NOTES AND CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

I. THE INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE

1. Police Power
2. Power of Eminent Domain
3. Power of Taxation
They are inherent powers because they belong to the very essence of
government and without them no government can exist.
Similarities, Distinctions, and Limitation
Similarities
they are inherent in the tate
they are necessary and indispensable
they are methods by which the tate interferes with private rights
they presuppose an e!uivalent compensation
they are exercised primarily by the legislature
Di!!erences
Police Po"er Eminent Domain Ta#ation
"s to regulation regulates both liberty
and property
regulates property
rights only
regulates
property rights
only
"s to who may
exercise
only the government government and
some private
entities
only the
government
"s to the
property ta#en
destroyed because it is
noxious or intended for
noxious purpose
$wholesome
$ta#en for a public
use or purpose
$wholesome
$ta#en for a
public use or
purpose
"s to
%ompensation
intangible altruistic
feeling that the person
has contributed to the
general welfare
full and fair
e!uivalent of the
property
expropriated
protection and
public
improvements
for the taxes
paid
Limitations
&a' (ill of )ights
A. POLICE POWER
Police Po"er * is an inherent power of the tate to promote the welfare of
society by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.
$%sti!ication o! e#istence
Salus populi est suprema lex the welfare of the people is the supreme
law+
Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas a person must use his own
property so as not to in,ure another
Sco&e
(a) cannot be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or contract
(Stone v Mississippi)
(b) may use taxing power as its implement (Tio vs Videogram Regulatory
Board)
(c) may use eminent domain as its implement (Assoc. of Small ando!ners
vs Sec. of Agrarian Reform)
(d) could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights
or contracts &police power prevails over contract'
(e) dynamic- not static- and must move with the moving society it is supposed
to regulate
W'o ma( e#ercise Police Po"er)
&a' the .egislature &inherent'
&b' President &by delegation'
&c' administrative boards &by delegation'
&d' lawma#ing bodies on all municipal levels- including barangay &by
delegation'
&e' /unicipal governments 0 .123s &conferred by statute * general welfare
clause of )" 4156'
7ot being a political subdivision but merely an executive authority it has no
police power. *++DA ,. -el.Air /illa0e Assoc.1
Tests *Limitations1
&a' La"!%l s%23ect * interests of the public generally- as distinguished from
those of a particular class- re!uire the exercise of police power
&b' La"!%l means * the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals
Additional limitations *"'en e#ercised 2( dele0ate1 87achura )eviewer9
express grant by law &e.g. )" 4156'
within territorial limits &for .123s'
must not be contrary to law ("ity #overnment of $ue%on "ity vs &ricta)
for municipal ordinances $
1. must not contravene the %onstitution or any statute
2. must not be unfair and oppressive
3. must not be partial and discriminatory
:. must not prohibit- but may regulate- trade
;. must not be unreasonable
5. must be general in application and consistent with public policy
<n Ermita.+alate Hotel and +otel O&erators Association, Inc. ,. +a(or
o! +anila- police power has been characteri=ed as the most essential-
insistent and least limitable of powers extending as it does >to all great
public needs.?
>8T@he mere fact that some individuals in the community may be deprived of
their business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the
exercise of police power. .. 8P9ersons licensed to pursue occupations
which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of
the police power embar# in these occupations sub,ect to the
disadvantages which may result from the exercise of that power. ?
1overnment can ta#e away a license and increase the cost of license fees
even to prohibitive levels- if public interest dictates so- without any
constitutional violations.
.icenses for regulating non$useful occupation are incidental to the exercise of
police power and the right to exact fees is may be implied from that power
to regulate. <n setting the fees- municipal corporations are given wider
discretion in this class of licenses &than for licenses issued to regular
business'. %ourts have generally upheld these because of the desirability
of imposing restraints on individuals who engage in these unuseful
enterprises.
<n 4not ,. IAC- the %ourt here ruled that the ban on transportation of
carabao under the assailed ordinance and their outright confiscation and
disposal without court hearing is a violation of due process hence it is an
invalid exercise of police power.
The court adopted the measures laid down in the Toribio case
Protection general welfare is a function of police power which both restrains and
is restrained by due process- which re!uires notice and hearing
%ase emphasi=ed the need to have a lawful method to follow due process
re!uirement
)easons why ordinance is invalid areA
7o reasonable connection between means employed &absolute
ban on movement of carabeef' and purpose sought to be
achieved &conservation of carabao for general welfare'
2nduly oppressive since petition not given due process or
opportunity to be heard in proper court
-. E+INENT DO+AIN
Eminent Domain * is the use of the government of its coercive authority- upon
,ust compensation- to forcibly ac!uire the needed property in order to devote the
same to public use.
Eminent domain is also #nown as expropriation- or condemnation.
W'o ma( E#ercise)
1. The %ongress &inherent'
2. President
3. various local legislative bodies
:. certain public corporations &e.g. 7ational Bousing "uthority'
;. Cuasi$public corporations &e.g. P.DT'
Eminent Domain Distin0%is'ed !rom Destr%ction !rom Necessit(
Eminent Domain Destr%ction !rom Necessit(
public right
arises from the laws of
society and is vested in the
state or grantee- acting
under the right and power of
the state or benefit of the
state
private right vested in every
individual with which the right of
state or state necessity has nothing
to do
comes under the right of necessity-
of self$preservation
arises under the laws of society or
society itself
cannot re!uire the conversion of the
property ta#en to public use- nor is
there any need for the payment of
,ust compensation
The )egional Trial %ourt &)T%' has the ,urisdiction over a complaint for
eminent domain.
Re5%isites o! Eminent Domain
1. 7ecessity of exercise
2. Private property
3. Ta#ing
:. Public use
;. Dust compensation
6. Necessit( o! E#ercise
genuine necessity- and
must be of public character
Ehen exercised by legislature * political 'uestion
Ehen exercised by a delegate * (usticiable 'uestion
determine theA &a' ade!uacy of compensation+ &b' necessity of
ta#ing+ and &c' public use character
7. Pri,ate Pro&ert(
8eneral R%le anything that can come under the dominion of man is
sub,ect to expropriation
E#ce&tions money and c)ose in action &personal right not reduced into
possession- i.e. the right to bring an action to recover debt- money or
thing'
Private property already devoted to public use cannot be expropriated by
a delegate acting under a general grant of aut)ority ("ity of Manila vs
")inese "ommunity)
9. Ta:in0
Re5%isites (Republic vs Castellvi)
&a' expropriator must enter a private property
&b' entry must be for more than a momentary period
&c' entry must be under the warrant of legal authority
&d' entry is for public use
&e' the owner is deprived of en,oying his property
if ta#ing is under police power- it is not compensable

Ta:in0 Under Eminent Domain ,s Ta:in0 in Police Po"er
Police Po"er Eminent Domain
the pre,udice suffered by the
individual property owner is
shared in common with the
rest of the community
the individual suffers more than
his ali'uot part of the damages-
i.e. a special in,ury above that
sustained by the rest of the
community
<n Ami0a2le ,. C%enca- where there is ta#ing in the constitutional sense-
the property owner need not file a claim for ,ust compensation with the
%ommission of "udit+ he may go directly to the court to demand payment.
"rbitrary action of the government shall be deemed a waiver of its
immunity from suit.
<n Cit( 8o,ernment ,. Ericta- an ordinance of Cue=on %ity- under the
guise of exercising police power- prescribed that at least 5F of the total
area of memorial par#s must be developed and set aside for the burial of
paupers. The %ourt held that such ordinance is not an exercise of police
power but the ta#ing of private property for public use. Bence- to satisfy
the %onstitution- there must be compensation.
;. P%2lic Use
P%2lic %se * is whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare-
including both direct or indirect benefit or advantage to the public
<n Heirs o! Ardona ,. Re(es- the %ourt held that the %onstitution
understand public use in a broad sense as meaning public welfare. That
includes development of tourism.
<. $%st Com&ensation
$%st com&ensation * is fair and full e!uivalent payment for the loss sustained-
which is the measure of the indemnity- not whatever gain would accrue to the
expropriating agency. <t is not mar#et value per se. *E&=a ,. D%la(1
W'ere onl( &art o! t'e &ro&ert( is e#&ro&riated entitlement to
conse'uential damages- if any G conse'uential benefits must be deducted
from the total compensation provided conse!uential benefits does not
exceed conse!uential damages
Payment of the correct amount G Payment within a reasonable time
Form o! Com&ensation /oney &Bowever- in Assoc. of Small
ando!ners vs Sec. of Agrarian Reform* payment is allowed to be made
partly in bonds because it deals with a revolutionary #ind of expropriation'.
Trans!er o! Title payment of ,ust compensation before title is
transferred.
Rec:onin0 &oint o! mar:et ,al%e o! &ro&ert( either as of the date of
ta#ing or filing of the complaint- whichever comes first
Entitlement o! interest
General Rule: when there is delay- there must be interest by way of
damages (Art. ++,-* "")
Exception: when waived by not claiming the interest
Pa(ment o! Ta#es taxes paid from the time of the ta#ing until the
transfer of the title- during which the owner did not en,oy any beneficial
use of the property- are reimbursable by the expropriator.
Ri0't o! t'e lando"ner in case o! non.&a(ment
General Rule: landowner is not entitled to recover possession of the
property- but only to demand payment
Exception: when the government failed to pay ,ust compensation
within ; years from the finality of ,udgment in expropriation
proceedings- there is a right to recover property
<n De >nec't ,. -a%tista- the court ruled that the expropriation
proceeding against the property of petitioner was arbitrary and cannot
receive ,udicial approval. There was another area where the expansion of
ED" can be underta#en- which will cost government less- affect lesser
homeowners- etc.
(ut in Re&%2lic ,s. >nec't, the same property was ordered expropriated.
"pparently- (P 3:6- which called for the ta#ing of the property- was
enacted after the 1
st
De Hnecht case. De Hnecht argued that there was
already a law of the case- which should not be disturbed.
%ourt responded that while it is true that there was a law of the case- it is
e!ually true that there is constitutional grant given to the tate to ta#e
private property upon payment of ,ust compensation. >uch expropriation
proceedings may be underta#en by the 8tate9 not only by voluntary
negotiation with landowners but also by ta#ing appropriate court action or
by legislation.?
The prior court decision is no obstacle for the legislature to ma#e its own
assessment of the circumstances that prevailed after the decision as well
as supervening events and reaching a conclusion as to the propriety of
underta#ing the appropriation of the De Hnecht property.
<n the case Re&%2lic ,. PLDT- the %ourt ordered the P.DT to allow the
reconnection of telephone lines of the )epublic.
7o cogent reason appears why Eminent Domain may be availed of to
impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property without
loss of title or possession for public use sub,ect to ,ust compensation
%ase highlights that even services may be sub,ected to eminent
domain
<n Cit( o! +anila ,. C'inese Comm%nit( o! +anila- the %ourt said that
>8T9he very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine
necessity and that necessity must be of public character.?
<n E&=a ,. D%la(- P.D. 7os. 45- :5:- 4I:- and 1;33 prescribed a formula
for arriving at ,ust compensation in expropriation proceedings - dispense
with the need to appoint commissioners to determine ,ust compensation.
The %ourt held that those decrees are unconstitutional and void for they
constitute >impermissible encroachment on ,udicial prerogatives.?
<n Re&%2lic ,. CA- the government argued that the nullification should
only have prospective effect. The %ourt agreed. Thus under the
>operative fact? doctrine- the effect of the invalidated law was allowed to
affect transactions completed before the declaration of nullity.
C. POWER OF TA?ATION
Po"er o! Ta#ation * is a method by which contributions are exacted from
persons and property for the support of government and for all public needs.
Jbligation to pay taxes is a duty
Ta#es ,s Licenses
Ta# License
to raise
revenues
for regulatory purpose only
,ustified under police power
amount of fees re!uired is usually limited to the
cost of regulation
Sco&e
all income earned in the taxing state- whether by citi=ens or aliens- and all
immovable and tangible personal properties found in its territory- as well
as tangible personal property owned by persons domiciled therein
Po"er to Ta# Incl%des Po"er to Destro(
&1' when used validly as an implement of the police power in discouraging
and in effect ultimately prohibiting certain things or enterprises inimical to
public welfare
Po"er to Ta# Does Not Incl%de Po"er to Destro(
where the tax is used solely for the purpose of raising revenues
W'o +a( E#ercise
1. .egislature 0 %ongress &inherent'
2. President &by delegation 0 tariff powers 8ec. 2K &2'- "rt. L<- %onsti9'
3. local legislative bodies &conferred by direct authority 8ec. ;- "rt. M-
%onsti9'
Limitations o! Ta#ation
1. Due Process of .aw
2. E!ual Protection
3. Public Purpose
6. D%e Process
S%2stanti,e tax should not be confiscatory except when used as an
implement of police power
Proced%ral due process does not re!uire previous notice and hearing
before a law prescribing specific taxes on specific articles may be
enacted. Bowever- where the tax to be collected is to be based on the
value of the taxable property- the taxpayer is entitled to be notified of the
assessment proceedings and to be heard therein on the correct valuation
of the property.
7. E5%al Protection
embodied in ec. 2K &1'- "rt. L<- 1IK4 %onstitution &The rule of taxation
shall be uniform and e!uitable. The %ongress shall evolve a progressive
system of taxation.'
Uni!ormit( * persons or things belonging to the same class shall be taxed
at the same rate
Re5%isites &Tan vs Del )osario'
&a' standards that are used are substantial and not arbitrary
&b' categori=ation is germane to achieve the legislative purpose
&c' the law applies- all things being e!ual- to both present and future
conditions
&d' classification applies e!ually well to all those belonging to the same
class
E5%ita2le ta#ation * based on the capacity to pay
E5%alit( in ta#ation * tax shall be strictly proportional to the relative value
of the property
Pro0ressi,e s(stem o! ta#ation * the rate increases as the tax base
increases
9. P%2lic P%r&ose
whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare
Do%2le Ta#ation @ Direct D%&licate Ta#ation
when additional taxes are laid on the same sub,ect by the same taxing
,urisdiction during the same taxing period and for the same purpose.
despite the lac# of specific prohibition- double taxation will not be
allowed if it results in a violation of the e!ual protection clause.
Ta# E#em&tions may either beA
constitutional
"rt. Li- ec. 2K &3' A when lands- buildings and improvements are
actually- directly and exclusively for religious- charitable or
educational purposes * entitled to exemption
statutory$ discretion of legislature
II. CI/IL AND POLITICAL RI8HTS
-ill o! Ri0'ts * set of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and
political rights of the individual- and imposing limitations on the powers of the
government as a means of securing the en,oyment of those rights.
Si0ni!icance o! t'e -ill o! Ri0'ts
1overnment is powerful. Ehen unlimited- it becomes tyrannical. The (ill of
)ights is a guarantee that there are certain areas of a person3s life- liberty- and
property which governmental power may not touch.
(ill of )ights are generally self$implementing.
Classi!ication o! Ri0'ts
1. Political Ri0'ts * granted by law to members of community in relation to
their direct or indirect participation in the establishment or administration of
the government+
2. Ci,il Ri0'ts * rights which municipal law will enforce at the instance of
private individuals for the purpose of securing them the en,oyment of their
means of happiness+
3. Social and Economic Ri0'ts+ and-
:. H%man Ri0'ts.
A. DUE PROCESS
Section 6, Art. III. No &erson s'all 2e de&ri,ed o! li!e, li2ert(, or &ro&ert(
"it'o%t d%e &rocess o! la", nor s'all an( &erson 2e denied t'e e5%al
&rotection o! t'e la"s.
no precise definition because it might prove constricting and prevent the
,udiciary from ad,usting it to the circumstances of particular cases
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason- obedience to the dictates of
,ustice
embodiment of sporting idea on fair play
guaranty against any arbitrariness on the part of the government
Protection o! Person
%overs .atural &citi=en and alien' and Artificial Persons. "s to the latter- with
respect only to property because its life and liberty are derived from and sub,ect
to control of legislature
De&ri,ation *in Sec. 6, Art. III1
connotes denial o! ri0't to li!e, li2ert( or &ro&ert(
not unconstitutional. what is prohibited is deprivation !it)out due process
of la!.
Ehen the tate acts to interfere with life- liberty- or property- the
presumption is that the action is valid.
6. Li!e
<t is not ,ust a protection of the right to be alive or to the security of one3s
limb against physical harm. The right to life is the right to a good life... a
life of dignity and... a decent standard of living.
7. Li2ert(
(/) freedom to do right and never wrong (Mabini)
(+) right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude
9. Pro&ert(
anything that can come under the right of ownership and be the sub,ect of
contract
all things within the commerce of man
Bowever- one cannot have a vested right to a public office as this is not
regarded as property. <f created by statue- it may be abolished by the
legislature at any time.
/ere privileges are not property rights and are therefore revocable at will
As&ects o! D%e Process
1. ubstantive Due Process
2. Procedural Due Process
"s a substantive re!uirement- it is a prohibition of arbitrary laws.
"s a procedural re!uirement- it relates chiefly to the mode of procedure
which government agencies must follow in the enforcement and
application of laws. <t is a guarantee of procedural fairness.
S%2stanti,e D%e Process
S%2stanti,e d%e &rocess A re!uires intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with
the rights of the person to his life- liberty or property
Re5%isites
&a' .awful ub,ect
&b' .awful /eans
Proced%ral D%e Process
Proced%ral d%e &rocess A is the restriction on actions of ,udicial and !uasi$
,udicial agencies of government.
6. $%dicial D%e Process
Re5%isites
*a1 <mpartial and %ompetent %ourt
*21 Durisdiction lawfully ac!uired over the person of t he defendant and0or
property
*c1 Bearing
not necessarily trial$type hearing+ submission of position papers is
enough
right of a party to cross$examine the witness against him in a civil case
is an indispensable part of due process
the filing of a motion for reconsideration cures the defect of absence of
a hearing
%ases in which notice and hearing may be dispensed with without
violating due processA
abatement of nuisance per se
preventive suspension of a civil servant facing administrative
charges
cancellation of passport of a person sought for the commission of a
crime
statutory presumptions
*d1 Dudgment rendered upon lawful hearing *-anco Es&anol Fili&ino ,.
Palanca1
7. Administrati,e D%e Process
Re5%isites
&a' )ight to a hearing
&b' Tribunal must consider the evidence presented
&c' Decision must have something to support itself
&d' Evidence must be ubstantial
&e' Decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing-
or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected
&f' Tribunal- body- or any of its ,udges must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the facts and law of the controversy
&g' Decision is rendered in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can #now the various issues involved- and the reason for
the decision rendered
<n administrative proceedings- the !uantum of proof re!uired is only
s%2stantial e,idence- such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as ade!uate to support a conclusion.
The la" is ,a0%e when it lac#s comprehensible standards that men >of
common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ
as to its application. <t is repugnant to the %onstitution in two respectsA
it violates due process for failure to accord persons fair notice of
conduct to avoid+ and-
it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes arbitrary flexing of the 1overnment
muscle.
<n Estrada ,s. Sandi0an2a(an- it was held that there was no violation of
due process because the nature of the charges against the petitioner is
not uncertain and void merely because general terms are used or because
it employed terms that were not defined. The "nti$Plunder law does not
violate due process since it defines the act which it purports to punish-
giving the accused fair warning of the charges against him- and can
effectively interpose a defense against on his behalf.
A "onnecticut statute ma0ing it a crime to use any drug or article to
prevent conception violates t)e rig)t of marital privacy !)ic) is !it)in t)e
penumbra of specific guarantees of t)e Bill of Rig)ts.
"lthough the (ill of )ights does not mention NprivacyO the %ourt ruled
that that the right was to be found in the PpenumbrasP of other
constitutional protections. >The Qirst "mendment has a penumbra
where privacy is penumbra where privacy is protected from
governmental intrusion.?
<n Loc'ner ,. Ne" 4or:- .ochner was charged with violation of the labor
laws of 7ew Ror# for wrongfully and unlawfully permitting an employee to
wor# more than 56 hours in one wee#. The statute allegedly violated
mandates that no employee shall contract or agree to wor# more than 16
hours per day.
<ssueA Ehether the statute is unconstitutional.
)ulingA Res. The statute is unconstitutional.
The statute interferes with the liberty of a person and the right of free contract
between employer and employee by determining the hours of labor in the
occupation of a ba#er without reasonable ground for doing so.
The general right to ma#e a contract in relation to oneOs business is a liberty
protected by the 1:
th
amendment.
The state may interfere with and regulate both property and liberty rights to
prevent the individual from ma#ing certain #inds of contracts in its exercise of
police power which relates to safety- health- morals and general welfare of the
society. <n this instance- the 1:
th
amendment cannot interfere.
The trade of a ba#er is not an alarmingly unhealthy one that would warrant the
stateOs interference with rights to labor and contract.
1octrine2 T)e rule must )ave a more direct relation* as means to an end* and t)e
end itself must be appropriate and legitimate* before an act can be )eld to be
valid !)ic) interferes !it) t)e general rig)t of an individual to be free in )is
person and in )is po!er to contract in relation to )is o!n labor.
Jur cases include %ourt of <ndustrial )elations *An0 Ti2a( ,s. CIR1 as an
administrative court which exercises ,udicial and !uasi$,udicial functions in
the determination of disputes between employers and employees.
7ational Telecommunications %ompany &PB<.%J/"T vs. "lcua='-
7ational .abor )elations %ommission or 7.)% &D(P vs. 7.)%' and
school tribunals &"teneo vs. %"$(oard of Discipline- "lcua= vs. P("-
Non ,s. $%d0e Dames- Tin#er vs. Des /oines %ommunity chool
District' also are clothed with !uasi$,udicial function. <t is a !uestion of
whether the body or institution has a ,udicial or !uasi$,udicial function that
ma#es it bound by the due process clause. &Dudicial function is
synonymous to ,udicial power which is the authority to settle ,usticiable
controversies or disputes involving rights that are legally enforceable and
demandable or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. <t is a
determination of what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are
with respect to a matter in controversy'.
<n An0 Ti2a( ,s. CIR- the %ourt laid down cardinal re!uirements in
administrative proceedings which essentially exercise a ,udicial or !uasi$
,udicial function. These areA
&1' the right to a hearing- which includes the right to present oneOs case and
submit evidence in support thereof
&2' The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
&3' The decision must have something to support itself
&:' The evidence must be substantial. ubstantial evidence means such a
reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as ade!uate to
support a conclusion
&;' The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearting or
at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected
&5' The tribunal or body of any of its ,udges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate
&4' The (oard or body should- in all controversial !uestions- render its
decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can #now the
various issues involved and the reason for the decision rendered.
-. EBUAL PROTECTION
Section 6, Art. III. No &erson s'all 2e de&ri,ed o! li!e, li2ert(, or &ro&ert(
"it'o%t d%e &rocess o! la", nor s'all an( &erson 2e denied t'e e5%al
&rotection o! t'e la"s.
The E!uality Protection %lause is a specific constitutional guarantee of the
E!uality of the Person. The e!uality it guarantees is >legal e!uality or- as
it is usually put- the e!uality of all persons before the law.
embraced in the concept of due process
embodied in a separate clause to provide for a more specific guaranty
against undue favoritism or hostility from the government
D%e Process Cla%se attac#s ar2itrariness in general
E5%al Protection Cla%se attac#s %n"arranted &artialit( or &re3%dice
S%2stanti,e E5%alit( * all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
ali#e- both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
E5%alit( in en!orcement o! t'e la" * law be enforced and applied e!ually
Re5%isites o! /alid Classi!ication
&a' it must be based on substantial distinctions
&b' it must be germane to the purposes of the law
&c' it must not be limited to existing conditions only
must be enforced as long as the problem sought to be corrected exists
&d' it must apply e!ually well to all members of the class
both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed
<n De 8%=man ,. Comelec, petitioners theori=e that ec. :: of )" K1KI
is violative of the e!ual protection clause because it singles out the %ity
and /unicipal Election Jfficers of the %J/E.E% as prohibited from
holding office in the same city or municipality for more than four years.
The %ourt held that the law is valid. The singling out of election officers in
order to >ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them
from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment.
<n Ormoc S%0ar Central ,. Ormoc Cit(- Jrmoc %ity imposes a tax on
Jrmoc ugar %entral by name. Jrmos ugar %entral is the only sugar
central in Jrmoc %ity. The %ourt held that such ordinance is not valid for it
would be discriminatoory against the Jrmoc ugar %entral which alone
comes under the ordinance.
C. SEARCH AND SEICURE
Section 7, Art. III. T'e ri0't o! t'e &eo&le to 2e sec%re in t'eir &ersons,
'o%ses, &a&ers, and e!!ects a0ainst %nreasona2le searc'es and sei=%res o!
"'ate,er nat%re and !or an( &%r&ose s'all 2e in,iola2le, and no searc'
"arrant or "arrant o! arrest s'all iss%e e#ce&t %&on &ro2a2le ca%se to 2e
determined &ersonall( 2( t'e 3%d0e a!ter e#amination %nder oat' or
a!!irmation o! t'e com&lainant and t'e "itnesses 'e ma( &rod%ce, and
&artic%larl( descri2in0 t'e &lace to 2e searc'ed and t'e &ersons or t'in0s
to 2e sei=ed.
Section 7, Art. III * deals with tangibles+ embodies the castle doctrine &a
man3s house is his castle+ a citi=en en,oys the right against official intrusion and is
master of all the surveys within the domain and privacy of his own home.'
This provision applies as a restraint directed only against the government
and its agencies tas#ed with enforcement of the law. <t does not protect
citi=ens from unreasonable searches and sei=ures perpetrated by private
individuals.
Section 9, Art. III. *61T'e &ri,ac( o! comm%nication and corres&ondence
s'all 2e in,iola2le e#ce&t %&on la"!%l order o! t'e co%rt, or "'en &%2lic
sa!et( or order re5%ires ot'er"ise, as &rescri2ed 2( la". *71 An( e,idence
o2tained in ,iolation o! t'is or t'e &recedin0 section s'all 2e inadmissi2le
!or an( &%r&ose in an( &roceedin0.
Section 9 *61, Art. III * deals with intangibles
Section 9 *71, Art. III * E#cl%sionar( R%le &which embodies the Doctrine of the
Qruit of the Poisonous Tree'
E#cl%sionar( R%le * evidence obtained in violation of ec. 2- "rt.<<<- shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding &Qruit of Poisonous Tree
Doctrine'. *Stone'ill ,. Dio:no1
available to natural and artificial persons- but the latter3s boo#s of accounts
may be re!uired to open for examination by the tate in the exercise of
police power or power of taxation
The right is personal (Stone)ill vs 1io0no)
8eneral R%le only a ,udge may issue a warrant.
E#ce&tion orders of arrest may be issues by administrative authorities but only
for the purpose of carrying out a final finding of a violation of a law
/alid Warrantless Searc'es
87JTEA each of these re!uires probable cause- except stop and fris#9
1. searc'es incidental to la"!%l arrest &rule 125- )ules of %ourt' * for
dangerous weapons or anything that may have been used or constitute in
the commission of an offense
Re5%isites
1. the item to be searched was within the arrestee3s custody or area of
immediate control
2. the search was contemporaneous with the arrest
7. searc'es o! mo,in0 ,e'icles
<n Ania0 ,. Comelec- twenty meters away from the gate of the
(atasan- a truc# was stopped and searched. The motorists had not
given any evidence of suspicious behaviour nor had the searching
officers received any confidential information about the car. The %ourt
held that the search was not ,ustifiable as a warrantless arrest of a
moving vehicle as there was no probable cause.
9. searc'es o! &ro'i2ited articles in &lain ,ie"
Re5%isites
1. prior valid intrusion to a place
2. evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who has the
right to be there
3. evidence is immediately apparent
:. there is no further search
;. en!orcement o! c%stoms la"
<. consented searc'es
5. sto& and !ris: &limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons'
<n Terr( ,. O'io- the stop$and$fris# rule is stated thusA >&E'here a
police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in the light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the person with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous- where in the course of investigation of this
behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and ma#es reasonable
in!uiries- and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others3 safety- he is
entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an
attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.?
Sto&.and.!ris: r%le serves a t"o.!old interestA
*61 the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection+
*71 the more pressing interest of safety and self$preservation.
*+alacat1
D. ro%tine searc'es at 2orders and &orts o! entr(
E. searc'es o! 2%sinesses in t'e e#ercise o! ,isitorial &o"ers to
en!orce &olice re0%lations
/alid Warrantless Arrest
1. in flagrante delicto
2. hot pursuit
3. the offender escaped from the penal establishment
Re5%isites o! a ,alid "arrant
Arrest Warrant Searc' Warrant
1. Pro2a2le
Ca%se
must refer to
one &1' specific
offense
uch facts and
circumstances which would
lead a reasonably prudent
man to believe that an
offense has been committed
and the person soug)t to be
arrested )ad committed it
uch facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably
prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed
and the ob(ects soug)t in t)e
connection of t)e offense are in
t)e place soug)t to be searc)ed
2. Personal
determination
o! &ro2a2le
ca%se 2( t'e
3%d0e
The ,udge personally
determines the existence of
probable cause+ it is not
necessary that he should
personally examine the
complainant and his
witnesses (Soliven vs
Ma0asiar)
Proced%re
&1' personally evaluate the
fiscal3s report- or
&2' if 819 is insufficient-
disregard it and re!uire the
submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses
Preliminar( in5%ir( &tas# of
the ,udge' * determination of
The ,udge must personally
e3amine in the form of
searching !uestions and
answers...
in writing and under oath...
the complainants and his
witnesses...
on facts personally #nown to
them...
and attach to the record their
sworn statements and affidavits.
(Silva vs 4residing 5udge)
probable cause for the
issuance of warrant of arrest
Preliminar( in,esti0ation
&ro&er &tas# of the
prosecutor' * ascertainment
whether the offender should
be held for trial or be
released
3. A!ter
e#amination
%nder oat' or
a!!irmation o!
t'e
com&lainant
and t'e
"itnesses 'e
ma( &rod%ce
7ot merely routinary but must
be probing and exhaustive
7ot merely routinary but must
be probing and exhaustive
:.Partic%larit(
o! descri&tion
8eneral R%le it must
contain the name6s of t)e
persons to be arrested
E#ce&tion if there is some
descriptio personae which
will enable the officer to
identify the accused
8eneral R%le when the
description therein is as specific
as the circumstances will
ordinarily allow.
E#ce&tion when no other more
accurate and detailed
description could have been
given.
<n /almonte ,. 8en. De /illa- the %ourt held that not all searches and
sei=ures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. "
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to
be resolved according to the facts of the case.
%hec#points are not illegal per se... )outine inspection and few !uestions do not
constitute unreasonable searches. <f the inspection becomes more thorough to
the extent of becoming a search- this can be done when there is deemed to be
probable cause. <n the latter situation- it is ,ustifiable as a warrantless search of a
moving vehicle.
Pro2a2le Ca%se * facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of a
warrant that are in themselves sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely upon
them.
<n Corro ,. Lisin0- the "ffidavit of %ol. %astillo stated that in several
issues of the Philippine TimesA?... we found that the said publication in fact
foments distrust and hatred against the government of the Philippines.
The %ourt held that the affidavit does not establish probable cause- and is
nothing but conclusions of law.
<n -%r0os ,. C'ie! o! Sta!!- a search warrant for the newspaper EE
Qorum is issued on the basis of a broad statement of the military that
(urgos- Dr. is >in possession of printing e!uipment and other
paraphernalia... used as means of committing the offense of subversion.?
The %ourt held that such allegation is not sufficient to establish probable
cause. <t is a mere conclusion of law unsupported by particulars.
The %ourt also held that the search warrant description has the >sweeping tenor?
ma#ing the document a general warrant. The search warrant particularly
statesA?all printing e!uipment- typewriters... of the EE Qorum newspaper and any
other documents...?
<t is not re!uired that the property to be searched should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is directed. <t is sufficient that the property is
under the control or possession of the person sought to be searched.
<n Soli,en ,. $%d0e +a:asiar- the %ourt clarified the meaning of
>personally? in the search and sei=ure clause. <t stated that in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of existence of probable cause- what is
re!uired is personal determination and not personal examination.
<n Lim ,. Feli#- the %ourt held that the ,udge in issuing a warrant of arrest
cannot rely solely on the certification or recommendation of a prosecutor
that probable cause exists. The ,udge must loo# at the report- the
affidavits- the transcripts of stenographic notes &if any'- and all other
supporting documents behind the Prosecutor3s certification.
<n Stone'ill ,. Dio:no- the %ourt held that the following description is
insufficient for it amounts to a general warrant authori=ing the officer to
pic# up anything he pleasesA > (oo# of accounts- financial records-
vouchers...and other documents showing all business transactions....?
The %ourt further held that the ob,ection to an unlawful search or sei=ure and to
evidence obtained thereby is purely personal and cannot be availed by third
parties.
D. +IRANDA RI8HTS
Section 67, Art. III.
6. An( &erson %nder in,esti0ation !or t'e commission o! an o!!ense s'all
'a,e t'e ri0't to 2e in!ormed o! 'is ri0't to remain silent and to 'a,e
com&etent and inde&endent co%nsel &re!era2l( o! 'is o"n c'oice. I! t'e
&erson cannot a!!ord t'e ser,ices o! co%nsel, 'e m%st 2e &ro,ided "it'
one. T'ese ri0'ts cannot 2e "ai,ed e#ce&t in "ritin0 and in t'e &resence o!
co%nsel.
7. No tort%re, !orce, ,iolence, t'reat, intimidation, or an( ot'er means
"'ic' ,itiate t'e !ree "ill s'all 2e %sed a0ainst 'im. Secret detention
&laces, solitar(, incomm%nicado, or ot'er similar !orms o! detention are
&ro'i2ited.
9. An( con!ession or admission o2tained in ,iolation o! t'is or Section 6D
'ereo! s'all 2e inadmissi2le in e,idence a0ainst 'im.
;. T'e la" s'all &ro,ide !or &enal and ci,il sanctions !or ,iolations o! t'is
Section as "ell as com&ensation to t'e re'a2ilitation o! ,ictims o! tort%re
or similar &ractices, and t'eir !amilies.
called the F+iranda DoctrineG &/iranda vs "ri=ona'
+iranda Doctrine A prior to any !uestioning during custodial investigation- the
person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent- that any statement he
gives may be used as evidence against him- and that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney- either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive
effectuation of these rights- provided the waiver is made voluntarily- #nowingly-
and intelligently.
P%r&ose o! t'e Doctrine
<n /iranda v "ri=ona- the 2 upreme %ourt established rules to &rotect a
criminal de!endantHs &ri,ile0e a0ainst sel!.incrimination !rom t'e &ress%res
arisin0 d%rin0 c%stodial in,esti0ation 2( t'e &olice. Thus- to provide
practical safeguards for the practical reinforcement for the right against
compulsory self$incrimination- the %ourt held that >the prosecution may not use
statements- whether exculpatory or inculpatory- stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self$incrimination.
Re5%isites o! t'e +iranda Doctrine
&1' any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent+
&2' anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law+
&3' he has the right to tal# to an attorney before being !uestioned and to have
his counsel present when being !uestioned+ and
&:' if he cannot afford an attorney- one will be provided before any !uestioning
if he so desires.
C%stodial in,esti0ation defined
"ny !uestioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been ta#en into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way.
(egins as soon as the investigation is no longer a general in!uiry unto an
unsolved crime- and direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect who
has been ta#en into custody and to whom the police would then direct
interrogatory !uestions which tend to elicit incriminating statements.
hall include the practice of issuing an invitation to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have
committed- without pre,udice to the liability of the inviting officer for any
violation of law.
E#tra3%dicial con!ession is Admissi2le "'en
&a' Loluntary
&b' Eith assistance of counsel
&c' <n writing- and
&d' Express
Ri0'ts Under C%stodial In,esti0ation
&a' To be informed of right to remain silent and to counsel
%arries the correlative obligation on the part of the investigator
to explain and contemplates effective communication which
results in the sub,ect understanding what is conveyed. *Peo&le
,. A0%stin1
&b' To be reminded that if he waives his right to remain silent- anything
he says can and will be used against him
&c' To remain silent
&d' To have competent and independent counsel preferably of own
choice
&e' To be provided with counsel if the person cannot afford the services
of one
&f' 7o torture- force- violence- threat- intimidation or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him
&g' ecret detention places- solitary- incommunicado- or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited
&h' %onfessions or admissions obtained in violation of these rights are
inadmissible as evidence &exclusionary rule'
Ri0'ts T'at +a( -e Wai,ed
8waiver must be in writing and in the presence of counsel9
&a' )ight to remain silent
&b' )ight to %ounsel
Ri0'ts T'at Cannot -e Wai,ed
&a' )ight to be informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel
&b' )ight to counsel when ma#ing the waiver of the right to remain silent or to
counsel
)ight to counsel de parte is not unlimited. "ccused cannot repeatedly as#
for postponement. Be must be provided with counsel de oficio.
)" 436IA victims of un,ust imprisonment may file their claims with the
(oard of %laims under DJD
Res 8estaeA The declaration of the accused ac#nowledging guilt made to
the police des# officer after the crime was committed may be given in
evidence against him by the police officer to whom the admission was
made- as part of the res gestae.
<n Peo&le ,. 8alit- rights under custodial investigation may be waived.
The %onstitution says+ >These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.? <n localities where there are no lawyers-
the tate must bring the individual to a place where there is one.
Termination o! ri0'ts %nder c%stodial in,esti0ation Ehen %harges
are filed against the accused &in such case- ections 1: and 14 come into
play'.
<n 8%tan0 ,. Peo&le- the %ourt held that urine sample is admissible.
>Ehat the %onstitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion
to extort communication from the accused- but not an inclusion of his body
in evidence- when it may be material. <n fact- an accused may be validly
compelled to be photographed or measured- or his garments or shoes
removed or replaced- or to move his body to enabl#e the foregoing things
to be done- without running afould of the proscription against testimonial
compulsion.
E. RI8HT TO -AIL
Section 69, Art. III. All &ersons, e#ce&t t'ose c'ar0ed "it' o!!enses
&%nis'a2le 2( recl%sion &er&et%a "'en e,idence o! 0%ilt is stron0, s'all,
2e!ore con,iction, 2e 2aila2le 2( s%!!icient s%reties, or 2e released on
reco0ni=ance as ma( 2e &ro,ided 2( la". T'e ri0't to 2ail s'all not 2e
im&aired e,en "'en t'e &ri,ile0e o! t'e "rit o! 'a2eas cor&%s is
s%s&ended. E#cessi,e 2ail s'all not 2e re5%ired.
-ail * is security given for the release of a person in custody of law- furnished by
him or a bondsman- to guaranty his appearance before any court as may be
re!uired
>inds o! -ail
&a' %ash bond
&b' ecurity bond
W'o +a( In,o:e)
" person under detention even if no formal charges have yet been filed &)ule
11:- )ules of %ourt'
W'o Are Entitled)
&a' Persons charged with offenses punishable by )eclusion Perpetua or
Death- when evidence of guilt is strong
&b' Persons convicted by the trial court. (ail is only discretionary pending
appeal.
&c' Persons who are members of the "QP facing a court martial.
<n Paderanga v. %"- all persons actually detained- except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death when evidence of
guilt is strong- shall- before conviction- be bailable bu sufficient sureties.
Jne is under the custody of the law either when he has been arrested or has
surrendered himself to the ,urisdiction of the court- as in the case where through
counsel petitioner for bail who was confined in a hospital communicated his
submission to the ,urisdiction of the court.
Ot'er Ri0'ts in Relation to -ail
The right to bail shall 7JT be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended.
Excessive bail shall not be re!uired.
Factors in Fi#in0 Amo%nt o! -ail
&a' "bility to post bail
&b' 7ature of the offense
&c' Penalty imposed by law
&d' %haracter and reputation of the accused
&e' Bealth of the accused
&f' trength of the evidence
&g' Probability of appearing at the trial
&h' Qorfeiture of previous bail bonds
&i' Ehether accused was a fugitive from ,ustice when arrested
&,' <f accused is under bond in other cases
Im&licit Limitations on t'e Ri0't to -ail
&a' The person claiming the right must be in actual detention or custody of the
law.
<n Peo&le ,. Donato- charged with rebellion- a bailable offense- alas
nevertheless agreed >to remain in legal custody during the pendency of
the trial of his criminal case.? The %ourt held that he does not have the
right to bail- because bu his act he has waived his right.
&b' The constitutional right is available only in criminal cases- not- e.g. in
deportation and extradition proceedings.
Note
&a' )ight to bail is not available in the military.
<n Comendador ,. De /illa- soldier under court martial does not en,oy the
right to bail. <t is because of the disciplinary structure of the military and
because soldiers are allowed the fiduciary right to bear arms and can
therefore cause great havoc... 7or can appeal be made to the e!ual
protection clause ebcause e!ual protection applies only to those who are
e!ually situated.
&b' "part from bail- a person may attain provisional liberty through
recogni=ance.
<n US ,. P%r%0anan- the %ourt held that extradition is not a criminal
proceeding. Bence- since bail is available only in criminal proceedings- a
respondent in an extradition proceeding is not entitled to a bail. Be should
apply for a bail in the court where he will be tried.
F. RI8HTS OF THE ACCUSED
Section 6;, Art. III.
6. No &erson s'all 2e 'eld to ans"er !or a criminal o!!ense "it'o%t d%e
&rocess o! la".
7. In all criminal &rosec%tions, t'e acc%sed s'all 2e &res%med innocent
%ntil t'e contrar( is &ro,ed, and s'all en3o( t'e ri0't to 2e 'eard 2( 'imsel!
and co%nsel, to 2e in!ormed o! t'e nat%re and ca%se o! t'e acc%sation
a0ainst 'im, to 'a,e a s&eed(, im&artial, and &%2lic trial, to meet t'e
"itnesses !ace to !ace, and to 'a,e com&%lsor( &rocess to sec%re t'e
attendance o! "itnesses and t'e &rod%ction o! e,idence in 'is 2e'al!.
Ho"e,er, a!ter arrai0nment, trial ma( &roceed not"it'standin0 t'e a2sence
o! t'e acc%sed Pro,ided, t'at 'e 'as 2een d%l( noti!ied and 'is !ail%re to
a&&ear is %n3%sti!ia2le.
T'e Ri0'ts o! t'e Acc%sed Incl%de
1. %riminal due process+
2. Presumption of innocence+
3. )ight to be heard by himself or counsel+
:. )ight to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him+
;. )ight to speedy- impartial and public trial+
5. )ight to meet the witnesses face to face+
4. )ight to compulsory process to secure attendance of witnesses and
production of evidence+ and
K. trial in absentia
6. Criminal D%e Process
Criminal &rocess incl%des
a' <nvestigation prior to the filing of charges
b' Preliminary examination and investigation after charges are filed
c' Period of trial
Re5%irements o! Criminal D%e Process
1. <mpartial and competent court in accordance with procedure prescribed by
law+
2. Proper observance of all the rights accorded the accused under the
%onstitution and the applicable statutes &example of statutory right of the
accusedA right to Preliminary investigation'
+istrial may be declared if shown that proceedings were held under
circumstances as would prevent the accused from freely ma#ing his
defense or the ,udge from freely arriving at his decision.
There is violation of due process when law not published and a person is
impleaded for violation of such law.
There is violation of due process when appeal is permitted by law but
there is denial thereof.
7. Pres%m&tion o! Innocence
(urden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused is with the
prosecution.
%onviction depends on the strength of prosecution- not on the wea#ness
of the defense
The presumption may be overcome by contrary presumption based on the
experience of human conduct. &e.g unexplained flight may lead to an
inference of guilt- as >the wic#ed flee when no man pursueth- but the
righteous are as bold as a lion.?'
The constitutional presumption will not apply as long as there is some
rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact
presumed- and the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be
so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. * %ooley
7o inference of guilt may be drawn against an accused for his failure to
ma#e a statement of any sort.
<n D%mlao ,. Comelec- for the purposes of dis!ualification in an election-
section : of (P (lg. ;2 says that? the filing of charges for the commission
of such crimes before civil court or military tribunal after preliminary
investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact &dis!ualification'.?
The %ourt held that this provision violates the guarantee of presumption of
innocence. "lthough filing of charges is only prima facie evidence and
may be rebutted- the proximity of elections and conse!uent ris# of not
having time to rebut the prima facie evidence already in effect ma#e him
suffer as though guilty even before trial.
E5%i&oise R%le * evidence of both sides are e!ually balanced- in which case
the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the
accused.
9. Ri0't to 2e Heard 2( Himsel! and Co%nsel
<ndispensable in any criminal prosecution where the sta#es are the liberty
or even the life of the accused
"ssistance of counsel begins from the time a person is ta#en into custody
and placed under investigation for the commission of a crime.
This is not sub,ect to waiver.
)ight to counsel means the right to effective representation.
<f the accused appears at arraignment without counsel- the ,udge mustA
&a' <nform the accused that he has a right to a counsel before
arraignment+
&b' "s# the accused if he desires the aid of counsel+
&c' <f the accused desires counsel- but cannot afford one- a counsel de
oficio must be appointed+
&d' <f the accused desires to obtain his own counsel- the court must
give him a reasonable time to get one.
;. Nat%re and Ca%se o! Acc%sation
P%r&ose !or t'e Ri0't to 2e in!ormed o! t'e Nat%re and Ca%se o!
Acc%sation
&1' To furnish the accused with a description of the charge against him as will
enable him to ma#e his defenses+
&2' To avail himself of his conviction or ac!uittal against a further prosecution
for the same cause+
&3' To inform the court of the facts alleged.
The description and not the designation of the offense is controlling &The
real nature of the crime charged is determined from the recital of facts in
the information. <t is not determined based on the caption or preamble
thereof nor from the specification of the provision of law allegedly
violated.'
<f the information fails to allege the material elements of the offense- the
accused cannot be convicted thereof even if the prosecution is able to
present evidence during the trial with respect to such elements.
/oid !or /a0%eness R%le * accused is denied the right to be informed of the
charge against him and to due process as well- where the statute itself is
couched in such indefinite language that it is not possible for men of ordinary
intelligence to determine therefrom what acts or omissions are punished and
hence- shall be avoided.
<n Estrada ,s Sandi0an2a(an, the %ourt held that the Void for
Vagueness octrine merely re'uires a reasonable degree of certainty
and not absolute precision or mat)ematical e3actitude.
<. T'e Trial
Factors in Determinin0 W'et'er T'ere Is /iolation
&a' Time expired from the filing of the information
&b' .ength of delay involved
&c' )easons for the delay
&d' "ssertion or non$assertion of the right by the accused
&e' Pre,udice caused to the defendant.
E!!ect o! dismissal 2ased on ,iolation o! t'is ri0't it amounts to an
ac!uittal and can be used as basis to claim double ,eopardy. This would
be the effect even if the dismissal was made with the consent of the
accused
Remed( i! t'e Ri0't is /iolated
&1' Be can move for the dismissal of the case+
&2' <f he is detained- he can file a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas
corpus.
S&eed( trial .
1. Qree from vexatious- capricious and oppressive delays
2. To relieve the accused from needless anxieties before sentence is
pronounced upon him
Im&artial trial * the accused is entitled to the >cold neutrality of an impartial
,udge?. <t is an element of due process.
P%2lic trial The attendance at the trial is open to all irrespective of their
relationship to the accused. Bowever- if the evidence to be adduced is
>offensive to decency or public morals?- the public may be excluded.
The right of the accused to a public trial is not violated if the hearings are
conducted on aturdays- either with the consent of the accused or if failed
to ob,ect thereto.
The right to be present covers the period from arraignment to
promulgation of sentence.
8eneral R%le the accused may waive the right to be present at the trial
by not showing up. Bowever- the court can still compel the attendance of
the accused if necessary for identification purposes.
E#ce&tion <f the accused- after arraignment- has stipulated that
he is indeed the person charged with the offense and named in the
information- and that any time a witness refers to a name by which
he is #nown- the witness is to be understood as referring to him.
Trial in "bsentia is mandatory upon the court whenever the accused has
been arraigned.
There is also Promulgation in "bsentia
Ehile the accused is entitled to be present during promulgation of
,udgment- the absence of his counsel during such promulgation does not
affect its validity
The trial in absentia does not abrogate the provisions of the )ules of %ourt
regarding forfeiture of bail bond if the accused fails to appear at his trial.
" court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines as this is a necessary conse!uence of the nature and function
of a bail bond
I. T'e Ri0't to +eet t'e Witnesses Face to Face
P%r&oses o! t'e Ri0't to +eet t'e Witnesses Face to Face
&1' To afford the accused an opportunity to cross$examine the witness
&2' To allow the ,udge the opportunity to observe the deportment of the
witness
Princi&al E#ce&tions to t'is Ri0't
&1' The admissibility of >dying declarations?
&2' Trial in absentia under ection 1:&2'
Eith respect to child testimony
Testimony of witness who was not cross$examined is not admissible as
evidence for being hearsay.
<f a prosecution witness dies before his cross$examination can be
completed- his direct testimony cannot be stric#en off the record- provided
the material points of his direct testimony had been covered on cross.
The right to confrontation may be waived.
D. Com&%lsor( Process
The accused is entitled to the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum and
subpoena duces tecum for the purpose of compelling the attendance of
witness and the production of evidence that he may need for his defense.
Qailure to obey * punishable as contempt of court.
There are exceptional circumstances when the defendant may as# for
conditional examination- provided the expected testimony is material of
any witness under circumstances that would ma#e him unavailable from
attending the trial.
E. Trial in A2sentia
Trial in A2sentia +a( Onl( -e Allo"ed I! t'e Follo"in0 Re5%isites Are +et
&1' the accused has been validly arraigned+
&2' "ccused has already been arraigned+
&3' "ccused has been duly notified of the trial+ and
&:' Bis failure to appear is un,ustifiable.
8. HA-EAS CORPUS
Section 6<, Art. III. T'e &ri,ile0e o! t'e "rit o! 'a2eas cor&%s s'all not 2e
s%s&ended e#ce&t in cases o! in,asion or re2ellion, "'en t'e &%2lic sa!et(
re5%ires it.
Writ o! Ha2eas Cor&%s * is a written order issued by a court- directed to a
person detaining another- commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner
at a designated time and place with the day and cause of his caption and
detention.
Pri,ile0e o! t'e Writ o! Ha2eas Cor&%s * the right to have an immediate
determination of the legality of the deprivation of physical liberty.
T'e President ma( s%s&end t'e &ri,ile0e
&1' in cases of invasion or rebellion
&2' when public safety re!uires it.
Babeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person3s liberty has been
,udicially ad,udged to be illegal or unlawful *In re S%m%lon01
The writ is a prerogative writ employed to test the validity of detention
To secure the detaineeOs release
The action shall ta#e precedence in the calendar of the court and must be
acted upon immediately
W'en a,aila2le &enumeration not exclusive'
restoration of liberty of an individual sub,ected to p)ysical restraint
may be availed of where- as a conse!uence of a ,udicial proceedingA
1. there has been deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the
restraint of the person
2. the court has no ,urisdiction to impose the sentence- or
3. an excessive penalty has been imposed- since such sentence is
void as to the excess.
/ay be extended to cases by which rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto
Ehen moral restraint is exerted &%aunca vs ala=ar'
)ight was accorded a person was sentenced to a longer penalty than was
subse!uently meted out to another person convicted of the same offense.
&1umabon vs Director of Prisons'
2nlawful denial of bail
W'en not a,aila2le &enumeration not exclusive'
the person alleged to be restrained is in the custody of an officer under a
process issued by the court which has ,urisdiction to do so
desaparecidos &disappeared persons' * persons could not be found+
remedy is to refer the matter to %ommission on Buman )ights
Proced%re
7eed to comply with writ+ disobedience thereof constitutes contempt
W'o ma( s%s&end t'e &ri,ile0e
The President
8ro%nds !or S%s&ension o! t'e &ri,ile0e
1. invasion or rebellion
2. when public safety re!uires it
Section 6E, Art. /II. T'e President s'all 2e t'e Commander.in.C'ie! o! all
armed !orces o! t'e P'ili&&ines and "'ene,er it 2ecomes necessar(, 'e
ma( call o%t s%c' armed !orces to &re,ent or s%&&ress la"less ,iolence,
in,asion or re2ellion. In case o! in,asion or re2ellion, "'en t'e &%2lic
sa!et( re5%ires it, 'e ma(, !or a &eriod not e#ceedin0 si#t( da(s, s%s&end
t'e &ri,ile0e o! t'e "rit o! 'a2eas cor&%s or &lace t'e P'ili&&ines or an(
&art t'ereo! %nder martial la". Wit'in !ort(.ei0't 'o%rs !rom t'e
&roclamation o! martial la" or t'e s%s&ension o! t'e &ri,ile0e o! t'e "rit o!
'a2eas cor&%s, t'e President s'all s%2mit a re&ort in &erson or in "ritin0
to t'e Con0ress. T'e Con0ress, ,otin0 3ointl(, 2( a ,ote o! at least a
ma3orit( o! all its +em2ers in re0%lar or s&ecial session, ma( re,o:e s%c'
&roclamation or s%s&ension, "'ic' re,ocation s'all not 2e set aside 2( t'e
President. U&on t'e initiati,e o! t'e President, t'e Con0ress ma(, in t'e
same manner, e#tend s%c' &roclamation or s%s&ension !or a &eriod to 2e
determined 2( t'e Con0ress, i! t'e in,asion or re2ellion s'all &ersist and
&%2lic sa!et( re5%ires it.
T'e Con0ress, i! not in session, s'all, "it'in t"ent(.!o%r 'o%rs !ollo"in0
s%c' &roclamation or s%s&ension, con,ene in accordance "it' its r%les
"it'o%t need o! a call.
T'e S%&reme Co%rt ma( re,ie", in an a&&ro&riate &roceedin0 !iled 2( an(
citi=en, t'e s%!!icienc( o! t'e !act%al 2asis o! t'e &roclamation o! martial
la" or t'e s%s&ension o! t'e &ri,ile0e o! t'e "rit or t'e e#tension t'ereo!,
and m%st &rom%l0ate its decision t'ereon "it'in t'irt( da(s !rom its !ilin0.
A state o! martial la" does not s%s&end t'e o&eration o! t'e Constit%tion,
nor s%&&lant t'e !%nctionin0 o! t'e ci,il co%rts or le0islati,e assem2lies,
nor a%t'ori=e t'e con!erment o! 3%risdiction on militar( co%rts and
a0encies o,er ci,ilians "'ere ci,il co%rts are a2le to !%nction, nor
a%tomaticall( s%s&end t'e &ri,ile0e o! t'e "rit.
T'e s%s&ension o! t'e &ri,ile0e o! t'e "rit s'all a&&l( onl( to &ersons
3%diciall( c'ar0ed !or re2ellion or o!!enses in'erent in or directl( connected
"it' in,asion.
D%rin0 t'e s%s&ension o! t'e &ri,ile0e o! t'e "rit, an( &erson t'%s arrested
or detained s'all 2e 3%diciall( c'ar0ed "it'in t'ree da(s, ot'er"ise 'e s'all
2e released.
Lansan0 doctrine *Lansan0 ,s 8arcia1 % has the power to in!uire into the
factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ. <t is written in "rticle
L<<- ec. 1K of the %onstitution.
H. WRIT OF A+PARO
A.+. No. JD.K.67.SC
*7< Se&tem2er 7JJD1
THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF A+PARO
SECTION 6. !etition" The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to
any person whose right to life- liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee- or of a
private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal #illings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof.
SEC. 7. #$o %a& 'ile" The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by
any !ualified person or entity in the following orderA
1. "ny member of the immediate family- namelyA the spouse- children
and parents of the aggrieved party+
2. "ny ascendant- descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved
party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity- in
default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph+ or
3. "ny concerned citi=en- organi=ation- association or institution- if
there is no #nown member of the immediate family or relative of the
aggrieved party.
The filing of a petition by the aggrieved party suspends the right of all other
authori=ed parties to file similar petitions. .i#ewise- the filing of the petition by an
authori=ed party on behalf of the aggrieved party suspends the right of all others-
observing the order established herein.
SEC. 9. #$ere to 'ile" The petition may be filed on any day and at any time
with the )egional Trial %ourt of the place where the threat- act or omission was
committed or any of its elements occurred- or with the andiganbayan- the %ourt
of "ppeals- the upreme %ourt- or any ,ustice of such courts. The writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
Ehen issued by a )egional Trial %ourt or any ,udge thereof- the writ shall be
returnable before such court or ,udge.
Ehen issued by the andiganbayan or the %ourt of "ppeals or any of their
,ustices- it may be returnable before such court or any ,ustice thereof- or to any
)egional Trial %ourt of the place where the threat- act or omission was
committed or any of its elements occurred.
Ehen issued by the upreme %ourt or any of its ,ustices- it may be returnable
before such %ourt or any ,ustice thereof- or before the andiganbayan or the
%ourt of "ppeals or any of their ,ustices- or to any )egional Trial %ourt of the
place where the threat- act or omission was committed or any of its elements
occurred.
SEC. ;. (o oc)et 'ees" The petitioner shall be exempted from the payment of
the doc#et and other lawful fees when filing the petition. The court- ,ustice or
,udge shall doc#et the petition and act upon it immediately.
SEC. <. Contents of !etition" The petition shall be signed and verified and shall
allege the followingA
1. The personal circumstances of the petitioner+
2. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent
responsible for the threat- act or omission- or- if the name is
un#nown or uncertain- the respondent may be described by an
assumed appellation+
3. The right to life- liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated
or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the
respondent- and how such threat or violation is committed with the
attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits+
:. The investigation conducted- if any- specifying the names- personal
circumstances- and addresses of the investigating authority or
individuals- as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation-
together with any report+
;. The actions and recourses ta#en by the petitioner to determine the
fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the
person responsible for the threat- act or omission+ and
5. The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other ,ust and e!uitable reliefs.
SEC. I. *ssuance of t$e #rit" 2pon the filing of the petition- the court- ,ustice or
,udge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to
issue. The cler# of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court+ or in case
of urgent necessity- the ,ustice or the ,udge may issue the writ under his or her
own hand- and may deputi=e any officer or person to serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition
which shall not be later than seven &4' days from the date of its issuance.
SEC. D. !enalt& for Refusing to *ssue or Serve t$e #rit" " cler# of court who
refuses to issue the writ after its allowance- or a deputi=ed person who refuses to
serve the same- shall be punished by the court- ,ustice or ,udge for contempt
without pre,udice to other disciplinary actions.
SEC. E. +o, t$e #rit is Served" The writ shall be served upon the respondent
by a ,udicial officer or by a person deputi=ed by the court- ,ustice or ,udge who
shall retain a copy on which to ma#e a return of service. <n case the writ cannot
be served personally on the respondent- the rules on substituted service shall
apply.
SEC. K. Return- Contents" Eithin seventy$two &42' hours after service of the
writ- the respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting
affidavits which shall- among other things- contain the followingA
1. The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or
threaten with violation the right to life- liberty and security of the
aggrieved party- through any act or omission+
2. The steps or actions ta#en by the respondent to determine the fate
or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons
responsible for the threat- act or omission+
3. "ll relevant information in the possession of the respondent
pertaining to the threat- act or omission against the aggrieved party+
and
:. <f the respondent is a public official or employee- the return shall
further state the actions that have been or will still be ta#enA
i. to verify the identity of the aggrieved party+
ii. to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or
disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid
in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible+
iii. to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning
the death or disappearance+
iv. to determine the cause- manner- location and time of death or
disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have
brought about the death or disappearance+
v. to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the
death or disappearance+ and
vi. to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.
The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation- its
resolution and the prosecution of the case.
" general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.
SEC. 6J. efenses not !leaded eemed #aived" "ll defenses shall be raised
in the return- otherwise- they shall be deemed waived.
SEC. 66. !ro$ibited !leadings and %otions" The following pleadings and
motions are prohibitedA
1. /otion to dismiss+
2. /otion for extension of time to file return- opposition- affidavit-
position paper and other pleadings+
3. Dilatory motion for postponement+
:. /otion for a bill of particulars+
;. %ounterclaim or cross$claim+
5. Third$party complaint+
4. )eply+
K. /otion to declare respondent in default+
I. <ntervention+
16. /emorandum+
11. /otion for
reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders+ and
12. Petition for certiorari-
mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order.
SEC. 67. Effect of 'ailure to 'ile Return" <n case the respondent fails to file a
return- the court- ,ustice or ,udge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte.
SEC. 69. Summar& +earing" The hearing on the petition shall be summary.
Bowever- the court- ,ustice or ,udge may call for a preliminary conference to
simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and
admissions from the parties.
The hearing shall be from day to day until completed and given the same priority
as petitions for habeas corpus.
SEC. 6;. *nterim Reliefs" 2pon filing of the petition or at anytime before final
,udgment- the court- ,ustice or ,udge may grant any of the following reliefsA
&a' Temporary Protection Jrder. The court- ,ustice or ,udge- upon motion
or motu proprio- may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and
any member of the immediate family be protected in a government agency
or by an accredited person or private institution capable of #eeping and
securing their safety. <f the petitioner is an organi=ation- association or
institution referred to in ection 3&c' of this )ule- the protection may be
extended to the officers involved.
The upreme %ourt shall accredit the persons and private institutions that
shall extend temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party
and any member of the immediate family- in accordance with guidelines
which it shall issue.
The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules
and conditions that may be imposed by the court- ,ustice or ,udge.
&b' <nspection Jrder. The court- ,ustice or ,udge- upon verified motion and
after due hearing- may order any person in possession or control of a
designated land or other property- to permit entry for the purpose of
inspecting- measuring- surveying- or photographing the property or any
relevant ob,ect or operation thereon.
The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. <t shall
be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal
#nowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party.
<f the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the
privileged nature of the information- the court- ,ustice or ,udge may
conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.
The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish
the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated.
The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authori=ed to
ma#e the inspection and the date- time- place and manner of ma#ing the
inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional
rights of all parties. The order shall expire five &;' days after the date of its
issuance- unless extended for ,ustifiable reasons.
&c' Production Jrder. The court- ,ustice or ,udge- upon verified motion and
after due hearing- may order any person in possession- custody or control
of any designated documents- papers- boo#s- accounts- letters-
photographs- ob,ects or tangible things- or ob,ects in digiti=ed or electronic
form- which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the
return- to produce and permit their inspection- copying or photographing
by or on behalf of the movant.
The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the
privileged nature of the information- in which case the court- ,ustice or
,udge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the
opposition.
The court- ,ustice or ,udge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the
constitutional rights of all the parties.
&d' Eitness Protection Jrder. The court- ,ustice or ,udge- upon motion or
motu proprio- may refer the witnesses to the Department of Dustice for
admission to the Eitness Protection- ecurity and (enefit Program-
pursuant to )epublic "ct 7o. 5IK1.
The court- ,ustice or ,udge may also refer the witnesses to other
government agencies- or to accredited persons or private institutions
capable of #eeping and securing their safety.
SEC. 6<. .vailabilit& of *nterim Reliefs to Respondent" 2pon verified motion
of the respondent and after due hearing- the court- ,ustice or ,udge may issue an
inspection order or production order under paragraphs &b' and &c' of the
preceding section.
" motion for inspection order under this section shall be supported by affidavits
or testimonies of witnesses having personal #nowledge of the defenses of the
respondent.
SEC. 6I. Contempt" The court- ,ustice or ,udge may order the respondent who
refuses to ma#e a return- or who ma#es a false return- or any person who
otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court to be
punished for contempt. The contemnor may be imprisoned or imposed a fine.
SEC. 6D. /urden of !roof and Standard of iligence Re0uired" The parties
shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary
diligence as re!uired by applicable laws- rules and regulations was observed in
the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that
extraordinary diligence as re!uired by applicable laws- rules and regulations was
observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invo#e the presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability.
SEC. 6E. 1udgment" The court shall render ,udgment within ten &16' days from
the time the petition is submitted for decision. <f the allegations in the petition are
proven by substantial evidence- the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and
such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate+ otherwise- the privilege shall be
denied.
SEC. 6K. .ppeal" "ny party may appeal from the final ,udgment or order to the
upreme %ourt under )ule :;. The appeal may raise !uestions of fact or law or
both.
The period of appeal shall be five &;' wor#ing days from the date of notice of the
adverse ,udgment.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus cases.
SEC. 7J. .rc$iving and Revival of Cases" The court shall not dismiss the
petition- but shall archive it- if upon its determination it cannot proceed for a valid
cause such as the failure of petitioner or witnesses to appear due to threats on
their lives.
" periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by the amparo court that
shall- motu proprio or upon motion by any party- order their revival when ready
for further proceedings. The petition shall be dismissed with pre,udice upon
failure to prosecute the case after the lapse of two &2' years from notice to the
petitioner of the order archiving the case.
The cler#s of court shall submit to the Jffice of the %ourt "dministrator a
consolidated list of archived cases under this )ule not later than the first wee# of
Danuary of every year.
SEC. 76. *nstitution of Separate .ctions" This )ule shall not preclude the filing
of separate criminal- civil or administrative actions.
SEC. 77. Effect of 'iling of a Criminal .ction" Ehen a criminal action has
been commenced- no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs
under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case.
The procedure under this )ule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available
under the writ of amparo.
SEC. 79. Consolidation" Ehen a criminal action is filed subse!uent to the filing
of a petition for the writ- the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
Ehen a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subse!uent to a
petition for a writ of amparo- the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal
action.
"fter consolidation- the procedure under this )ule shall continue to apply to the
disposition of the reliefs in the petition.
SEC. 7;. Substantive Rig$ts" This )ule shall not diminish- increase or modify
substantive rights recogni=ed and protected by the %onstitution.
SEC. 7<. Suppletor& .pplication of t$e Rules of Court" The )ules of %ourt
shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with this )ule.
SEC. 7I. .pplicabilit& to !ending Cases" This )ule shall govern cases
involving extralegal #illings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof
pending in the trial and appellate courts.
SEC. 7D. Effectivit&" This )ule shall ta#e effect on Jctober 2:- 2664- following
its publication in three &3' newspapers of general circulation.
I. SPEED4 DISPOSATION OF CASES
Section 6I, Art. III. All &ersons s'all 'a,e t'e ri0't to a s&eed( dis&osition
o! t'eir cases 2e!ore all 3%dicial, 5%asi.3%dicial, or administrati,e 2odies.
S&eed( Trial ,s. S&eed( Dis&osition o! Cases
S&eed( trial S&eed( dis&osition o! cases
)efers to trial phase only )efers to disposition of cases &"ll phases'
%riminal cases only Dudicial- !uasi$,udicial or admin. Proceedings
Periods !or decision !or co%rts &ec. 1;- "rt. L<<<'
%A 2: months from submission
"ll lower collegiate courtsA 12 months unless reduced by %
"ll other lower courtsA 3 months
Periods !or decision !or Constit%tional Commissions &ec 4- "rt. <M$"'
56 days from date of submission for decision or resolution
Factors considered in determinin0 "'et'er t'e ri0't is ,iolated
1. .ength of delay
2. )eason of delay
3. "ssertion of the right or failure to assert it
:. Pre,udice caused by delay
Remed( in case t'ere 'as 2een %nreasona2le dela( in resol%tion o! a case
Dismissal through mandamus
$. RI8HT A8AINST SELF.INCRI+INATION
Section 6D, Art. III. No &erson s'all 2e com&elled to 2e a "itness a0ainst
'imsel!.
-ased on
1. H%manitarian reasons * it is intended to prevent the tate- with all
its coercive powers- from extracting from the suspect testimony that
may convict him+
2. Practical reasons * a person sub,ected to such compulsion is
li#ely to per,ure himself for his own protection
A&&lica2le to
%riminal prosecutions- government proceedings- including civil actions
and administrative or legislative investigations
Transactional Imm%nit( Stat%te * testimony of any person or whose
possession of documents or other evidence necessary or convenient to
determine the truth in any investigation conducted is immune from criminal
prosecution for an offense to which such compelled testimony relates.
Use and Fr%it Imm%nit( Stat%te * prohibits the use of the witness3 compelled
testimony and its fruit in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution
for an offense to which such compelled testimony relates.
+a( 2e Claimed 2(
1. Acc%sed * at all times+ there is a reasonable assumption that the
purpose of his interrogation will be to incriminate him
2. Witness * only !)en an incriminating 'uestion is as0ed- since the
witness has no way of #nowing in advance the nature or effect of
the !uestion to be put to him
- Be cannot invo#e right to self$incrimination whenA
a' The !uestion is relevant and otherwise allo!ed even
if the answer may tend to incriminate him or sub,ect
him to civil liability
b' the !uestion relates to past criminality for which the
witness can no longer be prosecuted
c' he has been previously granted immunity under a
validly enacted statute
Jnly natural persons can invo#e this right. Dudicial persons are sub,ect to
the visitorial powers of the state in order to determine compliance with the
conditions of the charter granted to them.
Sco&e
&1' Testimonial %ompulsion
<n Lillaflor v. ummers- since the >#ernel of the privilege? was the
prohibition of >testimonial compulsion?- the %ourt was willing to compel a
pregnant woman accused of adultery to submit to the indignity of being
tested for pregnancy. (eing purely a mechanical act- it is not a violation of
her constitutional right against self$incrimination.
&2' Production of Documents- Papers and %hattels. ExceptionA when boo#s of
accounts are to be examined in the exercise of police power and power of
taxation.
Ehat is prohibited is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from the witness or to otherwise elicit evidence which
would not exist were it not for the actions compelled from the witness.
The right does not prohibit the examination of the body of the
accused or the use of findings with respect to his body as physical
evidence. Bence- the fingerprinting of an accused would not violate the
right against self$incrimination. Bowever- obtaining a sample of the
handwriting of the accused would violate this right if he is charged for
falsification.
The accused cannot be compelled to produce a private document in his
possession which might tend to incriminate him. Bowever- a third person
in custody of the document may be compelled to produce it.
Ri0't +a( 2e Wai,ed
- EitherA
a' Directly- or
b' (y failure to invo0e it P)JL<DED the waiver is certain and
une'uivocal and intelligently and !illingly made.
Section 6E *61, Art. III. No &erson s'all 2e detained solel( 2( reason o! 'is
&olitical 2elie!s and as&irations.
$. RI8HT A8AINST IN/OLUNTAR4 SER/ITUDE
Section 6E *71, Art. III. No in,ol%ntar( ser,it%de in an( !orm s'all e#ist
e#ce&t as a &%nis'ment !or a crime "'ereo! t'e &art( s'all 'a,e 2een d%l(
con,icted.
In,ol%ntar( Ser,it%de * the condition of one who is compelled by force-
coercion- or imprisonment- and against his will- to labor for another- whether he is
paid or not.
In,ol%ntar( Ser,it%de Incl%des
&1' Sla,er( *civil relation in which one man has absolute po!er over the life-
fortune and liberty of another+
&2' Peona0e * a condition of enforced servitude by which the servitor is
restrained of his liberty and compelled to labor in li'uidation of some debt
or obligation- real or pretended- against his will
8eneral R%le
7o involuntary service in any form shall exist.
E#ce&tions
1. P%nis'ment !or a crime for which the party shall have been duly
convicted &ec. 1K- "rt. <<<'
2. Personal militar( or ci,il ser,ice in the interest of national defense
&ec. :- "rt. <<'
3. Na,al enlistment * remain in service until the end of voyage so that the
crew would not desert the ship- ma#ing it difficult for the owners to recruit
new hands to continue the voyage &)obertson vs (aldwin'
:. !osse comitatus * in pursuit of persons who might have violated the
law- the authorities might command all male inhabitants of a certain age
to assist them &2 vs Pompeya'
;. Ret%rn to "or: order in ind%stries a!!ected "it' &%2lic interest
&Hapisanan ng /anggagawa sa Hahoy vs 1otamco'
5. !atria !otestas * unemancipated minors are obliged to obey their
parents so long as they are under parental power and to observe respect
and reverence to them always &"rt. 311- %ivil %ode'
2 vs
Pompeya
"n "ct providing for the method by which the people of the town
may be called upon to render assistance for the protection of the
public and the preservation of peace and good order is
constitutional. <t was enacted in the exercise of the police power of
the state and does not violate the constitutional prohibition on
involuntary servitude.
Polloc#
vs
Eilliams
7o indebtedness warrants a suspension of the right to be free from
compulsory service- and no state can ma#e the !uitting of wor#
any component of a crime- or ma#e criminal sanctions available for
holding unwilling persons to labor.
>. CRUEL AND INHU+AN PUNISH+ENT
Section 6K, Art. III.
6. E#cessi,e !ines s'all not 2e im&osed, nor cr%el, de0radin0 or in'%man
&%nis'ment in!licted. Neit'er s'all deat' &enalt( 2e im&osed, %nless, !or
com&ellin0 reasons in,ol,in0 'eino%s crimes, t'e Con0ress 'erea!ter
&ro,ides !or it. An( deat' &enalt( alread( im&osed s'all 2e red%ced to
recl%sion &er&et%a.
7. T'e em&lo(ment o! &'(sical, &s(c'olo0ical, or de0radin0 &%nis'ment
a0ainst an( &risoner or detainee or t'e %se o! s%2standard or inade5%ate
&enal !acilities %nder s%2'%man conditions s'all 2e dealt "it' 2( la".
W'en is a &enalt( Fcr%el, de0radin0 and in'%manG)
&1' " penalty is cruel and inhuman if it involves torture or lingering suffering.
Ex. (eing drawn and !uartered.
&2' " penalty is degrading if it exposes a person to public humiliation. Ex.
(eing tarred and feathered- then paraded throughout town.
Standards Used
&1' The punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of
human beings.
&2' <t must not be applied arbitrarily.
&3' <t must not be unacceptable to contemporary society
&:' <t must not be excessive- i.e. it must serve a penal purpose more
effectively than a less severe punishment would.
E#cessi,e Fine
" fine is excessive- when under any circumstance- it is disproportionate to
the offense.
7oteA Qr. (ernas says that the accused cannot be convicted of the crime to
which the punishment is attached if the court finds that the punishment is cruel-
degrading or inhuman.
)easonA Eithout a valid penalty- the law is not a penal law.
L. NON I+PRISON+ENT FOR DE-T
Section 7J, Art. III. No &erson s'all 2e im&risoned !or de2t or non.&a(ment
o! a &oll ta#.
Qor '%manitarian reasonsS an added guaranty of the liberty of persons
against their incarceration for the enforcement of purely private debts
because of their misfortune of being poor
De2t A any civil obligation arising from a contract- expressed or implied- resulting
in any liability to pay in money.
Sco&e o! 0%arant( a0ainst im&risonment !or non.&a(ment o! de2t
<f an accused fails to pay the fine imposed upon him- this may result in his
subsidiary imprisonment because his liability is e3 delicto and not e3
contractu.
A FRAUDULENT de2t ma( res%lt in t'e im&risonment o! t'e de2tor i!
1. The fraudulent debt constitutes a crime such as estafa+ and
2. The accused has been duly convicted.
POLL TA?
1eneral )uleA 7on$payment of taxes is punishable with imprisonment.
ExceptionA Qailure to pay a poll tax
Poll ta# A a specific sum levied upon every person belonging to a certain class
without regard to his property or occupation.
" tax is not a debt since it is an obligation arising from law. Bence- its
non$payment maybe validly punished with imprisonment.
+. DOU-LE $EOPARD4
Section 76, Art. III. No &erson s'all 2e t"ice &%t in 3eo&ard( o! &%nis'ment
!or t'e same o!!ense. I! an act is &%nis'ed 2( a la" and an ordinance,
con,iction or ac5%ittal %nder eit'er s'all constit%te a 2ar to anot'er
&rosec%tion !or t'e same act.
Do%2le 3eo&ard( * when a person was charged with an offense and the case
was terminated by ac!uittal or conviction or in any other manner without his
consent- he cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense.
Re5%isites o! Do%2le $eo&ard(
1. valid complaint or information
2. filed before a competent court
3. to which defendant has pleaded- and
:. defendant was previously ac!uitted or convicted or the case dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
T"o *71 >inds o! Do%2le $eo&ard(
&1' W'en a &erson is &%t t"ice in 3eo&ard( o! &%nis'ment !or t'e same
o!!ense &1
st
sentence of ection 21'
&2' W'en a la" and an ordinance &%nis' t'e same act &2
nd
sentence of
ec. 21'
Same O!!ense
Re5%isites !or a ,alid de!ense o! do%2le 3eo&ard(
&1' Qirst ,eopardy must have attached prior to the second.
&2' The first ,eopardy must have terminated.
&3' The second ,eopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.
W'en does 3eo&ard( ATTACH *6
st
re5%isite1
&a' " person is charged
&b' 2nder a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction
&c' (efore a court of competent ,urisdiction
&d' "fter the person is arraigned
&e' uch person enters a valid plea.
W'en does 3eo&ard( NOT attac'
&a' <f information does not charge any offense
&b' <f- upon pleading guilty- the accused presents evidence of complete self$
defense- and the court thereafter ac!uits him without entering a new plea
of not guilty for accused.
&c' <f the information for an offense cogni=able by the )T% is filed with the
/T%.
&d' <f a complaint filed for preliminary investigation is dismissed.
W'en does !irst 3eo&ard( TER+INATE *7
ND
REBUISITE1
1' "c!uittal
2' %onviction
3' Dismissal E0J the EMP)E consent of the accused
:' Dismissal on the merits.
E#am&les o! termination o! 3eo&ard(
&a' Dismissal based on violation of the right to a speedy trial. This amounts to
an ac!uittal.
&b' Dismissal based on a demurrer to evidence. This is a dismissal on the
merits.
&c' Dismissal on motion of the prosecution- subse!uent to a motion for
reinvestigation filed by the accused.
&d' Discharge of an accused to be a state witness. This amounts to an
ac!uittal.
W'en can t'e PROSECUTION a&&eal !rom an order o! dismissal
&a' <f dismissal is on motion of the accused. ExceptionA <f motion is based on
violation of the right to a speedy trial or on a demurrer to evidence.
&b' <f dismissal does 7JT amount to an ac!uittal or dismissal on the merits
&c' <f the !uestion to be passed upon is purely legal.
&d' <f the dismissal violates the right of due process of the prosecution.
&e' <f the dismissal was made with grave abuse of discretion.
W'at are considered to 2e t'e FSA+E OFFENSEG
&a' Exact identity between the offenses charged in the first and second cases.
&b' Jne offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of the other offense.
&c' Jne offense is necessarily included or necessary includes the other.
.ote2 where a single act results in the violation of different laws or
different provisions of the same law- the prosecution for one will not bar
the other so long as none of the exceptions apply.
Same Act
Double ,eopardy will result if the act punishable under the law and the
ordinance are the same. Qor there to be double ,eopardy- it is not
necessary that the offense be the same.
S%&er,enin0 Facts
1' 2nder the )ules of %ourt- a conviction for an offense will not bar a
prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged
in the former information whereA
&a' The graver offense developed due to a supervening fact arising
from the same act or omission constituting the former charge.
&b' The facts constituting the graver offense became #nown or were
discovered only after the filing of the former information.
&c' The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the
consent of the fiscal and the offended party.
2' 2nder &1'&b'- if the facts could have been discovered by the prosecution
but were not discovered because of the prosecutionOs incompetence- it
would not be considered a supervening event.
E!!ect o! a&&eal 2( t'e acc%sed
<f the accused appeals his conviction- he E"<LE his right to plead double
,eopardy. The whole case will be open to review by the appellate court.
uch court may even increase the penalties imposed on the accused by
the trial court.
<n "lmario v. %"- the %ourt held that the delays were not unreasonable+
hence- there was no denial of the right to speedy trial. econd- the
dismissal was with the consent of the accused. Bence- reinstatement did
not violate the right against double ,eopardy.
N. E? POST FACTO LAWS AND -ILL OF ATTAINDER
Section 77, Art. III. No e# &ost !acto la" or 2ill o! attainder s'all 2e enacted.
>inds o! E# Post Facto La"s
*61 Jne which ma#es an action done before the passing of the law- and which
was innocent when done- criminal- and punishes such action.
*71 Jne which aggravates the crime or ma#es it greater than when it was
committed.
*91 Jne which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than
that which the law annexed to the crime when it was committed.
*;1 Jne which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less testimony
than the law re!uired at the time of the commission of the offense in order
to convict the accused.
*<1 Jne which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only (2T- in
effect- imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right- which- when done- was
lawful.
*I1 Jne which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection
to which he has become entitled such as the protection of a former
conviction or ac!uittal- or a proclamation of amnesty. *In Re >a( /ille0as
>ami1
C'aracteristics o! E# Post Facto La"
&a' /ust refer to criminal matters
&b' Pre,udicial to the accused
&c' )etroactive in application
<n Lacson ,. E#ec. Sec.- the %ourt held that in general- ex post facto law
prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. )" 7o. K2:I is not a penal law....
The contention that the new law diluted their right to a two$tiered appeal is
incorrect because >the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in
nature that can be regulated by law. )" K2:I pertains only to matters of
procedure- and being merely an amendatory statute it does not parta#e
the nature of ex post facto law.?
<n Calder ,. -%ll- the %ourt said that when the law alters the legal rules of
evidence or mode of trial- it is an ex post facto law. ExceptionA &(ea=ell v.
Jhio' unless the changes operate only in limited and unsubstantial
manner to the disadvantage of the accused.
<n -a(ot ,. Sandi0an2a(an- the accused was convicted by the
andiganbayan for estafa on /ay 36- 1IK6. "ccused appealed. Jn
/arch 15- 1IK2- (P (lg. 1I; was passed authori=ing suspension of public
officers against whom an information may be pending at any stage. Jn
Duly 22- 1IK2- the court suspended the accused. The upreme %ourt
ruled that "rt. 2: of the )evised Penal %ode that suspension of an officer
during trial shall not be considered a penalty. The suspension in the case
is merely a preventive and not a penal measure which therefore does not
come under the ex post facto prohibition.
-ILL OF ATTAINDER
(ill of attainder * is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without ,udicial trial.
<f the punishment be less than death- the act is termed a bill of pains and
penalties.? *C%mmin0s ,. +isso%ri1
&"ll (ills of "ttainder are Ex Post Qacto .aws'
Elements o! -ill o! Attainder
1. There must be a law.
2. The law imposes a penal burden on a named individual or easily
ascertainable members of a group.
3. There is a direct imposition of penal burden without ,udicial trial.
O. PRI/AC4 OF CO++UNICATION
Section 9*61, Art. III. T'e &ri,ac( o! comm%nication and corres&ondence
s'all 2e in,iola2le e#ce&t %&on la"!%l order o! t'e co%rt, or "'en &%2lic
sa!et( or order re5%ires ot'er"ise, as &rescri2ed 2( la".
Forms o! Corres&ondences and Comm%nication Co,ered
1. letters
2. messages
3. telephone calls
:. telegrams- and
;. the li#es
Intr%sion into t'e Pri,ac( o! Comm%nication +a( -e Allo"ed
1. 2pon lawful order of the court- or
2. Ehen public safety or order re!uires otherwise as prescribed by law.
Ehen intrusion is made without a ,udicial order- it would have to be based
upon a government official3s assessment that public safety and order
demand such intrusion.
P%2lic Order and Sa!et( * the security of human lives- liberty- and property
against the activities of invaders- insurrectionists- and rebels.
RA No. ;7JJ :no"n as t'e Anti.Wireta&&in0 La" provides penalties for
specific violations of private communication. 2nder ec. 3 of the "ct
allows court$authori=ed taps- under specific conditions for the crimes of
treason- espionage- provo#ing war and disloyalty in case of war- piracy-
mutiny in the high seas- rebellion- conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion- inciting rebellion- sedition- conspiracy to commit sedition- inciting
to sedition- #idnapping.
P. RI8HT TO PRI/AC4
<n O&le ,. Torres- the right to privacy being a fundamental right- the
government has the burden of proof to show that a statute &"J no. 36K in
this case' is ,ustified by some compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn.
><n no uncertain terms- we also underscores that the right to privacy does not bar
all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific
and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common
good. <t merely re!uires that the law be narrowly focused.? <ntrusions into the
right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well$defined standards to
prevent unconstitutional invasions.
<n Roe ,. Wade- the %ourt held that abortions are permissible for any
reason a woman chooses- up until the Ppoint at which the fetus becomes
Nviable-O that is- potentially able to live outside the mother3s womb.
&a' The %onstitution does not explicitly mention any right to privacy but
the %ourt has recogni=ed that such right does exist in the
%onstitution. The %ourt deemed abortion a fundamental right under
the 2nited tates %onstitution- thereby sub,ecting all laws
attempting to restrict it to the standard of strict scrutiny. Ehere
certain >fundamental rights? are involved- the %ourt has held that
regulation limiting these rights may be ,ustified only by a
>compelling state interest.?
&b' The right to privacy is broad enough to encompass a womanOs
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. (ut a womanOs
right to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time- in whatever way
and for whatever reason she alone chooses is 7JT absolute. Ehile
recogni=ing the right to privacy- the %ourt also ac#nowledges that
some state regulation in areas protected by a right is appropriate. "
state may properly assert important interests in safeguarding
health- in maintaining medical standards- and in protecting potential
life.
B. WRIT OF HA-EAS DATA
Writ o! 'a2eas data * is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life- liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee- or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering- collecting or storing of data or information regarding
the person- family- home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
<t is governed by The )ule on the Erit of Babeas Data &"./. 7o. 6K$1$15$
% * full text'- which was approved by the upreme %ourt on 22 Danuary
266K. That )ule shall not diminish- increase or modify substantive rights.
Constit%tional -asis
Section <*<1, Art. /III. Prom%l0ate r%les concernin0 t'e &rotection and
en!orcement o! constit%tional ri0'ts, &leadin0, &ractice, and &roced%re in
all co%rts, t'e admission to t'e &ractice o! la", t'e inte0rated 2ar, and le0al
assistance to t'e %nder.&ri,ile0ed. S%c' r%les s'all &ro,ide a sim&li!ied
and ine#&ensi,e &roced%re !or t'e s&eed( dis&osition o! cases, s'all 2e
%ni!orm !or all co%rts o! t'e same 0rade, and s'all not diminis', increase,
or modi!( s%2stanti,e ri0'ts. R%les o! &roced%re o! s&ecial co%rts and
5%asi.3%dicial 2odies s'all remain e!!ecti,e %nless disa&&ro,ed 2( t'e
S%&reme Co%rt.
The )ule ta#es effect on 2 Qebruary 266K- following its publication in three
&3' newspapers of general circulation.
W'o ma( !ile a &etition !or t'e iss%ance o! a "rit o! 'a2eas data)
8eneral r%le The aggrieved party.
E#ce&tions <n cases of extralegal #illings and enforced disappearances-
the petition may be filed byA
&1' "ny member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party-
namelyA the spouse- children and parents+ or
&2' "ny ascendant- descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved
party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity- in
default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
W'ere can t'e &etition 2e !iled)
&1' )egional Trial %ourt where the petitioner or respondent resides- or that
which has ,urisdiction over the place where the data or information is
gathered- collected or stored- at the option of the petitioner.
&2' upreme %ourt+
&3' %ourt of "ppeals+ or
&:' andiganbayan- when the action concerns public data files of government
offices.
7o doc#et and other lawful fees shall be re!uired from an indigent
petitioner. The petition of the indigent shall be doc#eted and acted upon
immediately- without pre,udice to subse!uent submission of proof of
indigency not later than 1; days from the filing of the petition.
T'e ,eri!ied "ritten &etition s'all alle0e t'e !ollo"in0
&a' The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent+
&b' The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects
the right to life- liberty or security of the aggrieved party+
&c' The actions and recourses ta#en by the petitioner to secure the data or
information+
&d' The location of the files- registers or databases- the government office-
and the person in charge- in possession or in control of the data or
information- if #nown+
&e' The reliefs prayed for- which may include the updating- rectification-
suppression or destruction of the database or information or files #ept by
the respondent. <n case of threats- the relief may include a prayer for an
order en,oining the act complained of+ and
&f' uch other relevant reliefs as are ,ust and e!uitable.
W'en is t'e "rit o! 'a2eas data iss%ed)
2pon the filing of the petition- the court- ,ustice or ,udge shall immediately order
the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The cler# of court shall
issue the writ under the seal of the court and cause it to be served within three
&3' days from its issuance+ or- in case of urgent necessity- the ,ustice or ,udge
may issue the writ under his or her own hand- and may deputi=e any officer or
person to serve it. The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing
of the petition which shall not be later than ten &16' wor# days from the date of its
issuance.
" cler# of court who refuses to issue the writ after its allowance- or a
deputi=ed person who refuses to serve the same- shall be punished by the
court- ,ustice or ,udge for contempt without pre,udice to other disciplinary
actions.
The writ shall be served upon the respondent by the officer or person
deputi=ed by the court- ,ustice or ,udge who shall retain a copy on which to
ma#e a return of service. <n case the writ cannot be served personally on
the respondent- the rules on substituted service shall apply.
The respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting
affidavits within five &;' wor# days from service of the writ- which period
may be reasonably extended by the %ourt for ,ustifiable reasons.
Contents o! Ret%rn
&a' The lawful defenses such as national security- state secrets- privileged
communication- confidentiality of the source of information of media and
others+
&b' <n case of respondent in charge- in possession or in control of the data or
information sub,ect of the petitionA
&i' a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner- the nature of such
data or information- and the purpose for its collection+
&ii' the steps or actions ta#en by the respondent to ensure the security and
confidentiality of the data or information+ and
&iii' the currency and accuracy of the data or information held+ and
&c' Jther allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding.
Ehen the respondent fails to file a return- the court- ,ustice or ,udge shall
proceed to hear the petition ex parte- granting the petitioner such relief as
the petition may warrant unless the court in its discretion re!uires the
petitioner to submit evidence.
<nstead of having the hearing in open court- it can be done in chambers
when the respondent invo#es the defense that the release of the data or
information in !uestion shall compromise national security or state
secrets- or when the data or information cannot be divulged to the public
due to its nature or privileged character.
The hearing on the petition shall be summary. Bowever- the court- ,ustice
or ,udge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and
determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the
parties.
2pon its finality- the ,udgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any lawful
officer as may be designated by the court- ,ustice or ,udge within five &;'
wor# days.
Ehen a criminal action has been commenced- no separate petition for the
writ shall be filed- but the reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion
in the criminal case- and the procedure under this )ule shall govern the
disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of habeas data.
Ehen a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subse!uent to
a petition for a writ of habeas data- the petition shall be consolidated with
the criminal action. "fter consolidation- the procedure under this )ule shall
continue to govern the disposition of the reliefs in the petition.
The introduction of the Erit of Babeas Data into Philippine Dustice ystem
complemented several writs used in the Philippines. These writs which
protect the rights of the individual against the state are as followsA
The Writ o! Ha2eas Cor&%s * a writ ordering a person who
detained another to produce the body and bring it before a ,udge or
court. <ts purpose is to determine whether the detention is lawful or
not+
The Writ o! +andam%s * a writ ordering a governmental agency to
perform a ministerial function+
The Writ o! Pro'i2ition * a writ ordering a person to prohibit the
commission of an illegal act+
The Writ o! Certiorari * a writ ordering a person to correct an
erroneous act committed with grave abuse of discretion+ and
The Writ o! Am&aro * a writ designed to protect the most basic
right of a human being. These are the right to life- liberty and
security guaranteed by the %onstitution.
R. ACCESS TO PU-LIC INFOR+ATION
Section D, Art. III. T'e ri0't o! t'e &eo&le to in!ormation on matters o! &%2lic
concern s'all 2e reco0ni=ed. Access to o!!icial records, and to doc%ments
and &a&ers &ertainin0 to o!!icial acts, transactions, or decisions, as "ell as
to 0o,ernment researc' data %sed as 2asis !or &olic( de,elo&ment, s'all
2e a!!orded t'e citi=en, s%23ect to s%c' limitations as ma( 2e &ro,ided 2(
la".
the citi=enry has a right to #now what is going on in the country and in his
government so he can express his views thereon #nowledgeably and
intelligently.
Ri0'ts 8%aranteed
1. )ight to information on matters of public concern + and
2. %orollary right of access to official records and documents.
These are political rights that are available to citi=ens only &(ernas-
Philippine %onstitution- p. K;'.
Limitations >"s may be provided by law?
Lalmonte v
(elmonte
1IKI
The people have a right to access official records but they canOt
compel custodians of official records to prepare lists- abstracts-
summaries and the li#e- such not being based on a
demandable legal right.
Then right to privacy belongs to the individual and must be
invo#ed by the individual. " public agency li#e the 1<
cannot invo#e the right to privacy.
(aldo=a v
Dimaano
1I45
Dudges cannot prohibit access to ,udicial records. Bowever- a
,udge may regulate the manner in which persons desiring to
inspect- examine or copy records in his office- may exercise
their rights.
.egaspi v
%ivil ervice
%ommission
1IK4
Personal interest is not re!uired in asserting the right to
information on matters of public concern.
Ehat matters constitute >public concern? should be determined
by the court on a case to case basis.
%have= v
P%11
1IIK
Public concern &def.' * writings coming into the hands of public
officers in connection with their official functions
<ll$gotten wealth is- by its nature- a matter of public concern.
Privileged communicationA &1' national security- &2' trade
secrets- &3' criminal matters pending in court-
Echegaray
case
% held that ma#ing the .ethal <n,ection /anual inaccessible
to the convict was unconstitutional.
S. FREEDO+ OF E?PRESSION
Freedom o! S&eec' A >at once the instrument and the guaranty and the bright
consummate flower of all liberty.? &Eendell Philips'
Sco&e
Qreedom of Expression is available only insofar as it is exercised for the
discussion of matters affecting t)e public interest. Purely private interest
matters do not come within the guaranty &invasion of privacy is not
sanctioned by the %onstitution'.
covers ideas that are acceptable to the ma,ority and the unort)odo3 view.
&Jne of the functions of this freedom is >to invite dispute? * 2 upreme
%ourt+ >< may not agree with what you say- but < will defend to the death
your right to say it.? $ Loltaire'
The freedom to spea# includes the right to silent. &This freedom was
meant not only to protect the minority who want to tal# but also to benefit
the ma,ority who refuse to listen. $ ocrates'
Im&ortance
The ultimate good desired is better reached by a free trade in ideas * that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the mar#et+ and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out.
+odes o! E#&ression
&a' Jral and written language
&b' ymbolisms &e.g. bended #nee- salute to the flag- cartoons'
Elements o! Freedom o! E#&ression
&1' Qreedom from prior restraint or censorship
&2' Qreedom from subse!uent punishment
Freedom From Pre,io%s Restraint or Censors'i&
Section ;, Art. III. No la" s'all 2e &assed a2rid0in0 t'e !reedom o! s&eec',
o! e#&ression, or o! t'e &ress, or t'e ri0't o! t'e &eo&le &eacea2l( to
assem2le and &etition t'e 0o,ernment !or redress o! 0rie,ances.
Censors'i& * conditions the exercise of freedom of expression upon the prior
approval of the government. Jnly those ideas acceptable to it are allowed to be
disseminated.
%ensor- therefore- assumes the role of arbiter for the people- usually
applying his own sub,ective standards in determining the good and the
not. uch is anathema in a free society.
<n Ne" 4or: Times ,. United States- the %ourt held that prohibition of
>prior restraint? is not absolute- although any system of prior restraint
comes to court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutionality.
<n Near ,. +innesota- the exceptions to the prohibition of >prior restraint is
enumerated by the %ourt- thusA >Ehen a nation is at war- many things that
might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort .... 7o
one would !uestion but that government might prevent actual obstruction
to its recruiting service or the publication of sailing dates of transports or
the number or location of troops.... The security of the community life may
be protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by
force of orderly government.?
<n SWS ,. Comelec- ec. 1 of )" 7o. I665- the Qair Election "ct says
that surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen
&1;' days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall
not be published seven days before an election. The provision is
challenged as violative of freedom of expression. The %ourt held that as
prior restraint- the rule is presumed to be invalid. The power of the
%omelec over media franchises is limited to ensuring >e!ual opportunity-
time- space and the right to reply? as well as to reasonable rates of
charges for the use of media facilities for >public information and forums
among candidates.? Bere the prohibition of speech is direct- absolute and
substantial. 7or does the rule pass the J3(rien test for content related
regulation because &1' it suppresses one type of expression while
allowing other types such as editorials- etc. and &2' the restriction is
greater than what is needed to protect government interest because the
interest can be protected by narrower restriction such as subse!uent
punishment.
<n Re Re5%est !or Radio.T/ Co,era0e o! t'e Estrada Trial- the %ourt
held that the propriety of the Estrada trial involves the weighing out of the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public
information- on the one hand- and the fundamental rights of the accused-
on the other hand- along with the constitutional power of a court to control
its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial... Eith the possibility
of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an accused- it
behooves all to ma#e absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict
solely on the basis of a ,ust and dispassionate ,udgment...?
The doctrine of freedom of speech was formulated primarily for the
protection of >core speech-? i.e.- speech which communicates political-
social or religious ideas. %ommercial speech- however- does not.
1ros,ean vs
"merican
Press %o.
There need not be total suppression+ even restriction of
circulation constitutes censorship
(urgos vs
%hief of taff
the search- padloc#ing and sealing of the offices of
/etropolitan /ail and Ee Qorum by military authorities-
resulting in the discontinuance of publication of the
newspapers- was held to be prior restraint
/utuc vs
%J/E.E%
the %J/E.E% prohibition against the use of taped ,ingles in
the mobile units used in the campaign was held to be
unconstitutional- as it was in the nature of censorship
anidad vs
%J/E.E%
the %ourt annulled the %J/E.E% prohibition against radio
commentators or newspaper columnists from commenting on
the issues involved in the scheduled plebiscite on the organic
law creating the %ordillera "utonomous )egion as an
unconstitutional restraint on freedom of expression
But...
1on=ales vs
%J/E.E%
the %ourt upheld the validity of the law which prohibited-
except during the prescribed election period- the ma#ing of
speeches- announcements or commentaries for or against
the election of any party or candidate for public office.
D2T<Q<%"T<J7A the inordinate preoccupation of the people
with politics tended toward the neglect of the other serious
needs of the nation and the pollution of its suffrages.
<glesia ni %risto
vs %"
The (oard of )eview for /otion Pictures and Television
&()/PT' has the authority to review the petitioner3s television
program.
Bowever- the (oard acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it gave an >M$rating? to the TL program on the ground of
>attac#s against another religion.? uch a classification can
be ,ustified only if there is a showing that the tv program
would create a clear and present danger of an evil which the
tate ought to prevent.
Primicias vs
Qugosos
The respondent mayor could only reasonably regulate- not
absolutely prohibit- the use of public places for the purpose
indicated.
7ational Press
%lub vs
%J/E.E%
the upreme %ourt upheld the validity of ec. 11&b'- )" 55:5-
which prohibited any person ma#ing use of the media to sell
or to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign
or other political purposes except to the %J/E.E%. This was
held to be within the power of the %J/E.E% to supervise the
en,oyment or utili=ation of franchises for the operation of
media of communication and information- for the purpose of
ensuring e!ual opportunity- time and space- and the >right to
reply-? as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for
the use of such media facilities.
JsmeTa vs
%J/E.E%
% reaffirmed validity of )" 55:5 as a legitimate exercise of
police power. The regulation is unrelated to the suppression
of speech- as any restriction on freedom of expression
occasioned thereby is only incidental and no more than is
necessary to achieve the purpose of promoting e!uality.
7JTEA This is not inconsistent with the ruling in PP< vs
%J/E.E%- because in the latter- % simply said that
%J/E.E% cannot procure print space without paying ,ust
compensation.
"diong vs
%J/E.E%
%J/E.E%3s resolution prohibiting the posting of decals- and
stic#ers in mobile units li#e cars and other moving vehicles
was declared unconstitutional for infringmenet of freedom of
expression.
(esides- the constitutional ob,ective of giving the rich and
poor candidates3 e!ual opportunity to inform the electorate is
not violated by the posting of decals and stic#ers on cars and
other vehicles.
>O,er2readt' doctrine? U prohibits the government from
achieving its purpose by means that weep unnecessarily
broadly- reaching constitutionally protected as well as
unprotected activity+ t)e government )as gone too far+ its
legitimate interest can be satisfied without reaching so
broadly into the area of protected freedom.
1on=ales vs
#atigba#
petitioner !uestioned the classification of the movie as >for
adults only.? the petition was dismissed because the (oard
did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
Freedom From S%2se5%ent P%nis'ment
Section 6E*61, Art. III. No &erson s'all 2e detained solel( 2( reason o! 'is
&olitical 2elie!s and as&irations.
Eithout this assurance- the individual would hesitate to spea# for fear that
he might be held to account for his speech- or that he might be provo#ing
the vengeance of the officials he may have critici=ed.
7ot absolute+ sub,ect to police power and may be regulated &freedom of
expression does not cover ideas offensive to public order'
Ri0't o! st%dents to !ree s&eec' in sc'ool &remises not a2sol%te
1eneral )uleA a student shall not be expelled or suspended solely on the basis of
articles he has written
ExceptionA when the article materially disrupts class wor# or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of rights of others- the school has the right to discipline its
students &in such a case- it may expel or suspend the student'
Tests o! ,alid 0o,ernmental inter!erence
(criteria in determining t)e liability of t)e individual for ideas e3pressed by him'
1. %lear and present danger rule
2. Dangerous tendency doctrine
3. (alance of interest test
6. Clear and Present Dan0er R%le * when words are used in such
circumstance and of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that will
bring about the substantive evil that the tate has a right to prevent. &"s
formulated by Dustice Bolmes in Sc'enc: ,. United States'
Clear * causal connection with the danger of the substantive evil arising from the
utterance
Present * time element+ imminent and immediate danger &the danger must not
only be probable but also inevitable'. *8on=ales ,. Comelec1
<n A-S.C-N ,. Comelec- the %omelec banned >exit polls? in the exercise
of its authority to regulate the holders of media franchises during the
lection period. <t contends that >an exit poll has the tendency to sow
confusion considering the randomness of selecting interviewees....
Bowever- the %ourt said that exit polls constitute an essential part of the
freedoms of speech and of the press. Bence- the %omelec cannot ban
totally in the guise of of promoting clean- honest- orderly and credible
elections. The ban does not satisfy the clear and present danger rule
because the evils envisioned are merely speculative.
Terminiello vs %ity of
%hicago
&speech inside an auditorium with K66
persons'
speech is often provocative and
challenging. hence- >fighting words? are not
sufficient to convict a person absent a clear
and present danger of a serious substantive
evil
Primicias vs Qugosos The respondent mayor could only reasonably
regulate- not absolutely prohibit- the use of
public places for the purpose indicated.
the condition of /anila at that time did
not ,ustify the mayor3s fears. there was no
clear and present danger.
decided in 1I:4
7avarro vs Lillegas &compare with Primicias case'
% sustained respondent mayor3s act of
refusing to issue a permit enabling students to
hold a public rally. /ayor feared the rally would
result to public disorder.
$ decided in 1I46
)eyes vs (agatsing the denial of a permit to hold a public rally was
invalid as there was no showing of the
probability of a clear and present danger of an
evil that might arise as a result of the meeting.
The burden of proving such eventually rests on
the /ayor.
7. Dan0ero%s Tendenc( Doctrine A if the words uttered create a dangerous
tendency of an evil which the tate has the right to prevent.&Ca2ansa0 ,.
Fernande=1
Dustice Bolmes- criti'ue of this doctrineA Every idea is an incitement. <f
believed- it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it- or some
failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth.
(ayan vs Executive
ecretary Ermita
&f' the %alibrated Pre$emptive )esponse
Policy is null and void. )espondents are
en,oined from using it and to strictly observe
the re!uirements of maximum tolerance.
%abansag vs Qernande= <t is not necessary that some definite or
immediate acts of force or violence be
advocated. <t is sufficient that such acts be
advocated in general terms.
" mere tendency toward the evil was enough.
People vs Pere= "ccused declaredA >The Qilipinos li#e myself
must use bolos for cutting off &1overnor$
1eneral' Eood3s head for having
recommended a bad thing for the Qilipinos- for
he has #illed our independence.?
Be was sentenced to ,ail.
9. -alance o! Interest Test * when particular conduct is regulated in the interest
of public order- and the regulation results in an indirect- conditional- partial
abridgment of speech- the duty of the courts is to determine which of the two
conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the circumstances
presented. *American Comm%nications Association ,. Do%ds1
CLEAR AND
PRESENT DAN8ER
RULE
DAN8EROUS
TENDENC4 RULE
-ALANCE OF INTEREST
RULE
liberty is preferred Aut)ority is preferred the issue is resolved in the
light of the peculiar
circumstances obtaining in
each particular case
<n +%t%c ,. Comelec- the preferred freedom of expression calls all the
more the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination
of information to ma#e more meaningful the e!ually vital right of suffrage.
Ehen faced with border line situations where freedom &of expression' to spea# V
freedom to #now &to information' are invo#ed against &vs.' maintaining free and
clean elections$ the police- local officials and %J/E.E% should lean in favor of
freedom.
Qor in the ultimate analysis- the freedom of the citi=en and the tateOs power to
regulate are 7JT "7T"1J7<T<%.
There can be no free and honest elections if in the efforts to maintain them- the
freedom to spea# and the right to #now are unduly curtailed.
Ee examine the limits of regulation. D. Qeliciano shows that regulation of election
campaign activity may not pass the test of validity ifA
<t is too general in its terms
7ot limited in time and scope in its application
<t if restricts oneOs expression of belief in a candidate or oneOs opinion of
his or her !ualifications-
<f it cuts off the flow of media reporting
<f the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the
constitutionally sanctioned ob,ective.
The regulation stri#es at the freedom of an individual to express his preference
and- by displaying it on his car- to convince others to agree with him. " stic#er
may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed
in his private vehicle- the expression becomes a statement by the owner-
primarily his own and not of anybody else.
The 0eneral r%le for a speech to be considered libelous or defamatory isA
.ibel U falsity G actual malice &uttered in full #nowledge of its falsity or with
rec#less disregard'
E#em&tion Ehen the sub,ect of the supposed libelous or defamatory material is
a public officer. Defamatory words may be uttered against them and not be
considered libelous. The reason is that 1' they as#ed for it &>they voluntarily
thrust themselves into the public eye and therefore should not be thin$s#inned?'+
2' itOs a matter of public interest+ and 3' public figures have the opportunity and
resources to rebut whatever is said against them. &Policarpio vs /anila Times'+ &
Ne" 4or: Times ,s S%lli,an'
<n Ne" 4or: Times ,. S%lli,an- The 7ew Ror# Times is protected under
the freedom of speech in publishing paid advertisement- no matter if it
contained erroneous claims and facts. aid publication was not
>commercial? in the sense that it communicated information- expressed
opinion- recited grievances- protested claimed abuses- and sought a
financial support on behalf of a movement. That the Times was paid for
publishing the advertisement is as immaterial as the fact that newspapers
and boo#s are sold.
7ewspapers do not forfeit the protection they en,oy under speech freedom ,ust
because they publish paid advertisements. Jtherwise- newspapers will be
discouraged from carrying >editorial advertisements? and so might shut off an
important outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by persons who do
not themselves have access to publishing facilities.
Jn errorsA >ome degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every
thing+ and in no instance is this truer than that of the press.? Erroneous statement
is inevitable in free debate.
/oreover- criticism of official conduct does not lose its constitutional protection
merely because it is effective criticism and hence diminishes their official
reputations. Presence of clear and present danger of substantive evil must be
proved. "ctual /alice needs to be proved if a public official wants to recover
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct. >Even a false
statement may be deemed to ma#e a valuable contribution to public debate since
it brings about the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth- produced by
its collision with error.?
<n 1on=ales v. Halaw$Hatigba#- Hapit sa Patalim was classified as >Qor
"dults Jnly? by the /T)%( and was suggested to have certain portions
cut0 deleted.
BeldA /T)%( do not have the power to exercise prior restraint. The power of the
/T)%( is limited to the classification of films.
The test to determine whether a motion picture exceeds the bounds of
permissible exercise of free speech and- therefore should be censored- is the
clear and present danger test.
Assem2l( and Petition
The right to assemble is not sub,ect to prior restraint and may not be
conditioned upon the prior issuance of a permit or authori=ation from the
government authorities. Bowever- the right must be exercised in such a
way that it will not pre,udice the public welfare. &De la Cr%= ,. Co%rt o!
A&&eals1
<f assembly is to be held at a public place- permit for the use of such
place- and not for the assembly itself- may be validly re!uired. Power of
local officials is merely for regulation and not for prohibition. *Primicias ,.
F%0oso1
Permit for public assembly is not necessary if meeting is to be held inA a
private place+ the campus of a government$owned or operated educational
institution+ and freedom par#. *-.P. -l0. EEJ . FT'e P%2lic Assem2l( Act
o! 6KE<H1
<n $-L Re(es ,. -a0atsin0- retired D. D(. )eyes sought a permit from the
%ity of /anila to hold a march and rally on Jct 25- 1IK3 2$;pm from
.uneta to gates of 2 Embassy- and was denied by the /ayor due to
Lienna %onvention Jrdinance and fear of subversives may infiltrate the
ran#s of the demonstrators.
BeldA no ,ustifiable ground to deny permit because (ill of )ights will prevail over
Lienna Jrdinance should conflict exist &none proven because ;66m not
measured from gate to 2 Embassy proper' and fear of serious in,ury cannot
alone ,ustify suppression of free speech and assembly$ only clear and present
danger of substantive evil.
7otesA the %ourt is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights
to free speech and peaceful assemblyS
Tanada vs
(agatsing
% sustained the petitioner3s motion compelling the mayor of
/anila to issue a permit to hold a rally- but changed the
meeting place to 2garte Qield- a private par#
/alabanan vs
)amento
&several students were suspended for 1 year for conducting
demonstration in the premises of a university outside the area
permitted by the school authorities'
% emphasi=ed that the students did not shed their
constitutional rights to free speech at the schoolhouse gate-
and permitted the students to re$enroll and finish their
studies.
Lillar vs T<P &several students were barred from re$enrollment for
participating in demonstrations'
while the %ourt upheld the academic freedom of institutions of
higher learning- which includes the right to set academic
standards to determine under what circumstances failing
grades suffice for expulsion of students- it was held that this
right cannot be utili=ed to discriminate against those who
exercise their constitutional rights to peaceful assembly.
7on vs Dames % abandons its ruling in "lcua= vs P(" &that enrolment of
a student is a semester$to$semester contract and the school
may not be compelled to renew the contract' upholding the
primacy of freedom of expression- because the students do
not shed theur constitutionally protected rights at the school
gate.
P(/
Employees
"ssoc vs P(/
right to free assembly and petition prevails over economic
rights.
Tests o! a la"!%l assem2l(
*61 P%r&ose Test
ideally- the test should be the purpose for which the assembly is held-
regardless of the auspices under which it is organi=ed
*71 A%s&ices Test
Evengelista vs EarnshawA the mayor of /anila prohibited the members
of the %ommunist Party from holding any #ind of meeting- revo#ing all
permits previously granted by him on the ground that the party had
been found &by the fiscal3s office' to be an illegal association.
<n Peo&le ,. -%stos- (ustos and several people sent complaint letters via
counsel against Dustice of Peace )oman Punsalan- who charged them
with libel.
BeldA (ustos and the others were ac!uitted-
)atioA the guarantees of free speech and a free press include the right to critici=e
,udicial conduct. "nd these people did so in proper channels without undue
publicity- believing they were right.
Ri0't o! Association
Section E, Art. III. T'e ri0't o! t'e &eo&le, incl%din0 t'ose em&lo(ed in t'e
&%2lic and &ri,ate sectors, to !orm %nions, associations, or societies !or
&%r&oses not contrar( to la" s'all not 2e a2rid0ed.
The )ight of "ssociation is deemed embraced in freedom of expression because
the organi=ation can be used as a vehicle for the expression of views that have a
bearing on public welfare.

Employees
"ssoc vs %"
right to organi=e does not carry with it right to stri#e
Lictoriano vs
Eli=alde )ope
Eor#ers3
2nion
Jccena vs
%J/E.E%
right of association was not violated where political parties
were prohibited from participating in the barangay elections to
insure the non$partisanship of the candidates.
<n re Edillon (ar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. <ntegration does not ma#e a lawyer a member of any
group of which he is not already a member.
T. O-SCENIT4 CASES
2 vs Hottinger % ac!uitted accused who was charged of having
offered for sale pictures of half$clad members of
non$%hristian tribes- holding that he had only
presented them in their native attire
People vs 1o Pin "ccused was convicted for exhibiting nude
paintings and pictures- notwithstanding his claim
that he had done so in the interest of art. %-
noting that he has charged admission fees to the
exhibition- held that his purpose was commercial-
not merely artistic.
Pita vs %" % declared that the determination of what is
obscene is a ,udicial function.
/iller vs %alifornia Test of JbscenityA
whether the average person- applying
contemporary community standards- would
find that the wor#- ta#en as a whole-
appeals to the prurient interest
whether the wor# depicts- in a patently
offensive way- sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable law
whether the wor#- ta#en as a whole- lac#s
serious literary- artistic- political or scientific
value
Dustice Douglas- dissentA < do not thin# we- the
,udges- were ever given the constitutional power to
ma#e definitions of obscenity. Jbscenity is a
hodgepodge.
$ The %ourts should not apply a national standard but the standard of t)e
community in which the material is being tested.
<n Reno ,. ACLU- %ommunications Decency "ct see# to protect minors
from obscenity on the internet.
BeldA overbroad- vague- unconstitutional.
7otesA exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected
by the Qirst "mendment.
The internet is not an >invasive? medium because it re!uires a series of
affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely turning a dial &tv or
radio'.
There is no effective way to determine the identity or the age of a user who is
accessing material through email- mail exploders- newsgroups or chat rooms.
The %ommunity tandard as applied to the internet means that any
communication available to a nationwide audience will be ,udged by the
standards of the community most li#ely to be offended by the message.
The effect of %D" is such that when a site is bloc#ed for being >indecent? or
>patently offensive? the remaining content even if not indecent cannot be viewed
anymore. <mposition of re!uirements &adult identification number or credit card'
would bar adults who do not have a credit card and lac# the resources to obtain
one from accessing any bloc#ed material. <t burdens communication among
adults.
The %D" is punitive- a criminal statute. The %D" is a content$ based blan#et
restriction on speech- and as such- cannot be properly analy=ed as a form of
time- place and manner regulation.
The %D" was replaced with %hild Jnline Protection "ct- 1. The scope had
been limited to material displayed only on the world wide web. %hat and
email were not included. The classification of content was limited as
>harmful to minors? using the /iller L %alifornia Test. o- it was upheld by
the upreme %ourt.
7otesA the %ourtOs Durisprudence teaches that it is the publisherOs responsibility
to abide by that communityOs standards.
The fact that distributors of allegedly obscene materials may be sub,ected to
varying community standards in the various federal ,udicial districts into which
they transmit the materials does not render a federal statute unconstitutional.
$ Criticism of 2fficial Conduct
.agun=ad vs otto Lda.
de 1on=ales
the %ourt granted the petition to restrain the public
exhibition of the movie >/oises Padilla tory-?
because it contained fictionali=ed embellishments.
(eing a public figure does not destroy one3s right
to privacy.
"yer Productions vs
Dudge %apulong
the tribunal upheld the primacy of freedom of
expression over Enrile3s >right to privacy-? because
Enrile was a public figure and a public figure3s right
to privacy is narrower than that of an ordinary
citi=en. (esides- the movie >Qour Days of
)evolution &sabi ni %ru='? 0 >" Dangerous .ife
&sabi ni 7achura'? 0 >The Qour Day )evolution
&sabi sa case'? would not be historically faithful
without including therein the participation of Enrile
in the ED" revolution.
2 vs (ustos % compared criticism of official conduct to a
>scalpel that relieves the abscesses of officialdom?
People vs "larcon newspaper publications tending to impede-
obstruct- embarrass or influence the courts in
administering ,ustice in a pending suit or
proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is
summarily punishable by the courts.
<n re Durado a publication that tends to impede- embarrass or
obstruct the court and constitutes a clear and
present danger to the administration of ,ustice is
not protected by the guarantee of press freedom
and is punishable by contempt.
<t is not necessary that publication actually
obstructs the administration of ,ustice- it is enough
that it tends to do so.
<n re otto a senator was punished for contempt for having
attac#ed a decision of % which he called
incompetent and narrow$minded- and announcing
that he would file a bill for its reorgani=ation
<n re Tulfo Tulfo3s >ang#atuta# na (obo? column was held
contumacious. Qreedom of the press is
subordinate to the decision- authority and integrity
of the ,udiciary and the proper administration of
,ustice.
<n re .aureta a lawyer was held in contempt and suspended
from the practice of law for wrting individual letters
to members of the % division that decided a case
against his client- arrogantly !uestioning their
decision
Waldivar vs
andiganbayan
a member of the (ar who imputed charges of
improper influence- corruption and other misdeeds
to members of the upreme %ourt was suspended
from the practice of law as >neither the right of free
speech nor the right to engage in political
activities can be so construed or extended as to
permit any such liberties to a member of the bar.?
U. FREEDO+ OF RELI8ION
Section <, Art. III. No la" s'all 2e made res&ectin0 an esta2lis'ment o!
reli0ion, or &ro'i2itin0 t'e !ree e#ercise t'ereo!. T'e !ree e#ercise and
en3o(ment o! reli0io%s &ro!ession and "ors'i&, "it'o%t discrimination or
&re!erence, s'all !ore,er 2e allo"ed. No reli0io%s test s'all 2e re5%ired !or
t'e e#ercise o! ci,il or &olitical ri0'ts.
Reli0ion de!ined
>any specific system of belief- worship- conduct- etc.- often involving a
code of ethics and philosophy? &defined by %ru='
<n A0li&a( ,s R%i= religion is defined as >a profession of faith to an active
power that binds and elevates man to his %reator.
T"o 8%arantees Contained Section <, Art. III o! t'e Constit%tion
&1' 7on$establishment clause
&2' Qree exercise of religious profession and worship
6. Non.esta2lis'ment Cla%se
reinforces ec. 5- "rt. << on the separation of church and tate
other provisions which support thisA ec 2&;'- "rt. <M$% 8a religious sect or
denomination cannot be registered as a political party9- ec ;&2'- "rt. L<
8no sectoral representative from the religious sector9- and ec 2I &2'- "rt.
L< 8prohibition against the use of public money or property for the benefit
of any religion- or of any priest- minister or ecclsiastic9- ec. 2K &3'- "rt. L<
8exemption from taxation of properties actually- directly and exclusively
used for religious purposes- ec :&2'- "rt M<L 8citi=enship re!uirement of
ownership of educational institutions except those owned by religious
groups9- ec 2I&2'- "rt L< 8appropriation allowed where the minister is
employed in the armed forces- penal institution or government$owned
orphanage or leprosarium9
Sco&eA The tate
&a' cannot set up a church+
&b' cannot pass laws which aid one religion- all religions or prefer one over
another+
&c' cannot influence a person to go to or remain away from church against his
will+ nor
&d' force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.
RationaleA
to delineate boundaries between the two institutions+ and
to avoid encroachment by one against the other.
A %nion o! C'%rc' and State "o%ld eit'er
tend to destroy government and to degrade religion+ or
result in a conspiracy because of its composite strength
separation of church and state is not a !all of )ostility
The 1overnment is neutral. <t protects all- but prefers none and
disparages none.
Qreedom of religion includes freedom from religion+ the right to worship
includes right not to worship
T"o ,al%es so%0't to 2e &rotected 2( t'e non.esta2lis'ment cla%se
&1' /ol%ntarism * the growth of a religious sect as a social force must come
from the voluntary support of its members because of the belief that both
spiritual and secular society will benefit if religions are allowed to compete
on their own intrinsic merit without benefit of official patronage.
&2' Ins%lation o! t'e &olitical &rocess !rom inter!ait' dissension *
voluntarism cannot be achieved unless the political process is insulated
from religion and unless religion is insulated politics.
Engel vs Litale recitation by students in public schools in 7ew Ror# of a
prayer composed by the (oard of )egents was
unconstitutional
Everson vs (oard
of Education
2 upreme %ourt sustained the law providing free
transportation for all schoolchildren without
discrimination- including those attending parochial
schools
(oard of
Education vs "llen
2 upreme %ourt sustained the law re!uiring the
petitioner to lend textboo#s free of charge to all students
from grades 4$12- including those attending private
schools
<n &verson and Allen- the government aid was given directly to the student
and parents- not to the church$related school
"dong vs %heong
eng 1ee
in line with the constitutional principle of e!ual treatment
of all religions- the tate recogni=es the validity of
marriages performed in conformity with the rites of
/ohammedan religion
)ubi vs Provincial
(oard
the expression >non$%hristian? in >non$%hristian tribes?
was not meant to discriminate. <t refers to degree of
civili=ation- not to the religious belief.
<slamic Da3wah
%ouncil of the
Philippines vs
Jffice of Exec.
ec.
by arrogating to itself the tas# of issuing halal
certifications- the tate has- in effect- forced /uslims to
accept its own interpretation of the Cur3an and unna on
)alal food.
Intram%ral Reli0io%s Dis&%te A outside the ,urisdiction of the secular
authorities
1on=ales vs
"rchbishop of
/anila
where a civil right depends upon some matter pertaining
to ecclesiastical affairs- the civil tribunal tries the civil right
and nothing more.
Qonacier v %" where the dispute involves the property rights of the
religious group- or the relations of the members where the
property rights are involved- the civil courtws may assume
,urisdiction.
7. Free E#ercise Cla%se
T"o As&ects o! Free E#ercise Cla%se
6. Freedom to -elie,e
&a' absolute
&b' includes not to believe
&c' >everyone has a right to his beliefs and he may not be called to
account because he cannot prove what he believes?
7. Freedom to Act Accordin0 to OneHs -elie!s
&a' happens when the individual externali=es his beliefs in acts or omissions
&b' sub,ect to regulation+ can be en,oyed only with proper regard to rights of
others
&c' Dustice Qran#furterA the constitutional provision on religious freedom
terminated disabilities- it did not create new privileges... its essence is
freedom from conformity to religious dogma- not freedom from conformity
to law because of religious dogma
1erman vs (arangan % found that petitioners were not sincere in
their profession of religious liberty and were
using it merely to express their opposition to
the government
Ebralinag vs division
uperintendent of chools of
%ebu
% reversed 1erona vs ec. of Educ. - and
upheld the right of petitioners to refute to
salute the Philippine flag on account of their
religious scruples. To compel students to
ta#e part in a flag ceremony when it is against
their religious beliefs will violate their religious
freedom.
People vs Wosa invocation of religious scruples in order to
avoid military service was brushed aside by
the %
Lictoriano vs Eli=alde )ope
Eor#ers 2nion
% upheld the validity of )" 33;6- exempting
members of a religious sect from being
compelled to ,oin a labor union
"merican (ible ociety vs %ity
of /anila
the constitutional guarantee of free exercise
carries with it the right to disseminate
information- and any restraint of such right
can be ,ustified only on the ground that there
is a clear and present danger of an evil which
the tate has the right to prevent+
Bence- %ity ordinance imposing license fees
to on sale is inapplicable to the society
Tolentino vs ec. of Qinance the free exercise clause does not prohibit
imposing a generally applicable sales and
use tax on the sale of religious materials+
the registration fee is not imposed for the
exerise of a privilege- but only for the purpose
of defraying part of the cost of registration
Com&ellin0 State Interest test 8Estrada vs Escritor9
the constitution3s religion clause3s prescribe not a strict bu a
benevolent neutrality &which recogni=es that government must
pursue its secular goals and interests- but at the same time- strive
to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within
flexible constitutional limits
benevolent neutrality could allow for accomodation morality based
on religion provided it does not offend the compelling state interest
test.
two steps &as regards the test'A
in!uire whether respondent3s right to religious freedom
has been burdened+ and
ascertain respondent3s sincerity in her religious belief.
<n Centeno ,s /illalon.Pornillos- the %ourt held that solicitiations for
religious purposes re!uires not a prior permit from DED as it is not
included in solicitations for >charitable or public welfare purposes.?
Reli0io%s Tests
PurposeA to stop government3s clandestine attempts to prevent a person
from exercising his civil of political rights because of his religious beliefs.
<n Pamil ,. Teleron- ec. 214; of the )evised "dminsitrative %ode is
!uestioned whether or not it is consistent with the religious clause of the
%onstitution. aid %ode dis!ualifies an >ecclesiastic? from being elected
or appointed to a municipal office. even Dustices voted to consider this
a prohibited >religious test.? Qive ,ustices said it is not a religious test but a
safeguard against the constant threat of union of %hurch and tate that
has mar#ed the Philippine history. &Bence- since the ma,ority vote needed
under the 1I43 %onstitution to nullify a statute was not reached- the
dis!ualification remains enforceable.'
People vs Wosa invocation of religious scruples in order to avoid military
service was brushed aside by the %
/. RI8HT TO TRA/EL
Section I, Art. III. T'e li2ert( o! a2ode and o! c'an0in0 t'e same "it'in t'e
limits &rescri2ed 2( la" s'all not 2e im&aired e#ce&t %&on la"!%l order o!
t'e co%rt. Neit'er s'all t'e ri0't to tra,el 2e im&aired e#ce&t in t'e interest
o! national sec%rit(, &%2lic sa!et(, or &%2lic 'ealt', as ma( 2e &ro,ided 2(
la".
Li2ert( 8%aranteed 2( Sec. I Art. III
1. freedom to choose and change one3s place of abode+ and
2. freedom to travel both within the country and outside
Limitations
.iberty of "bode * >upon lawful order of the court?
)ight to Travel * >national security- public safety or public health as may
be provided by law?
%aunca vs
ala=ar
K2 Phil K;1
Ehether a maid had the right to transfer to another
residence even if she had not paid yet the amount
advances by an employment agencyA
Res. The fortunes of business cannot be controlled by
controlling a fundamental human freedom.
Buman dignity and freedom are essentially spiritual *
inseparable from the idea of eternal. /oney- power- etc.
belong to the ephemeral and perishable.
)ubi vs Provincial The respondents were ,ustified in re!uiring the members
(oard of /indoro
1I1I
of certain non$%hristian tribes to reside in a reservation-
for their better education- advancement and protection.
The measure was a legitimate exercise of police power.
Lillavicencio vs
.u#ban
1I1I
Prostitutes- despite being in a sense lepers- are not
chattels but Philippine citi=ens- protected by the same
constitutional guarantee of freedom of abode. They may
not be compelled to change their domicile in the absence
of a law allowing such.
alonga vs
Bermoso
I4 %)" 121
the case became moot and academic when the permit to
travel abroad was issued before the case could be heard.
.oren=o vs Dir. of
Bealth
1I24
.aws for the segregation of lepers have been provided the
world over and is supported by high scientific authority.
uch segregation is premised on the duty to protect public
health.
/anoto# vs %"
1IK5
(ail posted in a criminal case- is a valid restriction on the
right to travel. (y its nature- it may serve as a prohibition
on an accused from leaving the ,urisdiction of the
Philippines where orders of Philippine courts would have
no binding force.
/arcos vs
/anglapus
1IKI
The liberty of abode and the right to travel includes the
right to leave- reside and travel within oneOs country but it
does not include the right to return to oneOs country.
7JTEA %ourt warned that this case should not create a
precedent because /arcos was a class in himself.
Philippine
"ssociation of
ervice Exporters
vs Drilon
1IKK
)ight to travel may be impaired in the interest of national
security- public health or public order- as may be provided
by law.
"n order temporarily suspending the deployment of
overseas wor#ers is constitutional for having been issued
in the interest of the safety of JQEs- as provided by the
.abor %ode.