AND NOW, this 3rd day of J uly, 2014, upon consideration of Defendants motion to dismiss and Plaintiffs response, and after oral argument on the motion it is ORDERED the motion (Document 6) is DENIED without prejudice to revisit the issues raised therein at the summary judgment stage. 1
1 Plaintiff J ill E. Mancini brings this 42 U.S.C. 1983 action for violations of her constitutional rights in connection with her termination from her position as an Assistant County Solicitor for Northampton County. She asserts a First Amendment claim, as well as procedural due process and equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants moved to dismiss all claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the individual Defendants have not raised a qualified immunity defense at this time. On a motion to dismiss, this Court must accept as true all of the facts alleged and draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs favor. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In order to withstand dismissal, Plaintiffs claims must be facially plausible, meaning the allegations must contain sufficient factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. Plaintiffs cause of action is based on political patronage discrimination. As a general rule, political patronage dismissals violate the First Amendment. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976). An exception to this rule exists, however, when the employer can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980). This is an inherently factual determination, and to invoke the exception, Defendants carry the burden of proving that political affiliation is central to the job itself. Galli v. N.J. Meadowlands Commn, 490 F.3d 265, 271 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Wetzel v. Tucker, 139 F.3d 380, 383-84 (3d Cir. 1998) (observing [t]he character of this inquiry is inherently fact-specific in that it requires a court to examine the nature of the responsibilities of the particular job at issue). Defendants seek to invoke this exception as a basis to dismiss the Complaint. There is, however, only one allegation in the Complaint regarding Plaintiffs job responsibilities as Assistant County Solicitor. This single allegation, which simply lists a representative sample of
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BY THE COURT:
/s/ J uan R. Snchez J uan R. Snchez, J .
tasks undertaken by Plaintiff during her employment, is an insufficient record for the Court to determine whether Plaintiffs position requires party affiliation or whether party affiliation is central to the job itself. Defendants also argue Plaintiffs termination was not in fact based on political affiliation; instead, the position was eliminated based on budgetary considerations. Defendants explanation regarding the reasons for Plaintiffs termination provides no grounds to dismiss the Complaint, however, because Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to plausibly infer her termination was politically motivated. Crediting Defendants alternative basis for termination would require this Court to rely on facts outside the pleadings and make inferences in Defendants favor, both of which are impermissible at the motion to dismiss stage. Because Plaintiffs equal protection claim will likely rise or fall with her First Amendment claim, the Court also declines to dismiss the equal protection claim. With regard to the due process claim, the parties dispute the nature of Plaintiffs position and whether it carries an employment classification under the Countys Home Rule Charter and administrative code that would insulate Plaintiff from termination absent just cause. Whether Plaintiff has a protected property interest in her position may depend on resolving this factual issue. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976) (noting whether a person has a property interest protected by due process is determined by reference to state law); Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 234 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding an at-will employee under Pennsylvania law lacks a property interest in her position sufficient to trigger due process concerns) (citation omitted). All of the determinations that must be made (including whether Plaintiff did in fact receive the process she may have been due) will benefit from a developed factual record not limited by the scope of the pleadings. At this time, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to withstand dismissal.
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