DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, petitioners, vs. HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, ! "#e!$%$n& Ju%&e, '#n() I, *ou#+ o, -$#!+ In!+n(e o, ./01e!, O1on&2o *$+3, ANTHON4 M. ROSSI n% RAL"H L. 54ERS, respondents. *RU., J.: The basic issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they have been sued for damages by the private respondents. Once this question is decided, the other answers will fall into place and this petition need not detain us any longer than it already has. Petitioner Sanders was, at the time the incident in question occurred, the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station N!"ST!# in Olongapo $ity. 1 Petitioner %oreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval &ase, which includes the said station. 6 Private respondent 'ossi is an !merican citi(en with permanent residence in the Philippines, 3 as so was private respondent )yer, who died two years ago. 4 They were both employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of the N!"ST!, the former having been hired in *+,* and the latter in *+-+. 7 On October ., *+,/, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full0time to permanent part0time, effective October *1, *+,/. 6 Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to institute grievance proceedings conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of the U.S. 2epartment of 2efense. The result was a recommendation from the hearing officer who conducted the proceedings for the reinstatement of the private respondents to permanent full0time status plus bac3wages. The report on the hearing contained the observation that 4Special Services management practices an autocratic form of supervision.4 8 5n a letter addressed to petitioner %oreau on %ay *,, *+,- !nne6 4!4 of the complaint#, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer7s report and as3ed for the re8ection of the abovestated recommendation. The letter contained the statements that9 a # 4%r. 'ossi tends to alienate most co0wor3ers and supervisors:4 b# 4%essrs. 'ossi and )yers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise:4 and c# 4even though the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, they# placed the records in public places where others not involved in the case could hear.4 On November ,, *+,/, before the start of the grievance hearings, a0letter !nne6 4&4 of the complaint# purportedly corning from petitioner %oreau as the commanding general of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic &ay was sent to the $hief of Naval Personnel e6plaining the change of the private respondent7s employment status and requesting concurrence therewith. The letter did not carry his signature but was signed by ).&. %oore, ;r. 4by direction,4 presumably of %oreau. On the basis of these antecedent facts, the private respondent filed in the $ourt of <irst 5nstance of Olongapo $ity a for damages against the herein petitioners on November 1, *+,-. 8 The plaintiffs claimed that the letters contained libelous imputations that had e6posed them to ridicule and caused them mental anguish and that the pre8udgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights. The private respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their private or personal capacity. =owever, in a motion to dismiss filed under a special appearance, the petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no 8urisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity. !fter e6tensive written arguments between the parties, the motion was denied in an order dated %arch 1, *+,,, 9 on the main ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature and not personal torts, moreover, the allegation in the complaint was that the defendants had acted maliciously and in bad faith. The same order issued a writ of preliminary attachment, conditioned upon the filing of a P*>,>>>.>> bond by the plaintiffs, against the properties of petitioner %oreau, who allegedly was then about to leave the Philippines. Subsequently, to ma3e matters worse for the defendants, petitioner %oreau was declared in a default by the trial court in its order dated !ugust +, *+,,. The motion to lift the default order on the ground that %oreau7s failure to appear at the pre0trial conference was the result of some misunderstanding, and the motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to dismiss, which was filed by the petitioner7s new lawyers, were denied by the respondent court on September ,, *+,,. This petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary in8unction was thereafter filed before this $ourt, on the contention that the above0narrated acts of the respondent court are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac3 of 8urisdiction. )e return now to the basic question of whether the petitioners were acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did the acts for which the private respondents have sued them for damages. 5t is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. &y the same to3en, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in e6cess of his authority. These well0settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case. The respondent 8udge, apparently finding that the complained acts were prima facie personal and tortious, decided to proceed to trial to determine inter alia their precise character on the strength of the evidence to be submitted by the parties. The petitioners have ob8ected, arguing that no such evidence was needed to substantiate their claim of 8urisdictional immunity. Pending resolution of this question, we issued a temporary restraining order on September ?-, *+,,, that has since then suspended the proceedings in this case in the courta quo. 5n past cases, this $ourt has held that where the character of the act complained of can be determined from the pleadings e6changed between the parties before the trial, it is not necessary for the court to require them to belabor the point at a trial still to be conducted. Such a proceeding would be superfluous, not to say unfair to the defendant who is sub8ected to unnecessary and avoidable inconvenience. Thus, in Baer v. Tizon, 10 we held that a motion to dismiss a complaint against the commanding general of the Olongapo Naval &ase should not have been denied because it had been sufficiently shown that the act for which he was being sued was done in his official capacity on behalf of the !merican government. The United States had not given its consent to be sued. 5t was the reverse situation in Syquia v. Almeda Lopez,4 where we sustained the order of the lower court granting a where we motion to dismiss a complaint against certain officers of the U.S. armed forces also shown to be acting officially in the name of the !merican government. The United States had also not waived its immunity from suit. Only three years ago, in United States of America v. Ruiz, 16 we set aside the denial by the lower court of a motion to dismiss a complaint for damages filed against the United States and several of its officials, it appearing that the act complained of was governmental rather than proprietary, and certainly not personal. 5n these and several other cases 13 the $ourt found it redundant to prolong the other case proceedings after it had become clear that the suit could not prosper because the acts complained of were covered by the doctrine of state immunity. 5t is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of N!"ST!, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents, and had a hand in their employment, wor3 assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. 5t is not disputed that the letter he had written was in fact a reply to a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for more information regarding the case of the private respondents. 14 %oreover, even in the absence of such request, he still was within his rights in reacting to the hearing officer7s criticism @in effect a direct attac3 against him@0that Special Services was practicing 4an autocratic form of supervision.4 !s for %oreau,what he is claimed to have done was write the $hief of Naval Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the private respondents7 type of employment even before the grievance proceedings had even commenced. 2isregarding for the nonce the question of its timeliness, this act is clearly official in nature, performed by %oreau as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special services department of N!"ST! 5n fact, the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary problems of the department and contained recommendations for their solution, including the re0 designation of the private respondents. There was nothing personal or private about it. Aiven the official character of the above0described letters, we have to conclude that the petitioners were, legally spea3ing, being sued as officers of the United States government. !s they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts. !ssuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the 8udgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus ma3ing the action a suit against that government without its consent. There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to7 be sued. So we have ruled not only in &aer but in many other decisions where we upheld the doctrine of state immunity as applicable not only to our own government but also to foreign states sought to be sub8ected to the 8urisdiction of our courts. 17 The practical 8ustification for the doctrine, as =olmes put it, is that 4there can be no legal right against the authority which ma3es the law on which the right depends. 16 5n the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude would 4unduly ve6 the peace of nations.4 18 Our adherence to this precept is formally e6pressed in !rticle 55, Section ?, of our $onstitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines 4adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. !ll this is not to say that in no case may a public officer be sued as such without the previous consent of the state. To be sure, there are a number of well0recogni(ed e6ceptions. 5t is clear that a public officer may be sued as such to compel him to do an act required by law, as where, say, a register of deeds refuses to record a deed of sale: 18 or to restrain a $abinet member, for e6ample, from enforcing a law claimed to be unconstitutional: 19 or to compel the national treasurer to pay damages from an already appropriated assurance fund: 60 or the commissioner of internal revenue to refund ta6 over0payments from a fund already available for the purpose: 61 or, in general, to secure a 8udgment that the officer impleaded may satisfy by himself without the government itself having to do a positive act to assist him. )e have also held that where the government itself has violated its own laws, the aggrieved party may directly implead the government even without first filing his claim with the $ommission on !udit as normally required, as the doctrine of state immunity 4cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an in8ustice.4 66 This case must also be distinguished from such decisions as este!o v. ernando, 63 where the $ourt held that a bureau director could be sued for damages on a personal tort committed by him when he acted without or in e6cess of authority in forcibly ta3ing private property without paying 8ust compensation therefor although he did convert it into a public irrigation canal. 5t was not necessary to secure the previous consent of the state, nor could it be validly impleaded as a party defendant, as it was not responsible for the defendant7s unauthori(ed act. The case at bar, to repeat, comes under the rule and not under any of the recogni(ed e6ceptions. The government of the United States has not given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any 8udgment that may be rendered against them. !s it is the !merican government itself that will have to perform the affirmative act of appropriating the amount that may be ad8udged for the private respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for lac3 of 8urisdiction. The $ourt finds that, even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith, which has not been overturned by the private respondents. Bven mista3es concededly committed by such public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. 64 This, to, is well settled . 67 <urthermore, applying now our own penal laws, the letters come under the concept of privileged communications and are not punishable, 66 let alone the fact that the resented remar3s are not defamatory by our standards. 5t seems the private respondents have overstated their case. ! final consideration is that since the questioned acts were done in the Olongapo Naval &ase by the petitioners in the performance of their official duties and the private respondents are themselves !merican citi(ens, it would seem only proper for the courts of this country to refrain from ta3ing cogni(ance of this matter and to treat it as coming under the internal administration of the said base. The petitioners7 counsel have submitted a memorandum replete with citations of !merican cases, as if they were arguing before a court of the United States. The $ourt is bemused by such attitude. )hile these decisions do have persuasive effect upon us, they can at best be invo3ed only to support our own 8urisprudence, which we have developed and enriched on the basis of our own persuasions as a people, particularly since we became independent in *+C-. )e appreciate the assistance foreign decisions offer us, and not only from the United States but also from Spain and other countries from which we have derived some if not most of our own laws. &ut we should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own endowments )e live in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept of law and 8ustice. The private respondents must, if they are still sominded, pursue their claim against the petitioners in accordance with the laws of the United States, of which they are all citi(ens and under whose 8urisdiction the alleged offenses were committed. Bven assuming that our own laws are applicable, the United States government has not decided to give its consent to be sued in our courts, which therefore has not acquired the competence to act on the said claim,. )=B'B<O'B, the petition is A'!NTB2. The challenged orders dated %arch 1,*+,,, !ugust +,*+,,, and September ,, *+,,, are SBT !S52B. The respondent court is directed to 25S%5SS $ivil $ase No. ?>,,0O. Our Temporary restraining order of September ?-,*+,,, is made PB'%!NBNT. No costs. SO O'2B'B2. G.R. No. 84608 M#() 19, 1993 RE"U'LI* O- THE "HILI""INES, GEN. RAMON MONTANO, GEN. AL-REDO LIM, GEN. ALE9ANDER AGUIRRE, *OL. EDGAR DULA TORRES, *OL. *E.AR NA.ARENO, MAJ. -ILEMON GASMEN, "AT. NI*ANOR A'ANDO, "-* SERA-IN *E'U, JR., GEN. 'RIGIDO "AREDES, *OL. ROGELIO MON-ORTE, "-* ANTONIO LU*ERO, "AT. JOSE MENDIOLA, "AT. NELSON TUASON, "OLI*E *OR"ORAL "AN-ILO ROGOS, "OLI*E LT. JUAN '. 'ELTRAN, "AT. NOEL MANAG'AO, MARINE THIRD *LASS TRAINEE :3*T; NOLITO NOGATO, 3*T ALEJANDRO '. NAGUIO, JR., E-REN AR*ILLAS, 3*T AGERI*O LUNA, 3*T 'ASILIO 'ORJA, 3*T MANOLITO LUS"O, 3*T *RISTITUTO GERVA*IO, 3*T MANUEL DELA *RU., JR., MARINE :*D*; 'N., :*IVIL DISTUR'AN*E *ONTROL;, MO'ILE DIS"ERSAL TEAM :MDT;, LT. ROMEO "A<UINTO, LT. LAONGLAANG GO*E, MAJ. DEMETRIO DE LA *RU., "OLI*E *A"TAIN RODOL-O NAVAL, JOHN DOE, RI*HARD DOE, RO'ERTO DOE AND OTHER DOES, petitioners, vs. HON. EDIL'ERTO G. SANDOVAL, Re&$on1 T#$1 *ou#+ o, Mn$1, '#n() I9, ERLINDA *. *A4LAO, ANATALIA ANGELES "ERE., M4RNA 'AUTISTA, *I"RIANA EVANGELIO, ELMA GRAM"A, AMELIA GUTIERRE., NEMESIO LA=INDANUM, "URITA 4UMUL, MIGUEL ARA'E, TERESITA ARJONA, RONALDO *AM"OMANES AND *ARMEN*ITA ARDONI VDA. DE *AM"OMANES, ROGELIO DOMUNI*O, $n +)e$# (2($+3 ! )e$#! o, +)e %e(e!e% :RO'ERTO *. *A4LAO, SONN4 >'O4> "ERE., DIONESIO 'AUTISTA, DANTE EVANGELIO, ADEL-A ARI'E, DANILO ARJONA, VI*ENTE *AM"OMANES, RONILO DOMUNI*O; #e!2e(+$?e13@ n% :n/e! o, !$A+3-+Bo $nCu#e% ?$(+$/!; EDDIE AGUINALDO, -ELI*ISIMO AL'ASIA, NA"OLEON 'AUTISTA, DANILO *RU., EDDIE MENSOLA, AL'ERT "ITAL'O, VI*ENTE ROSEL, RU'EN *ARRIEDO, JO4 *RU., HONORIO LA'AM'A, JR., E-REN MA*ARAIG, SOLOMON MANALOTO, ROMEO DURAN, NILO TAGU'AT, JUN *ARSELLAR, JOE4 *LEMENTE, GERARDO *O4O*A, LUISITO DA*O, 'ENJAMIN DELA *RU., ARTHUR -ONTANILLA, 5ILSON GAR*IA, *ARLOS SIRA4, JOSE "ERRAS, TOMAS VALLOS, ARNOLD ENAJE, MARIANITA DIMA"ILIS, -RAN*IS*O ANGELES, MAR*ELO ESGUERRA, JOSE -ERRER, RODEL DE GUIA, ELVIS MENDO.A, VI*TORIANO <UIJANO, JOE4 ADIME, RESIENO ADUL, AL'ERTO TARSONA, *ARLOS AL*ANTARA, MAMERTO ALIAS, EMELITO ALMONTE, 'ENILDA ALONUEVO, EMMA A'ADILLO, RE4NALDO *A'ALLES, JR., JAIME *ALDETO, -A'IAN *ANTELEJO, RODRIGO *ARA'ARA, ENRI<UE DELGADO, JUN DELOS SANTOS, MARIO DEMASA*A, -RAN*IS*O GON.ALES, ERNESTO GON.ALES, RAMIRO JAMIL, JUAN LU*ENA, "ERLITO SALA4SA4, JOHNN4 SANTOS, MAR*ELO SANTOS, EMIL SA4AO, 'A4ANI UMALI, REMIGIO MAHALIN, 'ONG MANLULO, ARMANDO MATIEN.O, *ARLO MEDINA, LITO NOVENARIO, n% ROSELLA RO'ALE, respondents. G.R. No. 84647 M#() 19, 1993 ERLINDA *. *A4LAO, ANATALIA ANGELES "ERE., M4RNA 'AUTISTA, *I"RIANA EVANGELIO, ELMA GRAM"A, AMELIA GUTIERRE., NEMESIO LA=INDANUM, "URITA 4UMUL, MIGUEL ARA'E, TERESITA ARJONA, RONALDO *AM"OMANES AND *ARMEN*ITA ARDONI VDA. DE *AM"OMANES, ROGELIO DOMUNI*O, $n +)e$# (2($+3 ! )e$#! o, +)e %e(e!e% :RO'ERTO *. *A4LAO, SONN4 >'O4> "ERE., DIONESIO GRAM"A, ANGELITO GUTIERRE., 'ERNA'E LA=INDANUM, RO'ERTO 4UMUL, LEO"OLDO ALON.O, ADEL-A ARI'E, DANILO ARJONA, VI*ENTE *AM"OMANES, RONILO DOMUNI*O; #e!2e(+$?e13@ n% :n/e! o, !$A+3-+Bo $nCu#e% ?$(+$/!; EDDIE AGUINALDO, -ELI*ISIMO AL'ASIA, NA"OLEON 'AUTISTA, DANILO *RU., EDDIE MENSOLA, AL'ERT "ITAL'O, VI*ENTE ROSEL, RU'EN *ARRIEDO, JO4 *RU., HONORIO LA'AM'A, JR. E-REN MA*ARAIG, SOLOMON MANALOTO, ROMEO DURAN, NILO TAGU'AT, JUN *ARSELLAR, JOE4 *LEMENTE, GERARDO *O4O*A, LUISITO DA*O, 'ENJAMIN DELA *RU., ARTHUR -ONTANILLA, 5ILSON GAR*IA, *ARLOS SIRA4, JOSE "ERRAS TOMAS VALLOS, ARNOLD ENAJE, MARIANITA DIMA"ILIS, -RAN*IS*O ANGELES, MAR*ELO ESGUERRA, JOSE -ERRER, RODEL DE GUIA, ELVIS MENDO.A, VI*TORINO <UIJANO, JOE4 ADIME, RESIENO ADUL, AL'ERTO TARSONA, *ARLOS AL*ANTARA, MAMERTO ALIAS, EMELITO ALMONTE, 'ENILDA ALONUEVO, EMMA A'ADILLO, RE4NALDO *A'ALLES, JR., JAIME *ALDETO, -A'IAN *ANTELEJO, RODRIGO *ARA'ARA, ENRI<UE DELGADO, JUN DELOS SANTOS, MARIO DEMASA*A, -RAN*IS*O GON.ALES, ERNESTO GON.ALES, RAMIRO JAMIL, JUAN LU*ENA, "ERLITO SALA4SA4, JOHNN4 SANTOS, MAR*ELO SANTOS, EMIL SA4AO, 'A4ANI UMALI, REMIGIO MAHALIN, 'ONG MANLULO, ARMANDO MATIEN.O, *ARLO MEDINA, LITO NOVENARIO, ROSELLA RO'ALE, 2e+$+$one#!, ?!. RE"U'LI* O- THE "HILI""INES, n% HONORA'LE EDIL'ERTO G. SANDOVAL, Re&$on1 T#$1 *ou#+ o, Mn$1, '#n() 9, #e!2on%en+!. The Solicitor General for the Republic of the Philippines. Structural Alternative Legal Assistance for Grassroots for petitioners in 8464 ! private respon"ents in 846#$. *AM"OS, JR., J.: "eo21e /3 )?e 1#e%3 ,o#&o++en +)e +#&e%3 +)+ +#n!2$#e% on Jnu#3 66, 1988. I+ $! Du$+e $#on$( +)+ +)en, !o/e Cou#n1$!+! (11e% $+ '1(E T)u#!%3, ! &#$/ #e/$n%e# +o +)e n+$on o, +)e /$!,o#+une +)+ 0e,e11 +Be1?e :16; #113$!+!. 'u+ ,o# /o!+ -$1$2$no! noB, +)e Men%$o1 /!!(#e /3 noB Cu!+ ! Be11 0e ()2+e# $n ou# )$!+o#3 0ooE!. -o# +)o!e )oBe?e#, B)o )?e 0e(o/e B$%oB! n% o#2)n!, (e#+$n13 +)e3 Bou1% no+ !e++1e ,o# Cu!+ +)+. T)e3 !eeE #e+#$0u+$on ,o# +)e 1$?e! +Een +)+ B$11 ne?e# 0e 0#ou&)+ 0(E +o 1$,e &$n. Hen(e, +)e )e$#! o, +)e %e(e!e%, +o&e+)e# B$+) +)o!e $nCu#e% :*31o &#ou2;, $n!+$+u+e% +)$! 2e+$+$on, %o(Ee+e% ! G.R. No. 84647, un%e# Se(+$on 1 o, Ru1e 67 o, +)e Ru1e! o, *ou#+, !eeE$n& +)e #e?e#!1 n% !e++$n& !$%e o, +)e O#%e#! o, #e!2on%en+ Ju%&e Sn%o?1, 1 %+e% M3 31 n% Au&u!+ 8, 1988, %$!/$!!$n& +)e (o/21$n+ ,o# %/&e! o, )e#e$n 2e+$+$one#! &$n!+ +)e Re2u01$( o, +)e ")$1$22$ne! $n *$?$1 *!e No. 88-43371. "e+$+$one#, +)e Re2u01$( o, +)e ")$1$22$ne!, +)#ou&) !$/$1# #e/e%3, %o(Ee+e% ! G.R. No. 84608, !eeE! +o !e+ !$%e +)e O#%e# o, #e!2on%en+ Ju%&e %+e% M3 31, 1988, $n *$?$1 *!e No. 88-43371 en+$+1e% >E#1$n% *31o, e+ 1. ?!. Re2u01$( o, +)e ")$1$22$ne!, e+ 1.> T)e 2e#+$nen+ 2o#+$on o, +)e Due!+$one% O#%e# 6 %+e% M3 31, 1988, #e%! ! ,o11oB!F 5$+) #e!2e(+ )oBe?e# +o +)e o+)e# %e,en%n+!, +)e $/21e%e% M$1$+#3 O,,$(e#!, !$n(e +)e3 #e 0e$n& ()#&e% $n +)e$# 2e#!on1 n% o,,$($1 (2($+3, n% )o1%$n& +)e/ 1$01e, $, + 11, Bou1% no+ #e!u1+ $n ,$nn($1 #e!2on!$0$1$+3 o, +)e &o?e#n/en+, +)e 2#$n($21e o, $//un$+3 ,#o/ !u$+ (n no+ (on?en$en+13 n% (o##e!2on%$n&13 0e 221$e% +o +)e/. 5HERE-ORE, +)e (!e ! &$n!+ +)e %e,en%n+ Re2u01$( o, +)e ")$1$22$ne! $! )e#e03 %$!/$!!e%. A! &$n!+ +)e #e!+ o, +)e %e,en%n+! +)e /o+$on +o %$!/$!! $! %en$e%. T)e3 #e &$?en 2e#$o% o, +en :10; %3! ,#o/ #e(e$2+ o, +)$! o#%e# B$+)$n B)$() +o ,$1e +)e$# #e!2e(+$?e 21e%$n&!. On +)e o+)e# )n%, +)e O#%e# 3 , %+e% Au&u!+ 8, 1988, %en$e% +)e /o+$on! ,$1e% 03 0o+) 2#+$e!, ,o# #e(on!$%e#+$on o, +)e 0o?e($+e% O#%e#, #e!2on%en+ Ju%&e ,$n%$n& no (o&en+ #e!on +o %$!+u#0 +)e !$% o#%e#. T)e /!!(#e B! +)e (u1/$n+$on o, e$&)+ %3! n% !e?en n$&)+! o, en(/2/en+ 03 /e/0e#! o, +)e /$1$+n+ =$1u!n& M&0u0uE$% ! "$1$2$n! :=M"; + +)e +)en M$n$!+#3 :noB De2#+/en+; o, A&##$n Re,o#/ :MAR; + +)e ")$1$22$ne To0((o A%/$n$!+#+$on 'u$1%$n& 1on& E11$2+$(1 Ro% $n D$1$/n, <ueGon *$+3. T)e ,#/e#! n% +)e$# !3/2+)$Ge#! 2#e!en+e% +)e$# %e/n%! ,o# B)+ +)e3 (11e% >&enu$ne &##$n #e,o#/>. T)e =M", 1e% 03 $+! n+$on1 2#e!$%en+, J$/e T%eo, 2#e!en+e% +)e$# 2#o01e/! n% %e/n%!, /on& B)$() Be#eF :; &$?$n& 1n%! ,o# ,#ee +o ,#/e#!@ :0; Ge#o #e+en+$on o, 1n%! 03 1n%1o#%!@ n% :(; !+o2 /o#+$G+$on! o, 1n% 23/en+!. T)e %$1o&ue 0e+Been +)e ,#/e#! n% +)e MAR o,,$($1! 0e&n on Jnu#3 17, 1988. T)e +Bo %3! +)+ ,o11oBe% !B /#Ee% $n(#e!e $n 2eo21e + +)e en(/2/en+. I+ B! on13 on Jnu#3 19, 1988 +)+ J$/e T%eo ##$?e% +o /ee+ B$+) +)en M$n$!+e# He)e#!on A1?#eG, on13 +o 0e $n,o#/e% +)+ +)e M$n$!+e# (n on13 /ee+ B$+) )$/ +)e ,o11oB$n& %3. On Jnu#3 60, 1988, +)e /ee+$n& B! )e1% + +)e MAR (on,e#en(e #oo/. T%eo %e/n%e% +)+ +)e /$n$/u/ (o/2#e)en!$?e 1n% #e,o#/ 2#o&#/ 0e &#n+e% $//e%$+e13. M$n$!+e# A1?#eG, ,o# )$! 2#+, (n on13 2#o/$!e +o %o )$! 0e!+ +o 0#$n& +)e /++e# +o +)e ++en+$on o, +)en "#e!$%en+ ADu$no, %u#$n& +)e (0$ne+ /ee+$n& on Jnu#3 61, 1988. Ten!$on /oun+e% +)e ,o11oB$n& %3. T)e ,#/e#!, noB on +)e$# !e?en+) %3 o, en(/2/en+, 0##$(%e% +)e MAR 2#e/$!e! n% 2#e?en+e% +)e e/21o3ee! ,#o/ &o$n& $n!$%e +)e$# o,,$(e!. T)e3 )o$!+e% +)e =M" ,1& +o&e+)e# B$+) +)e ")$1$22$ne ,1&. A+ #oun% 6F30 2./. o, +)e !/e %3, M$n$!+e# A1?#eG, $n /ee+$n& B$+) T%eo n% )$! 1e%e#!, %?$!e% +)e 1++e# +o $n!+e% B$+ ,o# +)e #+$,$(+$on o, +)e 1988 *on!+$+u+$on n% Cu!+ 11oB +)e &o?e#n/en+ +o $/21e/en+ $+! (o/2#e)en!$?e 1n% #e,o#/ 2#o&#/. T%eo, )oBe?e#, (oun+e#e% 03 !3$n& +)+ )e %$% no+ 0e1$e?e $n +)e *on!+$+u+$on n% +)+ &enu$ne 1n% #e,o#/ (nno+ 0e #e1$Ge% un%e# 1n%1o#%-(on+#o11e% *on&#e!!. A )e+e% %$!(u!!$on en!ue% 0e+Been T%eo n% M$n$!+e# A1?#eG. T)$! no+B$+)!+n%$n&, M$n$!+e# A1?#eG !u&&e!+e% ne&o+$+$n& 2ne1 ,#o/ e() !$%e +o /ee+ &$n +)e ,o11oB$n& %3. On Jnu#3 66, 1988, T%eoH! &#ou2 $n!+e% %e($%e% +o /#() +o M1(In& +o $# +)e$# %e/n%!. 'e,o#e +)e /#() !+#+e%, T%eo +1Ee% +o +)e 2#e!! n% TV /e%$. He u++e#e% ,$e#3 Bo#%!, +)e /o!+ +e11$n& o, B)$() Be#eF >. . . $n1$! n/$n n& 0#$E% 0$1n& E)$1$n&n n& +$n& "#e!$%en+e, 2e#o E$nE$1n&n 1$!$n %$n n$3 n& 0#$E% ! Men%$o1 !2&E+ 0u0u+!$n %$n n/$n $3on + %%nE n& %u&o . . . .> 4 T)e ,#/e#! +)en 2#o(ee%e% +o /#() +o M1(In&, ,#o/ <ueGon Me/o#$1 *$#(1e, + 10F00 ./. T)e3 Be#e 1+e# Co$ne% 03 /e/0e#! o, o+)e# !e(+o#1 o#&n$G+$on! !u() ! +)e =$1u!n& M3o Uno :=MU;, '&on& A13n!n& ME03n :'A4AN;, Le&ue o, -$1$2$no S+u%en+! :L-S; n% =on&#e!o n& "&EE$! n& M#1$+n& Lun&!o% :="ML;. A+ #oun% 1F00 2./., +)e /#()e#! #e()e% L$B!n& 'on$,($o B)e#e +)e3 )e1% 0#$e, 2#o&#/. I+ B! + +)$! 2o$n+ +)+ !o/e o, +)e /#()e#! en+e#e% +)e e!+e#n !$%e o, +)e "o!+ O,,$(e 'u$1%$n&, n% #e/o?e% +)e !+ee1 0#! !u##oun%$n& +)e &#%en. T)e#e,+e#, +)e3 Co$ne% +)e /#() +o M1(In&. A+ 0ou+ 4F30 2./., +)e3 #e()e% *.M. Re(+o A?enue. In n+$($2+$on o, ($?$1 %$!+u#0n(e, n% (+$n& u2on #e2o#+! #e(e$?e% 03 +)e *2$+1 Re&$on1 *o//n% :*A"*OM; +)+ +)e #113$!+! Bou1% 2#o(ee% +o Men%$o1 +o 0#eE +)#ou&) +)e 2o1$(e 1$ne! n% #u!) +oB#%! M1(In&, *A"*OM *o//n%e# Gene#1 R/on E. Mon+Io $n!2e(+e% +)e 2#e2#+$on! n% %eDu(3 o, +)e &o?e#n/en+ ,o#(e! +o Due11 $/2en%$n& ++(E!. O"LAN 4ELLO5 :Re?$!e%; B! 2u+ $n+o e,,e(+. T!E -o#(e NG#eno un%e# +)e (o//n% o, *o1. *e!# NG#eno B! %e21o3e% + +)e ?$($n$+3 o, M1(In&. T)e ($?$1 %$!+u#0n(e (on+#o1 un$+! o, +)e 5e!+e#n "o1$(e D$!+#$(+ un%e# "o1$(e '#$&%$e# Gene#1 A1,#e%o S. L$/ Be#e 1!o (+$?+e%. In+e11$&en(e #e2o#+! Be#e 1!o #e(e$?e% +)+ +)e =M" B! )e?$13 $n,$1+#+e% 03 *""JN"A e1e/en+! n% +)+ n $n!u##e(+$on B! $/2en%$n&. T)e +)#e+ !ee/e% &#?e ! +)e#e Be#e 1!o #e2o#+! +)+ Sn 'e% *o11e&e n% *en+#o E!(o1# Un$?e#!$+3 Bou1% 0e ,o#($013 o((u2$e%. In $+! #e2o#+, +)e *$+$Gen!H Men%$o1 *o//$!!$on : 0o%3 !2e($,$(113 +!Ee% +o $n?e!+$&+e +)e ,(+! !u##oun%$n& +)e $n($%en+, *o//$!!$on ,o# !)o#+; !++e% +)+ +)e &o?e#n/en+ n+$-#$o+ ,o#(e! Be#e !!e/01e% + Men%$o1 $n ,o#/+$on o, +)#ee 2)1n&e!, $n +)e ,o11oB$n& /nne#F :1; T)e ,$#!+ 1$ne B! (o/2o!e% o, 2o1$(e/en ,#o/ 2o1$(e !++$on! No!. 3, 4, 6, 8, 8, 9 n% 10 n% +)e *)$n+oBn %e+()/en+ o, +)e 5e!+e#n "o1$(e D$!+#$(+. Police %olonel &"gar 'ula Torres, De2u+3 Su2e#$n+en%en+ o, +)e 5e!+e#n "o1$(e D$!+#$(+, B! %e!$&n+e% ! &#oun% (o//n%e# o, +)e *D* ,$#!+ 1$ne o, %e,en!e. T)e 5"D *D* e1e/en+! Be#e 2o!$+$one% + +)e $n+e#!e(+$on o, Men%$o1 n% Le&#% S+#ee+! ,+e# +)e3 Be#e o#%e#e% +o /o?e ,o#B#% ,#o/ +)e +o2 o, Men%$o1 0#$%&e. T)e 5"D ,o#(e! Be#e $n E)E$ un$,o#/ n% (##$e% +)e !+n%#% *D* eDu$2/en+ K 1u/$nu/ !)$e1%!, +#un()eon! n% &! /!E!. :6; A+ +)e !e(on% 1$ne o, %e,en!e 0ou+ +en :10; 3#%! 0e)$n% +)e 5"D 2o1$(e/en Be#e +)e e1e/en+! o, +)e In+e&#+e% N+$on1 "o1$(e :IN"; -$e1% -o#(e !++$one% + -o#+ 'on$,($o ,#o/ +)e 61!+ n% 66n% IN" -$e1% -o#(e, B)o (##$e% 1!o +)e !+n%#% *D* eDu$2/en+ K +#un()eon!, !)$e1%! n% &! /!E!. T)e IN" -$e1% -o#(e B! un"er the co((an" of Police )a*or 'e(etrio "ela %ru+. :3; -o#/$n& +)e +)$#% 1$ne B! +)e M#$ne *$?$1 D$!+u#0n(e *on+#o1 '++1$on (o/2o!e% o, +)e ,$#!+ n% !e(on% (o/2n$e! o, +)e ")$1$22$ne M#$ne! !++$one% + -o#+ 'on$,($o. T)e /#$ne! Be#e 11 eDu$22e% B$+) !)$e1%!, +#un()eon! n% M-16 #$,1e! :#/1$+e!; !1un& + +)e$# 0(E!, un"er the co((an" of )a*or ,eli(on -. Gas(in. T)e M#$ne *D* '++1$on B! 2o!$+$one% $n 1$ne ,o#/+$on +en :10; 3#%! ,#+)e# 0e)$n% +)e IN" -$e1% -o#(e. A+ +)e 0(E o, +)e /#$ne! Be#e ,ou# :4; 6 A 6 #/3 +#u(E!, o((u23$n& +)e en+$#e B$%+) o, Men%$o1 !+#ee+, ,o11oBe% $//e%$+e13 03 +Bo B+e# (nnon!, one on e() !$%e o, +)e !+#ee+ n% e$&)+ ,$#e +#u(E!, ,ou# +#u(E! on e() !$%e o, +)e !+#ee+. T)e e$&)+ ,$#e +#u(E! ,#o/ -$#e D$!+#$(+ I o, Mn$1 un"er ,ire Superinten"ent )ario %. Tanchanco, Be#e +o !u2213 B+e# +o +)e +Bo B+e# (nnon!. S++$one% ,#+)e# 0e)$n% +)e *D* ,o#(e! Be#e +)e +Bo Mo0$1e D$!2e#!1 Te/! :MDT; e() (o/2o!e% o, +Bo +e# &! &#en%$e#!, +Bo !2o++e#!, n !!$!+n+ &#en%$e#, %#$?e# n% +)e +e/ 1e%e#. In ,#on+ o, +)e *o11e&e o, +)e Ho13 S2$#$+ ne# G+e 4 o, M1(In& !+oo% +)e VOLVO Mo0$1e *o//un$(+$on! Vn o, +)e %o((an"ing General of %AP%.)/01P2 General Ra(on &. )onta3o. A+ +)$! (o//n% 2o!+, ,+e# Gene#1 Mon+Io )% (on,e##e% B$+) T, 1a+areno %o((an"er, %olonel %e+ar 1a+areno, 0ou+ +)e %eDu(3 n% #e%$ne!! o, )$! ,o#(e!, $+ B! &#ee% +)+ Police General Alfre"o S. Li( Bou1% %e!$&n+e Police %olonel &"gar 'ula Torresn% Police )a*or %onra"o ,rancisco ! ne&o+$+o#! B$+) +)e /#()e#!. "o1$(e Gene#1 L$/ +)en 2#o(ee%e% +o +)e 5"D *D* e1e/en+! 1#e%3 2o!$+$one% + +)e ,oo+ o, Men%$o1 0#$%&e +o #e13 +o "o1$(e *o1one1 To##e! n% "o1$(e MCo# -#n($!(o +)e $n!+#u(+$on! +)+ +)e 1++e# Bou1% ne&o+$+e B$+) +)e /#()e#!. 7 :E/2)!$! !u221$e%; T)e /#()e#!, + #oun% 4F30 2./., nu/0e#e% 0ou+ 10,000 +o 17,000. -#o/ *.M. Re(+o A?enue, +)e3 2#o(ee%e% +oB#% +)e 2o1$(e 1$ne!. No %$1o&ue +ooE 21(e 0e+Been +)e /#()e#! n% +)e n+$-#$o+ !Du%. I+ B! + +)$! /o/en+ +)+ (1!) o((u##e% n%, 0o##oB$n& +)e Bo#%! o, +)e *o//$!!$on >2n%e/on$u/ 0#oEe 1oo!e>. T)e *o//$!!$on !++e% $n $+! ,$n%$n&!, +o B$+F . . . T)e#e B! n eA21o!$on ,o11oBe% 03 +)#oB$n& o, 2$110oAe!, !+one! n% 0o++1e!. S+ee1 0#!, Boo%en (1u0! n% 1e% 2$2e! Be#e u!e% &$n!+ +)e 2o1$(e. T)e 2o1$(e ,ou&)+ 0(E B$+) +)e$# !)$e1%! n% +#un()eon!. T)e 2o1$(e 1$ne B! 0#e()e%. Su%%en13 !)o+! Be#e )e#%. T)e %e/on!+#+o#! %$!en&&e% ,#o/ +)e &o?e#n/en+ ,o#(e! n% #e+#e+e% +oB#%! *.M. Re(+o A?enue. 'u+ !2o#%$( ,$#$n& (on+$nue% ,#o/ +)e &o?e#n/en+ ,o#(e!. A,+e# +)e ,$#$n& (e!e%, +Bo MDT! hea"e" b4 Lt. Ro(eo Pa5uinto n% Lt. Laonglaan Goce!2e% +oB#%! Le&#% S+#ee+ n% 1o00e% +e# &! + +)e #e/$n$n& #113$!+ !+$11 &#ou2e% $n +)e ?$($n$+3 o, Men%$o1. A,+e# %$!2e#!$n& +)e (#oB%, +)e +Bo MDT!, +o&e+)e# B$+) +)e +Bo 5"D MDT!, 2#o(ee%e% +o L$B!n& 'on$,($o upon or"er of General )onta3o +o %$!2e#!e +)e #113$!+! !!e/01e% +)e#e+. A!!$!+$n& +)e MDT! Be#e nu/0e# o, 2o1$(e/en ,#o/ +)e 5"D, ++$#e% $n ($?$1$n (1o+)e! B$+) B)$+e )e% 0n%!, B)o Be#e #/e% B$+) 1on& ,$#e#/!. 6 :E/2)!$! ou#!; A,+e# +)e (1!), +Be1?e :16; /#()e#! Be#e o,,$($113 (on,$#/e% %e%, 1+)ou&) ((o#%$n& +o T%eo, +)e#e Be#e +)$#+een :13; %e%, 0u+ )e B! no+ 01e +o &$?e +)e n/e n% %%#e!! o, !$% ?$(+$/. T)$#+3-n$ne :39; Be#e Boun%e% 03 &un!)o+! n% +Be1?e :16; !u!+$ne% /$no# $nCu#$e!, 11 0e1on&$n& +o +)e &#ou2 o, +)e /#()e#!. O, +)e 2o1$(e n% /$1$+#3 2e#!onne1, +)#ee :3; !u!+$ne% &un!)o+ Boun%! n% +Ben+3 :60; !u,,e#e% /$no# 2)3!$(1 $nCu#$e! !u() ! 0#!$on!, (on+u!$on! n% +)e 1$Ee. In +)e ,+e#/+) o, +)e (on,#on++$on, +)en "#e!$%en+ *o#Gon *. ADu$no $!!ue% A%/$n$!+#+$?e O#%e# No. 11, 8 :A.O. 11, ,o# 0#e?$+3; %+e% Jnu#3 66, 1988, B)$() (#e+e% +)e *$+$Gen!H Men%$o1 *o//$!!$on. T)e 0o%3 B! (o/2o!e% o, #e+$#e% Su2#e/e *ou#+ Ju!+$(e V$(en+e A0% Sn+o! ! *)$#/n, #e+$#e% Su2#e/e *ou#+ Ju!+$(e Jo!e 4. -e#$ n% M#. An+on$o U. M$#n%, 0o+) ! /e/0e#!. A.O. 11 !++e% +)+ +)e *o//$!!$on B! (#e+e% 2#e($!e13 ,o# +)e >2u#2o!e o, (on%u(+$n& n $n?e!+$&+$on o, +)e %$!o#%e#, %e+)!, n% (!u1+$e! +)+ +ooE 21(e $n +)e ?$($n$+3 o, Men%$o1 '#$%&e n% Men%$o1 S+#ee+ n% *1#o M. Re(+o A?enue, Mn$1, $n +)e ,+e#noon o, Jnu#3 66, 1988>. T)e *o//$!!$on B! eA2e(+e% +o )?e !u0/$++e% $+! ,$n%$n&! no+ 1+e# +)n -e0#u#3 6, 1988. 'u+ $+ ,$1e% +o %o !o. *on!eDuen+13, +)e %e%1$ne B! /o?e% +o -e0#u#3 16, 1988 03 A%/$n$!+#+$?e O#%e# No. 13. A&$n, +)e *o//$!!$on B! un01e +o /ee+ +)$! %e%1$ne. -$n113, on -e0#u#3 68, 1988, $+ !u0/$++e% $+! #e2o#+, $n ((o#%n(e B$+) A%/$n$!+#+$?e O#%e# No. 18, $!!ue% on -e0#u#3 11, 1988. In $+! #e2o#+, +)e *o//$!!$on #e(2$+u1+e% $+! ,$n%$n&!, +o B$+F :1; T)e /#() +o Men%$o1 o, +)e =M" 1e% 03 J$/e T%eo, +o&e+)e# B$+) +)e o+)e# !e(+o#1 &#ou2!, B! no+ (o?e#e% 03 n3 2e#/$+ ! #eDu$#e% un%e# '+! "/0n! '1&. 880, +)e "u01$( A!!e/013 A(+ o, 1987, $n ?$o1+$on o, 2#) :; Se(+$on 13, 2un$!)01e un%e# 2#) :;, Se(+$on 14 o, !$% 1B. :6; T)e (#oB% %$!2e#!1 (on+#o1 un$+! o, +)e 2o1$(e n% +)e /$1$+#3 Be#e #/e% B$+) .38 n% .47 (1$0e# )n%&un!, n% M- 16 #/1$+e!, B)$() $! 2#o)$0$+e% (+ un%e# 2#) 4:&;, Se(+$on 13, n% 2un$!)01e un%e# 2#) :0;, Se(+$on 14 o, '+! "/0n! '1&. 880. :3; T)e !e(u#$+3 /en !!$&ne% +o 2#o+e(+ +)e 5"D, IN" -$e1% -o#(e, +)e M#$ne! n% !u22o#+$n& /$1$+#3 un$+!, ! Be11 ! +)e !e(u#$+3 o,,$(e#! o, +)e 2o1$(e n% /$1$+#3 (o//n%e#! Be#e $n civilian attire in violation o, 2#) :;, Se(+$on 10, '+! "/0n! 880. :4; T)e#e B! unne(e!!#3 ,$#$n& 03 +)e 2o1$(e n% /$1$+#3 (#oB% %$!2e#!1 (on+#o1 un$+! $n %$!2e#!$n& +)e /#()e#!, 2#o)$0$+e% (+ un%e# 2#) :e;, Se(+$on 13, n% 2un$!)01e un%e# 2#) :0;, Se(+$on 14, '+! "/0n! '1&. 880. :7; T)e (##3$n& n% u!e o, !+ee1 0#!, 2$110oAe!, %#+!, 1e% 2$2e, Boo%en (1u0! B$+) !2$Ee!, n% &un! 03 +)e /#()e#! ! o,,en!$?e Be2on! #e 2#o)$0$+e% (+! 2un$!)01e un%e# 2#) :&;, Se(+$on 13, n% 2un$!)01e un%e# 2#) :e;, Se(+$on 14 o, '+! "/0n! '1&. 880. :6; T)e =M" ,#/e#! 0#oEe o,, ,u#+)e# ne&o+$+$on! B$+) +)e MAR o,,$($1! n% Be#e %e+e#/$ne% +o /#() +o M1(In&, e/0o1%ene% ! +)e3 #e, 03 +)e $n,1//+o#3 n% $n(en%$#3 u++e#n(e! o, +)e$# 1e%e#, J$/e T%eo K >0u0u+!$n n/$n n& 0#$E% . . D%nE n% %u&o . . . An& n&u&u+o/ n /&!!E 3 &&B n& !#$1$n& 0u+!. . . :8; T)e#e B! no %$1o&ue 0e+Been +)e #113$!+! n% +)e &o?e#n/en+ ,o#(e!. U2on 22#o()$n& +)e $n+e#!e(+$on! o, Le&#% n% Men%$o1, +)e /#()e#! 0e&n 2u!)$n& +)e 2o1$(e 1$ne! n% 2ene+#+e% n% 0#oEe +)#ou&) +)e ,$#!+ 1$ne o, +)e *D* (on+$n&en+. :8; T)e 2o1$(e ,ou&)+ 0(E B$+) +)e$# +#un()eon! n% !)$e1%!. T)e3 !+oo% +)e$# &#oun% 0u+ +)e *D* 1$ne B! 0#e()e%. T)e#e en!ue% &un,$#e ,#o/ 0o+) !$%e!. I+ $! no+ (1e# B)o !+#+e% +)e ,$#$n&. :9; A+ +)e on!e+ o, +)e %$!+u#0n(e n% ?$o1en(e, +)e B+e# (nnon! n% +e# &! Be#e no+ 2u+ $n+o e,,e(+$?e u!e +o %$!2e#!e +)e #$o+$n& (#oB%. :10; T)e B+e# (nnon! n% ,$#e +#u(E! Be#e no+ 2u+ $n+o o2e#+$on 0e(u!e :; +)e#e B! no o#%e# +o u!e +)e/@ :0; +)e3 Be#e $n(o##e(+13 2#e2o!$+$one%@ n% :(; +)e3 Be#e ou+ o, #n&e o, +)e /#()e#!. :11; Te# &! B! no+ u!e% + +)e !+#+ o, +)e %$!+u#0n(e +o %$!2e#!e +)e #$o+e#!. A,+e# +)e (#oB% )% %$!2e#!e% n% +)e Boun%e% n% %e% Be#e 0e$n& (##$e% B3, +)e MDT! o, +)e 2o1$(e n% +)e /$1$+#3 B$+) +)e$# +e# &! eDu$2/en+ n% (o/2onen+! (on%u(+e% %$!2e#!1 o2e#+$on! $n +)e Men%$o1 #e n% 2#o(ee%e% +o L$B!n& 'on$,($o +o %$!2e#!e +)e #e/nn+! o, +)e /#()e#!. :16; No 0#0e% B$#e 0##$(%e B! u!e% $n Men%$o1 0u+ no o,,$($1 #e!on B! &$?en ,o# $+! 0!en(e. 8 -#o/ +)e #e!u1+! o, +)e 2#o0e, +)e *o//$!!$on #e(o//en%e% 9 +)e (#$/$n1 2#o!e(u+$on o, ,ou# un$%en+$,$e%, un$,o#/e% $n%$?$%u1!, !)oBn e$+)e# on +2e o# $n 2$(+u#e!, ,$#$n& + +)e %$#e(+$on o, +)e /#()e#!. In (onne(+$on B$+) +)$!, $+ B! +)e *o//$!!$onH! #e(o//en%+$on +)+ +)e N+$on1 'u#eu o, In?e!+$&+$on :N'I; 0e +!Ee% +o un%e#+Ee $n?e!+$&+$on! #e&#%$n& +)e $%en+$+$e! o, +)o!e B)o (+u113 ,$#e% +)e$# &un! +)+ #e!u1+e% $n +)e %e+) o, o# $nCu#3 +o +)e ?$(+$/! o, +)e $n($%en+. T)e *o//$!!$on 1!o !u&&e!+e% +)+ 11 +)e (o//$!!$one% o,,$(e#! o, 0o+) +)e 5e!+e#n "o1$(e D$!+#$(+ n% +)e IN" -$e1% -o#(e, B)o Be#e #/e% %u#$n& +)e $n($%en+, 0e 2#o!e(u+e% ,o# ?$o1+$on o, 2#) 4:&; o, Se(+$on 13, '+! "/0n! '1&. 880, +)e "u01$( A!!e/013 A(+ o, 1987. T)e *o//$!!$onH! #e(o//en%+$on 1!o $n(1u%e% +)e 2#o!e(u+$on o, +)e /#()e#!, ,o# (##3$n& %e%13 o# o,,en!$?e Be2on!, 0u+ B)o!e $%en+$+$e! )?e 3e+ +o 0e e!+01$!)e%. A! ,o# J$/e T%eo, +)e *o//$!!$on !$% +)+ )e !)ou1% 0e 2#o!e(u+e% 0o+) ,o# ?$o1+$on o, 2#) :;, Se(+$on 13, '+! "/0n! '1&. 880 ,o# )o1%$n& +)e #113 B$+)ou+ 2e#/$+ n% ,o# ?$o1+$on o, A#+$(1e 146, ! /en%e%, o, +)e Re?$!e% "en1 *o%e ,o# $n($+$n& +o !e%$+$on. A! ,o# +)e ,o11oB$n& o,,$(e#!, n/e13F :1; Gen. R/on E. Mon+Io@ :6; "o1$(e Gen. A1,#e%o S. L$/@ :3; "o1$(e Gen. E%&# Du1 To##e!@ :4; "o1$(e MC. De/e+#$o %e1 *#uG@ :7; *o1. *eG# NG#eno@ n% :7; MC. -e1$/on G!/$n, ,o# +)e$# ,$1u#e +o /Ee e,,e(+$?e u!e o, +)e$# !E$11 n% eA2e#$en(e $n %$#e(+$n& +)e %$!2e#!1 o2e#+$on! $n Men%$o1, %/$n$!+#+$?e !n(+$on! Be#e #e(o//en%e% +o 0e $/2o!e%. T)e 1!+ n% +)e /o!+ !$&n$,$(n+ #e(o//en%+$on o, +)e *o//$!!$on B! ,o# +)e %e(e!e% n% Boun%e% ?$(+$/! o, +)e Men%$o1 $n($%en+ +o 0e (o/2en!+e% 03 +)e &o?e#n/en+. I+ B! +)$! 2o#+$on +)+ 2e+$+$one#! :*31o &#ou2; $n?oEe $n +)e$# (1$/ ,o# %/&e! ,#o/ +)e &o?e#n/en+. No+B$+)!+n%$n& !u() #e(o//en%+$on, no (on(#e+e ,o#/ o, (o/2en!+$on B! #e(e$?e% 03 +)e ?$(+$/!. T)u!, on Ju13 68, 1988, )e#e$n 2e+$+$one#!, :*31o &#ou2; ,$1e% ,o#/1 1e++e# o, %e/n% ,o# (o/2en!+$on ,#o/ +)e Go?e#n/en+. 10 T)$! ,o#/1 %e/n% B! $n%o#!e% 03 +)e o,,$(e o, +)e EAe(u+$?e Se(#e+#3 +o +)e De2#+/en+ o, 'u%&e+ n% Mn&e/en+ :D'M; on Au&u!+ 13, 1988. T)e Hou!e *o//$++ee on Hu/n R$&)+!, on -e0#u#3 10, 1988, #e(o//en%e% +)e eA2e%$+$ou! 23/en+ o, (o/2en!+$on +o +)e Men%$o1 ?$(+$/!. 11 A,+e# 1/o!+ 3e#, on Jnu#3 60, 1988, 2e+$+$one#! :*31o &#ou2; Be#e (on!+#$ne% +o $n!+$+u+e n (+$on ,o# %/&e! &$n!+ +)e Re2u01$( o, +)e ")$1$22$ne!, +o&e+)e# B$+) +)e /$1$+#3 o,,$(e#!, n% 2e#!onne1 $n?o1?e% $n +)e Men%$o1 $n($%en+, 0e,o#e +)e +#$1 (ou#+. T)e (o/21$n+ B! %o(Ee+e% ! *$?$1 *!e No. 88-43371. On -e0#u#3 63, 1988, +)e So1$($+o# Gene#1 ,$1e% Mo+$on +o D$!/$!! on +)e &#oun% +)+ +)e S++e (nno+ 0e !ue% B$+)ou+ $+! (on!en+. "e+$+$one#! o22o!e% !$% /o+$on on M#() 16, 1988, /$n+$n$n& +)+ +)e S++e )! B$?e% $+! $//un$+3 ,#o/ !u$+ n% +)+ +)e %$!/$!!1 o, +)e $n!+n+ (+$on $! (on+##3 +o 0o+) +)e *on!+$+u+$on n% +)e In+e#n+$on1 LB on Hu/n R$&)+!. Re!2on%en+ Ju%&e Sn%o?1, $n )$! ,$#!+ Due!+$one% O#%e#, %$!/$!!e% +)e (o/21$n+ ! &$n!+ +)e Re2u01$( o, +)e ")$1$22$ne! on +)e &#oun% +)+ +)e#e B! no B$?e# 03 +)e S++e. "e+$+$one#! :*31o &#ou2; ,$1e% Mo+$on ,o# Re(on!$%e#+$on +)e#e,#o/, 0u+ +)e !/e B! %en$e% 03 #e!2on%en+ Cu%&e $n )$! O#%e# %+e% Au&u!+ 8, 1988. *on!eDuen+13, *31o n% )e# (o-2e+$+$one#! ,$1e% +)e $n!+n+ 2e+$+$on. On +)e o+)e# )n%, +)e Re2u01$( o, +)e ")$1$22$ne!, +o&e+)e# B$+) +)e /$1$+#3 o,,$(e#! n% 2e#!onne1 $/21e%e% ! %e,en%n+! $n +)e (ou#+ 0e1oB, ,$1e% $+! 2e+$+$on ,o# certiorari. H?$n& #$!en ,#o/ +)e !/e ,(+u1 0e&$nn$n&! n% #$!$n& 2#(+$(113 $%en+$(1 $!!ue!, +)e +Bo :6; 2e+$+$on! Be#e (on!o1$%+e% n% B$11 +)e#e,o#e 0e Co$n+13 %e1+ B$+) n% #e!o1?e% $n +)$! De($!$on. T)e #e!o1u+$on o, 0o+) 2e+$+$on! #e?o1?e! #oun% +)e /$n $!!ue o, B)e+)e# o# no+ +)e S++e )! B$?e% $+! $//un$+3 ,#o/ !u$+. "e+$+$one#! :*31o &#ou2; %?n(e +)e #&u/en+ +)+ +)e S++e )! $/21$e%13 B$?e% $+! !o?e#e$&n $//un$+3 ,#o/ !u$+. I+ $! +)e$# (on!$%e#e% ?$eB +)+ 03 +)e #e(o//en%+$on /%e 03 +)e *o//$!!$on ,o# +)e &o?e#n/en+ +o $n%e/n$,3 +)e )e$#! n% ?$(+$/! o, +)e Men%$o1 $n($%en+ n% 03 +)e 2u01$( %%#e!!e! /%e 03 +)en "#e!$%en+ ADu$no $n +)e ,+e#/+) o, +)e E$11$n&!, +)e S++e )! (on!en+e% +o 0e !ue%. Un%e# ou# *on!+$+u+$on +)e 2#$n($21e o, $//un$+3 o, +)e &o?e#n/en+ ,#o/ !u$+ $! eA2#e!!13 2#o?$%e% $n A#+$(1e 9VI, Se(+$on 3. T)e 2#$n($21e $! 0!e% on +)e ?e#3 e!!en(e o, !o?e#e$&n+3, n% on +)e 2#(+$(1 &#oun% +)+ +)e#e (n 0e no 1e&1 #$&)+ ! &$n!+ +)e u+)o#$+3 +)+ /Ee! +)e 1B on B)$() +)e #$&)+ %e2en%!. 16 I+ 1!o #e!+! on #e!on! o, 2u01$( 2o1$(3 K +)+ 2u01$( !e#?$(e Bou1% 0e )$n%e#e%, n% +)e 2u01$( en%n&e#e%, $, +)e !o?e#e$&n u+)o#$+3 (ou1% 0e !u0Ce(+e% +o 1B !u$+! + +)e $n!+n(e o, e?e#3 ($+$Gen n% (on!eDuen+13 (on+#o11e% $n +)e u!e! n% %$!2o!$+$on! o, +)e /en! #eDu$#e% ,o# +)e 2#o2e# %/$n$!+#+$on o, +)e &o?e#n/en+. 13 T)$! $! no+ !u$+ &$n!+ +)e S++e B$+) $+! (on!en+. -$#!+13, +)e #e(o//en%+$on /%e 03 +)e *o//$!!$on #e&#%$n& $n%e/n$,$(+$on o, +)e )e$#! o, +)e %e(e!e% n% +)e ?$(+$/! o, +)e $n($%en+ 03 +)e &o?e#n/en+ %oe! no+ $n n3 B3 /en +)+ 1$0$1$+3 u+o/+$(113 ++()e! +o +)e S++e. I+ $! $/2o#+n+ +o no+e +)+ A.O. 11 eA2#e!!13 !++e! +)+ +)e 2u#2o!e o, (#e+$n& +)e *o//$!!$on B! +o )?e 0o%3 +)+ B$11 (on%u(+ n >$n?e!+$&+$on o, +)e %$!o#%e#, %e+)! n% (!u1+$e! +)+ +ooE 21(e.> 14 In +)e eAe#($!e o, $+! ,un(+$on!, A.O. 11 2#o?$%e! &u$%e1$ne!, n% B)+ $! #e1e?n+ +o Ou# %$!(u!!$on #e%!F 1 I+! (on(1u!$on! #e&#%$n& +)e eA$!+en(e o, 2#o001e (u!e ,o# +)e (o//$!!$on o, n3 o,,en!e n% o, +)e 2e#!on! 2#o0013 &u$1+3 o, +)e !/e !)11 0e !u,,$($en+ (o/21$n(e B$+) +)e #u1e! on 2#e1$/$n#3 $n?e!+$&+$on n% +)e ()#&e! #$!$n& +)e#e,#o/ /3 0e ,$1e% %$#e(+13 B$+) +)e 2#o2e# (ou#+. 17 In e,,e(+, B)+e?e# /3 0e +)e ,$n%$n&! o, +)e *o//$!!$on, +)e !/e !)11 on13 !e#?e ! +)e (u!e o, (+$on $n +)e e?en+ +)+ n3 2#+3 %e($%e! +o 1$+$&+e )$!J)e# (1$/. T)e#e,o#e, +)e *o//$!!$on $! /e#e13 2#e1$/$n#3 ?enue. T)e *o//$!!$on $! no+ +)e en% $n $+!e1,. 5)+e?e# #e(o//en%+$on $+ /Ee! (nno+ $n n3 B3 0$n% +)e S++e $//e%$+e13, !u() #e(o//en%+$on no+ )?$n& 0e(o/e ,$n1 n%, eAe(u+o#3. T)$! $! 2#e($!e13 +)e e!!en(e o, $+ 0e$n& fact6 fin"ing bo"4. Se(on%13, B)+e?e# (+! o# u++e#n(e! +)+ +)en "#e!$%en+ ADu$no /3 )?e %one o# !$%, +)e !/e #e no+ +n+/oun+ +o +)e S++e )?$n& B$?e% $+! $//un$+3 ,#o/ !u$+. T)e "#e!$%en+H! (+ o, Co$n$n& +)e /#()e#!, %3! ,+e# +)e $n($%en+, %oe! no+ /en +)+ +)e#e B! n %/$!!$on 03 +)e S++e o, n3 1$0$1$+3. In ,(+ +o 0o##oB +)e Bo#%! o, 2e+$+$one#! :*31o &#ou2;, >$+ B! n (+ o, !o1$%#$+3 03 +)e &o?e#n/en+ B$+) +)e 2eo21e>. Mo#eo?e#, 2e+$+$one#! #e13 on "#e!$%en+ ADu$noH! !2ee() 2#o/$!$n& +)+ +)e &o?e#n/en+ Bou1% %%#e!! +)e &#$e?n(e! o, +)e #113$!+!. '3 +)$! 1one, $+ (nno+ 0e $n,e##e% +)+ +)e S++e )! %/$++e% n3 1$0$1$+3, /u() 1e!! (n $+ 0e $n,e##e% +)+ $+ )! (on!en+e% +o +)e !u$+. A1+)ou&) (on!en+ +o 0e !ue% /3 0e &$?en $/21$e%13, !+$11 $+ (nno+ 0e /$n+$ne% +)+ !u() (on!en+ B! &$?en (on!$%e#$n& +)e ($#(u/!+n(e! o0+$n$n& $n +)e $n!+n+ (!e. T)$#%13, +)e (!e %oe! no+ Du1$,3 ! !u$+ &$n!+ +)e S++e. So/e $n!+n(e! B)en !u$+ &$n!+ +)e S++e $! 2#o2e# #eF 16 :1; 5)en +)e Re2u01$( $! !ue% 03 n/e@ :6; 5)en +)e !u$+ $! &$n!+ n un$n(o#2o#+e% &o?e#n/en+ &en(3@ :3; 5)en +)e, !u$+ $! on $+! ,(e &$n!+ &o?e#n/en+ o,,$(e# 0u+ +)e (!e $! !u() +)+ u1+$/+e 1$0$1$+3 B$11 0e1on& no+ +o +)e o,,$(e# 0u+ +o +)e &o?e#n/en+. 5)$1e +)e Re2u01$( $n +)$! (!e $! !ue% 03 n/e, +)e u1+$/+e 1$0$1$+3 %oe! no+ 2e#+$n +o +)e &o?e#n/en+. A1+)ou&) +)e /$1$+#3 o,,$(e#! n% 2e#!onne1, +)en 2#+3 %e,en%n+!, Be#e %$!()#&$n& +)e$# o,,$($1 ,un(+$on! B)en +)e $n($%en+ o((u##e%, +)e$# ,un(+$on! (e!e% +o 0e o,,$($1 +)e /o/en+ +)e3 eA(ee%e% +)e$# u+)o#$+3. '!e% on +)e *o//$!!$on ,$n%$n&!, +)e#e B! 1(E o, Cu!+$,$(+$on 03 +)e &o?e#n/en+ ,o#(e! $n +)e u!e o, ,$#e#/!. 18 Mo#eo?e#, +)e /e/0e#! o, +)e 2o1$(e n% /$1$+#3 (#oB% %$!2e#!1 un$+! (o//$++e% 2#o)$0$+e% (+ un%e# '.". '1&. 880 18 ! +)e#e B! unne(e!!#3 ,$#$n& 03 +)e/ $n %$!2e#!$n& +)e /#()e#!. 19 A! e#13 ! 1974, +)$! *ou#+ )! 2#onoun(e% +)+ n o,,$(e# (nno+ !)e1+e# )$/!e1, 03 +)e 21e +)+ )e $! 2u01$( &en+ (+$n& un%e# +)e (o1o# o, )$! o,,$(e B)en )$! (+! #e B)o113 B$+)ou+ u+)o#$+3. 60 Un+$1 #e(en+13 $n 1991, 61 +)$! %o(+#$ne !+$11 ,oun% 221$(+$on, +)$! *ou#+ !3$n& +)+ $//un$+3 ,#o/ !u$+ (nno+ $n!+$+u+$on1$Ge $##e!2on!$0$1$+3 n% non-((oun+0$1$+3 no# &#n+ 2#$?$1e&e% !++u! no+ (1$/e% 03 n3 o+)e# o,,$($1 o, +)e Re2u01$(. T)e /$1$+#3 n% 2o1$(e ,o#(e! Be#e %e21o3e% +o en!u#e +)+ +)e #113 Bou1% 0e 2e(e,u1 n% o#%e#13 ! Be11 ! +o &u#n+ee +)e !,e+3 o, +)e ?e#3 2eo21e +)+ +)e3 #e %u+3- 0oun% +o 2#o+e(+. HoBe?e#, +)e ,(+! ! ,oun% 03 +)e +#$1 (ou#+ !)oBe% +)+ +)e3 ,$#e% + +)e un#u13 (#oB% +o %$!2e#!e +)e 1++e#. 5)$1e $+ $! +#ue +)+ no+)$n& $! 0e++e# !e++1e% +)n +)e &ene#1 #u1e +)+ !o?e#e$&n !++e n% $+! 2o1$+$(1 !u0%$?$!$on! (nno+ 0e !ue% $n +)e (ou#+! eA(e2+ B)en $+ )! &$?en $+! (on!en+, $+ (nno+ 0e $n?oEe% 03 0o+) +)e /$1$+#3 o,,$(e#! +o #e1e!e +)e/ ,#o/ n3 1$0$1$+3, n% 03 +)e )e$#! n% ?$(+$/! +o %e/n% $n%e/n$,$(+$on ,#o/ +)e &o?e#n/en+. T)e 2#$n($21e o, !++e $//un$+3 ,#o/ !u$+ %oe! no+ 2213, ! $n +)$! (!e, B)en +)e #e1$e, %e/n%e% 03 +)e !u$+ #eDu$#e! no ,,$#/+$?e o,,$($1 (+$on on +)e 2#+ o, +)e S++e no# +)e ,,$#/+$?e %$!()#&e o, n3 o01$&+$on B)$() 0e1on&! +o +)e S++e $n $+! 2o1$+$(1 (2($+3, even though the officers or agents 7ho are (a"e "efen"ants clai( to hol" or act onl4 b4 virtue of a title of the state an" as its agents an" servants. 66 T)$! *ou#+ )! /%e $+ Du$+e (1e# +)+ e?en >)$&) 2o!$+$on $n +)e &o?e#n/en+ %oe! no+ (on,e# 1$(en!e +o 2e#!e(u+e o# #e(E1e!!13 $nCu#e no+)e#.> 63 T)e $ne!(201e (on(1u!$on $! +)+ +)e S++e (nno+ 0e )e1% ($?$113 1$01e ,o# +)e %e+)! +)+ ,o11oBe% +)e $n($%en+. In!+e%, +)e 1$0$1$+3 !)ou1% ,11 on +)e n/e% %e,en%n+! $n +)e 1oBe# (ou#+. In 1$ne B$+) +)e #u1$n& o, +)$! (ou#+ $n Shauf vs. %ourt of Appeals, 64 )e#e$n 2u01$( o,,$($1!, )?$n& 0een ,oun% +o )?e (+e% 0e3on% +)e !(o2e o, +)e$# u+)o#$+3, /3 0e )e1% 1$01e ,o# %/&e!. 5HERE-ORE, ,$n%$n& no #e?e#!$01e e##o# n% no &#?e 0u!e o, %$!(#e+$on (o//$++e% 03 #e!2on%en+ Ju%&e $n $!!u$n& +)e Due!+$one% o#%e#!, +)e $n!+n+ 2e+$+$on! #e )e#e03 DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. 1arvasa2 %.J.2 %ru+2 ,eliciano2 Pa"illa2 -i"in2 Gri3o6A5uino2 Regala"o2 'avi"e2 Jr.2 Ro(ero2 1ocon2 -ellosillo2 )elo an" 8uiason2 JJ.2 concur. Gutierre+2 Jr.2 J.2 is on leave. G.R. No. L-7176 M#() 11, 1974 *ARMEN -ESTEJO, demandante0apelante, vs. ISAIAS -ERNANDO, D$#e(+o# %e O0#! "u01$(!, demandado0apelado. ". #loy B. Bello en representacion de la apelante. #l $rocurador %eneral Sr. $ompeyo "iaz y el $rocurador Sr. Antonio A. Torres en representacion del apelado. DIO=NO, J.F $armen <este8o, dueDa de unos terrenos a(ucareros, de un total de unas + hectareas y media de superfice, demando a 45saias <ernando 2irector, &ureau of public )or3s, que como tal 2irector de Obras Publicas tiene a su cargo los sistemas y proyectos de irrigacion y es el funcionario responsable de la construccion de los sistemas de irrigacion en el pais,4 alegando que @ The defendant, as 2irector of the &ureau of Public )or3s, without authority obtained first from the $ourt of <irst 5nstance of 5locos Sur, without obtaining first a right of way, and without the consent and 3nowledge of the plaintiff, and against her e6press ob8ection unlawfully too3 possession of portions of the three parcels of land described above, and caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the portion of the three parcels of land on or about the month of <ebruary *+/* the aggregate area being ?C,*,+ square meters to the damage and pre8udice of the plaintiff. 00000 R. on A., p. &. causando a ella variados daDos y per8uicios. Pidio, en su consecuencia, sentencia condenando el demandado9 . . . to return or cause to be returned the possession of the portions of land unlawfully occupied and appropriated in the aggregate area of ?C,*,+ square meters and to return the land to its former condition under the e6penses of the defendant. . . . 5n the remote event that the portions of land unlawfully occupied and appropriated can not be returned to the plaintiff, then to order the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P*+,.C..?> as value of the portions totalling an area of ?C,*,+ square meters: 0000 R. on A., p. '. y ademas a pagar P+,,/-.*+ de daDos y P/,>>> de honorarios de abogado, con las costas '. on !., pp. /0-. Bl demandado, por medio del Procurador Aeneral, presento mocion de sobreseimiento de la demanda por el fundamento de que el ;u(gado no tiene 8urisdiccion para dictar sentencia valida contra el, toda ve( que 8udicialmente la reclamacion es contra la 'epublica de <ilipinas, y esta no ha presentado su consentimiento a la demanda. Bl ;u(gado inferior estimo la mocion y sobreseyo la demanda sin per8uicio y sin costas. Bn apelacion, la demandante sostiene que fue un error considerar la demanda como una contra la 'epublica y sobreseer en su virtud la demanda. Ea mocion contra 45saias <ernando, 2irector de Obras Publicas, encargado y responsable de la construccion de los sistemas de irrigacion en <ilipinas4 es una dirigida personalmente contra el, por actos que asumio e8ecutar en su concepto oficial. Ea ley no le e6ime de responsabilidad por las e6tralimitaciones que cometa o haga cometer en el desempeDo de sus funciones oficiales. Un caso seme8ante es el de Nelson vs. &obcoc3 *+..# *1 minn. /1C, N) C+, +> !E' *C,?. !lli el $omisionado de $arreteras, al me8orar un tro(o de la carretera ocupo o se apropio de terrenos contiguos al derecho de paso. Bl Tribunal Supremo del Bstado declaro que es personalmenteresponsable al dueDo de los daDos causados. 2eclaro ademas que la ratificacion de lo que hicieron sus subordinados era equivalente a una orden a los mismos. =e aqui lo di8o el Tribunal. )e thin3 the evidence and conceded facts permitted the 8ury in finding that in the trespass on plaintiff7s land defendant committed acts outside the scope of his authority. )hen he went outside the boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff7s land and damaged it or destroyed its former condition an dusefulness, he must be held to have designedly departed from the duties imposed on him by law. There can be no claim that he thus invaded plaintiff7s land southeasterly of the right of way innocently. Surveys clearly mar3ed the limits of the land appropriated for the right of way of this trun3 highway before construction began. . . . 4'atification may be equivalent to command, and cooperation may be inferred from acquiescence where there is power to restrain.4 5t is unnecessary to consider other cases cited, . . ., for as before suggested, the 8ury could find or infer that, in so far as there was actual trespass by appropriation of plaintiff7s land as a dumping place for the roc3 to be removed from the additional appropriated right of way, defendant planned, approved, and ratified what was done by his subordinates. @ Nelson vs. &obcoc3, +> !.E.'., *C,?, *C,-, *C,,. Ea doctrina sobre la responsabilidad civil de los funcionarios en casos parecidos se resume como sigue9 Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable therefor, and may be sued as any other citi(en and held answerable for whatever in8ury or damage results from his tortious act. @ () Am. *ur. +,). . . . 5f an officer, even while acting under color of his office, e6ceeds the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself under the plea that he is a public agent. @ C. !m. ;ur. 1-. 5t is a general rule that an officer0e6ecutive, administrative quasi08udicial, ministerial, or otherwise who acts outside the scope of his 8urisdiction and without authori(ation of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. 5f he e6ceed the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office, and not personally. 5n the eye of the law, his acts then are wholly without authority. @ (& Am. *ur. ,)-).. Bl articulo .? del $odigo $ivil dice a su ve(9 !'T. .?. !ny public officer or emplyee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages9 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 -# The right against deprivation of property without due process of law: 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5n any of the cases referred to this article, whether or not the defendant7s acts or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right ot commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution if the latter be instituted#, and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence. The inmdemnity shall include moral damages B6emplary damages may also be ad8udicated. "eanse tambien Eung vs. !ldanese, C/ Phil., ,1C: Syquia vs. !lmeda, No. E0 *-C1, !gosto *,, *+C,: %arque( vs. Nelson, No. E0?C*?, Septiembre *+/>. Se revoca la orden apelada y se ordena la continuacion de la tramitacion de la demanda conforme proveen los reglamentos. Sin especial pronunciamiento en cuanto a las costas. !si se ordena. $adilla, Reyes, *u/o, Bautista An/elo and Labrador, 00., estan conformes. Se2#+e O2$n$on! *ON*E"*ION, J., dissenting9 To my mind, the allegations of the complaint lead to no other conclusion than that appellee 5saias <ernando is a party in this case, not in his personal capacity, but as an officer of the Aovernment. !ccording to said pleading the defendant is 45saias <ernando, 2irector, &ureau of Public )or3s.4 %oreover, in paragraphs C and / of the complaint, it is alleged9 C. That the defendant as "irector of the Bureau of $ublic 1or2s, is in charge of irrigation pro8ects and systems, and the official responsible for the construction of irrigation system in the Philippines: /. That the defendant, as "irector of the Bureau of $ublic 1or2s, without authority obtained first from the $ourt of <irst 5nstance of 5locos Sur, without obtaining first a right of way, and without the consent and 3nowledge of the plaintiff, and against her e6press ob8ection, unlawfully too3 possession of portions of the three parcels of land described above, and caused an irrigation canal to be constructed on the portion of the three parcels of land on or about the month of <ebruary *+/* the aggregate area being ?C,*,+ square meters to the damage and pre8udice of the plaintiff. Bmphasis supplied.# The emphasis thus placed upon the allegation that the acts complained of were performed by said defendant 4as 2irector of the &ureau of Public )or3s,4 clearly shows that the designation of his office was included in the title of the case to indicate that he was being sued in his official capacity. This conclusion is bolstered up by the fact that, among other things, plaintiff prays, in the complaint, for a 8udgment Ordering the defendant to return or caused to be returned the possession of the portions of land unlawfully occupied and appropriated in the aggregate area of ?C,*,+ square meters and to return the land to its former condition under the e6pense of the defendant. Paragraph a, of the complaint#. )e ta3e 8udicial notice of the fact that the irrigation pro8ects and system reffered to in the complaint @ of which the defendant, 5saias <ernando, according to the same pleading, is 4in charge4 and for which he is 4responsible4 as 2irector of the &ureau of Public )or3s @ are established and operated with public funds, which pursuant to the $onstitution, must be appropriated by law. 5rrespective of the manner in which the construction may have been underta3en by the &ureau of Public )or3s, the system or canal is, therefore, a property of the Aovernment. $onsequently, in praying that possession of the portions of land occupied by the irrigation canal involved in the present case be returned to plaintiff therein, and that said land be restored to its former condition, plaintiff see3s to divest the Aovernment of its possession of said irrigation canal, and, what is worse, to cause said property of the Aovernment to be removed or destroyed. !s held in Syquia vs. Lopez C, Off. Aa(., --/#, the Aovernment is, accordingly, 4the real party in interest as defendant4 in the case at bar. 5n other words, the same parta3es of the nature of a suit against the state and may not be maintained without its consent. =ence 5 am constrained to dissent. G.R. No. 86608 -e0#u#3 66, 1990 UNITED STATES O- AMERI*A, -REDERI*= M. SMOUSE AND 4VONNE REEVES, petitioners, vs. HON. ELIODORO '. GUINTO, "#e!$%$n& Ju%&e, '#n() LVII, Re&$on1 T#$1 *ou#+, An&e1e! *$+3, RO'ERTO T. VALEN*IA, EMEREN*IANA *. TANGLAO, AND "A'LO *. DEL "ILAR, respondents. G.R. No. 89480 -e0#u#3 66, 1990 UNITED STATES O- AMERI*A, ANTHON4 LAMA*HIA, TJSGT. USA-, 5IL-REDO 'ELSA, "ETER ORAS*ION AND ROSE *ARTALLA, petitioners, ?!. HON. RODOL-O D. RODRIGO, ! "#e!$%$n& Ju%&e o, '#n() 8, Re&$on1 T#$1 *ou#+ :'AGUIO *IT4;, L T#$n$%%, 'en&ue+ n% -A'IAN GENOVE, #e!2on%en+!. G.R. No. 80018 -e0#u#3 66, 1990 UNITED STATES O- AMERI*A, TOMI J. =INGI, DARREL D. D4E n% STEVEN -. 'OSTI*=, 2e+$+$one#!, ?!. HON. JOSE-INA D. *E'ALLOS, A! "#e!$%$n& Ju%&e, Re&$on1 T#$1 *ou#+, '#n() 66, *2!, T#1(, n% LUIS 'AUTISTA, #e!2on%en+!. G.R. No. 80678 -e0#u#3 66, 1990 UNITED STATES O- AMERI*A, MAJOR GENERAL MI*HAEL ". *. *ARNS, AI* ERNEST E. RIVEN'URGH, AI* RO'IN 'LEVINS, SGT. NOEL A. GON.ALES, SGT. THOMAS MIT*HELL, SGT. 5A4NE L. 'ENJAMIN, ET AL.,2e+$+$one#!, ?!. HON. *ON*E"*ION S. ALAR*ON VERGARA, ! "#e!$%$n& Ju%&e, '#n() 66 REGIONAL TRIAL *OURT, An&e1e! *$+3, n% RI*=4 SAN*HE., -REDDIE SAN*HE. A=A -REDDIE RIVERA, ED5IN MARIANO, A=A JESSIE DOLORES SANGALANG, ET AL., #e!2on%en+!. Luna2 Sison ! )anas La7 .ffice for petitioners. *RU., J.: T)e!e (!e! )?e 0een (on!o1$%+e% 0e(u!e +)e3 11 $n?o1?e +)e %o(+#$ne o, !++e $//un$+3. T)e Un$+e% S++e! o, A/e#$( B! no+ $/21e%e% $n +)e (o/21$n+! 0e1oB 0u+ )! /o?e% +o %$!/$!! on +)e &#oun% +)+ +)e3 #e $n e,,e(+ !u$+! &$n!+ $+ +o B)$() $+ )! no+ (on!en+e%. I+ $! noB (on+e!+$n& +)e %en$1 o, $+! /o+$on! 03 +)e #e!2on%en+ Cu%&e!. In G.R. No. 86608, +)e 2#$?+e #e!2on%en+! #e !u$n& !e?e#1 o,,$(e#! o, +)e U.S. A$# -o#(e !++$one% $n *1#E A$# '!e $n (onne(+$on B$+) +)e 0$%%$n& (on%u(+e% 03 +)e/ ,o# (on+#(+! ,o# 0#0e# !e#?$(e! $n +)e !$% 0!e. On -e0#u#3 64, 1986, +)e 5e!+e#n "($,$( *on+#(+$n& O,,$(e, OE$nB A#e EA()n&e, U.S. A$# -o#(e, !o1$($+e% 0$%! ,o# !u() (on+#(+! +)#ou&) $+! (on+#(+$n& o,,$(e#, J/e! -. S)B. A/on& +)o!e B)o !u0/$++e% +)e$# 0$%! Be#e 2#$?+e #e!2on%en+! Ro0e#+o T. V1en($, E/e#en($n *. Tn&1o, n% "01o *. %e1 "$1#. V1en($ )% 0een (on(e!!$on$#e $n!$%e *1#E ,o# 34 3e#!@ %e1 "$1# ,o# 16 3e#!@ n% Tn&1o ,o# 70 3e#!. T)e 0$%%$n& B! Bon 03 R/on D$Gon, o?e# +)e o0Ce(+$on o, +)e 2#$?+e #e!2on%en+!, B)o (1$/e% +)+ )e )% /%e 0$% ,o# ,ou# ,($1$+$e!, $n(1u%$n& +)e *$?$1 En&$nee#$n& A#e, B)$() B! no+ $n(1u%e% $n +)e $n?$++$on +o 0$%. T)e 2#$?+e #e!2on%en+! (o/21$ne% +o +)e ")$1$22$ne A#e EA()n&e :"HA9;. T)e 1++e#, +)#ou&) $+! #e2#e!en++$?e!, 2e+$+$one#! 4?onne Ree?e! n% -#e%e#$( M. S/ou!e eA21$ne% +)+ +)e *$?$1 En&$nee#$n& (on(e!!$on )% no+ 0een B#%e% +o D$Gon ! #e!u1+ o, +)e -e0#u#3 64, 1986 !o1$($++$on. D$Gon B! 1#e%3 o2e#+$n& +)$! (on(e!!$on, +)en EnoBn ! +)e N*O (1u0 (on(e!!$on, n% +)e eA2$#+$on o, +)e (on+#(+ )% 0een eA+en%e% ,#o/ June 30, 1986 +o Au&u!+ 31, 1986. T)e3 ,u#+)e# eA21$ne% +)+ +)e !o1$($++$on o, +)e *E 0#0e#!)o2 Bou1% 0e ?$101e on13 03 +)e en% o, June n% +)e 2#$?+e #e!2on%en+! Bou1% 0e no+$,$e%. On June 30, 1986, +)e 2#$?+e #e!2on%en+! ,$1e% (o/21$n+ $n +)e (ou#+ 0e1oB +o (o/2e1 "HA9 n% +)e $n%$?$%u1 2e+$+$one#! +o (n(e1 +)e B#% +o %e,en%n+ D$Gon, +o (on%u(+ #e0$%%$n& ,o# +)e 0#0e#!)o2 (on(e!!$on! n% +o 11oB +)e 2#$?+e #e!2on%en+! 03 B#$+ o, 2#e1$/$n#3 $nCun(+$on +o (on+$nue o2e#+$n& +)e (on(e!!$on! 2en%$n& 1$+$&+$on. 1 U2on +)e ,$1$n& o, +)e (o/21$n+, +)e #e!2on%en+ (ou#+ $!!ue% n e9 parte o#%e# %$#e(+$n& +)e $n%$?$%u1 2e+$+$one#! +o /$n+$n +)e status 5uo. On Ju13 66, 1986, +)e 2e+$+$one#! ,$1e% /o+$on +o %$!/$!! n% o22o!$+$on +o +)e 2e+$+$on ,o# 2#e1$/$n#3 $nCun(+$on on +)e &#oun% +)+ +)e (+$on B! $n e,,e(+ !u$+ &$n!+ +)e Un$+e% S++e! o, A/e#$(, B)$() )% no+ B$?e% $+! non- !u0$1$+3. T)e $n%$?$%u1 %e,en%n+!, ! o,,$($1 e/21o3ee! o, +)e U.S. A$# -o#(e, Be#e 1!o $//une ,#o/ !u$+. On +)e !/e %+e, Ju13 66, 1986, +)e +#$1 (ou#+ %en$e% +)e 221$(+$on ,o# B#$+ o, 2#e1$/$n#3 $nCun(+$on. On O(+o0e# 10, 1988, +)e +#$1 (ou#+ %en$e% +)e 2e+$+$one#!H /o+$on +o %$!/$!!, )o1%$n& $n 2#+ ! ,o11oB!F -#o/ +)e 21e%$n&! +)u! ,# 2#e!en+e% +o +)$! *ou#+ 03 +)e 2#+$e!, +)e *ou#+H! ++en+$on $! (11e% 03 +)e #e1+$on!)$2 0e+Been +)e 21$n+$,,! ! Be11 ! +)e %e,en%n+!, $n(1u%$n& +)e US Go?e#n/en+, $n +)+ 2#$o# +o +)e 0$%%$n& o# !o1$($++$on $n Due!+$on, +)e#e B! 0$n%$n& (on+#(+ 0e+Been +)e 21$n+$,,! ! Be11 ! +)e %e,en%n+!, $n(1u%$n& +)e US Go?e#n/en+. '3 ?$#+ue o, !$% (on+#(+ o, (on(e!!$on $+ $! +)e *ou#+H! un%e#!+n%$n& +)+ ne$+)e# +)e US Go?e#n/en+ no# +)e )e#e$n 2#$n($21 %e,en%n+! Bou1% 0e(o/e +)e e/21o3e#J! o, +)e 21$n+$,,! 0u+ +)+ +)e 1++e# #e +)e e/21o3e#! +)e/!e1?e! o, +)e 0#0e#!, e+(. B$+) +)e e/21o3e#, +)e 21$n+$,,! )e#e$n, #e/$++$n& +)e !+$2u1+e% 2e#(en+&e o, (o//$!!$on! +o +)e ")$1$22$ne A#e EA()n&e. T)e !/e ($#(u/!+n(e Bou1% 0e(o/e $n e,,e(+ B)en +)e ")$1$22$ne A#e EA()n&e o2ene% ,o# 0$%%$n& o# !o1$($++$on +)e Due!+$one% 0#0e# !)o2 (on(e!!$on!. To +)$! eA+en+, +)e#e,o#e, $n%ee% (o//e#($1 +#n!(+$on )! 0een en+e#e%, n% ,o# 2u#2o!e! o, +)e !$% !o1$($++$on, Bou1% ne(e!!#$13 0e en+e#e% 0e+Been +)e 21$n+$,,! ! Be11 ! +)e %e,en%n+!. T)e *ou#+, ,u#+)e#, $! o, +)e ?$eB +)+ A#+$(1e 9VIII o, +)e R"-US '!e! A&#ee/en+ %oe! no+ (o?e# !u() E$n% o, !e#?$(e! ,11$n& un%e# +)e (on(e!!$on$#e!)$2, !u() ! 0#0e# !)o2 (on(e!!$on. 6 On De(e/0e# 11, 1986, ,o11oB$n& +)e ,$1$n& o, +)e )e#e$n 2e+$+$on ,o# certiorari n% 2#o)$0$+$on B$+) 2#e1$/$n#3 $nCun(+$on, Be $!!ue% +e/2o##3 #e!+#$n$n& o#%e# &$n!+ ,u#+)e# 2#o(ee%$n&! $n +)e (ou#+ 0e1oB. 3 In G.R. No. 89480, -0$n Geno?e ,$1e% (o/21$n+ ,o# %/&e! &$n!+ 2e+$+$one#! An+)on3 L/()$, 5$1,#e%o 'e1!, Ro!e *#+11 n% "e+e# O#!($on ,o# )$! %$!/$!!1 ! (ooE $n +)e U.S. A$# -o#(e Re(#e+$on *en+e# + +)e Jo)n H3 A$# S++$on $n '&u$o *$+3. I+ )% 0een !(e#+$ne% ,+e# $n?e!+$&+$on, ,#o/ +)e +e!+$/on3 o, 'e1! *#+11 n% O#!($on, +)+ Geno?e )% 2ou#e% u#$ne $n+o +)e !ou2 !+o(E u!e% $n (ooE$n& +)e ?e&e+01e! !e#?e% +o +)e (1u0 (u!+o/e#!. L/()$, ! (1u0 /n&e#, !u!2en%e% )$/ n% +)e#e,+e# #e,e##e% +)e (!e +o 0o#% o, #0$+#+o#! (on,o#/013 +o +)e (o11e(+$?e 0#&$n$n& &#ee/en+ 0e+Been +)e *en+e# n% $+! e/21o3ee!. T)e 0o#% unn$/ou!13 ,oun% )$/ &u$1+3 n% #e(o//en%e% )$! %$!/$!!1. T)$! B! e,,e(+e% on M#() 7, 1986, 03 *o1. D?$% *. =$/011, *o//n%e# o, +)e 3#% *o/0+ Su22o#+ G#ou2, "A*A- *1#E A$# -o#(e '!e. Geno?eH! #e(+$on B! +o ,$1e M! (o/21$n+ $n +)e Re&$on1 T#$1 *ou#+ o, '&u$o *$+3 &$n!+ +)e $n%$?$%u1 2e+$+$one#!. 4 On M#() 13, 1988, +)e %e,en%n+!, Co$ne% 03 +)e Un$+e% S++e! o, A/e#$(, /o?e% +o %$!/$!! +)e (o/21$n+, 11e&$n& +)+ L/()$, ! n o,,$(e# o, +)e U.S. A$# -o#(e !++$one% + Jo)n H3 A$# S++$on, B! $//une ,#o/ !u$+ ,o# +)e (+! %one 03 )$/ $n )$! o,,$($1 (2($+3. T)e3 #&ue% +)+ +)e !u$+ B! $n e,,e(+ &$n!+ +)e Un$+e% S++e!, B)$() )% no+ &$?en $+! (on!en+ +o 0e !ue%. T)$! /o+$on B! %en$e% 03 +)e #e!2on%en+ Cu%&e on June 4, 1988, $n n o#%e# B)$() #e% $n 2#+F I+ $! +)e un%e#!+n%$n& o, +)e *ou#+, 0!e% on +)e 11e&+$on! o, +)e (o/21$n+ K B)$() )?e 0een )32o+)e+$(113 %/$++e% 03 %e,en%n+! u2on +)e ,$1$n& o, +)e$# /o+$on +o %$!/$!! K +)+ 1+)ou&) %e,en%n+! (+e% $n$+$113 $n +)e$# o,,$($1 (2($+$e!, +)e$# &o$n& 0e3on% B)+ +)e$# ,un(+$on! (11e% ,o# 0#ou&)+ +)e/ ou+ o, +)e 2#o+e(+$?e /n+1e o, B)+e?e# $//un$+$e! +)e3 /3 )?e )% $n +)e 0e&$nn$n&. T)u!, +)e 11e&+$on +)+ +)e (+! (o/21$ne% o, Be#e $11e&1, %one. B$+) eA+#e/e 0% ,$+) n% B$+) 2#e-(on(e$?e% !$n$!+e# 21n +o )#!! n% ,$n113 %$!/$!! +)e 21$n+$,,, &$n! !$&n$,$(n(e. 7 T)e 2e+$+$one#! +)en (/e +o +)$! *ou#+ !eeE$n& certiorari n% 2#o)$0$+$on B$+) 2#e1$/$n#3 $nCun(+$on. In G.R. No. 80018, Lu$! 'u+$!+, B)o B! e/21o3e% ! 0##(E! 0o3 $n */2 OH Donne11, n eA+en!$on o, *1#E A$# '!e, B! ##e!+e% ,o11oB$n& 0u3-0u!+ o2e#+$on (on%u(+e% 03 +)e $n%$?$%u1 2e+$+$one#! )e#e$n, n/e13, To/$ J. =$n&, D##e1 D. D3e n% S+e2)en -. 'o!+$(E, o,,$(e#! o, +)e U.S. A$# -o#(e n% !2e($1 &en+! o, +)e A$# -o#(e O,,$(e o, S2e($1 In?e!+$&+o#! :A-OSI;. On +)e 0!$! o, +)e !Bo#n !++e/en+! /%e 03 +)e/, n $n,o#/+$on ,o# ?$o1+$on o, R.A. 6467, o+)e#B$!e EnoBn ! +)e Dn&e#ou! D#u&! A(+, B! ,$1e% &$n!+ 'u+$!+ $n +)e Re&$on1 T#$1 *ou#+ o, T#1(. T)e 0o?e-n/e% o,,$(e#! +e!+$,$e% &$n!+ )$/ + )$! +#$1. A! #e!u1+ o, +)e ,$1$n& o, +)e ()#&e, 'u+$!+ B! %$!/$!!e% ,#o/ )$! e/21o3/en+. He +)en ,$1e% (o/21$n+ ,o# %/&e! &$n!+ +)e $n%$?$%u1 2e+$+$one#! )e#e$n (1$/$n& +)+ $+ B! 0e(u!e o, +)e$# (+! +)+ )e B! #e/o?e%. 6 Du#$n& +)e 2e#$o% ,o# ,$1$n& o, +)e n!Be#, M#$no 4. N?##o !2e($1 (oun!e1 !!$&ne% +o +)e In+e#n+$on1 LB D$?$!$on, O,,$(e o, +)e S+,, Ju%&e A%?o(+e o, *1#E A$# '!e, en+e#e% !2e($1 22e#n(e ,o# +)e %e,en%n+! n% /o?e% ,o# n eA+en!$on B$+)$n B)$() +o ,$1e n >n!Be# n%Jo# o+)e# 21e%$n&!.> H$! #e!on B! +)+ +)e A++o#ne3 Gene#1 o, +)e Un$+e% S++e! )% no+ 3e+ %e!$&n+e% (oun!e1 +o #e2#e!en+ +)e %e,en%n+!, B)o Be#e 0e$n& !ue% ,o# +)e$# o,,$($1 (+!. 5$+)$n +)e eA+en%e% 2e#$o%, +)e %e,en%n+!, B$+)ou+ +)e !!$!+n(e o, (oun!e1 o# u+)o#$+3 ,#o/ +)e U.S. De2#+/en+ o, Ju!+$(e, ,$1e% +)e$# n!Be#. T)e3 11e&e% +)e#e$n ! ,,$#/+$?e %e,en!e! +)+ +)e3 )% on13 %one +)e$# %u+3 $n +)e en,o#(e/en+ o, +)e 1B! o, +)e ")$1$22$ne! $n!$%e +)e A/e#$(n 0!e! 2u#!un+ +o +)e R"-US M$1$+#3 '!e! A&#ee/en+. On M3 8, 1988, +)e 1B ,$#/ o, Lun, S$!on n% Mn!, )?$n& 0een #e+$ne% +o #e2#e!en+ +)e %e,en%n+!, ,$1e% B$+) 1e?e o, (ou#+ /o+$on +o B$+)%#B +)e n!Be# n% %$!/$!! +)e (o/21$n+. T)e &#oun% $n?oEe% B! +)+ +)e %e,en%n+! Be#e (+$n& $n +)e$# o,,$($1 (2($+3 B)en +)e3 %$% +)e (+! (o/21$ne% o, n% +)+ +)e (o/21$n+ &$n!+ +)e/ B! $n e,,e(+ !u$+ &$n!+ +)e Un$+e% S++e! B$+)ou+ $+! (on!en+. T)e /o+$on B! %en$e% 03 +)e #e!2on%en+ Cu%&e $n )$! o#%e# %+e% Se2+e/0e# 11, 1988, B)$() )e1% +)+ +)e (1$/e% $//un$+3 un%e# +)e M$1$+#3 '!e! A&#ee/en+ (o?e#e% on13 (#$/$n1 n% no+ ($?$1 (!e!. Mo#eo?e#, +)e %e,en%n+! )% (o/e un%e# +)e Cu#$!%$(+$on o, +)e (ou#+ B)en +)e3 !u0/$++e% +)e$# n!Be#. 8 -o11oB$n& +)e ,$1$n& o, +)e )e#e$n 2e+$+$on ,o# certiorari n% 2#o)$0$+$on B$+) 2#e1$/$n#3 $nCun(+$on, Be $!!ue% on O(+o0e# 14, 1988, +e/2o##3 #e!+#$n$n& o#%e#. 8 In G.R. No. 80678, (o/21$n+ ,o# %/&e! B! ,$1e% 03 +)e 2#$?+e #e!2on%en+! &$n!+ +)e )e#e$n 2e+$+$one#! :eA(e2+ +)e Un$+e% S++e! o, A/e#$(;, ,o# $nCu#$e! 11e&e%13 !u!+$ne% 03 +)e 21$n+$,,! ! #e!u1+ o, +)e (+! o, +)e %e,en%n+!. 9 T)e#e $! (on,1$(+ o, ,(+u1 11e&+$on! )e#e. A((o#%$n& +o +)e 21$n+$,,!, +)e %e,en%n+! 0e+ +)e/ u2, )n%(u,,e% +)e/ n% un1e!)e% %o&! on +)e/ B)$() 0$+ +)e/ $n !e?e#1 2#+! o, +)e$# 0o%$e! n% (u!e% eA+en!$?e $nCu#$e! +o +)e/. T)e %e,en%n+! %en3 +)$! n% (1$/ +)e 21$n+$,,! Be#e ##e!+e% ,o# +)e,+ n% Be#e 0$++en 03 +)e %o&! 0e(u!e +)e3 Be#e !+#u&&1$n& n% #e!$!+$n& ##e!+, T)e %e,en%n+! !+#e!! +)+ +)e %o&! Be#e (11e% o,, n% +)e 21$n+$,,! Be#e $//e%$+e13 +Een +o +)e /e%$(1 (en+e# ,o# +#e+/en+ o, +)e$# Boun%!. In /o+$on +o %$!/$!! +)e (o/21$n+, +)e Un$+e% S++e! o, A/e#$( n% +)e $n%$?$%u113 n/e% %e,en%n+! #&ue% +)+ +)e !u$+ B! $n e,,e(+ !u$+ &$n!+ +)e Un$+e% S++e!, B)$() )% no+ &$?en $+! (on!en+ +o 0e !ue%. T)e %e,en%n+! Be#e 1!o $//une ,#o/ !u$+ un%e# +)e R"-US '!e! T#e+3 ,o# (+! %one 03 +)e/ $n +)e 2e#,o#/n(e o, +)e$# o,,$($1 ,un(+$on!. T)e /o+$on +o %$!/$!! B! %en$e% 03 +)e +#$1 (ou#+ $n $+! o#%e# %+e% Au&u!+ 10, 1988, #e%$n& $n 2#+ ! ,o11oB!F T)e %e,en%n+! (e#+$n13 (nno+ (o##e(+13 #&ue +)+ +)e3 #e $//une ,#o/ !u$+. T)e 11e&+$on!, o, +)e (o/21$n+ B)$() $! !ou&)+ +o 0e %$!/$!!e%, )% +o 0e )32o+)e+$(113 %/$++e% n% B)+e?e# &#oun% +)e %e,en%n+! /3 )?e, )% +o 0e ?en+$1+e% %u#$n& +)e +#$1 o, +)e (!e on +)e /e#$+!. T)e (o/21$n+ 11e&e% (#$/$n1 (+! &$n!+ +)e $n%$?$%u113-n/e% %e,en%n+! n% ,#o/ +)e n+u#e o, !$% (+! $+ (ou1% no+ 0e !$% +)+ +)e3 #e A(+! o, S++e, ,o# B)$() $//un$+3 !)ou1% 0e $n?oEe%. I, +)e -$1$2$no! +)e/!e1?e! #e %u+3 0oun% +o #e!2e(+, o0e3 n% !u0/$+ +)e/!e1?e! +o +)e 1B! o, +)e (oun+#3, B$+) /o#e #e!on, +)e /e/0e#! o, +)e Un$+e% S++e! A#/e% -o#(e! B)o #e 0e$n& +#e+e% ! &ue!+! o, +)$! (oun+#3 !)ou1% #e!2e(+, o0e3 n% !u0/$+ +)e/!e1?e! +o $+! 1B!. 10 n% !o B! +)e /o+$on ,o# #e(on!$%e#+$on. T)e %e,en%n+! !u0/$++e% +)e$# n!Be# ! #eDu$#e% 0u+ !u0!eDuen+13 ,$1e% +)e$# 2e+$+$on ,o# certiorari n% 2#o)$0$+$on B$+) 2#e1$/$n#3 $nCun(+$on B$+) +)$! *ou#+. 5e $!!ue% +e/2o##3 #e!+#$n$n& o#%e# on O(+o0e# 68, 1988. 11 II T)e #u1e +)+ !++e /3 no+ 0e !ue% B$+)ou+ $+! (on!en+, noB eA2#e!!e% $n A#+$(1e 9VI, Se(+$on 3, o, +)e 1988 *on!+$+u+$on, $! one o, +)e &ene#113 ((e2+e% 2#$n($21e! o, $n+e#n+$on1 1B +)+ Be )?e %o2+e% ! 2#+ o, +)e 1B o, ou# 1n% un%e# A#+$(1e II, Se(+$on 6. T)$! 1++e# 2#o?$!$on /e#e13 #e$+e#+e! 2o1$(3 e#1$e# e/0o%$e% $n +)e 1937 n% 1983 *on!+$+u+$on! n% 1!o $n+en%e% +o /n$,e!+ ou# #e!o1?e +o 0$%e 03 +)e #u1e! o, +)e $n+e#n+$on1 (o//un$+3. E?en B$+)ou+ !u() ,,$#/+$on, Be Bou1% !+$11 0e 0oun% 03 +)e &ene#113 ((e2+e% 2#$n($21e! o, $n+e#n+$on1 1B un%e# +)e %o(+#$ne o, $n(o#2o#+$on. Un%e# +)$! %o(+#$ne, ! ((e2+e% 03 +)e /Co#$+3 o, !++e!, !u() 2#$n($21e! #e %ee/e% $n(o#2o#+e% $n +)e 1B o, e?e#3 ($?$1$Ge% !++e ! (on%$+$on n% (on!eDuen(e o, $+! /e/0e#!)$2 $n +)e !o($e+3 o, n+$on!. U2on $+! %/$!!$on +o !u() !o($e+3, +)e !++e $! u+o/+$(113 o01$&+e% +o (o/213 B$+) +)e!e 2#$n($21e! $n $+! #e1+$on! B$+) o+)e# !++e!. A! 221$e% +o +)e 1o(1 !++e, +)e %o(+#$ne o, !++e $//un$+3 $! 0!e% on +)e Cu!+$,$(+$on &$?en 03 Ju!+$(e Ho1/e! +)+ >+)e#e (n 0e no 1e&1 #$&)+ &$n!+ +)e u+)o#$+3 B)$() /Ee! +)e 1B on B)$() +)e #$&)+ %e2en%!.> 16 T)e#e #e o+)e# 2#(+$(1 #e!on! ,o# +)e en,o#(e/en+ o, +)e %o(+#$ne. In +)e (!e o, +)e ,o#e$&n !++e !ou&)+ +o 0e $/21e%e% $n +)e 1o(1 Cu#$!%$(+$on, +)e %%e% $n)$0$+$on $! eA2#e!!e% $n +)e /A$/ par in pare(2 non habet i(periu(. A11 !++e! #e !o?e#e$&n eDu1! n% (nno+ !!e#+ Cu#$!%$(+$on o?e# one no+)e#. A (on+##3 %$!2o!$+$on Bou1%, $n +)e 1n&u&e o, (e1e0#+e% (!e, >un%u13 ?eA +)e 2e(e o, n+$on!.> 13 5)$1e +)e %o(+#$ne 22e#! +o 2#o)$0$+ on13 !u$+! &$n!+ +)e !++e B$+)ou+ $+! (on!en+, $+ $! 1!o 221$(01e +o (o/21$n+! ,$1e% &$n!+ o,,$($1! o, +)e !++e ,o# (+! 11e&e%13 2e#,o#/e% 03 +)e/ $n +)e %$!()#&e o, +)e$# %u+$e!. T)e #u1e $! +)+ $, +)e Cu%&/en+ &$n!+ !u() o,,$($1! B$11 #eDu$#e +)e !++e $+!e1, +o 2e#,o#/ n ,,$#/+$?e (+ +o !+$!,3 +)e !/e, !u() ! +)e 22#o2#$+$on o, +)e /oun+ nee%e% +o 23 +)e %/&e! B#%e% &$n!+ +)e/, +)e !u$+ /u!+ 0e #e&#%e% ! &$n!+ +)e !++e $+!e1, 1+)ou&) $+ )! no+ 0een ,o#/113 $/21e%e%. 14 In !u() !$+u+$on, +)e !++e /3 /o?e +o %$!/$!! +)e (o/21$n+ on +)e &#oun% +)+ $+ )! 0een ,$1e% B$+)ou+ $+! (on!en+. T)e %o(+#$ne $! !o/e+$/e! %e#$!$?e13 (11e% >+)e #o31 2#e#o&+$?e o, %$!)one!+3> 0e(u!e o, +)e 2#$?$1e&e $+ &#n+! +)e !++e +o %e,e+ n3 1e&$+$/+e (1$/ &$n!+ $+ 03 !$/213 $n?oE$n& $+! non-!u0$1$+3. T)+ $! )#%13 ,$#, + 1e!+ $n %e/o(#+$( !o($e+$e!, ,o# +)e !++e $! no+ n un,ee1$n& +3#n+ un/o?e% 03 +)e ?1$% (1$/! o, $+! ($+$Gen!. In ,(+, +)e %o(+#$ne $! no+ 0!o1u+e n% %oe! no+ !3 +)e !++e /3 no+ 0e !ue% un%e# n3 ($#(u/!+n(e. On +)e (on+##3, +)e #u1e !3! +)+ +)e !++e /3 no+ 0e !ue% B$+)ou+ $+! (on!en+, B)$() (1e#13 $/2o#+! +)+ $+ /3 0e !ue% $, $+ (on!en+!. T)e (on!en+ o, +)e !++e +o 0e !ue% /3 0e /n$,e!+e% eA2#e!!13 o# $/21$e%13. EA2#e!! (on!en+ /3 0e e/0o%$e% $n &ene#1 1B o# !2e($1 1B. *on!en+ $! $/21$e% B)en +)e !++e en+e#! $n+o (on+#(+ o# $+ $+!e1, (o//en(e! 1$+$&+$on. T)e &ene#1 1B B$?$n& +)e $//un$+3 o, +)e !++e ,#o/ !u$+ $! ,oun% $n A(+ No. 3083, un%e# B)$() +)e ")$1$22$ne &o?e#n/en+ >(on!en+! n% !u0/$+! +o 0e !ue% u2on n3 /one3e% (1$/ $n?o1?$n& 1$0$1$+3 #$!$n& ,#o/ (on+#(+, eA2#e!! o# $/21$e%, B)$() (ou1% !e#?e ! 0!$! o, ($?$1 (+$on 0e+Been 2#$?+e 2#+$e!.> In )erritt v. 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B$%e13 ((e2+e% 2#$n($21e o, $n+e#n+$on1 1B, B)$() $! /%e 2#+ o, +)e 1B o, +)e 1n% :A#+$(1e II, Se(+$on 3 o, +)e *on!+$+u+$on;, +)+ ,o#e$&n !++e /3 no+ 0e 0#ou&)+ +o !u$+ 0e,o#e +)e (ou#+! o, no+)e# !++e o# $+! oBn (ou#+! B$+)ou+ $+! (on!en+.H -$n113, +)e#e $! Johnson v. Turner, n 22e1 03 +)e %e,en%n+, +)en *o//n%$n& Gene#1, ")$1$22$ne *o//n% :A$# -o#(e, B$+) o,,$(e + *1#E -$e1%; ,#o/ %e($!$on o#%e#$n& +)e #e+u#n +o 21$n+$,, o, +)e (on,$!(+e% /$1$+#3 23/en+ (e#+$,$(+e! EnoBn ! !(#$2 /one3. In #e?e#!$n& +)e 1oBe# (ou#+ %e($!$on, +)$! T#$0un1, +)#ou&) Ju!+$(e Mon+e/3o#, #e1$e% on S45uia v. Al(e"a Lope+, eA21$n$n& B)3 $+ (ou1% no+ 0e !u!+$ne%. I+ 0e#! !+#e!!$n& + +)$! 2o$n+ +)+ +)e 0o?e o0!e#?+$on! %o no+ (on,e# on +)e Un$+e% S++e! o, A/e#$( 01nEe+ $//un$+3 ,o# 11 (+! %one 03 $+ o# $+! &en+! $n +)e ")$1$22$ne!. Ne$+)e# /3 +)e o+)e# 2e+$+$one#! (1$/ +)+ +)e3 #e 1!o $n!u1+e% ,#o/ !u$+ $n +)$! 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I+ (nno+ ,o# /o/en+ 0e $/&$ne% +)+ +)e3 Be#e (+$n& $n +)e$# 2#$?+e o# uno,,$($1 (2($+3 B)en +)e3 22#e)en%e% n% 1+e# +e!+$,$e% &$n!+ +)e (o/21$nn+. I+ ,o11oB! +)+ ,o# %$!()#&$n& +)e$# %u+$e! ! &en+! o, +)e Un$+e% S++e!, +)e3 (nno+ 0e %$#e(+13 $/21e%e% ,o# (+! $/2u+01e +o +)e$# 2#$n($21, B)$() )! no+ &$?en $+! (on!en+ +o 0e !ue%. A! Be o0!e#?e% $n San"ers v. <eri"ianoF 64 G$?en +)e o,,$($1 ()#(+e# o, +)e 0o?e-%e!(#$0e% 1e++e#!, Be )?e +o (on(1u%e +)+ +)e 2e+$+$one#! Be#e, 1e&113 !2eE$n&, 0e$n& !ue% ! o,,$(e#! o, +)e Un$+e% S++e! &o?e#n/en+. A! +)e3 )?e (+e% on 0e)1, o, +)+ &o?e#n/en+, n% B$+)$n +)e !(o2e o, +)e$# u+)o#$+3, $+ $! +)+ &o?e#n/en+, n% no+ +)e 2e+$+$one#! 2e#!on113, +)+ $! #e!2on!$01e ,o# +)e$# (+!. T)e 2#$?+e #e!2on%en+ $n?oEe! A#+$(1e 6180 o, +)e *$?$1 *o%e B)$() )o1%! +)e &o?e#n/en+ 1$01e $, $+ (+! +)#ou&) !2e($1 &en+. T)e #&u/en+, $+ Bou1% !ee/, $! 2#e/$!e% on +)e &#oun% +)+ !$n(e +)e o,,$(e#! #e %e!$&n+e% >!2e($1 &en+!,> +)e Un$+e% S++e! &o?e#n/en+ !)ou1% 0e 1$01e ,o# +)e$# +o#+!. T)e#e !ee/! +o 0e ,$1u#e +o %$!+$n&u$!) 0e+Been !u0$1$+3 n% 1$0$1$+3 n% /$!(on(e2+$on +)+ +)e +Bo +e#/! #e !3non3/ou!. Su0$1$+3 %e2en%! on +)e (on!en+ o, +)e !++e +o 0e !ue%, 1$0$1$+3 on +)e 221$(01e 1B n% +)e e!+01$!)e% ,(+!. T)e ($#(u/!+n(e +)+ !++e $! !u01e %oe! no+ ne(e!!#$13 /en +)+ $+ $! 1$01e@ on +)e o+)e# )n%, $+ (n ne?e# 0e )e1% 1$01e $, $+ %oe! no+ ,$#!+ (on!en+ +o 0e !ue%. L$0$1$+3 $! no+ (on(e%e% 03 +)e /e#e ,(+ +)+ +)e !++e )! 11oBe% $+!e1, +o 0e !ue%. 5)en +)e !++e %oe! B$?e $+! !o?e#e$&n $//un$+3, $+ $! on13 &$?$n& +)e 21$n+$,, +)e ()n(e +o 2#o?e, $, $+ (n, +)+ +)e %e,en%n+ $! 1$01e. T)e !$% #+$(1e e!+01$!)e! #u1e o, liabilit4, no+ !u0$1$+3. T)e &o?e#n/en+ /3 0e )e1% 1$01e un%e# +)$! #u1e on13 $, $+ ,$#!+ 11oB! $+!e1, +o 0e !ue% +)#ou&) n3 o, +)e ((e2+e% ,o#/! o, (on!en+. 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T)e (on+#%$(+o#3 ,(+u1 11e&+$on! $n +)$! (!e %e!e#?e $n ou# ?$eB (1o!e# !+u%3 o, B)+ (+u113 )22ene% +o +)e 21$n+$,,!. T)e #e(o#% $! +oo /e&e# +o $n%$(+e $, +)e %e,en%n+! Be#e #e113 %$!()#&$n& +)e$# o,,$($1 %u+$e! o# )% (+u113 eA(ee%e% +)e$# u+)o#$+3 B)en +)e $n($%en+ $n Due!+$on o((u##e%. L(E$n& +)$! $n,o#/+$on, +)$! *ou#+ (nno+ %$#e(+13 %e($%e +)$! (!e. T)e nee%e% $nDu$#3 /u!+ ,$#!+ 0e /%e 03 +)e 1oBe# (ou#+ !o $+ /3 !!e!! n% #e!o1?e +)e (on,1$(+$n& (1$/! o, +)e 2#+$e! on +)e 0!$! o, +)e e?$%en(e +)+ )! 3e+ +o 0e 2#e!en+e% + +)e +#$1. On13 ,+e# $+ !)11 )?e %e+e#/$ne% $n B)+ (2($+3 +)e 2e+$+$one#! Be#e (+$n& + +)e +$/e o, +)e $n($%en+ $n Due!+$on B$11 +)$! *ou#+ %e+e#/$ne, $, !+$11 ne(e!!#3, $, +)e %o(+#$ne o, !++e $//un$+3 $! 221$(01e. In G.R. No. 89480, 2#$?+e #e!2on%en+ Geno?e B! e/21o3e% ! (ooE $n +)e M$n *1u0 1o(+e% + +)e U.S. A$# -o#(e Re(#e+$on *en+e#, 1!o EnoBn ! +)e O2en Me!! *o/21eA, + Jo)n H3 A$# S++$on. A! /n&e# o, +)$! (o/21eA, 2e+$+$one# L/()$ $! #e!2on!$01e ,o# e1e?en %$?e#!$,$e% (+$?$+$e! &ene#+$n& n nnu1 $n(o/e o, L6 /$11$on. Un%e# )$! eAe(u+$?e /n&e/en+ #e +)#ee !e#?$(e #e!+u#n+!, (,e+e#$, 0Ee#3, *1!! VI !+o#e, (o,,ee n% 2n+#3 !)o2, /$n (!)$e# (&e, n %/$n$!+#+$?e o,,$(e, n% %e(en+#1$Ge% B#e)ou!e B)$() /$n+$n! !+o(E 1e?e1 o, L600,000.00 2e# /on+) $n #e!1e $+e/!. He !u2e#?$!e! 168 e/21o3ee!, one o, B)o/ B! Geno?e, B$+) B)o/ +)e Un$+e% S++e! &o?e#n/en+ )! (on(1u%e% (o11e(+$?e 0#&$n$n& &#ee/en+. -#o/ +)e!e ($#(u/!+n(e!, +)e *ou#+ (n !!u/e +)+ +)e #e!+u#n+ !e#?$(e! o,,e#e% + +)e Jo)n H3 A$# S++$on 2#+Ee o, +)e n+u#e o, 0u!$ne!! en+e#2#$!e un%e#+Een 03 +)e Un$+e% S++e! &o?e#n/en+ $n $+! 2#o2#$e+#3 (2($+3. Su() !e#?$(e! #e no+ eA+en%e% +o +)e A/e#$(n !e#?$(e/en ,o# ,#ee ! 2e#Du$!$+e o, /e/0e#!)$2 $n +)e A#/e% -o#(e! o, +)e Un$+e% S++e!. Ne$+)e# %oe! $+ 22e# +)+ +)e3 #e eA(1u!$?e13 o,,e#e% +o +)e!e !e#?$(e/en@ on +)e (on+##3, $+ $! Be11 EnoBn +)+ +)e3 #e ?$101e +o +)e &ene#1 2u01$( ! 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'u+ +)e!e (on!$%e#+$on! no+B$+)!+n%$n&, Be )o1% +)+ +)e (o/21$n+ &$n!+ +)e 2e+$+$one#! $n +)e (ou#+ 0e1oB /u!+ !+$11 0e %$!/$!!e%. 5)$1e !u01e, +)e 2e+$+$one#! #e ne?e#+)e1e!! no+ 1$01e. I+ $! o0?$ou! +)+ +)e (1$/ ,o# %/&e! (nno+ 0e 11oBe% on +)e !+#en&+) o, +)e e?$%en(e 0e,o#e u!, B)$() Be )?e (#e,u113 eA/$ne%. T)e %$!/$!!1 o, +)e 2#$?+e #e!2on%en+ B! %e($%e% u2on on13 ,+e# +)o#ou&) $n?e!+$&+$on B)e#e $+ B! e!+01$!)e% 0e3on% %ou0+ +)+ )e )% 2o11u+e% +)e !ou2 !+o(E B$+) u#$ne. T)e $n?e!+$&+$on, $n ,(+, %$% no+ !+o2 +)e#e. De!2$+e +)e %e,$n$+$?e ,$n%$n& o, Geno?eH! &u$1+, +)e (!e B! !+$11 #e,e##e% +o +)e 0o#% o, #0$+#+o#! 2#o?$%e% ,o# $n +)e (o11e(+$?e 0#&$n$n& &#ee/en+. T)$! 0o#% unn$/ou!13 ,,$#/e% +)e ,$n%$n&! o, +)e $n?e!+$&+o#! n% #e(o//en%e% Geno?eH! %$!/$!!1. T)e#e B! no+)$n& #0$+##3 0ou+ +)e 2#o(ee%$n&!. T)e 2e+$+$one#! (+e% Du$+e 2#o2e#13 $n +e#/$n+$n& +)e 2#$?+e #e!2on%en+H! e/21o3/en+ ,o# )$! un0e1$e?013 nu!e+$n& (+. I+ $! !u#2#$!$n& +)+ )e !)ou1% !+$11 )?e +)e +e/e#$+3 +o ,$1e )$! (o/21$n+ ,o# %/&e! ,+e# (o//$++$n& )$! u++e#13 %$!&u!+$n& o,,en!e. *on(e#n$n& G.R. No. 86608, Be 1!o ,$n% +)+ +)e 0#0e#!)o2! !u0Ce(+ o, +)e (on(e!!$on! &#n+e% 03 +)e Un$+e% S++e! &o?e#n/en+ #e (o//e#($1 en+e#2#$!e! o2e#+e% 03 2#$?+e 2e#!onH!. T)e3 #e no+ &en($e! o, +)e Un$+e% S++e! A#/e% -o#(e! no# #e +)e$# ,($1$+$e! %e/n%01e ! /++e# o, #$&)+ 03 +)e A/e#$(n !e#?$(e/en. T)e!e e!+01$!)/en+! 2#o?$%e ,o# +)e &#oo/$n& nee%! o, +)e$# (u!+o/e#! n% o,,e# no+ on13 +)e 0!$( )$#(u+ n% !)?e :! #eDu$#e% $n /o!+ /$1$+#3 o#&n$G+$on!; 0u+ !u() o+)e# /en$+$e! ! !)/2oo, /!!&e, /n$(u#e n% o+)e# !$/$1# $n%u1&en(e!. An% 11 ,o# ,ee. In+e#e!+$n&13, one o, +)e (on(e!!$on$#e!, 2#$?+e #e!2on%en+ V1en($, B! e?en !en+ 0#o% +o $/2#o?e )$! +on!o#$1 0u!$ne!!, 2#e!u/013 ,o# +)e 0ene,$+ o, )$! (u!+o/e#!. No 1e!! !$&n$,$(n+13, $, no+ /o#e !o, 11 +)e 0#0e#!)o2 (on(e!!$on$#e! #e un%e# +)e +e#/! o, +)e$# (on+#(+!, #eDu$#e% +o #e/$+ +o +)e Un$+e% S++e! &o?e#n/en+ ,$Ae% (o//$!!$on! $n (on!$%e#+$on o, +)e eA(1u!$?e (on(e!!$on! &#n+e% +o +)e/ $n +)e$# #e!2e(+$?e #e!. T)$! 0e$n& +)e (!e, +)e 2e+$+$one#! (nno+ 21e% n3 $//un$+3 ,#o/ +)e (o/21$n+ ,$1e% 03 +)e 2#$?+e #e!2on%en+! $n +)e (ou#+ 0e1oB. T)e (on+#(+! $n Due!+$on 0e$n& %e($%e%13 (o//e#($1, +)e (on(1u!$on #e()e% $n +)e ;nite" States of A(erica v. Rui+ (!e (nno+ 0e 221$e% )e#e. T)e *ou#+ Bou1% )?e %$#e(+13 #e!o1?e% +)e (1$/! &$n!+ +)e %e,en%n+! ! Be )?e %one $n G.R. No. 89480, eA(e2+ ,o# +)e 2u($+3 o, +)e #e(o#% $n +)e (!e + )n%. T)e e?$%en(e o, +)e 11e&e% $##e&u1#$+3 $n +)e &#n+ o, +)e 0#0e#!)o2 (on(e!!$on! $! no+ 0e,o#e u!. T)$! /en! +)+, ! $n G.R. No. 80678, +)e #e!2on%en+ (ou#+ B$11 )?e +o #e(e$?e +)+ e?$%en(e ,$#!+, !o $+ (n 1+e# %e+e#/$ne on +)e 0!$! +)e#eo, $, +)e 21$n+$,,! #e en+$+1e% +o +)e #e1$e, +)e3 !eeE. A((o#%$n&13, +)$! (!e /u!+ 1!o 0e #e/n%e% +o +)e (ou#+ 0e1oB ,o# ,u#+)e# 2#o(ee%$n&!. IV T)e#e #e nu/0e# o, o+)e# (!e! noB 2en%$n& 0e,o#e u! B)$() 1!o $n?o1?e +)e Due!+$on o, +)e $//un$+3 o, +)e Un$+e% S++e! ,#o/ +)e Cu#$!%$(+$on o, +)e ")$1$22$ne!. T)$! $! (u!e ,o# #e&#e+, $n%ee%, ! +)e3 /# +)e +#%$+$on1 ,#$en%!)$2 0e+Been +Bo (oun+#$e! 1on& 11$e% $n +)e (u!e o, %e/o(#(3. I+ $! )o2e% +)+ +)e !o-(11e% >$##$+n+!> $n +)e$# #e1+$on! B$11 0e #e!o1?e% $n !2$#$+ o, /u+u1 ((o//o%+$on n% #e!2e(+, B$+)ou+ +)e $n(on?en$en(e n% !2e#$+3 o, 1$+$&+$on n% 1B3! B$+) Cu!+$(e +o 0o+) 2#+$e!. 5HERE-ORE, ,+e# (on!$%e#$n& 11 +)e 0o?e 2#e/$!e!, +)e *ou#+ )e#e03 #en%e#! Cu%&/en+ ! ,o11oB!F 1. In G.R. No. 86608, +)e 2e+$+$on $! DISMISSED n% +)e #e!2on%en+ Cu%&e $! %$#e(+e% +o 2#o(ee% B$+) +)e )e#$n& n% %e($!$on o, *$?$1 *!e No. 4886. T)e +e/2o##3 #e!+#$n$n& o#%e# %+e% De(e/0e# 11, 1986, $! LI-TED. 6. In G.R. No. 89480, +)e 2e+$+$on $! GRANTED n% *$?$1 *!e No. 869-R:698; $! DISMISSED. 3. In G.R. No. 80018, +)e 2e+$+$on $! GRANTED n% *$?$1 *!e No. 117-*-88 $! DISMISSED. T)e +e/2o##3 #e!+#$n$n& o#%e# %+e% O(+o0e# 14, 1988, $! /%e 2e#/nen+. 4. In G.R. No. 80678, +)e 2e+$+$on $! DISMISSED n% +)e #e!2on%en+ (ou#+ $! %$#e(+e% +o 2#o(ee% B$+) +)e )e#$n& n% %e($!$on o, *$?$1 *!e No. 4996. T)e +e/2o##3 #e!+#$n$n& o#%e# %+e% O(+o0e# 68, 1988, $! LI-TED. A11 B$+)ou+ n3 2#onoun(e/en+ ! +o (o!+!. SO ORDERED. [G.R. No. 91359. September 25, 1992.] VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTVE SERVCES, NC., Petitioner, !. T"E CO#RT O$ APPEA%S, T"E C"E$ O$ P"%PPNE CONSTA&#%AR' ()* P"%PPNE CONSTA&#%AR' S#PERVSOR' #NT $OR SEC#RT' AND NVESTGATON AGENCES +PC,S#SA-,Respondents. $r()./0o A. %(!(, 1r. ()* A)*re0/to 2. $or)/er 3or Petitioner. S'%%A&#S 1. POLITICAL LAW; IMMUNITY FROM SUIT; THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY CHIEF AND THE PC-SUSIA MAY NOT BE SUED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE STATE. The State may !t "e #$e% &'th!$t 't# (!#et )A*t'(+e ,-I. Se(t'! /. !0 the 1123 C!#t't$t'!4. I5!6'7 th'# *$+e. the PC Ch'e0 a% PC-SUSIA (!te% that. "e'7 '#t*$meta+'t'e# !0 the at'!a+ 7!5e*met e8e*('#'7 a 9*'ma*'+y 7!5e*meta+ 0$(t'! !0 *e7$+at'7 the !*7a':at'! a% !9e*at'! !0 9*'5ate %ete(t'5e. &at(hme. !* #e($*'ty 7$a*% a7e('e#. #a'% !00'('a+ )the PC Ch'e04 a% a7e(y )PC- SUSIA4 may !t "e #$e% &'th!$t the ;!5e*met<# (!#et. e#9e('a++y ' th'# (a#e "e(a$#e -MPSI<# (!m9+a't #ee6# !t !+y t! (!m9e+ the 9$"+'( *e#9!%et# t! a(t ' a (e*ta' &ay. "$t &!*#e. "e(a$#e -MPSI #ee6# a(t$a+ a% (!m9e#at!*y %ama7e# ' the #$m !0 P1.===.===.==. e8em9+a*y %ama7e# ' the #ame am!$t. a% P>==.===.== a# att!*ey<# 0ee# 0*!m #a'% 9$"+'( *e#9!%et#. E5e '0 't# a(t'! 9*!#9e*#. the 9aymet !0 't# m!eta*y (+a'm# may !t "e e0!*(e% "e(a$#e the State %'% !t (!#et t! a99*!9*'ate the e(e##a*y 0$%# 0!* that 9$*9!#e. >. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC OFFICIAL MAY BE SUED IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY IF HE ACTS. AMON; OTHERS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY; CASE AT BAR. A 9$"+'( !00'('a+ may #!met'me# "e he+% +'a"+e ' h'# 9e*#!a+ !* 9*'5ate (a9a('ty '0 he a(t# ' "a% 0a'th. !* "ey!% the #(!9e !0 h'# a$th!*'ty !* ?$*'#%'(t'! )Sha$0 5. C!$*t !0 A99ea+#. #$9*a4. h!&e5e*. #'(e the a(t# 0!* &h'(h the PC Ch'e0 a% PC-SUSIA a*e "e'7 (a++e% t! a((!$t ' th'# (a#e. &e*e 9e*0!*me% "y them a# 9a*t !0 the'* !00'('a+ %$t'e#. &'th!$t ma+'(e. 7*!## e7+'7e(e. !* "a% 0a'th. ! *e(!5e*y may "e ha% a7a'#t them ' the'* 9*'5ate (a9a('t'e#. /. ID.; ID.; CONSENT TO BE SUED MUST EMANATE FROM A LE;ISLATI-E ACT. Wa'5e* !0 the State<# 'mm$'ty 0*!m #$'t. "e'7 a %e*!7at'! !0 #!5e*e'7ty. &'++ !t "e +'7ht+y '0e**e%. "$t m$#t "e (!#t*$e% #t*'(t'##'m' ?$*'# )Re9$"+'( 5. Fe+'('a!. 1@2 SCRA @>@4. The (!#et !0 the State t! "e #$e% m$#t emaate 0*!m #tat$t!*y a$th!*'ty. he(e. 0*!m a +e7'#+at'5e a(t. !t 0*!m a me*e mem!*a%$m. W'th!$t #$(h (!#et. the t*'a+ (!$*t %'% !t a(A$'*e ?$*'#%'(t'! !5e* the 9$"+'( *e#9!%et#. @. ID.; ID.; REASONS BEHIND. The #tate 'mm$'ty %!(t*'e *e#t# $9! *ea#!# !0 9$"+'( 9!+'(y a% the '(!5e'e(e a% %a7e* &h'(h &!$+% 0+!& 0*!m a %'00e*et *$+e. BIt '# !"5'!$# that 9$"+'( #e*5'(e &!$+% "e h'%e*e%. a% 9$"+'( #a0ety e%a7e*e%. '0 the #$9*eme a$th!*'ty (!$+% "e #$"?e(te% t! #$'t# at the '#ta(e !0 e5e*y ('t':e. a%. (!#eA$et+y. (!t*!++e% ' the $#e a% %'#9!#'t'! !0 the mea# *eA$'*e% 0!* the 9*!9e* a%m''#t*at'! !0 the 7!5e*metB )S'*e 5. U.S. Wa++. 1C>. 11 L. e%. 1>1. a# ('te% ' 32 SCRA @334. D E C S O N GR4O,A5#NO, J.6 Th'# '# a 9et't'! 0!* *e5'e& ! certiorari !0 the %e('#'! %ate% A$7$#t 11. 1121. !0 the C!$*t !0 A99ea+# ' CA-;.R. SP N!. 1C11=. et't+e% BThe Ch'e0 !0 Ph'+'99'e C!#ta"$+a*y )PC4 a% Ph'+'99'e C!#ta"$+a*y S$9e*5'#!* U't 0!* Se($*'ty a% I5e#t'7at'! A7e('e# )PC-SUSIA4 5. H!. Oma* U. Am' a% -ete*a# Ma9!&e* a% P*!te(t'5e Se*5'(e#. I(. )-MPSI4.B +'0t'7 the &*'t !0 9*e+'m'a*y '?$(t'! &h'(h the Re7'!a+ T*'a+ C!$*t ha% '##$e% t! the PC-SUSIA e?!''7 them 0*!m (!mm'tt'7 a(t# that &!$+% *e#$+t ' the (a(e++at'! !* !-*ee&a+ !0 the +'(e#e !0 -MPSI t! !9e*ate a# a #e($*'ty a7e(y.(ha*!"+e# 5'*t$a+ +a&+'"*a*y O Ma*(h >2. 1122. -MPSI 0'+e% a (!m9+a't ' the Re7'!a+ T*'a+ C!$*t at Ma6at'. Met*! Ma'+a. 9*ay'7 the (!$*t t!D?7(D(ha*!"+e#.(!m.9h BA. F!*th&'th '##$e a tem9!*a*y *e#t*a''7 !*%e* t! 9*e#e*5e the #tat$# A$!. e?!''7 the %e0e%at#. !* ay !e a(t'7 ' the'* 9+a(e !* #tea%. t! *e0*a' 0*!m (!mm'tt'7 a(t# that &!$+% *e#$+t ' the (a(e++at'! !* !- *ee&a+ !0 -MPSI<# +'(e#e; BB. I %$e t'me. '##$e a &*'t !0 9*e+'m'a*y '?$(t'! t! the #ame e00e(t; BC. Re%e* %e('#'! a% ?$%7met %e(+a*'7 $++ a% 5!'% the ame%met !0 Se(t'! @ !0 R.A. N!. C@23. "y PD N!. 11 e8em9t'7 !*7a':at'!# +'6e PADPAO 0*!m the 9*!h'"'t'! that ! 9e*#! #ha++ !*7a':e !* ha5e a 'te*e#t ' m!*e tha !e a7e(y. %e(+a*'7 PADPAO a# a '++e7a+ !*7a':at'! e8'#t'7 ' 5'!+at'! !0 #a'% 9*!h'"'t'!. &'th!$t the '++e7a+ e8em9t'! 9*!5'%e% ' PD N!. 11; %e(+a*'7 $++ a% 5!'% Se(t'! 13 !0 R.A. N!. C@23 &h'(h 9*!5'%e# 0!* the '##$a(e !0 *$+e# a% *e7$+at'!# ' (!#$+tat'! &'th PADPAO. %e(+a*'7 $++ a% 5!'% the Fe"*$a*y 1. 112> %'*e(t'5e !0 C!+. Sa"a# -. E%a%a#. ' the ame !0 the the PC Ch'e0. *eA$'*'7 a++ 9*'5ate #e($*'ty a7e('e#E#e($*'ty 0!*(e# #$(h a# -MPSI t! ?!' PADPAO a# a 9*e*eA$'#'te t! #e($*eE*ee& the'* +'(e#e#. %e(+a*'7 that -MPSI %'% !t e7a7e ' F($t-th*!at (!m9et't'!< ' 't# (!t*a(t &'th MWSS. !*%e*'7 %e0e%at# PC Ch'e0 a% PC-SUSIA t! *ee& the +'(e#e !0 -MPSI; !*%e*'7 the %e0e%at# t! *e0*a' 0*!m 0$*the* ha*a##'7 -MPSI a% 0*!m th*eate'7 -MPSI &'th (a(e++at'!# !* !-*ee&a+ !0 +'(e#e. &'th!$t +e7a+ a% ?$#t'0'a"+e (a$#e; !*%e*'7 the %e0e%at# t! 9ay t! -MPSI the #$m !0 P1.===.===.== a# a(t$a+ a% (!m9e#at!*y %ama7e#. P1.===.===.== a# e8em9+a*y %ama7e#. a% P>==.===.== a# att!*ey<# 0ee# a% e89e#e# !0 +'t'7at'!; a% 7*at'7 #$(h 0$*the* !* !the* *e+'e0# t! -MPSI a# may "e %eeme% +a&0$+. eA$'ta"+e a% ?$#t.B )99. CC-CG. R!++!.4 The (!#t't$t'!a+'ty !0 the 0!++!&'7 9*!5'#'!# !0 R.A. C@23 )!the*&'#e 6!& a# the BP*'5ate Se($*'ty A7e(y La&B4. a# ame%e%. '# A$e#t'!e% "y -MPSI ' 't# (!m9+a'tD(ha*!"+e#.(!m.9h D 5'*t$a+ +a& +'"*a*y BSECTION @. Wh! may O*7a':e a Se($*'ty !* Wat(hma A7e(y. Ay F'+'9'! ('t':e !* a (!*9!*at'!. 9a*te*#h'9. !* a##!('at'!. &'th a m''m$m (a9'ta+ !0 0'5e th!$#a% 9e#!#. !e h$%*e% 9e* (et !0 &h'(h '# !&e% a% (!t*!++e% "y F'+'9'! ('t':e# may !*7a':e a #e($*'ty !* &at(hma a7e(yD P*!5'%e%. That ! 9e*#! #ha++ !*7a':e !* ha5e a 'te*e#t '. m!*e tha !e #$(h a7e(y e8(e9t th!#e &h'(h a*e a+*ea%y e8'#t'7 at the 9*!m$+7at'! !0 th'# De(*eeD . . .B )A# ame%e% "y P.D. N!#. 11 a% 1==.4 BSECTION 13. R$+e# a% Re7$+at'!# "y Ch'e0. Ph'+'99'e C!#ta"$+a*y. The Ch'e0 !0 the Ph'+'99'e C!#ta"$+a*y. ' (!#$+tat'! &'th the Ph'+'99'e A##!('at'! !0 Dete(t'5e a% P*!te(t'5e A7e(y O9e*at!*#. I(. a% #$"?e(t t! the 9*!5'#'! !0 e8'#t'7 +a&#. '# he*e"y a$th!*':e% t! '##$e the *$+e# a% *e7$+at'!# e(e##a*y t! (a**y !$t the 9$*9!#e !0 th'# A(t.B(*a+a& 5'*t$a1a& +'"*a*y -MPSI a++e7e# that the a"!5e 9*!5'#'!# !0 R.A. N!. C@23 5'!+ate the 9*!5'#'!# !0 the 1123 C!#t't$t'! a7a'#t m!!9!+'e#. $0a'* (!m9et't'! a% (!m"'at'!# ' *e#t*a't !0 t*a%e. a% te% t! 0a5!* a% '#t't$t'!a+':e the Ph'+'99'e A##!('at'! !0 Dete(t'5e a% P*!te(t'5e A7e(y O9e*at!*#. I(. )PADPAO4 &h'(h '# m!!9!+'#t'( "e(a$#e 't ha# a 'te*e#t ' m!*e tha !e #e($*'ty a7e(y. Re#9!%et -MPSI +'6e&'#e A$e#t'!# the 5a+'%'ty !0 9a*a7*a9h /. #$"9a*a7*a9h )74 !0 the M!%'0y'7 Re7$+at'!# ! the I##$a(e !0 L'(e#e t! O9e*ate a% P*'5ate Se($*'ty L'(e#e# a% S9e('0y'7 Re7$+at'!# 0!* the O9e*at'! !0 PADPAO '##$e% "y the PC Ch'e0 Lt. ;e. F'%e+ -. Ram!#. th*!$7h C!+. Sa"a# -. E%a%e#. *eA$'*'7 that Ba++ 9*'5ate #e($*'ty a7e('e#E(!m9ay #e($*'ty 0!*(e# m$#t *e7'#te* a# mem"e*# !0 ay PADPAO Cha9te* !*7a':e% &'th' the Re7'! &he*e the'* ma' !00'(e# a*e +!(ate% . . .B )99. C-G. C!m9+a't ' C'5'+ Ca#e N!. 22-@314. A# #$(h mem"e*#h'9 *eA$'*emet ' PADPAO '# (!m9$+#!*y ' at$*e. 't a++e7e%+y 5'!+ate# +e7a+ a% (!#t't$t'!a+ 9*!5'#'!# a7a'#t m!!9!+'e#. $0a'* (!m9et't'! a% (!m"'at'!# ' *e#t*a't !0 t*a%e.(ha*!"+e#.(!m D 5'*t$a+ +a& +'"*a*y O May 1>. 112G. a Mem!*a%$m !0 A7*eemet &a# e8e($te% "y PADPAO a% the PC Ch'e0. &h'(h 0'8e% the m''m$m m!th+y (!t*a(t *ate 9e* 7$a*% 0!* e'7ht )24 h!$*# !0 #e($*'ty #e*5'(e 9e* %ay at P>.>CC.== &'th' Met*! Ma'+a a% P>.>1C.== !$t#'%e !0 Met*! Ma'+a )Ae8 B. Pet't'!4. O H$e >1. 1123. O%' Se($*'ty A7e(y )O%'4 0'+e% a (!m9+a't &'th PADPAO a(($#'7 -MPSI !0 ($t-th*!at (!m9et't'! "y $%e*($tt'7 't# (!t*a(t *ate 0!* #e($*'ty #e*5'(e# *e%e*e% t! the Met*!9!+'ta Wate*&!*6# a% Se&e*a7e Sy#tem )MWSS4. (ha*7'7 #a'% ($#t!me* +!&e* tha the #ta%a*% m''m$m *ate# 9*!5'%e% ' the Mem!*a%$m !0 A7*eemet %ate% May 1>. 112G. PADPAO 0!$% -MPSI 7$'+ty !0 ($t-th*!at (!m9et't'!. he(e. the PADPAO C!mm'ttee ! D'#('9+'e *e(!mme%e% the e89$+#'! !0 -MPSI 0*!m PADPAO a% the (a(e++at'! !0 't# +'(e#e t! !9e*ate a #e($*'ty a7e(y )Ae8 D. Pet't'!4. The PC-SUSIA ma%e #'m'+a* 0'%'7# a% +'6e&'#e *e(!mme%e% the (a(e++at'! !0 -MPSI<# +'(e#e )Ae8 E. Pet't'!4. A# a *e#$+t. PADPAO *e0$#e% t! '##$e a (+ea*a(eE(e*t'0'(ate !0 mem"e*#h'9 t! -MPSI &he 't *eA$e#te% !e. -MPSI &*!te the PC Ch'e0 ! Ma*(h 1=. 1122. *eA$e#t'7 h'm t! #et a#'%e !* %'#*e7a*% the 0'%'7# !0 PADPAO a% (!#'%e* -MPSI<# a99+'(at'! 0!* *ee&a+ !0 't# +'(e#e. e5e &'th!$t a (e*t'0'(ate !0 mem"e*#h'9 0*!m PADPAO )Ae8 F. Pet't'!4. A# the PC Ch'e0 %'% !t *e9+y. a% -MPSI<# +'(e#e &a# e89'*'7 ! Ma*(h /1. 1122. -MPSI 0'+e% C'5'+ Ca#e N!. 22-@31 ' the RTC-Ma6at'. B*a(h 1/C. ! Ma*(h >2. 1122 a7a'#t the PC Ch'e0 a% PC-SUSIA. O the #ame %ate. the (!$*t '##$e% a *e#t*a''7 !*%e* e?!''7 the PC Ch'e0 a% PC- SUSIA B0*!m (!mm'tt'7 a(t# that &!$+% *e#$+t ' the (a(e++at'! !* !- *ee&a+ !0 -MPSI<# +'(e#eB )Ae8 ;. Pet't'!4. The PC (h'e0 a% PC-SUSIA 0'+e% a BM!t'! t! D'#m'##. O99!#'t'! t! the I##$a(e !0 W*'t !0 P*e+'m'a*y I?$(t'!. a% M!t'! t! I$a#h the Tem9!*a*y Re#t*a''7 O*%e*.B ! the 7*!$%# that the (a#e '# a7a'#t the State &h'(h ha% !t 7'5e (!#et the*et! a% that -MPSI<# +'(e#e a+*ea%y e89'*e% ! Ma*(h /1. 1122. he(e. the *e#t*a''7 !*%e* !* 9*e+'m'a*y '?$(t'! &!$+% !t #e*5e ay 9$*9!#e "e(a$#e the*e &a# ! m!*e +'(e#e t! "e (a(e++e% )Ae8 H. Pet't'!4. Re#9!%et -MPSI !99!#e% the m!t'!. O A9*'+ 12. 1122. the +!&e* (!$*t %e'e% -MPSI<# a99+'(at'! 0!* a &*'t !0 9*e+'m'a*y '?$(t'! 0!* "e'7 9*emat$*e "e(a$#e 't Bha# $9 t! May /1. 1122 &'th' &h'(h t! 0'+e 't# a99+'(at'! 0!* *ee&a+ 9$*#$at t! Se(t'! > )e4 !0 P*e#'%et'a+ De(*ee N!. 111. . . .B )9. 1@=. R!++!.4.(ha*!"+e#.(!m D 5'*t$a+ +a& +'"*a*y O May >/. 1122. -MPSI *e'te*ate% 't# a99+'(at'! 0!* the '##$a(e !0 a &*'t !0 9*e+'m'a*y '?$(t'! "e(a$#e PC-SUSIA ha% *e?e(te% 9aymet !0 the 9ea+ty 0!* 't# 0a'+$*e t! #$"m't 't# a99+'(at'! 0!* *ee&a+ !0 't# +'(e#e a% the *eA$'*emet# the*e0!* &'th' the 9*e#(*'"e% 9e*'!% ' Se(t'! >)e4 !0 the Re5'#e% R$+e# a% Re7$+at'!# Im9+emet'7 R.A. C@23. a# ame%e% "y P.D. 1111 )Ae8 M. Pet't'!4. O H$e 1=. 1112. the RTC-Ma6at' '##$e% a &*'t !0 9*e+'m'a*y '?$(t'! $9! a "!% !0 P1==.===.==. *e#t*a''7 the %e0e%at#. !* ay !e a(t'7 ' the'* "eha+0. 0*!m (a(e++'7 !* %ey'7 *ee&a+ !0 -MPSI<# +'(e#e. $t'+ 0$*the* !*%e*# 0*!m the (!$*t. The PC Ch'e0 a% PC-SUSIA 0'+e% a M!t'! 0!* Re(!#'%e*at'! !0 the a"!5e !*%e*. "$t 't &a# %e'e% "y the (!$*t ' 't# O*%e* !0 A$7$#t 1=. 1122 )Ae8 R. Pet't'!4. O N!5em"e* /. 1122. the PC Ch'e0 a% PC-SUSIA #!$7ht *e+'e0 "y a 9et't'! 0!* certiorari ' the C!$*t !0 A99ea+#. O A$7$#t 11. 1121. the C!$*t !0 A99ea+# 7*ate% the 9et't'!. The %'#9!#'t'5e 9!*t'! !0 't# %e('#'! *ea%#D?7(D(ha*!"+e#.(!m.9h BWHEREFORE. the 9et't'! 0!* certiorari 0'+e% "y 9et't'!e*# PC Ch'e0 a% PC-SUSIA '# he*e"y ;RANTED. a% the RTC-Ma6at'. B*a(h 1/C. '# !*%e*e% t! %'#m'## the (!m9+a't 0'+e% "y *e#9!%et -MPSI ' C'5'+ Ca#e N!. 22- @31. '#!0a* a# 9et't'!e*# PC Ch'e0 a% PC-SUSIA a*e (!(e*e%. 0!* +a(6 !0 ?$*'#%'(t'!. The &*'t !0 9*e+'m'a*y '?$(t'! '##$e% ! H$e 1=. 1122. '# %'##!+5e%.B )99. >1C->1G. R!++!.4 -MPSI (ame t! $# &'th th'# 9et't'! 0!* *e5'e&. The 9*'ma*y '##$e ' th'# (a#e '# &hethe* !* !t -MPSI<# (!m9+a't a7a'#t the PC Ch'e0 a% PC-SUSIA '# a #$'t a7a'#t the State &'th!$t 't# (!#et. The a#&e* '# ye#. The State may !t "e #$e% &'th!$t 't# (!#et )A*t'(+e ,-I. Se(t'! /. !0 the 1123 C!#t't$t'!4. I5!6'7 th'# *$+e. the PC Ch'e0 a% PC-SUSIA (!te% that. "e'7 '#t*$meta+'t'e# !0 the at'!a+ 7!5e*met e8e*('#'7 a 9*'ma*'+y 7!5e*meta+ 0$(t'! !0 *e7$+at'7 the !*7a':at'! a% !9e*at'! !0 9*'5ate %ete(t'5e. &at(hme. !* #e($*'ty 7$a*% a7e('e#. #a'% !00'('a+ )the PC Ch'e04 a% a7e(y )PC-SUSIA4 may !t "e #$e% &'th!$t the ;!5e*met<# (!#et. e#9e('a++y ' th'# (a#e "e(a$#e -MPSI<# (!m9+a't #ee6# !t !+y t! (!m9e+ the 9$"+'( *e#9!%et# t! a(t ' a (e*ta' &ay. "$t &!*#e. "e(a$#e -MPSI #ee6# a(t$a+ a% (!m9e#at!*y %ama7e# ' the #$m !0 P1.===.===.==. e8em9+a*y %ama7e# ' the #ame am!$t. a% P>==.===.== a# att!*ey<# 0ee# 0*!m #a'% 9$"+'( *e#9!%et#. E5e '0 't# a(t'! 9*!#9e*#. the 9aymet !0 't# m!eta*y (+a'm# may !t "e e0!*(e% "e(a$#e the State %'% !t (!#et t! a99*!9*'ate the e(e##a*y 0$%# 0!* that 9$*9!#e.(ha*!"+e#5'*t$a+a&+'"*a*y Th$# %'% &e h!+% ' Sha$0 5. C!$*t !0 A99ea+#. 111 SCRA 31/D?7(D(ha*!"+e#.(!m.9h BWh'+e the %!(t*'e a99ea*# t! 9*!h'"'t !+y #$'t# a7a'#t the #tate &'th!$t 't# (!#et. 't '# a+#! a99+'(a"+e t! (!m9+a't# 0'+e% a7a'#t !00'('a+# !0 the #tate 0!* a(t# a++e7e%+y 9e*0!*me% "y them ' the %'#(ha*7e !0 the'* %$t'e#. The *$+e '# that '0 the ?$%7met a7a'#t #$(h !00'('a+# &'++ *eA$'*e the #tate 't#e+0 t! 9e*0!*m a a00'*mat'5e a(t t! #at'#0y the #ame. #$(h a# the a99*!9*'at'! !0 the am!$t ee%e% t! 9ay the %ama7e# a&a*%e% a7a'#t them. the #$'t m$#t "e *e7a*%e% a# a7a'#t the #tate 't#e+0 a+th!$7h 't ha# !t "ee 0!*ma++y 'm9+ea%e%.B )Emphasis supplied.4 A 9$"+'( !00'('a+ may #!met'me# "e he+% +'a"+e ' h'# 9e*#!a+ !* 9*'5ate (a9a('ty '0 he a(t# ' "a% 0a'th. !* "ey!% the #(!9e !0 h'# a$th!*'ty !* ?$*'#%'(t'! )Sha$0 5. C!$*t !0 A99ea+#. #$9*a4. h!&e5e*. #'(e the a(t# 0!* &h'(h the PC Ch'e0 a% PC-SUSIA a*e "e'7 (a++e% t! a((!$t ' th'# (a#e. &e*e 9e*0!*me% "y them a# 9a*t !0 the'* !00'('a+ %$t'e#. &'th!$t ma+'(e. 7*!## e7+'7e(e. !* "a% 0a'th. ! *e(!5e*y may "e ha% a7a'#t them ' the'* 9*'5ate (a9a('t'e#. We a7*ee &'th the !"#e*5at'! !0 the C!$*t !0 A99ea+# that the Mem!*a%$m !0 A7*eemet %ate% May 1>. 112G %!e# !t (!#t't$te a 'm9+'e% (!#et "y the State t! "e #$e%D?7(D(ha*!"+e#.(!m.9h BThe Mem!*a%$m !0 A7*eemet %ate% May 1>. 112G &a# ete*e% 't! "y the PC Ch'e0 ' *e+at'! t! the e8e*('#e !0 a 0$(t'! #!5e*e'7 ' at$*e. The (!**e(t te#t 0!* the a99+'(at'! !0 #tate 'mm$'ty '# !t the (!(+$#'! !0 a (!t*a(t "y the State "$t the +e7a+ at$*e !0 the a(t. Th'# &a# (+ea*+y e$('ate% ' the (a#e !0 U'te% State# !0 Ame*'(a 5. R$': &he*e the H!. S$9*eme C!$*t he+%D?7(D(ha*!"+e#.(!m.9h BFThe *e#t*'(t'5e a99+'(at'! !0 State 'mm$'ty '# 9*!9e* !+y &he the 9*!(ee%'7# a*'#e !$t !0 (!mme*('a+ t*a#a(t'!# !0 the 0!*e'7 #!5e*e'7. 't# (!mme*('a+ a(t'5't'e# !* e(!!m'( a00a'*#. State% %'00e*et+y. a State may "e #a'% t! ha5e %e#(e%e% t! the +e5e+ !0 a '%'5'%$a+ a% (a th$# "e %eeme% t! ha5e ta('t+y 7'5e 't# (!#et t! "e #$e% !+y &he 't ete*# 't! a "$#'e## (!t*a(t. It %!e# !t a99+y &he*e the (!t*a(t *e+ate# t! the e8e*('#e !0 't# 0$(t'!#.< )1/G SCRA @23. @1>.4 BI the '#tat (a#e. the Mem!*a%$m !0 A7*eemet ete*e% 't! "y the PC Ch'e0 a% PADPAO &a# 'te%e% t! 9*!0e##'!a+':e the '%$#t*y a% t! #ta%a*%':e the #a+a*'e# !0 #e($*'ty 7$a*%# a# &e++ a# the ($**et *ate# !0 #e($*'ty #e*5'(e#. (+ea*+y. a 7!5e*meta+ 0$(t'!. The e8e($t'! !0 the #a'% a7*eemet '# '('%eta+ t! the 9$*9!#e !0 R.A. C@23. a# ame%e%. &h'(h '# t! *e7$+ate the !*7a':at'! a% !9e*at'! !0 9*'5ate %ete(t'5e. &at(hme !* #e($*'ty 7$a*% a7e('e#. )Emphasis ours.4B )99. >C2->C1. R!++!.4 Wa'5e* !0 the State<# 'mm$'ty 0*!m #$'t. "e'7 a %e*!7at'! !0 #!5e*e'7ty. &'++ !t "e +'7ht+y '0e**e%. "$t m$#t "e (!#t*$e% #t*'(t'##'m' ?$*'# )Re9$"+'( 5. Fe+'('a!. 1@2 SCRA @>@4. The (!#et !0 the State t! "e #$e% m$#t emaate 0*!m #tat$t!*y a$th!*'ty. he(e. 0*!m a +e7'#+at'5e a(t. !t 0*!m a me*e mem!*a%$m. W'th!$t #$(h (!#et. the t*'a+ (!$*t %'% !t a(A$'*e ?$*'#%'(t'! !5e* the 9$"+'( *e#9!%et#. The #tate 'mm$'ty %!(t*'e *e#t# $9! *ea#!# !0 9$"+'( 9!+'(y a% the '(!5e'e(e a% %a7e* &h'(h &!$+% 0+!& 0*!m a %'00e*et *$+e. BIt '# !"5'!$# that 9$"+'( #e*5'(e &!$+% "e h'%e*e%. a% 9$"+'( #a0ety e%a7e*e%. '0 the #$9*eme a$th!*'ty (!$+% "e #$"?e(te% t! #$'t# at the '#ta(e !0 e5e*y ('t':e. a%. (!#eA$et+y. (!t*!++e% ' the $#e a% %'#9!#'t'! !0 the mea# *eA$'*e% 0!* the 9*!9e* a%m''#t*at'! !0 the 7!5e*metB )S'*e 5. U.S. Wa++. 1C>. 11 L. e%. 1>1. a# ('te% ' 32 SCRA @334. I the #ame 5e'. th'# C!$*t ' Re9$"+'( 5. P$*'#'ma )32 SCRA @3=. @3/4 *at'!a+':e%D?7(D(ha*!"+e#.(!m.9h BN!ethe+e##. a (!t'$e% a%he*e(e t! the %!(t*'e !0 !#$a"'+'ty '# !t t! "e %e9+!*e% 0!* a# a7a'#t the '(!5e'e(e that may "e (a$#e J"yK 9*'5ate 9a*t'e#. the +!## !0 7!5e*meta+ e00'('e(y a% the !"#ta(+e t! the 9e*0!*ma(e !0 't# m$+t'0a*'!$# 0$(t'!# a*e 0a* 7*eate* '0 #$(h a 0$%ameta+ 9*'('9+e &e*e a"a%!e% a% the a5a'+a"'+'ty !0 ?$%'('a+ *eme%y &e*e !t th$# *e#t*'(te%. W'th the &e++ 6!& 9*!9e#'ty ! the 9a*t !0 !$* 9e!9+e t! 7! t! (!$*t. at the +ea#t 9*!5!(at'!. the +!## !0 t'me a% ee*7y *eA$'*e% t! %e0e% a7a'#t +a& #$'t#. ' the a"#e(e !0 #$(h a "a#'( 9*'('9+e that (!#t't$te# #$(h a e00e(t'5e !"#ta(+e#. (!$+% 5e*y &e++ "e 'ma7'e%.B )('t'7 P*!5'%e(e Wa#h'7t! I#$*a(e C!. 5. Re9$"+'(. >1 SCRA C12.4(*a+a&a% WHEREFORE. the 9et't'! 0!* *e5'e& '# DENIED a% the ?$%7met a99ea+e% 0*!m '# AFFIRMED ' t!t!. N! (!#t#. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-11174 M#() 61, 1916 E. MERRITT, plaintiff0appellant, vs. GOVERNMENT O- THE "HILI""INE ISLANDS, defendant0appellant. 3rossfield and 45Brien for plaintiff. Attorney-%eneral Avance6a for defendant.. TRENT, J.F This is an appeal by both parties from a 8udgment of the $ourt of <irst 5nstance of the city of %anila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P*C,,C*, together with the costs of the cause. $ounsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred *# 4in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff suffered to P/,>>>, instead of P?/,>>> as claimed in the complaint,4 and ?# 4in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twenty0one days and fi6ing the damage accordingly in the sum of P?,---, instead of P-,>>> as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint.4 The !ttorney0Aeneral on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred9 a# in finding that the collision between the plaintiff7s motorcycle and the ambulance of the Aeneral =ospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur: b# in holding that the Aovernment of the Philippine 5slands is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true that the collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur: and c# in rendering 8udgment against the defendant for the sum of P*C,,C*. The trial court7s findings of fact, which are fully supported by the record, are as follows9 5t is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of $alle Padre <aura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour, upon crossing Taft !venue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the Aeneral =ospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the %otor "ehicle !ct, turned suddenly and une6pectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft !venue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struc3 the plaintiff, who was already si6 feet from the southwestern point or from the post place there. &y reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely in8ured that, according to 2r. Saleeby, who e6amined him on the very same day that he was ta3en to the Aeneral =ospital, he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a would in the same place and in the bac3 part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious. The mar3s revealed that he had one or more fractures of the s3ull and that the grey matter and brain was had suffered material in8ury. !t ten o7cloc3 of the night in question, which was the time set for performing the operation, his pulse was so wea3 and so irregular that, in his opinion, there was little hope that he would live. =is right leg was bro3en in such a way that the fracture e6tended to the outer s3in in such manner that it might be regarded as double and the would be e6posed to infection, for which reason it was of the most serious nature. !t another e6amination si6 days before the day of the trial, 2r. Saleeby noticed that the plaintiff7s leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very wea3 and painful at the point of the fracture. B6amination of his head revealed a notable read8ustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. The patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a light wea3ness in his eyes and in his mental condition. This latter wea3ness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor, especially when he attempted to use his money for mathematical calculations. !ccording to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff7s mental and physical condition prior to the accident was e6cellent, and that after having received the in8uries that have been discussed, his physical condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the agility, energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his wor3 because he had lost /> per cent of his efficiency. !s a contractor, he could no longer, as he had before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to reach the highest parts of the building. !s a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his wor3 as a contractor, he had to dissolved the partnership he had formed with the engineer. )ilson, because he was incapacitated from ma3ing mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg and of his mental faculties, and he had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy $haco building.4 )e may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the effect that the collision between the plaintiff7s motorcycle and the ambulance of the Aeneral =ospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur. The two items which constitute a part of the P*C,,C* and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are a# P/,>>>, the award awarded for permanent in8uries, and b# the P?,---, the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. )e find nothing in the record which would 8ustify us in increasing the amount of the first. !s to the second, the record shows, and the trial court so found, that the plaintiff7s services as a contractor were worth P*,>>> per month. The court, however, limited the time to two months and twenty0one days, which the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. 5n this we thin3 there was error, because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period of si6 months. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only two months and twenty0one days while the remainder of the si6 months was spent in his home, would not prevent recovery for the whole time. )e, therefore, find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part, is P*1,>,/. !s the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Aovernment, the inquiry at once arises whether the Aovernment is legally0liable for the damages resulting therefrom. !ct No. ?C/,, effective <ebruary ., *+*/, reads9 !n !ct authori(ing B. %erritt to bring suit against the Aovernment of the Philippine 5slands and authori(ing the !ttorney0Aeneral of said 5slands to appear in said suit. )hereas a claim has been filed against the Aovernment of the Philippine 5slands by %r. B. %erritt, of %anila, for damages resulting from a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the Aeneral =ospital on %arch twenty0fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen: )hereas it is not 3nown who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to determine the amount of damages, if any, to which the claimant is entitled: and )hereas the 2irector of Public )or3s and the !ttorney0Aeneral recommended that an !ct be passed by the Eegislature authori(ing %r. B. %erritt to bring suit in the courts against the Aovernment, in order that said questions may be decided9 Now, therefore, By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the $hilippine Le/islature, that7 SB$T5ON *. B. %erritt is hereby authori(ed to bring suit in the $ourt of <irst 5nstance of the city of %anila against the Aovernment of the Philippine 5slands in order to fi6 the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the Aeneral =ospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which %r. B. %erritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the !ttorney0Aeneral of the Philippine 5slands is hereby authori(ed and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Aovernment of said 5slands, to defendant said Aovernment at the same. SB$. ?. This !ct shall ta3e effect on its passage. Bnacted, <ebruary ., *+*/. 2id the defendant, in enacting the above quoted !ct, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiffF 5f only the former, then it cannot be held that the !ct created any new cause of action in favor of the plaintiff or e6tended the defendant7s liability to any case not previously recogni(ed. !ll admit that the 5nsular Aovernment the defendant# cannot be sued by an individual without its consent. 5t is also admitted that the instant case is one against the Aovernment. !s the consent of the Aovernment to be sued by the plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to loo3 carefully into the terms of the consent, and render 8udgment accordingly. The plaintiff was authori(ed to bring this action against the Aovernment 4in order to fi6 the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the Aeneral =ospital and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which %r. B. %erritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . .4 These were the two questions submitted to the court for determination. The !ct was passed 4in order that said questions may be decided.4 )e have 4decided4 that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the time an employee of the defendant, and we have also fi6ed the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision. 2oes the !ct authori(e us to hold that the Aovernment is legally liable for that amountF 5f not, we must loo3 elsewhere for such authority, if it e6ists. The Aovernment of the Philippine 5slands having been 4modeled after the <ederal and State Aovernments in the United States,4 we may loo3 to the decisions of the high courts of that country for aid in determining the purpose and scope of !ct No. ?C/,. 5n the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, e6cept when e6pressly made so by legislative enactment, is well settled. 4The Aovernment,4 says ;ustice Story, 4does not underta3e to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.4 $laussen vs. $ity of Euverne, *>. %inn., C+*, citing U. S. vs. Gir3patric3, + )heat, ,?>: - E. Bd., *++: and &eers vs. States, ?> =ow., /?,: */ E. Bd., ++*.# 5n the case of 0elvin vs. State *?* $al., *-#, the plaintiff sought to recover damages from the state for personal in8uries received on account of the negligence of the state officers at the state fair, a state institution created by the legislature for the purpose of improving agricultural and 3indred industries: to disseminate information calculated to educate and benefit the industrial classes: and to advance by such means the material interests of the state, being ob8ects similar to those sought by the public school system. 5n passing upon the question of the state7s liability for the negligent acts of its officers or agents, the court said9 No claim arises against any government is favor of an individual, by reason of the misfeasance, laches, or unauthori(ed e6ercise of powers by its officers or agents. $iting Aibbons vs. U. S., 1 )all., ?-+: $lodfelter vs. State, 1- N. $., /*, /.: C* !m. 'ep., CC>: $hapman vs. State, *>C $al., -+>: C. !m. St. 'ep., */1: Areen vs. State, ,. $al., ?+: &ourn vs. =art, +. $al., .?*: ?, !m. St. 'ep., ?>.: Story on !gency, sec. .*+.# !s to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises out of either fort or contract, the rule is stated in .- $yc., +*/, thus9 &y consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. 5t does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or e6tend its liability to any cause not previously recogni(ed. 5t merely gives a remedy to enforce a pree6isting liability and submits itself to the 8urisdiction of the court, sub8ect to its right to interpose any lawful defense. 5n Apfelbacher vs. State */? N. )., *CC, advanced sheets#, decided !pril *-, *+*/, the !ct of *+*., which authori(ed the bringing of this suit, read9 SB$T5ON *. !uthority is hereby given to Aeorge !pfelbacher, of the town of Summit, )au3esha $ounty, )isconsin, to bring suit in such court or courts and in such form or forms as he may be advised for the purpose of settling and determining all controversies which he may now have with the State of )isconsin, or its duly authori(ed officers and agents, relative to the mill property of said Aeorge !pfelbacher, the fish hatchery of the State of )isconsin on the &ar3 'iver, and the mill property of Bvan =umphrey at the lower end of Nagawic3a Ea3e, and relative to the use of the waters of said &ar3 'iver and Nagawic3a Ea3e, all in the county of )au3esha, )isconsin. 5n determining the scope of this act, the court said9 Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on the part of the state for the acts of its officers, and that the suit now stands 8ust as it would stand between private parties. 5t is difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do, more than remove the state7s immunity from suit. 5t simply gives authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff7s controversies with the estate. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit shall depart from well established principles of law, or that the amount of damages is the only question to be settled. The act opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. 5t did not pass upon the question of liability, but left the suit 8ust where it would be in the absence of the state7s immunity from suit. 5f the Eegislature had intended to change the rule that obtained in this state so long and to declare liability on the part of the state, it would not have left so important a matter to mere inference, but would have done so in e6press terms. %urdoc3 Arate $o. vs. $ommonwealth, */? %ass., ?1: ?C N.B., 1/C: 1 E. '. !., .++.# 5n "ennin/ vs. State *?. $al., .*-#, the provisions of the !ct of *1+., relied upon and considered, are as follows9 !ll persons who have, or shall hereafter have, claims on contract or for negligence against the state not allowed by the state board of e6aminers, are hereby authori(ed, on the terms and conditions herein contained, to bring suit thereon against the state in any of the courts of this state of competent 8urisdiction, and prosecute the same to final 8udgment. The rules of practice in civil cases shall apply to such suits, e6cept as herein otherwise provided. !nd the court said9 This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases, arising under different facts, and in both it was held that said statute did not create any liability or cause of action against the state where none e6isted before, but merely gave an additional remedy to enforce such liability as would have e6isted if the statute had not been enacted. $hapman vs. State, *>C $al., -+>: C. !m. St. 'ep., */1: %elvin vs. State, *?* $al., *-.# ! statute of %assachusetts enacted in *11, gave to the superior court 48urisdiction of all claims against the commonwealth, whether at law or in equity,4 with an e6ception not necessary to be here mentioned. 5n construing this statute the court, in 0urdoc2 %rate 3o. vs. 3ommon8ealth */? %ass., ?1#, said9 The statute we are discussing disclose no intention to create against the state a new and heretofore unrecogni(ed class of liabilities, but only an intention to provide a 8udicial tribunal where well recogni(ed e6isting liabilities can be ad8udicated. 5n Sipple vs. State ++ N. H., ?1C#, where the board of the canal claims had, by the terms of the statute of New Hor3, 8urisdiction of claims for damages for in8uries in the management of the canals such as the plaintiff had sustained, $hief ;ustice 'uger remar3s9 45t must be conceded that the state can be made liable for in8uries arising from the negligence of its agents or servants, only by force of some positive statute assuming such liability.4 5t being quite clear that !ct No. ?C/, does not operate to e6tend the Aovernment7s liability to any cause not previously recogni(ed, we will now e6amine the substantive law touching the defendant7s liability for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph / of article *+>. of the $ivil $ode reads9 The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said9 That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Eaw ., Title */, Partida ,, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or negligence, ta3es part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. 5t follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organi(ation of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents: on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal an that of private persons interested in its operation. &etween these latter and the state, therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise e6cept in a case where the state acts as a 8udicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. Supreme $ourt of Spain, ;anuary ,, *1+1: 1. ;ur. $iv., ?C.# That the $ivil $ode in chapter ?, title *-, boo3 C, regulates the obligations which arise out of fault or negligence: and whereas in the first article thereof. No. *+>?, where the general principle is laid down that where a person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage so done, reference is made to acts or omissions of the persons who directly or indirectly cause the damage, the following articles refers to this persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those who maintain fi6ed relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage, because the law presumes that in consequence of such relations the evil caused by their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. This legal presumption gives way to proof, however, because, as held in the last paragraph of article *+>., responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the persons mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage, and among these persons, called upon to answer in a direct and not a subsidiary manner, are found, in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case, guardians and owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise, the state, but not always, e6cept when it acts through the agency of a special agent, doubtless because and only in this case, the fault or negligence, which is the original basis of this 3ind of ob8ections, must be presumed to lie with the state. That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in article *+>? respond for all the damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or negligence are made by branches of the central administration acting in the name and representation of the state itself and as an e6ternal e6pression of its sovereignty in the e6ercise of its e6ecutive powers, yet said article is not applicable in the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the petitioners by an e9ecutive official, acting in the e6ercise of his powers, in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property ta6es owing by the owner of the property which they hold in sublease. That the responsibility of the state is limited by article *+>. to the case wherein it acts throu/h a special a/ent and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fi6ed order or commission, foreign to the e6ercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official# so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he e6ecutes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any e6ecutive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations.4 Supreme $ourt of Spain, %ay *1, *+>C: +1 ;ur. $iv., .1+, .+>.# That according to paragraph / of article *+>. of the $ivil $ode and the principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the *1th of %ay, *+>C, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or char/ed 8ith some definite purpose 8hich /ives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. $onsequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of articles *+>? and *+>. of the $ivil $ode. Supreme $ourt of Spain, ;uly .>, *+**: *?? ;ur. $iv., *C-.# 5t is, therefore, evidence that the State the Aovernment of the Philippine 5slands# is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme $ourt of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph / of article *+>., supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the Aeneral =ospital was not such an agent. <or the foregoing reasons, the 8udgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. )hether the Aovernment intends to ma3e itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Eegislature and not with the courts. G.R. No. L-66400 -e0#u#3 69, 1986 VI*TORIA AMIGA'LE, plaintiff0appellant, vs. NI*OLAS *UEN*A, ! *o//$!!$one# o, "u01$( H$&)B3! n% RE"U'LI* O- THE "HILI""INES, defendants0appellees. MA=ALINTAL, J.:p This is an appeal from the decision of the $ourt of <irst 5nstance of $ebu in its $ivil $ase No. '0/+,,, dismissing the plaintiff7s complaint. "ictoria !migable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Eot No. -.+ of the &anilad Bstate in $ebu $ity as shown by Transfer $ertificate of Title No. T0*1>->, which superseded Transfer $ertificate of Title No. 'T0.?,? T0.C./# issued to her by the 'egister of 2eeds of $ebu on <ebruary *, *+?C. No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property appears at the bac3 of the certificate. )ithout prior e6propriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot, with an area of -,*-, square meters, for the construction of the %ango and Aorordo !venues. 5t appears that said avenues were already e6isting in *+?* although 4they were in bad condition and very narrow, unli3e the wide and beautiful avenues that they are now,4 and 4that the tracing of said roads was begun in *+?C, and the formal construction in *+?/.4 M On %arch ?,, *+/1 !migable7s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the !uditor Aeneral, who disallowed it in his +th 5ndorsement dated 2ecember +, *+/1. ! copy of said indorsement was transmitted to !migable7s counsel by the Office of the President on ;anuary ,, *+/+. On <ebruary -, *+/+ !migable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which was later amended on !pril *,, *+/+ upon motion of the defendants, against the 'epublic of the Philippines and Nicolas $uenca, in his capacity as $ommissioner of Public =ighways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the -,*-, square meters of land traversed by the %ango and Aorordo !venues. She also sought the payment of compensatory damages in the sum of P/>,>>>.>> for the illegal occupation of her land, moral damages in the sum of P?/,>>>.>>, attorney7s fees in the sum of P/,>>>.>> and the costs of the suit. )ithin the reglementary period the defendants filed a 8oint answer denying the material allegations of the complaint and interposing the following affirmative defenses, to wit9 *# that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the Office of the !uditor Aeneral: ?# that the right of action for the recovery of any amount which might be due the plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed: .# that the action being a suit against the Aovernment, the claim for moral damages, attorney7s fees and costs had no valid basis since as to these items the Aovernment had not given its consent to be sued: and C# that inasmuch as it was the province of $ebu that appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of %ango !venue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants. 2uring the scheduled hearings nobody appeared for the defendants notwithstanding due notice, so the trial court proceeded to receive the plaintiff7s evidence e9 parte. On ;uly ?+, *+/+ said court rendered its decision holding that it had no 8urisdiction over the plaintiff7s cause of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of her lot in question on the ground that the government cannot be sued without its consent: that it had neither original nor appellate 8urisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiff7s claim for compensatory damages in the sum of P/>,>>>.>>, the same being a money claim against the government: and that the claim for moral damages had long prescribed, nor did it have 8urisdiction over said claim because the government had not given its consent to be sued. !ccordingly, the complaint was dismissed. Unable to secure a reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the $ourt of !ppeals, which subsequently certified the case to Us, there being no question of fact involved. The issue here is whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of the case. 5n the case of 0inisterio vs. 3ourt of irst :nstance of 3ebu, 1 involving a claim for payment of the value of a portion of land used for the widening of the Aorordo !venue in $ebu $ity, this $ourt, through %r. ;ustice Bnrique %. <ernando, held that where the government ta3es away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of e6propriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. )e there said9 . ... . 5f the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property ta3en for public use were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an in8ustice on a citi(en. =ad the government followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of the compensation fi6ed by the 8udgment, or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the amount fi6ed, may it 4have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the public use defined in the 8udgment.4 5f there were an observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now. 5t is unthin3able then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. 5t is 8ust as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. 5t is not too much to say that when the government ta3es any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of 8ust compensation, to be 8udicially ascertained, it ma3es manifest that it submits to the 8urisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invo3ed. $onsidering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the bac3 of her certificate of title and that she has not e6ecuted any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. !s registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. =owever, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to ma3e due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the ta3ing. 6 !s regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land from the time it was ta3en up to the time that payment is made by the government. 3 5n addition, the government should pay for attorney7s fees, the amount of which should be fi6ed by the trial court after hearing. )=B'B<O'B, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for the determination of compensation, including attorney7s fees, to which the appellant is entitled as above indicated. No pronouncement as to costs. G.R. No. 90488 No?e/0e# 61, 1991 RE"U'LI* O- THE "HILI""INES :"RESIDENTIAL *OMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT;, petitioner, vs. SANDIGAN'A4AN, 'IENVENIDO R. TANTO*O, JR. n% DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO, respondents. "ominador R. Santia/o for and in his o8n behalf and as counsel for respondent Tantoco, *r. NARVASA, J.:p Private respondents &ienvenido '. Tantoco, ;r. and 2ominador '. Santiago @ together with <erdinand B. %arcos, 5melda '. %arcos, &ienvenido '. Tantoco, Sr., Aliceria '. Tantoco, and %aria Eourdes Tantoco0Pineda0are defendants in $ivil $ase No. >>>1 of the Sandiganbayan. The case was commenced on ;uly ?*, *+1, by the Presidential $ommission on Aood Aovernment P$AA# in behalf of the 'epublic of the Philippines. The complaint which initiated the action was denominated one 4for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages,4 and was avowedly filed pursuant to B6ecutive Order No. *C of President $ora(on $. !quino. !fter having been served with summons, Tantoco, ;r. and Santiago, instead of filing their answer, 8ointly filed a 4%OT5ON TO ST'5GB OUT SO%B PO'T5ONS O< T=B $O%PE!5NT !N2 <O' &5EE O< P!'T5$UE!'S O< OT=B' PO'T5ONS4 dated Nov. ., *+1,. 1 The P$AA filed an opposition thereto, 6 and the movants, a reply to the opposition. 3 &y order dated ;anuary ?+, *+11, the Sandiganbayan, in order to e6pedite proceedings and accommodate the defendants, gave the P$AA forty0five C/# days to e6pand its complaint to ma3e more specific certain allegations. 4 Tantoco and Santiago then presented a 4motion for leave to file interrogatories under 'ule ?/ of the 'ules of $ourt4 dated <ebruary *, *+11, and 45nterrogatories under 'ule ?/.4 7 &asically, they sought an answer to the question9 41ho 8ere the 3ommissioners of the $3%% ;aside from its 3hairman, <on. Ramon "iaz, 8ho verified the complaint= 8ho approved or authorized the inclusion of 0essrs. Bienvenido R. Tantoco, *r. and "ominador R. Santia/o as defendants in the . . caseF4 6 The P$AA responded by filing a motion dated <ebruary +, *+11 to stri3e out said motion and interrogatories as being impertinent, 4queer,4 4weird,4 or 4procedurally bi(arre as the purpose thereof lac3s merit as it is improper, impertinent and irrelevant under any guise.4 8 On %arch *1, *+11, in compliance with the Order of ;anuary ?+, *+11, the P$AA filed an B6panded $omplaint. 8!s this e6panded complaint, Tantoco and Santiago reiterated their motion for bill of particulars, through a %anifestation dated !pril **, *+11. 9 !fterwards, by 'esolution dated ;uly C, *+11, 10 the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to stri3e out, for bill of particulars, and for leave to file interrogatories, holding them to be without legal and factual basis. !lso denied was the P$AA7s motion to stri3e out impertinent pleading dated <ebruary +, *+11. The Sandiganbayan declared inter alia the complaint to be 4sufficiently definite and clear enough,4 there are adequate allegations . . which clearly portray the supposed involvement andIor alleged participation of defendants0movants in the transactions described in detail in said $omplaint,4 and 4the other matters sought for particulari(ation are evidentiary in nature which should be ventilated in the pre0trial or trial proper . .4 5t also opined that 4s#ervice of interrogatories before 8oinder of issue and without leave of court is premature . . absent# any special or e6traordinary circumstances . . which would 8ustify . . the same#.4 Tantoco and Santiago then filed an !nswer with $ompulsory $ounterclaim under date of ;uly *1, *+11. 11 5n response, the P$AA presented a 4'eply to !nswer with %otion to 2ismiss $ompulsory $ounterclaim 4 16 The case was set for pre0trial on ;uly .*, *+1+. 13 On ;uly ?/, *+1+, the P$AA submitted its P'B0T'5!E. 14 The pre0trial was however reset to September **, *+1+, and all other parties were required to submit pre0trial briefs on or before that date. 17 On ;uly ?,, *+1+ Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated 45nterrogatories to Plaintiff,4 16 and on !ugust ?, *+1+, an 4!mended 5nterrogatories to Plaintiff47 18 as well as a %otion for Production and 5nspection of 2ocuments. 18 The amended interrogatories chiefly sought factual details relative to specific averments of P$AA7s amended complaint, through such questions, for instance, as@ *. 5n connection with the allegations . . in paragraph * . ., 8hat specific property or properties does the plaintiff claim it has the ri/ht to recover from defendants Tantoco, *r. and Santia/o for bein/ ill-/ottenF .. 5n connection with the allegations . . in paragraph *> a# . . 8hat specific act or acts . . 8ere committed by defendants Tantoco, *r. and Santia/o in >concert 8ith> defendant erdinand 0arcos and in furtherance or pursuit, of the alle/ed systematic plan of said defendant 0arcos to accumulate ill-/otten 8ealthF4 /. 5n connection with . . paragraph *. . ., 8hat specific act or acts of the defendants Tantoco, *r. and Santia/o . . 8ere committed by said defendants as part, or in furtherance, of the alle/ed plan to conceal assets of defendants erdinand and :melda 0arcos? ,. 5n connection with . . paragraph */c# . . is it plaintiff5s position or theory of the case that Tourist "uty ree Shops, :nc., includin/ all the assets of said corporation, are beneficially o8ned by either or both defendants erdinand and :melda 0arcos and that the defendants Tantoco, *r. and Santia/o, as 8ell as, the other stoc2holders of record of the same corporation are mere >dummies> of said defendants erdinand and @or :melda R. 0arcosF On the other hand, the motion for production and inspection of documents prayed for e6amination and copying of@ *# the 4official records and other evidence4 on the basis of which the verification of the !mended $omplaint asserted that the allegations thereof are 4true and correct:4 ?# the documents listed in P$AA7s Pre0Trial &rief as those 4intended to be presented and . . mar3ed as e6hibits for the plaintiff:4 and .# 4the minutes of the meeting of the P$AA which chronicles the discussion if any# and the decision of the $hairman and members# to file the complaint4 in the case at bar. &y 'esolutions dated !ugust ?*, *+1+ and !ugust ?/, *+1+, the Sandiganbayan admitted the !mended 5nterrogatories and granted the motion for production and inspection of documents production being scheduled on September *C and */, *+1+#, respectively. On September *, *+1+, the P$AA filed a %otion for 'econsideration of the 'esolution of !ugust ?/, *+1+ allowing production and inspection of documents#. 5t argued that *# since the documents sub8ect thereof would be mar3ed as e6hibits during the pre0 trial on September **, *+1+ anyway, the order for 4their production and inspection on September *C and */, are purposeless and unnecessary:4 ?# movants already 3now of the e6istence and contents of the document which 4are clearly described . . in# plaintiff7s Pre0Trial &rief:4 .# the documents are 4privileged in character4 since they are intended to be used against the P$AA andIor its $ommissioners in violation of Section C, B6ecutive Order No. *, viz.9 a# No civil action shall lie against the $ommission or any member thereof for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the tas3 contemplated by this Order. b# No member or staff of the $ommission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any 8udicial, legislative, or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cogni(ance. 5t also filed on September C, *+1+ an opposition to the !mended 5nterrogatories, 19 which the Sandiganbayan treated as a motion for reconsideration of the 'esolution of !ugust ?*, *+1+ admitting the !mended 5nterrogatories#. The opposition alleged that @ *# the interrogatories 4are not specific and do not name the person to whom they are propounded . .,4 or 4who in the P$AA, in particular, . . should# answer the interrogatories:4 ?# the interrogatories delve into 4factual matters which had already been decreed . . as part of the proof of the $omplaint upon trial . .:4 .# the interrogatories 4are frivolous4 since they inquire about 4matters of fact . . which defendants . . sought to . . e6tract# through their aborted %otion for &ill of Particulars:4 C# the interrogatories 4are really in the nature of a deposition, which is prematurely filed and irregularly utili(ed . . since# the order of trial calls for plaintiff to first present its evidence.4 Tantoco and Santiago filed a reply and opposition on September *1, *+1+. !fter hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two ?# 'esolutions on September ?+, *+1+, the first, denying reconsideration of the 'esolution allowing production of documents#, and the second, reiterating by implication the permission to serve the amended interrogatories on the plaintiff P$AA#. 60 =ence, this petition for certiorari. The P$AA contends that said orders, both dated September ?+, *+1+, should be nullified because rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to e6cess of 8urisdiction. %ore particularly, it claims @ a# as regards the order allowing the amended interrogatories to the plaintiff P$AA9 *# that said interrogatories are not specific and do not name the particular individuals to whom they are propounded, being addressed only to the P$AA: ?# that the interrogatories deal with factual matters which the Sandiganbayan in denying the movants7 motion for bill of particulars# had already declared to be part of the P$AA7s proof upon trial: and .# that the interrogatories would ma3e P$AA $ommissioners and officers witnesses, in contravention of B6ecutive Order No. *C and related issuances: and b# as regards the order granting the motion for production of documents9 *# that movants had not shown any good cause therefor: ?# that some documents sought to be produced and inspected had already been presented in $ourt and mar3ed preliminarily as P$AA7s e6hibits, and the movants had viewed, scrutini(ed and even offered ob8ections thereto and made comments thereon: and .# that the other documents sought to be produced are either @ a# privileged in character or confidential in nature and their use is proscribed by the immunity provisions of B6ecutive Order No. *, or b# non0e6istent, or mere products of the movants7 suspicion and fear. This $ourt issued a temporary restraining order on October ?,, *+1+, directing the Sandiganbayan to desist from enforcing its questioned resolutions of September ?+, *+1+ in $ivil $ase No. >>>1. 61 !fter the issues were delineated and argued at no little length by the parties, the Solicitor Aeneral withdrew 4as counsel for plaintiff . . with the reservation, however, conformably with Presidential 2ecree No. C,1, the provisions of B6ecutive Order No. ?+?, as well as the decisional law of 7Orbos v. $ivil Service $ommission, et al.,7 A.'. No. +?/-*, September *?, *++># 66 to submit his commentIobservation on incidentsImatters pending with this . . $ourt if called for by circumstances in the interest of the Aovernment or if he is so required by the $ourt.4 63 This, the $ourt allowed by 'esolution dated ;anuary ?*, *++*. 64 Subsequently, P$AA $ommissioner %a6imo !. %aceren advised the $ourt that the cases from which the Solicitor Aeneral had withdrawn would henceforth be under his %aceren7s# charge 4andIor any of the following private attorneys9 Bliseo &. !lampay, ;r., %ario B. Ong3i3o, %ario ;alandoni and such other attorneys as it may later authori(e.4 67 The facts not being in dispute, and it appearing that the parties have fully ventilated their respective positions, the $ourt now proceeds to decide the case. 5nvolved in the present proceedings are two of the modes of discovery provided in the 'ules of $ourt9 interrogatories to parties , 66 and production and inspection of documents and things. 68 Now, it appears to the $ourt that among far too many lawyers and not a few 8udges#, there is, if not a regrettable unfamiliarity and even outright ignorance about the nature, purposes and operation of the modes of discovery, at least a strong yet unreasoned and unreasonable disinclination to resort to them @ which is a great pity for the intelligent and adequate use of the deposition0 discovery mechanism, coupled with pre0trial procedure, could, as the e6perience of other 8urisdictions convincingly demonstrates, effectively shorten the period of litigation and speed up ad8udication. 68 =ence, a few words about these remedies is not at all inappropriate. The resolution of controversies is, as everyone 3nows, the raison d5etre of courts. This essential function is accomplished by first, the ascertainment of all the material and relevant facts from the pleadings and from the evidence adduced by the parties, and second, after that determination of the facts has been completed, by the application of the law thereto to the end that the controversy may be settled authoritatively, definitely and finally. 5t is for this reason that a substantial part of the ad8ective law in this 8urisdiction is occupied with assuring that all the facts are indeed presented to the $ourt: for obviously, to the e6tent that ad8udication is made on the basis of incomplete facts, to that e6tent there is faultiness in the appro6imation of ob8ective 8ustice. 5t is thus the obligation of lawyers no less than of 8udges to see that this ob8ective is attained: that is to say, that there no suppression, obscuration, misrepresentation or distortion of the facts: and that no party be unaware of any fact material a relevant to the action, or surprised by any factual detail suddenly brought to his attention during the trial. 69 Seventy0one years ago, in Alonso v. Aillamor, 30 this $ourt described the nature and ob8ect of litigation and in the process laid down the standards by which 8udicial contests are to be conducted in this 8urisdiction. 5t said9 ! litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and s3illed in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. 5t is, rather a contest in which each contendin/ party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then brushin/ aside as 8holly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, as2s that !ustice be done on the merits. Eawsuits, unli3e duels, are not to be won by a rapier7s thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to 8ustice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no vested right in technicalities. . . . The message is plain. 5t is the duty of each contending party to lay before the court the facts in issue0fully and fairly: i.e., to present to the court all the material and relevant facts 3nown to him, suppressing or concealing nothing, nor preventing another party, by clever and adroit manipulation of the technical rules of pleading and evidence, from also presenting all the facts within his 3nowledge. 5nitially, that underta3ing of laying the facts before the court is accomplished by the pleadings filed by the parties: but that, only in a very general way. Only 4ultimate facts4 are set forth in the pleadings: hence, only the barest outline of the facfual basis of a party7s claims or defenses is limned in his pleadings. The law says that every pleading 4shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate factson which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts.4 31 Parenthetically, if this requirement is not observed, i.e., the ultimate facts are alleged too generally or 4not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable . . an adverse party# properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial,4 a bill of particulars see3ing a 4more definite statement4 may be ordered by the court on motion of a party. The office of a bill of particulars is, however, limited to ma3ing more particular or definite the ultimate facts in a pleading 5t is not its office to supply evidentiary matters. !nd the common perception is that said evidentiary details are made 3nown to the parties and the court only during the trial, when proof is adduced on the issues of fact arising from the pleadings. The truth is that 4evidentiary matters4 may be inquired into and learned by the parties before the trial. 5ndeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties @ before the trial if not indeed even before the pre0trial @ should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only those 3nown to them individually, but also those 3nown to adversaries: in other words, the desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the dar3: and the 'ules of $ourt ma3e this ideal possible through the deposition0discovery mechanism set forth in 'ules ?C to ?+. The e6perience in other 8urisdictions has been that ample discovery before trial, under proper regulation, accomplished one of the most necessary of modern procedure9 it not only eliminates unessential issue from trials thereby shortening them considerably, but also requires parties to play the game with the cards on the table so that the possibility of fair settlement before trial is measurably increased. . .4 36 !s 8ust intimated, the deposition0discovery procedure was designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre0trial functions of notice0giving, issue0formulation and fact revelation theretofore performed primarily by the pleadings. The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve *# as a device, along with the pre0trial hearing under 'ule ?>, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and ?# as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable parties, consistent with recogni(ed privileges, to obtain the fullest possible 3nowledge of the issues and facts before trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dar3. 33 To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party is called as a witness to testify orally at trial. The inquiry e6tends to all facts which are relevant, whether they be ultimate or evidentiary, e6cepting only those matters which are privileged. The ob8ective is as much to give every party the fullest possible information of all the relevant facts before the trial as to obtain evidence for use upon said trial. The principle is reflected in Section ?, 'ule ?C governing depositions# 34 which generally allows the e6amination of a deponent @ *# 4regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the sub8ect of the pending action, whether relating to the claim or defense of any other party:4 ?# as well as9 a# 4the e6istence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any boo3s, documents, or other tangible things4 and b# 4the identity and location of persons having 3nowledge of relevant facts.4 )hat is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be useful in the preparation for trial, such as the identity and location of persons having 3nowledge of relevant facts: those relevant facts themselves: and the e6istence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any boo3s, documents, or other tangible things. =ence, 4the deposition0discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time0honored cry of 4fishing e6pedition4 serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent7s case. %utual 3nowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition0discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility, of surprise, . . . 37 5n line with this principle of according liberal treatment to the deposition0discovery mechanism, such modes of discovery as a# depositions whether by oral e6amination or written interrogatories# under 'ule ?C, b# interrogatories to parties under 'ule ?/, and c# requests for admissions under 'ule ?-, may be availed of without leave of court, and generally, without court intervention. The 'ules of $ourt e6plicitly provide that leave of court is not necessary to avail of said modes of discovery after an answer to the complaint has been served. 36 5t is only when an answer has not yet been filed but after 8urisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or property sub8ect of the action# that prior leave of court is needed to avail of these modes of discovery, the reason being that at that time the issues are not yet 8oined and the disputed facts are not clear. 38 On the other hand, leave of court is required as regards discovery by a# production or inspection of documents or things in accordance with 'ule ?,, or b# physical and mental e6amination of persons under 'ule ?1, which may be granted upon due application and a showing of due cause. To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the law imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to ma3e discovery, such as dismissing the action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering 8udgment by default against the disobedient party: contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party: payment of the amount of reasonable e6penses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery: ta3ing the matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the party see3ing discovery: refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or defenses: stri3ing out pleadings or parts thereof: staying further proceedings. 38 Of course, there are limitations to discovery, even when permitted to be underta3en without leave and without 8udicial intervention. 4!s indicated by the# 'ules . . ., limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the e6amination is being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy, embarass, or oppress the person sub8ect to the inquiry. 39 !nd . . . further limitations come into e6istence when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recogni(ed domains of privilege.4 40 5n fine, the liberty of a party to ma3e discovery is well nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law. 5t is in light of these broad principles underlying the deposition0discovery mechanism, in relation of course to the particular rules directly involved, that the issues in this case will now be resolved. The petitioner7s ob8ections to the interrogatories served on it in accordance with 'ule ?/ of the 'ules of $ourt cannot be sustained. 5t should initially be pointed out @ as regards the private respondents 4%otion for Eeave to <ile 5nterrogatories4 dated <ebruary *, *+11 41 @ that it was correct for them to see3 leave to serve interrogatories, because discovery was being availed of before an answer had been served. 5n such a situation, i.e., 4after 8urisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property sub8ect of the action4 but before answer, Section * of 'ule ?C treating of depositions#, in relation to Section * of 'ule ?/ dealing with interrogatories to parties# e6plicitly requires 4leave of court.4 46 &ut there was no need for the private respondents to see3 such leave to serve their 4!mended 5nterrogatories to Plaintiff4 dated !ugust ?, *+1+ 43# after they had filed their answer to the P$AA7s complaint, 8ust as there was no need for the Sandiganbayan to act thereon. *. The petitioner7s first contention @ that the interrogatories in question are defective because they a# do not name the particular individuals to whom they are propounded, being addressed only to the P$AA, and b# are 4fundamentally the same matters . . private respondents# sought to be clarified through their aborted %otion . . for &ill of Particulars4 @ are untenable and quic3ly disposed of. The first part of petitioner7s submission is adequately confuted by Section *, 'ule ?/ which states that if the party served with interrogatories is a 8uridical entity such as 4a public or private corporation or a partnership or association,4 the same shall be 4answered . . by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf.4 There is absolutely no reason why this proposition should not be applied by analogy to the interrogatories served on the P$AA. That the interrogatories are addressed only to the P$AA, without naming any specific commissioner o officer thereof, is utterly of no consequence, and may not be invo3ed as a reason to refuse to answer. !s the rule states, the interrogatories shall be answered 4by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf.4 That the matters on which discovery is desired are the same matters sub8ect of a prior motion for bill of particulars addressed to the P$AA7s amended complaint @ and denied for lac3 of merit @ is beside the point. 5ndeed, as already pointed out above, a bill of particulars may elicit only ultimate facts, not so0called evidentiary facts. The latter are without doubt proper sub8ect of discovery. 44 Neither may it be validly argued that the amended interrogatories lac3 specificity. The merest glance at them disproves the argument. The interrogatories are made to relate to individual paragraphs of the P$AA7s e6panded complaint and inquire about details of the ultimate facts therein alleged. )hat the P$AA may properly do is to ob8ect to specific items of the interrogatories, on the ground of lac3 of relevancy, or privilege, or that the inquiries are being made in bad faith, or simply to embarass or oppress it. 47 &ut until such an ob8ection is presented and sustained, the obligation to answer subsists. ?. That the interrogatories deal with factual matters which will be part of the P$AA7s proof upon trial, is not ground for suppressing them either. !s already pointed out, it is the precise purpose of discovery to ensure mutual 3nowledge of all the relevant facts on the part of all parties even before trial, this being deemed essential to proper litigation. This is why either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession: and the stage at which disclosure of evidence is made is advanced from the time of trial to the period preceding it. .. !lso unmeritorious is the ob8ection that the interrogatories would ma3e P$AA $ommissioners and officers witnesses, in contravention of B6ecutive Order No. *C and related issuances. 5n the first place, there is nothing at all wrong in a party7s ma3ing his adversary his witness .46 This is e6pressly allowed by Section -, 'ule *.? of the 'ules of $ourt, viz.9 Sec. -. 2irect e6amination of unwilling or hostile witnesses. @ ! party may . . . call an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party, and interrogate him by leading questions and contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, and the witness thus called may be contradicted and impeached by or on behalf of the adverse party also, and may be cross0e6amined by the adverse party only upon the sub8ect0matter of his e6amination in chief. The P$AA insinuates that the private respondents are engaged on a 4fishing e6pedition,4 apart from the fact that the information sought is immaterial since they are evidently meant to establish a claim against P$AA officers who are not parties to the action. 5t suffices to point out that 4fishing e6peditions4 are precisely permitted through the modes of discovery. 48 %oreover, a defendant who files a counterclaim against the plaintiff is allowed by the 'ules to implead persons therefore strangers to the action# as additional defendants on said counterclaim. This may be done pursuant to Section *C, 'ule - of the 'ules, to wit9 Sec. *C. Brin/in/ ne8 parties. @ )hen the presence of parties other than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross0 claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants, if 8urisdiction over them can be obtained.4 The P$AA7s assertion that it or its members are not amenable to any civil action 4for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the tas3 contemplated by . . B6ecutive# Order No. *#,4 is not a ground to refuse to answer the interrogatories. The disclosure of facto relevant to the action and which are not self0incriminatory or otherwise privileged is one thing: the matter of whether or not liability may arise from the facts disclosed in light of B6ecutive Order No. *, is another. No doubt, the latter proposition may properly be set up by way of defense in the action. The apprehension has been e6pressed that the answers to the interrogatories may be utili(ed as foundation for a counterclaim against the P$AA or its members and officers. They will be. The private respondents have made no secret that this is in fact their intention. )ithal, the $ourt is unable to uphold the proposition that while the P$AA obviously feels itself at liberty to bring actions on the basis of its study and appreciation of the evidence in its possession, the parties sued should not be free to file counterclaims in the same actions against the P$AA or its officers for gross neglect or ignorance, if not downright bad faith or malice in the commencement or initiation of such 8udicial proceedings, or that in the actions that it may bring, the P$AA may opt not to be bound by rule applicable to the parties it has sued, e.g., the rules of discovery. So, too, the P$AA7s postulation that none of its members may be 4required to testify or produce evidence in any 8udicial . . proceeding concerning matters within its official cogni(ance,4 has no application to a 8udicial proceeding it has itself initiated. !s 8ust suggested, the act of bringing suit must entail a waiver of the e6emption from giving evidence: by bringing suit it brings itself within the operation and scope of all the rules governing civil actions, including the rights and duties under the rules of discovery. Otherwise, the absurd would have to be conceded, that while the parties it has impleaded as defendants may be required to 4disgorge all the facts4 within their 3nowledge and in their possession, it may not itself be sub8ect to a li3e compulsion. The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its consent. &ut it is a6iomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The P$AA cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the State, even while assuming to represent or act for the State. 48 The suggestion 49 that the State ma3es no implied waiver of immunity by filing suit e6cept when in so doing it acts in, or in matters concerning, its proprietary or non0 governmental capacity, is unacceptable: it attempts a distinction without support in principle or precedent. On the contrary @ The consent of the State to be sued may be given e6pressly or impliedly. B6press consent may be manifested either through a general law or a special law. 5mplied consent is given 8hen the State itself commences liti/ation or when it enters into a contract. 70 The immunity of the State from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. 5n short, by ta3ing the initiative in an action against the private parties, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the state. . . . Sinco, Philippine Political Eaw, Tenth B., pp. .-0.,, citin/ U.S. vs. 'inggold, 1 Pet. */>, 1 E. ed. 1++#4 71 5t can hardly be doubted that in e6ercising the right of eminent domain, the State e6ercises its !us imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights or !us /estionis. Het, even in that area, it has been held that where private property has been ta3en in e6propriation without 8ust compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit cannot be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owner. 76 The $ourt also finds itself unable to sustain the P$AA7s other principal contention, of the nullity of the Sandiganbayan7s Order for the production and inspection of specified documents and things allegedly in its possession. The $ourt gives short shrift to the argument that some documents sought to be produced and inspected had already been presented in $ourt and mar3ed preliminarily as P$AA7s e6hibits, the movants having in fact viewed, scrutini(ed and even offered ob8ections thereto and made comments thereon. Obviously, there is nothing secret or confidential about these documents. No serious ob8ection can therefore be presented to the desire of the private respondents to have copies of those documents in order to study them some more or otherwise use them during the trial for any purpose allowed by law. The P$AA says that some of the documents are non0e6istent. This it can allege in response to the corresponding question in the interrogatories, and it will incur no sanction for doing so unless it is subsequently established that the denial is false. The claim that use of the documents is proscribed by B6ecutive Order No. * has already been dealt with. The P$AA is however at liberty to allege and prove that said documents fall within some other privilege, constitutional or statutory. The $ourt finally finds that, contrary to the petitioner7s theory, there is good cause for the production and inspection of the documents sub8ect of the motion dated !ugust ., *+1+. 73 Some of the documents are, according to the verification of the amended complaint, the basis of several of the material allegations of said complaint. Others, admittedly, are to be used in evidence by the plaintiff. 5t is matters such as these into which inquiry is precisely allowed by the rules of discovery, to the end that the parties may adequately prepare for pre0trial and trial. The only other documents sought to be produced are needed in relation to the allegations of the counterclaim. Their relevance is indisputable: their disclosure may not be opposed. One last word. 2ue no doubt to the deplorable unfamiliarity respecting the nature, purposes and operation of the modes of discovery earlier mentioned, 74 there also appears to be a widely entertained idea that application of said modes is a complicated matter, unduly e6pensive and dilatory. Nothing could be farther from the truth. <or e6ample, as will already have been noted from the preceding discussion, all that is entailed to activate or put in motion the process of discovery by interrogatories to parties under 'ule ?/ of the 'ules of $ourt, is simply the delivery directly to a party of a letter setting forth a list of least questions with the request that they be answered individually. 77 That is all. The service of such a communication on the party has the effect of imposing on him the obligation of answering the questions 4separately and fully in writing underoath,4 and serving 4a copy of the answers on the party submitting the interrogatories within fifteen */# days after service of the interrogatories . . .4 76 The sanctions for refusing to ma3e discovery have already been mentioned. 78 So, too, discovery under 'ule ?- is begun by nothing more comple6 than the service on a party of a letter or other written communication containing a request that specific facts therein set forth andIor particular documents copies of which are thereto appended, be admitted in writing. 78 That is all. !gain, the receipt of such a communication by the party has the effect of imposing on him the obligation of serving the party requesting admission with 4a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters,4 failing in which 4e#ach of the matters of which admission is requested shall be deemed admitted.4 79 The ta3ing of depositions in accordance with 'ule ?C either on oral e6amination or by written interrogatories# while somewhat less simple, is nonetheless by no means as complicated as seems to be the lamentably e6tensive notion. )=B'B<O'B, the petition is 2BN5B2, without pronouncement as to costs. The temporary restraining order issued on October ?,, *+1+ is hereby E5<TB2 !N2 SBT !S52B. SO O'2B'B2. G.R. No. 80873 M#() 16, 1988 RE"U'LI* O- THE "HILI""INES, petitioner0appellee, vs. "A'LO -ELI*IANO n% INTERMEDIATE A""ELLATE *OURT, respondents0 appellants. 4A", J.: Petitioner see3s the review of the decision of the 5ntermediate !ppellate $ourt dated !pril .>, *+1/ reversing the order of the $ourt of <irst 5nstance of $amarines Sur, &ranch "5, dated !ugust ?*, *+1>, which dismissed the complaint of respondent Pablo <eliciano for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land on the ground of non0suability of the State. The bac3ground of the present controversy may be briefly summari(ed as follows9 On ;anuary ??, *+,>, respondent <eliciano filed a complaint with the then $ourt of <irst 5nstance of $amarines Sur against the 'epublic of the Philippines, represented by the Eand !uthority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of four C# lots with an aggregate area of *,.-C.C*,, hectares, situated in the &arrio of Salvacion, %unicipality of Tinambac, $amarines Sur. Plaintiff alleged that he bought the property in question from "ictor Aardiola by virtue of a $ontract of Sale dated %ay .*, *+/?, followed by a 2eed of !bsolute Sale on October .>, *+/C: that Aardiola had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of <rancisco !bra(ado whose title to the said property was evidenced by an informacion posesoria that upon plaintiff7s purchase of the property, he too3 actual possession of the same, introduced various improvements therein and caused it to be surveyed in ;uly *+/?, which survey was approved by the 2irector of Eands on October ?C, *+/C: that on November *, *+/C, President 'amon %agsaysay issued Proclamation No. +> reserving for settlement purposes, under the administration of the National 'esettlement and 'ehabilitation !dministration N!''!#, a tract of land situated in the %unicipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, $amarines Sur, after which the N!''! and its successor agency, the Eand !uthority, started sub0dividing and distributing the land to the settlers: that the property in question, while located within the reservation established under Proclamation No. +>, was the private property of plaintiff and should therefore be e6cluded therefrom. Plaintiff prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the property in question consisting of *,.-C.C*,, hectares: that his title of ownership based oninformacion posesoria of his predecessor0in0interest be declared legal valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers. The defendant, represented by the Eand !uthority, filed an answer, raising by way of affirmative defenses lac3 of sufficient cause of action and prescription. On !ugust ?+, *+,>, the trial court, through ;udge 'afael S. Sison, rendered a decision declaring Eot No. *, with an area of ,>*.+>-C hectares, to be the private property of the plaintiff, 4being covered by a possessory information title in the name of his predecessor0in0interest4 and declaring said lot e6cluded from the N!''! settlement reservation. The court declared the rest of the property claimed by plaintiff, i.e. Eots ?, . and C, reverted to the public domain. ! motion to intervene and to set aside the decision of !ugust ?+, *+,> was filed by eighty0si6 1-# settlers, together with the barrio council of Pag0asay, alleging among other things that intervenors had been in possession of the land in question for more than twenty ?># years under claim of ownership. On ;anuary ?/, *+,*, the court a quo reconsidered its decision, reopened the case and directed the intervenors to file their corresponding pleadings and present their evidence: all evidence already presented were to remain but plaintiff, as well as the 'epublic of the Philippines, could present additional evidence if they so desire. The plaintiff presented additional evidence on ;uly .>, *+,*, and the case was set for hearing for the reception of intervenors7 evidence on !ugust .> and !ugust .*, *+,*. On !ugust .>, *+,*, the date set for the presentation of the evidence for intervenors, the latter did not appear but submitted a motion for postponement and resetting of the hearing on the ne6t day, !ugust .*, *+,*. The trial court denied the motion for postponement and allowed plaintiff to offer his evidence 4en ausencia,4 after which the case would be deemed submitted for decision. On the following day, !ugust .*, *+,*, ;udge Sison rendered a decision reiterating his decision of !ugust ?+, *+,>. ! motion for reconsideration was immediately filed by the intervenors. &ut before this motion was acted upon, plaintiff filed a motion for e6ecution, dated November *1, *+,*. On 2ecember *>, *+,*, the lower court, this time through ;udge %iguel Navarro, issued an order denying the motion for e6ecution and setting aside the order denying intervenors7 motion for postponement. The case was reopened to allow intervenors to present their evidence. Unable to secure a reconsideration of ;udge Navarro7s order, the plaintiff went to the 5ntermediate !ppellate $ourt on a petition for certiorari. Said petition was, however, denied by the 5ntermediate !ppellate $ourt, and petitioners brought the matter to this $ourt in A.'. No. .-*-., which was denied on %ay ., *+,. $onsequently, the case was remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. On !ugust .*, *+,>, intervenors filed a motion to dismiss, principally on the ground that the 'epublic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by the plaintiff. On !ugust ?*, *+1>, the trial court, through ;udge Bsteban Eising, issued the questioned order dismissing the case for lac3 of 8urisdiction. 'espondent moved for reconsideration, while the Solicitor Aeneral, on behalf of the 'epublic of the Philippines filed its opposition thereto, maintaining that the dismissal was proper on the ground of non0suability of the State and also on the ground that the e6istence andIor authenticity of the purported possessory information title of the respondents7 predecessor0in0interest had not been demonstrated and that at any rate, the same is not evidence of title, or if it is, its efficacy has been lost by prescription and laches. Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, plaintiff again went to the 5ntermediate !ppellate $ourt on petition for certiorari. On !pril .>, *+1/, the respondent appellate court rendered its decision reversing the order of ;udge Eising and remanding the case to the court a quo for further proceedings. =ence this petition. )e find the petition meritorious. The doctrine of non0suability of the State has proper application in this case. The plaintiff has impleaded the 'epublic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court 8ust li3e any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property. ! suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam.1 5t is an action directed against a specific party or parties, and any 8udgment therein binds only such party or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is directed against the 'epublic of the Philippines, represented by the Eand !uthority, a governmental agency created by 'epublic !ct No. .1CC. &y its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled 8urisprudence is not permitted, e6cept upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either e6pressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. 6 There is no such showing in the instant case. )orse, the complaint itself fails to allege the e6istence of such consent. This is a fatal defect, 3 and on this basis alone, the complaint should have been dismissed. The failure of the petitioner to assert the defense of immunity from suit when the case was tried before the court a quo, as alleged by private respondent, is not fatal. 5t is now settled that such defense 4may be invo3ed by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings.4 4 Private respondent contends that the consent of petitioner may be read from the Proclamation itself, when it established the reservation 4 sub8ect to private rights, if any there be. 4 )e do not agree. No such consent can be drawn from the language of the Proclamation. The e6clusion of e6isting private rights from the reservation established by Proclamation No. +> can not be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the State from suit. )aiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be construed instrictissimi !uris. 7 %oreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. )aiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body. Neither is there merit in respondent7s submission, which the respondent appellate court sustained, on the basis of our decision in the Be/osa case, 6 that the present action is not a suit against the State within the rule of State immunity from suit, because plaintiff does not see3 to divest the Aovernment of any of its lands or its funds. 5t is contended that the complaint involves land not owned by the State, but private land belonging to the plaintiff, hence the Aovernment is not being divested of any of its properties. There is some sophistry involved in this argument, since the character of the land sought to be recovered still remains to be established, and the plaintiff7s action is directed against the State precisely to compel the latter to litigate the ownership and possession of the property. 5n other words, the plaintiff is out to establish that he is the owner of the land in question based, incidentally, on an informacion posesoria of dubious value, and he see3s to establish his claim of ownership by suing the 'epublic of the Philippines in an action in personam. The inscription in the property registry of an informacion posesoria under the Spanish %ortgage Eaw was a means provided by the law then in force in the Philippines prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States of !merica, to record a claimant7s actual possession of a piece of land, established through an e9 parteproceeding conducted in accordance with prescribed rules. 8 Such inscription merely furnishes, at best, prima facieevidence of the fact that at the time the proceeding was held, the claimant was in possession of the land under a claim of right as set forth in his application. 8 The possessory information could ripen into a record of ownership after the lapse of ?> years later reduced to *> years#, upon the fulfillment of the requisites prescribed in !rticle .+. of the Spanish %ortgage Eaw. There is no showing in the case at bar that the informacion posesoria held by the respondent had been converted into a record of ownership. Such possessory information, therefore, remained at best mere prima facie evidence of possession. Using this possessory information, the respondent could have applied for 8udicial confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Eand !ct, which is an action in rem. =owever, having failed to do so, it is rather late for him to pursue this avenue at this time. 'espondent must also contend, as the records disclose, with the fact admitted by him and stated in the decision of the $ourt a quo that settlers have been occupying and cultivating the land in question since even before the outbrea3 of the war, which puts in grave doubt his own claim of possession. )orthy of note is the fact, as pointed out by the Solicitor Aeneral, that the informacion posesoria registered in the Office of the 'egister of 2eed of $amarines Sur on September ?., *+/? was a 4reconstituted4 possessory information: it was 4reconstituted from the duplicate presented to this office 'egister of 2eeds# by 2r. Pablo <eliciano,4 without the submission of proof that the alleged duplicate was authentic or that the original thereof was lost. 'econstitution can be validly made only in case of loss of the original. 10 These circumstances raise grave doubts as to the authenticity and validity of the 4informacion posesoria4 relied upon by respondent <eliciano. !dding to the dubiousness of said document is the fact that 4possessory information calls for an area of only *>> hectares,4 11 whereas the land claimed by respondent <eliciano comprises *,.-C.C*,, hectares, later reduced to ,>*0+>-C hectares. $ourts should be wary in accepting 4possessory information documents, as well as other purportedly old Spanish titles, as proof of alleged ownership of lands. )=B'B<O'B, 8udgment is hereby rendered reversing and setting aside the appealed decision of the 5ntermediate !ppellate $ourt, dated !pril .>, *+1/, and affirming the order of the court a quo, dated !ugust ?*, *+1>, dismissing the complaint filed by respondent Pablo <eliciano against the 'epublic of the Philippines. No costs. SO O'2B'B2. G.R. No. L-37647 M3 66, 1987 UNITED STATES O- AMERI*A, *A"T. JAMES E. GALLO5A4, 5ILLIAM I. *OLLINS n% RO'ERT GOHIER,petitioners, vs. HON. V. M. RUI., "#e!$%$n& Ju%&e o, '#n() 9V, *ou#+ o, -$#!+ In!+n(e o, R$G1 n% ELIGIO DE GU.MAN N *O., IN*., respondents. Sycip, Salazar, Luna B 0analo B eliciano La8 for petitioners. Albert, Aer/ara, Benares, $erias B "omin/uez La8 4ffice for respondents. A'AD SANTOS, J.: This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain the respondent 8udge from trying $ivil $ase No. ,,+% of the defunct $ourt of <irst 5nstance of 'i(al. The factual bac3ground is as follows9 !t times material to this case, the United States of !merica had a naval base in Subic, Jambales. The base was one of those provided in the %ilitary &ases !greement between the Philippines and the United States. Sometime in %ay, *+,?, the United States invited the submission of bids for the following pro8ects *. 'epair offender system, !lava )harf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic &ay, Philippines. ?. 'epair typhoon damage to N!S $ubi shoreline: repair typhoon damage to shoreline revetment, N!"&!SB Subic: and repair to Eeyte )harf approach, N!"&!SB Subic &ay, Philippines. Bligio de Au(man K $o., 5nc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from the United States two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company complied with the requests. L5n its complaint, the company alleges that the United States had accepted its bids because 4! request to confirm a price proposal confirms the acceptance of a bid pursuant to defendant United States7 bidding practices.4 'ollo, p. .>.# The truth of this allegation has not been tested because the case has not reached the trial stage.M 5n ;une, *+,?, the company received a letter which was signed by )ilham 5. $ollins, 2irector, $ontracts 2ivision, Naval <acilities Bngineering $ommand, Southwest Pacific, 2epartment of the Navy of the United States, who is one of the petitioners herein. The letter said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the pro8ects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic &ay. The letter further said that the pro8ects had been awarded to third parties. 5n the abovementioned $ivil $ase No. ,,+0%, the company sued the United States of !merica and %essrs. ;ames B. Aalloway, )illiam 5. $ollins and 'obert Aohier all members of the Bngineering $ommand of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the wor3 on the pro8ects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also as3ed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary in8unction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for wor3 on the pro8ects. The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the 8urisdiction of this court over the sub8ect matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the sub8ect matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of !merica, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint.4 'ollo, p. />.# Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary in8unction. The company opposed the motion. The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail. =ence the instant petition which see3s to restrain perpetually the proceedings in $ivil $ase No. ,,+0% for lac3 of 8urisdiction on the part of the trial court. The petition is highly impressed with merit. The traditional rule of State immunity e6empts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. =owever, the rules of 5nternational Eaw are not petrified: they are constantly developing and evolving. !nd because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them0between sovereign and governmental acts !ure imperii# and private, commercial and proprietary acts !ure /estionis#. The result is that State immunity now e6tends only to acts 8ure imperil The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Gingdom and other states in western Burope. See $oquia and 2efensor Santiago, Public 5nternational Eaw, pp. ?>,0?>+ L*+1CM.# The respondent 8udge recogni(ed the restrictive doctrine of State immunity when he said in his Order denying the defendants7 now petitioners# motion9 4 ! distinction should be made between a strictly governmental function of the sovereign state from its private, proprietary or non0 governmental acts 'ollo, p. ?>.# =owever, the respondent 8udge also said9 45t is the $ourt7s considered opinion that entering into a contract for the repair of wharves or shoreline is certainly not a governmental function altho it may parta3e of a public nature or character. !s aptly pointed out by plaintiff7s counsel in his reply citing the ruling in the case of Eyons, 5nc., L*>C Phil. /+C *+/1#M, and which this $ourt quotes with approval, vi(.9 5t is however contended that when a sovereign state enters into a contract with a private person, the state can be sued upon the theory that it has descended to the level of an individual from which it can be implied that it has given its consent to be sued under the contract. ... 666 666 666 )e agree to the above contention, and considering that the United States government, through its agency at Subic &ay, entered into a contract with appellant for stevedoring and miscellaneous labor services within the Subic &ay !rea, a U.S. Naval 'eservation, it is evident that it can bring an action before our courts for any contractual liability that that political entity may assume under the contract. The trial court, therefore, has 8urisdiction to entertain this case ... 'ollo, pp. ?>0?*.# The reliance placed on Eyons by the respondent 8udge is misplaced for the following reasons9 5n <arry Lyons, :nc. vs. The United States of America, supra, plaintiff brought suit in the $ourt of <irst 5nstance of %anila to collect several sums of money on account of a contract between plaintiff and defendant. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court had no 8urisdiction over defendant and over the sub8ect matter of the action. The court granted the motion on the grounds that9 a# it had no 8urisdiction over the defendant who did not give its consent to the suit: and b# plaintiff failed to e6haust the administrative remedies provided in the contract. The order of dismissal was elevated to this $ourt for review. 5n sustaining the action of the lower court, this $ourt said9 5t appearing in the complaint that appellant has not complied with the procedure laid down in !rticle NN5 of the contract regarding the prosecution of its claim against the United States Aovernment, or, stated differently, it has failed to first e6haust its administrative remedies against said Aovernment, the lower court acted properly in dismissing this case.!t p. /+1.# 5t can thus be seen that the statement in respect of the waiver of State immunity from suit was purely gratuitous and, therefore, obiter so that it has no value as an imperative authority. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. 5t does not apply where the contract relates to the e6ercise of its sovereign functions. 5n this case the pro8ects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order: they are not utili(ed for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez, 1C Phil. .*? *+C+#. 5n that case the plaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to the United States of !merica for the use of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued to recover possession of the premises on the ground that the term of the leases had e6pired. They also as3ed for increased rentals until the apartments shall have been vacated. The defendants who were armed forces officers of the United States moved to dismiss the suit for lac3 of 8urisdiction in the part of the court. The %unicipal $ourt of %anila granted the motion to dismiss: sustained by the $ourt of <irst 5nstance, the plaintiffs went to this $ourt for review on certiorari. 5n denying the petition, this $ourt said9 On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the belief and we hold that the real party defendant in interest is the Aovernment of the United States of !merica: that any 8udgment for bac3 or 5ncreased rentals or damages will have to be paid not by defendants %oore and Tillman and their -C co0defendants but by the said U.S. Aovernment. On the basis of the ruling in the case of Eand vs. 2ollar already cited, and on what we have already stated, the present action must be considered as one against the U.S. Aovernment. 5t is clear hat the courts of the Philippines including the %unicipal $ourt of %anila have no 8urisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of lac3 of 8urisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Aovernment has not , given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. %oreover, this is not only a case of a citi(en filing a suit against his own Aovernment without the latter7s consent but it is of a citi(en filing an action against a foreign government without said government7s consent, which renders more obvious the lac3 of 8urisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law behind this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof. !t p. .?..# 5n Syquia,the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but the contracts notwithstanding the States was not deemed to have given or waived its consent to be sued for the reason that the contracts were for!ure imperii and not for !ure /estionis. )=B'B<O'B, the petition is granted: the questioned orders of the respondent 8udge are set aside and $ivil $ase No. is dismissed. $osts against the private respondent. Teehan2ee, Aquino, 3oncepcion, *r., 0elencio-<errera, $lana, M #scolin, Relova, %utierrez, *r., "e la uente, 3uevas and Alampay, **., concur. ernando, 3.*., too2 no part. Se2#+e O2$n$on! MA=ASIAR, J.2 dissenting9 The petition should be dismissed and the proceedings in $ivil $ase No. ,,+0% in the defunct $<5 now 'T$# of 'i(al be allowed to continue therein. 5n the case of Lyons vs. the United States of America *>C Phil. /+.#, where the contract entered into between the plaintiff =arry Eyons, 5nc.# and the defendant U.S. Aovernment# involved stevedoring and labor services within the Subic &ay area, this $ourt further stated that inasmuch as 4. . . the United States Aovernment. through its agency at Subic &ay, entered into a contract with appellant for stevedoring and miscellaneous labor services within the Subic &ay area, a U.S. Navy 'eservation, it is evident that it can bring an action before our courts for any contractual liability that that political entity may assume under the contract.4 )hen the U.S. Aovernment, through its agency at Subic &ay, confirmed the acceptance of a bid of a private company for the repair of wharves or shoreline in the Subic &ay area, it is deemed to have entered into a contract and thus waived the mantle of sovereign immunity from suit and descended to the level of the ordinary citi(en. 5ts consent to be sued, therefore, is implied from its act of entering into a contract Santos vs. Santos, +? Phil. ?1*, ?1C#. ;ustice and fairness dictate that a foreign government that commits a breach of its contractual obligation in the case at bar by the unilateral cancellation of the award for the pro8ect by the United States government, through its agency at Subic &ay should not be allowed to ta3e undue advantage of a party who may have legitimate claims against it by see3ing refuge behind the shield of non0suability. ! contrary view would render a <ilipino citi(en, as in the instant case, helpless and without redress in his own country for violation of his rights committed by the agents of the foreign government professing to act in its name. !ppropriate are the words of ;ustice Perfecto in his dissenting opinion in Syquia vs. Almeda Lopez, 1C Phil. .*?, .?/9 !lthough, generally, foreign governments are beyond the 8urisdiction of domestic courts of 8ustice, such rule is inapplicable to cases in which the foreign government enters into private contracts with the citi(ens of the court7s 8urisdiction. ! contrary view would simply run against all principles of decency and violative of all tenets of morals. %oral principles and principles of 8ustice are as valid and applicable as well with regard to private individuals as with regard to governments either domestic or foreign. Once a foreign government enters into a private contract with the private citi(ens of another country, such foreign government cannot shield its non0 performance or contravention of the terms of the contract under the cloa3 of non08urisdiction. To place such foreign government beyond the 8urisdiction of the domestic courts is to give approval to the e6ecution of unilateral contracts, graphically described in Spanish as 7contratos leoninos7, because one party gets the lion7s share to the detriment of the other. To give validity to such contract is to sanctify bad faith, deceit, fraud. )e prefer to adhere to the thesis that all parties in a private contract, including governments and the most powerful of them, are amenable to law, and that such contracts are enforceable through the help of the courts of 8ustice with 8urisdiction to ta3e cogni(ance of any violation of such contracts if the same had been entered into only by private individuals. $onstant resort by a foreign state or its agents to the doctrine of State immunity in this 8urisdiction impinges unduly upon our sovereignty and dignity as a nation. 5ts application will particularly discourage <ilipino or domestic contractors from transacting business and entering into contracts with United States authorities or facilities in the Philippines whether naval, air or ground forces0because the difficulty, if not impossibility, of enforcing a validly e6ecuted contract and of see3ing 8udicial remedy in our own courts for breaches of contractual obligation committed by agents of the United States government, always, looms large, thereby hampering the growth of <ilipino enterprises and creating a virtual monopoly in our own country by United States contractors of contracts for services or supplies with the various U.S. offices and agencies operating in the Philippines. The sanctity of upholding agreements freely entered into by the parties cannot be over emphasi(ed. )hether the parties are nations or private individuals, it is to be reasonably assumed and e6pected that the underta3ings in the contract 8ill be complied 8ith in /ood faith. One glaring fact of modern day civili(ation is that a big and powerful nation, li3e the United States of !merica, can always overwhelm small and wea3 nations. The declaration in the United Nations $harter that its member states are equal and sovereign, becomes hollow and meaningless because big nations wielding economic and military superiority impose upon and dictate to small nations, subverting their sovereignty and dignity as nations. Thus, more often than not, when U.S. interest clashes with the interest of small nations, the !merican governmental agencies or its citi(ens invo3e principles of international law for their own benefit. 5n the case at bar, the efficacy of the contract between the U.S. Naval authorities at Subic &ay on one hand, and herein private respondent on the other, was honored more in the breach than in the compliance The opinion of the ma8ority will certainly open the floodgates of more violations of contractual obligations. !merican authorities or any foreign government in the Philippines for that matter, dealing with the citi(ens of this country, can conveniently see3 protective cover under the ma8ority opinion. The result is disastrous to the Philippines. This opinion of the ma8ority manifests a neo0colonial mentality. 5t fosters economic imperialism and foreign political ascendancy in our 'epublic. The doctrine of government immunity from suit cannot and should not serve as an instrument for perpetrating an in8ustice on a citi(en !migable vs. $uenca, E0?-C>>, <ebruary ?+, *+,?, C. S$'! .->: %inisterio vs. $ourt of <irst 5nstance, E0.*-./, !ugust .*, *+,*, C> S$'! C-C#. Under the doctrine of implied waiver of its non0suability, the United States government, through its naval authorities at Subic &ay, should be held amenable to lawsuits in our country li3e any other 8uristic person. The invocation by the petitioner United States of !merica is not in accord with paragraph . of !rticle 555 of the original 'P0US %ilitary &ases !greement of %arch *C, *+C,, which states that 4in the e6ercise of the above0mentioned rights, powers and authority, the United States a/rees that the po8ers /ranted to it 8ill not be used unreasonably. . .4 Bmphasis supplied#. Nor is such posture of the petitioners herein in harmony with the amendment dated %ay ?,, *+-1 to the aforesaid 'P0US %ilitary &ases !greement, which recogni(es 4the need to promote and maintain sound employment practices which will assure equality of treatment of all employees ... and continuing favorable employer0employee relations ...4 and 4&#elieving that an agreement will be mutually beneficial and will strengthen the democratic institutions cherished by both Aovernments, ... the United States Aovernment agrees to accord preferential employment of <ilipino citi(ens in the &ases, thus *# the U.S. <orces in the Philippines shall fill the needs for civilian employment by employing <ilipino citi(ens, etc.4 Par. *, !rt. 5 of the !mendment of %ay ?,, *+-1#. Neither does the invocation by petitioners of state immunity from suit e6press fidelity to paragraph * of !rticle 5" of the aforesaid amendment of %ay ? ,, *+-1 which directs that 4 contractors and concessionaires performing wor3 for the U.S. !rmed <orces shall be required by their contract or concession agreements to comply 8ith all applicable $hilippine labor la8s and re/ulations, 4 even though paragraph ? thereof affirms that 4nothing in this !greement shall imply any waiver by either of the two Aovernments of such immunity under international law.4 'eliance by petitioners on the non0suability of the United States Aovernment before the local courts, actually clashes with No. 555 on respect for Philippine law of the %emorandum of !greement signed on ;anuary ,, *+,+, also amending 'P0US %ilitary &ases !greement, which stresses that 4it is the duty of members of the United States orces, the civilian component and their dependents, to respect the la8s of the Republic of the $hilippines and to abstain from any activity inconsistent 8ith the spirit of the 0ilitary Bases A/reement and, in particular, from any political activity in the $hilippines. The United States shag ta3e all measures within its authority to insure that they adhere to them Bmphasis supplied#. The foregoing duty imposed by the amendment to the !greement is further emphasi(ed by No. 5" on the economic and social improvement of areas surrounding the bases, which directs that 4moreover, the United States orces shall procure /oods and services in the $hilippines to the ma9imum e9tent feasible4 Bmphasis supplied#. Under No. "5 on labor and ta6ation of the said amendment of ;anuary -, *+,+ in connection with the discussions on possible revisions or alterations of the !greement of %ay ?,, *+-1, 4the discussions shall be conducted on the basis of the principles of equality of treatment, the ri/ht to or/anize, and bar/ain collectively, and respect for the soverei/nty of the Republic of the $hilippines4 Bmphasis supplied# The ma8ority opinion seems to moc3 the provision of paragraph * of the 8oint statement of President %arcos and "ice0President %ondale of the United States dated %ay C, *+,1 that 4the United States re-affirms that $hilippine soverei/nty e9tends over the bases and that :ts base shall be under the command of a $hilippine Base 3ommander, 4 which is supposed to underscore the 8oint $ommunique of President %arcos and U.S. President <ord of 2ecember ,, *+,/, under which 4they affirm that soverei/n equality, territorial inte/rity and political independence of all States are fundamental principles 8hich both countries scrupulously respectC and that >they confirm that mutual respect for the di/nity of each nation shall characterize their friendship as 8ell as the alliance bet8een their t8o countries. > The ma8ority opinion negates the statement on the delineation of the powers, duties and responsibilities of both the Philippine and !merican &ase $ommanders that 4in the performance of their duties, the Philippine &ase $ommander and the !merican &ase $ommander shall be guided by full respect for $hilippine soverei/nty on the one hand and the assurance of unhampered U.S. military operations on the other hand and that 4they shall promote cooperation understandin/ and harmonious relations 8ithin the Base and 8ith the /eneral public in the pro6imate vicinity thereof4 par. ? K par. . of the !nne6 covered by the e6change of notes, ;anuary ,, *+,+, between !mbassador 'ichard ). %urphy and %inister of <oreign !ffairs $arlos P. 'omulo, Bmphasis supplied#. G.R. No. 101949 De(e/0e# 1, 1994 THE HOL4 SEE, petitioner, vs. THE HON. ERI'ERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., ! "#e!$%$n& Ju%&e o, +)e Re&$on1 T#$1 *ou#+ o, ME+$, '#n() 61 n% STAR'RIGHT SALES ENTER"RISES, IN*., respondents. $adilla La8 4ffice for petitioner. Si/uion Reyna, 0ontecillo B 4n/sia2o for private respondent. <UIASON, J.: This is a petition for certiorari under 'ule -/ of the 'evised 'ules of $ourt to reverse and set aside the Orders dated ;une ?>, *++* and September *+, *++* of the 'egional Trial $ourt, &ranch -*, %a3ati, %etro %anila in $ivil $ase No. +>0*1.. The Order dated ;une ?>, *++* denied the motion of petitioner to dismiss the complaint in $ivil $ase No. +>0*1., while the Order dated September *+, *++* denied the motion for reconsideration of the ;une ?>,*++* Order. Petitioner is the =oly See who e6ercises sovereignty over the "atican $ity in 'ome, 5taly, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio. Private respondent, Starbright Sales Bnterprises, 5nc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business. This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of -,>>> square meters Eot /0!, Transfer $ertificate of Title No. .+>CC># located in the %unicipality of ParaDaque, %etro %anila and registered in the name of petitioner. Said Eot /0! is contiguous to Eots /0& and /02 which are covered by Transfer $ertificates of Title Nos. ?,**>1 and ?-/.11 respectively and registered in the name of the Philippine 'ealty $orporation P'$#. The three lots were sold to 'amon Eicup, through %sgr. 2omingo !. $irilos, ;r., acting as agent to the sellers. Eater, Eicup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent. 5n view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. $omplicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Eot /0! to Tropicana Properties and 2evelopment $orporation Tropicana#. 5 On ;anuary ?., *++>, private respondent filed a complaint with the 'egional Trial $ourt, &ranch -*, %a3ati, %etro %anila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants9 namely, %sgr. 2omingo !. $irilos, ;r., the P'$ and Tropicana $ivil $ase No. +>0*1.#. The complaint alleged that9 *# on !pril *,, *+11, %sgr. $irilos, ;r., on behalf of petitioner and the P'$, agreed to sell to 'amon Eicup Eots /0!, /0& and /02 at the price of P*,?C>.>> per square meters: ?# the agreement to sell was made on the condition that earnest money of P*>>,>>>.>> be paid by Eicup to the sellers, and that the sellers clear the said lots of squatters who were then occupying the same: .# Eicup paid the earnest money to %sgr. $irilos: C# in the same month, Eicup assigned his rights over the property to private respondent and informed the sellers of the said assignment: /# thereafter, private respondent demanded from %sgr. $irilos that the sellers fulfill their underta3ing and clear the property of squatters: however, %sgr. $irilos informed private respondent of the squatters7 refusal to vacate the lots, proposing instead either that private respondent underta3e the eviction or that the earnest money be returned to the latter: -# private respondent counterproposed that if it would underta3e the eviction of the squatters, the purchase price of the lots should be reduced from P*,?C>.>> to P*,*/>.>> per square meter: ,# %sgr. $irilos returned the earnest money of P*>>,>>>.>> and wrote private respondent giving it seven days from receipt of the letter to pay the original purchase price in cash: 1# private respondent sent the earnest money bac3 to the sellers, but later discovered that on %arch .>, *+1+, petitioner and the P'$, without notice to private respondent, sold the lots to Tropicana, as evidenced by two separate 2eeds of Sale, one over Eot /0!, and another over Eots /0& and /02: and that the sellers7 transfer certificate of title over the lots were cancelled, transferred and registered in the name of Tropicana: +# Tropicana induced petitioner and the P'$ to sell the lots to it and thus enriched itself at the e6pense of private respondent: *># private respondent demanded the rescission of the sale to Tropicana and the reconveyance of the lots, to no avail: and **# private respondent is willing and able to comply with the terms of the contract to sell and has actually made plans to develop the lots into a townhouse pro8ect, but in view of the sellers7 breach, it lost profits of not less than P.>,>>>.>>>.>>. Private respondent thus prayed for9 *# the annulment of the 2eeds of Sale between petitioner and the P'$ on the one hand, and Tropicana on the other: ?# the reconveyance of the lots in question: .# specific performance of the agreement to sell between it and the owners of the lots: and C# damages. On ;une 1, *++>, petitioner and %sgr. $irilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint @ petitioner for lac3 of 8urisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and %sgr. $irilos for being an improper party. !n opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent. On ;une ?>, *++*, the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner7s motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner 4shed off LitsM sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question4 Rollo, pp. ?>0?*#. On ;uly *?, *++*, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order. On !ugust .>, *++*, petitioner filed a 4%otion for a =earing for the Sole Purpose of Bstablishing <actual !llegation for claim of 5mmunity as a ;urisdictional 2efense.4 So as to facilitate the determination of its defense of sovereign immunity, petitioner prayed that a hearing be conducted to allow it to establish certain facts upon which the said defense is based. Private respondent opposed this motion as well as the motion for reconsideration. On October *, *++*, the trial court issued an order deferring the resolution on the motion for reconsideration until after trial on the merits and directing petitioner to file its answer Rollo, p. ??#. Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. 5n its petition, petitioner invo3es the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio. On 2ecember +, *++*, a %otion for 5ntervention was filed before us by the 2epartment of <oreign !ffairs, claiming that it has a legal interest in the outcome of the case as regards the diplomatic immunity of petitioner, and that it 4adopts by reference, the allegations contained in the petition of the =oly See insofar as they refer to arguments relative to its claim of sovereign immunity from suit4 Rollo, p. 1,#. Private respondent opposed the intervention of the 2epartment of <oreign !ffairs. 5n compliance with the resolution of this $ourt, both parties and the 2epartment of <oreign !ffairs submitted their respective memoranda. 55 ! preliminary matter to be threshed out is the procedural issue of whether the petition for certiorari under 'ule -/ of the 'evised 'ules of $ourt can be availed of to question the order denying petitioner7s motion to dismiss. The general rule is that an order denying a motion to dismiss is not reviewable by the appellate courts, the remedy of the movant being to file his answer and to proceed with the hearing before the trial court. &ut the general rule admits of e6ceptions, and one of these is when it is very clear in the records that the trial court has no alternative but to dismiss the complaint Philippine National &an3 v. <lorendo, ?>- S$'! /1? L*++?M: Jagada v. $ivil Service $ommission, ?*- S$'! **C L*++?M. 5n such a case, it would be a sheer waste of time and energy to require the parties to undergo the rigors of a trial. The other procedural question raised by private respondent is the personality or legal interest of the 2epartment of <oreign !ffairs to intervene in the case in behalf of the =oly See Rollo, pp. *1-0*+>#. 5n Public 5nternational Eaw, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the <oreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity. 5n the United States, the procedure followed is the process of 4suggestion,4 where the foreign state or the international organi(ation sued in an !merican court requests the Secretary of State to ma3e a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. 5f the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, as3s the !ttorney Aeneral to submit to the court a 4suggestion4 that the defendant is entitled to immunity. 5n Bngland, a similar procedure is followed, only the <oreign Office issues a certification to that effect instead of submitting a 4suggestion4 O7$onnell, 5 5nternational Eaw *.> L*+-/M: Note9 5mmunity from Suit of <oreign Sovereign 5nstrumentalities and Obligations, /> Hale Eaw ;ournal *>11 L*+C*M#. 5n the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organi(ation to first secure an e6ecutive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. &ut how the Philippine <oreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. 5n :nternational 3atholic 0i/ration 3ommission v. 3alle!a, *+> S$'! *.> *++>#, the Secretary of <oreign !ffairs 8ust sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Eabor and Bmployment, informing the latter that the respondent0 employer could not be sued because it en8oyed diplomatic immunity. 5n1orld <ealth 4r/anization v. Aquino, C1 S$'! ?C? *+,?#, the Secretary of <oreign !ffairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. 5n Baer v. Tizon, /, S$'! * *+,C#, the U.S. Bmbassy as3ed the Secretary of <oreign !ffairs to request the Solicitor Aeneral to ma3e, in behalf of the $ommander of the United States Naval &ase at Olongapo $ity, Jambales, a 4suggestion4 to respondent ;udge. The Solicitor Aeneral embodied the 4suggestion4 in a %anifestation and %emorandum as amicus curiae. 5n the case at bench, the 2epartment of <oreign !ffairs, through the Office of Eegal !ffairs moved with this $ourt to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The $ourt allowed the said 2epartment to file its memorandum in support of petitioner7s claim of sovereign immunity. 5n some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by the respondents through their private counsels 'aqui(a v. &radford, ,/ Phil. /> L*+C/M: %iquiabas v. Philippine0'yu3yus $ommand, 1> Phil. ?-? L*+C1M: United States of !merica v. Auinto, *1? S$'! -CC L*++>M and companion cases#. 5n cases where the foreign states bypass the <oreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and ma3e their own determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions involved. 555 The burden of the petition is that respondent trial court has no 8urisdiction over petitioner, being a foreign state en8oying sovereign immunity. On the other hand, private respondent insists that the doctrine of non0suability is not anymore absolute and that petitioner has divested itself of such a cloa3 when, of its own free will, it entered into a commercial transaction for the sale of a parcel of land located in the Philippines. !. The <oly See &efore we determine the issue of petitioner7s non0suability, a brief loo3 into its status as a sovereign state is in order. &efore the anne6ation of the Papal States by 5taly in *1,>, the Pope was the monarch and he, as the =oly See, was considered a sub8ect of 5nternational Eaw. )ith the loss of the Papal States and the limitation of the territory under the =oly See to an area of *>1., acres, the position of the =oly See in 5nternational Eaw became controversial Salonga and Hap, Public 5nternational Eaw .-0., L*++?M#. 5n *+?+, 5taly and the =oly See entered into the Eateran Treaty, where 5taly recogni(ed the e6clusive dominion and sovereign 8urisdiction of the =oly See over the "atican $ity. 5t also recogni(ed the right of the =oly See to receive foreign diplomats, to send its own diplomats to foreign countries, and to enter into treaties according to 5nternational Eaw Aarcia, Ouestions and Problems 5n 5nternational Eaw, Public and Private 1* L*+C1M#. The Eateran Treaty established the statehood of the "atican $ity 4for the purpose of assuring to the =oly See absolute and visible independence and of guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in the field of international relations4 O7$onnell, 5 5nternational Eaw .** L*+-/M#. 5n view of the wordings of the Eateran Treaty, it is difficult to determine whether the statehood is vested in the =oly See or in the "atican $ity. Some writers even suggested that the treaty created two international persons @ the =oly See and "atican $ity Salonga and Hap, supra, .,#. The "atican $ity fits into none of the established categories of states, and the attribution to it of 4sovereignty4 must be made in a sense different from that in which it is applied to other states <enwic3, 5nternational Eaw *?C0*?/ L*+C1M: $ru(, 5nternational Eaw ., L*++*M#. 5n a community of national states, the "atican $ity represents an entity organi(ed not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and international ob8ects. 2espite its si(e and ob8ect, the "atican $ity has an independent government of its own, with the Pope, who is also head of the 'oman $atholic $hurch, as the =oly See or =ead of State, in conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its mission in the world. 5ndeed, the world0wide interests and activities of the "atican $ity are such as to ma3e it in a sense an 4international state4 <enwic3, supra., *?/: Gelsen, Principles of 5nternational Eaw *-> L*+/-M#. One authority wrote that the recognition of the "atican $ity as a state has significant implication @ that it is possible for any entity pursuing ob8ects essentially different from those pursued by states to be invested with international personality Gun(, The Status of the =oly See in 5nternational Eaw, C- The !merican ;ournal of 5nternational Eaw .>1 L*+/?M#. 5nasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into transactions as the =oly See and not in the name of the "atican $ity, one can conclude that in the Pope7s own view, it is the =oly See that is the international person. The 'epublic of the Philippines has accorded the =oly See the status of a foreign sovereign. The =oly See, through its !mbassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since *+/, Rollo, p. 1,#. This appears to be the universal practice in international relations. &. Soverei/n :mmunity !s e6pressed in Section ? of !rticle 55 of the *+1, $onstitution, we have adopted the generally accepted principles of 5nternational Eaw. Bven without this affirmation, such principles of 5nternational Eaw are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations United States of !merica v. Auinto, *1? S$'! -CC L*++>M#. There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. !ccording to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. !ccording to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recogni(ed only with regard to public acts or acts !ure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts !ure /estionis United States of !merica v. 'ui(, *.- S$'! C1, L*+1,M: $oquia and 2efensor0 Santiago, Public 5nternational Eaw *+C L*+1CM#. Some states passed legislation to serve as guidelines for the e6ecutive or 8udicial determination when an act may be considered as !ure /estionis. The United States passed the <oreign Sovereign 5mmunities !ct of *+,-, which defines a commercial activity as 4either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act.4 <urthermore, the law declared that the 4commercial character of the activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.4 The $anadian Parliament enacted in *+1? an !ct to Provide <or State 5mmunity in $anadian $ourts. The !ct defines a 4commercial activity4 as any particular transaction, act or conduct or any regular course of conduct that by reason of its nature, is of a 4commercial character.4 The restrictive theory, which is intended to be a solution to the host of problems involving the issue of sovereign immunity, has created problems of its own. Eegal treatises and the decisions in countries which follow the restrictive theory have difficulty in characteri(ing whether a contract of a sovereign state with a private party is an act !ure /estionis or an act !ure imperii. The restrictive theory came about because of the entry of sovereign states into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of governmental functions. This is particularly true with respect to the $ommunist states which too3 control of nationali(ed business activities and international trading. This $ourt has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts !ure imperii9 *# the lease by a foreign government of apartment buildings for use of its military officers Syquia v. Eope(, 1C Phil. .*? L*+C+M: ?# the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station United States of !merica v. 'ui(, supra.#: and .# the change of employment status of base employees Sanders v. "eridiano, *-? S$'! 11 L*+11M#. On the other hand, this $ourt has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts !ure /estionis9 *# the hiring of a coo3 in the recreation center, consisting of three restaurants, a cafeteria, a ba3ery, a store, and a coffee and pastry shop at the ;ohn =ay !ir Station in &aguio $ity, to cater to !merican servicemen and the general public United States of !merica v. 'odrigo, *1? S$'! -CC L*++>M#: and ?# the bidding for the operation of barber shops in $lar3 !ir &ase in !ngeles $ity United States of !merica v. Auinto, *1? S$'! -CC L*++>M#. The operation of the restaurants and other facilities open to the general public is undoubtedly for profit as a commercial and not a governmental activity. &y entering into the employment contract with the coo3 in the discharge of its proprietary function, the United States government impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. 5n the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be considered 4commercial4 and as constituting acts !ure /estionis, we have to come out with our own guidelines, tentative they may be. $ertainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. 5f the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. 5f the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act !ure imperii, especially when it is not underta3en for gain or profit. !s held in United States of America v. %uinto, supra#9 There is no question that the United States of !merica, li3e any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non0 suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. 5t is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. 5n the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categori(ed as an act !ure /estionis. =owever, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Eot /0! were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the !postolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim. Eot /0! was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the !rchdiocese of %anila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recogni(ed in the *+-* "ienna $onvention on 2iplomatic 'elations !rts. ?>0??#. This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November */, *+-/. 5n !rticle .*a# of the $onvention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative 8urisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission. 5f this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason should immunity be recogni(ed as regards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the =oly See. The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are li3ewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Eot /0! for profit or gain. 5t merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint Rollo, pp. ?-, ?,#. The issue of petitioner7s non0suability can be determined by the trial court without going to trial in the light of the pleadings, particularly the admission of private respondent. &esides, the privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the %emorandum and $ertification of the 2epartment of <oreign !ffairs. !s the department tas3ed with the conduct of the Philippines7 foreign relations !dministrative $ode of *+1,, &oo3 5", Title 5, Sec. .#, the 2epartment of <oreign !ffairs has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the Bmbassy of the =oly See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the 'epublic of the Philippines e6empt from local 8urisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country Rollo, pp. */-0*/,#. The determination of the e6ecutive arm of government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon the courts 5nternational $atholic %igration $ommission v. $alle8a, *+> S$'! *.> L*++>M#. )here the plea of immunity is recogni(ed and affirmed by the e6ecutive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the e6ecutive arm of the government in conducting the country7s foreign relations )orld =ealth Organi(ation v. !quino, C1 S$'! ?C? L*+,?M#. !s in :nternational 3atholic 0i/ration 3ommission and in 1orld <ealth 4r/anization, we abide by the certification of the 2epartment of <oreign !ffairs. Ordinarily, the procedure would be to remand the case and order the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish the facts alleged by petitioner in its motion. 5n view of said certification, such procedure would however be pointless and unduly circuitous Ortigas K $o. Etd. Partnership v. ;udge Tirso "elasco, A.'. No. *>+-C/, ;uly ?/, *++C#. 5" Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public 5nternational Eaw and Transnational Eaw, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can as3 his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels. Private respondent can as3 the Philippine government, through the <oreign Office, to espouse its claims against the =oly See. 5ts first tas3 is to persuade the Philippine government to ta3e up with the =oly See the validity of its claims. Of course, the <oreign Office shall first ma3e a determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the =oly See Houng, Remedies of $rivate 3laimants A/ainst orei/n States, Selected 'eadings on Protection by Eaw of Private <oreign 5nvestments +>/, +*+ L*+-CM#. Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause. !ccording to the Permanent $ourt of 5nternational ;ustice, the forerunner of the 5nternational $ourt of ;ustice9 &y ta3ing up the case of one of its sub8ects and by reporting to diplomatic action or international 8udicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights @ its right to ensure, in the person of its sub8ects, respect for the rules of international law The %avrommatis Palestine $oncessions, * =udson, )orld $ourt 'eports ?+., .>? L*+?CM#. )=B'B<O'B, the petition for certiorari is A'!NTB2 and the complaint in $ivil $ase No. +>0*1. against petitioner is 25S%5SSB2. SO O'2B'B2. G.R. No. L-30681 No?e/0e# 68, 1983 RE"U'LI* O- THE "HILI""INES, petitioner, vs. HON. GUILLERMO ". VILLASOR, ! Ju%&e o, +)e *ou#+ o, -$#!+ In!+n(e o, *e0u, '#n() I, THE "ROVIN*IAL SHERI-- O- RI.AL, THE SHERI-- O- <UE.ON *IT4, n% THE SHERI-- O- THE *IT4 O- MANILA, THE *LER= O- *OURT, *ou#+ o, -$#!+ In!+n(e o, *e0u, ". J. =IENER *O., LTD., GAVINO UN*HUAN, AND INTERNATIONAL *ONSTRU*TION *OR"ORATION, respondents. 4ffice of the Solicitor %eneral eli9 A. 0a2asiar and Solicitor Bernardo $. $ardo for petitioner. Andres T. Aelarde and 0arcelo B. ernan for respondents. -ERNANDO, J.: The 'epublic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding challenges the validity of an order issued by respondent ;udge Auillermo P. "illasor, then of the $ourt of <irst 5nstance of $ebu, &ranch 5, 1 declaring a decision final and e6ecutory and of an alias writ of e6ecution directed against the funds of the !rmed <orces of the Philippines subsequently issued in pursuance thereof, the alleged ground being e6cess of 8urisdiction, or at the very least, grave abuse of discretion. !s thus simply and tersely put, with the facts being undisputed and the principle of law that calls for application indisputable, the outcome is predictable. The 'epublic of the Philippines is entitled to the writs prayed for. 'espondent ;udge ought not to have acted thus. The order thus impugned and the alias writ of e6ecution must be nullified. 5n the petition filed by the 'epublic of the Philippines on ;uly ,, *+-+, a summary of facts was set forth thus9 4,. On ;uly ., *+-*, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. ?*/-0' in favor of respondents P. ;. Giener $o., Etd., Aavino Unchuan, and 5nternational $onstruction $orporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P*,,*?,.+-.C>, sub8ect of Special Proceedings. 1. On ;une ?C, *+-+, respondent =onorable Auillermo P. "illasor, issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision of ;uly ., *+-* final and e6ecutory, directing the Sheriffs of 'i(al Province, Oue(on $ity Las well asM %anila to e6ecute the said decision. +. Pursuant to the said Order dated ;une ?C, *+-+, the corresponding !lias )rit of B6ecution Lwas issuedM dated ;une ?-, *+-+, .... *>. On the strength of the afore0mentioned !lias )rit of B6ecution dated ;une ?-, *+-+, the Provincial Sheriff of 'i(al respondent herein# served notices of garnishment dated ;une ?1, *+-+ with several &an3s, specially on the 4monies due the !rmed <orces of the Philippines in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said )rit of B6ecution4: the Philippine "eterans &an3 received the same notice of garnishment on ;une .>, *+-+ .... **. The funds of the !rmed <orces of the Philippines on deposit with the &an3s, particularly, with the Philippine "eterans &an3 and the Philippine National &an3 LorM their branches are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the !rmed <orces of the Philippines, as per $ertification dated ;uly ., *+-+ by the !<P $ontroller,...4 6 . The paragraph immediately succeeding in such petition then alleged9 4*?. 'espondent ;udge, =onorable Auillermo P. "illasor, acted in e6cess of 8urisdiction LorM with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac3 of 8urisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of e6ecution against the properties of the !rmed <orces of the Philippines, hence, the !lias )rit of B6ecution and notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null and void.4 3 5n the answer filed by respondents, through counsel !ndres T. "elarde and %arcelo &. <ernan, the facts set forth were admitted with the only qualification being that the total award was in the amount of P?,.,?,..*.C>. 4 The 'epublic of the Philippines, as mentioned at the outset, did right in filing this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. )hat was done by respondent ;udge is not in conformity with the dictates of the $onstitution. . 5t is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the 8uristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. 5t is readily understandable why it must be so. 5n the classic formulation of =olmes9 4! sovereign is e6empt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that ma3es the law on which the right depends.4 7 Sociological 8urisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a recent decision, $rovidence 1ashin/ton :nsurance 3o. v. Republic of the $hilippines, 6 with its affirmation that 4a continued adherence to the doctrine of non0suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of 8udicial remedy were not thus restricted. )ith the well 3nown propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined.4 8 This fundamental postulate underlying the *+./ $onstitution is now made e6plicit in the revised charter. 5t is therein e6pressly provided9 4The State may not be sued without its consent.4 8 ! corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the ob8ect of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability ad8udged. Thus in the recent case of 3ommissioner of $ublic <i/h8ays v. San "ie/o, 9 such a well0settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of ;ustice Teehan3ee9 4The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant7s action 7only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of e6ecution7 and that the power of the $ourts ends when the 8udgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be sei(ed under writs of e6ecution or garnishment to satisfy such 8udgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. 2isbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paraly(ed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific ob8ects, as appropriated by law.4 10 Such a principle applies even to an attempted garnishment of a salary that had accrued in favor of an employee. "irector of 3ommerce and :ndustry v. 3oncepcion, 11 spea3s to that effect. ;ustice %alcolm as ponente left no doubt on that score. Thus9 4! rule which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts e6cept by e6press authori(ation by the Eegislature, and to sub8ect its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. !nother reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Aovernment, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. !nd still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids it.4 16 5n the light of the above, it is made abundantly clear why the 'epublic of the Philippines could rightfully allege a legitimate grievance. )=B'B<O'B, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, nullifying and setting aside both the order of ;une ?C, *+-+ declaring e6ecutory the decision of ;uly ., *+-* as well as the alias writ of e6ecution issued thereunder. The preliminary in8unction issued by this $ourt on ;uly *?, *+-+ is hereby made permanent. Daldivar ;3hairman=, Antonio, ernandez and Aquino, **., concur. Barredo, *, too2 no part. G.R. No. 104669 No?e/0e# 11, 1993 DE"ARTMENT O- AGRI*ULTURE, petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL LA'OR RELATIONS *OMMISSION, e+ 1., respondents. Roy La/o Salcedo for private respondents. VITUG, J.: <or consideration are the incidents that flow from the familiar doctrine of non0suability of the state. 5n this petition for certiorari, the 2epartment of !griculture see3s to nullify the 'esolution, 1 dated ?, November *++*, of the National Eabor 'elations $ommission NE'$#, <ifth 2ivision, $agayan de Oro $ity, denying the petition for in8unction, prohibition and mandamus that prays to en8oin permanently the NE'$7s 'egional !rbitration &ranch N and $agayan de Oro $ity Sheriff from enforcing the decision 6 of .* %ay *++* of the B6ecutive Eabor !rbiter and from attaching and e6ecuting on petitioner7s property. The 2epartment of !griculture herein petitioner# and Sultan Security !gency entered into a contract 3 on >* !pril *+1+ for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Save for the increase in the monthly rate of the guards, the same terms and conditions were also made to apply to another contract, dated >* %ay *++>, between the same parties. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan !gency in the various premises of the petitioner. On *. September *++>, several guards of the Sultan Security !gency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non0payment of *.th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages, 4 before the 'egional !rbitration &ranch N of $agayan de Oro $ity, doc3eted as NE'$ $ase No. *>0>+0>>C//0+> or *>0*>0>>/*+0+>, its original doc3et number#, against the 2epartment of !griculture and Sultan Security !gency. The B6ecutive Eabor !rbiter rendered a decision on .* %ay finding herein petitioner and !ointly and severallyliable with Sultan Security !gency for the payment of money claims, aggregating P?--,C1..+*, of the complainant security guards. The petitioner and Sultan Security !gency did not appeal the decision of the Eabor !rbiter. Thus, the decision became final and e6ecutory. On *1 ;uly *++*, the Eabor !rbiter issued a writ of e6ecution. 7 commanding the $ity Sheriff to enforce and e6ecute the 8udgment against the property of the two respondents. <orthwith, or on *+ ;uly *++*, the $ity Sheriff levied on e6ecution the motor vehicles of the petitioner, i.e. one *# unit Toyota =i0!ce, one *# unit Toyota %ini $ruiser, and one *# unit Toyota $rown. 6 These units were put under the custody of Jacharias 'oa, the property custodian of the petitioner, pending their sale at public auction or the final settlement of the case, whichever would come first. ! petition for in8unction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of in8unction was filed by the petitioner with the National Eabor 'elations $ommission NE'$#, $agayan de Oro, alleging, inter alia, that the writ issued was effected without the Eabor !rbiter having duly acquired 8urisdiction over the petitioner, and that, therefore, the decision of the Eabor !rbiter was null and void and all actions pursuant thereto should be deemed equally invalid and of no legal, effect. The petitioner also pointed out that the attachment or sei(ure of its property would hamper and 8eopardi(e petitioner7s governmental functions to the pre8udice of the public good. On ?, November *++*, the NE'$ promulgated its assailed resolution: viz7 )=B'B<O'B, premises considered, the following orders are issued9 *. The enforcement and e6ecution of the 8udgments against petitioner in NE'$ '!&N $ases Nos. *>0*>0>>C//0+>: *>0*>0 >C1*0+> and *>0*>0>>/*+0+> are temporarily suspended for a period of two ?# months, more or less, but not e6tending beyond the last quarter of calendar year *++* to enable petitioner to source and raise funds to satisfy the 8udgment awards against it: ?. %eantime, petitioner is ordered and directed to source for funds within the period above0stated and to deposit the sums of money equivalent to the aggregate amount. it has been ad8udged to pay 8ointly and severally with respondent Sultan Security !gency with the 'egional !rbitration &ranch N, $agayan de Oro $ity within the same period for proper dispositions: .. 5n order to ensure compliance with this order, petitioner is li3ewise directed to put up and post sufficient surety and supersedeas bond equivalent to at least to fifty />P# percent of the total monetary award issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Supreme $ourt or by the 'egional Trial $ourt of %isamis Oriental to answer for the satisfaction of the money claims in case of failure or default on the part of petitioner to satisfy the money claims: C. The $ity Sheriff is ordered to immediately release the properties of petitioner levied on e6ecution within ten *># days from notice of the posting of sufficient surety or supersedeas bond as specified above. 5n the meanwhile, petitioner is assessed to pay the costs andIor e6penses incurred by the $ity Sheriff, if any, in connection with the e6ecution of the 8udgments in the above0stated cases upon presentation of the appropriate claims or vouchers and receipts by the city Sheriff, sub8ect to the conditions specified in the NE'$ Sheriff, sub8ect to the conditions specified in the NE'$ %anual of 5nstructions for Sheriffs: /. The right of any of the 8udgment debtors to claim reimbursement against each other for any payments made in connection with the satisfaction of the 8udgments herein is hereby recogni(ed pursuant to the ruling in the #a/le Security case, supra#. 5n case of dispute between the 8udgment debtors, the B6ecutive Eabor !rbiter of the &ranch of origin may upon proper petition by any of the parties conduct arbitration proceedings for the purpose and thereby render his decision after due notice and hearings: ,. <inally, the petition for in8unction is "ismissed for lac3 of basis. The writ of preliminary in8unction previously issued is Lifted and Set Aside and in lieu thereof, a Temporary Stay of #9ecution is issued for a period of two ?# months but not e6tending beyond the last quarter of calendar year *++*, conditioned upon the posting of a surety or supersedeas bond by petitioner within ten *># days from notice pursuant to paragraph . of this disposition. The motion to admit the complaint in intervention is"enied for lac3 of merit while the motion to dismiss the petition filed by 2uty Sheriff is Eoted SO O'2B'B2. 5n this petition for certiorari, the petitioner charges the NE'$ with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of e6ecution. The petitioner faults the NE'$ for assuming 8urisdiction over a money claim against the 2epartment, which, it claims, falls under the e6clusive 8urisdiction of the $ommission on !udit. %ore importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NE'$ has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non0 suability of the State. The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security !gency. The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that 4t#he State may not be sued without its consent,4 8 reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an e6press affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the 8urisdiction of courts. 8 5t is based on the very essence of sovereignty. !s has been aptly observed, by ;ustice =olmes, a sovereign is e6empt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that ma3es the law on which the right depends. 9 True, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is derisively called 4the royal prerogative of dishonesty4 because it grants the state the prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invo3ing its non0 suability. 10 )e have had occasion, to e6plain in its defense, however, that a continued adherence to the doctrine of non0suability cannot be deplored, for the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions would be far greater in severity than the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, if such fundamental principle is to be abandoned and the availability of 8udicial remedy is not to be accordingly restricted. 11 The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstances. On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, 4the state may not be sued without its consent:4 its clear import then is that the State may at times be sued. 16 The States7 consent may be given e6pressly or impliedly. B6press consent may be made through a general law 13 or a special law. 14 5n this 8urisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in !ct No. .>1., where the Philippine government 4consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract, e6press or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.4 17 5mplied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim 16 or when it enters into a contract. 18 5n this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied upon by the NE'$ and the private respondents, is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non0suability: distinction must still be made between one which is e6ecuted in the e6ercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. 18 5n the Unites States of America vs. Ruiz, 19 where the questioned transaction dealt with improvements on the wharves in the naval installation at Subic &ay, we held9 The traditional rule of immunity e6empts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. =owever, the rules of 5nternational Eaw are not petrified: they are constantly developing and evolving. !nd because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them @ between sovereign and governmental acts !ure imperii# and private, commercial and proprietary act !ure /estionisis#. The result is that State immunity now e6tends only to acts !ure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Gingdom and other states in )estern Burope. 666 666 666 The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. 5t does not apply where the contracts relates to the e6ercise of its sovereign functions. 5n this case the pro8ects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order: they are not utili(ed for not dedicated to commercial or business purposes. 5n the instant case, the 2epartment of !griculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract: nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. &ut, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e. for underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the $ontract for Service, clearly constitute money claims. !ct No. .>1., aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be 4sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, e6press or implied, . . . Pursuant, however, to $ommonwealth !ct 4$.!.4# No. .?,, as amended by Presidential 2ecree 4P.2.4# No. **C/, the money claim first be brought to the $ommission on !udit. Thus, in3arabao, :nc., vs. A/ricultural $roductivity 3ommission, 60 we ruled9 $#laimants have to prosecute their money claims against the Aovernment under $ommonwealth !ct .?,, stating that !ct .>1. stands now merely as the general law waiving the State7s immunity from suit, sub8ect to the general limitation e6pressed in Section , thereof that 4no e6ecution shall issue upon any 8udgment rendered by any $ourt against the Aovernment of the Philippines#, and that the conditions provided in $ommonwealth !ct .?, for filing money claims against the Aovernment must be strictly observed.4 )e fail to see any substantial conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of $.!. No. .?, and the Eabor $ode with respect to money claims against the State. The Eabor code, in relation to !ct No. .>1., provides the legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in $.!. No. .?,, as amended by P.2. *CC/. )hen the state gives its consent to be sued, it does thereby necessarily consent to unrestrained e6ecution against it. tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability. 61 5n Republic vs. Aillasor 66 this $ourt, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of e6ecution directed against the funds of the !rmed <orces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and e6ecutory 8udgment, has e6plained, thus @ The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit the claimant7s action 4only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of e6ecution4 and that the po8er of the 3ourts ends 8hen the !ud/ment is rendered, since /overnment funds and properties may not be seized under 8rits or e9ecution or /arnishment to satisfy such !ud/ments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. 2isbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paraly(ed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific ob8ects, as appropriated by law. 63 )=B'B<O'B, the petition is A'!NTB2. The resolution, dated ?, November *++*, is hereby 'B"B'SB2 and SBT !S52B. The writ of e6ecution directed against the property of the 2epartment of !griculture is nullified, and the public respondents are hereby en8oined permanently from doing, issuing and implementing any and all writs of e6ecution issued pursuant to the decision rendered by the Eabor !rbiter against said petitioner. SO O'2B'B2. G.R. No. L-33116 June 17, 1988 "HILI""INE NATIONAL 'AN=, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE JAVIER "A'ALAN, Ju%&e o, +)e *ou#+ o, -$#!+ In!+n(e, '#n() III, L Un$on, AGOO TO'A**O "LANTERS ASSO*IATION, IN*., "HILI""INE VIRGINIA TO'A**O ADMINISTRATION, n% "AN-ILO ". JIMENE., De2u+3 S)e#$,,, L Un$on, respondents. 3onrado #. 0edina, #d/ardo 0. 0a/talas B 1alfrido 3limaco for petitioner. elimon A. Aspirin fit respondent A/oo 5Tobacco $lanters Association, :nc. Air/ilio 3. Abe!o for respondent $hil. Air/inia Tobacco Administration. -ERNANDO, Acting %.J.: The reliance of petitioner Philippine National &an3 in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding against respondent ;udge ;avier Pabalan who issued a writ of e6ecution, 1 followed thereafter by a notice of garnishment of the funds of respondent Philippine "irginia Tobacco !dministration, 6 deposited with it, is on the fundamental constitutional law doctrine of non0suability of a state, it being alleged that such funds are public in character. This is not the first time petitioner raised that issue. 5t did so before in Philippine National &an3 v. $ourt of industrial 'elations, 3 decided only last ;anuary. 5t did not meet with success, this $ourt ruling in accordance with the two previous cases of National Shipyard and Steel $orporation 4 and %anila =otel Bmployees !ssociation v. %anila =otel $ompany, 7 that funds of public corporations which can sue and be sued were not e6empt from garnishment. !s respondent Philippine "irginia Tobacco !dministration is li3ewise a public corporation possessed of the same attributes, 6 a similar outcome is indicated. This petition must be dismissed. 5t is undisputed that the 8udgment against respondent Philippine "irginia Tobacco !dministration had reached the stage of finality. ! writ of e6ecution was, therefore, in order. 5t was accordingly issued on 2ecember *,, *+,>. 8 There was a notice of garnishment for the full amount mentioned in such writ of e6ecution in the sum of P*?,,?C,--. 8 5n view of the ob8ection, however, by petitioner Philippine National &an3 on the above ground, coupled with an inquiry as to whether or not respondent Philippine "irginia Tobacco !dministration had funds deposited with petitioner7s Ea Union branch, it was not until ;anuary ?/, *+,* that the order sought to be set aside in this certiorari proceeding was issued by respondent ;udge. 9 5ts dispositive portion reads as follows9 $onformably with the foregoing, it is now ordered, in accordance with law, that sufficient funds of the Philippine "irginia Tobacco !dministration now deposited with the Philippine National &an3, Ea Union &ranch, shall be garnished and delivered to the plaintiff immediately to satisfy the )rit of B6ecution for one0half of the amount awarded in the decision of November *-, *+,>.4 10 =ence this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. !s noted at the outset, petitioner Philippine National &an3 would invo3e the doctrine of non0suability. 5t is to be admitted that under the present $onstitution, what was formerly implicit as a fundamental doctrine in constitutional law has been set forth in e6press terms9 4The State may not be sued without its consent.4 11 5f the funds appertained to one of the regular departments or offices in the government, then, certainly, such a provision would be a bar to garnishment. Such is not the case here. Aarnishment would lie. Only last ;anuary, as noted in the opening paragraph of this decision, this $ourt, in a case brought by the same petitioner precisely invo3ing such a doctrine, left no doubt that the funds of public corporations could properly be made the ob8ect of a notice of garnishment. !ccordingly, this petition must fail. *. The alleged grave abuse of discretion, the basis of this certiorari proceeding, was sought to be 8ustified on the failure of respondent ;udge to set aside the notice of garnishment of funds belonging to respondent Philippine "irginia Tobacco !dministration. This e6cerpt from the aforecited decision of $hilippine Eational Ban2 v. 3ourt of :ndustrial Relations ma3es manifest why such an argument is far from persuasive. 4The premise that the funds could be spo3en as public character may be accepted in the sense that the People =omesite and =ousing $orporation was a government0owned entity. 5t does not follow though that they were e6empt. from garnishment. National Shipyard and Steel $orporation v. $ourt of 5ndustrial 'elations is squarely in point. !s was e6plicitly stated in the opinion of the then ;ustice, later $hief ;ustice, $oncepcion9 4The allegation to the effect that the funds of the N!SS$O are public funds of the government, and that, as such, the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for, as a government owned and controlled corporation, the N!SS$O has a personality of its own. distinct and separate from that of the Aovernment. 5t has @ pursuant to Section ? of B6ecutive Order No. ./-, dated October ?., *+/> ... , pursuant to which The N!SS$O has been established @ all the powers of a corporation under the $orporation Eaw ... .4 !ccordingly, it may be sue and be sued and may be sub8ected to court processes 8ust li3e any other corporation Section *., !ct No. *C/+, as amended.#4 ... To repeat, the ruling was the appropriate remedy for the prevailing party which could proceed against the funds of a corporate entity even if owned or controlled by the government.4 16 ?. The National Shipyard and Steel $orporation decision was not the first of its 3ind. The ruling therein could be inferred from the 8udgment announced in %anila =otel Bmployees !ssociation v. %anila =otel $ompany, decided as far bac3 as *+C*. 13 5n the language of its ponente ;ustice O(aeta 4On the other hand, it is well0settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated li3e any other corporation. &an3 of the United States v. Planters7 &an3, + )heat. +>C, - E.ed. ?CC#. &y engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation sub8ect to the rules of law governing private corporations.4 14 5t is worth mentioning that ;ustice O(aeta could find support for such a pronouncement from the leading !merican Supreme $ourt case of united States v. $lanters5 Ban2, 17 with the opinion coming from the illustrious $hief ;ustice %arshall. 5t was handed down more than one hundred fifty years ago, *1?C to be e6act. 5t is apparent, therefore, that petitioner &an3 could it legally set forth as a bar or impediment to a notice of garnishment the doctrine of non0suability. )=B'B<O'B, this petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed. No costs. G.R. No. L-77683-83 De(e/0e# 19, 1981 GAUDEN*IO RA4O, 'IENVINIDO "AS*UAL, TOMAS MANUEL, MARIANO *RU., "EDRO 'ARTOLOME, 'ERNARDINO *RU. JOSE "ALAD , LU*IO -AJARDO, -RAN*IS*O RA4OS, ANGEL TORRES, NOR'ERTO TORRES, RODELIO JOA<UIN, "EDRO A<UINO, A"OLINARIO 'ARTOLOME, MAMERTO 'ERNARDO, *IRIA*O *ASTILLO, GREGORIO *RU., SIMEON ESTRELLA, E"I-ANIO MAR*ELO, HERMOGENES SAN "EDRO, JUAN SANTOS, ELI.A'ETH A'AN, MAR*ELINA 'ERNA'E, 'UENAVENTURA *RU., ANTONIO MENESES, ROMAN SAN "EDRO, LO"E. ES"INOSA, GODO-REDO "UN.AL, JULIANA GAR*IA, LE'ERATO SARMIENTO, INO*EN*IO DE LEON, *ARLOS *ORREA, RE4NALDO *ASIMIRO, ANTONIO GENER, GAUDEN*IO *ASTILLO, MATIAS "ERE., *RIS"INIANO TORRES, *RESEN*IO *RU., "ROTA*IO 'ERNA'E, MARIANO ANDRES, *RISOSTOMO *RU., MAR*OS EUSTA<UIO, "A'LO LEGAS"I, VI*ENTE "AS*UAL, ALEJANDRA SISON, EU-RA*IO TORRES, ROGELIO 'ARTOLOME, RODOL-O 'ERNARDO, A"OLONIO *ASTILLO, MAR*ELINO DALMA*IO, EUTI<UIO LEGAS"I, LOREN.O LU*IANO n% GREGORIO "ALAD,petitioners, vs. *OURT O- -IRST INSTAN*E O- 'ULA*AN, 'RAN*H V, STA. MARIA, n% NATIONAL "O5ER *OR"ORATION, respondents. A'AD SANTOS, J.: The relevant antecedents of this case are narrated in the petition and have not been controverted, namely9 .. !t about midnight on October ?-, *+,1, during the height of that infamous typhoon 4G!25NA4 the respondent corporation, acting through its plant superintendent, &en8amin $have(, opened or caused to be opened simultaneously all the three floodgates of the !ngat 2am. !nd as a direct and immediate result of the sudden, precipitate and simultaneous opening of said floodgates several towns in &ulacan were inundated. =ardest0hit was Nor(agaray. !bout a hundred of its residents died or were reported to have died and properties worth million of pesos destroyed or washed away. This flood was unprecedented in Nor(agaray. C. Petitioners, who were among the many unfortunate victims of that man0caused flood, filed with the respondent $ourt eleven complaints for damages against the respondent corporation and the plant superintendent of !ngat 2am, &en8amin $have(, doc3eted as $ivil $ases Nos. S%0+/> +/*, +/., +/1, +/+, +-C, +-/, +--, +1*, +1? and +1.. These complaints though separately filed have a commonIsimilar cause of action. ... /. 'espondent corporation filed separate answers to each of these eleven complaints. !part from traversing the material averments in the complaints and setting forth counterclaims for damages respondent corporation invo3ed in each answer a special and affirmative defense that 4in the operation of the !ngat 2am,4 it is 4performing a purely governmental function4, hence it 4can not be sued without the e6press consent of the State.4 ... -. On motion of the respondent corporation a preliminary hearing was held on its affirmative defense as though a motion to dismiss were filed. Petitioners opposed the prayer for dismissal and contended that respondent corporation is performing not governmental but merely proprietary functions and that under its own organic act, Section . d# of 'epublic !ct No. -.+/, it can sue and be sued in any court. ... ,. On ;uly ?+, *+1> petitioners received a copy of the questioned order of the respondent $ourt dated 2ecember ?*, *+,+ dismissing all their complaints as against the respondent corporation thereby leaving the superintendent of the !ngat 2am, &en8amin $have(, as the sole party0defendant. ... 1. On !ugust ,, *+1> petitioners filed with the respondent $ourt a motion for reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal. ... +. The respondent $ourt denied petitioners7 motion for reconsideration in its order dated October ., *+1>. ... =ence, the present petition for review on certiorari under 'epublic !ct No. /CC>. 'ollo, pp. .0-.# The Order of dismissal dated 2ecember *?, *+,+, reads as follows9 Under consideration is a motion to dismiss embodied as a special affirmative defense in the answer filed by defendant NP$ on the grounds that said defendant performs a purely governmental function in the operation of the !ngat 2am and cannot therefore be sued for damages in the instant cases in connection therewith. Plaintiffs7 opposition to said motion to discuss, relying on Sec. . d# of 'epublic !ct -.+- which imposes on the NP$ the power and liability to sue and be sued in any court, is not tenable since the same refer to such matters only as are within the scope of the other corporate powers of said defendant and not matters of tort as in the instant cases. 5t being an agency performing a purely governmental function in the operation of the !ngat 2am, said defendant was not given any right to commit wrongs upon individuals. To sue said defendant for tort may require the e6press consent of the State. )=B'B<O'B, the cases against defendant NP$ are hereby dismissed. 'ollo, p. ->.# The Order dated October ., *+1>, denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiffs is pro formaC the motion was simply denied for lac3 of merit. 'ollo, p. ,C.# The petition to review the two orders of the public respondent was filed on October *-, *+1>, and on October ?,, *+1>, )e required the respondents to comment. 5t was only on !pril *., *+1*, after a number of e6tensions, that the Solicitor Aeneral filed the required comment. 'ollo, pp. *>,0**C.# On %ay ?,, *+1>, )e required the parties to file simultaneous memoranda within twenty ?># days from notice. 'ollo, p. **/.# Petitioners filed their memorandum on ;uly ??, *+1*. 'ollo, pp. **10*?/.# The Solicitor Aeneral filed a number of motions for e6tension of time to file his memorandum. )e granted the seventh e6tension with a warning that there would be no further e6tension. 2espite the warning the Solicitor Aeneral moved for an eighth e6tension which )e denied on November +, *+1*. ! motion for a ninth e6tension was similarly denied on November *1, *+1*. The decision in this case is therefore, without the memorandum of the Solicitor Aeneral. The parties are agreed that the Order dated 2ecember ?*, *+,+, raises the following issues9 *. )hether respondent National Power $orporation performs a governmental function with respect to the management and operation of the !ngat 2am: and ?. )hether the power of respondent National Power $orporation to sue and be sued under its organic charter includes the power to be sued for tort. The petition is highly impressed with merit. 5t is not necessary to write an e6tended dissertation on whether or not the NP$ performs a governmental function with respect to the management and operation of the !ngat 2am. 5t is sufficient to say that the government has organi(ed a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. '.!. No. -.+/, Sec. . d#.# !s a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Aovernment. See National Shipyards and Steel $orp. vs. $5', et al., E0*,1,C, !ugust .*, *+-., 1 S$'! ,1*.# %oreover, the charter provision that the NP$ can 4sue and be sued in any court4 is without qualification on the cause of action and accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by the petitioners. )=B'B<O'B, the petition is hereby granted: the Orders of the respondent court dated 2ecember *?, *+,+ and October ., *+1>, are set aside: and said court is ordered to reinstate the complaints of the petitioners. $osts against the NP$. SO O'2B'B2. G.R. No. L-17871 Jnu#3 68, 1961 'UREAU O- "RINTING, SERA-IN SALVADOR n% MARIANO LEDESMA, petitioners, vs. THE 'UREAU O- "RINTING EM"LO4EES ASSO*IATION :NLU;, "A*I-I*O ADVIN*ULA, RO'ERTO MENDO.A, "ON*IANO ARGANDA n% TEODULO TOLERAN, respondents. 4ffice of the Solicitor %eneral for petitioners. #ulo/io R. Lerum for respondents. GUTIERRE. DAVID, J.F This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary in8unction to annul $ertain orders of the respondent $ourt of 5ndustrial 'elations and to restrain it from further proceeding in the action for unfair labor practice pending before it on the ground of lac3 of 8urisdiction. Aiving due course to the petition, this $ourt ordered the issuance of the writ of preliminary in8unction prayed for without bond. The action in question was @ upon complaint of the respondents &ureau of Printing Bmployees !ssociation NEU# Pacifico !dvincula, 'oberto %endo(a, Ponciano !rganda and Teodulo Toleran @ filed by an acting prosecutor of the 5ndustrial $ourt against herein petitioner &ureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, the !cting Secretary of the 2epartment of Aeneral Services, and %ariano Eedesma the 2irector of the &ureau of Printing. The complaint alleged that Serafin Salvador and %ariano Eedesma have been engaging in unfair labor practices by interfering with, or coercing the employees of the &ureau of Printing particularly the members of the complaining association petition, in the e6ercise of their right to self0organi(ation an discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their employment in order to discourage them from pursuing the union activities. !nswering the complaint, the petitioners &ureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and %ariano Eedesma denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to the and, by way of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that respondents Pacifico !dvincula, 'oberto %endo(a Ponciano !rganda and Teodulo Toleran were suspended pending result of an administrative investigation against them for breach of $ivil Service rules and regulations petitions: that the &ureau of Printing has no 8uridical personality to sue and be sued: that said &ureau of Printing is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the 'epublic performing government functions. <or relief, they prayed that the case be dismissed for lac3 of 8urisdiction. Thereafter, before the case could be heard, petitioners filed an 4Omnibus %otion4 as3ing for a preliminary hearing on the question of 8urisdiction raised by them in their answer and for suspension of the trial of the case on the merits pending the determination of such 8urisdictional question. The motion was granted, but after hearing, the trial 8udge of the 5ndustrial $ourt in an order dated ;anuary ?,, *+/+ sustained the 8urisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of the &ureau of Printing are 4e6clusively proprietary in nature,4 and, consequently, denied the prayer for dismissal. 'econsideration of this order having been also denied by the court in banc, the petitioners brought the case to this $ourt through the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. )e find the petition to be meritorious. The &ureau of Printing is an office of the Aovernment created by the !dministrative $ode of *+*- !ct No. ?-/,#. !s such instrumentality of the Aovernment, it operates under the direct supervision of the B6ecutive Secretary, Office of the President, and is 4charged with the e6ecution of all printing and binding, including wor3 incidental to those processes, required by the National Aovernment and such other wor3 of the same character as said &ureau may, by law or by order of the Secretary of <inance# B6ecutive Secretary, be authori(ed to underta3e . . ..4 See. *-CC, 'ev. !dm. $ode#. 5t has no corporate e6istence, and its appropriations are provided for in the Aeneral !ppropriations !ct. 2esigned to meet the printing needs of the Aovernment, it is primarily a service bureau and obviously, not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit. 5t is true, as stated in the order complained of, that the &ureau of Printing receives outside 8obs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime wor3 on regular wor3ing days and on holidays, but these facts do not 8ustify the conclusion that its functions are 4e6clusively proprietary in nature.4 Overtime wor3 in the &ureau of Printing is done only when the interest of the service so requires sec. /--, 'ev. !dm. $ode#. !s a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the head of the &ureau depending upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that the functions of said &ureau are wholly proprietary in character. !nent the additional wor3 it e6ecutes for private persons, we find that such wor3 is done upon request, as distinguished from those solicited, and only 4as the requirements of Aovernment wor3 will permit4 sec. *-/C, 'ev. !dm. $ode#, and 4upon terms fi6ed by the 2irector of Printing, with the approval of the 2epartment =ead4 sec. *-//, id.#. !s shown by the uncontradicted evidence of the petitioners, most of these wor3s consist of orders for greeting cards during $hristmas from government officials, and for printing of chec3s of private ban3ing institutions. On those greeting cards, the Aovernment seal, of which only the &ureau of Printing is authori(ed to use, is embossed, and on the ban3 chee3s, only the &ureau of Printing can print the reproduction of the official documentary stamps appearing thereon. The volume of private 8obs done, in comparison with government 8obs, is only one0half of * per cent, and in computing the costs for wor3 done for private parties, the &ureau does not include profit because it is not allowed to ma3e any. $learly, while the &ureau of Printing is allowed to underta3e private printing 8obs, it cannot be pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional wor3 it e6ecutes for private parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such wor3 may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the employees performing said proprietary function are separate and distinct from those employed in its general governmental functions. <rom what has been stated, it is obvious that the $ourt of 5ndustrial 'elations did not acquire 8urisdiction over the respondent &ureau of Printing, and is thus devoid of any authority to ta3e cogni(ance of the case. This $ourt has already held in a long line of decisions that the 5ndustrial $ourt has no 8urisdiction to hear and determine the complaint for unfair labor practice filed against institutions or corporations not organi(ed for profit and, consequently, not an industrial or business organi(ation. This is so because the 5ndustrial Peace !ct was intended to apply only to industrial employment, and to govern the relations between employers engaged in industry and occupations for purposes of gain, and their industrial employees. University of the Philippines, et al. vs. $5', et al., A.'. No. E0*/C*-, !pril ?1, *+->: University of Sto. Tomas vs. "illanueva, et al., A.'. No. E0*.,C1, October .>, *+/+: Ea $onsolacion $ollege vs. $5', A.'. No. E0*.?1?, !pril ??, *+->: See also the cases cited therein.# . 5ndeed, as an office of the Aovernment, without any corporate or 8uridical personality, the &ureau of Printing cannot be sued. Sec. *, 'ule ., 'ules of $ourt#. !ny suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Aovernment itself, and the rule is settled that the Aovernment cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its ob8ection. See %etran vs. Paredes, C/ Off. Aa(. ?1./: !ngat 'iver 5rrigation System, et al. vs. !ngat 'iver )or3ers7 Union, et. al., A.'. Nos. E0*>+C.0CC, 2ecember ?1, *+/,#. The record also discloses that the instant case arose from the filing of administrative charges against some officers of the respondent &ureau of Printing Bmployees7 !ssociation by the !cting Secretary of Aeneral Services. Said administrative charges are for insubordination, grave misconduct and acts pre8udicial to public service committed by inciting the employees, of the &ureau of Printing to wal3 out of their 8obs against the order of the duly constituted officials. Under the law, the =eads of 2epartments and &ureaus are authori(ed to institute and investigate administrative charges against erring subordinates. <or the 5ndustrial $ourt now to ta3e cogni(ance of the case filed before it, which is in effect a review of the acts of e6ecutive officials having to do with the discipline of government employees under them, would be to interfere with the discharge of such functions by said officials. )=B'B<O'B, the petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The orders complained of are set aside and the complaint for unfair labor practice against the petitioners is dismissed, with costs against respondents other than the respondent court. Ben/zon, Bautista An/elo, Labrador, $aredes and "izon, **., concur. Reyes, *.B.L., *., concurs in the result. G.R. No. L-63139 De(e/0e# 18, 1966 MO'IL "HILI""INES E9"LORATION, IN*., plaintiff0appellant, vs. *USTOMS ARRASTRE SERVI*E n% 'UREAU o, *USTOMS, defendants0 appellees. Ale!andro Basin, *r. and Associates for plaintiff-appellant. elipe T. 3uison for defendants-appellees. 'ENG.ON, J."., J.: <our cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. 4Eeoville4 sometime in November of *+-?, consigned to %obil Philippines B6ploration, 5nc., %anila. The shipment arrived at the Port of %anila on !pril *>, *+-., and was discharged to the custody of the $ustoms !rrastre Service, the unit of the &ureau of $ustoms then handling arrastre operations therein. The $ustoms !rrastre Service later delivered to the bro3er of the consignee three cases only of the shipment. On !pril C, *+-C %obil Philippines B6ploration, 5nc., filed suit in the $ourt of <irst 5nstance of %anila against the $ustoms !rrastre Service and the &ureau of $ustoms to recover the value of the undelivered case in the amount of P*1,C+..., plus other damages. On !pril ?>, *+-C the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons under the law, defendants cannot be sued. !fter plaintiff opposed the motion, the court, on !pril ?/, *+-C, dismissed the complaint on the ground that neither the $ustoms !rrastre Service nor the &ureau of $ustoms is suable. Plaintiff appealed to Us from the order of dismissal. 'aised, therefore, in this appeal is the purely legal question of the defendants7 suability under the facts stated. !ppellant contends that not all government entities are immune from suit: that defendant &ureau of $ustoms as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of %anila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private individuals. The 'ules of $ourt, in Section *, 'ule ., provide9 SB$T5ON *. 1ho may be parties.@Only natural or 8uridical persons or entities authori(ed by law may be parties in a civil action. !ccordingly, a defendant in a civil suit must be *# a natural person: ?# a 8uridical person or .# an entity authori(ed by law to be sued. Neither the &ureau of $ustoms nor a fortiori# its function unit, the $ustoms !rrastre Service, is a person. They are merely parts of the machinery of Aovernment. The &ureau of $ustoms is a bureau under the 2epartment of <inance Sec. 1*, 'evised !dministrative $ode#: and as stated, the $ustoms !rrastre Service is a unit of the &ureau of $ustom, set up under $ustoms !dministrative Order No. 10-? of November +, *+-? !nne6 4!4 to %otion to 2ismiss, pp. *.0*/, 'ecord an !ppeal#. 5t follows that the defendants herein cannot he sued under the first two abovementioned categories of natural or 8uridical persons. Nonetheless it is urged that by authori(ing the &ureau of $ustoms to engage in arrastre service, the law therebyimpliedly authorizes it to be sued as arrastre operator, for the reason that the nature of this function arrastre service# is proprietary, not governmental. Thus, insofar as arrastre operation is concerned, appellant would put defendants under the third category of 4entities authori(ed by law4 to be sued. Stated differently, it is argued that while there is no law e6pressly authori(ing the &ureau of $ustoms to sue or be sued, still its capacity to be sued is implied from its very power to render arrastre service at the Port of %anila, which it is alleged, amounts to the transaction of a private business. The statutory provision on arrastre service is found in Section *?*. of 'epublic !ct *+., Tariff and $ustoms $ode, effective ;une *, *+/,#, and it states9 SB$. *?*.. Receivin/, <andlin/, 3ustody and "elivery of Articles.@The &ureau of $ustoms shall have e6clusive supervision and control over the receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles on the wharves and piers at all ports of entry and in the e6ercise of its functions it is hereby authori(ed to acquire, ta3e over, operate and superintend such plants and facilities as may be necessary for the receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles, and the convenience and comfort of passengers and the handling of baggage: as well as to acquire fire protection equipment for use in the piers9 $rovided, That whenever in his 8udgment the receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles can be carried on by private parties with greater efficiency, the $ommissioner may, after public bidding and sub8ect to the approval of the department head, contract with any private party for the service of receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles, and in such event, the contract may include the sale or lease of government0 owned equipment and facilities used in such service. 5n Associated 1or2ers Union, et al. vs. Bureau of 3ustoms, et al., E0?*.+,, resolution of !ugust -, *+-., this $ourt indeed held 4that the foregoing statutory provisions authori(ing the grant by contract to any private party of the right to render said arrastre services necessarily imply that the same is deemed by $ongress to be proprietary or non0governmental function.4 The issue in said case, however, was whether laborers engaged in arrastre service fall under the concept of employees in the Aovernment employed in /overnmental functions for purposes of the prohibition in Section **, 'epublic !ct 1,/ to the effect that 4employees in the Aovernment . . . shall not stri3e,4 but 4may belong to any labor organi(ation which does not impose the obligation to stri3e or to 8oin in stri3e,4 which prohibition 4shall apply only to employees employed in governmental functions of the Aovernment . . . . Thus, the ruling therein was that the $ourt of 5ndustrial 'elations had 8urisdiction over the sub8ect matter of the case, but not that the &ureau of $ustoms can be sued. Said issue of suability was not resolved, the resolution stating only that 4the issue on the personality or lac3 of personality of the &ureau of $ustoms to be sued does not affect the 8urisdiction of the lower court over the sub8ect matter of the case, aside from the fact that amendment may be made in the pleadings by the inclusion as respondents of the public officers deemed responsible, for the unfair labor practice acts charged by petitioning Unions4. Now, the fact that a non0corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. 5f said non0governmental function is underta3en as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit e6tended to such government entity. This is the doctrine recogni(ed in Bureau of $rintin/, et al. vs. Bureau of $rintin/ #mployees Association, et al., E0*/,/*, ;anuary ?1, *+-*9 The &ureau of Printing is an office of the Aovernment created by the !dministrative $ode of *+*- !ct No. ?-/,#. !s such instrumentality of the Aovernment, it operates under the direct supervision of the B6ecutive Secretary, Office of the President, and is 4charged with the e6ecution of all printing and binding, including wor3 incidental to those processes, required by the National Aovernment and such other wor3 of the same character as said &ureau may, by law or by order of the Secretary of <inance# B6ecutive Secretary, be authori(ed to underta3e . . . .4 Sec. *-CC, 'ev. !dm. $ode.# 5t has no corporate e6istence, and its appropriations are provided for in the Aeneral !ppropriations !ct. 2esigned to meet the printing needs of the Aovernment, it is primarily a service bureau and, obviously, not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary profit. 666 666 666 . . . $learly, while the &ureau of Printing is allowed to underta3e private printing 8obs, it cannot be pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern. The additional wor3 it e6ecutes for private parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such wor3 may be deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the employees performing said proprietary function are separate and distinct from those emoloyed in its general governmental functions. 666 666 666 5ndeed, as an office of the Aovernment, without any corporate or 8uridical personality, the &ureau of Printing cannot be sued Sec. *, 'ule ., 'ules of $ourt.# !ny suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Aovernment itself, and the rule is settled that the Aovernment cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its ob8ection. See %etran vs. Paredes, C/ Off. Aa(. ?1./: !ngat 'iver 5rrigation System, et al. vs. !ngat 'iver )or3ers Union, et al., A.'. Nos. E0*>+C.0CC, 2ecember ?1, *+/,.# The situation here is not materially different. The &ureau of $ustoms, to repeat, is part of the 2epartment of <inance Sec. 1*, 'ev. !dm. $ode#, with no personality of its own apart from that of the national government. 5ts primary function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties Sec. ->?, '.!. *+.,#. To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. <or practical reasons said revenues and customs duties can not be assessed and collected by simply receiving the importer7s or ship agent7s or consignee7s declaration of merchandise being imported and imposing the duty provided in the Tariff law. $ustoms authorities and officers must see to it that the declaration tallies with the merchandise actually landed. !nd this chec3ing up requires that the landed merchandise be hauled from the ship7s side to a suitable place in the customs premises to enable said customs officers to ma3e it, that is, it requires arrastre operations. * $learly, therefore, although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the &ureau of $ustoms, so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said &ureau liable to suit. <or otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function without necessarily e6posing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity, granted as to the end, should not be denied as to the necessary means to that end. !nd herein lies the distinction between the present case and that of Eational Airports 3orporation vs. Teodoro, +* Phil. ?>., on which appellant would rely. <or there, the $ivil !eronautics !dministration was found have for its prime reason for e6istence not a governmental but a proprietary function, so that to it the latter was not a mere incidental function9 !mong the general powers of the $ivil !eronautics !dministration are, under Section ., to e6ecute contracts of any 3ind, to purchase property, and to grant concessions rights, and under Section C, to charge landing fees, royalties on sales to aircraft of aviation gasoline, accessories and supplies, and rentals for the use of any property under its management. These provisions confer upon the $ivil !eronautics !dministration, in our opinion, the power to sue and be sued. The power to sue and be sued is implied from the power to transact private business. . . . 666 666 666 The $ivil !eronautics !dministration comes under the category of a private entity. !lthough not a body corporate it was created, li3e the National !irports $orporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime ob8ective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. . . . 'egardless of the merits of the claim against it, the State, for obvious reasons of public policy, cannot be sued without its consent. Plaintiff should have filed its present claim to the Aeneral !uditing Office, it being for money under the provisions of $ommonwealth !ct .?,, which state the conditions under which money claims against the Aovernment may be filed. 5t must be remembered that statutory provisions waiving State immunity from suit are strictly construed and that waiver of immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred. C+ !m. ;ur., States, Territories and 2ependencies, Sec. +-, p. .*C: Petty vs. Tennessee0%issouri &ridge $om., ./+ U.S. ?,/, . E. Bd. 1>C, ,+ S. $t. ,1/#. <rom the provision authori(ing the &ureau of $ustoms to lease arrastre operations to private parties, )e see no authority to sue the said &ureau in the instances where it underta3es to conduct said operation itself. The &ureau of $ustoms, acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the operation of the arrastre service, pursuant to e6press legislative mandate and as a necessary incident of its prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary. )=B'B<O'B, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered. 3oncepcion, 3.*., 'eyes, ;.&.E., &arrera, 2i(on, 'egala, Jaldivar and Sanche(, ;;., concur. 0a2alintal, *., concurs in the result. 3astro, *., reserves his vote. G.R. No. L-71806 No?e/0e# 8, 1988 *IVIL AERONAUTI*S ADMINISTRATION, petitioner, vs. *OURT O- A""EALS n% ERNEST E. SIM=E, respondents. The Solicitor %eneral for petitioner. Ledesma, %uytin/co, Aeleasco B Associates for respondent #rnest #. Sim2e. *ORTES, J.: !ssailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision of the $ourt of !ppeals affirming the trial court decision which reads as follows9 )=B'B<O'B, 8udgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P*/,/1+.// as full reimbursement of his actual medical and hospital e6penses, with interest at the legal rate from the commencement of the suit: the amount of P?>,?>>.>> as consequential damages: the amount of P.>,>>>.>> as moral damages: the amount of PC>,>>>.>> as e6emplary damages: the further amount of P?>,>>>.>> as attorney7s fees and the costs L'ollo, p. ?CM. The facts of the case are as follows9 Private respondent is a naturali(ed <ilipino citi(en and at the time of the incident was the =onorary $onsul Aeileral of 5srael in the Philippines. 5n the afternoon of 2ecember *., *+-1, private respondent with several other persons went to the %anila 5nternational !irport to meet his future son0in0law. 5n order to get a better view of the incoming passengers, he and his group proceeded to the viewing dec3 or terrace of the airport. )hile wal3ing on the terrace, then filled with other people, private respondent slipped over an elevation about four C# inches high at the far end of the terrace. !s a result, private respondent fell on his bac3 and bro3e his thigh bone. The ne6t day, 2ecember *C, *+-1, private respondent was operated on for about three hours. Private respondent then filed an action for damages based on quasi0delict with the $ourt of <irst 5nstance of 'i(al, &ranch "55 against petitioner $ivil !eronautics !dministration or $!! as the entity empowered 4to administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the %anila 5nternational !irport ... .4 LSec. .? ?C#, '.!. ,,-M. Said claim for damages included, aside from the medical and hospital bills, consequential damages for the e6penses of two lawyers who had to go abroad in private respondent7s stead to finali(e certain business transactions and for the publication of notices announcing the postponement of private respondent7s daughter7s wedding which had to be cancelled because of his accident L'ecord on !ppeal, p. /M. ;udgment was rendered in private respondent7s favor prompting petitioner to appeal to the $ourt of !ppeals. The latter affirmed the trial court7s decision. Petitioner then filed with the same court a %otion for, 'econsideration but this was denied. Petitioner now comes before this $ourt raising the following assignment of errors9 *. The $ourt of !ppeals gravely erred in not holding that the present the $!! is really a suit against the 'epublic of the Philippines which cannot be sued without its consent, which was not given in this case. ?. The $ourt of !ppeals gravely erred in finding that the in8uries of respondent Brnest B. Sim3e were due to petitioner7s negligence @ although there was no substantial evidence to support such finding: and that the inference that the hump or elevation the surface of the floor area of the terrace of the fold# %5! building is dangerous 8ust because said respondent tripped over it is manifestly mista3en @ circumstances that 8ustify a review by this =onorable $ourt of the said finding of fact of respondent appellate court Aarcia v. $ourt of !ppeals, .. S$'! -??: 'amos v. $!, -. S$'! ..*.# .. The $ourt of !ppeals gravely erred in ordering petitioner to pay actual, consequential, moral and e6emplary damages, as well as attorney7s fees to respondent Sim3e @ although there was no substantial and competent proof to support said awards 5 'ollo, pp. +.0+C *. 5 5nvo3ing the rule that the State cannot be sued without its consent, petitioner contends that being an agency of the government, it cannot be made a party0 defendant in this case. This $ourt has already held otherwise in the case of Eational Airports 3orporation v. Teodoro, Sr. L+* Phil. ?>. *+/?#M. Petitioner contends that the said ruling does not apply in this case because9 <irst, in the Teodoro case, the $!! was sued only in a substituted capacity, the National !irports $orporation being the original party. Second, in the Teodoro case, the cause of action was contractual in nature while here, the cause of action is based on a quasi0delict. Third, there is no specific provision in 'epublic !ct No. ,,-, the law governing the $!!, which would 8ustify the conclusion that petitioner was organi(ed for business and not for governmental purposes. L'ollo, pp. +C0+,M. Such arguments are untenable. irst, the Teodoro case, far from stressing the point that the $!! was only substituted for the National !irports $orporation, in fact treated the $!! as the real party in interest when it stated that9 666 666 666 ... To all legal intents and practical purposes, the National !irports $orporation is dead and the $ivil !eronautics !dministration is its heir or legal representative, acting by the law of its creation upon its own rights and in its own name. The better practice there should have been to ma3e the $ivil !eronautics !dministration the third party defendant instead of the National !irports $orporation. LNational !irports $orp. v. Teodoro, supra, p. ?>1.M 666 666 666 Second, the Teodoro case did not ma3e any qualification or limitation as to whether or not the $!!7s power to sue and be sued applies only to contractual obligations. The $ourt in the Teodoro case ruled that Sections . and C of B6ecutive Order .-/ confer upon the $!!, without any qualification, the power to sue and be sued, albeit only by implication. !ccordingly, this $ourt7s pronouncement that where such power to sue and be sued has been granted without any qualification, it can include a claim based on tort or quasi0delict L'ayo v. $ourt of <irst 5nstance of &ulacan, A.'. Nos. //?,.0 1., 2ecember *+,*+1*, * * > S$'! C/-* finds relevance and applicability to the present case. Third, it has already been settled in the Teodoro case that the $!! as an agency is not immune from suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity. 666 666 666 The $ivil !eronautics !dministration comes under the category of a private entity. !lthough not a body corporate it was created, li3e the National !irports $orporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime ob8ective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. 5t is engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the e6clusive prerogative of state, may, more than the construction of public roads, be underta3en by private concerns. LNational !irports $orp. v. Teodoro, supra, p. ?>,.M 666 666 666 True, the law prevailing in *+/? when the Teodoro case was promulgated was B6ec. Order .-/ 'eorgani(ing the $ivil !eronautics !dministration and !bolishing the National !irports $orporation#. 'epublic !ct No. ,,- $ivil !eronautics !ct of the Philippines#, subsequently enacted on ;une ?>, *+/?, did not alter the character of the $!!7s ob8ectives under B6ec, Order .-/. The pertinent provisions cited in the Teodoro case, particularly Secs. . and C of B6ec. Order .-/, which led the $ourt to consider the $!! in the category of a private entity were retained substantially in 'epublic !ct ,,-, Sec. .? ?C# and ?/#.FGreHHanIJKL8M Said !ct provides9 Sec. .?. $o8ers and "uties of the Administrator. Sub8ect to the general @ control and supervision of the 2epartment =ead, the !dministrator shall have among others, the following powers and duties9 666 666 666 ?C# To administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the %anila 5nternational !irport and all government0owned aerodromes e6cept those controlled or operated by the !rmed <orces of the Philippines including such powers and duties as9 a# to plan, design, construct, equip, e6pand, improve, repair or alter aerodromes or such structures, improvement or air navigation facilities: b# to enter into, ma3e and e6ecute contracts of any 3ind with any person, firm, or public or private corporation or entity: ... . ?/# To determine, fi6, impose, collect and receive landing fees, par3ing space fees, royalties on sales or deliveries, direct or indirect, to any aircraft for its use of aviation gasoline, oil and lubricants, spare parts, accessories and supplies, tools, other royalties, fees or rentals for the use of any of the property under its management and control. 666 666 666 <rom the foregoing, it can be seen that the $!! is tas3ed with private or non0 governmental functions which operate to remove it from the purview of the rule on State immunity from suit. <or the correct rule as set forth in the Tedoro case states9 666 666 666 Not all government entities, whether corporate or non0corporate, are immune from suits. :mmunity functions suits is determined by the character of the ob!ects for 8hich the entity 8as or/anized. The rule is thus stated in $orpus ;uris9 Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in private or non0governmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to engage in matters parta3ing more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state. The latter is true, although the state may own stoc3 or property of such a corporation for by engaging in business operations through a corporation, the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and by implication consents to suits against the corporation. /+ $.;., .*.# LNational !irport $orporation v. Teodoro, supra, pp. ?>-0?>,: Bmphasis supplied.M This doctrine has been reaffirmed in the recent case of 0alon/ v. $hilippine Eational Rail8ays LA.'. No. E0C++.>, !ugust ,, *+1/, *.1 S$'! -.*, where it was held that the Philippine National 'ailways, although owned and operated by the government, was not immune from suit as it does not e6ercise sovereign but purely proprietary and business functions. !ccordingly, as the $!! was created to underta3e the management of airport operations which primarily involve proprietary functions, it cannot avail of the immunity from suit accorded to government agencies performing strictly governmental functions. 55 Petitioner tries to escape liability on the ground that there was no basis for a finding of negligence. There can be no negligence on its part, it alleged, because the elevation in question 4had a legitimate purpose for being on the terrace and was never intended to trip down people and in8ure them. 5t was there for no other purpose but to drain water on the floor area of the terrace4 L'ollo, P. ++M. To determine whether or not the construction of the elevation was done in a negligent manner, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the premises. 666 666 666 ... This $ourt after its ocular inspection found the elevation shown in B6hs. ! or -0! where plaintiff slipped to be a step, a dangerous sliding step, and the pro6imate cause of plaintiffs in8ury... 666 666 666 This $ourt during its ocular inspection also observed the dangerous and defective condition of the open terrace which has remained unrepaired through the years. 5t has observed the lac3 of maintenance and up3eep of the %5! terrace, typical of many government buildings and offices. !side from the litter allowed to accumulate in the terrace, pot holes cause by missing tiles remained unrepaired and unattented. The several elevations shown in the e6hibits presented were verified by this $ourt during the ocular inspection it undertoo3. !mong these elevations is the one B6h. !# where plaintiff slipped. This $ourt also observed the other ha(ard, the slanting or sliding step B6h. &# as one passes the entrance door leading to the terrace L'ecord on !ppeal, U.S., pp. /- and /+: Bmphasis supplied.M The $ourt of !ppeals further noted that9 The inclination itself is an architectural anomaly for as stated by the said witness, it is neither a ramp because a ramp is an inclined surface in such a way that it will prevent people or pedestrians from sliding. &ut if, it is a step then it will not serve its purpose, for pedestrian purposes. tsn, p. ./, 5d.# Lrollo, p. ?+.M These factual findings are binding and conclusive upon this $ourt. =ence, the $!! cannot disclaim its liability for the negligent construction of the elevation since under 'epublic !ct No. ,,-, it was charged with the duty of planning, designing, constructing, equipping, e6panding, improving, repairing or altering aerodromes or such structures, improvements or air navigation facilities LSection .?, supra, '.!. ,,-M. 5n the discharge of this obligation, the $!! is duty0bound to e6ercise due diligence in overseeing the construction and maintenance of the viewing dec3 or terrace of the airport. 5t must be borne in mind that pursuant to !rticle **,. of the $ivil $ode, 4t#he fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time and of the place.4 =ere, the obligation of the $!! in maintaining the viewing dec3, a facility open to the public, requires that $!! insure the safety of the viewers using it. !s these people come to the viewing dec3 to watch the planes and passengers, their tendency would be to loo3 to where the planes and the incoming passengers are and not to loo3 down on the floor or pavement of the viewing dec3. The $!! should have thus made sure that no dangerous obstructions or elevations e6ist on the floor of the dec3 to prevent any undue harm to the public. The legal foundation of $!!7s liability for quasi0delict can be found in !rticle ?*,- of the $ivil $ode which provides that 4w#hoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done... !s the $!! 3new of the e6istence of the dangerous elevation which it claims though, was made precisely in accordance with the plans and specifications of the building for proper drainage of the open terrace LSee 'ecord on !ppeal, pp. *. and /,: 'ollo, p. .+*, its failure to have it repaired or altered in order to eliminate the e6isting ha(ard constitutes such negligence as to warrant a finding of liability based on quasi0delict upon $!!. The $ourt finds the contention that private respondent was, at the very least, guilty of contributory negligence, thus reducing the damages that plaintiff may recover, unmeritorious. $ontributory negligence under !rticle ?*,+ of the $ivil $ode contemplates a negligent act or omission on the part of the plaintiff, which although not the pro6imate cause of his in8ury, contributed to his own damage, the pro6imate cause of the plaintiffs own in8ury being the defendant7s lac3 of due care. 5n the instant case, no contributory negligence can be imputed to the private respondent, considering the following test formulated in the early case of $icart v. Smith, ., Phil. 1>+ *+*1#9 The test by which to determine the e6istence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows9 "id the defendant in doin/ the alle/ed ne/li/ent act use that reasonable care and caution 8hich an ordinarily prudent man 8ould have used in the same situationF 5f not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the 'oman law. The e6istence of the negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal 8udgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be rec3less, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human e6perience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. !bstract speculations cannot be here of much value but this much can be profitably said9 'easonable men0overn their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or 3nown to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be omniscient of the future. <ence they can be e9pected to ta2e care only 8hen there is somethin/ before them to su//est or 8arn of dan/er. $ould a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued7 5f so, it was the duty of the actor to ta3e precautions to guard against that harm. 'easonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to e6ist.... LPicart v. Smith, supra, p. 1*.: Bmphasis supplied.M The private respondent, who was the plaintiff in the case before the lower court, could not have reasonably foreseen the harm that would befall him, considering the attendant factual circumstances. Bven if the private respondent had been loo3ing where he was going, the step in question could not easily be noticed because of its construction. !s the trial court found9 5n connection with the incident testified to, a s3etch, B6hibit O, shows a section of the floorings oil which plaintiff had tripped, This s3etch reveals two pavements ad8oining each other, one being elevated by four and one0fourth inches than the other. <rom the architectural standpoint the higher, pavement is a step. =owever, unli3e a step commonly seen around, the edge of the elevated pavement slanted outward as one wal3s to one interior of the terrace. The length of the inclination between the edges of the two pavements is three inches. Obviously, plaintiff had stepped on the inclination because had his foot landed on the lower pavement he would not have lost his balance. The same s3etch shows that both pavements including the inclined portion are tiled in red cement, and as shown by the photograph B6hibit !, the lines of the tilings are continuous. 5t would therefore be difficult for a pedestrian to see the inclination especially where there are plenty of persons in the terrace as was the situation when plaintiff fell down. There was no warning sign to direct one7s attention to the change in the elevation of the floorings. L'ollo, pp. ?1?+.M 555 <inally, petitioner appeals to this $ourt the award of damages to private respondent. The liability of $!! to answer for damages, whether actual, moral or e6emplary, cannot be seriously doubted in view of one conferment of the power to sue and be sued upon it, which, as held in the case of Rayo v. 3ourt of irst :nstance, supra, includes liability on a claim for quasi0dilict. 5n the aforestated case, the liability of the National Power $orporation to answer for damages resulting from its act of sudden, precipitate and simultaneous opening of the !ngat 2am, which caused the death of several residents of the area and the destruction of properties, was upheld since the o,rant of the power to sue and be sued upon it necessarily implies that it can be held answerable for its tortious acts or any wrongful act for that matter. )ith respect to actual or compensatory damages, the law mandates that the same be proven. !rt. ?*++. B6cept as provided by law or by stipulation, one are entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual on compensatory damages LNew $ivil $odeM. Private respondent claims P*/,/1+.// representing medical and hospitali(ation bills. This $ourt finds the same to have been duly proven through the testimony of 2r. !mbrosio Tangco, the physician who attended to private respondent 'ollo, p. ?-# and who 5dentified B6h. 4=4 which was his bill for professional services L'ollo, p. .*M. $oncerning the P?>,?>>.>> alleged to have been spent for other e6penses such as the transportation of the two lawyers who had to represent private respondent abroad and the publication of the postponement notices of the wedding, the $ourt holds that the same had also been duly proven. Private respondent had adequately shown the e6istence of such losses and the amount thereof in the testimonies before the trial court L$! decision, p. 1*. !t any rate, the findings of the $ourt of !ppeals with respect to this are findings of facts LOne =eart Sporting $lub, 5nc. v. $ourt of !ppeals, A.'. Nos. /.,+>/.+,?, Oct. ?., *+1*, *>1 S$'! C*-* which, as had been held time and again, are, as a general rule, conclusive before this $ourt LSese v. 5ntermediate !ppellate $ourt, A.'. No. --*1-, ;uly .*, *+1,,*/? S$'! /1/M. )ith respect to the P.>,>>>.>> awarded as moral damages, the $ourt holds private respondent entitled thereto because of the physical suffering and physical in8uries caused by the negligence of the $!! L!rts. ??*, and ??*+ ?#, New $ivil $odeM. )ith respect to the award of e6emplary damages, the $ivil $ode e6plicitly, states9 !rt. ???+. B6emplary or corrective damages, are imposed, by way of e6ample or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, liquidated or compensatory !rt. ??.*. 5n quasi0delicts, e6emplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. Aross negligence which, according to the $ourt, is equivalent to the term 4notorious negligence4 and consists in the failure to e6ercise even slight care L$aunan v. $ompania Aeneral de Tabacos, /- Phil. /C? *+.?#M can be attributed to the $!! for its failure to remedy the dangerous condition of the questioned elevation or to even post a warning sign directing the attention of the viewers to the change in the elevation of the floorings notwithstanding its 3nowledge of the ha(ard posed by such elevation L'ollo, pp. ?10?+: 'ecord oil !ppeal, p. /,M. The wanton disregard by the $!! of the safety of the people using the viewing dec3, who are charged an admission fee, including the petitioner who paid the entrance fees to get inside the vantage place L$! decision, p. ?: 'ollo, p. ?/M and are, therefore, entitled to e6pect a facility that is properly and safely maintained @ 8ustifies the award of e6emplary damages against the $!!, as a deterrent and by way of e6ample or correction for the public good. The award of PC>,>>>.>> by the trial court as e6emplary damages appropriately underscores the point that as an entity changed with providing service to the public, the $!!. li3e all other entities serving the public. has the obligation to provide the public with reasonably safe service. <inally, the award of attorney7s fees is also upheld considering that under !rt. ??>1 *# of the $ivil $ode, the same may be awarded whenever e6emplary damages are awarded, as in this case, and,at any rate, under !rt. ??>1 **#, the $ourt has the discretion to grant the same when it is 8ust and equitable. =owever, since the %anila 5nternational !irport !uthority %5!!# has ta3en over the management and operations of the %anila 5nternational !irport Lrenamed Ninoy !quino 5nternational !irport under 'epublic !ct No. --.+M pursuant to B6ecutive Order No. ,,1 as amended by e6ecutive Orders Nos. +>. *+1.#, +>+ *+1.# and ?+1 *+1,# and under Section ?C of the said B6ec. Order ,,1, the %5!! has assumed all the debts, liabilities and obligations of the now defunct $ivil !eronautics !dministration $!!#, the liabilities of the $!! have now been transferred to the %5!!. )=B'B<O'B, finding no reversible error, the Petition for review on certiorari is 2BN5B2 and the decision of the $ourt of !ppeals in $!0A.'. No. /**,?0' is !<<5'%B2. SO O'2B'B2. G.R. No. 179406 -e0#u#3 63, 6011 AIR TRANS"ORTATION O--I*E, Petitioner, vs. S"OUSES DAVID Q ELISEA RAMOS, 'espondents. ' B S O E U T 5 O N 'ERSAMIN, J.: The StateRs immunity from suit does not e6tend to the petitioner because it is an agency of the State engaged in an enterprise that is far from being the StateRs e6clusive prerogative. Under challenge is the decision promulgated on %ay *C, ?>>., * by which the $ourt of !ppeals $!# affirmed with modification the decision rendered on <ebruary ?*, ?>>* by the 'egional Trial $ourt, &ranch -* 'T$#, in &aguio $ity in favor of the respondents. ? !ntecedents Spouses 2avid and Blisea 'amos respondents# discovered that a portion of their land registered under Transfer $ertificate of Title No. T0/11+C of the &aguio $ity land records with an area of +1/ square meters, more or less, was being used as part of the runway and running shoulder of the Eoa3an !irport being operated by petitioner !ir Transportation Office !TO#. On !ugust **, *++/, the respondents agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the !TO in consideration of the amount of P,,1,*/>.>>. =owever, the !TO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands. Thus, on !pril ?+, *++1, the respondents filed an action for collection against the !TO and some of its officials in the 'T$ doc3eted as $ivil $ase No. C>*,0' and entitled Spouses 2avid and Blisea 'amos v. !ir Transportation Office, $apt. Panfilo "illaruel, Aen. $arlos Tanega, and %r. $esar de ;esus#. 5n their answer, the !TO and its co0defendants invo3ed as an affirmative defense the issuance of Proclamation No. *./1, whereby President %arcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the respondentsR affected portion for use of the Eoa3an !irport. They asserted that the 'T$ had no 8urisdiction to entertain the action without the StateRs consent considering that the deed of sale had been entered into in the performance of governmental functions. On November *>, *++1, the 'T$ denied the !TORs motion for a preliminary hearing of the affirmative defense. !fter the 'T$ li3ewise denied the !TORs motion for reconsideration on 2ecember *>, *++1, the !TO commenced a special civil action for certiorari in the $! to assail the 'T$Rs orders. The $! dismissed the petition for certiorari, however, upon its finding that the assailed orders were not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. . Subsequently, <ebruary ?*, ?>>*, the 'T$ rendered its decision on the merits, C disposing9 )=B'B<O'B, the 8udgment is rendered O'2B'5NA the defendant !ir Transportation Office to pay the plaintiffs 2!"52 and BE5SB! '!%OS the following9 *# The amount of P,,1,*/>.>> being the value of the parcel of land appropriated by the defendant !TO as embodied in the 2eed of Sale, plus an annual interest of *?P from !ugust **, *++/, the date of the 2eed of Sale until fully paid: ?# The amount of P*/>,>>>.>> by way of moral damages and P*/>,>>>.>> as e6emplary damages: .# the amount of P/>,>>>.>> by way of attorneyRs fees plus P*/,>>>.>> representing the *>, more or less, court appearances of plaintiffRs counsel: C# The costs of this suit. SO O'2B'B2. 5n due course, the !TO appealed to the $!, which affirmed the 'T$Rs decision on %ay *C, ?>>., / viz9 5N "5B) O< !EE T=B <O'BAO5NA, the appealed decision is hereby !<<5'%B2, with %O25<5$!T5ON that the awarded cost therein is deleted, while that of moral and e6emplary damages is reduced to P.>,>>>.>> each, and attorneyRs fees is lowered to P*>,>>>.>>. No cost. SO O'2B'B2. =ence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari. I!!ue The only issue presented for resolution is whether the !TO could be sued without the StateRs consent. Ru1$n& The petition for review has no merit. The immunity of the State from suit, 3nown also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non0suability of the State, is e6pressly provided in !rticle N"5 of the *+1, $onstitution, vi(9 Section .. The State may not be sued without its consent. The immunity from suit is based on the political truism that the State, as a sovereign, can do no wrong. %oreover, as the eminent ;ustice =olmes said in Gawanana3oa v. Polyblan39 - The territory Lof =awaiiM, of course, could waive its e6emption Smith v. 'eeves, *,1 US C.-, CC E ed **C>, ?> Sup. $t. 'ep. +*+#, and it too3 no ob8ection to the proceedings in the cases cited if it could have done so. 666 &ut in the case at bar it did ob8ect, and the question raised is whether the plaintiffs were bound to yield. Some doubts have been e6pressed as to the source of the immunity of a sovereign power from suit without its own permission, but the answer has been public property since before the days of =obbes. Eeviathan, chap. ?-, ?. ! sovereign is e6empt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that ma3es the law on which the right depends. 4$ar on peut bien recevoir loy d7autruy, mais il est impossible par nature de se donner loy.4 &odin, 'epublique, *, chap. 1, ed. *-?+, p. *.?: Sir ;ohn Bliot, 2e ;ure %aiestatis, chap. .. Nemo suo statuto ligatur necessitative. &aldus, 2e Eeg. et $onst. 2igna "o6, ?. ed. *C+-, fol. /*b, ed. */.+, fol. -*. , Practical considerations dictate the establishment of an immunity from suit in favor of the State. Otherwise, and the State is suable at the instance of every other individual, government service may be severely obstructed and public safety endangered because of the number of suits that the State has to defend against. 1 Several 8ustifications have been offered to support the adoption of the doctrine in the Philippines, but that offered in Providence )ashington 5nsurance $o. v. 'epublic of the Philippines + is 4the most acceptable e6planation,4 according to <ather &ernas, a recogni(ed commentator on $onstitutional Eaw, *> to wit9 L!M continued adherence to the doctrine of non0suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of 8udicial remedy were not thus restricted. )ith the well03nown propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined. !n unincorporated government agency without any separate 8uridical personality of its own en8oys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. !ccordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper: otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. ** =owever, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function: *? it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a business. *. Should the doctrine of sovereignty immunity or non0suability of the State be e6tended to the !TOF 5n its challenged decision, *C the $! answered in the negative, holding9 On the first assignment of error, appellants see3 to impress upon Us that the sub8ect contract of sale partoo3 of a governmental character. Apropos, the lower court erred in applying the =igh $ourtRs ruling in Eational Airports 3orporation vs. Teodoro )K $hil. +.& LK)'+M#, arguing that in Teodoro, the matter involved the collection of landing and par3ing fees which is a proprietary function, while the case at bar involves the maintenance and operation of aircraft and air navigational facilities and services which are governmental functions. )e are not persuaded. $ontrary to appellantsR conclusions, it was not merely the collection of landing and par3ing fees which was declared as proprietary in nature by the =igh $ourt in Teodoro, but management and maintenance of airport operations as a whole, as well. Thus, in the much later case of 3ivil Aeronautics Administration vs. 3ourt of Appeals ;KNO S3RA +, PK),,Q=, the Supreme $ourt, reiterating the pronouncements laid down in Teodoro, declared that the $!! predecessor of AT4# is an agency not immune from suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity. 5t went on to e6plain in this wise9 6 6 6 The $ivil !eronautics !dministration comes under the category of a private entity. !lthough not a body corporate it was created, li3e the National !irports $orporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime ob8ective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. 5t is engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the e6clusive prerogative of state, may, more than the construction of public roads, be underta3en by private concerns. LNational !irports $orp. v. Teodoro, supra, p. ?>,.M 6 6 6 True, the law prevailing in *+/? when the Teodoro case was promulgated was B6ec. Order .-/ 'eorgani(ing the $ivil !eronautics !dministration and !bolishing the National !irports $orporation#. 'epublic !ct No. ,,- $ivil !eronautics !ct of the Philippines#, subsequently enacted on ;une ?>, *+/?, did not alter the character of the $!!Rs ob8ectives under B6ec. Order .-/. The pertinent provisions cited in the Teodoro case, particularly Secs. . and C of B6ec. Order .-/, which led the $ourt to consider the $!! in the category of a private entity were retained substantially in 'epublic !ct ,,-, Sec. .??C# and ?/#. Said !ct provides9 Sec. .?. $o8ers and "uties of the Administrator. S Sub8ect to the general control and supervision of the 2epartment =ead, the !dministrator shall have among others, the following powers and duties9 6 6 6 ?C# To administer, operate, mana/e, control, maintain and develop the 0anila :nternational Airport and all /overnment-o8ned aerodromes e6cept those controlled or operated by the !rmed <orces of the Philippines including such powers and duties as9 a# to plan, design, construct, equip, e6pand, improve, repair or alter aerodromes or such structures, improvement or air navigation facilities: b# to enter into, ma3e and e6ecute contracts of any 3ind with any person, firm, or public or private corporation or entity: T ?/# To determine, fi6, impose, collect and receive landing fees, par3ing space fees, royalties on sales or deliveries, direct or indirect, to any aircraft for its use of aviation gasoline, oil and lubricants, spare parts, accessories and supplies, tools, other royalties, fees or rentals for the use of any of the property under its management and control. 6 6 6 <rom the foregoing, it can be seen that the $!! is tas3ed with private or non0 governmental functions which operate to remove it from the purview of the rule on State immunity from suit. <or the correct rule as set forth in the Teodoro case states9 6 6 6 Not all government entities, whether corporate or non0corporate, are immune from suits. :mmunity from suits is determined by the character of the ob!ects for 8hich the entity 8as or/anized. The rule is thus stated in $orpus ;uris9 Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in private or non0governmental capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to engage in matters parta3ing more of the nature of ordinary business rather than functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits against the state. The latter is true, although the state may own stoc3 or property of such a corporation for by engaging in business operations through a corporation, the state divests itself so far of its sovereign character, and by implication consents to suits against the corporation. /+ $.;., .*.# LNational !irports $orporation v. Teodoro, supra, pp. ?>-0 ?>,: 5talics supplied.M This doctrine has been reaffirmed in the recent case of 0alon/ v. $hilippine Eational Rail8ays LA.'. No. E0C++.>, !ugust ,, *+1/, *.1 S$'! -.M, where it was held that the Philippine National 'ailways, although owned and operated by the government, was not immune from suit as it does not e6ercise sovereign but purely proprietary and business functions. !ccordingly, as the $!! was created to underta3e the management of airport operations which primarily involve proprietary functions, it cannot avail of the immunity from suit accorded to government agencies performing strictly governmental functions. */ 5n our view, the $! thereby correctly appreciated the 8uridical character of the !TO as an agency of the Aovernment not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Eoa3an !irport, an activity that was not the e6clusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. =ence, the !TO had no claim to the StateRs immunity from suit. )e uphold the $!Rs aforequoted holding. )e further observe the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invo3ed to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the ta3ing without 8ust compensation and without the proper e6propriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffsR property. *- Thus, in 2e los Santos v. 5ntermediate !ppellate $ourt, *, the trial courtRs dismissal based on the doctrine of non0suability of the State of two cases one of which was for damages# filed by owners of property where a road + meters wide and *?1.,> meters long occupying a total area of *,*-/ square meters and an artificial cree3 ?..?> meters wide and *?1.-+ meters long occupying an area of ?,+>- square meters had been constructed by the provincial engineer of 'i(al and a private contractor without the ownersR 3nowledge and consent was reversed and the cases remanded for trial on the merits. The Supreme $ourt ruled that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was not an instrument for perpetrating any in8ustice on a citi(en. 5n e6ercising the right of eminent domain, the $ourt e6plained, the State e6ercised its 8us imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights, or 8us gestionis: yet, even in that area, where private property had been ta3en in e6propriation without 8ust compensation being paid, the defense of immunity from suit could not be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owners. Eastly, the issue of whether or not the !TO could be sued without the StateRs consent has been rendered moot by the passage of 'epublic !ct No. +C+,, otherwise 3nown as the 3ivil Aviation Authority Act of +..,. '.!. No. +C+, abolished the !TO, to wit9 Section C. $reation of the !uthority. S There is hereby created an independent regulatory body with quasi08udicial and quasi0legislative powers and possessing corporate attributes to be 3nown as the $ivil !viation !uthority of the Philippines $!!P#, herein after referred to as the 4!uthority4 attached to the 2epartment of Transportation and $ommunications 2OT$# for the purpose of policy coordination. -o# +)$! 2u#2o!e, +)e eA$!+$n& A$# +#n!2o#++$on O,,$(e (#e+e% un%e# +)e 2#o?$!$on! o, Re2u01$( A(+ No. 886, ! /en%e% $! )e#e03 0o1$!)e%. 6 6 6 Under its Transitory Provisions, '.!. No. +C+, established in place of the !TO the $ivil !viation !uthority of the Philippines $!!P#, which thereby assumed all of the !TORs powers, duties and rights, assets, real and personal properties, funds, and revenues, viz9 $=!PTB' N55 T'!NS5TO'TH P'O"5S5ONS Section 1/. !bolition of the !ir Transportation Office. S The !ir Transportation Office !TO# created under 'epublic !ct No. ,,-, a sectoral office of the 2epartment of Transportation and $ommunications 2OT$#, is hereby abolished.KavvphiK A11 2oBe#!, %u+$e! n% #$&)+! vested by law and e6ercised 03 +)e ATO $! hereby +#n!,e##e% +o +)e Au+)o#$+3. A11 !!e+!, #e1 n% 2e#!on1 2#o2e#+$e!, ,un%! n% revenues owned by or vested in the different offices of the ATO #e +#n!,e##e% +o +)e Au+)o#$+3. A11 (on+#(+!, #e(o#%! n% %o(u/en+! #e1+$n& +o +)e o2e#+$on! o, +)e 0o1$!)e% &en(3 and its offices and branches are li3ewise+#n!,e##e% +o +)e Au+)o#$+3. An3 #e1 2#o2e#+3 oBne% 03 +)e n+$on1 &o?e#n/en+ o# &o?e#n/en+-oBne% (o#2o#+$on o# u+)o#$+3 which is 0e$n& u!e% n% u+$1$Ge% as office or facility 03 +)e ATO shall be +#n!,e##e% n% +$+1e% $n ,?o# o, +)e Au+)o#$+3. Section ?. of '.!. No. +C+, enumerates the corporate powers vested in the $!!P, including the power to sue and be sued, to enter into contracts of every class, 3ind and description, to construct, acquire, own, hold, operate, maintain, administer and lease personal and real properties, and to settle, under such terms and conditions most advantageous to it, any claim by or against it. *1 )ith the $!!P having legally succeeded the !TO pursuant to '.!. No. +C+,, the obligations that the !TO had incurred by virtue of the deed of sale with the 'amos spouses might now be enforced against the $!!P. )=B'B<O'B, the $ourt denies the petition for review on certiorari, and affirms the decision promulgated by the $ourt of !ppeals. No pronouncement on costs of suit. SO O'2B'B2. G.R. No. L-76189 A2#$1 8, 1991 MUNI*I"ALIT4 O- SAN -ERNANDO, LA UNION, petitioner vs. HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. -IRME, JUANA RIMANDO-'ANIOA, IAUREANO 'ANIOA, JR., SOR MARIETA 'ANIOA, MONTANO 'ANIOA, ORJA 'ANIOA, AND L4DIA R. 'ANIOA, respondents. 0auro 3. 3abadin/, *r. for petitioner. Simeon %. <ipol for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:p This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory in8unction see3ing the nullification or modification of the proceedings and the orders issued by the respondent ;udge 'omeo N. <irme, in his capacity as the presiding 8udge of the $ourt of <irst 5nstance of Ea Union, Second ;udicial 2istrict, &ranch 5", &auang, Ea Union in $ivil $ase No. *>,0&A, entitled 4;uana 'imando &aniDa, et al. vs. %acario Nieveras, et al.4 dated November C, *+,/: ;uly *., *+,-: !ugust ?.,*+,-: <ebruary ?., *+,,: %arch *-, *+,,: ;uly ?-, *+,+: September ,, *+,+: November ,, *+,+ and 2ecember ., *+,+ and the decision dated October *>, *+,+ ordering defendants %unicipality of San <ernando, Ea Union and !lfredo &islig to pay, 8ointly and severally, the plaintiffs for funeral e6penses, actual damages consisting of the loss of earning capacity of the deceased, attorney7s fees and costs of suit and dismissing the complaint against the Bstate of %acario Nieveras and &ernardo &alagot. The antecedent facts are as follows9 Petitioner %unicipality of San <ernando, Ea Union is a municipal corporation e6isting under and in accordance with the laws of the 'epublic of the Philippines. 'espondent =onorable ;udge 'omeo N. <irme is impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding 8udge of the $ourt of <irst 5nstance of Ea Union, &ranch 5", &auang, Ea Union. )hile private respondents ;uana 'imando0&aniDa, Eaureano &aniDa, ;r., Sor %arietta &aniDa, %ontano &aniDa, Or8a &aniDa and Eydia '. &aniDa are heirs of the deceased Eaureano &aniDa Sr. and plaintiffs in $ivil $ase No. *>,0&g before the aforesaid court. !t about , o7cloc3 in the morning of 2ecember *-, *+-/, a collision occurred involving a passenger 8eepney driven by &ernardo &alagot and owned by the Bstate of %acario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truc3 driven by ;ose %anandeg and owned by Tanquilino "elasque( and a dump truc3 of the %unicipality of San <ernando, Ea Union and driven by !lfredo &islig. 2ue to the impact, several passengers of the 8eepney including Eaureano &aniDa Sr. died as a result of the in8uries they sustained and four C# others suffered varying degrees of physical in8uries. On 2ecember **, *+--, the private respondents instituted a compliant for damages against the Bstate of %acario Nieveras and &ernardo &alagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger 8eepney, which was doc3eted $ivil $ase No. ?*1. in the $ourt of <irst 5nstance of Ea Union, &ranch 5, San <ernando, Ea Union. =owever, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party $omplaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truc3 of petitioner. Thereafter, the case was subsequently transferred to &ranch 5", presided over by respondent 8udge and was subsequently doc3eted as $ivil $ase No. *>,0&g. &y virtue of a court order dated %ay ,, *+,/, the private respondents amended the complaint wherein the petitioner and its regular employee, !lfredo &islig were impleaded for the first time as defendants. Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lac3 of cause of action, non0suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger 8eepney as the pro6imate cause of the collision. 5n the course of the proceedings, the respondent 8udge issued the following questioned orders, to wit9 *# Order dated November C, *+,/ dismissing the cross0claim against &ernardo &alagot: ?# Order dated ;uly *., *+,- admitting the !mended !nswer of the %unicipality of San <ernando, Ea Union and &islig and setting the hearing on the affirmative defenses only with respect to the supposed lac3 of 8urisdiction: .# Order dated !ugust ?., *+,- deferring there resolution of the grounds for the %otion to 2ismiss until the trial: C# Order dated <ebruary ?., *+,, denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of ;uly *., *+,- filed by the %unicipality and &islig for having been filed out of time: /# Order dated %arch *-, *+,, reiterating the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order of ;uly *., *+,-: -# Order dated ;uly ?-, *+,+ declaring the case deemed submitted for decision it appearing that parties have not yet submitted their respective memoranda despite the court7s direction: and ,# Order dated September ,, *+,+ denying the petitioner7s motion for reconsideration andIor order to recall prosecution witnesses for cross e6amination. On October *>, *+,+ the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion is hereunder quoted as follows9 5N "5B) O< !EE O< sic# T=B <O'BAO5NA, 8udgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs, and defendants %unicipality of San <ernando, Ea Union and !lfredo &islig are ordered to pay 8ointly and severally, plaintiffs ;uana 'imando0&aniDa, %rs. Priscilla &. Surell, Eaureano &aniDa ;r., Sor %arietta &aniDa, %rs. <e &. Soriano, %ontano &aniDa, Or8a &aniDa and Eydia &. &aniDa the sums of P*,/>>.>> as funeral e6penses and P?C,,CC.?C as the lost e6pected earnings of the late Eaureano &aniDa Sr., P.>,>>>.>> as moral damages, and P?,/>>.>> as attorney7s fees. $osts against said defendants. The $omplaint is dismissed as to defendants Bstate of %acario Nieveras and &ernardo &alagot. SO O'2B'B2. Rollo, p. .># Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for a new trial without pre8udice to another motion which was then pending. =owever, respondent 8udge issued another order dated November ,, *+,+ denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of September ,, *+,+ for having been filed out of time. <inally, the respondent 8udge issued an order dated 2ecember ., *+,+ providing that if defendants municipality and &islig further wish to pursue the matter disposed of in the order of ;uly ?-, *+,+, such should be elevated to a higher court in accordance with the 'ules of $ourt. =ence, this petition. Petitioner maintains that the respondent 8udge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to e6cess of 8urisdiction in issuing the aforesaid orders and in rendering a decision. <urthermore, petitioner asserts that while appeal of the decision maybe available, the same is not the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. On the other hand, private respondents controvert the position of the petitioner and allege that the petition is devoid of merit, utterly lac3ing the good faith which is indispensable in a petition for certiorari and prohibition. Rollo, p. C?.# 5n addition, the private respondents stress that petitioner has not considered that every court, including respondent court, has the inherent power to amend and control its process and orders so as to ma3e them conformable to law and 8ustice. Rollo, p. C..# The controversy boils down to the main issue of whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non0suability of the State amounting to lac3 of 8urisdiction in a motion to dismiss. 5n the case at bar, the respondent 8udge deferred the resolution of the defense of non0 suability of the State amounting to lac3 of 8urisdiction until trial. =owever, said respondent 8udge failed to resolve such defense, proceeded with the trial and thereafter rendered a decision against the municipality and its driver. The respondent 8udge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the e6ercise of its 8udgment it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of non0suability of the State in the guise of the municipality. =owever, said 8udge acted in e6cess of his 8urisdiction when in his decision dated October *>, *+,+ he held the municipality liable for the quasi0delict committed by its regular employee. The doctrine of non0suability of the State is e6pressly provided for in !rticle N"5, Section . of the $onstitution, to wit9 4the State may not be sued without its consent.4 Stated in simple parlance, the /eneral rule is that the State may not be sued e9cept 8hen it /ives consent to be sued. $onsent ta3es the form of e6press or implied consent. B6press consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of the State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in !ct No. .>1.. ! special law may be passed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged quasi0delict, as in %erritt v. Aovernment of the Philippine 5slands .C Phil .**#. see United States of !merica v. Auinto, A.'. No. ,-->,, <ebruary ?-, *++>, *1? S$'! -CC, -/C.# $onsent is implied when the government enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other contracting party, and also when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. :bid# %unicipal corporations, for e6ample, li3e provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should en8oy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are sub8ect to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued. $ru(, $hilippine $olitical La8, *+1, Bdition, p. .+# ! distinction should first be made between suability and liability. 4Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable: on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Eiability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. )hen the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.4 United States of !merica vs. Auinto, supra, p. -/+0--># !nent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions. !s emphasi(ed in the case of Torio vs. <ontanilla A. '. No. E0?+++., October ?., *+,1. 1/ S$'! /++, ->-#, the distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an in8ury to third persons. !nother statement of the test is given in $ity of Go3omo vs. Eoy, decided by the Supreme $ourt of 5ndiana in *+*-, thus9 %unicipal corporations e6ist in a dual capacity, and their functions are twofold. 5n one they e6ercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental. Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. 5n the other capacity the municipalities e6ercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their e6istence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power.4 **? N.B., ++C0++/# :bid, pp. ->/0->-.# 5t has already been remar3ed that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. 5n permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the in8ury was committed or that the case comes under the e6ceptions recogni(ed by law. <ailing this, the claimant cannot recover. $ru(, supra, p. CC.# 5n the case at bar, the driver of the dump truc3 of the municipality insists that 4he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San <ernando7s municipal streets.4 Rollo, p. ?+.# 5n the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section .m# of 'ule *.* of the 'evised 'ules of $ourt. =ence, )e rule that the driver of the dump truc3 was performing duties or tas3s pertaining to his office. )e already stressed in the case of $alafo9, et. al. vs. $rovince of :locos Eorte, the 2istrict Bngineer, and the Provincial Treasurer *>? Phil **1-# that 4the construction or maintenance of roads in which the truc3 and the driver wor3ed at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities.4 !fter a careful e6amination of e6isting laws and 8urisprudence, )e arrive at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its re/ular employee, 8ho 8as then en/a/ed in the dischar/e of /overnmental functions. =ence, the death of the passenger SS tragic and deplorable though it may be SS imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation. !ll premises considered, the $ourt is convinced that the respondent 8udge7s dereliction in failing to resolve the issue of non0suability did not amount to grave abuse of discretion. &ut said 8udge e6ceeded his 8urisdiction when it ruled on the issue of liability. !$$O'25NAEH, the petition is A'!NTB2 and the decision of the respondent court is hereby modified, absolving the petitioner municipality of any liability in favor of private respondents. SO O'2B'B2. G.R. No. L-61844 June 67, 1984 MUNI*I"ALIT4 O- SAN MIGUEL, 'ULA*AN, petitioner, vs. HONORA'LE OS*AR *. -ERNANDE., $n )$! (2($+3 ! +)e "#e!$%$n& Ju%&e, '#n() IV, '1$u&, 'u1(n, T)e "ROVIN*IAL SHERI-- o, 'u1(n, MARGARITA D. VDA. DE IM"ERIO, ADORA*ION IM"ERIO, RODOL-O IM"ERIO, *ONRADO IM"ERIO, ERNESTO IM"ERIO, AL-REDO IM"ERIO, *ARLOS IM"ERIO, JR., JUAN IM"ERIO n% S"OUSES MAR*ELO "INEDA n% LU*ILA "ONG*O, respondents. $ascual 3. Liatch2o for petitioner. The Solicitor %eneral and 0arcelo $ineda for respondents. RELOVA, J.: 5n $ivil $ase No. ->C0&, entitled 40ar/arita ". Ada. de :mperio, et al. vs. 0unicipal %overnment of San 0i/uel, Bulacan, et al.4, the then $ourt of <irst 5nstance of &ulacan, on !pril ?1, *+,1, rendered 8udgment holding herein petitioner municipality liable to private respondents, as follows9 )=B'B<O'B, premises considered, 8udgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant %unicipal Aovernment of San %iguel &ulacan, represented by %ayor %ar %arcelo A. !ure and its %unicipal Treasurer9 *. ordering the partial revocation of the 2eed of 2onation signed by the deceased $arlos 5mperio in favor of the %unicipality of San %iguel &ulacan, dated October ?,, *+C, insofar as Eots Nos. *, ?, ., C and /, &loc3 ** of Subdivision Plan Psd0?>1.* are concerned, with an aggregate total area of C,-C- square meters, which lots are among those covered and described under T$T No. T0*1.* of the 'egister of 2eeds of &ulacan in the name of the %unicipal Aovernment of San %iguel &ulacan, ?. ordering the defendant to e6ecute the corresponding 2eed of 'econveyance over the aforementioned five lots in favor of the plaintiffs in the proportion of the undivided one0half U# share in the name of plaintiffs %argarita 2. "da. de 5mperio, !doracion, 'odolfo, $onrado, Brnesto, !lfredo, $arlos, ;r. and ;uan, all surnamed 5mperio, and the remaining undivided one0half U# share in favor of plaintiffs uses %arcelo B. Pineda and Eucila Pongco: .. ordering the defendant municipality to pay to the plaintiffs in the proportion mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph the sum of P-C,CC>.>> corresponding to the rentals it has collected from the occupants for their use and occupation of the premises from *+,> up to and including *+,/, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from ;anuary *+,> until fully paid: C. ordering the restoration of ownership and possession over the five lots in question in favor of the plaintiffs in the same proportion aforementioned: /. ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P.,>>>.>> for attomey7s fees: and to pay the cost of suit. The counterclaim of the defendant is hereby ordered dismissed for lac3 of evidence presented to substantiate the same. SO O'2B'B2. pp. **0*?, 'ollo# The foregoing 8udgment became final when herein petitioner7s appeal was dismissed due to its failure to file the record on appeal on time. The dismissal was affirmed by the then $ourt of !ppeals in $!0A.'. No. SP0*?**1 and by this $ourt in A.'. No. /++.1. Thereafter, herein private respondents moved for issuance of a writ of e6ecution for the satisfaction of the 8udgment. 'espondent 8udge, on ;uly ?,, *+1?, issued an order, to wit9 $onsidering that an entry of 8udgment had already been made on ;une *C, *+1? in A. '. No. E0/++.1 and: $onsidering further that there is no opposition to plaintiffs7 motion for e6ecution dated ;uly ?., *+1.: Eet a writ of e6ecution be so issued, as prayed for in the aforestated motion. p. *>, 'ollo# Petitioner, on ;uly .>, *+1?, filed a %otion to Ouash the writ of e6ecution on the ground that the municipality7s property or funds are all public funds e6empt from e6ecution. The said motion to quash was, however, denied by the respondent 8udge in an order dated !ugust ?., *+1? and the alias writ of e6ecution stands in full force and effect. On September *., *+1?, respondent 8udge issued an order which in part, states9 5t is clear and evident from the foregoing that defendant has more than enough funds to meet its 8udgment obligation. %unicipal Treasurer %iguel $, 'oura of San %iguel, &ulacan and Provincial Treasurer of &ulacan !gustin O. Talavera are therefor hereby ordered to comply with the money 8udgment rendered by ;udge !gustin $. &agasao against said municipality. 5n li3e manner, the municipal authorities of San %iguel, &ulacan are li3ewise ordered to desist from plaintiffs7 legal possession of the property already returned to plaintiffs by virtue of the alias writ of e6ecution. <inally, defendants are hereby given an ine6tendible period of ten *># days from receipt of a copy of this order by the Office of the Provincial <iscal of &ulacan within which to submit their written compliance, p. ?C, 'ollo# )hen the treasurers provincial and municipal# failed to comply with the order of September *., *+1?, respondent 8udge issued an order for their arrest and that they will be release only upon compliance thereof. =ence, the present petition on the issue whether the funds of the %unicipality of San %iguel, &ulacan, in the hands of the provincial and municipal treasurers of &ulacan and San %iguel, respectively, are public funds which are e6empt from e6ecution for the satisfaction of the money 8udgment in $ivil $ase No. ->C0&. )ell settled is the rule that public funds are not sub8ect to levy and e6ecution. The reason for this was e6plained in the case of %unicipality of $aoay vs. 0anaois, 1- Phil. -?+ 4that they are held in trust for the people, intended and used for the accomplishment of the purposes for which municipal corporations are created, and that to sub8ect said properties and public funds to e6ecution would materially impede, even defeat and in some instances destroy said purpose.4 !nd, in Tantoco vs. 0unicipal 3ouncil of :loilo, C+ Phil. /?, it was held that 4it is the settled doctrine of the law that not only the public property but also the ta6es and public revenues of such corporations $annot be sei(ed under e6ecution against them, either in the treasury or when in transit to it. ;udgments rendered for ta6es, and the proceeds of such 8udgments in the hands of officers of the law, are not sub8ect to e6ecution unless so declared by statute.4 Thus, it is clear that all the funds of petitioner municipality in the possession of the %unicipal Treasurer of San %iguel, as well as those in the possession of the Provincial Treasurer of &ulacan, are also public funds and as such they are e6empt from e6ecution. &esides, Presidential 2ecree No. C,,, 3nown as 4The 2ecree on Eocal <iscal !dministration4, Section ? a#, provides9 SB$. ?. undamental $rinciples. @ Eocal government financial affairs, transactions, and operations shall be governed by the fundamental principles set forth hereunder9 a# No money shall be paid out of the treasury e6cept in pursuance of a lawful appropriation or other specific statutory authority. 666 666 666 Otherwise stated, there must be a corresponding appropriation in the form of an ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang &ayan before any money of the municipality may be paid out. 5n the case at bar, it has not been shown that the Sangguniang &ayan has passed an ordinance to this effect. <urthermore, Section */, 'ule .+ of the New 'ules of $ourt, outlines the procedure for the enforcement of money 8udgment9 a# &y levying on all the property of the debtor, whether real or personal, not otherwise e6empt from e6ecution, or only on such part of the property as is sufficient to satisfy the 8udgment and accruing cost, if he has more than sufficient property for the purpose: b# &y selling the property levied upon: c# &y paying the 8udgment0creditor so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the 8udgment and accruing costs: and d# &y delivering to the 8udgment0debtor the e6cess, if any, unless otherwise, directed by 8udgment or order of the court. The foregoing has not been followed in the case at bar. !$$O'25NAEH, the petition is granted and the order of respondent 8udge, dated ;uly ?,, *+1?, granting issuance of a writ of e6ecution: the alias writ of e6ecution, dated ;uly ?,, *+1?: and the order of respondent 8udge, dated September *., *+1?, directing the Provincial Treasurer of &ulacan and the %unicipal Treasurer of San %iguel, &ulacan to comply with the money 8udgments, are SBT !S52B: and respondents are hereby en8oined from implementing the writ of e6ecution. SO O'2B'B2. G.R. No!. 89898-99 O(+o0e# 1, 1990 MUNI*I"ALIT4 O- MA=ATI, petitioner, vs. THE HONORA'LE *OURT O- A""EALS, HON. SALVADOR ". DE GU.MAN, JR., ! Ju%&e RT* o, ME+$, '#n() *9LII ADMIRAL -INAN*E *REDITORS *ONSORTIUM, IN*., n% SHERI-- SILVINO R. "ASTRANA,respondents. "efante B #le/ado for petitioner. Roberto B. Lu/ue for private respondent Admiral inance 3reditors5 3onsortium, :nc. R E S O L U T I O N *ORTPS, J.: The present petition for review is an off0shoot of e6propriation proceedings initiated by petitioner %unicipality of %a3ati against private respondent !dmiral <inance $reditors $onsortium, 5nc., =ome &uilding System K 'ealty $orporation and one !rceli P. ;o, involving a parcel of land and improvements thereon located at %ayapis St., San !ntonio "illage, %a3ati and registered in the name of !rceli P. ;o under T$T No. S0 /C++. 5t appears that the action for eminent domain was filed on %ay ?>, *+1-, doc3eted as $ivil $ase No. *.-++. !ttached to petitioner7s complaint was a certification that a ban3 account !ccount No. SI! ?-/0/.,*/C0.# had been opened with the PN& &uendia &ranch under petitioner7s name containing the sum of PC*,,/*>.>>, made pursuant to the provisions of Pres. 2ecree No. C?. !fter due hearing where the parties presented their respective appraisal reports regarding the value of the property, respondent 'T$ 8udge rendered a decision on ;une C, *+1,, fi6ing the appraised value of the property at P/,?+*,---.>>, and ordering petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced payment of P..1,*->.>> which was earlier released to private respondent. !fter this decision became final and e6ecutory, private respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of e6ecution. This motion was granted by respondent 'T$ 8udge. !fter issuance of the writ of e6ecution, a Notice of Aarnishment dated ;anuary *C, *+11 was served by respondent sheriff Silvino '. Pastrana upon the manager of the PN& &uendia &ranch. =owever, respondent sheriff was informed that a 4hold code4 was placed on the account of petitioner. !s a result of this, private respondent filed a motion dated ;anuary ?,, *+11 praying that an order be issued directing the ban3 to deliver to respondent sheriff the amount equivalent to the unpaid balance due under the 'T$ decision dated ;une C, *+1,. Petitioner filed a motion to lift the garnishment, on the ground that the manner of payment of the e6propriation amount should be done in installments which the respondent 'T$ 8udge failed to state in his decision. Private respondent filed its opposition to the motion. Pending resolution of the above motions, petitioner filed on ;uly ?>, *+11 a 4%anifestation4 informing the court that private respondent was no longer the true and lawful owner of the sub8ect property because a new title over the property had been registered in the name of Philippine Savings &an3, 5nc. PS&# 'espondent 'T$ 8udge issued an order requiring PS& to ma3e available the documents pertaining to its transactions over the sub8ect property, and the PN& &uendia &ranch to reveal the amount in petitioner7s account which was garnished by respondent sheriff. 5n compliance with this order, PS& filed a manifestation informing the court that it had consolidated its ownership over the property as mortgageeIpurchaser at an e6tra8udicial foreclosure sale held on !pril ?>, *+1,. !fter several conferences, PS& and private respondent entered into a compromise agreement whereby they agreed to divide between themselves the compensation due from the e6propriation proceedings. 'espondent trial 8udge subsequently issued an order dated September 1, *+11 which9 *# approved the compromise agreement: ?# ordered PN& &uendia &ranch to immediately release to PS& the sum of PC,+/.,/>-.C/ which corresponds to the balance of the appraised value of the sub8ect property under the 'T$ decision dated ;une C, *+1,, from the garnished account of petitioner: and, .# ordered PS& and private respondent to e6ecute the necessary deed of conveyance over the sub8ect property in favor of petitioner. Petitioner7s motion to lift the garnishment was denied. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was duly opposed by private respondent. On the other hand, for failure of the manager of the PN& &uendia &ranch to comply with the order dated September 1, *+11, private respondent filed two succeeding motions to require the ban3 manager to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. 2uring the hearings conducted for the above motions, the general manager of the PN& &uendia &ranch, a %r. !ntonio &autista, informed the court that he was still waiting for proper authori(ation from the PN& head office enabling him to ma3e a disbursement for the amount so ordered. <or its part, petitioner contended that its funds at the PN& &uendia &ranch could neither be garnished nor levied upon e6ecution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the $hilippines v. $alacio LA.'. No. E0?>.??, %ay ?+, *+-1, ?. S$'! 1++M. 'espondent trial 8udge issued an order dated 2ecember ?*, *+11 denying petitioner7s motion for reconsideration on the ground that the doctrine enunciated in Republic v. $alacio did not apply to the case because petitioner7s PN& !ccount No. SI! ?-/0 /.,*/C0. was an account specifically opened for the e6propriation proceedings of the sub8ect property pursuant to Pres. 2ecree No. C?. 'espondent 'T$ 8udge li3ewise declared %r. !ntonio &autista guilty of contempt of court for his ine6cusable refusal to obey the order dated September 1, *+11, and thus ordered his arrest and detention until his compliance with the said order. Petitioner and the ban3 manager of PN& &uendia &ranch then filed separate petitions for certiorari with the $ourt of !ppeals, which were eventually consolidated. 5n a decision promulgated on ;une ?1, *+1+, the $ourt of !ppeals dismissed both petitions for lac3 of merit, sustained the 8urisdiction of respondent 'T$ 8udge over the funds contained in petitioner7s PN& !ccount No. ?-/0/.,*/C0., and affirmed his authority to levy on such funds. 5ts motion for reconsideration having been denied by the $ourt of !ppeals, petitioner now files the present petition for review with prayer for preliminary in8unction. On November ?>, *+1+, the $ourt resolved to issue a temporary restraining order en8oining respondent 'T$ 8udge, respondent sheriff, and their representatives, from enforcing andIor carrying out the 'T$ order dated 2ecember ?*, *+11 and the writ of garnishment issued pursuant thereto. Private respondent then filed its comment to the petition, while petitioner filed its reply. Petitioner not only reiterates the arguments adduced in its petition before the $ourt of !ppeals, but also alleges for the first time that it has actually two accounts with the PN& &uendia &ranch, to wit9 666 666 666 *# !ccount No. SI! ?-/0/.,*/C0. @ e6clusively for the e6propriation of the sub8ect property, with an outstanding balance of P++,,C..+C. ?# !ccount No. SI! ?-.0/.>1/>0, @ for statutory obligations and other purposes of the municipal government, with a balance of P*,>,>+1,C?*.,?, as of ;uly *?, *+1+. 666 666 666 LPetition, pp. -0,: Rollo, pp. **0*?.M &ecause the petitioner has belatedly alleged only in this $ourt the e6istence of two ban3 accounts, it may fairly be as3ed whether the second account was opened only for the purpose of undermining the legal basis of the assailed orders of respondent 'T$ 8udge and the decision of the $ourt of !ppeals, and strengthening its reliance on the doctrine that public funds are e6empted from garnishment or e6ecution as enunciated in Republic v. $alacioLsupra.M !t any rate, the $ourt will give petitioner the benefit of the doubt, and proceed to resolve the principal issues presented based on the factual circumstances thus alleged by petitioner. !dmitting that its PN& !ccount No. SI! ?-/0/.,*/C0. was specifically opened for e6propriation proceedings it had initiated over the sub8ect property, petitioner poses no ob8ection to the garnishment or the levy under e6ecution of the funds deposited therein amounting to P++,,C..+C. =owever, it is petitioner7s main contention that inasmuch as the assailed orders of respondent 'T$ 8udge involved the net amount of PC,+-/,/>-.C/, the funds garnished by respondent sheriff in e6cess of P++,,C..+C, which are public funds earmar3ed for the municipal government7s other statutory obligations, are e6empted from e6ecution without the proper appropriation required under the law. There is merit in this contention. The funds deposited in the second PN& !ccount No. SI! ?-.0/.>1/>0, are public funds of the municipal government. 5n this 8urisdiction, well0settled is the rule that public funds are not sub8ect to levy and e6ecution, unless otherwise provided for by statute L'epublic v. Palacio, supra.: The $ommissioner of Public =ighways v. San 2iego, A.'. No. E0.>>+1, <ebruary *1, *+,>, .* S$'! -*-M. %ore particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at e6ecution sale to satisfy a money 8udgment against the municipality. %unicipal revenues derived from ta6es, licenses and mar3et fees, and which are intended primarily and e6clusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are e6empt from e6ecution LSee "iuda 2e Tan Toco v. The %unicipal $ouncil of 5loilo, C+ Phil. /? *+?-#9 The %unicipality of Paoay, 5locos Norte v. %anaois, 1- Phil. -?+ *+/>#: %unicipality of San %iguel, &ulacan v. <ernande(, A.'. No. -*,CC, ;une ?/, *+1C, *.> S$'! /-M. The foregoing rule finds application in the case at bar. !bsent a showing that the municipal council of %a3ati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the 'T$ decision dated ;une C, *+1,, less the sum of P++,,C..+C deposited in !ccount No. SI! ?-/0/.,*/C0., no levy under e6ecution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner deposited in !ccount No. SI! ?-.0/.>1/>0,. Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PS& are left with no legal recourse. )here a municipality fails or refuses, without 8ustifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money 8udgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor LSee"iuda 2e Tan Toco v. The %unicipal $ouncil of 5loilo, supra: &aldivia v. Eota, *>, Phil. *>++ *+->#: Huviengco v. Aon(ales, *>1 Phil. ?C, *+->#M. 5n the case at bar, the validity of the 'T$ decision dated ;une C, *+1, is not disputed by petitioner. No appeal was ta3en therefrom. <or three years now, petitioner has en8oyed possession and use of the sub8ect property notwithstanding its ine6cusable failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay 8ust compensation. Petitioner has benefited from its possession of the property since the same has been the site of %a3ati )est =igh School since the school year *+1-0*+1,. This $ourt will not condone petitioner7s blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from e6propriation proceedings it had in fact initiated. 5t cannot be over0emphasi(ed that, within the conte6t of the State7s inherent power of eminent domain, . . . L8Must compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its ta3ing. )ithout prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered 48ust4 for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss L$osculluela v. The =onorable $ourt of !ppeals, A.'. No. ,,,-/, !ugust */, *+11, *-C S$'! .+., C>>. See also Provincial Aovernment of Sorsogon v. "da. de "illaroya, A.'. No. -C>.,, !ugust ?,, *+1,, */. S$'! ?+*M. The State7s power of eminent domain should be e6ercised within the bounds of fair play and 8ustice. 5n the case at bar, considering that valuable property has been ta3en, the compensation to be paid fi6ed and the municipality is in full possession and utili(ing the property for public purpose, for three .# years, the $ourt finds that the municipality has had more than reasonable time to pay full compensation. )=B'B<O'B, the $ourt 'esolved to O'2B' petitioner %unicipality of %a3ati to immediately pay Philippine Savings &an3, 5nc. and private respondent the amount of PC,+/.,/>-.C/. Petitioner is hereby required to submit to this $ourt a report of its compliance with the foregoing order within a non0e6tendible period of S5NTH -># 2!HS from the date of receipt of this resolution. The order of respondent 'T$ 8udge dated 2ecember ?*, *+11, which was rendered in $ivil $ase No. *.-++, is SBT !S52B and the temporary restraining order issued by the $ourt on November ?>, *+1+ is %!2B PB'%!NBNT. SO O'2B'B2. G.R. No. 108681 Se2+e/0e# 10, 6003 *IT4 O- *ALOO*AN n% NORMA M. A'RA*IA, petitioners, vs. HON. MAURO T. ALLARDE, "#e!$%$n& Ju%&e o, '#n() 163, RT* o, *1oo(n *$+3, AL'ERTO A. *ASTILLO, De2u+3 S)e#$,, o, '#n() 163, RT* o, *1oo(n *$+3, n% DEL-INA HERNANDE. SANTIAGO n% "HILI""INE NATIONAL 'AN= :"N';, respondents. *ORONA, J.F !ssailed in this petition for certiorari is the decision * dated !ugust .*, *++?, of the $ourt of !ppeals in $! A.'. SP No. ?,C?., ordering the 'egional Trial $ourt of $aloocan $ity, &ranch *?., to implement an alias writ of e6ecution dated ;anuary *-, *++?. The dispositive portion read as follows9 )=B'B<O'B the petition is hereby granted ordering the 'egional Trial $ourt of Galoocan $ity, &ranch *?., to immediately effect the alias writ of e6ecution dated ;anuary *-, *++? without further delay. $ounsel for the respondents are warned that a repetition of their contemptuous act to delay the e6ecution of a final and e6ecutory 8udgment will be dealt with more severely. SO O'2B'B2. ? 5t is important to state at the outset that the dispute between petitioner and private respondent has been litigated thrice before this $ourt9 first, in A.'. No. E0.+?1101+, entitled <eirs of Abelardo $alomique, et al. vs. 0arcial Samson, et al., decided on ;anuary .*, *+1/: second, in A.'. No. +1.--, entitled 3ity %overnment of 3aloocan vs. 3ourt of Appeals, et al., resolved on %ay *-, *++*, and third, in A.'. No. *>?-?/, entitled Santia/o vs. Sto. Tomas, et al., decided on !ugust *, *++/. This is not to mention the numerous concurrent efforts by the $ity Aovernment of $aloocan to see3 relief from other 8udicial and quasi08udicial bodies. The present petition for certiorari is the ,ou#+) time we are called upon to resolve the dispute. The factual and procedural antecedents follow. Sometime in *+,?, %arcial Samson, $ity %ayor of $aloocan $ity, through Ordinance No. *,C+, abolished the position of !ssistant $ity !dministrator and *, other positions from the plantilla of the local government of $aloocan. Then !ssistant $ity !dministrator 2elfina =ernande( Santiago and the *, affected employees of the $ity Aovernment assailed the legality of the abolition before the then $ourt of <irst 5nstance $<5# of $aloocan $ity, &ranch ... 5n *+,., the $<5 declared the abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and the payment of their bac3 salaries and other emoluments. The $ity Aovernment of $aloocan appealed to the $ourt of !ppeals. 'espondent Santiago and her co0parties moved for the dismissal of the appeal for being dilatory and frivolous but the appellate court denied their motion. Thus, they elevated the case on certiorari before this $ourt, doc3eted as A.'. No. E0.+?1101+, <eirs of Abelardo $alomique, et al. vs. 0arcial Samson, et al. 5n our 'esolution dated ;anuary .*, *+1/, we held that the appellate court 4erred in not dismissing the appeal,4 and 4that the appeal of the $ity Aovernment of $aloocan was frivolous and dilatory.4 5n due time, the resolution lapsed into finality and entry of 8udgment was made on <ebruary ?,, *+1/. 5n *+1-, the $ity Aovernment of $aloocan paid respondent Santiago P,/,>1..., in partial payment of her bac3wages, thereby leaving a balance of P/.>,,-*.+*. =er co0 parties were paid in full. . 5n *+1,, the $ity of $aloocan appropriated funds for her unpaid bac3 salaries. This was included in Supplemental &udget No. . for the fiscal year *+1,. Surprisingly, however, the $ity later refused to release the money to respondent Santiago. 'espondent Santiago e6erted effort for the e6ecution of the remainder of the money 8udgment but she met stiff opposition from the $ity Aovernment of $aloocan. On <ebruary *?, *++*, ;udge %auro T. !llarde, 'T$ of $aloocan $ity, &ranch *?., issued a writ of e6ecution for the payment of the remainder of respondent SantiagoRs bac3 salaries and other emoluments. C <or the second time, the $ity Aovernment of $aloocan went up to the $ourt of !ppeals and filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and in8unction to stop the trial court from enforcing the writ of e6ecution. The $! dismissed the petition and affirmed the order of issuance of the writ of e6ecution. / One of the issues raised and resolved therein was the e6tent to which bac3 salaries and emoluments were due to respondent Santiago. The appellate court held that she was entitled to her salaries from October, *+1. to 2ecember, *+1-. !nd for the second time, the $ity Aovernment of $aloocan appealed to this $ourt in A.'. No. +1.--, 3ity %overnment of 3aloocan vs. 3ourt of Appeals, et al. The petition was dismissed, through our 'esolution of %ay *-, *++*, for having been filed late and for failure to show any reversible error on the part of the $ourt of !ppeals. The resolution subsequently attained finality and the corresponding entry of 8udgment was made on ;uly ?+, *++*. On motion of private respondent Santiago, ;udge %auro T. !llarde ordered the issuance of an alias writ of e6ecution on %arch ., *++?. The $ity Aovernment of $aloocan moved to reconsider the order, insisting in the main that respondent Santiago was not entitled to bac3wages from *+1. to *+1-. The court a quo denied the motion and forthwith issued the alias writ of e6ecution. Unfa(ed, the $ity Aovernment of $aloocan filed a motion to quash the writ, maintaining that the money 8udgment sought to be enforced should not have included salaries and allowances for the years *+1.0*+1-. The trial court li3ewise denied the motion. On ;uly ?,, *++?, Sheriff !lberto !. $astillo levied and sold at public auction one of the motor vehicles of the $ity Aovernment of $aloocan, with plate no. S&=0*-/, for P*>>,>>>. The proceeds of the sale were turned over to respondent Santiago in partial satisfaction of her claim, thereby leaving a balance of PC.+,.,,.*C, inclusive of interest. Petitioners filed a motion questioning the validity of the auction sale of the vehicle with plate no. S&=0*-/, and a supplemental motion maintaining that the properties of the municipality were e6empt from e6ecution. 5n his Order dated October *, *++?, ;udge !llarde denied both motions and directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction three more vehicles of the $ity of $aloocan 0 -V IpW ONB *# Unit %otor "ehicle =unter Station )agon#: %otor No. $0?C>0 *++-?+: $hassis No. %&&0+*>.-+$: ONB *# Unit %otor "ehicle =unter Series **02iesel#: Bngine No. C<&*0 *,C.?1, $hassis No. %&&0+*>.C/$: Plate No. S2E0-/.: ONB *# Unit %otor "ehicle =unter Series **02iesel#: Bngine No. C<&0 *-/*+-: $hassis No. %&& +*>.C+$. !ll the vehicles, including that previously sold in the auction sale, were owned by the $ity and assigned for the use of herein petitioner Norma !bracia, 2ivision Superintendent of $aloocan $ity, and other officials of the 2ivision of $ity Schools. %eanwhile, the $ity Aovernment of $aloocan sought clarification from the $ivil Service $ommission $S$# on whether respondent Santiago was considered to have rendered services from *+1.0*+1- as to be entitled to bac3wages for that period. 5n its 'esolution No. +*0**?C, the $S$ ruled in the negative. On November ??, *++*, private respondent Santiago challenged the $S$ resolution before this $ourt in A.'. No. *>?-?/, Santia/o vs. Sto. Tomas, et al. On ;uly 1, *++., we initially dismissed the petition for lac3 of merit: however, we reconsidered the dismissal of the petition in our 'esolution dated !ugust *, *++/, this time ruling in favor of respondent Santiago9 The issue of petitioner Santia/oRs ri/ht to bac2 salaries for the period from 4ctober K),& to "ecember K),N havin/ been resolved in %.R. Eo. ),&NN on KN 0ay K))K, 3S3 Resolution Eo. )K-KK+( promul/ated later on +( September K))K S in particular, its rulin/ on the e9tent of bac28a/es due petitioner Santia/o S 8as in fact moot and academic at the time of its promul/ation. 3S3 Resolution Eo. )K-KK+( could not, of course, set aside 8hat had been !udicially decided 8ith finality 6 6 6 6 the court considers that resort by the $ity Aovernment of $aloocan to respondent $S$ was but another attempt to deprive petitioner Santiago of her claim to bac3 salaries 6 6 6 and a continuation of the $ityRs abuse and misuse of the rules of 8udicial procedure. The $ityRs acts have resulted in wasting the precious time and resources of the courts and respondent $S$. Underscoring supplied#. On October /, *++?, the $ity $ouncil of $aloocan passed Ordinance No. >*.C, Series of *++?, which included the amount of PC.+,.,,.*C claimed by respondent Santiago as bac3 salaries, plus interest. , Pursuant to the sub8ect ordinance, ;udge !llarde issued an order dated November *>, *++?, decreeing that9 )=B'B<O'B, the $ity Treasurer of $aloocan#, Norberto !(arcon is hereby ordered to deliver to this $ourt within five /# days from receipt hereof, a# managerRs chec3 covering the amount of PC.+,.,1.>> representing the bac3 salaries of petitioner 2elfina =. Santiago in accordance with Ordinance No. >*.C S. *++? and pursuant to the final and e6ecutory decision in these cases. Then $aloocan %ayor %acario !. !sistio, ;r., however, refused to sign the chec3 intended as payment for respondent SantiagoRs claims. This, despite the fact that he was one of the signatories of the ordinance authori(ing such payment. On !pril ?+, *++., ;udge !llarde issued another order directing the !cting $ity %ayor of $aloocan, 'eynaldo O. %alon(o, to sign the chec3 which had been pending before the Office of the %ayor since 2ecember **, *++?. !cting $ity %ayor %alon(o informed the trial court that 4he could not comply with the order since the sub8ect chec3 was not formally turned over to him by the $ity %ayor4 who went on official leave of absence on !pril */, *++., and that 4he doubted whether he had authority to sign the same.4 1 Thus, in an order dated %ay ,, *++., ;udge !llarde ordered Sheriff !lberto !. $astillo to immediately garnish the funds of the $ity Aovernment of $aloocan corresponding to the claim of respondent Santiago. + On the same day, Sheriff !lberto !. $astillo served a copy of the Notice of Aarnishment on the Philippine National &an3 PN&#, Sangandaan &ranch, $aloocan $ity. )hen PN& immediately notified the $ity of $aloocan of the Notice of Aarnishment, the $ity Treasurer sent a letter0advice informing PN& that the order of garnishment was 4illegal,4 with a warning that it would hold PN& liable for any damages which may be caused by the withholding of the funds of the city. PN& opted to comply with the order of ;udge !llarde and released to the Sheriff a managerRs chec3 amounting to PC.+,.,1. !fter ?* long years, the claim of private respondent Santiago was finally settled in full. On ;une C, *++., however, while the instant petition was pending, the $ity Aovernment of $aloocan filed yet another motion with this $ourt, a %otion to 2eclare in $ontempt of $ourt: to Set !side the Aarnishment and !dministrative $omplaint against ;udge !llarde, respondent Santiago and PN&. Subsequently, the $ity Aovernment of $aloocan filed a Supplemental Petition formally impleading PN& as a party0respondent in this case. The instant petition for certiorari is directed this time against the validity of the garnishment of the funds of the $ity of $aloocan, as well as the validity of the levy and sale of the motor vehicles belonging to the $ity of $aloocan. %ore specifically, petitioners insist that ;udge !llarde gravely abused his discretion in9 a# ordering the garnishment of the funds of the $ity of $aloocan deposited with the PN&, since it is settled that public funds are beyond the reach of garnishment and even with the appropriation passed by the $ity $ouncil, the authority of the %ayor is still needed for the release of the appropriation: b# ordering the levy and sale at public auction of three .# motor vehicles owned by the $ity of $aloocan, which vehicles are necessary for public use and cannot be attached nor sold in an e6ecution sale to satisfy a money 8udgment against the $ity of $aloocan: c# peremptorily denying petitioner $ity of $aloocanRs urgent motions to vacate and set aside the auction sale of the motor vehicle with PE!TB NO. S&=0*-/, notwithstanding that the auction sale by the Sheriff was tainted with serious irregularities, more particularly9 i. non0compliance with the mandatory posting of the notice of sale: ii. non0observance of the procedure that a sale through public auction has to be made and consummated at the time of the auction, at the designated place and upon actual payment of the purchase price by the winning bidder: iii. violation of Sec. ?*, 'ule .+ of the 'ules of $ourt to the effect that sale of personal property capable of manual delivery Xmust be sold within the view of those attending the sale:R and, iv. the SheriffRs $ertificate of Sale contained false narration of facts respecting the actual time of the public auction: d# the enforcement of the levy made by the Sheriff covering the three .# motor vehicles based on an alias writ that has long e6pired. The petition has absolutely no merit. The trial court committed no grave abuse of discretion in implementing the alias writ of e6ecution to settle the claim of respondent Santiago, the satisfaction of which petitioner had been maliciously evading for ?* years. Petitioner argues that the garnishment of its funds in PN& was invalid inasmuch as these were public funds and thus e6empt from e6ecution. Aarnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff see3s to sub8ect to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a third person, or money owed by such third person or garnishee to the defendant. *> The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited in the PN& or any other official depositary of the Philippine Aovernment by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or special deposit, remain government funds and may not be sub8ect to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law9 ** Bven though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is rela6ed, the power of the courts ends when the 8udgment is rendered. !lthough the liability of the state has been 8udicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the 8udgment or not, and e6ecution cannot issue on a 8udgment against the state. Such statutes do not authori(e a sei(ure of state property to satisfy 8udgments recovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature will recogni(e such 8udgment as final and ma3e provision for the satisfaction thereof. *? The rule is based on obvious considerations of public policy. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paraly(ed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific ob8ects, as appropriated by law. *. =owever, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well0defined e6ception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Otherwise stated, the rule on the immunity of public funds from sei(ure or garnishment does not apply where the funds sought to be levied under e6ecution are already allocated by law specifically for the satisfaction of the money 8udgment against the government. 5n such a case, the monetary 8udgment may be legally enforced by 8udicial processes. Thus, in the similar case of $asay 3ity %overnment, et al. vs. 3: of 0anila, Br. T, et al., *C where petitioners challenged the trial courtRs order garnishing its funds in payment of the contract price for the construction of the $ity =all, we ruled that, while government funds deposited in the PN& are e6empt from e6ecution or garnishment, this rule does not apply if an ordinance has already been enacted for the payment of the $ityRs obligations S Upon the issuance of the writ of e6ecution, the petitioner0appellants moved for its quashal alleging among other things the e6emption of the government from e6ecution. This move on the part of petitioner0appellants is at first glance laudable for Xall government funds deposited with the Philippine National &an3 by any agency or instrumentality of the government, whether by way of general or special deposit, remain government funds and may not be sub8ect to garnishment or levy.R &ut inasmuch as an ordinance has already been enacted e6pressly appropriating the amount of P-*.,>+-.>> as payment to the respondent0appellee, then the herein case is covered by the e6ception to the general rule 6 6 6 6 5n the instant case, the $ity $ouncil of $aloocan already approved and passed Ordinance No. >*.C, Series of *++?, allocating the amount of PC.+,.,,.*C for respondent SantiagoRs bac3 salaries plus interest. Thus this case fell squarely within the e6ception. <or all intents and purposes, Ordinance No. >*.C, Series of *++?, was the 4corresponding appropriation as required by law.4 The sum indicated in the ordinance for Santiago were deemed automatically segregated from the other budgetary allocations of the $ity of $aloocan and earmar3ed solely for the $ityRs monetary obligation to her. The 8udgment of the trial court could then be validly enforced against such funds. 5ndeed, this conclusion is further buttressed by the $ertification issued on 2ecember ?., *++? by Norberto $. !(arcon, $ity Treasurer of $aloocan9 $B'T5<5$!T5ON This is to certify that according to the records available in this Office the claim for bac3wages of the =ON. ;U2AB 2BE<5N! =. S!NT5!AO has been properly obli/ated and can be collected in accordance 8ith e9istin/ accountin/ and auditin/ rules and re/ulations. This is to certify further that in case the claim is not collected within the present fiscal year, such claim shall be entered in the boo3s of !ccounts Payable and can still be collected in the ne6t fiscal year 6 6 6 6 Underscoring supplied# PetitionersR reliance on 0unicipality of 0a2ati vs. 3ourt of Appeals, et al., */ and 3ommissioner of $ublic <i/h8ays vs. San "ie/o, *- does not help their cause. *, &oth cases implicitly affirmed that public funds may be garnished if there is a statute 8hich appropriated the amount so /arnished. Thus, in 0unicipality of 0a2ati, citing San "ie/o, we unequivocally held that9 5n this 8urisdiction, well0settled is the rule that public funds are not sub8ect to levy and e6ecution, unless other8ise provided by statute 6 6 6 6 Similarly, we cannot agree with petitionerRs argument that the appropriation ordinance of the $ity $ouncil did not authori(e PN& to release the funds because only the $ity %ayor could authori(e the release thereof. ! valid appropriation of public funds lifts its e6emption from e6ecution. =ere, the appropriation passed by the $ity $ouncil of $aloocan providing for the payment of bac3wages to respondent was duly approved and si/ned by both the council and then %ayor %acario !sistio, ;r. The mayorRs signature approving the budget ordinance was his assent to the appropriation of funds for respondent SantiagoRs bac3wages. 5f he did not agree with such allocation, he could have vetoed the item pursuant to Section // of the Eocal Aovernment $ode. *1 There was no such veto. 5n view of the foregoing discourse, we dismiss petitionersR unfounded assertion, probably made more out of sheer ignorance of prevailing 8urisprudence than a deliberate attempt to mislead us, that the rule that 4public funds are# beyond the reach of levy and garnishment is not qualified by any condition.4 *+ )e now come to the issue of the legality of the levy on the three motor vehicles belonging to the $ity of $aloocan which petitioners claimed to be e6empt from e6ecution, and which levy was based on an alias writ that had purportedly e6pired. Suffice it to say that ;udge !llarde, in his Order dated November *>, *++?, ?> already lifted the levy on the three vehicles, thereby formally discharging them from the 8urisdiction of the court and turning them over to the $ity Aovernment of $aloocan9 6 6 6 6 the levy of the three .# vehicles made by Sheriff !lberto $astillo pursuant to the Orders of this $ourt dated October * and 1, *++? is hereby lifted and the said Sheriff is hereby ordered to return the same to the $ity Aovernment in view of the satisfaction of the decision in these cases 6 6 6 6 5t is thus unnecessary for us to discuss a moot issue. )e turn to the third issue raised by petitioners that the auction sale by Sheriff !lberto !. $astillo of the motor vehicle with plate no. S&=0*-/ was tainted with serious irregularities. )e need not emphasi(e that the sheriff en8oys the presumption of regularity in the performance of the functions of his office. This presumption prevails in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary and cannot be overcome by bare and self0serving allegations. The petitioners failed to convince us that the auction sale conducted by the sheriff indeed suffered from fatal flaws. No evidence was adduced to prove that the sheriff had been remiss in the performance of his duties during the public auction sale. 5ndeed it would be in8udicious for us to assume, as petitioners want us to do, that the sheriff failed to follow the established procedures governing public auctions. On the contrary, a review of the records shows that the sheriff complied with the rules on public auction. The sale of the $ityRs vehicle was made publicly in front of the $aloocan $ity =all on the date fi6ed in the notice S ;uly ?,, *++?. 5n fact, petitioners in their %otion to 2eclare in $ontempt of $ourt: to Set !side the Aarnishment and !dministrative $omplaint admitted as much9 On *uly +O, K))+, by virtue of an alias writ of e6ecution issued by the respondent court, a vehicle owned by the petitioner 666 was levied and sold at public auction for the amount of P*>>,>>>.>> and which amount was immediately delivered to the private respondent 6 6 6 6 ?* =ence, petitioners cannot now be heard to impugn the validity of the auction sale. Petitioners, in desperation, li3ewise ma3e much of the proceedings before the trial court on October 1, *++?, wherein petitioner Norma !bracia, Superintendent of the 2ivision of $ity Schools of $aloocan, was commanded to appear and show cause why she should not be cited in contempt for delaying the e6ecution of 8udgment. This was in connection with her failure or refusal# to surrender the three motor vehicles assigned to the 2ivision of $ity Schools to the custody of the sheriff. Petitioner !bracia, assisted by %r. 'icardo Nagpacan of the 2ivision of $ity Schools, appeared during the hearing but requested a ten0day period within which to refer the matter of contempt to a counsel of her choice. The request was denied by ;udge !llarde in his assailed order dated October 1, *++?. Thus petitioner !bracia claimed, inter alia, that9 a# she was denied due process: b# the silence of the order of ;udge !llarde on her request for time violated an orderly and faithful recording of the proceedings, and c# she was coerced into agreeing to surrender the vehicles. )e do not thin3 so. )hat violates due process is the absolute lac3 of opportunity to be heard. That opportunity, the $ourt is convinced, was sufficiently accorded to petitioner !bracia. She was notified of the contempt charge against her: she was effectively assisted by counsel when she appeared during the hearing on October 1, *++?: and she was afforded ample opportunity to answer and refute the charge against her. The circumstance that she opted not to avail of her chance to be heard on that occasion by as3ing for an e6tension of time within which to hire a counsel of her choice, a request denied by the trial court, did not transgress nor deprive her of her right to due process. Significantly, during the hearing on October 1, *++?, %r. Nagpacan manifested in open court that, after conferring with petitioner !bracia, the latter was 48illin/ to surrender these vehicles into the custody of the sheriff on the condition that the standing motion for contempt# be withdrawn.4 ?? =er decision was made freely and voluntarily, and after conferring with her counsel. %oreover, it was petitioner !bracia herself who imposed the condition that respondent Santiago should withdraw her motion for contempt in e6change for her promise to surrender the sub8ect vehicles. Thus, petitioner !braciaRs claim that she was coerced into surrendering the vehicles had no basis. Bven assuming e9 /ratia ar/umenti that there indeed e6isted certain legal infirmities in connection with the assailed orders of ;udge !llarde, still, considering the totality of circumstances of this case, the nullification of the contested orders would be way out of line. <or ?* long years, starting *+,? when this controversy started up to *++. when her claim was fully paid out of the garnished funds of the $ity of $aloocan, respondent Santiago was cruelly and un8ustly deprived of what was due her. 5t would be, at the very least, merciless and unchristian to ma3e private respondent refund the $ity of $aloocan the amount already paid to her, only to force her to go through the same nightmare all over again. !t any rate, of paramount importance to us is that 8ustice has been served. No right of the public was violated and public interest was preserved. <inally, we cannot simply pass over in silence the deplorable act of the former %ayor of $aloocan $ity in refusing to sign the chec3 in payment of the $ityRs obligation to private respondent. 5t was an open defiance of 8udicial processes, smac3ing of political arrogance, and a direct violation of the very ordinance he himself approved. Our 'esolution in A.'. No. +1.--, 3ity %overnment of 3aloocan vs. 3ourt of Appeals, et al., dated %ay *-, *++*, dismissing the petition of the $ity of $aloocan assailing the issuance of a writ of e6ecution by the trial court, already resolved with finality all impediments to the e6ecution of 8udgment in this case. Het, the $ity Aovernment of $aloocan, in a blatant display of malice and bad faith, refused to comply with the decision. Now, it has the temerity to come to this $ourt once more and continue inflicting in8ustice on a hapless citi(en, as if all the harm and pre8udice it has already heaped upon respondent Santiago are still not enough. This $ourt will not condone the repudiation of 8ust obligations contracted by municipal corporations. On the contrary, we will e6tend our aid and every 8udicial facility to any citi(en in the enforcement of 8ust and valid claims against abusive local government units. 5HERE-ORE, the petition is hereby 25S%5SSB2 for utter lac3 of merit. The assailed orders of the trial court dated October *, *++?, October 1, *++? and %ay ,, *++., respectively, are !<<5'%B2. Petitioners and their counsels are hereby warned against filing any more pleadings in connection with the issues already resolved with finality herein and in related cases. $osts against petitioners. SO O'2B'B2.