Electrical Engineering Workplace Safety

November
2010
Vol: 1
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CONSIDERATIONS
IN UNIT
SUBSTATION
DESIGN TO
OPTIMIZE
RELIABILITY
AND ELECTRICAL
WORKPLACE
SAFETY
Abstract
i. introduction
ii. design considerations
iii. application wake-up calls
iv. a path forward via
product technology
V. The genesis of a new
substation design
vi. the greeneld site design
selection
vii. the next generation of unit
substation design
Viii. conclusion.
INDEX
LINKED
page 2 Electrical Engineer - Vol 1: November 2010
Session 9 - Considerations in Unit Substation Design to Optimize Reliability & Electrical Workplace Safety
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CONSIDERATIONS IN UNIT
SUBSTATION DESIGN TO
OPTIMIZE RELIABILITY AND
ELECTRICAL WORKPLACE
SAFETY
David B. Durocher
Senior Member IEEE
Industry Manager
Eaton Corporation
26850 SW Kinsman Road
Wilsonville, OR 97070 USA
DavidBDurocher@eaton.com
(c) 2010 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from 2010 IEEE IAS Electrical Safety Workshop
ABSTRACT
M
any legacy low and medium-voltage unit substations installed today are based upon older designs
that took advantage of reduced rst cost "opportunities" allowed by existing installation codes
and standards. Fast-forward to how these substation designs fair in safety and reliability today,
particularly in industrial process applications found in cement, pulp and paper, petroleum & chemical and
others, some of the exercised "opportunities" applied in the past begin to look more like liabilities than
assets.
Legacy engineering decisions once thought to be prudent take on new meanings today, particularly
when these decisions are viewed through the lens of emerging new workplace safety standards. The critical
issue of addressing destructive arc-ash hazards associated with persons working on or around energized
electrical equipment must now be considered.
Because traditional substation designs often appeared to involve some compromise regarding both safety
and reliability, a design team of a major process industry user took a fresh look at unit substation design. The
design review took place in conjunction with construction of a Greeneld plant built in the spring of 2009
in the USA.
This paper will review the design limitations of traditional unit substation congurations, offer an
overview of the alternatives considered by the Greeneld site project team, and discuss commercial,
operational, technical and safety validation of the design that was ultimately selected and installed.
Index Terms - Process Industries, Power Distribution, Unit Substations, Safety by Design, Electrical
Workplace Safety
I. INTRODUCTION
L
ow and medium voltage unit substations are applied universally across most every industry. At the
tree-top level, unit substations are used simply to transform medium-voltage, typically 15 to 25kV, to
a lower distribution voltage, typically 0.48 to 4.16kV, for application in supporting a host of various
motor and process equipment loads.
Fig. 1 shows a typical low-voltage unit substation.
In this case, the primary assembly at the left is a medium-voltage fused load break switch. For this
example, we will assume the primary voltage is 13.8kV. For assemblies in North American industry, this
assembly is typically designed to metal-enclosed switchgear standard ANSI/IEEE Standard C37.20.3 [1].
This assembly includes a load-break isolation switch with ratings of 600 or 1200 amperes and a
medium-voltage current-limiting fuse, appropriately sized to protect the transformer.
The primary switchgear is close-coupled to a substation transformer, either dry-type or liquid lled.
The substation transformer is designed to ANSI/IEEE Standard C.57.12 [2] with wall-mounted primary
and secondary bushings. There are many different substation transformer design alternatives to choose from,
Electrical Engineer - Vol 1: November 2010 page 3
beyond the scope of this paper.
Good information on the alternatives can be found in other technical papers, including [3]. In this case, the
transformer rating is shown at 2000kVA. With a secondary distribution voltage at 480Y/277 volts, the

low-voltage bushings are shown close-coupled to metal enclosed low-voltage switchgear.
In Fig. 1 (above), the low-voltage switchgear consists of a 3200 ampere secondary main bus and secondary
metering, with no secondary main circuit breaker, connected to four 1200 ampere feeder circuit breakers.
There are again variations on low-voltage switchgear designs. For process industry applications, most
frequently these assemblies are manufactured to UL1558 Standard [4].
This unit substation assembly, installed indoor or outdoors, remains the stalwart of power distribution
systems of today. In some applications, the primary metal-enclosed switchgear and transformer may be
mounted outdoors and a secondary air terminal chamber at the transformer will cable-feed to indoor
low-voltage switchgear.
Without a doubt, the integrated design shown here has been low cost and reliable performer and in this
conguration, continues to be applied in many industrial systems to this day.
II. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
I
n anticipation of the upcoming project, the design team for the Greeneld site took on the task of
investigating existing unit substation congurations carefully to identify where there may be some
inherent hidden aws in the design. It is important to note that prevailing codes and standards regarding
installation of this equipment had an impact on the unit substation design. In the US, the prevailing
installation document that applies is the National Electrical Code (NEC) [5]. Let's investigate two areas of this
code that impact the design and installation of the unit substation presented here.
A. NEC Article 240.21(C)2 Overcurrent Protection
Article 240.21(C) of the NEC addresses required overcurrent protection, specically related to transformer
secondary conductors. The article states that "a set of conductors feeding a single load ... shall be permitted to
be connected to a transformer secondary, without overcurrent protection of the secondary ...".
The article denes six conditions, specied in 240.21(C)(1) through 240.21(C)(6), under which secondary
overcurrent protection is not required. Sorting through the six options for our close-coupled unit substation
example, points us to the condition outlined in 240.21(C)(2) which most closely applies.
This condition gets fairly involved, with four different sub-conditions, all which must apply in order to satisfy
the exception of no secondary protection. Relevant language in these sub-conditions includes:
240.21(C)(2): Transformer Secondary Conductors Not over 3m (10 ft) Long.
(1) The ampacity of the secondary conductors is
a). Not less than the combined calculated loads on the circuits supplied by the secondary conductors
b). Not less than the rating of the device supplied by the secondary conductors or not less than the rating
of the overcurrent-protective device at the termination of the secondary conductors."
The rst item (1) a) above requires that the engineer perform calculations to determine the total
conductor load and then specify a conductor size to support the calculated load. Referring back to the Fig. 1
example above, note that the secondary conductor is specied at 3200A.
So, although the total connected rated load of the secondary feeder breakers is 4800A (four breakers rated
Session 9: Considerations in Unit Substation Design to Optimize Reliability & Electrical Workplace Safety
Safety Control Systems Conference IDC Technologies
2
Fig. 1: Typical Unit Substation today: Primary metal enclosed load interrupter switchgear,
fused load-break switch. Transformer close-coupled liquid filled or dry/cast resin. Secondary
switchgear metal enclosed with low-voltage power circuit breakers, shown here with four
feeders and no main breaker.
fused load break switch. For this example, we will assume the primary voltage
is 13.8kV. For assemblies in North American industry, this assembly is typically
designed to metal-enclosed switchgear standard ANSI/IEEE Standard
C37.20.3 [1]. This assembly includes a load-break isolation switch with ratings
of 600 or 1200 amperes and a medium-voltage current-limiting fuse,
appropriately sized to protect the transformer. The primary switchgear is close-
coupled to a substation transformer, either dry-type or liquid filled. The
substation transformer is designed to ANSI/IEEE Standard C.57.12 [2] with
wall-mounted primary and secondary bushings. There are many different
substation transformer design alternatives to choose from, beyond the scope of
this paper. Good information on the alternatives can be found in other technical
papers, including [3]. In this case, the transformer rating is shown at 2000kVA.
With a secondary distribution voltage at 480Y/277 volts, the low-voltage
bushings are shown close-coupled to metal enclosed low-voltage switchgear.
In Fig. 1, the low-voltage switchgear consists of a 3200 ampere secondary
main bus and secondary metering, with no secondary main circuit breaker,
connected to four 1200 ampere feeder circuit breakers. There are again
variations on low-voltage switchgear designs. For process industry
applications, most frequently these assemblies are manufactured to UL1558
Standard [4].
This unit substation assembly, installed indoor or outdoors, remains the
stalwart of power distribution systems of today. In some applications, the
primary metal-enclosed switchgear and transformer may be mounted outdoors
and a secondary air terminal chamber at the transformer will cable-feed to
indoor low-voltage switchgear. Without a doubt, the integrated design shown
here has been low cost and reliable performer and in this configuration,
continues to be applied in many industrial systems to this day.
3200A
125E
13.8kV
480Y/277V
2000kVA
5.75%Z
1200A
1200A
1200A
1200A

II. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
In anticipation of the upcoming project, the design team for the Greenfield site
took on the task of investigating existing unit substation configurations carefully
to identify where there may be some inherent hidden flaws in the design. It is
Figure 1
at 1200A each), the NEC allows the designer to assume a load diversity and size the secondary bus as some
lower value. The second item (1) b. in essence states that the secondary conductor ampacity be either greater
than the overcurrent device at which the conductors terminate (in this conguration, there is no such device)
or greater than conductor or bus rating in the equipment where the conductors terminate.
From this language, it seems clear that secondary bus protection for the unit substation is not required.
There is ongoing debate in some circles regarding the word "device" in this article, as some see the term
device to mean something other then the switchgear. Interestingly, the NEC Code Making Panel supporting
this Article is reviewing this language and considering future revision to clarify the meaning. This aside, note
also that Article 240.21(C) includes a Fine Print Note stating "For overcurrent protection requirements for
transformers, see 450.3.
B. NEC Article 450.3 Equipment - Transformers
Article 450.3 of the NEC addresses secondary overcurrent protection of transformers. Note 2 for Table
450.3(A) states: "Where secondary overcurrent protection is required, the secondary overcurrent device shall
be permitted to consist of not more then six circuit breakers or six sets of fuses grouped in one location".
Traditionally referred to as the "six disconnect" or "six handle" rule, this provision allows the user to forego
secondary overcurrent protection in a unit substation, provided there are no more than six feeder devices in
the assembly.
For the example shown in Fig. 1, this is clearly the case, so this assembly could be installed without concern
that the design would violate the applicable installation code.
III. APPLICATION WAKE-UP CALL
A
lthough the "six feeders - no main" unit substation passes all requirements outlined in the applicable
standards, the unit substation equipment manufacturer and the project team investigating design
alternatives were not satised this was the best approach.
Earlier experiences in industrial plants where arc-ash studies have been performed as outlined in NFPA-
70E [6] using calculation methods in IEEE1584 [7] yielded some very revealing and disturbing results. In
the event of a secondary bus fault, the NFPA-70E standard requires that the upstream overcurrent protective
device be used in determining the available arcing current.
In this case, the current-limiting fuse on the primary of the substation is the device used in the calculation.
Specically, Fig. 2 (below) shows calculations revealing arc ash energies at the secondary switchgear in excess
of 700 calories/cm
2
. These levels are dened in IEEE1584 as UNAPPROACHABLE, where effectively no
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) would be adequate in safeguarding personnel should a bus fault occur
while persons were working on the energized substation.
In many existing facilities, unit substation feeder devices were used as a lockout/tagout point while
downstream equipment was being serviced or maintained.
The elevated arc ash energies effectively made it unsafe to rack-out a secondary feeder breaker while the
secondary bus was energized. In process industry applications where electrical workplace safety is paramount
and energized lockout/tagout is common, the "six feeders - no main" unit substation design was simply no
longer a practical option.
A number of vintage unit substations that employed the conguration shown in Fig. 2, have effectively
been upgraded to improve reliability and electrical safety. Although beyond the scope of this paper, one such
5
this unit substation design is UNAPPROACHABLE. In addition, should a bus
fault occur while this assembly was energized, the likely result beyond
extremely high arc flash energies would be extensive equipment damage
caused by the heat energy developed before the primary fuse would clear. In a
process industry environment, this translates to hours or perhaps days of
downtime. In the end, the primary fuse in the 13.8kV fused load-break switch
shown in Fig. 2, is intended to protect the transformer, not the secondary bus.
Adding a secondary main circuit breaker would resolve this issue of protection
in some applications. This would in effect protect the secondary bus
downstream of the main breaker. However, the bus from the transformer
secondary terminals up to the main is still not adequately protected. This area
of the bus is sometimes referred to as the fault free zone as shown in Fig. 2.
The author cannot explain the reason for this label, save perhaps that in this
area, there is a strong desire that a fault will never occur!
In applications where the primary assembly and transformer are outdoors and
cable connected to the secondary switchgear, the secondary bus protection
issue becomes more problematic. The secondary conductors could be installed
in accordance with the NEC if they were 10 feet or less, but still not be
protected from either short circuit or overload. Clearly, an opportunity existed
for the project design team to consider design alternatives that would offer
better performance, both in reliability and workplace safety.
NFPA70E: Fault at 480V Switchgear Bus
31.8kA Symmetrical Fault current
1167 AF Boundary
702.4 cal/cm
2
@ 18
UNAPPROACHABLE
NFPA70E-2009: Category 4 is
highest category @ 40 cal/cm
2
3200A
125E
Bus Fault at 480V Switchgear
10kA Secondary Arcing Fault
At 13.8kV = 348A primary fault
125E fuse clearing time = 160 seconds
Arc Flash & PPE
2000kVA
5.75%Z
13.8kV
480Y/277V
1200A
1200A
1200A
1200A
= Fault Free Zone!

IV. A PATH FORWARD VIA PRODUCT TECHNOLOGY
Recognizing the limitations of the legacy unit substation design, the project
team worked with the power distribution equipment supplier to review
alternative designs that might offer improved performance. Because of the
extreme hazard and potential for extended outage time, the group quickly
dismissed the age-old approach of installing unit substations based on the six
feeders - no main design. The strategy was to look at designs that included a
secondary main overcurrent protective device (in this case, a low-voltage
Fig. 2: Limitations of existing unit substation designs have been identified for existing plants after arc-flash
hazard assessments in accordance with IEEE1584 have been performed. In this example, an arcing fault
at the unit substation secondary bus results in a calculated incident energy of 702.4 cal/cm
2
.
Figure 2
upgrade is presented in the case study outlined in [8].
Returning to the primary current-limiting fuse in the unit substation shown in Fig. 2, selecting the rating
of this fuse to account for transformer inrush results in a melting time requirement up to 12X the transformer
rated primary current for 0.1 seconds. In the 2000kVA substation shown in Fig. 2 , a 125E fuse is applied.
A bolted secondary fault would result in a primary current of less than 1000 amps, resulting in a fuse
clearing time of over 2 seconds. The example calculation assumes an arcing fault of 10,000 amperes on
the secondary bus, resulting in a fuse clearing time of 160 seconds. In either the case of a bolted fault
or an arcing fault, the secondary arc ash energy on the secondary bus of this unit substation design is
UNAPPROACHABLE.
In addition, should a bus fault occur while this assembly was energized, the likely result beyond extremely
high arc ash energies would be extensive equipment damage caused by the heat energy developed before
the primary fuse would clear. In a process industry environment, this translates to hours or perhaps days of
downtime. In the end, the primary fuse in the 13.8kV fused load-break switch shown in Fig. 2, is intended
to protect the transformer, not the secondary bus. Adding a secondary main circuit breaker would resolve this
issue of protection in some applications.
This would in effect protect the secondary bus downstream of the main breaker. However, the bus from
the transformer secondary terminals up to the main is still not adequately protected. This area of the bus is
sometimes referred to as the "fault free zone" as shown in Fig. 2. The author cannot explain the reason for this
label, save perhaps that in this area, there is a strong desire that a fault will never occur!
In applications where the primary assembly and transformer are outdoors and cable connected to
the secondary switchgear, the secondary bus protection issue becomes more problematic. The secondary
conductors could be installed in accordance with the NEC if they were 10 feet or less, but still not be
protected from either short circuit or overload. Clearly, an opportunity existed for the project design team to
consider design alternatives that would offer better performance, both in reliability and workplace safety.
IV. A PATH FORWARD VIA PRODUCT TECHNOLOGY
R
ecognizing the limitations of the legacy unit substation design, the project team worked with the
power distribution equipment supplier to review alternative designs that might offer improved
performance. Because of the extreme hazard and potential for extended outage time, the group
quickly dismissed the age-old approach of installing unit substations based on the "six feeders - no main"
design. The strategy was to look at designs that included a secondary main overcurrent protective device
(in this case, a low-voltage power circuit breaker) and then investigate design alternatives that might offer
advantages to this design approach. The group recognized that adding a secondary main device would add
cost and was interested in alternatives that might perform as well, or better, than the secondary main design.
The group considered several emerging technologies that might offer improved performance.
Three technologies were considered and ultimately applied. These are discussed below:
A. 15kV Vacuum Primary Circuit Breaker
One technology that appeared promising was in the area of medium-voltage vacuum circuit breakers. The
group believed that application of a low-cost circuit breaker in the primary of the unit substation, providing
both primary and secondary current protection, would be a desirable alternative to the traditional fused load-
break switch. Although vacuum circuit breakers have traditionally involved higher space and cost than a fused
6
power circuit breaker) and then investigate design alternatives that might offer
advantages to this design approach. The group recognized that adding a
secondary main device would add cost and was interested in alternatives that
might perform as well, or better, than the secondary main design.
The group considered several emerging technologies that might offer improved
performance. Three technologies were considered and ultimately applied.
These are discussed below:
A. 15kV Vacuum Primary Circuit Breaker
One technology that appeared promising was in the area of medium-voltage
vacuum circuit breakers. The group believed that application of a low-cost
circuit breaker in the primary of the unit substation, providing both primary and
secondary current protection, would be a desirable alternative to the traditional
fused load-break switch. Although vacuum circuit breakers have traditionally
involved higher space and cost than a fused switch, some manufacturers had
developed newer vacuum breakers that looked promising. Fig. 3 shows and
example of one such design available. In the North American markets, vacuum
circuit breakers are manufactured to ANSI Standard C37.06 [9]. Inspired in part
by a trend toward global design standards, traditional designs have given way
to newer offerings that are smaller, lighter, and have improved functionality. As
is shown in Fig. 3, although the newer design vacuum breakers are only
available in limited ratings, most offer a smaller size with fewer parts. Notably
different from traditional vacuum circuit breakers, the new design includes an
integral trip unit with linear trip actuator. This actually offers improved
performance with reduced clearing times, in part due to the smaller sized
component. Where traditional vacuum circuit breakers require 5 cycles total
clearing time, the newer vacuum breaker can in some applications, clear a fault
within 3 cycles. In unit substation applications where higher ratings are not as
important as in medium-voltage switchgear line-ups, the newer design breaker
offers a viable alternative.
15kV Vacuum Circuit Breaker
25H X 20W X 18 D, 330 lbs
ANSI C37.20 Rated at 25 and 40kA
600, 1200,2000 and 2500A ratings
Integral trip unit with linear trip actuator
2-step stored energy mechanism
15kV Vacuum Circuit Breaker
31H X 29.5W X 25D, 460 lbs
ANSI C37.20 Rated at 25, 40 and 50kA
1200, 2000, 3000 and 5000A ratings
External relay required
2-step stored energy mechanism

Fig. 3: Newer design 15kV class vacuum circuit breakers are manufactured to the same standards as
previous versions, but are smaller, lighter, and have increased functionality. Shown above is a
comparison of the newer design at left and traditional design at right. The new design shown includes
an integral multifunction trip unit.
Figure 3
switch, some manufacturers had developed newer vacuum breakers that looked promising. Fig. 3 (previous
page) shows and example of one such design available. In the North American markets, vacuum circuit
breakers are manufactured to ANSI Standard C37.06 [9]. Inspired in part by a trend toward global design
standards, traditional designs have given way to newer offerings that are smaller, lighter, and have improved
functionality. As is shown in Fig. 3 (previous page), although the newer design vacuum breakers are only
available in limited ratings, most offer a smaller size with fewer parts.
Notably different from traditional vacuum circuit breakers, the new design includes an integral trip unit
with linear trip actuator. This actually offers improved performance with reduced clearing times, in part due
to the smaller sized component. Where traditional vacuum circuit breakers require 5 cycles total clearing
time, the newer vacuum breaker can in some applications, clear a fault within 3 cycles. In unit substation
applications where higher ratings are not as important as in medium-voltage switchgear line-ups, the newer
design breaker offers a viable alternative.
B. Zone Selective Interlocking
Zone selective interlocking for low and medium-voltage circuit breakers has been an available technology
for many years and most all manufacturers offer this feature as a standard offering for low-voltage power
circuit breakers. The application is reviewed here and discussed relative to Fig. 4 (below).
This gure shows the conguration of a typical low-voltage switchgear assembly in a low-voltage
substation with a main power circuit breaker and three feeder circuit breakers. Zone selective interlocking
is a functionality of the circuit breaker tripping system. In this example, all four breakers (the main and thee
feeders) are connected together with a common zone control circuit.
The main and feeders are selectively coordinated so that the breaker nearest the fault clears rst. A slightly
longer short time delay setting for the main breaker is used to assure the system is selectively coordinated.
In the event of a downstream fault shown at (1) on Fig. 4, the feeder breaker nearest the fault would trip,
following the short-time delay setting of 0.2 seconds or 12.5 cycles on a 60 hertz system.
If however a bus fault shown at (2) on Fig. 4 occurred, the main circuit breaker would be called upon to
clear the fault. Without zone selective interlocking, the breaker short-time delay trip setting of 0.5 seconds or
30 cycles would dictate the clearing time. A zone selective interlocking (ZSI) control connection between all
circuit breakers adds intelligence to this system.
When a bus fault occurs, ZSI allows the main breaker to interrogate the feeder breakers in the zone to
determine if they "see" a fault as well. If all report back that there is now downstream fault, then the main
breaker will trip with no intentional delay.
The ZSI feature is simple to enable and can offer signicant advantages in reducing potential arc
ash hazards described previously. For a typical low-voltage system capable of delivering 35,000 amperes
symmetrical fault current, calculations in accordance with IEEE1584 show that adding ZSI can reduce the
incident energy from 43.7 calories/cm2 to 7.0 calories/cm
2
.
The NFPA70E denes the rst condition above as UNAPPROACHABLE where no level of PPE would
be safe and the second where PPE rated at 8 calories/cm2 would offer adequate protection, a signicant
difference.
C. Multiple Settings Groups
One nal technology applied in today's power distribution systems is a newer capability offering multiple
settings group capability for protective relays used with circuit breakers. Although this capability has been
7
B. Zone Selective Interlocking
Zone selective interlocking for low and medium-voltage circuit breakers has
been an available technology for many years and most all manufacturers offer
this feature as a standard offering for low-voltage power circuit breakers. The
application is reviewed here and discussed relative to Fig. 4 below. Fig. 4
shows the configuration of a typical low-voltage switchgear assembly in a low-
voltage substation with a main power circuit breaker and three feeder circuit
breakers. Zone selective interlocking is a functionality of the circuit breaker
tripping system. In this example, all four breakers (the main and thee feeders)
are connected together with a common zone control circuit. The main and
feeders are selectively coordinated so that the breaker nearest the fault clears
first. A slightly longer short time delay setting for the main breaker is used to
assure the system is selectively coordinated. In the event of a downstream fault
shown at (1) on Fig. 4, the feeder breaker nearest the fault would trip, following
the short-time delay setting of 0.2 seconds or 12.5 cycles on a 60 hertz system.
If however a bus fault shown at (2) on Fig. 4 occurred, the main circuit breaker
would be called upon to clear the fault. Without zone selective interlocking, the
breaker short-time delay trip setting of 0.5 seconds or 30 cycles would dictate
the clearing time. A zone selective interlocking (ZSI) control connection
between all circuit breakers adds intelligence to this system. When a bus fault
occurs, ZSI allows the main breaker to interrogate the feeder breakers in the
zone to determine if they see a fault as well. If all report back that there is now
downstream fault, then the main breaker will trip with no intentional delay.
The ZSI feature is simple to enable and can offer significant advantages in
reducing potential arc flash hazards described previously. For a typical low-
voltage system capable of delivering 35,000 amperes symmetrical fault current,
calculations in accordance with IEEE1584 show that adding ZSI can reduce the
incident energy from 43.7 calories/cm2 to 7.0 calories/cm2. The NFPA70E
defines the first condition above as UNAPPROACHABLE where no level of
PPE would be safe and the second where PPE rated at 8 calories/cm2 would
offer adequate protection, a significant difference.

SD=
0.5S
SD=
0.2S
SD=
0.2S
SD=
0.2S
SD=
0.2S
SD=
0.2S
SD=
0.2S
M1
F1 F2 F3
X
(2) Bus Fault
X
(1) Downstream Fault
ZSI
Control
wires

Fig. 4: A block diagram example of unit substation low-voltage switchgear is
shown with zone selective interlocking applied. In the event of a bus fault, the
ZSI controls will trip the main breaker with no intentional delay.
Figure 4
a feature for several years on a few higher-end protective relays used in medium-voltage systems, several
tripping systems applied in integral trip units of low-voltage power circuit breakers now also include this
feature. In a similar concept described above in ZSI applications, use of multiple settings groups for circuit
breaker tripping enables the tripping system to respond differently for different system conditions. Again,
referring to Fig. 4, if a downstream fault condition existed, the feeder circuit breaker setting would dictate
that the 0.20 second short-time delay setting time out before the breaker trips.
The power systems engineer determines this setting to assure coordination with downstream overcurrent
protective devices and system loads so that the device nearest the fault trips rst. In some cases for instance,
large downstream motors may have high inrush currents or long acceleration times that will affect the
short-time setting of the feeder breakers in the unit substation.
As discussed previously, adding an intentional delay to a breaker clearing time comes at the cost of higher
incident energy and arc-ash hazards. When personnel are working in downstream equipment, such as a
low-voltage motor control center, the opportunity for a dropped tool or accidental contact of a tool or
probe between an energized conductor and ground is increased. As this could lead to a higher incident of
short circuits or arc-ash incidents, it is often prudent to reduce trip settings to enable the upstream circuit
breaker to trip faster.
Multiple settings groups effectively allow for the power systems engineer to establish one group of
protective settings during normal operations and another "maintenance mode" setting that can be used while
personnel are working in downstream equipment. Fig. 5 (below) illustrates application of the multiple setting
group technology.
At the left of Fig. 5, the integral Long-time, Short-time, Instantaneous & Ground (LSIG) integral trip unit
mounted in the low-voltage power circuit breaker is equipped with an on-off switch that enables a second
"group" of settings. In the normal mode, the power systems engineer settings are based on a selectively
coordinated system, while in the maintenance mode, the LSIG settings are replaced with an instantaneous
only setting, effectively disabling the normal short-time settings.
The result is a faster clearing time of the circuit breaker should a downstream fault occur. At the right
of Fig. 5, note that the before and after coordination curves are shown to demonstrate the impact of the
maintenance setting. The selectively coordinated curves set at the left shows the main and feeder circuit
breaker curves and plots a short-circuit current of 5,600 amperes. Note that due to the short-time delay
setting for the feeder circuit breaker, the time to clear this lower level fault is extended.
The curve set on the far right shows the maintenance mode enabled, which effectively shifts the
instantaneous setting of the feeder breaker to the left. The result in this example is a reduction in arc-ash
energy from 11 calories/cm
2
to less than 4 calories/cm
2
. This demonstrates the advantage of the multiple
setting group feature.
The maintenance (or instantaneous only) mode actually allows for faster clearing times than the normal
instantaneous settings, in part because the tripping system responds to peak currents as opposed to the
normal RMS or root mean squared currents. Since the tripping system is not burdened with the additional
RMS calculation before sending a signal to the circuit breaker to trip on overcurrent, the time to actually
open the breaker contacts during a fault is reduced.
Typically, instantaneous clearing times can occur in 3 cycles rather than the standard 5-cyle trip for this
class of circuit breaker. Although clearing in an additional 2 cycles (32 milliseconds) seems insignicant,
9
Fig. 5: Newer designs of stand-alone and integral circuit breaker trip units include capabilities for
multiple settings groups. Selectively coordinated settings can be overridden by an instantaneous only
setting while downstream maintenance is being performed. At the center are the selectively coordinated
curves. At the right, the feeder breaker instantaneous setting maintenance setting is shown shifted to
the left, enabling the breaker to clear the fault faster should a lower level arcing fault occur.
additional RMS calculation before sending a signal to the circuit breaker to trip
on overcurrent, the time to actually open the breaker contacts during a fault is
reduced. Typically, instantaneous clearing times can occur in 3 cycles rather
than the standard 5-cyle trip for this class of circuit breaker. Although clearing
in an additional 2 cycles (32 milliseconds) seems insignificant, this actually can
mean a difference in the reducing incident energy from 8 calories/cm2 to 4
calories/cm2, a significant improvement.

It is important to understand that the multiple settings group capability does
represent a trade-off on two different fronts. First, depending on the
instantaneous setting selected, selective coordination of the system may be
compromised. In the Fig. 5 example, note that the curve to the far left of the
plot (brown in color) represents an across-the-line start of the largest motor fed
by this substation feeder breaker. In the selectively coordinated setting, starting
this motor would assure this motor could be started without a feeder breaker
trip. However, in the maintenance mode, note from the curve set at the right
that the feeder breaker would indeed trip. Second, application of multiple
settings group functionality dictates that facility maintenance practices be
revised and then adhered to. Maintenance persons will need to adopt a
process where the maintenance mode could be safely engaged while
downstream energized work is being performed, and also be assured that the
protective settings were returned to normal after maintenance is completed. It
would be typical for the maintenance mode settings to be enabled with a
lockable switch and door-mounted light so this alternative maintenance setting
could be included in the facility lockout/tagout procedure.
Finally, it is important to note that the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) clearly prohibits work on energized equipment.
Specifically, OSHA 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 1910.333 (a)(1)
[10] requires that live parts be deenergized before an employee works on or
near them. There is simply no argument that turning the power off results in the
LSIG Trip Unit
AF Hazard < 4 cal/cm
2
AF Current = 5.6kA AF Current = 5.6kA
AF Hazard 11 cal/cm
2
Figure 5
this actually can mean a difference in the reducing incident energy from 8 calories/cm
2
to 4 calories/cm
2
,
a signicant improvement. It is important to understand that the multiple settings group capability does
represent a trade-off on two different fronts.
First, depending on the instantaneous setting selected, selective coordination of the system may be
compromised. In the Fig. 5 example, note that the curve to the far left of the plot (brown in color) represents
an across-the-line start of the largest motor fed by this substation feeder breaker. In the selectively coordinated
setting, starting this motor would assure this motor could be started without a feeder breaker trip. However, in
the maintenance mode, note from the curve set at the right that the feeder breaker would indeed trip. Second,
application of multiple settings group functionality dictates that facility maintenance practices be revised and
then adhered to.
Maintenance persons will need to adopt a process where the maintenance mode could be safely engaged
while downstream energized work is being performed, and also be assured that the protective settings were
returned to normal after maintenance is completed. It would be typical for the maintenance mode settings to
be enabled with a lockable switch and door-mounted light so this alternative maintenance setting could be
included in the facility lockout/tagout procedure.
Finally, it is important to note that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) clearly
prohibits work on energized equipment. Specically, OSHA 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part
1910.333 (a)(1) [10] requires that live parts be deenergized before an employee works on or near them. There
is simply no argument that turning the power off results in the safest working condition. However, in some
process industry environments, deenergizing the power system is simply not practical and at times can result
in an even greater hazard.
V. THE GENESIS OF A NEW SUBSTATION DESIGN
A
pplication of the various technologies discussed in the previous section came to fruition in
upgrading several existing unit substations at an integrated pulp and paper mill in the Western
United States. Following a facility wide effort to update power systems studies to achieve
compliance with NFPA70E, the site engineering team discovered that most of the areas of very high or
UNAPPROACHABLE incident energies as calculated by the system study were at the secondary bus of
low-voltage unit substations.
In fact, the results of the study include actual calculated incident energy values for one of the 2000kVA
substations reviewed previously with the results as shown in Fig. 2. In this facility, since most existing unit
substations were already installed, adding new protective devices such as a secondary main low-voltage circuit
breaker was not practical. There simply was no room to add new assemblies. Fig. 6 (below) shows what was
ultimately installed. The existing unit substation was upgraded by removing the medium-voltages fuses in the
existing fused load-break switch, and replacing them with a new xed-mount vacuum circuit breaker.
The new 15kV vacuum breaker with an integral overcurrent trip unit at the substation primary, connected
to secondary current sensors at the transformer secondary spade terminations, offered secondary bus
overcurrent protection. In addition to the integral trip unit, a second overcurrent protective relay along with
primary current transformers were added to protect the transformer, a necessary addition after the primary
10
safest working condition. However, in some process industry environments,
deenergizing the power system is simply not practical and at times can result in
an even greater hazard.

V. THE GENESIS OF A NEW SUBSTATION DESIGN
Application of the various technologies discussed in the previous section came
to fruition in upgrading several existing unit substations at an integrated pulp
and paper mill in the Western United States. Following a facility wide effort to
update power systems studies to achieve compliance with NFPA70E, the site
engineering team discovered that most of the areas of very high or
UNAPPROACHABLE incident energies as calculated by the system study were
at the secondary bus of low-voltage unit substations. In fact, the results of the
study include actual calculated incident energy values for one of the 2000kVA
substations reviewed previously with the results as shown in Fig. 2. In this
facility, since most existing unit substations were already installed, adding new
protective devices such as a secondary main low-voltage circuit breaker was
not practical. There simply was no room to add new assemblies. Fig. 6 shows
what was ultimately installed. The existing unit substation was upgraded by
removing the medium-voltages fuses in the existing fused load-break switch,
and replacing them with a new fixed-mount vacuum circuit breaker.
15kV Vacuum Breaker
Before After
Arc Flash Study Results
Sym. Fault at 480V Switchgear Bus 31.8kA 31.8kA
AF Boundary 1167 18
Cal/cm
2
702.4 1.4
NFPA70E HRC Unapproachable 1
Improved Unit Substation Design
LV Substation with Retrofit Vacuum Primary Breaker
86
ST
Integral
50/51 Relay
50/51
Relay

The new 15kV vacuum breaker with an integral overcurrent trip unit at the
substation primary, connected to secondary current sensors at the transformer
secondary spade terminations, offered secondary bus overcurrent protection. In
addition to the integral trip unit, a second overcurrent protective relay along with
primary current transformers were added to protect the transformer, a
necessary addition after the primary fuses were removed to make room for the
vacuum breaker. In this application, the site engineering team elected to add
Fig. 6: Unit substation retrofit included a vacuum breaker installed at the primary. Both primary and
secondary overcurrent protection was installed, reducing incident energy at the secondary switchgear
main bus from 702.4 cal/cm
2
to 1.4 cal/cm
2
.
Figure 6
fuses were removed to make room for the vacuum breaker. In this application, the site engineering team
elected to add multiple settings group functionality to the vacuum breaker integral trip unit. This allowed for
an additional maintenance setting that could be used when necessary. In this case, the maintenance setting was
used primarily when the existing secondary draw-out power circuit breakers were being racked onto or off of
the energized secondary bus.
The site routinely used the secondary feeder breakers as a convenient systems location to perform lockout/
tagout of downstream loads. In a continuous process environment, it was not practical to deenergize the unit
substation to perform this work. Before the substation upgrade, the extremely high incident energies at the
secondary bus effectively prohibited removal of secondary feeder breakers.
Further details outlining this unique solution that improved both the safety and reliability of unit
substations at this mill site are explained in the award winning paper referenced previously [8].
VI. THE GREENFIELD SITE DESIGN SELECTION
D
rawing upon new technologies and unit substation retrot experiences described previously, the
design team for the Greeneld industrial plant drove toward the optimum design. The group
determined early-on that secondary bus protection, either via a secondary main circuit breaker, or
from a vacuum primary breaker with secondary current sensors was required. Past experience proved that
selection and application of a primary fuse to protect the transformer and expect this device would also
adequately protect the secondary bus, was a poor design approach.
Because the new site required both low-voltage (480Y/277V secondary) and medium-voltage
(4160Y/2400V secondary) unit substations, the design team decided to move to application of a primary
load-break switch over a xed mounted vacuum circuit breaker at the primary as a standard platform for both
low and medium-voltage unit substations.
A product was commercially available that was congured as shown in Fig. 7 (above). Note from the
section-view at the right that the incoming power enters at the top-rear of the assembly. The incoming cable
termination is designed to accommodate a typical drip loop and also has room so that medium-voltage cables
can be looped in and out of the assembly to feed an adjacent unit substation. Above the load-break switch is a
distribution class lightning arrestor to protect the incoming of each substation.
Bus runbacks on the load-side of the switch include current transformers, connected at the vacuum
breakers to support primary overcurrent protection of the transformer. The vacuum breaker in the lower
compartment includes an integral trip unit.
Note also at the lower rear of the assembly is a snubber network, the purpose for which is described below.
A. Vacuum Interrupters and Voltage Transients
One phenomenon which is not widely discussed or understood is the potential for voltage transients that
occur when the vacuum interrupter in a vacuum circuit breaker opens an inductive load. One of the physical
characteristics of all vacuum interrupters (VI) is a phenomenon called chop current.
When the contacts of a VI open, current continues to ow through the arc drawn across the contacts
within the vacuum bottle. In an ac sine-wave, as the current approaches zero, the energy across the arc cannot
be sustained within the vacuum. When the arc energy reaches a low current level, the arc is immediately
quenched and the current is driven to zero nearly instantaneously. The current value where the energy
Figure 7
11
multiple settings group functionality to the vacuum breaker integral trip unit.
This allowed for an additional maintenance setting that could be used when
necessary. In this case, the maintenance setting was used primarily when the
existing secondary draw-out power circuit breakers were being racked onto or
off of the energized secondary bus. The site routinely used the secondary
feeder breakers as a convenient systems location to perform lockout/tagout of
downstream loads. In a continuous process environment, it was not practical to
deenergize the unit substation to perform this work. Before the substation
upgrade, the extremely high incident energies at the secondary bus effectively
prohibited removal of secondary feeder breakers. Further details outlining this
unique solution that improved both the safety and reliability of unit substations
at this mill site are explained in the award winning paper referenced previously
[8].

VI. THE GREENFIELD SITE DESIGN SELECTION
Drawing upon new technologies and unit substation retrofit experiences
described previously, the design team for the Greenfield industrial plant drove
toward the optimum design. The group determined early-on that secondary bus
protection, either via a secondary main circuit breaker, or from a vacuum
primary breaker with secondary current sensors was required. Past experience
proved that selection and application of a primary fuse to protect the
transformer and expect this device would also adequately protect the
secondary bus, was a poor design approach.
Because the new site required both low-voltage (480Y/277V secondary) and
medium-voltage (4160Y/2400V secondary) unit substations, the design team
decided to move to application of a primary load-break switch over a fixed
mounted vacuum circuit breaker at the primary as a standard platform for both
low and medium-voltage unit substations. A product was commercially
available that was configured as shown in Fig. 7. Note from the section-view at
the right that the incoming power enters at the top-rear of the assembly. The

Line
Load
Snubber
LA
Vac Bkr
LB
Switch
Fig. 7: Greenfield site included 11 low and medium-voltage unit substations, each with a primary load-break
switch over a fixed mounted vacuum circuit breaker configured as shown. This replaced previous fused load-
break switch designs, adding secondary bus overcurrent protection.
collapses to zero for a VI is known as the chop current. All VI's have this chop current characteristic and this
value will typically be published by the VI manufacturer. Often on the order of 3 to 10 amperes, chop current
is a function of the VI design itself, including geometry, material composition, hardness of the contact surface
and other physical characteristics.
Because energy cannot be created or destroyed instantaneously, driving current to zero with very high di/
dt results in corresponding voltage transient, when switched into an inductive load (V = L * di/dt). Although
VIs are typically applied in medium-voltage switchgear and motor controllers where hundreds of feet of cable
connect the vacuum breaker element to the supported load, in this unit substation application the vacuum
circuit breaker is often within 10 feet of the transformer primary winding.
Transient studies performed by the equipment manufacturer's power systems engineering group proved
that voltage transients caused failure of the primary winding of a number of substation transformers.
Fig. 8 shows one such transformer, a vacuum pressure impregnated (VPI) dry-type design that failed turn-
to-turn at the rst primary winding. In this application, voltage transients caused due to VI current chop
exceeded the Basic Impulse Level (BIL) of the transformer design.
Fig. 9 shows the results of a transient study with the VI opening as a chop current of 6 amperes as shown
at the left, resulted in a corresponding voltage transient as shown at the right. Note from Fig. 9 that the
negative peak voltage transient is nearly 150kV, exceeding the 95kV BIL rating of most 15kV class substation
transformers.
To curtail the severe voltage transients caused due to the VI in close proximity to the transformer inductive
load, the equipment manufacturer designed a simple Resistor-Capacitor AC snubber network. This snubber,
comprised of three single-phase 15kV class capacitors and series connected resistor elements, was connected
on the load terminals of the vacuum breaker assembly. The snubber assembly was mounted as a component in
the substation primary medium-voltage load break switch and xed vacuum breaker assembly.
Fig. 10 shows a photo of one of the three-phase snubbers at the left and three single-phase assemblies at the
right. The waveform above shows the resulting impact from adding the R-C snubber as calculated from the
transient study. This shows that the peak voltage transients have been signicantly reduced - in this example to
a level below 30kV.
12
incoming cable termination is designed to accommodate a typical drip loop and
also has room so that medium-voltage cables can be looped in and out of the
assembly to feed an adjacent unit substation. Above the load-break switch is a
distribution class lightning arrestor to protect the incoming of each substation.
Bus runbacks on the load-side of the switch include current transformers,
connected at the vacuum breakers to support primary overcurrent protection of
the transformer. The vacuum breaker in the lower compartment includes an
integral trip unit. Note also at the lower rear of the assembly is a snubber
network, the purpose for which is described below.
A. Vacuum Interrupters and Voltage Transients
One phenomenon which is not widely discussed or understood is the potential
for voltage transients that occur when the vacuum interrupter in a vacuum
circuit breaker opens an inductive load. One of the physical characteristics of
all vacuum interrupters (VI) is a phenomenon called chop current. When the
contacts of a VI open, current continues to flow through the arc drawn across
the contacts within the vacuum bottle. In an ac sine-wave, as the current
approaches zero, the energy across the arc cannot be sustained within the
vacuum. When the arc energy reaches a low current level, the arc is
immediately quenched and the current is driven to zero nearly instantaneously.
The current value where the energy collapses to zero for a VI is known as the
chop current. All VIs have this chop current characteristic and this value will
typically be published by the VI manufacturer. Often on the order of 3 to 10
amperes, chop current is a function of the VI design itself, including geometry,
material composition, hardness of the contact surface and other physical
characteristics. Because energy cannot be created or destroyed
instantaneously, driving current to zero with very high di/dt results in
corresponding voltage transient, when switched into an inductive load (V = L *
di/dt). Although VIs are typically applied in medium-voltage switchgear and
motor controllers where hundreds of feet of cable connect the vacuum breaker
element to the supported load, in this unit substation application the vacuum
circuit breaker is often within 10 feet of the transformer primary winding.
Transient studies performed by the equipment manufacturers power systems
engineering group proved that voltage transients caused failure of the primary
winding of a number of substation transformers. Fig. 8 shows one such
transformer, a vacuum pressure impregnated (VPI) dry-type design that failed
turn-to-turn at the first primary winding. In this application, voltage transients

Transformer Failure On VI De-Energization
Flash/Burn Marks
Coil to Coil Failure
Fig. 8: Unit substation dry-type transformer field failure likely caused by VI switching transients.
13
caused due to VI current chop exceeded the Basic Impulse Level (BIL) of the
transformer design. Fig. 9 shows the results of a transient study with the VI
opening as a chop current of 6 amperes as shown at the left, resulted in a
corresponding voltage transient as shown at the right. Note from Fig. 9 that the
negative peak voltage transient is nearly 150kV, exceeding the 95kV BIL rating
of most 15kV class substation transformers.

To curtail the severe voltage transients caused due to the VI in close proximity
to the transformer inductive load, the equipment manufacturer designed a
simple Resistor-Capacitor AC snubber network. This snubber, comprised of
three single-phase 15kV class capacitors and series connected resistor
elements, was connected on the load terminals of the vacuum breaker
assembly. The snubber assembly was mounted as a component in the
substation primary medium-voltage load break switch and fixed vacuum
breaker assembly. Fig. 10 shows a photo of one of the three-phase snubbers at
the left and three single-phase assemblies at the right. The waveform above
shows the resulting impact from adding the R-C snubber as calculated from the
transient study. This shows that the peak voltage transients have been
significantly reduced in this example to a level below 30kV.

B. Putting it all Together
Since the site would apply cast resin coil design transformers, the entire unit
substation assembly was designed for close-coupled indoor application. A
-150kV!
Voltage Waveforms Without Snubbers
0
50
100
150
- 50
- 100
- 150
Current Waveforms Without Snubbers
I
chop
+6 amps
0
20
40
60
- 20
- 40
- 60
Fig. 9: Chop current of the vacuum interrupter shown at left result in very high voltage transients shown at right.
Voltage Waveforms With Snubbers
0
10
20
30
- 10
- 20
- 30 -30kV
Fig. 10: Addition of an R-C snubber assembly installed in the primary metal-enclosed switchgear to attenuate
voltage transients. A single-phase resistor capacitor snubber shown at center and three of these assemblies
mounted in the switchgear at right
Figure 8
Figure 9
Since the site would apply cast resin coil design transformers, the entire unit substation assembly was
designed for close-coupled indoor application. A rigorous analysis of several alternative unit substation
congurations was completed as a part of the process. Particular focus on the unit substation rst cost for
various alternatives was reviewed to assure the improved design alternatives were not adding signicantly to
the cost.
Table I shows the rst cost of several alternative designs considered. Note that the values shown are
estimates, as the relative magnitude comparing one design versus another is the relevant issue. Because the
economic modeling suggested that applying a primary load-break switch over a xed mounted vacuum
circuit breaker with an integral trip unit was the best overall selection, the design team elected to establish this
approach as the Greeneld site standard for both low-voltage and medium-voltage unit substations.
The team selected a metal-enclosed assembly at the primary of each unit substation, built to the ANSI
Standard C37.20.3 [1]. As shown in Table I, a metal-clad assembly, built to the ANSI Standard C37.20.2
[11] was also considered. This design included a draw-out vacuum breaker and no visible load-break switch.
Ultimately, the metal-clad draw-out design was dismissed, as it proved more costly and lacked the visible blade
incoming disconnect device, which was considered an important functionality used as a part of the company
lockout/tagout safety procedure.
TABLE I
SUBSTATION ALTERNATIVES PRIMARYS
SWGR
SUBSTATION
XFMR
SECONDARY
SWGR
TOTALS
2000kVA: 13.8kV TO 480Y/277V, 600A LB SW & FUSE, LIQ TRX,
3200A MCB, 4-800A FCB'S
$19,000 $90,000 $88,000 $197,000,
2000kVA: 13.8kV TO 480Y/277V, 600A LB SW & VAC BKR, LIQ TRX,
3200A BUS, 4-800A FCB'S
$31,000 $90,000 $72,000 $193,000
2000kVA: 13.8kV TO 480Y/277V, 600A LB SW & FUSE, CAST TRX,
3200A MCB, 4-800A FCB'S
$17,000 $165,000 $86,000 $268,000
2000kVA: 13.8kV TO 480Y/277V, 600A LB SW & VAC BKR, CAST
TRX, 3200A BUS, 4-800A FCB'S
$29,000 $165,000 $70,000 $264,000
5000kVA: 13.8kV TO 4160Y/2400V, 600A LB SW & FUSE, LIQ TRX,
2000A MCB, 2-1200A FCB'S
$19,000 $175,000 $118,000 $312,000
5000kVA: 13.8kV TO 4160Y/2400V, 600A LB SW & VAC BKR, LIQ
TRX, 2000A BUS, 2-1200A FCB'S
$31,000 $175,000 $85,000 $291,000
VII. THE NEXT GENERATION OF UNIT SUBSTATION DESIGN
T
he design team selected the new unit substation design based on leveraging power distribution
equipment technologies to improve system safety and reliability. The selected design was applied to
11 new unit substations installed at the plant site; two medium-voltage unit substations (10MVA and
5MVA with a secondary voltage of 4160V) and nine low-voltage substations (all at 2000kVA with a secondary
voltage of 480Y/277V).
Both medium-voltage and low-voltage substations were installed with high resistance grounding systems,
application described in [12] and [13], which eliminated the possibility of a phase to ground fault, further
enhancing system safety and reliability. A typical low-voltage substation one-line diagram is shown in Fig. 11.
In this application, the project team applied the smaller, low-cost vacuum circuit breaker technology and also
zone selective interlocking as described in Section IV above.
From Fig. 11, note that the 15kV class vacuum breaker integral overcurrent trip unit is connected to
primary bus current sensors, and a separate overcurrent relay with current transformers mounted at the
secondary bus is set-up to shunt trip the primary vacuum breaker in the event of a secondary bus fault. In this
conguration, the multiple settings group capability of the vacuum breaker integral trip unit was not used.
13


-150kV!
0
50
100
150
- 50
- 100
- 150
I
chop
+6 amps
0
20
40
60
- 20
- 40
- 60
0
10
20
30
- 10
- 20
- 30 -30kV
13


-150kV!
0
50
100
150
- 50
- 100
- 150
I
chop
+6 amps
0
20
40
60
- 20
- 40
- 60
0
10
20
30
- 10
- 20
- 30 -30kV
Figure 10
Instead, the team elected to opt for a zone selective interlocking scheme, with control connections between
the separate overcurrent relay and the secondary low-voltage power circuit breaker trip units. In this scheme, a
bus fault would result in the primary vacuum breaker tripping with no intentional short-time delay.
The design team made the choice to not take advantage of the faster clearing times available with the
multiple setting group capability discussed previously, primarily because the company felt that revising their
established safety procedures for lockout/tagout could potentially cause confusion for plant operators.
By denition, the multiple setting group approach required that the system studies be run in two different
protection modes and required that operators would engage the instantaneous only mode during maintenance
and also remember to switch things back to the normal settings after maintenance was performed.
An alternate conguration that takes advantage of the multiple setting group capability is shown in
Fig. 12 (next page). In this case, secondary bus protection is supported by current sensors connected to the
vacuum circuit breaker integral overcurrent trip unit, and primary protection is accomplished via a separate
overcurrent relay connected to primary current transformers.
Using the vacuum circuit breaker integral trip unit to protect the substation secondary bus offers two
advantages in system performance over the connection discussed in Fig. 12 (next page).
First, in clearing a fault, the inherent latency due to the 86 lockout relay and shunt trip are eliminated.
Second, using the multiple settings group capability in a maintenance mode further improves the primary
breaker clearing time from 5-7 cycles down to 3 cycles. Both serve to reduce the downstream arc ash energy
should a bus fault occur. The tradeoff here is of course that maintenance and operations need to embrace this
approach and be willing to adopt new lockout/tagout procedures to support this.
Results from this new design approach were impressive. After the power systems design studies were
completed and all settings were made in the eld, the facility was outtted with arc ash and shock hazard
labels. The studies conrmed that the entire electrical system, both low and medium-voltage, delivered arc
ash hazards below 8 cal/cm
2
.
This was very welcome news to plant operations, since the facility PPE standards included company
Figure 11
15
overcurrent trip unit is connected to primary bus current sensors, and a
separate overcurrent relay with current transformers mounted at the secondary
bus is set-up to shunt trip the primary vacuum breaker in the event of a
secondary bus fault. In this configuration, the multiple settings group capability
of the vacuum breaker integral trip unit was not used. Instead, the team elected
to opt for a zone selective interlocking scheme, with control connections
between the separate overcurrent relay and the secondary low-voltage power
circuit breaker trip units. In this scheme, a bus fault would result in the primary
vacuum breaker tripping with no intentional short-time delay. The design team
made the choice to not take advantage of the faster clearing times available
with the multiple setting group capability discussed previously, primarily
because the company felt that revising their established safety procedures for
lockout/tagout could potentially cause confusion for plant operators. By
definition, the multiple setting group approach required that the system studies
be run in two different protection modes and required that operators would
engage the instantaneous only mode during maintenance and also remember
to switch things back to the normal settings after maintenance was performed.

An alternate configuration that takes advantage of the multiple setting group
capability is shown in Fig. 12. In this case, secondary bus protection is
supported by current sensors connected to the vacuum circuit breaker integral
overcurrent trip unit, and primary protection is accomplished via a separate
overcurrent relay connected to primary current transformers. Using the vacuum
Substation One-Line
As Installed Primary Protection
ZSI
ZSI ZSI ZSI ZSI
50
51
50
51
50
51
50
51
LV
PCB
L,S,I
800AF
800AT
LV
PCB
L,S,I
800AF
800AT
(3) 200:1 CURRENT SENSORS
(3) 3200:5 CT
(3) 3200:5 CT
OC
RELAY
LV
PCB
L,S,I
800AF
800AT
LV
PCB
L,S,I
800AF
800AT
LV
PCB
L,S,I
800AF
800AT
LV
PCB
L,S,I
800AF
800AT
LV
PCB
L,S,I
800AF
800AT
LV
PCB
L,S,I
800AF
800AT
MV
VCB
L,S,I
600AF
200AT
Fig. 11: Greenfield site installed unit substation design. Metal enclosed primary switchgear; 15kV load-break switch over
a fixed mounted vacuum circuit breaker. Integral breaker trip unit used for primary transformer protection, separate
overcurrent relay mounted in the secondary switchgear with 86 lockout relay and shunt-trip used for secondary bus
protection. ZSI connection between secondary overcurrent relay and all 480V low-voltage power circuit breakers.
provided PPE rated at 8 cal/cm
2
for all electrical maintenance personnel.
So, no special PPE was necessary on the rare occasion that work needed to be performed on energized
equipment anywhere in the facility.
The design team was very pleased with these results.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As new challenges emerge in power distribution systems reliability and electrical workplace safety, it is the
responsibility of the systems designer to seek out new approaches and solutions that address them.
Stepping back and looking at the big picture, the systems designer has an onerous responsibility in
specifying or selecting the best designs.
Design decisions made today will impact cost, safety and serviceability of the installed systems for 40 or 50
years during the useful life for the owner.
Studies have shown that this cost is an order of magnitude of 7 to 10 times the installed cost of the power
distribution equipment.
The work by the project design team in this effort is considered a signicant step forward in innovation
in unit substation design. In the current environment of emerging codes and standards such as NFPA70E,
focused on improved electrical workplace safety, the obvious rst choice for any power systems designer is to
design the hazard out.
Industry must continue to increase focus on Safety By Design as the most effective approach in minimizing
electrical hazards while improving system reliability.
Developments such as those described in this paper and efforts by a recently formed Working Group
within the IEEE [14] and discussed in [15] are considered driving forces in accomplishing this important
objective.
16
circuit breaker integral trip unit to protect the substation secondary bus offers
two advantages in system performance over the connection discussed in Fig.
12. First, in clearing a fault, the inherent latency due to the 86 lockout relay and
shunt trip are eliminated. Second, using the multiple settings group capability in
a maintenance mode further improves the primary breaker clearing time from 5-
7 cycles down to 3 cycles. Both serve to reduce the downstream arc flash
energy should a bus fault occur. The tradeoff here is of course that
maintenance and operations need to embrace this approach and be willing to
adopt new lockout/tagout procedures to support this.

Results from this new design approach were impressive. After the power
systems design studies were completed and all settings were made in the field,
the facility was outfitted with arc flash and shock hazard labels. The studies
confirmed that the entire electrical system, both low and medium-voltage,
delivered arc flash hazards below 8 cal/cm2. This was very welcome news to
plant operations, since the facility PPE standards included company provided
PPE rated at 8 cal/cm2 for all electrical maintenance personnel. So, no special
PPE was necessary on the rare occasion that work needed to be performed on
energized equipment anywhere in the facility. The design team was very
pleased with these results.
Substation One-Line
Alternate Primary Protection
ZSI
ZSI ZSI ZSI ZSI
50
51
50
51
50
51
50
51
LV
PCB
L,S,I
800AF
800AT
LV
PCB
L,S,I
800AF
800AT
(3) 100:5 CT
(3) 3200:5 CT
(3) 3150:1 CURRENT SENSORS
OC
RELAY
LV
PCB
L,S,I
800AF
800AT
LV
PCB
L,S,I
800AF
800AT
LV
PCB
L,S,I
800AF
800AT
LV
PCB
L,S,I
800AF
800AT
LV
PCB
L,S,I
800AF
800AT
LV
PCB
L,S,I
800AF
800AT
MV
VCB
L,S,I
600AF
3150AT
Fig. 12: Alternate unit substation design. Metal enclosed primary switchgear; 15kV load-break switch over a fixed
mounted vacuum circuit breaker. Integral breaker trip unit with multiple settings group maintenance feature used for
secondary bus protection, separate overcurrent relay mounted in the primary switchgear with 86 lockout relay and
shunt-trip used for primary transformer protection. ZSI connection between integral overcurrent relay and all 480V
low-voltage power circuit breakers.
Figure 12
IX. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author wishes to thank Warren S. Hopper, Weyerhaeuser Company and David D. Shipp, Eaton
Corporation for their technical expertise and support in developing this paper. Without the help of these
individuals, the concepts and applications outlined here would simply not have been possible.
REFERENCES
[1] American National Standards Institute ANSI Standard C37.20.3-2001, IEEE Standard for Metal-
Enclosed Load Interrupter Switchgear, November 2001.
[2] American National Standards Institute ANSI Standard C57.12 IEEE Standard for Three Phase Power
Transformers, 2005
[3] Considerations in Application and Selection of Unit Substation Transformers, IEEE Transactions on
Industry Applications, Volume 38, May-June 2002, pgs 778-787.
[4] Underwriters Laboratories UL1558 Standard for Metal-Enclosed Low-Voltage Power Circuit Breaker
Switchgear, February 1999.
[5] National Fire Protection Agency NFPA70 - National Electrical Code, 2008 Edition.
[6] National Fire Protection Agency NFPA70E Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace, 2009 Edition
[7] Standard 1584, IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations. September 2002
[8] W.S. Hopper, B.L. Etzel, "Distribution Equipment Modernization to Reduce Arc Flash Hazards", IEEE
Transactions on Industry Applications, Volume 38, Volume 44, Issue 3, May-June 2008, pgs 940-948
[9] American National Standards Institute ANSI Standard C37.06, IEEE Standard for Medium Voltage
Circuit Breakers
[10] Occupational Safety and Health Administration 29 CFR 1910.333, OSHA Sub Part S, Electrical
Installations, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington DC, 2007
[11] American National Standards Institute ANSI C37.20.2-1999, IEEE Standard for Metal-Clad
Switchgear, October 1999.
[12] R. Beltz, I. Peacock, W. Vilcheck, "Application Considerations For High Resistance Ground Retrots",
Conference Record, 2000 IEEE IAS PPIC, pgs 33-40.
[13] A.S. Locker, M.S. Scarborough, "Advancements in Technology Create Safer & Smarter HRG Systems",
Conference Record, 2009 IEEE IAS PPIC, Pgs 102-113.
[14] IEEE Working Group P1814 "Recommended Practice for Electrical System Design Techniques to
Improve Electrical Safety" Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, IAS PCIC, 2009.
[15] L. Bruce McClung, Dennis J. Hill, "Electrical System Design Techniques to Improve Electrical Safety",
Conference Record, 2010 IEEE IAS Electrical Safety Workshop, Pgs 147-152.

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