Violence and Migration: Central America

AmericasBarometer Insights: 2014
Number 101
Violence and Migration in Central America

By Jonathan Hiskey
j.hiskey@vanderbilt.edu
Vanderbilt University

Mary Malone
mary.malone@unh.edu
University of New Hampshire

Diana Orcés
diana.m.orces@vanderbilt.edu
Vanderbilt University
Executive Summary. Over the past decade, much of Central America has been devastated by
alarming increases in crime and violence. For most of this timeframe, migration from many of these
same countries to the United States increased as well, at least until the 2008 financial crisis
deflated migration numbers. In the following Insights report, we examine the possible relationship
between high levels of violence and Central Americans’ migration intentions. Though conventional
views of the motivations behind migration tend to highlight economic and familial factors as the
principal causes of migration, we find that crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity among
Central Americans also play a significant role in determining the extent to which an individual
considers migration as a viable strategy. Nonetheless, in the face of consistently high levels of
crime and violence, perceptions of insecurity among Central Americans over the past ten years
have been declining, suggesting perhaps a populace that has become accustomed to a high crime
context and thus one less inclined to let crime influence future migration patterns.
The Insights Series is co-edited by Jonathan Hiskey, Mitchell A. Seligson and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister
with administrative, technical, and intellectual support from the LAPOP group at Vanderbilt.
www.AmericasBarometer.org
Violence and Migration
Hiskey, Malone and Orcés
H omicide rates, and crime

more generally, have been on
a tragically steady rise across much
Figure 1. Intentional homicide rate per 100,000 population
(2000-2011)
100
of Central America over the past Honduras
90
several years. With the increasing 80
presence of drug trafficking El Salvador
70
organizations (DTOs) and the
60
proliferation of street gangs, citizen
security in countries like Honduras 50
Guatemala
and El Salvador has evaporated. 40
30
Panama
In this Insights report we examine 20
Nicaragua
one potential consequence of these 10 Costa Rica
increased levels of crime and 0
violence – migration.1 Through 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
analysis of the LAPOP
AmericasBarometer survey data2, Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “UNODC Homicide
Statistics.” <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html>
we examine whether fear of crime
and crime victimization seems to be
driving some Central Americans to Crime, Violence and Migration in
seek a better life in another country. Central America
Given the role of criminal organizations As evident in Figure 1, violent crime in
in fueling much of the violence, and the Central America, and Honduras and El
pervasive corruption that tends to Salvador in particular, has reached
accompany these criminal unprecedented levels. At the same
organizations, we also examine the time, the past ten years has also
linkages between perceptions of witnessed an equally significant rise in
corruption, as well as personal migration rates for many of these same
experiences with corrupt officials, and countries. In fact, the number of
intentions to migrate. Central American migrants to the U.S.
between 2000 and 2010 increased over
1 Prior issues in the Insights Series can be found at:
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.
50 percent, faster than any other
The data on which they are based can be found at migrant‐sending region in Latin
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php
2 Funding for the 2012 round mainly came from the United America (Stoney and Batalova 2013).
States Agency for International Development (USAID). This overall increase occurred despite a
Important sources of support were also the Inter‐American
Development Bank (IADB), the United Nations drop in migration rates following the
Development Program (UNDP), and Vanderbilt University. 2008 global financial crisis, which
This Insights report is solely produced by LAPOP and the
opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not greatly diminished the level of demand
necessarily reflect the point of view of the United States for migrant labor in the U.S. market.
Agency for International Development, or any other
supporting agency.
© 2014, Latin American Public Opinion Project Insights series Page 1
Many observers have posited a

connection between Central Figure 2. Migration Intentions, Crime Victimization and
Perception of Insecurity in Central America
America’s rising crime rates and the
significant outflow of migrants from
40
the region. A recent report in The
Guardian claims that “[e]xtreme 35
violence in Central America is
Percentage (%)
sending a surge of refugees fleeing 30
north to Mexico” and likens this

“exodus” to that of citizens fleeing a 25
civil war (Tuckman 2013). More

20
rigorous work on this question also
finds a significant effect for violence 15
and political instability on migration
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
in cases such as Nicaragua during Migration Intentions Perception of Insecurity (Very & Somewhat) Crime Victimization
the Contra war (Lundquist and Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP
Massey 2005) and Guatemala during
the height of its civil war (Morrison

and May 1994). Indeed, currently the
Of particular interest for understanding
leading migrant‐sending countries in
the impact of crime on Central
the region, El Salvador, Guatemala, and
American migration rates is the degree
Honduras, are also those confronting
to which being a victim of crime versus
the highest levels of crime and
simply feeling unsafe in one’s
violence. All of these countries,
neighborhood leads to migration. For
however, also have pre‐‐established
while the number of those directly
migration networks, making unclear
affected by crime in Central America is
the precise connection between crime,
staggering, there are even greater
violence, and the migration decision.
numbers of Central Americans who

feel unsafe in their neighborhoods even
Through analysis of
though they may not have been
AmericasBarometer survey data from
personally victimized by crime.
2004 through 2012, we attempt to
Therefore, identifying the relative
clarify the relationship between crime
impact each factor has on migration
and migration after taking into account
becomes essential for a complete
the more conventional predictors of
assessment of crime’s impact on
migration such as age, gender, income,
regional migration patterns.
and one’s level of connectedness to a

migration network.3
3In addition to the extensive work on the causes of et al. (2011) explore this question in a previous issue of
migration by such scholars as Massey, et al. (2005), Arnold, Insights.
In order to explore these linkages, we

analyze responses to the following Figure 3. Migration Intentions, Perception of Insecurity and
Crime Victimization in Central America, 2012
AmericasBarometer item that has been El Salvador
asked in each survey since 2004: Migration Intentions 23.5
Perception of Insecurity 42.5
Crime Victimization 17.4
Q14: Do you have any intention of Nicaragua
going to live or work in another Migration Intentions 20.1
Perception of Insecurity 29.0
country in the next three years? Crime Victimization 13.5
Guatemala
As Figure 2 illustrates, the percentage Migration Intentions 14.4
of Central Americans who reported Perception of Insecurity 31.5
such intentions was quite steady from
Honduras
2004 through 2008, hovering around Migration Intentions 11.4
22%. Migration intentions have Perception of Insecurity 23.2
declined steadily since 2008, however,
Costa Rica
falling to just under 15 percent in 2012. Migration Intentions 10.1
Such a drop is consistent with reports Perception of Insecurity
29.7
of widespread declines in migration

Panama
rates across Mexico and Central
Migration Intentions 6.0
America following the onset of the Perception of Insecurity 19.3
2008‐09 global financial crisis that
0 10 20 30 40 50
greatly diminished the level of demand 95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effect Based)
Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2012
for migrant labor in the U.S. market.

Interestingly enough, Figure 2 also
reveals an even sharper decline in only country where fear of crime
feelings of insecurity among Central remained steady from 2004‐2012, with
Americans in recent years, with a drop roughly 42% of respondents stating
of close to 15 percentage points that they felt insecure in their
between 2004 and 2012 despite the neighborhoods. In all the other
rising levels of actual crime and countries, fear of crime declined over
violence during this time. Crime this time period, even in Honduras, the
victimization, meanwhile, though country that witnessed the sharpest
dipping slightly between 2010 and increase in homicides.4 These
2012, remained several points higher contrasting trends of actual and
than it was in 2004, mapping more perceived levels of insecurity suggest
closely to the homicide data revealed in that Central Americans may have
Figure 1. become increasingly desensitized to

Delving deeper into these cross‐time 4 In 2004, 36.6% of Honduran respondents reported feeling
insecure in their neighborhoods, yet in 2012 this percentage
patterns we find that El Salvador is the had dropped to 23%.
high levels of crime, or made these crime‐related factors may be at
behavioral adjustments in their daily work in pushing at least some
lives to avoid victimization, and thus percentage of Central Americans to
are now less likely to feel unsafe in consider leaving their native country.
their neighborhoods. To further explore these patterns,
though, we must turn to a multivariate
The question these contrasting trends analysis of the individual‐level
of violence and perceived insecurity determinants of migration intentions
raises for this report is the extent to among Central Americans.
which either, or both, help explain
current and future migration patterns Modeling Crime’s Impact on
across Central America. As we see in Migration
Figure 3, in some countries there does In order to effectively identify the
appear to be a connection between unique effects of crime victimization
levels of perceived insecurity and and perceptions of insecurity on
migration intentions. Respondents in El Central Americans’ migration
Salvador, for example, were most likely intentions, we first must incorporate a
to report feeling unsafe in their series of control variables that should
neighborhood in 2012 and also the theoretically also be associated with
most likely to report having intentions one’s migration intentions. An
to migrate. El Salvador, though, is a abundance of research on the
country with an extensive migration determinants of actual migration has
history so it is unclear whether this identified two groups of factors that
high level of insecurity is in fact most help distinguish those who
causally related to the equally high migrate from those who do not (e.g.,
level of migration intentions. Massey, et al. 2005).

Conversely, notwithstanding the The first, and perhaps most intuitive,
country’s unprecedented levels of are socioeconomic and demographic
violence, individuals in Honduras were identifiers of migrants. These include
among the least likely of Central such factors as age, gender, income,
American respondents to report feeling and education levels, along with an
unsafe in their neighborhood and also individual’s views of her personal and
ranked very low in reported migration the national economic situation. We
intentions.5 At this aggregate level, therefore include variables in the
though, personal victimization is also following model designed to capture
strongly correlated with intentions to these factors.6
migrate, suggesting again that both of
5 The Pearson’s correlation between fear of crime and 6The model also includes country dummy variables. See
intentions to migrate is .103 (p<..001). appendix for the full results from the model.
A second group of predictors of

Figure 4. Factors explaining migration intentions in Central
migration concerns an individual’s ties
America, 2012
with an active migration network.
Typically referred to as the “friends F=32.779
Female N =8243
and family effect” (Massey, et al. 2005),
Years of Education
those individuals who have migrant
16-29 years old
friends or relatives already living 30-45 years old
abroad, and particularly those who Remittance Recipient
receive remittances from those friends Wealth
or relatives, will be far more likely to Perception of Insecurity
migrate themselves because such ties Crime Victimization
Perception of Corruption
reduce the costs of migration. This
Corruption Victimization
reduction in cost not only includes the
Government Handling of Citizen Safety Evaluation
financial help remittances may provide -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
a potential migrant, but also the 95% C.I. (Design-Effects Based)
informational advantages she may get Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2012
from knowing individuals that have
already established themselves in the
destination country. In order to model of crime in the previous twelve months.
this “friends and family effect” then, The expectation here is clear – all else
we include an item that indicates equal, a respondent who has been
whether or not a respondent receives victimized will be more likely to
remittances as a proxy for a high level consider leaving her country. Similarly,
of involvement in a migration network. an individual who feels very unsafe
Our expectations for these controls are when going about her daily life should
in line with research that identifies also be more likely to consider
those most likely to migrate as young migrating. In order to test this
males with relatively high levels of proposition, we include an item that
education and income, as well as those asked respondents to assess how safe
who have existing connections to a they feel in their neighborhood on a 1‐4
migration network. scale. Finally, we included an item that
asked respondents to evaluate their
Of central concern for this report, government’s anti‐crime efforts,
however, is the impact that high levels expecting that those who do not have
of crime have on an individual’s much confidence in their government’s
migration decision. Here we include a ability to address the country’s crime
series of variables designed to capture a problem will be more likely to consider
range of possible effects crime may migration as well.
have on migration. First, we use an
item that asked respondents whether Another facet of Central America’s
they had been victimized by any type crime wave in recent years has been the
consequent increase in corruption, intentions significantly outweigh the

particularly in those countries where impact the “perceptions” items have.
drug trafficking organizations have Though higher feelings of insecurity do
established a presence. Thus citizens have a marginally significant effect on
may consider high levels of corruption the migration decision, this impact is
to be at least in part a by‐product of the decidedly less than either of the
high levels of crime, suggesting that we “victimization” items. What these
examine the impact of corruption on findings suggest, then, is that victims of
the migration decision as well. the current crime wave, as well as those
victimized by the pervasive corruption
To do this, we include an item similar that has accompanied the crime wave,
to the “crime victimization” measure are increasingly likely to consider
that asks respondents whether they migration as a viable means of escape
had been asked for a bribe in the from their current situation.
previous twelve months by a public
official. Such In comparing these
concrete Both crime and corruption individual‐level results
evidence of victimization are significant to the aggregate
corruption patterns displayed in
predictors of migration
should lead Figure 3, we see that
individuals to intentions suggesting the crime countries like El
give greater wave in Central America will Salvador, Nicaragua,
consideration to continue to contribute to and Guatemala seem to
migration as a support the central
h f
viable life plan finding that crime and
in the future. We also include insecurity lead individuals to consider
respondents’ perceptions of corruption emigration. Conversely, when we look
in government, again expecting higher at countries like Honduras, with high
levels of perceived corruption to make levels of crime victimization but
someone more likely to consider relatively low levels migration
leaving the country altogether. intentions; or Costa Rica where close to
a third of respondents reported feelings
The results of our binary logistic of insecurity but only 10 percent had
regression model of migration plans to migrate, other factors seem to
intentions appear in Figure 4. be at play that are diluting the crime‐
Immediately evident is the significant migration relationship.
impact that being a victim of crime and
corruption has on the probability an The individual‐level results also find
individual will plan to migrate in the support in the behavior of the control
near future. The effects for both of variables included in the model. The
these victimization items on migration powerful effect that receiving
remittances has on the probability of References

planning to migrate, along with the age
and gender profile of the likely Arnold, Alex, Paul Hamilton, Jimmy Moore
migrant, all suggest that our dependent and Arturo Maldonado. 2011. “Who
Seeks to Exit? Security, Connections,
variable, migration intentions, serves as and Happiness as Predictors of
an adequate proxy for migration itself, Migration Intentions in the Americas.”
despite not measuring actual behavior. AmericasBarometer Insights (64).
Nashville: Latin American Public
Opinion Project.
Conclusion
Lundquist, Jennifer Hickes and Douglas
In this brief report we have explored Massey. 2005. “Politics or Economics?
the possibility that Central America’s International Migration During the
recent crime wave has contributed to a Nicaraguan Contra War.” Journal of
Latin American Studies 37: 1‐25.
growing number of emigrants from the
region. More specifically, we Massey, Douglas S., Joaquin Arango, Graeme
investigate whether being victimized Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino,
by crime or corruption, having strong and J. Edward Taylor. 2005. Worlds in
feelings of insecurity, or both increase Motion: Understanding International
Migration at the End of the Millennium.
the probability an individual will seek New York: Oxford University Press.
to leave her country of origin.
Morrison, Andrew R. and Rachel A. May.
We find that both actual victimization 1994. “Escape from Terror: Violence
as well as fear of crime are significantly and Migration in Post‐Revolutionary
Guatemala.” Latin American Research
linked to intentions to migrate, Review, 29(2): 111‐132.
although firsthand experience with
crime is far more important. Likewise, Stoney, Sierra and Jeanne Batalova. 2013.
personal experience with corruption “Central American Immigrants in the
significantly increases the probability United States.” Migration Information
Source, Migration Policy Institute
that an individual will contemplate <http://www.migrationinformation.org
leaving his country, but overall /USfocus/print.cfm?ID=938 > Accessed
perceptions of corruption levels in the January 5, 2014.
country yielded no impact. These
findings indicate that in addition to its Tuckman, Jo. 2013. “Central America Migrants
Flee Turf Wars and Corrupt States for
other tragic consequences, the crime Refuge in Mexico.” The Guardian, 30
wave currently affecting much of December.
Central America seems also to be <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2
contributing to a larger pool of people 013/dec/31/central‐america‐migrants‐
looking to exit the country. flee‐mexico> Accessed January 5, 2014.

Appendix

Table 1. Migration Intentions
Coefficients (t)
Evaluations of Government Handling of 0.047 (1.21)
Citizen Security
Corruption Victimization 0.209* (6.36)
Perception of Corruption 0.034 (1.01)
Crime Victimization 0.167* (5.36)
Perception of Insecurity 0.088* (2.43)
Wealth ‐0.014 (‐0.29)
Remittance Recipient 0.285* (9.73)
30‐45 years old 0.383* (8.04)
16‐29 years old 0.692* (14.54)
Years of Education 0.082 (1.72)
Female ‐0.183* (‐5.40)
Perceptions of national economic situation ‐0.144* (‐3.45)
Perceptions of personal economic situation ‐0.109* (‐2.73)
Big city ‐0.053 (‐1.12)
Medium city ‐0.049 (‐0.95)
Small city ‐0.049 (‐1.15)
Rural Area ‐0.113* (‐1.99)
Guatemala 0.070 (1.30)
El Salvador 0.240* (4.00)
Honduras ‐0.041 (‐0.68)
Nicaragua 0.250* (4.22)
Panama ‐0.193* (‐2.69)
Constant ‐2.092* (‐44.39)
F 32.78
Number of Obs. 8243
Note: Coefficients are statistically significant at *p<0.05 two‐tailed.
Country of Reference: Costa Rica


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AmericasBarometer Insights: 2014

H omicide rates, and crime

Many observers have posited a

north to Mexico” and likens this

civil war (Tuckman 2013). More

the Contra war (Lundquist and Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

In order to explore these linkages, we

of widespread declines in migration

A second group of predictors of

migrate themselves because such ties Crime Victimization

consequent increase in corruption, intentions significantly outweigh the

remittances has on the probability of References

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