's definition covers actual or
attempted attacks, whether the ship is berthed, at anchor, or at sea. Petty thefts are excluded unless
the thieves are armed. This definition seems quite practical for today's needs and is broad enough to
cover the widening variety of types of attacks being seen today. Commercial crime is growing
quickly, as is evidenced the IMBs Weekly Piracy Report. The nature of piracy has changed
significantly since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Todays pirate is often more barbaric and
better prepared, due to the implementation of technological advancements, to fight than ever
before.

2
Maslow, 1943.
3
ICC IMB, 1998.
4
McDaniel, 2000.
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The days of the swashbuckler swinging on a chandelier, brandishing a trusty cutlass, are long
gone. Disguised by a patch over one eye, oversized hoop earrings, and a puffy shirt, the pirates
outfit of yesteryear has given way to the modern pirates accouterments: high-powered weapons,
vanguard communications, and the ominous black balaclava. It is sophistication and celerity (the
swiftness of small motorized vessels) that enable the modern terrorist-pirate to ply their trade,
making the shipping industry more and more vulnerable to attack. The 2008 IMB Annual Report
revealed 1,845 actual or attempted acts of piracy occurred worldwide between 2003 and 2008. In
addition, an IMB report for the first quarter of 2009 provides a comparison for first quarter attacks
from 2004 through 2009 (See Table 1).
5
Table 1: Actual and Attempted Attacks, 20032008

Year Total Attacks Year
JanMar
Attacks
2003 445 2004 79
2004 329 2005 56
2005 276 2006 61
2006 239 2007 41
2007 263 2008 49
2008 293 2009 102
20032008 1,845 20042009 388
ICC IMB 2008 Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report
ICC IMB 2009 Report for the Period 1 January 31 March, 2009
During the period 20032008, there appeared to be a downward trend in actual and
attempted attacks despite a slight increase in the number of attacks in 20072008 (Figure 1). This
trend is primarily due to the high number of attacks (N2003 = 445) in 2003, compared with the
declining numbers in the subsequent three years (N2004 = 329; N2005 = 276; N2006 = 239).

5
ICC IMB, January 2009; ICC IMB, April 2009.
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Figure 1

Based on the numbers for 2007 and 2008 (N2007 = 263; N2008 = 293), the downward trend
indicated by an analysis of the IMB 2008 Annual Report appeared to be reversing. In addition, the
IMB report for the first quarter for 2009 suggests an upward trend, as the number of attacks for the
first quarter of 2009 (N1stQ2009 = 102) is nearly double the average (N1stQavg2005-2008 = 51.75) of the
prior four years (Figure 2).
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Figure 2
An examination of recent attacks provides a picture of the types of ships most frequently
targeted by pirates. Tankers tend to be most often targeted (NTanker = 85), accounting for more than
one-third of all attacks in 2008, and the numbers for the first quarter of 2009 project a 46 percent
increase.
Table 2: Attacks by Vessel Type
Vessel 2008 JanMar 2009 Projected 2009
Container 49 16 64
Bulk Carrier 48 32 128
Chemical Tanker 39 12 48
General Cargo 38 10 40
Tanker 30 11 44
Tug 16 1 4
Product Tanker 16 4 16
Total 236 86 344
The depiction of maritime attacks by vessel type in Figure 3, comparing the numbers for
2008 with the projections for 2009 based on the first quarter of 2009, provides some insight into the
decision-making process among pirates. For most of the vessel types, the projection of attacks for
2009 remains fairly consistent; however, there is an upward trend for attacks on bulk carriers. This
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increased targeting of bulk carriers may be due to the size and speed of the vessel, as they tend to be
very large, therefore easily identifiable from a distance, and relatively slow, especially in comparison
to the speedboats employed by many pirates. Another factor that could have an impact on the
increased targeting of bulk carriers, which account for approximately one-third of all cargo vessels, is
their increased usage in maritime trade since their inception in the 1950s.

Figure 3
Attacks like the one in the Gulf of Aden in October 2002, when the French tanker Limburg
was rammed by a boat packed with explosives, are difficult to prevent. "No shipboard response can
protect the ship in these circumstances."
6

6
ICC-International Maritime Bureau, 2003a.

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Figure 4
An unsettling trend in maritime attacks is the significant increase in hostage taking. The
number of hostages taken in 2008 is triple the average number of hostages between 2003 and 2007
(Figure 4). One possible explanation for this upward trend is the realization that hostages provide
greater leverage during negations and the potential for higher ransoms. In April 2009, Somalia
pirates seized the Maersk Alabama and her crew and held them for ransom. Captain Richard Phillips
was held for several days before U.S. navy snipers shot and killed three of four pirates; the fourth
was brought to the United States for prosecution.
7
An examination of the IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships ReportAnnual
Report 2008, provides evidence that the overwhelming majority of attacks took place against ships
either anchored or steaming, with only 6.5 percent of the attacks taking place against berthed ships.
Attacks against anchored ships accounted for 35.5 percent, with 104 attacks. Attacks against
steaming ships accounted for 58 percent, with 169 attacks. However, only approximately half of
those attacks against steaming ships were successful, with 87 successful attacks and 82 unsuccessful

7
McFadden and Shane, 2009.
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attempts. The size of a commercial vessel can make it a soft target, as the crew simply cannot
maintain an adequate watch while underway. Vigilant anti-piracy measures still remain the best
deterrent to illegal boarding.
8
Nexus to Criminological Theory

The social conditions associated with piracy typically include poverty, hunger,
unemployment, poor housing, and political instability. Those who exploit the vulnerabilities created
by social disorganization are doing so in response to the strain and frustration that manifest from a
lack of lifes basic necessities such as food, shelter, and clothing. In these regions of the world, there
is a subculture willing to support individual criminal behavior, operating in an environment too
corrupt to stop it.
Political instability, which results from a weak or non-existent central government, produces
a social phenomenon known as anomie.
9
Anomie is a condition in which social and moral norms are
weak, conflicting, or simply absent. Emile Durkheim (1893) proposed that the lack of normsa
state of normlessnesscreates deviant behavior and ultimately social upheaval. For example,
Somalia, where piracy is prevalent, has been without an effective central government since President
Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991.
10
The country suffers from widespread fighting among warring
militias, famine, and disease that has eroded the social and moral norms that regulate behavior
plunging the country into lawlessness. Somalia and countries like it represent a regression to a state
of naturea hypothetical social state similar to anarchy that existed before the rule of law and the
states monopoly on the use of force.
11

8
ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2003b.

Similar conditions exist in Indonesia, where the sprawling nation of 13,000 islands was thrust
9
Durkheim, 1893.
10
BBC News, 2009.
11
Hobbes, 1651.
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into social and political upheaval when former President Suharto resigned amid a mounting
economic crisis in 1998. It is widely accepted that when pirates strike in the Straits of Malacca, they
will easily evade detection by taking refuge among the numerous island hide-outs away from a
government too corrupt to care. Piracy has gained a foothold in Indonesia due to the countrys
economic instability, which poses threats to other developing areas of Asia as well.
As conditions persist and government structures weaken, opportunities for criminal activity
arise. Opportunities exist because international commerce relies on ports and waterways that are
adjacent to economically and politically unstable countries. Since there is no domestic force (i.e.,
police or viable military) to stop the pirates in these countries, they can easily set upon unguarded
vessels passing through international waters, seize the crew and their cargo, return to land, and
liquidate the goods. Opportunities for piracy can be explained from three perspectives that
converge into a single explanation known as opportunity theory: first, the routine activities
approach;
12
second, the rational choice perspective;
13
and third, crime pattern theory.
14
Opportunity Theory

This approach to controlling crime consists of three opportunity-reducing principles: first,
directing crime control measures at highly specific forms of crime; second, managing, designing, or
manipulating the immediate environment in as systematic and permanent way as possible; and third,
increasing the perceived risk or effort to commit a crime, or reducing the rewards or removing the
excuses for committing a crime.
15
Routine Activities Approach. The routine activities approach suggests crime is more likely
to occur when three conditions are satisfied: 1) the presence of a motivated offender; 2) the

12
Cohen and Felson, 1979.
13
Cornish and Clarke, 1986.
14
Brantingham and Brantingham, 1984.
15
Clarke, 1997: 4; see also Felson and Clarke, 1998.
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presence of a suitable target; and 3) the absence of a
capable guardian (Figure 5).
16
Suitable targets are those that exhibit these four qualities: 1) value, 2) inertia, 3) visibility, and
4) access.
The presence of a
motivated offender is a given; the theory assumes an
offender is predisposed to acting on his or her
criminal inclinations, for without an overt act there
would not be a crime. Motivation for piracy is the
oppressive social and moral foreground pirates are
subjected to in their homeland, including poverty, unemployment,
political and social strife, and economic deprivation.
17
The last segment of routine activities is the absence of capable guardians. The motivation to
commit an act of piracy follows Travis Hirschis line of thought that crime occurs in the absence of
controls.
Pirates typically go after targets that are easily converted to cash; however, some targets
may be symbolic. Inertia refers to the targets weight and how easily it can be carried away or
disposed of. Visibility refers to the targets sightlines. A large seagoing vessel such as a tanker or
container ship can be easily spotted from the shore line or from a boat used by pirates to scout the
waters. Lastly, pirates must have access to the target. Pirates can pull up alongside a vessel and
board it by using a grappling hook or similar climbing device.
18

16
Felson, 1998.
When temptations are high and controls are low, a motivated pirate can strike more
easily. A guardian is not necessarily a formal agent (e.g., police officer, soldier, teacher) but anyone
who can serve as a reminder that someone is watching. The lynchpin is capable. Since most high
17
Felson, 1998: 54-55.
18
Hirschi, 1969.
Suitable Target
Motivated
Offender
Absence of
Capable
guardians
Crime
Figure 5
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seas piracy is an armed takeover, pirates can easily force an unarmed crew into submission and
render them incapable of defending the ship. In this sense, even though a crew of able-bodied
adults is aboard, they are no match for the overwhelmingly force applied by armed pirates.
Crime Pattern Theory. Crime pattern theory suggests people are intertwined with their
environment and crime is a product of how they move about and converge in time and space.
19
Rational Choice Perspective. The rational choice perspective focuses on offender
decision making. The premise is that offenders weigh the costs (i.e., pain and punishment) and
benefits (i.e., pleasure and gain) before committing a crime. Except, their decisions are never perfect
and they rely on information that constrains their decisions, which results in flawed outcomes (i.e.,
arrest, injury, death, monetary loss).

This theory is useful for understanding how opportunities are concentrated at particular times in
particle places. Pirates that embark from developing countries may seem to lack the technical
wherewithal to hijack a ship. Admittedly, their operations are crude; however, through corruption
or basic reconnaissance they gain access to information about what type of cargo may be aboard,
what routes the ships sail, the ships port of call, when the ships will sail, and how often ships pass
through certain regions (i.e., time of day, day of week, season). Armed with this knowledge, it is
easy to recognize patterns of shipping and to intercept the ships along their primary travel route.
20
Because the conditions in the pirates homeland are so
oppressive, the pleasure associated with seizing a ships cargo and converting it to cash outweighs
the pain associated with capture. The profile of the typical pirate operating in the Straits of Malacca
is one of an opportunist, who is perhaps working from a local village, or a local community. He
may have had military training and he is doing it basically for his own gain and advantage.
21

19
Brantingham and Brantingham, 1984, 1991.
Other
20
Cornish and Clarke, 1986.
21
Bateman, 2001.
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reported cases involve juveniles who have been kidnapped and forced into piracy.
22
Together, routine activities, crime pattern theory, and rational choice, form opportunity
theory, which suggests specific situations, environments, and products can be intentionally
manipulated to reduce crime. That is, interventions can be specifically constructed to design-out
crime.
Liquidating
stolen goods may involve cooperation from local officials who use the proceeds to further corrupt
already destabilized governments.
23
There is a large body of historical and contemporary research
24
supporting this theory
through a wide range of criminal behaviors including delinquency
25
, deceit
26
, burglary
27
, and auto
theft.
28
Despite the problems plaguing certain developing regions and the propensity of pirate youth
to use violence to achieve their goals, a ships master may unwittingly precipitate their own demise
through the routine activities of shipping. Vessel security is dependent upon the activities of the
crew and the masters itinerary. The route traveled, the season, the port of call, the regulations that
govern shipping, the time of departure and arrival, and the nature of the cargo, among the many, all
contribute to the routine of shipping. In the interest of time, inasmuch as time is money, ship
masters rely on the familiar; that which has saved time and effort in the past is likely to do so in the
future, thus keeping deliveries on schedule. Deliveries that are on-time are dependable and cheaper,
The consistent premise of this line of inquiry is that increasing risk or effort and reducing
the benefits of crimedimensions that can be intentionally controlled by industry, government, and
individual citizenshas much to do with someones decision to commit or forego criminal activity.

22
Zambito, Boyle and Connor, 2009.
23
Felson and Clarke, 1998; Jeffrey, 1971; Newman, 1972, 1996.
24
Visit the Center for Problem Oriented Policing (www.popcenter.org) for more than 1,000 examples of
problem-oriented projects by police departments, as well as a collection of problem-specific guides and other
resources on situational crime prevention.
25
Burt, 1925.
26
Farrington and Knight, 1980; Hartshorne and May, 1928.
27
Brantingham and Brantingham, 1975; Reppetto, 1974; Scar, 1973.
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dependability and low cost ensure higher profit, irrespective of crew safety. The quickest shortest
route known to the master may also be known to the motivated pirate.
Once patterns are established, they become predictable. Predictable patterns breed
complacency and complacency breeds vulnerability. The opportunities for pirates to strike
generated by routine shipping activities eventually create hot-spotsareas that produce a
disproportionate amount of crime. Some of the hot-spots for piracy today are Southeast Asia, the
Horn of Africa, and Indonesia. With an understanding of how opportunity theory works, it is useful
to describe the structure of opportunity.
Reducing Opportunity
Clarkes (1997) description of opportunity structure includes victims, targets, and facilitators
(Figure 6). The target is the commodities aboard the ship (e.g., palm oil, lumber, textiles, and
household goods). The victim is the ships crew or the ship itself, and the facilitators are the means by
which piracy is carried out (i.e., speed boats, heavy weapons, communications). The source of
targets and their nature is a product of (i) the physical environment including the (e.g., design and size of
the ship), and (ii) the routine activities of the shipping industry including patterns of trade among
nations, season, weather, supply and demand of commodities, number of crew, speed of travel, and
ocean currents, which can affect guardianship. The physical environment, routine activities and the
broader socio-demographic structure (i.e., poverty, unemployment, disaffection) sets up a complex
interaction that may induce sufficiently motivated offenders into acting while concurrently reducing
guardianship, which makes piracy more likely.
29

28
Wilkins, 1964.

29
Clarke, 1997: 12-13.
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Victims
The ship;
The crew
Physical
Environment
Topography, Size and
Design of the Ship
Routine Activity
trade among nations,
supply and demand of
commodities, number
of crew, speed of
travel, and ocean
currents
Socio-Economic Structure
Demography; Geography
Poverty/Government/Law Enforcement/Topography
Targets
Cash;
Commodities
Facilitators
Guns;
Speed boats;
Communications
Lack of
guardianship
Crime Opportunity Structure
Potential Offenders
Numbers;
Motivation
Subcultural Influences;
Social Control;
Government,
Law Enforcement;
Societal Structure
(i.e., traditional
criminological theory)
Lack of enforcement/
regulation
Unfettered movement
("Unchecked" offender)
Search/Perception
Information/Modeling
Adapted from R.V Clarke (1995). Situational crime prevention

Identifying the routine activities associated with shipping and analyzing the situational
factors surrounding each act of piracy contribute to the body of knowledge known as environmental
criminology. From this analysis, the practical application of situational crime prevention can be
undertaken (i.e., vessel security practices). Clarke (1997) identifies several opportunity-reducing
techniques, some of which have already been incorporated into the shipping industrys practices;
twelve techniques appear here.
Figure 6
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Table 3:
Opportunity-Reducing Measures for Vessel Security
Increasing
Perceived
Effort
Action
Taken
Increasing
Perceived
Risks
Action
Taken
Reducing
Anticipated
Rewards
Action
Taken
Removing
Excuses
Action
Taken
Target
Hardening
Using
containers
instead of bails
or loose cargo
Fortified/
reinforced
bridge and
engine room
Storing money
in hidden safe
Entry/Exit
Screening
Embarking/
disembarking
procedures
Proper I.D.
Proper ticketing
of passengers
Captains
interview of
crew members
Certificate
validation
Identifying
Property
Unique owner-
applied numbers
to the containers
or to cargo
(DataDots
)
Requiring
containers to be
registered
Rule
Setting
International
legislation against
piracy and
terrorism
Written vessel
security plans and
procedures
Maritime
regulations
Regulating the sale
of certain
merchandise
Access
Control
SecureShip

electrified fence
Ship-board
security
measures to
control
sensitive areas
(the bridge, the
engine room,
the gangway)
Surveillance
by Employees
Vigilant anti-
piracy watch by
crews while
underway
CCTV while
berthed or
anchored
Perimeter
patrols
Hand-held
radios
Reducing
Temptation
Destroying pirate
hideouts
Creating secure
anchoring areas
Carrying little or
no cash
Establishing no
slowing
zones/minimum
speed limit
Stimulating
Conscience
Posting anti-piracy
warnings
Publishing results
from piracy
arrests/
prosecutions
Public service
announcements
against piracy
Deflecting
Offenders
Sailing farther
from coastline
of source
countries
(Somalia)
Buffer zones
for ships
(Yemen 3,000
meters)
Escorts to open
waters
Formal
Surveillance
ShipLoc

Satellite
Monitoring
IMB Piracy
Reporting
Centre
IMB Rapid
Response
Investigative
Service
Denying
Benefits
Ink merchandise
tags
No cash sales
or transfers of
merchandise
Merchant
agreements not
to vend except
with established
clients
Facilitating
Compliance
Clearly marked
shipping lanes
preventing wrong
turns
U.S.C.G./U.S.
military to train
foreign
governments in
anti-piracy
Creating incentives
Adopting a foreign
policy

The international and dynamic nature of the maritime shipping business and services
provided makes the shipping industry more vulnerable to security lapses than most other
industries. The number of variables involved in protecting a ship are, by far, greater than protecting
a stationary building. With a comprehensive security program a company can limit access to both
the ship and the terminal or port facility the vessel is calling on. Shipping companies can review the
content of the policies, plans, and procedures in their management systems to verify they adequately
address elements, such as training, communications, key procedures, and emergency preparedness,
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that apply to security issues. Clarkson (2003)
30
1. Gangway SecurityA vessels gangway is the easiest point of access to a
vessel when she is moored at berth. Too often, the crew member assigned to
monitor gangway access is not given clear instructions for boarding
procedures and when to call for the assistance of an officer. Furthermore,
decreased staffing levels on ships often result in the gangway watchman
taking on additional responsibilities that require leaving the gangway
unattended for periods of time.
identifies some improvements of a comprehensive
management system for shipboard security, which includes access control, entry/exit screening,
surveillance by employees, and rule setting, all aspects of situational crime prevention:

Vessel operators need to emphasize the security aspects of the gangway
watchman in procedures and training. Items to be addressed should include
Embarking/Disembarking procedures (for crew, guests, and contractors),
communication procedures (internal and ship-to-shore), Stores and Package
Receiving procedures, and Security Equipment (lighting, CCTV's, hand-held
radios, etc.)

In many ports, the terminal or a third party provides a security officer. In
such cases, the vessel should have procedures to familiarize the security
officer with his responsibilities to the vessel. In all cases, the master of the
vessel must ensure that this security is adequate and that security personnel
know and understand shipboard requirements and procedures.

2. Modified Pre-Departure ChecklistsMost shipping companies have a
pre-arrival/pre-departure checklist for entering and leaving port. Sometimes
these checklists are forms that must be completed and filed for verification
purposes.

Others act as guidelines and the recording mechanism for completion is a log
entry stating that the items on the checklist were inspected and/or tested and
in good working order. Companies should review these checklists to verify
they provide adequate attention to security related issues. Items like
stowaway search and securing restricted access spaces are examples.

3. Modified Vessel Familiarization ToursA standard requirement for ISM
Code compliant safety management systems is a familiarization tour for crew
members new to the vessel. Security requirements such as the conduct of a
proper gangway watch, security rounds, recognition of an intruder alarm, and
station bill duties for an emergency involving an intruder or hostage situation
need to be included in the orientation process.

30
Clarkson (2003).
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4. Certificate ValidationOne of the most difficult processes to carry out
aboard a vessel is validation of a crew member's certification. Forged and
illegally obtained documents are widespread and must be dealt with through
a cooperative effort from several sources. Validation procedures should
include input from the vessel, vessel management, manning agencies or
unions, and, in some circumstances, flag-state administrations.

5. Captains Interview of Crew MembersShips masters should conduct
one-on-one interviews with each new member of the crew as they sign on. A
thorough interview will give the master insight to the capabilities and attitude
of the crew member and provide the opportunity to immediately establish
policy and expectations aboard the vessel.

6. Security Tours and Contingency PlansCrew members rounds, both at
sea and in port, should always include elements of security. Tours and
inspections throughout the vessel can include checks for intrusion and
piracy, lock and key control, and adherence to limited access spaces. Also,
vessel management systems should be examined for content of their
Emergency Response Plans. Most vessels have plans for emergency items
such as pollution events (hazmat, oil spills), medical emergencies, fire,
abandon ship, man overboard, and many others. However, few vessels have
contingency plans for bomb threats, dealing with intruders, or hostage
situations.

One of the first tasks that must be undertaken when designing security responses is to
analyze the universe of incidents. Naturally, before any analysis can occur there must be accurate
reporting and indexing of the offenses, preferably in some sort of a central repository. Outrage in
the shipping industry at the alarming growth in piracy on the worlds oceans prompted the creation
of the IMBs Piracy Reporting Centre in October 1992 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The Piracy
Reporting Centre responds immediately to acts of piracy to collect and analyze data as well as
evidence for law enforcement agencies and is a form of formal surveillance. Rapid reporting by
shipping companies has been credited with many foiled piracy attempts and multiple victim vessels
being recovered. The IMB has been moving forward to create a variety of public and private
programs designed to combat piracy.
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One program about to be launched by the IMB is the Rapid Response Investigative
Service. Teams of trained anti-pirate investigators will mobilize within hours of an incident to
complete criminal investigations that often require many days on the part of poorly trained port
officials. The program is not only designed to bring more criminals to justice, but also will hopefully
address the problem of under-reporting.
Conclusion
Controlling piracy has as much to do with improving social conditions in politically unstable
regions of the world as it does with manipulating the immediate environment. A multi-faceted
effort will include international government participation in destabilized regions of the world
31
and
maritime industry security improvements of the type defined by situational crime prevention. In the
international community, the United States will have to convince the governments in regions most
affected by piracy that it is in their long-term economic interest to adopt more proactive measures
against piracy, dismantle corrupt maritime forces, and secure their ports and waterways from the
threat of piracy or risk economic sanctions.
32
This will require some measure of nation building
33

31
Rand, 2003.

from the industrialized democracies of the world, which will remove the excuses for piracy.
Removing military regimes and corrupt governments such as the one that exists in Somalia is a long-
term endeavor, but as part of a multi-prong anti-piracy effort it is worth the investment. The more
immediate and less distant response to high-seas terrorism rests with the shipping industry. On a
daily basis shippers are confronted with the realities of piracy. Only through consistent, vigilant,
proactive security measures, such as those outlined previously, will the shipping industry reduce the
rewards and incentives for pirates to strike.
32
Dillon, 2000.
33
Fritz and Menocal, 2007; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2008.
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The international trend is clearly towards defense collaboration driven by political, economic,
and military factors. States ignore this trend at their own peril. It remains to be seen whether Asian
States will replicate the trend of international defense collaboration; however it is doubtless in their
best interest. Yemen, for example, announced new restrictions for vessels traveling to that country.
The restrictions are for vessels approaching commercial ships without authorization and
[they] will open fire on any ship violating the restriction. Other craft must maintain a
distance of 3,000 meters from any tankers and 250 meters from any general cargo ship.
Fishing boats are to be licensed for the first time and the government has banned the
unauthorized transport of boats by land. This latter restriction follows Yemeni declarations
that the boat that rammed the Limburg was transported over land on a trailer with foreign
license plates.
54
John Mo of Sea Grant Law and Policy Digest concurs that the most effective means to
controlling piracy is international cooperation. Mo argues that . . .government cooperation
involving most of the governments of the Southeast Asian region is the best way to combat
maritime piracy, although it is not an easy task due to various political, economical, and historical
reasons. A unilateral and expedient arrangement by one or a few governments to combat maritime
piracy may be convenient but may also encounter resistance or raise suspicion from other
governments.

In order for the maritime community to realize substantial security gains, anti-piracy must
have at its foundation state-sponsored support. Piracy must be thought of as terrorism for two
reasons: first, although there is not a consensus among researchers, there is a nexus to established

st

20

terrorist organizations; second, the proceeds from piracy may be used to finance terrorist operations.
In the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States is developing a foreign policy on
terrorism. The logical corollary is for that policy to extend to piracy.
Terrorists [and pirates] are ruthless but not numerous. They control no territory
permanently. If their activities are harassed [and disrupted] by the security forces and
administrative organs of all their potential victimsif no country will harbor themthey
will become outlaws, increasingly obliged to devote their efforts to their own survival. . . .
The key to antiterrorism strategy, therefore, is to eliminate safe havens. . . . The
overwhelming majority of safe havens occur where a government closes its eyes because it
sympathizes with at least some of the objectives of the terroristsas in Afghanistan, Yemen,
and Somalia. [The United States must create] incentives for the sharing of intelligence.
Security cooperation [must be] improved, designed to interrupt the flow of funds, harass
terrorists communications, and subject the countries that provide safe havens to pressures,
including, in the extreme case, military pressure.
34
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is best poised to assume the leadership role
necessary for disparate (and suspicious) governments to work cooperatively on this important
international issue. The IMO has already made recommendations for a concerted international
effort:

1. Inviting governments to cooperate in the interests of safety of life at sea and
environmental protection by increasing their efforts to suppress and prevent
acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships.
2. Inviting governments to develop, as appropriate, agreements and procedures to
facilitate cooperation in applying efficient and effective measures to prevent

34
Kissinger, 2001.
st

21

3. Encouraging governments to apply the provisions of international instruments
aimed at improving safety of life at sea and the prevention and suppression of
35

Piracy will stop when individuals believe there is a greater risk of being captured or killed (pain)
than getting rich (pleasure), as the result of committing an act of piracy. The worlds democracies
should seize the opportunity presented by the IMO and combine anti-piracy efforts with
counterterrorism initiatives. A unified force will be a significant achievement; it will signal the
opening engagement of a continuing worldwide campaign of improving life at sea.

35
Parritt, 2002.
st

22

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