1

CANON 8 & 9


Laput vs. Remotigue
(6 SCRA 45 September 29, 1962)

Facts: Atty. Casiano U. Laput was the former counsel of one Nieves vda. De Barrera, the administrator of the estate of Macario Barrera, regarding the testate of the
latter. He charged respondents Atty. Remotigue and Atty. Patalinghug with unprofessional and unethical conduct in soliciting cases and intriguing against another
lawyer. Complainant alleges that weeks after his client refused to countersign several pleadings that he prepared, he found out that respondent Atty. Patalinghug
was the new counsel of Mrs. Barrera so he voluntarily asked the court to be relieved as counsel for Mrs. Barrera. After that, the other respondent Atty. Remotigue
entered his appearance. Complainant says that the respondents nursed the desire of his former client to replace him and also made Mrs. Barrera sign documents
sent to corporations which have stocks owned by Macario Barrera revoking his power of attorney. He further alleges that the motive of the respondents was to
embarrass him to the officials, lawyers and employees of those companies picturing him as a dishonest lawyer and no longer trusted by his client.

Issue: WON respondents were guilty of unethical and unprofessional conduct

Held: No, the solicitor-general found that before respondents filed their appearance, Mrs. Barrera had already filed with the court, a pleading discharging the
complainant. The fact that complainant was not able to get a copy was not the fault of the respondents. Also, it was found that Mrs. Barrera dismissed Atty. Laput
because she no longer trusted him after finding out that some checks were sent to the complainant instead of her and that several withdrawals were made by
complainant in her account without her permission. There is no irregularity in the appearance of respondents as counsel. The revocation of power of attorney
prepared by respondent was done without malice and was made only to safeguard his client. Charges DISMISSED.

Canon 9
Office of the Court Administrator vs Atty. Misael M. Ladaga
(A.M. No. P-99-1287 January 26, 2001)
Facts: Atty. Misael Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga,
an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for Falsification of Public Documents before the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of said
respondent in said case was without the previous permission of the Court.

During the occasions that the respondent appeared as such counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding
Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. Respondent appeared as pro bono counsel for his cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga. Respondent
did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her out of his compassion
and high regard for her.

This is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member of his family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of
settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has
been in government service, he has maintained his integrity and independence.

He failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department. The presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of the
Department contemplated by law.

Issue: WON Atty. Ladaga, upon such several appearances, was engages into private practice? NO

Held: Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from
engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain
attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession.

THERE WAS NO PRIVATE PRACTICE:

In People vs. Villanueva: Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In
other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522,
98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law.

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not
constitute the private practice of the law profession contemplated by law.

DECISION: Reprimanded.

Donna Marie S. Aguirre vs. Edwin L. Rana
(B.M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003)

Facts: Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass
oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre ("complainant") filed against respondent a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention
Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the
lawyer's oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as
counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges
that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the
Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the
pleading as counsel for George Bunan ("Bunan").
2

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance" to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he decided to assist and
advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law." Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain
votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney" in the pleading.

Issue: Whether respondent is engaged in unauthorized practice of law.

Held: Yes, We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission
to the Philippine Bar. Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22
May 2001, before respondent took the lawyer's oath.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so.
Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar.
Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a
lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege
that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer's oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-
fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law.
Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court
and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
People vs Sim Ben
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8320 December 20, 1955
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SIM BEN, defendant-appellant.
Vicente Jayme and Celso C. Veloso for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan Liwag, Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Antonio A. Torres for
appellee.

PADILLA, J .:
Sim Ben appeals from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding him guilty of violating paragraph 3, Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, for having exhibit cinematographic films of indecent or immoral scenes inside his establishment, a restaurant
which is a place open to public view in the City of Cebu, on the sole ground that he entered a plea of guilty to the information without
the aid of counsel.
The minutes of the session of the Court on 31 January 1953 disclose that when the case was called for trial, the appellant was
informed by the Court of his right to have counsel and asked if he desired the aid of one. He replied that he did not. Then the Court
asked if he was agreeable to have the information read to him even without the assistance of counsel. His answer was in the
affirmative. The court interpreter translated the information to him in the local dialect and after the translation he entered a plea of
guilty. He was asked whether he knew that because of the plea of guilty the punishment as provided for by law would be imposed
upon him and he answered "Yes, sir." The Court asked him if he insisted on his plea of guilty and he answered "Yes, sir." At this
juncture the fiscal recommended that a fine of P200 be imposed upon the defendant. Thereupon, the Court sentenced him to suffer 6
months and 1 day of prision correccional and to pay the costs.lawphi1.net
What transpired when the appellant was arraigned shows that his rights were fully protected and safeguarded. The Court complied
with its duly when it informed the appellant that it was his right to have the aid of counse. And before pronouncing the sentence the
Court took pains to ascertain whether he was aware of the consequences of the plea he had entered. Notwithstanding this precaution
and warning, he waived his right to have the aid of counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the information.
Appellant claims that he entered the plea of guilty because the fiscal promised him that only a fine would be imposed. The
recommendation of the fiscal that only a fine be imposed upon the appellant seems to bear out his claim; but such recommendation or
one of leniency does not mean that the appellant is not guilty of the crime charged against him. A promise to recommend a specific
penalty such as fine does not render the sentence void if the Court ignores the recommendation and metes out to the defendant a
penalty which is provided by law.
3
The sentence appealed from is affirmed, with cost against the appellant.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.

Guballa vs Caguioa
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed
by a member of the Bar in good standing.
Guballa vs. Caguioa, 78 SCRA 302
A lawyer is prohibited from taking as partner or associate any person who is not
authorized to practice law to appear in court or to sign pleadings. A lawyer, who is under
suspension from practice of law is not a member of the Bar in good standing. A lawyer whose
authority to practice has been withdrawn due to a change in citizenship or allegiance to the
country cannot appear before the courts.
Comments of IBP Committee, pp. 47-48
A lawyer can employ lay secretaries, lay investigators, lay detectives, lay researchers,
accountants or non-lawyer draftsmen, to undertake any task not involving practice of law. He may
also avail himself of the assistance of law students in many of the fields of the lawyers work,
such as the examination of a case law, finding and interviewing witness, examining court records,
delivering papers, and similar matters.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46537 July 29, 1977
JOSE GUBALLA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA, RICARDO G. CARLOS and DOMINGO FORTEZA, JR., respondents.

SANTOS, J :
In this petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction, petitioner seeks to set aside the Order of respondent Judge dated
July 12, 1977, denying his Petition for Relief from Judgment and allowing a writ of execution to issue in Civil Case No.
680-V of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
The factual antecedents may be recited as follows:
Petitioner is an operator of a public utility vehicle which was involved, on October 1, 1971, in an accident resulting to
injuries sustained by private respondent Domingo Forteza Jr. As a consequence thereof, a complaint for damages was
filed by Forteza against petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VIII), docketed as Civil Case No.
680-V. An Answer thereto was filed on behalf of petitioner by Irineo W. Vida Jr., of the law firm of Vida Enriquez, Mercado
& Associates.
1

Because petitioner and counsel failed to appear at the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, despite due notice, petitioner
was treated as in default and private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. A decision was thereafter
4
rendered by the trial court in favor of private respondent Forteza Jr. A Motion for Reconsideration was then filed by
petitioner seeking the lifting of the order of default, the reopening of the case for the presentation of his evidence and the
setting aside of the decision. Said Motion for Reconsideration was signed by Ponciano Mercado, another member of the
law firm. The same was denied by the lower Court and petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following
alleged errors, to wit:
a. That the Hon. Court erred in denying defendant Jose Guballa his day in Court by declaring him in
default, it being contrary to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter;
b. That this Hon. Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case;
c. Award of damages in favor of plaintiff, more particularly award of moral damages is contrary to law;
and
d. Defendant has valid, legal and justiciable defenses.
2

The appealed case was handled by Atty. Benjamin Bautista, an associate of the same law firm. The decision appealed
from was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52610R. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by
petitioner, through a different counsel, Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos II. However the same was denied and the decision
became final on June 29, 1977 and was then remanded to the lower Court, presided by respondent Judge for execution.
3

A Motion for Execution was thereafter filed by private respondent with the lower Court which was granted by respondent
Judge.
4

On July 6, 1977, petitioner, through Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos 11, filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging his
discovery that Irineo W. Vida Jr., who prepared his Answer to the Complaint is not a member of the Philippine Bar and
that consequently, his rights had not been adequately protected and his properties are in danger of being confiscated
and/or levied upon without due process of law.
5

In an Order dated July 12, 1977, respondent Judge denied the Petition and directed the issuance of a writ of execution for
the reasons that said Petition is ". . a clear case of dilatory tactic on the part of counsel for defendant-appellant ..." herein
petitioner, and, that the grounds relied upon ". . . could have been ventilated in the appeal before the Court of Appeals ...
"
6

On July 19, 1977, respondent Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. Carlos, acting upon the writ of execution, issued by respondent
Judge, levied on three motor vehicles, of petitioner for the satisfaction of the judgment.
7

Hence the instant Petition.
Respondent Judge's forthright denial of the Petition for Relief to frustrate a dilatory maneuver is well-taken; and this
Petition must be denied for lack of merit. The alleged fact that the person who represented petitioner at the initial stage of
the litigation, i.e., the filing of an Answer and the pretrial proceedings, turned out to be not a member of the Bar
8
did not
amount to a denial of petitioner's day in court. It should be noted that in the subsequent stages of the proceedings, after
the rendition of the judgment by default, petitioner was duly represented by bona fidemembers of the Bar in seeking a
reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law and jurisprudence and the existence of valid, legal and justifiable
defenses. In other words, petitioner's rights had been amply protected in the proceedings before the trial and appellate
courts as he was subsequently assisted by counsel. Moreover, petitioner himself was at fault as the order of treatment as
in default was predicated, not only on the alleged counsel's failure to attend the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, but
likewise on his own failure to attend the same, without justifiable reason. To allow this petition due course is to
countenance further delay in a proceeding which has already taken well over six years to resolve,
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction is hereby dismissed. The law firm
"Vida, Enriquez, Mercado & Associates" of 209 Sampaguita Bldg., Cubao, Quezon City, is hereby ordered to explain,
within ten (10) days from notice this Resolution, why Irineo W. Vida Jr. was permitted to sign the Answer in Civil Case No.
680-V of CFI, Bulacan, when he is not a member of the Bar.
Fernando, (Chairman) Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
ECO VS RODRIGUEZ
FELIPE ECO VS. JUAN DE RODRIGUEZ
L-16731. March 30, 1960
FACTS:
5
In 1956, Eco was granted a Certificate of Private Woodland Registration by the Bureau of Forestry which was cancelled by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources due to numerous oppositions and also by Ecos refusal to submit himself to a formal
investigation.
In 1958, Eco filed a notice of appeal and posted the required appeal bond, which was opposed because the filing was made out of
time. Eco argued that the delay was an excusable negligence. The alleged negligence was due to the erroneous computation of the
prescriptive period made by the counsels clerk.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the delay is an excusable negligence.
HELD:
No. Because what was delegated by Ecos counsel to his clerk was the computation of the period within which the appropriate
pleading maybe filed; he should not delegated that duty to an employee because it concerns a question of the study of law and its
application which clearly violates Canon 9 (2). Such negligence on the part of the attorney cannot be considered an excusable
negligence as a ground for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
ALA VS CIR
Amalgamated Laborers Association vs CIR

FACTS:
Amalgamated laborers association won a case of unfair labor practice against Binalbagan Sugar Central Company, Inc. (Biscom).
Upon motion to the complainants, CIR set the Chief Examiner to go to Biscom and compute the backwages. Total net backwages
amounted to P79, 755.22. Appeals were made against this decision. In the interim, Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez (herein
respondent), in the same case, filed a Notice of attorneys lien over the amount to be rewarded. He alleged therein that he had
been the attorney of record for the said case since the inception of the preliminary hearings of said case up to the Supreme Court in
Appeal, as chief counsel. He claimed that the laborers have voluntary agreed to give him as attorneys fees on contingent basis 25%
of the award. He further averred that this already a discounted fee out of the plea of the unions president to reduce it from 30% for
them to also satisfy Atty. Jose Ur Carbonell. Meanwhile, CIR decided the appeals still in favor of the petitioner and ordered Biscom to
deposit the amount representing 25% of P79, 755.22 to the cashier of the court to be awarded and granted to Atty. Fernandez. Atty.
Carbonell and ALA appealed from the decision contending that 1) CIR is bereft of jurisdiction to adjudicate contractual disputes
over attorneys fees averring that a dispute arising from contracts from attorneys fees is not a labor dispute and is not one among
the cases ruled to be within CIRs authority and to consider such a dispute to be a mere incident to a case over which CIR may validly
assume jurisdiction is to disregard the special and limited nature of said courts jurisdiction. 2) The award 25% as attorneys fees to
Atty. Fernandez is excessive, unfair and illegal. This and a subsequent motion for reconsideration were denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Is CIR bereft of jurisdiction over the claim for attorneys fees?
2. Is 25% of the award a reasonable attorneys fee?

RULING:

1. No, court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction. In the absence of such
express grant, and in the absence of prohibitive legislation, it shall also be impliedly granted. In the case at bench, to
direct that the present dispute be lodged in another court as petitioners advocate would only result in multiplicity of
suits, a situation abhorred by the rule. Since the court of Industrial Relations obviously had the jurisdiction to consider
and decide all matters collateral thereto, such as claims for attorneys fees made by the members of the bar who appear
in.
2. Yes. An examination of the record of the case will readily show that an award of 25% attorneys fees reasonably
compensates the whole legal services rendered in the case. This must however be share by petitioner Atty. Carbonell and
respondent Atty. Fernandez. The case has been remanded to the CIR for the sole determination of shares.

Other Points:
6
1. Canon 34 of the legal ethics condemns the arrangement wherein union presidents should share in the attorneys fees. No
division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer. The union president is not the attorney for the
laborers. He may seek compensation only as a union president.
2. A contingent fee contract specifying the percentage of recovery an attorney is to receive should be reasonable under all
circumstances of e case and should always be subject to the supervision of the court, as to its reasonableness.
Tan tek Beng v David
Facts:
Tan Tek Beng, a non lawyer, entered into an agreement with Atty. Timoteo David as documented provided by
the latter. In the said agreement, Atty David not only agreed to give one half of his professional fee but also bounded
himself not deal directly with the clients.
The agreement went sour due to the allegations of double cross from the both sides. Tan Tek Beng denounced
the respondent before the SC but did not seek the enforcement of their agreement.

Issue: WON David is guilty of malpractice.

Held:
Yes. The agreement is void because it is tantamount to malpractice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through agents or brokers- Sec. 27, rule 138, ROC.
In addition, practice of law is a profession not a business.
Furthermore the respondent also violated the Rule 9.02 of the code of professional responsibility stating that
a lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law.
Wherefore the respondent is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice.

HALILI VS CIR

HALILI V. CIR

Facts:
This case stemmed from a dispute regarding claims for overtime of more than 500 bus drivers and conductors of
Halilia Transit. While the case was before the Court of Industrial Relations, the union of the workers and the employer
executed an agreement whereby Halili Transit bound itself to deliver a parcel of land and P25k to the Union, as full settlement.
So a deed of conveyance was executed transferring the land to the union, in trust for the members therein.

The union, through Atty. Pineda filed an urgent motion with the Ministry of Labor requesting for the authority to
sell the land. Motion was granted but the buyer was hesitant to purchase the land because there was a law that requires an
order from a court as authority to sell properties in trust. So Atty. Pineda filed a motion with the SC requesting authority to
sell. The SC merely noted the motion in a resolution. Nevertheless, Atty. Pineda filed and was granted an authority to sell by
the labor arbiter. So the sale was consummated resulting in the execution of an escrow agreement wherein the purchase price
was deposited with Manila Bank. The amounts due the claimants were eventually released. This included attorneys fees
released to Atty. Pineda, and union expenses released to the union.


Issue:
W/N the attorneys fees released to Atty. Pineda is valid.

Held and Ratio:
It is invalid because Section 11, Rule VIII of Book III provides that Sec. 11. Attorney's feesAttorney's fees on any judicial or
administrative proceedings for the recovery of wages shall not exceed 10% of the amount awarded. The fees may be deducted
from the total amount due the winning party.


FIVE J TAXI VS NLRC

Five J Taxi and Armamiento vs. NLRC Case Digest
Five J Taxi and/or Juan Armamiento vs. NLRC
235 SCRA 556
Facts: Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi drivers and, as such, they
worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the daily boundary of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or
P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to
answer for any deficiency in their boundary, for every actual working day.
In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he already failed to report for work for unknown
7
reasons. Petitioners learned that he was working for Mine of Gold Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of
petitioners on September 1983, he was held up by his armed passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was
hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to this home province to recuperate.
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms and conditions as when he was first
employed, but his working schedule was made on an alternative basis where he drove only every other day. However, on several
occasions, he failed to report for work during his schedule. On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his boundary of P700.00
for the previous day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated requests of
petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for Bulaklak
Company.
Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners
told him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits as these were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the repairs of
the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their
taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed
that his termination from employment was effected when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers.
On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the manila Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations
Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions.
Issue: Whether or not the deductions made were illegal and if illegal, considered a prohibition regarding wages.
Ruling: The Court declares that the deposits made amounts to the prohibition provided by law. The deposits made were illegal and the
respondents must be refunded.
Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
Deposits for loss or damage. No employer shall require his worker to make deposits from which deductions shall be made for the
reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer, except when the employer is engaged
in such trades, occupations or business where the practice of making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable as
determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and regulations.
It can be deduced that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials or equipments supplied by the
employer. Clearly, the same does not apply to or permit deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the
remittance of his boundary.
On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his decision: "Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is
no dispute that as a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has
given to the same clean condition when he took it out, and as claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present case),
complainant(s) (private respondents herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for washing, the amount doled out was paid directly
to the person who washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in this practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the
driver as illegal deduction in the context of the law."
Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It will be noted that there
was nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the
Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.
Five J Taxi v. NLRC
As a non-lawyer, Pulia is not entitled to attorneys fees even though he is the authorized representative of the respondents
to the NLRC. The existence of an attorneys fee imputes an attorney-client relationship. This cannot happen between
Pulia and respondents.


CANON 10
COBB PEREZ VS LANTIN
24 SCRA 219 Legal Ethics Counsels Assertiveness
A civil case was filed by Ricardo Hermoso against Damaso Perez for the latters failure to pay a debt of P17k. Hermoso
won and a writ of execution was issued in his favor. The sheriff was to conduct a public sale of a property owned by
Damaso worth P300k. This was opposed by Damaso as he claimed the amount of said property was more than the
amount of the debt. Judge Lantin, issuing judge, found merit on this hence he amended his earlier decision and so he
issued a second writ this time directing the sheriff to conduct a public sale on Damasos 210 shares of stock
approximately worth P17k.
Subsequently, Damaso and his wife filed five more petitions for injunction trying to enjoin the public sale. The case
eventually reached the Supreme Court where the SC ruled that the petition of the Perez spouses are without merit; that
their numerous petitions for injunction are contemplated for delay. In said decision, the Supreme Court ordered petitioners
to pay the cost of the suit but said cost should be paid by their counsels. The counsels now appeal said decision by the
Supreme Court as they claimed that such decision reflected adversely against their professionalism; that If there was
delay, it was because petitioners counsel happened to be more assertive . . . a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be
condemned.
ISSUE: Whether or not the counsels for the Spouses Perez are excused.
8
HELD: No. A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his clients cause must be encouraged and is
to be commended; what is not tolerated is a lawyers insistence despite the patent futility of his clients position, as in the
case at bar. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on
the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his clients cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise
the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices
of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyers oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his
duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.

COMELEC VS NOYNAY
COMELEC vs. NOYNAY ( 292 SCRA 254 )
Election Offense, B. Jurisdiction Over Election OffensesFacts: In an Order issued on 25 August 1997, respondent Judge Tomas B.
Noynay,as presiding judge of Branch 23, motu proprio ordered the records of the cases to bewi t hdrawn and di rect ed
t he Comel ec Law Depart ment t o f i l e t he cases wi t h t heappropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground that
pursuant to Section 32 of B.P.Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. no. 7691, the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdictionover the
cases since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does notexceed six years of imprisonment.I s s u e :
W h e t h e r o r n o t R . A . N o . 7 6 9 1 h a s d i v e s t e d R e g i o n a l T r i a l C o u r t s o r
j uri sdi ct i on over el ect i on of f enses, whi ch are puni shabl e wi t h i mpri sonment of not exceeding six years.Hel d:
By vi rt ue of t he except i on provi ded f or i n openi ng sent ence of sect i on 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, MunicipalTrial Courts and Municipal Circuit Courts does not cover those criminal cases
whichby specific provisions of law fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of RegionalTrial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan,
regardless of the penalty prescribed therefor.Pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, election offenses also
fallwi t hi n t he except i on provi ded f or i n t he openi ng sent ence of Sect i on 32 of
Bat asP a m b
a n s a
1 2 9 . Republic Act
7691 can by no means be considered as a special law on jurisdiction it is merely an amendatory law intended to amend
specific sections of the JudiciaryReorganization Act of 1980 and it does not have the effect of repealing laws vestingupon
the Regional trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction toheart and decide the cases therein specified.Congress
may thus provide by law that a certain class of cases should be exclusivelyheard and determined by one court. Such law would be a
special law and must beconst rued as an except i on t o t he general l aw on j uri sdi ct i on of court s.
However, Congress never intended that R. A. no. 7691 should repeal such special provisions isindubitably evident from the fact that it did
not touch at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the exception.

GARCIA VS FRANCISCO
Garcia vs. Francisco, 220 SCRA 512 (1993)
A lawyer should not abuse his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly
rebuffed. Neither should he use his knowledge of law as an instrument to harass a party nor to misuse judicial processes,
as the same constitutes serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For while he owes fidelity to the
cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of justice.

GOMEZ VS PRESIDING JUDGE
Gomez vs. Presiding J udge, 249 SCRA 432 (1995)
As an officer of the court, a lawyer should not misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay
or impede the execution of final judgment, otherwise he may be subjected to disciplinary sanctions.

CANON 11

In re Sotto

Atty. Vicente Sotto was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt in connection with his written
statement of the Supreme Court's decision in the matter of Angel Parazo's case, which was published in Manila Times and
in other newspapers in the locality.

Sotto was given ten days more besides the five originally given him to file his answer, and although his answer was filed
after the expiration of the period of time given him the said answer was admitted. He does not deny the authenticity of the
statement as it has been published. He however, contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon
this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, the Supreme Court has has no
power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and it can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has
to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive. He also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the
freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith and
with no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously
decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any one.
9
Issue: Whether or not Sotto is guilty of contempt.
HELD: The Court finds that the respondent Sotto knowingly published false imputations against its members. He accused them of
such depravity as to have committed "blunders and injustices deliberately." He has maliciously branded them to be incompetent,
narrow-minded, perpetrators of evil, "a constant peril to liberty and democracy," to be the opposite of those who were the honor
and glory of the Philippines judiciary, to be needing a lesson in law, to be rendering an intolerable sentence, to be needing
replacement by better qualified justices. Respondent has not presented any evidence or offered any to support his slanderous
imputations, and no single word can be found in his answer showing that he ever believed that the imputations are based on fact. It
is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and
communication to the courts, he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant
misconduct.
BUENASEDA VS FLAVIER
Legal Ethics Legal Profession Motion for Disbarment Improperly Filed
Administrative Law Power of the Ombudsman Preventive Suspension
In 1992, the NCMH Nurses Association (NCMH) filed a case of graft and corruption against Dr. Brigida Buenaseda and
several other government officials of the Department of Health (DOH). The Ombudsman (then Conrado Vasquez),
ordered the suspension of Buenaseda et al. The suspension was carried on by then DOH Secretary Juan Flavier, being
the officer in charge over Buenaseda et al. Buenaseda et al then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus, questioning the suspension order. NCMH submitted its Comment on the Petition where they
attached a Motion for Disbarment against the lawyers of Buenaseda et al.
Allegedly, the lawyers of Buenaseda et al advised them not to obey the suspension order, which is a lawful order from a
duly constituted authority. NCMH maintains that such advice from the lawyers constitute a violation against the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The Solicitor General, commenting on the case, agreed with Buenasedas lawyers as he maintained that all the
Ombudsman can do is to recommend suspensions not impose them. The Sol-Gen based his argument on Section 13 (3)
of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have inter alia the power, function, and
duty to:
Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, andrecommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials. Whether or not a Motion for
Disbarment may be filed in a special civil action.
HELD: Yes, the Ombudsman may impose suspension orders. The Supreme Court clarifies that what the Ombudsman
issued is an order of preventive suspension pending the resolution of the case or investigation thereof. It is not imposing
suspension as a penalty (not punitive suspension). What the Constitution contemplates that the Ombudsman may
recommend are punitive suspensions.
Anent the issue of the Motion for Disbarment filed with the Ombudsman, the same is not proper. It cannot be filed in
this special civil action which is confined to questions of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the purpose of relieving
persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-judicial officers. There is a set of procedure for the discipline of
members of the bar separate and apart from the present special civil action. However, the lawyers of Buenaseda were
reminded not be carried away in espousing their clients cause. The language of a lawyer, both oral or written, must be
respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession and with his behavioral attitude toward his
brethren in the profession.

Buenaseda vs. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 770 (1993)
The language of a lawyer, both oral and written, must be respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession and with his behavioral attitude toward his brethren in the profession. The use of abusive language by counsel
against the opposing counsel constitutes at the same time a disrespect to the dignity of the court justice. Moreover, the
use of impassioned language in pleadings, more often than not, creates more heat than light.

SANGALANG VS IAC

Facts: The incident before the Court refers to charges for contempt against Atty. J. Cezar Sangco, counsel for the
petitioners Spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang.

On February 2, 1989, the Court issued a Resolution, requiring, among other things, Atty. Sangco to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt "for using intemperate and accusatory language." On March 2, 1989, Atty. Sangco
10
filed an explanation. The Court finds Atty. Sangco's remarks in his motion for reconsideration, particularly, . . . The Court
not only put to seriousquestion its own integrity and competence but also jeopardized its own campaign against graft and
corruption undeniably pervading the judiciary . . . disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for. His suggestions that the
Court might have been guilty of graft and corruption in acting on these cases are not only unbecoming, but comes, as
well, as an open assault upon the Court's honor and integrity.

Issue: Whether or not the counsels act constitutes malpractice inviolation of the Codes (CPR) provision on the use of
scandalous offensive or menacing language or behavior before the courts.

Held: In rendering its judgment, the Court yielded to the recordsbefore it, and to the records alone, and not to outside
influences, much less, the influence of any of the parties. Atty. Sangco, as a former judge of an inferior court, should know
better that in any litigation, one party prevails, but his success will not justify indictments of bribery by the other party. He
should be aware that because of his accusations, he has done an enormous disservice to the integrity of the highest
tribunal and to the stability of the administration of justice in general. Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to a
license to insult the Court with derogatory statements and recourses to argumenta ad hominem . In that event, it is the
Court's duty "to act to preservethe honor and dignity . . . and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession."
The Court in their "show-cause" Resolution, they sought to hold Atty. Sangco in contempt, specifically, for resort to
insulting language amounting to disrespect toward the Court within the meaning ofSection 1, of Rule 71, of the Rules of
Court. Clearly, however, his act also constitutes malpractice as the term is defined by Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Sangalang v. IAC, 177 SCRA 87 (1989)
x x x Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to a license to insult the Court with derogatory statements and
recourses to argumenta ad hominem. x x x Of course, the Court is not unreceptive to comments and critique of its
decisions, provided that they are fair and dignified.

GO VS ABROGAR
FACTS: Petitioners, Jimmy Go and Atty. Gregorio Caneda alleged Judge Zeus C Abrgogar for Gross Ignorance of the Law because of the
decision he rendered in a civil case (No. 98-791) where Jimmy Go together with Alberto Looyuko were one of the defendants, and also for
the judges order dismissing their appeal from the decision of the said civil case. They allege that respondent Judge did not possess the
authority to do so nor rule that the judgment was ripe for execution, the same being reserved in the Court of Appeals. The petitioners also
asserted that the judgment against Go was not yet final and executory in view of the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition assailing the dismissal of their appeal. In support of their claim, they cite the principle ofjudicial courtesy.
In the respondent Judges defense, his writ of execution in Civil Case No. 98-791 was directed only against defendant Alberto T.
Looyuko who had withdrawn his notice of appeal and conveyed his acquiescence to the execution of the Decision against his properties
involved in the said civil case. Judge Abrogar claims that the reference of the writ todefendants was a mere clerical mistake, as it should
have read defendant, that was not corrected when the writ was issued.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge acted with Gross Ignorance of Law.
RULING: NO. Obviously, on the basis of the foregoing case scrutiny, there is no basis to hold respondent Judge liable for Gross
Ignorance of the Law. The allegations of complainants and the proffered evidence thereof do not prove the elements of this administrative
offense, i.e., that the subject order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties must not only be contrary to
existing law and jurisprudence but more importantly must be attended by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. It may even be
said confidently that respondent Judge did not deviate from established rules on the execution of judgments.
Moreover, the court finds that the fault is at the complainants own doing. Irresponsibly, they set the hearing thereof a period of fourteen
(14) days from the date of its filing, and thereafter postponed their own setting to a date seven (7) days later. Eventually, after their self-
induced delay of twenty-one (21) days, complainants moved for the cancellation of the scheduled hearing upon a measly one (1) days
notice. For a supposedly pressing and imperative motion, the hearings set by complainants do not indicate a bona fide intention to correct an
earnest injustice as the dates were calendared simply far apart until finally the hearing of their motion was called off unceremoniously.
WHEREFORE, the instant complaint against JUDGE ZEUS C. ABROGAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 150, is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the
case. The rule allows such criticism so long as it is supported by the record or it is material to the case.
11
A lawyers right to criticize the acts of courts and judges in a proper and respectful way and through legitimate
channels is well recognized. The cardinal condition of all such criticism is that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the wall of decency and propriety.
(Agpalo)
The court will not hesitate to sanction persons who recklessly and nonchalantly impute ill motives that are nothing but unfounded
speculations. Any serious accusation against a judicial officer that is utterly baseless, unsubstantiated and unjustified shall not be
countenanced.

MACEDA VS VASQUEZ

FACTS: Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks the review of
the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer
to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences. Together with the
complainant judges petition for review are the preliminary mandatory injunction with regard to whether the office of the
Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification by Judge Maceda of his certificate of service
submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to administer criminal complaint or cases against a judge.
RULING: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and inefficiency (Sec. 1,
Rule 140, Rules of Court) and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious conduct. The Ombudsman could
therefore entertain the criminal complaint. However, where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employees arises from
their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the Supreme Court for
determination whether said judges or court employees acted within the scope of their administrative duties. Otherwise, in the absence
of any administrative action taken against Maceda, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts
power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances
against a Judge to the proper authorities only.
ANG VS CASTRO

FACTS: Petitioner, Armando Ang seeks to set aside the order, dated February 9, 1984 of respondent Judge Jose P. Castro of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch LXXXIV in Quezon City, denying his appeal from an order holding him in contempt of court. Petitioner also asks the
Court (1) to order respondent Judge Castro to forward the records of Civil Case No. Q-35466 to the Intermediate Appellate Court; (2) to
enjoin him from enforcing his order for the arrest of petitioner; (3) to restrain respondent Assistant Fiscal Narciso T. Atienza of
Quezon City from conducting preliminary investigation on the libel charge filed against him by respondent judge; and, (4) to prohibit
respondent Judge Jose P. Arro of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch CIII, Quezon City from proceeding and/or conducting a hearing
on the criminal complaint for libel against petitioner in Criminal Case charged against him (Armando Ang).
In the respondent judges (Hon. Castro) statement, Armando Ang shall be charged with libel because the letter he sent in the
Office of the Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs stating that the respondent judge acted with ignorance of the law, gross inexcusable
negligence, incompetence, manifest partiality, grave abuse of discretion, grave misconduct, rendering unjust decision in a Civil Case under
Section 3, Rule 71 of the New Rules of Court constitutes indirect contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners act constitutes libel or indirect contempt against the court/ judge
RULING: NO. The Rules of Court cannot be any clearer. The use of disrespectful of contemptuous language against a particular
judge in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct, contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in
the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Stated differently, if the pleading containing
derogatory, offensive or malicious statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, it is
direct contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt
the administration of justice. Considering the aforecited provisions, petitioner's conduct if at all, constitutes indirect contempt and if
found guilty, he may appeal pursuant to Section 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
"SEC. 10. Review of judgment or order by Court of Appeals or Supreme Court; bond for stay. - The judgment or order of a Court of First
Instance made in a case of contempt punished after written charge and hearing may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court, but execution of the judgment or order shall not be suspended until a bond is filed by the person in contempt, in an amount fixed by
the Court of First Instance, conditioned that if the appeal be decided against him he will abide by and perform the judgment or order. The
appeal may be taken as in criminal cases."
The letter of the petitioner complaining against respondent judge's ignorance of the law, gross inexcusable negligence, incompetence,
disregard for the Supreme Court administrative order, grave misconduct, rendering an unjust decision and dereliction of duty was done in
good faith, as manifested in the case of Santiago vs. Calvo, 48 Phil. 922, "a communication made in good faith upon any subject matter in
which the party making the communication has an interest or concerning which he has a duty is privileged if made to a person having a
corresponding interest of duty, although it contains incriminatory or derogatory matter which without the privilege would be libelous and
12
actionable; . . . that parties, counsel and witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander for words otherwise defamatory published
in the course of judicial proceedings, provided the statements are pertinent or relevant to the case."
Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances
against a Judge to the proper authorities only.
Rule 11.04. A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality
to the case.
NOTES
(Agpalo) The rule allows such criticism so long as it is supported by the record or it is material to the case. A
lawyers right to criticize the acts of courts and judges in a proper and respectful way and through legitimate
channels is well recognized. What a lawyer can ordinarily say against a concluded litigation and the manner
the judge handed down the decision therein may not generally be said to a pending action. Once litigation is
concluded the judge who decided it is subject to the same criticism as any other public official because then his
ruling becomes public property and is thrown open to public scrutiny. The cardinal condition of all such
criticism is that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the wall of decency and propriety.
In re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562 (1970)
X x x Every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not dismissed
by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially
recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because then the courts actuations are thrown open to
public consumption. Courts thus treats with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations for
courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence as citizen and
officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the
shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be
bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Post litigation utterances or publications made by
lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the
permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into dispute or to subvert
public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct
which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the SC in the exercise of the
prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
x x x It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of the Courts authority in the premises, that, as Atty.
Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the complainants, prosecutors and judges all rolled up into
one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at
hand but also of the Courts role therein. Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the
present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial of an action or a
suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is
in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by
the court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of the attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.


CANON 12

VILLASIS VS CA

FACTS: The Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the appellate court's dismissal of petitioners-appellants' appeal for failure to file
appellants' brief finds that petitioners have shown no valid and justifiable reason for their inexplicable failure to file their brief and have
only themselves to blame for their counsel's (Atty. Tayco) utter inaction and gross indifference and neglect in not having filed their brief
for a year since receipt of due notice to file the same. Petitioners' counsel before Atty Tayco was Atty. Valente who filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel due to his having been employed as technical assistant in the Supreme Court, with a prayer that appellants' newly
engaged counsel be given sufficient time to file their brief. Said new counsel, Atty. Esdras F. Tayco, filed on August 18, 1970 his
appearance with the appellate court.
New counsel Tayco's claim in his motion for reconsideration that he had not received the notice to file brief borders on the frivolous. Such
notice to file brief had been received by his predecessor-counsel Atty. Valente and is binding on him as the successor. A new counsel who
accepts a case in midstream is presumed and obliged to acquaint himself with all the antecedent processes and proceedings that have
transpired in the record prior to his takeover. It is noteworthy that Atty. Tayco makes no claim that he was unaware that notice to file
brief had been duly served on Atty. Valente and that the period would expire on August 10, 1970 and that Atty. Valente had asked in his
two withdrawal motions that he (Tayco) as new counsel be granted "sufficient time" to file the brief.
The appellate court consequently required both counsels of appellants, Atty. Valente (whose withdrawal it held in abeyance until he filed
a proper motion in verified form with the signed conformity of the clients as per its resolution of August 18, 1970) and Atty. Tayco to
comment on the dismissal motion. Withdrawing counsel Valente filed his manifestation alleging inter alia that he had not received a copy
of the dismissal motion and could not therefore comment thereon and submitting therewith the signed conformity of his clients to his
13
withdrawal and reiterating his prayer for the court to grant his withdrawal and to grant appellants sufficient time to file their brief. New
counsel Tayco filed no comment whatsoever.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court committed an error in dismissing the petition/appeal of the petitioner-appellant.
RULING: The appellate court committed no error therefore in dismissing the appeal. Petitioners-appellants have shown no valid and
justifiable reason for their inexplicable failure to file their brief and have only themselves to blame for their counsel's utter inaction and
gross indifference and neglect in not having filed their brief for a year since receipt of due notice to file the same. They could not even
claim ignorance of the appellate court's notice to file brief since it had required withdrawing counsel Valente to secure their written
conformity before granting his withdrawal as counsel, and certainly they must have ascertained from him as well as new counsel the
status of their appeal which accounts for Atty. Valente's repeated prayers in his two motions for withdrawal for the granting of sufficient
time for new counsel to file the brief. They had almost a year thereafter to make sure that their new counsel did attend to their appeal
and did file the brief. Where a lawyers motion for extension of time to file a pleading, memorandum or brief has remained unacted by
the court, the least that is expected of him is to file it within the period asked for.
Rule 12.01 - A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has adequately prepared himself on the law and the facts of his
case, the evidence he will adduce.
RULE 12.03
NOT TO DELAY CASE: A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse
without submitting to the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition at bar is dismissed with costs against petitioners

ACHACOSO VS CA

FACTS: The court reprimanded Atty. Rodrigo Nera for repeatedly filing extensions of time to file pleadings and thereafter simply let the
period lapse without submitting the pleading to even an explanation or manifestation of their failure to do so. His explanations in the
extensions of time were: (1) Dated Feb12 (Feb 27)- March 14: in order that this Honorable Court may be fully and completely informed
of the nature of the controversy which gave rise to the instant petition; (2) Dated Mar14 (Mar20)- Mar 29: due to the pressure of urgent
professional work and daily trial engagements of the undersigned counsel during the original period granted, he has not had sufficient
material time to complete the preparation of petitioner's reply and; (3) Dated Mar 29 (Apr6) April 13- due to the pressure of urgent
professional work and daily trial engagements of the undersigned counsel during the original period granted, he has not had sufficient
material time to complete the preparation of petitioner's reply. The undersigned counsel humbly apologizes that in view of his
crowded schedule, he has been constrained to ask for this extension, but respectfully assures the Honorable Court that this will be the
last one requested.
Atty Neras defensively stated that he failed to submit the required pleadings because of the petitioners failure to
communicate with him and their financial position. He also pleads that it is not their intention to delay the administration of justice and
much less trifle with the resolutions and orders of this Honorable Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a disciplinary action should be taken against the counsel/ Atty. Rodrgio M. Nera
RULING: YES. The court finds the explanation of the counsel far from satisfactory. If indeed he was not in a financial position to advance
the necessary expenses for preparing and submitting the reply, then he could have filed timely the necessary manifestation that he was
foregoing the filing of such reply on petitioner's behalf. His inaction unduly delayed the Court's prompt disposition of the case after the
filing by respondents of their comments on the petition showing its lack of merit. The Court would have then so disposed of the petition
had it not been for petitioner's plea to be given time and opportunity to file a reply to the comments in order to fully apprise the Court of
the nature of the controversy, which plea the Court granted in reliance on his good faith. Yet after having obtained three extensions of
time for the filing of the reply, counsel simply failed neither to file any reply nor to give the Court the courtesy of any explanation or
manifestation for his failure to do so. In view of the counsels readily perceived explanation that his conduct comes close to delaying the
administration of justice and trifling with the Court's processes, it does not reflect well on counsel's conduct as an officer of the Court that
after assuring the Court that the third extension requested by him "in view of his crowded schedule" and "of urgent professional work and
daily trial engagements" would be the last within which period he would at last file the awaited reply, for him thereafter to let the period
simply lapse without any explanation whatsoever, and worse, to wait to be found out, and have the Court require him to explain.
RULE 12.03
NOT TO DELAY CASE: A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse
without submitting to the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
MANILA PEST CONTROL VS WCC

FACTS: Mario Abitria, an employee of Manila Pest Control suffered from tuberculosis found to have been contracted from his work. He was
granted disability benefits by the Court but Manila Pest Control alleged infringement of due process as it was not served the decision by the
court thru its counsel. It claimed that a writ of execution should not have been ordered since it did not receive a copy of the decision. The
decision was sent to Atty. Manuel Camacho, who was without any connection to the case, and not to its counsel Atty. Corpuz. The Supreme
Court upheld the decision of the Workmens Compensation Commision (WCC) which explained that when it delivered the decision to Atty.
Manuel Corpuz, he refused to receive the decision alleging that he was no longer handling the case. He instead instructed WCC to deliver
said decision to Atty. Camacho, who according to him was now handling the case. In view of said instruction, the employee of WCC handed
the copy of the decision to the receiving clerk in the Office of Atty. Camacho. The Court imposed treble costs against petitioner to be paid
by Atty. Corpuz.
14

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty Corpuz acted with great misuse of court process.

RULING: YES. It is sad to note that Atty. Corpuz is now impugning the delivery of the decision to Atty. Camacho when in fact the delivery of
said decision was made per his instruction to the employee of WCC. This would not be the first time where out of excess of zeal and out of
desire to rely on every conceivable defense that could delay if not defeat the satisfaction incumbent on ones client, counsel would attempt
to put the most favorable light on a course of conduct which certainly cannot be given the stamp of approval. Not that it would clear
counsel of any further responsibility. His conduct leaves much to be desired. The effort to evade liability by petitioner by invoking due
process guaranty must not be rewarded with success. An effort was made to serve petitioner with a copy of the decision; that such effort
failed was attributable to the conduct of its own counsel.

It is not enough that petitioner be required to pay the sum due to Abitria. The unseemly conduct of petitioners counsel calls for words of
reproof. It is one thing to exert to the utmost ones ability to protect the interest of ones client. It is quite another thing to take advantage
any unforeseen turn of events, if not to create one, to delay if not to defeat the recovery of what is justly due and demandable, especially
so when the obligee is a poverty stricken man suffering from a dreaded disease. The ancient and learned profession of the law stresses the
fairness and honor; that must be ever kept in mind by everyone who is enrolled in its ranks and who expects to remain a member of a good
standing.

It is one thing to exert to the utmost ones ability to protect the interest of ones client. It is quite another thing to delay if
not defeat the recovery of what is justly due and demandable due to the misleading acts of a
lawyer. (Manila Pest Control v. WCC, 25 SCRA 700 (1968))

WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is denied. With treble costs against petitioner to be paid
by his counsel, Attorney Manuel A. Corpuz.

RULE 12.04 :COURT PROCESS: A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.

US VS BALLENA

FACTS: In the case at bar the record shows beyond any question of a doubt that the witness Barruga, after being duly sworn, did
knowingly and willfully testify falsely in a criminal case before a duly constituted tribunal; that this witness so testified at the
instigation of the defendant Leoncio Ballena; and that the defendant knew that the testimony given by the witness Barruga was false.
The witness so informed the defendant. Notwithstanding this information, the defendant strongly insisted that by the witness
Barruga testifying that the fiscal committed those acts would be the only was to save her daughter from imprisonment. The
defendant not only knowingly and willfully induced this witness to swear falsely, but he did so maliciously, as it appears from the
record that he was an enemy of the fiscal at that time, the fiscal having prosecuted him previous to this trial. So the only question to
be determined is, as we have said, Was the testimony of Barruga material to the issues involved in that criminal case against her
daughter for perjury? Materiality is an essential element in the crime of perjury. (U. S. vs. Estraa, 16 Phil. Rep., 520.) It, therefore,
necessarily follows that materiality is likewise an indispensable requisite in the crime of subornation of perjury, as the latter is derived
from the former.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant committed a crime of perjury

RULING: YES. Subornation of perjury is committed by a person who knowingly and willfully procures another to swear falsely and
the witness subornated does testify under circumstances rendering him guilty of perjury.

Rule 12.06 - A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to misrepresent himself or to impersonate another.
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Art. 184, Revised Penal Code
The lawyer who presented a witness knowing
him to be a false witness is criminally liable for
Offering False Testimony In Evidence. The
lawyer is both criminally and administratively
liable.

PNB VS UY TENG PIAO

FACTS: Pursuant to a judgment of the Court of First Instance the mortgaged lands of Uy Teng Piao were sold. Philippine National Bank
obtained a waiver of the right to redemption. Uy Teng Piao alleged that the waiver was given with the agreement that the bank would
not collect from him the balance of judgment. One of the attorneys for the bank during trial testified that the defendant renounced
his right to redeem the parcel of land because a friend of the defendant was interested in buying it.

ISSSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the banks attorney as a witness is valid.

RULING: With respect to the testimony of the banks attorney, we should like to observe that although the law does not forbid an
attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not testify as witness
unless it is necessary and that they should withdraw from the active management of the case. Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics
provides that when a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters. Such as the attestation or custody of an
instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer
should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client.

Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client; except:
a. on formal matters, such as mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument, and the like; or
15
b. on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which event
he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.

CANON 13
AUSTRIA VS MASAQUEL
FACTS: Petitioner, Domingo Austria filed an instant petition for certiorari for having been punished summarily for direct contempt of
court because he prayed for the disqualification of judge Masaquel for two (2) main reasons, specifically: (1) The lawyer of the other
party was the judges former assistant and (2) the defendant Pedro Bravo himself that he is boasting in San Carlos that because he has
a new lawyer, that surely he is going to win this case. The petitioner stated that he had not committed an act of contempt against the
court and the respondent judge had acted win excess of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when he declared the
petitioner in direct contempt of court and imposed on him the fine of Php 50.00 as penalty.

The respondent judge, on the other hand said that the actuation of the petitioner, in the premises, is offensive, insulting, and a
reflection on his integrity and honesty and it shows lack of respect to the court. He considered that the petitioner was not justified
and had no reason to entertain doubts in his fairness and integrity simply because the defendant's counsel was his former associate.
And that the act of the petitioners counsel/attorney (Atty. Macraeg) in approaching him in his chambers is prohibited.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner acted in direct contempt against the court and the respondent judge

RULING: NO. The court considered the view that when the petitioner requested respondent Judge to inhibit himself from further
trying the case upon the ground that the counsel for the opposite party was the former associate of the respondent Judge, petitioner
did so because he was impelled by a justifiable apprehension which can occur in the mind of a litigant who sees what seems to be an
advantage on the part of his adversary; and that the petitioner made his request in a manner that was not disrespectful, much less
insulting or offensive to the respondent Judge or to the court.

Moreover, the petitioner did not take an arrogant attitude toward respondent Judge. What he did was to request his lawyer, Atty.
Macaraeg, to approach respondent Judge in his chamber and suggest to him to refrain from hearing the case on the new trial,
precisely in order that respondent Judge might not be embarrassed or exposed to public odium. There is nothing in the record which
shows that when respondent Judge refused to disqualify himself, the petitioner insisted in asking for his disqualification. If the
request of petitioner for respondent Judge to disqualify himself came to the knowledge of the public it was because respondent
Judge himself brought up the matter in open court.

It is, however, improper for a litigant or counsel to see a judge in chambers and talk to him about a matter related to the case pending
in the court of said judge.

Wherefore, the order of respondent Judge dated February 10, 1964, in Civil Case No. 13259 of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, declaring petitioner in direct contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P50.00, is hereby annulled and set
aside; and it is ordered that the sum of P50.00, paid under protest by petitioner as a fine, be refunded to him. No costs. It is so
ordered.

Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extendextraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for cultivating familiarity
with Judges.
The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only
occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must
falter or fail." The power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless
necessary in the interest of justice.

NESTLE PHIL VS SANCHEZ
FACTS: Two unions (Union of Filipro Employees and Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-
Olalia) with pending cases before the Supreme Court had intermittent pickets (guards/wardens) in front of the Padre Faura gate of
the SC building, obstructing access to and egress from the Courts premises. They also constructed provisional shelters, set up a
kitchen, littered the area causing it to be unhygienic and unsanitized, waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and
harangued the court with the use of loudspeakers. Two justices (Judge Pedro L. Yap and Judge Marcelo Fernan) called the leaders of
the unions and their counsel to inform them that the pickets constitute direct contempt of court, and that their petitions could not
be heard until the pickets stop. Atty Espinas, the counsel for the unions, apologized and assured that the acts would not be repeated.
The Supreme Court dismissed the contempt charges against Atty. Espinas.

ISSUE: Whether or not the direct contempt charges against Atty Espinas shall be dismissed.

RULING: YES. However, grievances must be ventilated through proper channels (appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings) in
keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to proceed to the disposition of its business
in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of
justice. The acts of the respondents are not only affront to the dignity of this Court, but equally a violation of the right of the adverse
parties and the citizenry at large. The individuals cited are not knowledgeable in the intricacies of substantive and adjective laws,
but the duty of advising them rests primarily on their counsel of record. For though the rights of free speech and of assembly are
constitutionally protected, an attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice is no longer within the ambit of constitutional
protection.

16
WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED. Henceforth, no demonstrations or pickets intended
to pressure or influence courts of justice into acting one way or the other on pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or
within the premises of any and all courts.

Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extendextraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for cultivating familiarity
with Judges.

Nestle Phil. v. Sanchez 154 SCRA 542 (1987) Courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be
immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the
determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.. The court will not hesitate in the
future to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the court into acting one way
or the other in any case pending before it. Grievances should be aired along proper channels.

IN RE DE VERA
FACTS: Atty. De Vera made some remarks to the Philippine Daily Inquirer regarding a pending case involving the constitutionality of
the Plunder Law. In one statement, he asked the SC to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition filed by Estradas
lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional and that his group was greatly disturbed by the rumors. In another statement,
he said that a decision in favor of the laws unconstitutionality would trigger mass actions and the people would not just swallow any
SC decision that is basically wrong. Atty. De Vera admitted to making the statements but that these were factually accurate and that
these are within his right to freedom of speech. Also, his second statement is allegedly historically correct (Marcos and Erap times)
but that both statements are not to degrade the court, to destroy public confidence and to bring it into disrepute. The SC found that
de Veras acts constitute indirect contempt and fined him P20, 000.

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER Monday, November 19, 2001: Atty. Leonard De Vera also argued that he was merely exercising
his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech when he said that a decision by the Court declaring the Plunder Law
unconstitutional would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to People Power II. While Atty. Leonard De
Vera admitted to having uttered the aforecited statements, respondent denied having made the same to degrade the Court, to
destroy public confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Leonard De Vera is liable for indirect contempt of court for uttering statements aimed to influence and
threat the Court in deciding in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law

RULING: Yes. Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must be balanced with the requirements of equally important public interests,
such as the maintenance of the integrity of the courts and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. De Vera is in abuse of
his right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot
be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect and confidence thereof. His statements are not fair
criticisms of any decision of the Court, but are threats made against it to force the Court to decide the issue in a particular manner,
or risk earning the ire of the public. It tends to promote distrust an undermines public confidence in the judiciary, by creating the
impression that the Court cannot be trusted to resolve cases impartially, uninfluenced by public clamor and other extraneous
influences.


CRUZ VS SALVA

FACTS
- A certain Manuel Monroy was murdered. CFI Pasay found Castelo, de Jesus, Bonifacio, Mendoza, Berdugo et al. guilty of murder.
They all appealed and Castelo sought new trial. Castelo was again found guilty.
- Pres Magsaysay ordered reinvestigation. Philippine Constabulary questioned people and got confessions pointing to persons other
than those convicted.
- Castelo et al wrote to Fiscal Salva to conduct reinvestigation on basis of new confessions. Fiscal conferred w/ SolGen and the
Justice Sec decided to have the results of investigation made available to counsel for appellants.
- Chief of Phil Constabulary furnished Fiscal Salva copies of the affidavits and confessions. Salva organized a committee for
reinvestigation and subpoenaed Timoteo Cruz, who was implicated as instigator and mastermind in the new affidavits and
confessions. Cruz counsel questioned jurisdiction of the committee and of Salva to conduct preliminary investigation bec the case
was pending appeal in the SC. Counsel filed this present petition.
- Salva said he subpoenaed Cruz bec of Cruz oral and personal request to allow him to appear at the investigation.
- SC issued writ of preliminary injunction stopping the prelim investigation.

ISSUES
1. WON Salva and his committee can push through with the investigation
2. WON Cruz can be compelled to appear and testify before Salva
3. WON Salva conducted the investigation property

HELD
1. Yes.
- SC believed Salva that it was Cruz who personally reqested to allow him to appear at the investigation.
- Normally, when a criminal case handled by fiscal is tried and decided and appealed to a higher court, functions of fiscal have
terminated. However, Salva has justified his reinvestigation bec in the orig case, one of the defendants (Salvador Realista y de
Guzman) was not included in the trial.
- The duty of a prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent.
- Writ of preliminary injunction dissolved. Investigation may continue.
17
- Petition for certiorari and prohibition granted in part, denied in part.
2. No
- Under the law, Cruz had right to be present at the investigation but he need not be present. His presence is more of a right than a
legal obligation.
3. No
- Salva shld have done investigation privately in his office and not publicly in the session hall of Municipal Court of Pasay where
microphones were installed and media people were present. He should also not have made the media people ask questions. SC was
disturbed and annoyed by such publicity.
- Salva is publicly reprehended and censured.

RE: REQUEST RADIO TV COVERAGE

FACTS: The petitioner, in essence, sought to reverse the 1991 Supreme Court resolution denying the live coverage of a libel case
filed by then President Aquino. In this case, petitioners requested the Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial
before the Sandiganbayan of criminal charges against Pres. Estrada. In the 1991 case, the court totally prohibited live radio and TV
coverage because of the prejudice it poses to the defendants right to due process and to the fair and orderly administration of
justice. The Court also held that the right of the people to information may be served by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial
means. The radio and TV coverage allowed was limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel
taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or photographs were permitted during the trial proper.
The Supreme Court denied the petition.

ISSUE:
RULING: This resolution of this case involves the weighing out of the freedom of the press and the right of the people to information
on one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused on the other, along with the constitutional power of the court to control its
proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. Jurisprudence tells us that the right of the accused must be preferred. Television
can work profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on. However, the actual effect of media cannot be quantified.
The effect of television may escape the ordinary means of proof, but is not far-fetched. The court also pointed out that a public trial
is not synonymous to a publicized trial. Although the court recognizes the constitutionally protected freedom of the press and the
right to public information, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due
process.

In Estes v. Texas, it was held that the likely prejudices of a live coverage of a trial are: (1) When the judge allows the trial to be
televised, the case automatically assumes an important status in the community such that everybody becomes interested. (2) The
quality of the testimony in criminal trials will often be impaired. (3) There are additional responsibilities that the presence of
television places upon the judge. (4) The presence of television may prove to be a form of mental sometimes physical
harassment on the part of the defendant. (much like being in a police lineup). The court is not unmindful of recent technological
advances but to chance with the life or liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even in the presence of safety
precautions, is a price too high to pay.

Trial should not to be televised. The right of accused, who is in danger of losing his life and liberty, to a fair trial, outweighs
right of public to information. Media exposure may unduly interfere with the disposition of the trial.

RULE: 13.02 NO PUBLIC STATEMENT TO MEDIA
A lawyer shall not make public statements in media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public
opinion
for or against a party.

MAGSALANG VS PEOPLE

FACTS: Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, the petitioners counsel is charged with the contempt of court and improper conduct as a
member of the bar and an officer of the Court for after having a copy of a complaint dated December 19, 1989, he filed it in the
Office of the President of the Philippines. Whereby, Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as complainant,
accused all the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with "biases and or ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust
judgments or resolution." The complaint was signed by Atty. Castellano "for the complainant" with the conformity of one Calixto B.
Maglasang, allegedly the father of accused-complainant Khalyxto.

By reason of the strong and intemperate language of the complaint and its improper filing with the Office of the President, which,
as he should know as a lawyer, has no jurisdiction to discipline, much more, remove, Justices of the Supreme Court, Atty.
Castellano was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt or administratively dealt with for improper
conduct.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of complaint against the justices in the Office of the President is improper.

RULING: YES. In filing a "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second Division with the Office of the President, even the
most basic tenet of our government system-the separation of powers between the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative
branches-has been lost on Atty. Castellano. Related rule: Rule 11.05. A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.

Rule 13.03 - A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference by another branch or agency of the government in the normal
course of judicial proceedings.


CANON 14

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LEDESMA VS CLIMACO

CANON 14 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REFUSE HIS SERVICES TO THE NEEDY.

Rule 14.02 - A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and sufficient cause, an appointment as counsel de oficio
or as amicus curiae, or a request from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any of its chapters for rendition of
free legal aid.

BLANZA VS ARCANGEL
FACTS: Complainants Olegaria Blanza and Maria Pasion ask the Court to take disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Agustin
Arcangel for professional non-feasance. They complain that way back in April, 1955, respondent volunteered to help them in their
respective pension claims in connection with the deaths of their husbands, both P.C. soldiers, and for this purpose, they handed over
to him the pertinent documents and also affixed their signatures on blank papers. But subsequently, they noticed that since then,
respondent had lost interest in the progress of their claims and when they finally asked for the return of their papers six years later,
respondent refused to surrender them.

Respondent answered these accusations before Fiscal Raa to whom this case was referred by the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. He admitted having received the documents from complainants but explained that it
was for photostating purposes only. His failure to immediately return them, he said, was due to complainants' refusal to hand him
the money to pay for the photostating costs which prevented him from withdrawing said documents from the photostat service.
Anyway, he had already advanced the expenses himself and turned over the documents, to their respective photostats and the
photostat service receipt to the fiscal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the actions of Atty Arcangel constitutes disciplinary actions by the court

RULING: NO. However, he should be reminded of what high standards of his chosen profession require of him. Finding respondent's
explanation satisfactory and considering that he charged complainants nothing for his services, Fiscal Raa recommended the
former's exoneration, on at most, that he be reprimanded only. The Solicitor General, however, feels that respondent deserves at
least a severe reprimand considering (1) his failure to attend to the complainants' pension claims for six years: (2) his failure to
immediately return the documents despite repeated demands upon him, and (3) his failure to return to complainant Pasion,
allegedly, all of her documents.

Moreover, as a lawyer who volunteered his services to a client, and therefore not entitled to attorneys fees, nevertheless, he is
bound to attend to a clients case with all due diligence and zeal.

By volunteering his services, he has established a client-lawyer relationship. (Blanza v. Arcangel, 21 SCRA 1 (1967))

If the counsel does refuse (see above justifications), Rule 2.02 governs, which says:
In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a case, he shall not refuse to render legal advice to the person
concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the latter's rights.

Rule 14.04 - A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his professional fees shall observe the same
standard of conduct governing his relations with paying clients.

CANON 15

Regala vs. Sandiganbayan

PCGG want to build up their case against Eduardo Coujuanco for the anomalies in the COCO LEVY FUNDS. PCGG wants
petitioners divulge that Cojuangco indeed was a client of their firm, as well as other information regarding Cojuangco.

Issue: Can the PCGG compel petitioners to divulge its clients name?

Held: NO.

As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be shrouded in mystery. The general is that a lawyer may not invoke the
privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.

1) the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
2) the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not
attach until there is a client.
3) the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.

Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. A party suing or
sued is entitled to know who his opponent is. He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces.

Except:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the clients name would implicate that client in the very
activity for which he sought the lawyers advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.
3) Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys client unless, by revealing the clients name, the said name
would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the clients name is
privileged.
19
That client identity is privileged in those instances where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would
implicate the client in the very criminal activity for which the lawyers legal advice was obtained.

DEE VS CA
Dee and his father went to the residence of Atty Mutuc to seek his advice regarding the problem of the alleged
indebtedness of petitioners brother Dewey Dee, to Ceasars Palace. Petitioners father was apprehensive over the safety
of his son, Dewey having heard of a link between the mafia and Ceasars Palace and his possibility that his son may be
harmed at the instance of the latter.
Atty Mutuc assured petitioner and his father that he would inquire into the matter, after which his services were
reportedly contracted for P100,000.
Further investigations revealed that the alleged debt of Dewey had actually been incurred by Ramon Sy, with Dewey
merely signing for the chits. Atty Mutuc talked with the president of Ceasars palace and advised the president that for
the sake and in the interest of the casino it would be better to make Ramon Sy answer for the indebtedness. The president
told him that if he could convince Ramon Sy to acknowledge the obligation, Dewey would be exculpated from liability.
Ramon Sy acknowledged the obligation, thereafter, the account of Dewey was cleared.
Atty Mutuc sent demand letters to petitioner demanding the balance of P50,000 as attorneys fees. Petitioner Dee ignored
said letters. Atty Mutuc filed a complaint against petitioner Dee for the collection of attorneys fees.
Petitioner denied the existence of any professional relationship of attorney and client between hin and Atty Mutuc. Dee
insists that the visits made to Atty Mutuc was merely informal and that Atty Mutuc had not been specifically contacted to
handle the problem. The P50,000 given to Atty Mutuc was alleged to be given not in the nature of attorneys fees but
merely pocket money.
Issue:
W/n there was a lawyer-client relationship
Held:
YES. The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship which
merits attorneys fees for professional services rendered. To establish the relationship, it is sufficient that the advice and
assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the relation is
implied on the part of the attorney from his acting on behalf of his client in pursuance of a request from the latter.
Therefore, Mutuc is entitled to receive a reasonable compensation.
Atty Mutuc did not represent conflicting interests as claimed by Dee when Dee alleged that Mutuc was acting as agent of
Ceasars Palace. Mutucs representations in behalf of petitioner Dee were not in resistance to the casinos claim but were
actually geared toward proving the liability of true debtor, Ramon Sy.
NAKPIL VS VALDEZ

A lawyer violated the trust and confidence of the client when he represented conflicting interest. He represented the
creditors when his accounting firm prepared and computed the claims of the creditors while his law firm represented the
estate.

FACTS:
Jose Nakpil, husband of the complainant, became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran Street, Baguio
City. For lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran property for him. They agreed that respondent
would keep the property in thrust for the Nakpils until the latter could buy it back. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent
obtained two (2) loans from a bank which he used to purchase and renovate the property. Title was then issued in
respondents name.
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings when Jose Nakpil died. Respondent
acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow. Respondent excluded the Moran property from the inventory of
Joses estate and transferred his title to the Moran property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was conflict of interest between the respondent Atty. Valdes and the complainant.
HELD:
20
YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of law for one (1) year.
RATIO:
[T]here is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors are adverse to each other. Respondents
accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time, computed the claims of two
creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of
the two claimants who are creditors of the estate.
[R]espondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position where his loyalty to his client could be doubted. In the estate
proceedings, the duty of respondents law firm was to contest the claims of these two creditors but which claims were
prepared by respondents accounting firm. Even if the claims were valid and did not prejudice the estate, the set-up is still
undesirable. The test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest in the representation is probability, not certainty of
conflict. It was respondents duty to inhibit either of his firms from said proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of
interest.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.
Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity
of the legal profession. Members of the bar are expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and
demands utmost fidelity and good faith. In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to observe
candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his clients.