You are on page 1of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA




J ILL E. MANCINI

v.

NORTHAMPTON COUNTY, et al.
:
:
:
:
:

CIVIL ACTION

No. 14-963

ORDER

AND NOW, this 3rd day of J uly, 2014, upon consideration of Defendants motion to
dismiss and Plaintiffs response, and after oral argument on the motion it is ORDERED the
motion (Document 6) is DENIED without prejudice to revisit the issues raised therein at the
summary judgment stage.
1

1
Plaintiff J ill E. Mancini brings this 42 U.S.C. 1983 action for violations of her constitutional
rights in connection with her termination from her position as an Assistant County Solicitor for
Northampton County. She asserts a First Amendment claim, as well as procedural due process
and equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants moved to dismiss all
claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the individual Defendants have not
raised a qualified immunity defense at this time. On a motion to dismiss, this Court must accept
as true all of the facts alleged and draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs favor. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In order to withstand dismissal, Plaintiffs claims must be
facially plausible, meaning the allegations must contain sufficient factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Id.
Plaintiffs cause of action is based on political patronage discrimination. As a general
rule, political patronage dismissals violate the First Amendment. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 360 (1976). An exception to this rule exists, however, when the employer can demonstrate
that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public
office involved. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980). This is an inherently factual
determination, and to invoke the exception, Defendants carry the burden of proving that
political affiliation is central to the job itself. Galli v. N.J. Meadowlands Commn, 490 F.3d
265, 271 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Wetzel v. Tucker, 139 F.3d 380, 383-84 (3d Cir. 1998)
(observing [t]he character of this inquiry is inherently fact-specific in that it requires a court to
examine the nature of the responsibilities of the particular job at issue).
Defendants seek to invoke this exception as a basis to dismiss the Complaint. There is,
however, only one allegation in the Complaint regarding Plaintiffs job responsibilities as
Assistant County Solicitor. This single allegation, which simply lists a representative sample of

Case 5:14-cv-00963-JS Document 14 Filed 07/03/14 Page 1 of 2

BY THE COURT:

/s/ J uan R. Snchez
J uan R. Snchez, J .








tasks undertaken by Plaintiff during her employment, is an insufficient record for the Court to
determine whether Plaintiffs position requires party affiliation or whether party affiliation is
central to the job itself. Defendants also argue Plaintiffs termination was not in fact based on
political affiliation; instead, the position was eliminated based on budgetary considerations.
Defendants explanation regarding the reasons for Plaintiffs termination provides no grounds to
dismiss the Complaint, however, because Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to plausibly infer
her termination was politically motivated. Crediting Defendants alternative basis for termination
would require this Court to rely on facts outside the pleadings and make inferences in
Defendants favor, both of which are impermissible at the motion to dismiss stage. Because
Plaintiffs equal protection claim will likely rise or fall with her First Amendment claim, the
Court also declines to dismiss the equal protection claim.
With regard to the due process claim, the parties dispute the nature of Plaintiffs position
and whether it carries an employment classification under the Countys Home Rule Charter and
administrative code that would insulate Plaintiff from termination absent just cause. Whether
Plaintiff has a protected property interest in her position may depend on resolving this factual
issue. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976) (noting whether a person has a property
interest protected by due process is determined by reference to state law); Hill v. Borough of
Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 234 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding an at-will employee under Pennsylvania
law lacks a property interest in her position sufficient to trigger due process concerns) (citation
omitted). All of the determinations that must be made (including whether Plaintiff did in fact
receive the process she may have been due) will benefit from a developed factual record not
limited by the scope of the pleadings. At this time, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to
withstand dismissal.

Case 5:14-cv-00963-JS Document 14 Filed 07/03/14 Page 2 of 2

You might also like