Ortiz vs.

Kayanan

Facts:
1. The lot in controversy was formerly the subj of Homestead application of Martin Dolorico II, plaintiffs ward who died on
August 20, 1932
2. The plaintiff continued the cultivation and possession of the property without however filing any application to acquire title.
3. In 1951, Martin Dolorico I as his heir and successor in interest executed an affidavit relinquishing his rights over the property
in favor of the defendants Quirino Comitan and Eleuterio Zamora and requested the director of lands to cancel the homestead
application.
4. Homestead Application was cancelled and thereafter, defendants Comintan and Zamora filed their respective sales
applications alleging that he should be given preference to purchase the lot in as much as he is the actual occupant and has
been in continuous possession of the same since 1931.
5. Despite plaintiffs opposition, Portion A of the property was sold at public auction wherein defendants Comintan was the
only bidder.
6. Regional Land Officer, dismissed plaintiffs claim and giving due course to defendants sales applications on the ground that
the relinquishment of the homestead rights of Martin in favor of Comintan and Zamora is proper, the former having been
designated as successor in interest of the original homestead applicant.

Issue: When does possession in good faith is legally interrupted?

Held: Possession in good faith ceases or is legally interrupted form the moment defects un the title are made known to the possessor,
by extraneous evidence or by the filing of an action in court by the true owner for the recovery of the property. Hence, all the fruits that
the possessor may receive from the time he is summoned in court or when he answers the complaint must be delivered and paid by
him to the owner or lawful possessor.

Bernardo vs. Bataclan

Facts:
1. The plaintiff herein acquired from Pastor Samonte and others ownership of a parcel of land of about 90 hectares situated in
sitio Balayuan, Silanf Cavite.
2. To secure possession of the land from the vendors, the said plaintiff instituted a civil case in the CFI of Cavite.
3. When plaintiff entered upon the premises, however the defendant Catalino Bataclan, who appears to have been authorized by
former owners to clear the land and make improvements thereon.
4. Plaintiff was declare the owner but defendant was held to be a possessor in good faith, entitled to reimbursement in the total
sum of 1, 642 for work done and improvements made.

Issue: Whether plaintiff Bernardo has the right to choose given the option?

Held: Yes, the law has provided a just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements
after payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent.
It is the owner of the land who is allowed to exercise the option because his right is older and because by principle of
accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.
The plaintiff as owner of the land, chose to require the defendant, as owner of the improvements to pay for the land. When the
latter failed to pay for the land, he lost his right of retention.

Mores vs. Yu-Go

Facts:
1. Plaintiffs- appellants filed a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injuction before the RTC in Naga City against defendants- Appellees (Mores) alleged that they co-owned a
parcel of land located in Sto. Tomas Magarao Camarines Sur on which a building of strong materials was built.
2. Appellees pleaded to appellants that they be allowed to stay in the subject property in the mean time that they did not own a
house yet,
3. Antonio Mores used to be an errand boy for appellants family, they readily agreed without asking for any rental but subject
only to the condition that the said would last until anyone of the appellants would need the subject property.
4. In Nov. 1997 appellants made known to appellees that they were already in need of the subject property yet appellees begged
that they be given a 6-month extension to stay.
5. However, appellees failed to make good their promise and even further asked that they be allowed to stay therein until
October 1998, which was again extended until the end of the same year.
6. On the first week of January, appellants gave their final demand to vacate however, instead of heading such demand,
appellees hired some laborers and started demolishing the improvements on the subject property.

Issue: Whether the Mores spouses may be considered builders in good faith?

Held: No. Tenants like the spouses Mores cannot be said to be builders in good faith as they have no pretension to be owners of the
property. Full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made applies only to a
possessor in good faith. One who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does not apply where ones only interest
is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to improve his landlord out of his
property.

Office of the City Mayor of Paranaque vs. Ebio

Facts:
1. Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land.
2. Said land was an accretion of Cut-Cut creek. Respondents assert that the original occupant and possessor of the said parcer of
land was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez.
3. Jose, gave the said land to Pedro. Mario Ebio married Pedros daughter Zanida. Upon Pedros advice the couple established
their home on said lot.
4. Mario secured building permits from the municipal office. Pedro executed a notarized transfer of rights ceding his claim over
the entire parcel of land in favor of Ebio.
5. The Sangguniang barangay of Vitalez passed a resolution seeking assistance from the City government for the construction of
an access road along cut-cut creek located in the said barangay. The proposed projected road will run from the Urma Drive to
the main road of Vitalez compound.
6. The City government advised that all affected residents to vacate the said area, respondents immediately registered their
opposition thereto.

Issue: Whether the character of respondents possession and occupation entitles them to avail of the relief of prohibitory injunction?

Held : Yes, the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-Cut creek. The
law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Art 84 of he Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 which remains in effect in relation
to Art 457 of the CC.

The alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to
the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided by law is that the owner of the adjoining
property must register the same under the Torrens System; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through
prescription by 3
rd
persons.

Republic vs. CA (1984)

Facts:
1. Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Maria Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are registered owners of a
parcel of land covered by TCT T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and
Bocaue rivers.
2. On 24 June 1973, the Tancincos filed an application for the registration of 3 lots adjacent to their fishpond property (Psu-
131892: Lot 1, 33837 sq.m.; Lot 2, 5,453 sq.m.; Lot 3, 1985 sq. m.)
3. On 5 April 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, in representation of the Bureau of Lands filed a written
opposition to the application for registration.
4. On 6 March 1975, the Tancincos filed a partial withdrawal of the application for registration with respect to Lot 3 of Plan
Psu-131892 in line with the recommendation of the Commissioner appointed by the Court. On 7 March 1975, Lot 3 was
ordered withdrawn from the application and trial proceeded only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.
On 26 June 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on the finding that the lands in question are
accretions to the Tancincos fishponds covered by TCT 89709.
5. On 30 July 1976, the Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 19 August 1982, the appellate court rendered a decision
affirming in toto the decision of the lower cost; without costs. Hence, the petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the
CA.
6. The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the decision appealed from, and ordered the private
respondents to move back the dikes of their fishponds to their original location and return the disputed property to the river
to which it belongs.
Issue : Whether the alleged alluvial deposits were man made?
Held: Yes, The alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of the sole effect of the current rivers but as a result of the transfer
of the dike towards the river and encroaching upon it.
The land sought to be registered is not even dry land cast imperceptibly and gradually but the rivers current on the fishpond adjoining
it.

1. Power to review vested in the Court; Binding effect of the findings of facts by lower court not absolute
The rule that the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court admits of certain exceptions.
The Court retains the power to review and rectify the findings of fact of said courts when (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, and impossible; (3)
where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the court, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee
(Carolina Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., 97 SCRA 734).
2. No accretion to speak of as the transfer of dikes is man-made and artificial; Article 457 NCC
There is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil Code because what actually happened is that the private
respondents simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the Meycauayan Rivers, and thus, if there is any accretion to
speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river.
Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides that to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
3. Accretion, requisites
Article 457 requires the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion covered by this particular provision is said to have taken
place. They are (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
4. Alluvion as exclusive work of nature indispensable
The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of
the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. In the instant case,
there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said property was made gradually through the effects of the current of
the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers; but there is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made and not the
exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of the
sole effect of the current of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching upon it.
5. Reason in giving riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river
The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river is to compensate him for the
danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of his land. If estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils
produced by the destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions, said estates are subject to incumbrances and
various kinds of easements, it is proper that the risk or danger which may prejudice the owners thereof should be compensated by the
right of accretion. (Cortes v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). In the present case, the riparian owner does not acquire the additions to his land
caused by special works expressly intended or designed to bring about accretion. When the private respondents transferred their dikes
towards the river bed, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not to protect their property from the destructive force of the
waters of the river.
6. Adjudication of land in question as private property is null and void
The conclusion that can be made from said alleged accretion being declared for taxation purposes only in 1972 is that areas could not
have been there in 1939. They existed only after the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan
river in 1951. What private respondents claim as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by
reclamation. Thus, the lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of the private respondents. These lots
were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as property of the public domain under Article 420
paragraph 1 and Article 502, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to registration under the Land
Registration Act. The adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names of the private respondents is null and void.