'-Ik,

COLONIAL RULE IN THE BRITISH SOMALILAND

PROTECTORATE, 1905-1939
a
by
PATRICK KITABURAZA KAKWENZIRE
Thesis Submitted'for the Degree-of Doctor
of
Philosophy
-University,
'of London
ABSTRACT
The
aim of
this thesis is to
reconstruct
the
history
of
Britain's
rule
in her Somaliland Protectorate
between 19P5
and
1939. The first
chapter provides
the
geographical
and social setting as well as a
historical
introduction.
The
period covered
divides
roughly
into
two
phases:
the first
extends
from 1905 to 1920. ThiSklas
the time
when
Britain,
which
had failed to
suppress
Sayyid
Muhammad Abdille Hassan's
anti-British movement
during the
previous
four
expeditions, continued
to be
challenged
by
the
same movement.
In 1905 Britain tried-to
appease
the Sayyid,
going as
far
as
to
sign a
treaty
with
him.
Within
three
years,
however, the Sayyid had
resumed
hostilities,
and
Britain
was
forced to fight him
actively.
The
situation
remained
inconclusive; the
position
of
the
British
administration
was
becoming
progressively
worse.
In 1910 Britain decided to
abandon
the interior
and
2
.
aqminister the
coastal strip.
The interior
was
immediately
plunged into
chaos,
trade
came
to
a standstill., and
the
Sayyid
threatened
to drive the British
on
the
coast
into
the
sea.
In 1912 Britain
re-considered
her
policy
and
decided
to
re-occupy certain parts of
the interior
as well
as offer some
kind
of opposition
to the Sayyid. The
out-
break
of
World War I.
however,
compelled
Britain
to divert
her
attention and resources
to the
world crisis.
Somaliland
was
temporarily
overshadowed.
Thus between 1914
and
1919
the Sayyid
managed
to
re-establish
his
authority
in the
eastern
section of
the Protectorate
and
to build strong
fortresses.
9
C)
It
was not until
1920 that Britain
was able
to
launch
a well equipped expedition which
defeated the Sayyid
once and
for
all.
She then began to
consider ways and
means
by
which
British Somaliland
could
be developed
and
brought in line
with most of
Britain's
other
dependencies.
Yet
the Somali
remained adamant:
they
refused
to
pay
taxes
or send
their
children
to British
schools or even
learn to
write
their
own
language. Sporadic
riots continued
to frustrate
the British
administration and
to
claim
British
lives
and money.
In 1930 Britain decided
she
had had
enough.
All development
plans were scrapped, and
the
administration
reduced to the bare
minimum.
Stagnation became the
official
Policy.
With the Italian invasion
of
Ethiopia in 1935,
however,
the
political situation
in the Horn
of
Africa
underwent
a radical
transformation; Britain
found the
Policy
of stagnation on
her
side of
the border
out of place,
and even
dangerous. In 1938, therefore,
she resolved
to
abandon
it
and start a programme of cautious
development.
4
CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT
2
PREFACE
5
CHAPTER I: Somaliland Before 1905
17
CHAPTER II: The Period
of
the Militia,
_:
and
the Illig Peace Agreement
(1905-1908)
77
CHAPTER III: From Wingate's Mission to
Dul Madoba
(1909-1913)
143
CHAPTER IV: The Re-Occupation
of
the Interior
(1914-1918)
213
CHAPTER
V: The End
of
the Dervish Period
and
Subsequent Search for
an
Alternative
Policy (1919-1925)
295
CHAPTER
VI:
Harold Kittermaster's Governorship:
The Twilight
of
British
Somaliland's
Colonial History
(1926-1931)
388
CHAPTER
VII: From Stagnation to
a
Modest
Programme
of
Development. The Impact
of
Italian
Imperial Expansion,
(1932-1939).
473
EPILOGUE
562
BIBLIOGRAPHY
575
APPENDICES
585
PREFACE
At the
end of
1972 the History Department,
MakereAUniversity,
recommended me
for
a scholarship,
under a scheme
known
as
the Staff Development
Programme.
This
scheme
is intended to train future
staff
members of
the University,
and candidates are,
thereforeo
sponsored
on
the
express understanding
that they
will pursue
studies which
the University
might consider
it
necessary
to develop its
academic programme.
In the Department of
History,
various courses were
being
contemplated
for
inclusion
in the
curriculum., among which was
the History
of
North East Africa. Thus,
on
being
selected
for the
scholarship, I had to
sign an undertaking
that I
would
do
research
on a
topic
within
this
general
field.
Clearly, for
someone
with my previous
education
5
the
main
problem of an approach
to this
area
was
to
acquire
a working knowledge
of some of
the languages
in
which
the
historical
literature
and
the
archival
sources
were
written.
From this
point of view
Ethiopia
presented
a
daunting
prospect
for
a
beginner,
since
the
acquisition
of
Frencho
Italian
and
ARiaric
would
be indispensable
from the
early
stages
of any useful project.
I therefore
decided
to
focus
my attention on
Somalia,
where a substantial
body
of archival and., printed sources
in English would
be
immediately
available'to me, and where
the
gradual
acqui-
sition of,.
Italian
and.
Somali-would-enable me
to
extend
my
field
of-study
from the
northern
to the,
southern
part
of
the
area at-a
later date.
--'I resolved,
to
concentrate
my
thesis-project
onBritish
Somalilando,
while preparing
6
myself
linguistically
to
widen and
deepen
my studies as
opportunity
offered.
Apart from
such general works as
I. M. Lewists
The Modern History
of
Somaliland., I found that the
only
archivalty based
study of
the British Somaliland
Protec-
torate
was
the
unpublished
Ph. D. thesis by Andrew M.
Brockettp "The
British Somaliland Protectorate
to 1905"
(Oxford,
1969).
This dealt
only with
the
period of
Foreign
Office
control,
from 1884 to 1905. The
subse-
quent
period
of
British
administration under
the Colonial
Office had
never
been
studied
in detail by
any scholar.
Moreover,
I found that
even
Brockettts
work,
though
important
for the build-up
of
British interests
in
Somalilandp
was
deficient for the last five
years of
Foreign
Office
rule, when
the internal
resistance
of
the Dervishes
under
the leadership
of
Sayyid
Muhammad
Abdille
Hassan, had its
origins.
Brockettts
treatment
of
this
particular theme is based
mainly on
D. J.
Jardinets
book,
The Mad Mullah
of
Somaliland
(London)
1923.
In
view of
Brockettts
substantial contributions
it
seemed
right
to
set
1905
as my
formal
starting
dates
but
also
to
provide an
introductory
chapter whichp
while
owing much
to Brockettts
workj, would offer a rather
different
interpretation to the first five
years of
the
twentieth
century.
Brockett had treated these
years as
if they
were
the
end of an era, and
this is
probably
Why
he
relied
more on. secondary sources
than the
primary
ones.
With-the
material
I had
collected
from the Foreign
office
files, in'. the Public'Record office, "I found that I
could
7
give
Brockett's last
years a
different
kind
of emphasiss
since
to
me
they
were
the introductory years
to
my
thesis.
The
year
1905
was nevertheless
a
landmark
in
the history
of
British
rule
in Somaliland:
this
was
the
year
in
which
Britain
concluded a peace
treaty
with
Sayyid
Muhammad Abdille Hassan, the
resister of
British
rule
for the
past six years;
this
was also
the
year
in
which
Britain
declared her intention to
reduce
her
res-
ponsibilities in the Protectorate;
and
it
was
this
same
year
that the Protectorate
was
transferred
from the
Foreign
Office to the Colonial office.
1905
marked
the
end of
the
expeditionary period and
the beginning
of a
limited
civil administration.
As
already
indicated I
pursued
my work on
British
sources
side
by
side vjith a considerable
pro-
gramme
of
language
study
in Italian
and
Somali.
While
the
main
relevance
of
these
studies
Ijill
necessarily
be
to
my
future
work, some of
their fruits
should
already
be
apparent in this thesis. During
the first
half
of my
period2 Somali-British
relations were
dominated
by the
ideas
and
activities of
Sayyid Muhammad
Abdille
Hassan2
and my understanding
of
this
man, and of
the
movement
which
he
spearheaded,
had been
greatly
enriched
by
Dr. B. W. Andrzejewski
who
has
made a
life-long study
Of
the
Sayyid's
writings, and who placed
his translations
and
his
knowledge freely
at my
disposal.
In the Summer
of
1974 1
got
funds
from Makerere
University
to do f ield
work
in Somalia.
My
aim
was
to
explore libraries
and archives,
in Mogadishu*
in
search
of
8
sources
for the important
relations
between the Italian
Colony
and
the British Somaliland Protectorate.
Next I
hoped
to
proceed
to the
north
to
work
in the district
archives
of ex-British
Somaliland. I
also
intended to
interview
at
least
some
living
witnesses
both in
Mogadishu
and
in the
north.
Although I had been
given
to
Understand, through
my correspondence with
the Somali
Ministry
of
Culture
and
Higher Education., that
such an
undertaking
was
feasible,
my experience
disappointed my
expectations. What happened during
my
trip is too
boring
to
relate
here. Suffice it to
say
that I
spent
the first
two
weeks
in Mogadishu trying to
obtain per-
Mission to
work
in the
archives.
At first
nobody
appeared to know
whether any archives existed
at all,
but
I
was
eventually
informed that the
permission
I
required
could
only
be
given
by the Security
Section
of
the
Ministry
of
Internal Affairs. On
the
6th August I
was
summoned to the
office of
the Director General.,
Ministry
of
Internil Affairs,
and
interviewed
as
to the
purpose
of my
trip
and what
I intended to do. The
Director
General
considered
it beyond his
authority
to
allow
me
access
into the
archives, and so
he decided
to
refer the
matter
to the Minister
of
Internal
Affairs
(who
is
also
Vice-President
of
the Supreme Revolutionary
Council),,
Major-. General Kulmiye Afrah. on
the
8th
I
was
invited
to the Vice-President's
office
and re-
interviewed
about
the
research
I intended
to do. The
Vice-President,
though
showing a genuine
interest
in
my
project
anda willingness
to
offer every assistance
I
needed',
'-expressed
doubts
whether
the Mogadishu'archives
would
be
of any use.
In
reply
to
my suggestion
that I
should
find
out,
he
pointed out
that the
archives were
not well sorted out, and
that
old
documents
were mixed
up with
the
recent ones which were not supposed
to be
seen.
He
was,
however, keen that I
should proceed
to
the
north and
do the
rest of my research
there. I
must
at
this
point record my very sincere
thanks to Maj. Gen.
Kulmiye
who..
having heard that I intended to travel to
Hargeisa by
road, a
journey
of
3 to
4
days,
offered me
a return air
ticket. He
was also
kind
enough
to invite
me
to join
a
Uganda delegation
on
their
country-wide
tours. Nevertheless, I
was rather surprised, and even
embarrassed.,
to hear the Vice-President
saying., when
it
became
my
turn to be introduced to the
public gatheringso
that I
was a
"University
man who
is
writing
books
about
Uganda
and
Somalia
with a view
to
consolidating relations
between the two
countries and
their leaders".
Towards the
end of
August I decided to
go
to
the
north.
In Hargeisa I found the Governor's
officeo
to
which
I
was attachedo rather unenthusiastic.
The '
Secretary to the Governor
excused
himself
saying
he
was
a new man
in the
station and so could not arrange a pro-
gramme
by
which
I
could contact elders.
He
went on
to
say
that
so
far
as
he knew
all archival material
had been
destroyed by the Italians. Two days-latero howevero he
asked an official
to
accompany me
to
a small room
in
which were some old
files.,
-
I
spent a couple of
hours
looking through the files but did
not
find
any which
dated before 1954. Through
the kind
services of
.
Abdullahi Osobleho
I
managed
to
get
into touch
with a
few
elders whom
I interviewed. From Hargeisa I
pro-
o
ceeded
to Berbera, Sheikh
and
then Burao.
In fairness, I
must say
that I
was given
maximum
hospitality
as well as security.
Everywhere
I
arrived
I
was
told that
a
telegram had been
sent
from
Mogadishu
announcing my expected arrival.
In Hargeisao
a security official was assigned
the duty
of accompanying
me everywhere
I
went.
In Berbera
my
interviews
were con-
ducted in the Mayor's Office,
and were attended
by
a
security officer, a
factor
which caused considerable
inhibition to the, informants. In Somalia
no one can
possibly
discuss
political, or
indeed
any other subject,
with a stranger without
the latter having been formally
introduced by the Government.
The
greatest and most
important
source material
for
my
thesis
are
the
archival sources
in London
and
the
African
manuscripts
in Rhodes Housep oxford.
The
most
useful series
in the P. R. O.
were
the C. O. 535
(Somali-
land)
series.
Altogether,
I
consulted
138
volumes which
cover
the
period
1905 to 1940. These
volumes contain
the following
categories of
documents:
1. Copies
of
despatches-from
the C. O. to
Somaliland.
2. Despatches from Somaliland
to the C. O.
Copies
of correspondence
between'the
F. O.
and
the British Diplomatic
Missions
abroad.
Correspondence between'the
C. O.
and other
Ministries.
Copies
of correspondence
between the British
Residency
in Aden
and
the'India
Office.
11
6.
Copies
of correspondence
between the F. O.
and
Foreign Diplomatic
Missions in London.
7. Intelligence
Reports
on
Somaliland.
8.
Intelligence
Reports
on
Ethiopia,
especi-
ally
during the
period of
Italo-Ethiopian dispute.
9. Selected
newspaper articles.
10. Summaries
of certain
Cabinet
proceedings.
11. Memoranda
and
telegrams.
12. Correspondence between individuals
and
the C. 0.
13. Reports
on specific subjects e. g. on
military
operations
and
departmental
reports.
14. Estimates
and
Treasury
minutes.
15.
Correspondence
between the Somaliland
administration
and other
territories
(e.
g.
Ethiopiao
Italian
Somaliland,
The East Africa Protectorateo the
Residency
in Aden
etc.
)
16.
correspondence
between the Somaliland
administration
and
individuals
(e.
g.
Sayyid Muhammad
Abdille
Hassan).
17.
Captured letters between Sayyid
Muhammad
Abdille Hassan
and
his
sympathisers
in Somaliland
and
abroad, etc.
The Confidential
Prints
(C.
O.
879
and
F. O.
403)
were also extremely
valuable.
These Prints
were
intended
for
circulation 'Within
their
respective
ministries;
the
most
important despatches
were printed
either
in full
or
in
summary
form. Thus, the Confidential
Prints
are a
good
introduction
and guide
to the
manuscript sources.
They
also contain a number of
documents
which are nowhere
to be found in the
manuscript series.
12
Rhodes House
was also another
important
source
of
information. The
specific manuscripts
I
con8ulted are
listed in the bibliography.
I
was also able
to
use a number of
Somali
sources.
In Somalia, the
oral project
did
not
turn
out
to be
as
successful as
I had
anticipated,
for
reasons already
explained.
Nevertheless, I benefitted from the inter-
views
I
carried out at
the Somali Academy, Mogadishu,
where
the
atmosphere was relatively more relaxed
than in
the
north.
In
particular
I
wish
to thank the following
elders who gave me a
deep insight into the Somali
atti-
tudes towards British
rule:
Dahir Afqarshe, Mohamed
Haji Hussein, Musa Galaal Ali, Ahmed Hassan Ibrahim
and
Mahmud Ahmed Ali.
The
most
important Somali
source
(written
in
Arabic) I
was able
to
use was
Sheikh Jaamac Cumar Ciise
Tarikh"al-Sumal fi-l-tUsur
al-Wusta wa-l-hadithah
(History
of
Somalia in Medieval
and
Modern Times). I
am grateful
to Miss Lidwien Kapteijns
who placed
her translations
of
the book
at my
disposal. In
addition
to the.
above cited
book, Ciise
edited
the
poems of
Sayyid Muhammad Abdille
Hassan
which
I
was able
to
use, with
the help
of
Dr.
Andrzejewski
and
Mr. Abdisalaam. I
am very grateful
to
them. The Sayyid's
poems and
his
numerous
letters
provide
a very useful
insight into the thinking
of
the Sayyid
and
his Dervishes. The
rest of
the
sources
I
consulted will
be
found in the bibliography.
The
aim of my
thesis is to
contribute
to the
knowledge
of
the Horn
of
Africa, taking the History
of
t
British
rule
in Somalia, 1905-1940,
as my specific subject
of
investigation. This is
a subject which
has
not
been
studied
before,
and yet
it is
a subject whose appearance
in the historiography
of
British imperialism in Africa
is long
overdue.
British Somaliland
affords one of
the
most
interesting
and unique records of
British
colonialism.
The British, having
acquired
Somaliland for the
sole
purpose of extracting commodities
for Adeno
soon'found
themselves
paying a
high
price
for
this utilitarian
motive;
for twenty
years
they
grappled with
the formidable
resistance
led by Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan.,
who was
finally bombed
out and
defeated in 1920. Even
after
the
fall
of
Sayyid Muhammad,
whom
the British
had held
responsible
for their difficulties, Somaliland
continued
to be
ungovernable and unproductive;
the Somali
would not
pay
taxes..
or, accept
European
education or even
learn to
write
their language. Government
agents were
despised,
insulted
and
in
some cases
killed.
By 1926 Britain
was
thoroughly vexed.
On
several occasions
Britain
contemplated
abandoning
the
Protectorate
or giving
it to
some other
European power.
For
reasons
of strategy and prestige,
the idea
never
materialized.
At the beginning
of
1930 Britain
decided
to
pursue
the
policy of stagnation
by
which
her-aims
were
limited to
ensuring
that Aden
was supplied
with
foodstuffs
from the Somali Coast
and
that
no other
European country
threatened Britain's
strategic
interests
in the Red Sea.
It
was not until
1938 that Britain
began
a policy of
cautious
development.
The limitations
of my
thesis
are
too
obvious
1,1
Is
to
require elaboration.
My heavy
reliance on
British
sources means
that
mo
,
st of
the issues
are seen
through
the
eyes of
British
officials.
Happily, I
am not
the
first
victim, and
indeed this limitation is
encountered
not only
by those
researching
into
written sources
but
also
by those
who research
into the
oral
traditions.
Nevertheless, there has been
a
tendency for
people
to
exaggerate
the
extent
to
which
the
researcher using
one
type
of sources
is
rendered
incapable
of seeing any
other point of view; and, at
least for this thesis, I
hope it
will not
be found to be
a glorification of
British
colonialism at any cost.
On the
other
hand,
being
anon-Somali,
I did
not
find it
necessarily
true,
as most
Somali tried to
convince me,
that British
rule was
totally detrimental to Somali interests
and
progress.
With
all
due
respect
to,
and
in full
solidarity with,
the Pan-Somali
aspirations
in
parti-
cular, and
Pan-Africanism in
general,
I feel that
academic
analysis requires a
different kind
of exercise
from
political and
ideological
oratory.
I
wish
to thank Professor R. Oliver
who not
only supervised my
thesis but
also recommended me
favourably
whenever
I
needed
his
recommendation.
The
following too helped
me
in different
ways:
Dr. Peter
Garretson
read
the drafts
of my early chapters;
Dr. R.
Turton
read some of my chapters and made very useful
comments;
Mr. David Hall
of
S. O. A. S. Library helped
me
in
my
Italian
studies and
lent
me a number of
Italian
opera
records which
introduced
me
into the
world of
Italiah
culture.
I
am grateful
to the Somali
people who
V5
gave me
hospitality,
and
in
particular
to Maj. Gen.
Kulmiye Afrah
and
to Mr. Yusuf Abdi. The latter
was my
constant companion and
interpreter in Mogadishu. I
am
also
thankful to Professor Semakula Kiwanukao Dr.
Karugire
and
Dr. Denoon
who recommended me
for
my
scholarship.
Above
all,
I
am grateful
to the Ugandan
taxpayerSwho have
provided
the financial
support
for
my work.
Last but
not
least, I
am
thankful to
my wife
whoo
besides looking to
my material comfort
during the
preparation
of
the thesis,
made a number of critical
comments on my chapters.
Happily,
my
twin babies
arrived
too late to disorientate
my work.
4
i
NW-M-EAST AFRICA
KEY
CAt AL
N
13\
tlWMLLA
Prese,
it
ln'icnxiionoLL
C-., IL4, Q: D(AFui
Bow,
ccx, fs
c- D ME 0--A
vMCA
GULF
A
OF
A
RAS
LL-1
ev\,
.f11.
...................
Prxvious Bov.
ndcvy
bowee.
vl
B,
lhk fv-4
--l LA
ol sAjnv-, vp
I
:,,
v,,
% .!
It -aII
'AxSLkj
-E v
LN\
A
SS I NJ IA
t%V. 5 A
HAUD
BY
kV4
AP-Th
L-LVE P&f\8A
'ILE
r,:
-S
LANL, K
0
CPc A
ELOBuLD0
witITE
1
Ll
lu
\Ii-LI!,
v6
I
\
cc FlVQ
v
L
CHAPTER I
SOMALILAND BEFORE 1905
The term
"the
Horn
of
Africa" is
generally used
to
refer
to that
region
in North-East Africa, the
popula-
tion
of which
is
predominantly,
though
not exclusively,
Somali. The Horn
covers almost
400,000
square miles, and
embraces
the
whole of
the
present
Somali Democratic
Republic,,
one
third
of
French Somalilandp
nearly one
fifth
of
Ethiopia
and about one
fifth
of
Kenya.
1
The
Horn
of
Africa is
a well
defined
geographical unit, with
one of
the
most
inhospitable
climatic conditions
-in
Africa.
In the
north
lies the
arid coastal plain
stretching
from the lava-strewn deserts
of
French Somali-
land to Cape Guardafui. This
plain
is known, in Somali
language,
as
Guban
(to
burn). During the hot
season
(,
Tune
to September) the Guban
very nearly
lives
up
to,. its
name.
The
average rainfall
is hardly
ever more
than three incheso
and
this falls during the
cool months
(October
to January).
I
The Guban
-
an alluvial., gentle rising plateau
-
ranges
in
breadth from half
a mile
in the
east
to
60
miles
in-the
west.
Behind the Gubanj,
rise
the Golis
and
Ogo
mountains.,
reaching
8,000
feet
at some points
in the
east, and
9,000
feet in the
west.
From the top
of
the Golis,
a
long,
wide
1. Saadia Touval. Somali Nationalism:
International Politics
and
Drive for Unity in the Horn
of
Africa (Harvard
U. P.
1963j,
chap.
1; See
also
I. M. Lewis The Modern History-o
Somaliland
(London)
1965
chap.
'I.
is
and nearly
featureless
plateau slopes gently
to the
south
and east
into the Haud
and
Ethiopia. The
plateau
has
an
average elevation of
3,000 feet
and covers
the largest
part
of
the Somali hinterland. Rainfall here
averages
20 inches,
and some cultivation
is, thus,
possible, especially
between
Harar
and
Hargeisa.
2
The Ogaden Plateau lies to the
south east of
Harar,,
and embraces
the
whole eastern part of
Ethiopia.
It is
an arid area with an average rainfall of
less than
10 inches. In the
southern part of
the Somali Democratic
Republic, the
plateau
is intersected by
a maritime plain
and valleys,
the
most
important being those traversed by
the Shebelle
and
Juba Rivers. The
maritime plain
is
about
100
miles wide
in the
south,
but
narrows
to
about
5
miles
in the
north,
in the
region of
Ras Hafoun.
3
To the
south of
the Shebelle, the Juba flows
through the
eastern
Highland
mass of
Ethiopia
and enters
the Indian Ocean
at
Kismayu. The Shebelle
and
the Juba
are
the
most
important
watercourses
in the Horn
of
Africa,
and
the latter
was extensively used
by European
travellers in the
nineteenth century;
the disadvantage
with
the Shebelle is that it does
not reach
the
ocean
except
during
very
heavy
rains when
it joins the Juba.
The Shebelle-Juba
region
is
a great contrast
to the
other
parts of
the Horn
of
Africa. It is
well'supplied with
2. Andrew M. Brockett
"The
British
Somaliland Protectorate
to 1905"
(unpublished
Ph. D. thesis) Oxford, 1969,
Chapter. l.
3. Ibid;
see also
I. M. Lewis The Modern History
Of
Somali-
land
op. cit. chap.
1.
19
rainfall and carries
thick
vegetation and even
forest.
At the
present
time, the two
rivers are
being
used
for
irrigation;
and
the Juba-Shebelle
area
is the
most
intensively
cultivated region
in the Somali Democratic'
Republic. As
a result of
the drought
of
1974 the Govern-
ment, with
the
assistance of
the United Nations Organization,
moved a substantial-number of
the
poverty-stricken nomads
of
the
north, and resettled
them in the Juba-Shebelle
region.
The
measure, was resisted
by
some nomads, who,
apparently, preferred starving
to
parting with
their
nomadic culture,
but the
policy was
implemented
with
ruthless
force.
4
The
main crops grown
in the
area are
sorghum.,
Indian
corn., sesame,
beans,
manioc, and sugar
cane.
5
Within this
geograpffsical setting
the British
Somaliland Protectorate
occupied a small area of
68,000
square miles,
in the
north-eastern part of
the Horn. It
lay between
80
and
120
north of
the
equator, and was
bounded by the Gulf.
-of'Aden
to the
north.,
flanked by
Italian Somaliland to the
east,
by Ethiopia to the
south
and
French Somaliland-to, the
west.
It
covered,
400,
miles
of
the
coastal plain, starting
from Bunder Mad
at
the
eastern extreme
(490
Long.
)
to Loy Adu
(Long. 430
15') in
the,
west.
The Protectorate's
share of,
the Guban-ranged'
from
ii
breadth
of,
30,
miles
in the
west, narrowing
to
some-
thing like 1
mile,
in-the,
east.
It7is.
characterized
by
4.
A
good number of
Wadads
(men
ofireligion). preached against
the Government's
resettlement scheme
in the
mosques.
They
were arrested and
ten
of.
them-,
were sentenced
to death by
public execution.
I. M. Lewis A Pastoral Democracy: A Study
of
Pastoralism
and
Politics
among
the Northern Somali
of
the Horn
o-f--K-f
(London) 1961v Chap. 1.
20
broken
ridges of
limestone
and rocky
hills. The Plateau
which
falls
away
behind the Golis
and
Ogo
mountain ranges
descends into the Haud
where
the Protectorate
shared a
common
boundary
with
Ethiopia.
6
The Somali belong to the Cushitic
(and
more
particularly
Eastern Cushitic) language
group, whose
original
homeland is believed"to lie in the
area of
southern
Ethiopia-northern Kenya
(7
0
Nj,
4oo
E to 00P
370 E). Their
closest
kinsmen
are
the Afar, Galla, Saho
and
Beja. Altogether, the Cushitic
group embraces
22
languages,
most of which are still concentrated
in,
or
in the
vicinity of,
the
original
homeland.
No
one
is
certain as
to
when
the Somali
moved
into the
areas
they
now occupy,
but it is believed that the
ebb and
flow
of
the Cushitic
people started many centuries
back,
and
accelerated
in
or about
the
sixteenth century;
"the
preponderant
trend
of
Eastern Cushitic
migration and expansion
has been from
south
and west,
to the
north and east.
"
7
As for the Somali traditional
accounts,
they
prefer
to
claim
Arabian
ancestry,, stressing
in
particular,,
the
Somali
connection with various
Arabian families
and
the
Ibid.
7. Herbert S. Lewisig"The
Origins
of
the Galla
and
Somali",
J. A. H.
2
VIIO 1(
66)
p.
41.
-The
traditional,. theory
(advo-
cated,
inter
alia,
by 1. M. Lewis
and,
E. Cerulli) is to the
effect
that the
Mmali-migration
and expansion was
from
north-.
to the
south.
Herbert Lewis,
who
bases the
new
theory
on
linguistic
classification2
dismissesthe tradi-
tional theories
as
"mythical
charters
for
modem religious
and political
life. (P.
35). The
controversy about
Cushitic
migration and-expansion,
howeverp
remains
unresolved.
This
study
does
not attempt
to
undertake a
detailed investigation
of
this
controversial subject.
2c I
Prophet. Most
scholars are agreed
that
such claims
have
no
basis in historical fact. Nowadays these
claims of
Arabian
ancestry are
being discouraged,,
and
the Somali
are
being
encouraged
to take
more pride
in their African
connections.
8
The
most remarkable
features
of
the Somali
society are
their
socio-political organization and
their
mode of
life. Until
very recently, over
80%
of
the Somali
people were nomads who
depended for their livelihood
on
their
camels, sheep and goats.
The
cultivators
inhabit
the fertile
southern areas, especially
in the Shebelle
and
Juba
regions.
9
The
camel
is the
most valuable economic
and social assets comparable
to the
cow
in the 3&custrine
region of
Uganda. The
camels'in
fact, does
much more
for
the Somali than the
cow
does for the
cattle
keepers
of
Western Uganda: the
camel
is
not only a symbol of social
prestige and source of
livelihoods but it
also performs
such
tasks
as
transporting
goods and people.
It is
also
ridden
by troops in
combat situations
during times
of war.
The
seasonal migration of
the Somali
nomads
is
dictated by the distribution
of grazing areas and wells as
8.
As
recently as
the late 1930s the Somali
community
in
Kenya
clamoured
for
recognition as a non-African race.,
seeking
to be
classified as an
Asiatic
community.
They
urged
their kinsmen in British Somaliland
to
resist
Britain's
attempt
to introduce the teaching
of
the Somali
language. The
argument was
that Arabic
was
the language
of
the Koran,
and
that the teaching
of
Somali
would weaken
Islam. Today the Somali language is the
official medium
of communication
in the Somali Democratic Republic.
S. Touval Somali Nationalism
op., cit. p.
10-12.
2c
2
well as
by the
changing seasons.
Between December
and
January the
monsoon winds
bring heavy
rains andAcool
et; mate
to the
coastal area, with
the
result
that the
nomads get attracted
to the Guban. When the
monsoon
stops
in April, the
area
becomes lifeless
and
is deserted.
The
nomads
then drift
southwards
into the Haud in
search
of grazing and water.
By September the Haud is
already
dry
and
inhospitable;
so
the
nomads
begin to
move north-
wards and others eastwards
into the Ogaden.
10
Until
recently,
this
seasonal movement of people was a source
of constant
internal feuds,
especially
during
serious
droughts. Inthe
circumstances,
life
was extremely
hazardous for those
who were not well equipped either
to
defend themselves
or
to
compete
for the limited
wells and
good grazing.
The
struggle
for
existence
in the
rough
conditions of
Somaliland inevitably
made
the individual
tough
and
fiercely independent, but he
was, at
the
same
time,
-bound
in
a remarkable socio-political organization.
The key to the Somali
socio-political organization
is kin-
ship.
Individuals
are
bound together by ties
of patrilineal
kinship
rather,
than by
any claim
to
a specific piece of-
land., Institutionalized hierarchical-authority, is
alien
to the Somali. Thus,
every socio-political unit,
is
com-
posed of.
individuals
who can
trace their descent to,
a
common male ancester-from, whom
they take, the title
of
their
clan-family.
The latter is,
in
turn.,
-divided
into
clans.,
10. During
very severe
droughto
most of
the
nomads move
to the
Ogaden, for here
one
finds
some permanent wells.
Other'S-go
to the Mijjertein
country.
-The
British Somaliland Protec-
torate
used
to
have
no permanent wells or reliably good
pasture.
Hence, the British Somali tribes
were
dependent
on
Ethiopia
and
Italian Somaliland.
9
'wi
lineages
and
Dia-paying
groups:
Clan
-,
family
-:
' Cia
Pr
! lbLn
lineage
Dia-paying
group
Dia-paying
group
Whereas inter-clan
and
inter-lineage feuds
are
part and parcel of
the Somali
mode of
life, the dia7paying
group
is the
most unifieds viable and stable unit.
The
individual's
primary allegiance and obligations are
to his
dia-paying
group.
It
operates, more or
less,
on
the basis
of a social contract
by
which
the
unit as a whole
is
res-
ponsible
for the
conduct of
its
members, and
liable for
their
mischiefs.
Any internal
conflict within a.
dia-group
is
settled
by
a general meeting of
the
group, at which
the
elders use
their
experience and wisdom
in
restoring
harmony.
Not
surprisingly,
the
colonial administrationo
in
recogni-
tion
ofthe viability of,
the dia-paying
group,
took it
as
the
main political unit. and proceeded',
to-,
make
laws in that
light. The
Collective
Punishment'Ordinancev
for
examplej,
11.1. M. Lewiso A Pastoral Democracys
op. cit. p.
4-7.
'It
stipulated
that
every
dia-paying
group must
be liable for
a crime or raid committed
by
one or some of
its
members.
The
colonial
institution
which
did
not work out satis-
factorily
was,
however, that
of
Akils
(Goverment
agents).
These had been intended to be the
equivalent of chiefs,
but
since
the Somali
were not used
to having
chiefs,
the
Akils failed to
exercise
the
authority and respect
the
British had hoped they
would.
Out
of
the
six clan-families
into
which
the
Somali
are
divided,, two
reside
in
what used
to be the
British Somaliland Protectorate,
namely,
the Ishaak
(or
Isaq)
and
the Darod
(or
Darood)
12
Ishaak
(Clan-family)
I
(Clans)
Hbr Awal Hab Gerhajis- HAr TolJaala
(Primary
lineages), Aidegalla Yunis
12. Drake-Brockman,, British Somaliland,
-(London)-1912,. p.
272;
see also
Andrew Brockett "The Br ish Somaliland Protec-
torate
...
"
it
op., cit. p.
4...
In the thesis,,
-
I
use
"tribe"
instead
of, clan".
25
Darod
(Clan-family)
Kombe-Harti
Mijjerteii
iahanta geli
Ogaden
2k
The
other clan-families which
live beyond the
borders
of
the former British Somaliland Protectorate
are
the Dir, Hawiye, Digil
and
Rahaniin. The last two
were
the
only agricultural groups
inhabiting the fertile
regions of
the
south.
The
clan and
lineages
shown above multiply
into
numerous sub-lineages and
dia-Paying
groups.
In 1958 the
dia-paying
groups
in the British Somaliland Protectorate
alone numbered more
than 360.13
The Habr Awal lived in the
neighbourhood of
Berbera
ands
thereforeo
used
to
control most of
the Berbera
trade. At the
same
time, however, they
were
the
most vul-
nerable group
to British
reprisals
in the
event of
their
committing-any mischief or crime.
This facts
combined
with
their dependence
on
the
goodwill of
their European
trading
partners, made
them
adopt a
friendly
attitude
towards the British. Indeed, during the turbulent
years
of
the Dervish
uprising,
the loyalty
of
the Habr Awal to
the British
remained unshakable.
On
the
whole.,
the Ishaak
13. Brockett
op. cit. p.
c' r
1-
VO
I
CLAN
11
a
GULF OF A-DEN I
6
el L
NOR-1-VIE ;
-N
: 30PAALILAND
Las 6
vo
I
N
DL
INDIAN
OCCAW
----------
Bc,
",,
dory
oF
Brtii.
5in
sorylaIllo'n(A
Approximore. C
MI LES
flo
(00
NV3-: Do
NVIC"Ni
OQ)
Cppolil U01-
'alok"XQ. Ajdv
. .........
pu, op J'OUAO;
I
lT
3A VNII
NA
lo
xct'01,10
.
2?
Ev,,
SVI
4!, OVN
X)I! z
zia.. "
I
-, c *fII
-i -I "I
%C.
-t
_If
It-1
.
1%, 11103 NNI--iij-'JOJN
NIV
1J
7
27
were regarded
by the, British
as
their
allies.
Nevertheless,
during the Dervish
rebellion.. some
Ishaak
groups., particu-
larly the Habr Toljaala
who-lived
further
south
in the
interior,
could afford
to
shift-their allegiance either
to the British
or
to the Dervishes, depending
on
the
changing
fortunes
of
the
struggle.
The Darod, in
general, were
the thorn in the
flesh
of
the British
administration.
They lived in the
most
inhospitable
parts of
the interior,
and
had little
to do
with
the British
at
Berbera. The leader
of
the
Dervsh
rebellion
belonged to the Bagheri,
one of
the
Ogaden
clans, and on several occastions
he
successfully
wooed
the
support of
the Warsengeli living in the
north-
eastern part of
the Protectorate. The Mijjertein lived in
Italian Somaliland
and.,
like their Darod kinsmen in-British
Somaliland,
resisted
Italian-colonialism for
a, considerable
length
of
time.
14
All
writers on
Somaliland have
emphasized
the
Somali
sense of
independence,
pride,
insubordination
and
individualism. They have
particularly
been
struck
by the
fact that these
seemingly anarchical
traits
arej, at
the
same
time,
welded
into
a social system whicho
in
some
cases,
is
even more stable and more
binding than the
cen-
tralized
political systems.
This
combination of
diversity
and unity was
incomprehensible to the
early
European
observers, especially,
those
who
tried. to
use
European
concepts, or parallels
from the
other parts of
Africa, in
14. Robert Hesss Italian Colonialism in Somalia
(Chicago
u. p.
)
1966,
Chap.
28
analysing
Somali
society.
They
reached wrong conclusions,
and
this is
precisely what
lay
at
the
roots of
Britain's
failure to devise
a viable and stable administrative
system.
The
model of
African
chieftainship was applied,
with
disappointing
results.
It
was not until
1939 that
the Colonial Office
confessed
its ignorance
of
the true
nature of
the Somali institutions
and concepts, and pro-
posed
to
send a
trained
anthropologist
to
study
them.
15
The harshest
comments about
Somali
character
and
their
mode of
life
were made
by the
nineteenth cen-
tury
and early
twentieth
century writers.
Some
of
these,
having found little
problem
in
establishing
the European
claim
to
racial and cultural superiority elsewhere
in
Africa,
were appalled
by the Somali disregard for,
and
sometimes rebuttal of,
that
claim.
This
was
taken for
vanity and retrogression.
Thus, Brockman
asserted'that
"the'Somali
does
not change,
it is the European
who changes.
He is
much
the
same
today
as
he
was
in the days
when
Strabo
and
Pliny
(sic)
first heard
of
him. His
country
is the
same*
his habits
are
the
same and
his ideas
are
the
same.
The infusion
of
Semitic blood
effected
only a
temporary
alteration
in his
mode of
life
and
thought but the
ages
that have
passed
have
only
tended to
obliterate all
the
good
that it did,
and slowly
but
surely
drag him
back to his
original state"'16
Another
writer, a
former
administrative officer
in the
Protectorate, describes the Somali-as
"a
race of maniacs
....
the
name
Somali is
anathema.
The Somali has
no sense of reverence
and considers
himself
as. good a man,. andlike
all mad'men, as sane a man as any-one else
in
the
world".
17
15. C. O. 535/13V46168 C. O. to Governor Glenday 27/4/1939-
16. Drake-Brockman
op. cit.
88-89.
17. H. Rayne Sun, 'Sand
and
Somalia: Leaves from the
notebook
of a
District Commissioner
(London) 1926
P.
58-59.
29
A third
writer considered
the Somali
as
"inordinately
vain and will walk off'into
the
Jungle
I
and make
his
way
home., leaving two
months pay and rations
behind him if he
considers
his lordly dignity insulted.
"
18
In
addition
to these descriptions, fashionable
phrases
such as
the
"Irishmen
of
Africa",
and
"the
people without
a pillow" were often used
to
underline
the Somali indepen-
dence
and
their
reluctance
to
submit
to
alien authority.
19
The
earliest
historical
references
to the
area
we now
know
as
the Somali Coast.,
- are
found in the
ancient
Egyptian inscriptions
written around
1,700 B. C. These
writings refer
to the
region generally as
the
"Land
of
Punt"; but its
exact
limits
and nature of government are
questions of
debate
among
historians. References to the
Horn
of
Africa become
clearer and more abundant
in the
seventh century,
following the
spread of
Islam,
and
the
compilation of chronicles and
travellers'
accounts which
accompanied
it.
20
However, the
name
"Soomaale" (from
which
"Somali"
derives)
was not used until
the first half
of
the fifteenth
century.
It
occurred
in
a song praising
King Yeshaq
of
Ethiopia for his
victory over
the
muslim and
partly
Somali
state. of
Adal,
(or
Awdal) based
on
Zeila.
21
18. H. G. S. Swayne Seventeen Trips Through Somaliland
and
A
Visit-to Abyssinia (London)
190.3)
p.
b.
19. Military Report On Somaliland, 1907
(published
by the War
Office)
p.
gb-100.
20. For
a
detailed
study of some of
the
seventh century
chronicles relating
to the Somali Coast,
see
E. Cerulli
(Somalia:
Scritti
vari editi'ed
inediti
vol.
1
(Rome)
1957.
21. E. Cerulli
"La
Somalia
nelle
Cronache Etiopichet'. in
Africa Italiana, 11,19290
p.
262-65.
30
Thereafters'the
name was adopted
by
a
famous Arabian
historian
of
the
sixteenth centuryo
Shihab
ad-Dinp-in
his
accounts of
the
numerous wars
between the Ethiopians
and
the Muslim
army of
Imaam Ahmad ibn Ibrahim
al-Ghaaz
(alias
Ahmed Granhe). The latter
was
heavily dependent
on
Somali
troops; he
overran
Ethiopia between 1527
and
1543 but
was
eventually
killed'on-the battlefield by
a combination of
Ethiopian
and
Portuguese forces,
21
Before the
arrival of
the Portuguese, Zeila
and
Berbera
were
the
most
important
ports on
the Somali
coast.
The foundation
of
Zeila by immigrant Arabs dated
as
far
back
as
the tenth
century.
It became
a very outstanding
centre of commerce,
learning
and
Islam. Berbera did
not
rise
to the
same status,
but
was
famous for its
seasonal
trade fair between April
and
October.
22
Portuguese
commercial
imperialism,
whose weight
had
already
been felt by
various other communities on
the
east coast, appeared on
the Somali
coast
during the first
decade
of
the
sixteenth century.
This
was,
in
many wayso
a
turning
point
in-the history
of
the Horn
of
Africa:
not
only
did it
mark
the beginning
of
the decline
of
the
once
prosperous
Somali
coastal
towns
such as
Zeila, but it
also marked
the beginning
of active
foreign intervenfton
into the Afro-Arabic
politics of
the
region.
Threatened
by the
combination of
Portuguese'and Ethiopian
military
21. E. Cerulli
"La
Somalia
nelle cronache
Etiopiche",, in
Africa Italiana,. II, 1929.,
p.
262-65.
22. For
a
detailed
study of
the
early
history
of
these towns,
see
M. Abir
"Trade
and
Politics in the Ethiopian Region
1830-1855"
(an
unpublished
Ph. D. Thesis) London Univer-
sity..
1964,
31
resources,
Ahmed Granhe tried to
redress
the imbalance
by
enlisting
the Turks to his
side.
Unfortunately for
Granhe, his honeymoon
with
the Turks
was short-lived.
They
quarrelled and parted company within a
few
years of
their
alliance.
Ahmad Granhe's fate
was
thereby
sealed.
As
already mentioned,
he
was
defeated in 1542; the fall
of
Zeila
and other coastal
towns followed
suitpo
23
For the
next
three
centuries
the Horn
of
Africa
was
the
scene of political
turmoil, intrigue
and
feuds.
First., the Turks, having fallen
out with
Ahmad Granhep
invaded Massawa
and occupied
it by force
until
1633
when
they
were eventually
driven
out
by the Ethiopians.
24
The
other
important
event
following the death
of
Granhe
was
the Galla invasion
of
Ethiopia
and
the
surround-
chronicles
ing territories. According to Ethiopian
and
Portuguese/of
the
sixteenth century,
the Galla,
who
inhabited the
area
to the
east of
Lake Shamo
and south of
Gamo., began their
invasion
of
the
south-eastern province of
Ethiopia in
earnest
in the 1550's. By the 1580's
waves of
Galla
invaders had
reached
Dawaro, Adal, Fatajar, Gan, Angote
-
all on
the
eastern side of
Ethiopia,
and
largely
muslim
-
and even as
far
north and west as
Amhara, Begemder,
and
Dembea.
"Within
50
years
the Galla
were waging war against
organized states and conquering
land.
as
far
as
500
miles
away
from their
original
homeland.
1125
23.1. M. Lewis,
-The
Modern Histay
of
Somaliland
op. cit. p.
42.
24. A detailed
account of
the
relations
between the Somali
coast and
Ethiopia in the fifteenth
and sixteenth century
is
given
by J. S. Trimingham., Islam
in
Ethiopia,
(Oxford)
1952.1
25. Herbert S. Lewis,
"The
Origins
of
the Galla
and
Somali"
J. A. H.
OP. cit. P.
33.
32
In the
aftermath of
these
upheavals,
the Sharifs
of
Mokha
(or
Mukha) in Yemen found the Somali
coast an
easy prey when
they
made a
bid for
power
in the
seventeenth
century.
'Here
they
reigned supreme., and
in 1847 they leased
Zeila to
a wealthy
Somali
merchant,
Haji Shirmake.
A
new element
in the
politics of
the
region was
meanwhile
brewing in the
shape of
the British
occupation
of
Aden in 1839. Hitherto Britain had
shown no
interest
in the Somali
coast
beyond the desire to
protect
her
com-
mercial vessels and
their
crews.
For
example when
the
Habr Awal
plundered
the British
ship
"Mary
Anne" in 1827
Britain decided to bombard Berbera. This
was
followed by
the
signing of
the Anglo-Habr Awal Agreement by
which
the
two
sides undertook
to
respect each otherts
trading-rights
on
the
coast.
Britain
promised
to
respect
the
political
independence
of'the
Habr Awal.
26
In 1839 however Britain
annexed
Aden. The
step
was motivated
by Britaints
wish
to
establish a station on
the
short route
to the Far East. Britain's
annexation of
Aden
not only
introduced
a new
dimension into the
politics
of
the Somali
coast,
but it
also stirred other
European
countries
into
action.
No
sooner
had Britain,
consolidated
her
position on
Aden than France began to
connive with some
local Sheikhs,
with a view
to
gaining a
foothold
at
Zeila
26. F. O.
403/8
Memorandum, by-the Goverment
of
India
on
the
Affairs
of
Somalee'Coast
n.
d
(Encl.
in Sir. L., Mallet to
Lord Tenterden, 21/4/1875 NO:
33
and
Tajura
.
27
The European
struggle
for dominance in
the Hom-of Africa had thus begun.
In
order
to forestall
or
frustrate the
reported
French initiative in Zeila
and
Tajura, Britain
sent
Moresby
in 1840 to dissuade the local Sheikhs there from
ceding
their territories to
any other
European
country without
the
express permission of
Britain. Moresby
was
further
authorized
to
purchase such places as
he
considered
to be
strategically vital
to Britaints interests in the Red Sea.
Moresby's
mission was an outstanding success'.
He
signed
two treaties in August
and
September
with
the Sultans
of
Tajura
and
Zeila,
respectively
by
which
these Sultans
undertook
"not
to
enter
into
any other
treaty
or
bond
with any other
European
nation without con-
sulting
the British
authorities at
Aden.
"
28
He
also purchased
for Britain the Island
of
Mussah from the
Sultan
of
Tajura.. for ten bags
of rice.
In
addition,
he
accepted, on
behalf
of
Britain, the Island
of
Aubad from
the Governor
of
Zeila,
whose right
to
cede
it
was contested
for
many years
by the Sharifs
of
Mokha,
29
Moresbyts treaties
of
1840
were,
thus, the first
steps
taken by Britain to
particularize
her interests
on
the Somali
coast as well as exclude other maritime powers
27. Virginia Thompson
and
Richard Adloffo Djibouti
and
The
Horn
of
Africa
(Stanford'U.
P'.
)'1968.,
Chap. 1. This is
a
scholarly work
based'on
research
in France
and
Jibuti.
Thompson
and
Adloff
are
the
authors of
The Malagasy
Republic
,
and
The Emerging States
of
French
Equatorial
Africa.
28. F. o.
4o3/8
Memorandum by the Government
of
India
...
n.
d.
op. cit.
29. E. Hertslet, MaR
of
Africa by Treaty Vol. I
(London)
1909
p.
4o8.
I
from the
area.
The Somali
coast was a vital source of
-
supplies
for Aden,
a potential area
for
economic
develop-
ment and a
key
outlet
for trade
with
Ethiopia. Britain's
interests
were
limited to the
coastal strip, and very
little
was
known
about
the interior. As long
as
the
interior trade flowed
smoothly and caravans were not
dis-
rupted,
Britain had
no
intention,
much
less desire, to
get
involved in the
affairs of
the Somali
who were reputed
for
their hostility towards
strangers.
When Britain
earmarked
this
sphere of
influence
on
the
southern shore of
the Gulf
of
Aden,
she was not con-
versant with
the Somali
way of
life
and socio-political
organization; she was
totally
unprepared
for the
problems
which
later beset her
colonial rule
for
more
than two
decades. In the first half
of
the
nineteenth century,
the
politics of
the Somali Coast
were
in
a restless state.
Zeila
was smarting under
the
arbitrary rule of
Haji
Shirmake
who,
having been
given a semi-autonomous status
by his
masters
in Mokha, began to
pay
lip
service
to them;
"in
the first half
of
the
nineteenth century
Zeila
was
just
a shadow of
its
past olory"*30
Berbera's
seasonal commercial
boom
was only a camouflage
for
a
fundamental
problem:
"during
the height
of
the trade fair, Berbera is
a perfect
Babel, in
confusion as
in languages;
no chief
is
acknowledged and
the
customs of
the
bygone days
are
the laws
of
the
place.
Disputes
between the inland tribes daily
arise and are
settled
by the
spearu.
30
Ao.
3M.
Abir,,
"Trade
and
Politics in the Ethiopian Region
op. cit. P. -298-
30$). R. F. Burton First Footsteps in East Africa
(London)
1856
p.
226.
35
This
was
the
state of affairs when
the Suez
Canal
was opened
in 1869. Up to this time Britain had
managed, with varying degrees
of success,
to
protect
her
interests
as well as
keep the
other
European
powers at
arms
length
without
herself
annexing
the Somali
coast.
From time to time,
Britain
was compelled
to take
punitive
action against
the
coastal
dwellers
whenever
British
natio
at
were mishandled.
Following
an attack on
Burtonts
party
in 1855, for
example,
Berbera
was
blockaded by
war-
ships.
The blockade
was
finally lifted
when
the Habr Awal
agreed
to
sign a new
treaty to the
effect
that
"all
vessels sailing under
British flag
shall
have free
permission
to trade
at
the
port of
Berbera'or
at any other place
in the territories
of
Habr Awal,
t'
31
The
attack on
Burtonts
party was embarrassing
to
those
who
had
advocated
British
annexation of
the Somali
coast, saying
that
"the
Somali
admire our rule, respect our power,
comprehend our
forbearance
....
and
they
evince
" gentleness of
disposition
of
disposition
and
"
docility
which offer
fair hopes to
civilization
in this
region of
barbarism".
32
In the
meantime,
Haji Shirmake,
who
had
played
host to Burtonp
continued
to tighten his
grip on
Zeila
at
the
expense of
his bosses in Mokha. He
was
deposed in
1855 but
was
later
re-instated with severe warnings.
Then
in 1859 the French
consul at
Aden, Lambert,
was murdered
near
Tajura,
and
Shirmarke
was
believed to have been impli-
cated
in the
murder plot.
The French
arrested
Shirmake
and
31. F. O.
403/8
Memorandum by the Goverment
of
India
n.
d.,
op. cit.
32. Burton
as quoted
by Brockett
op. cit. p*
22.
C'
ci
shipped
him to Hodeida for trial; his
reign came
to
an
ignominous
end when
he died in
mysterious circumstances
on
his
way
to Hodeida.
33
The
removal of
Shirmake
and
the
subsequent
intervention by France in Tajura,
provided
France
with a
good pretext
for
promoting
her territorial
ambitions.
Britain had
all along suspected
France
of cherishing such
ambitions, and
had taken the
stand
that the independence
of
the Somali
coast ought
to be
respected
by
all
the
European
countries.
Following the death
of
Shirmake,
France began to
make serious manoeuvres
to
obtain a
foot-
hold, disregarding Britaints
policy.
34
The French began
to ingratiate themselves
with
the leading Sheikhs..
and
invited
one of
them to
visit
Paris in 1862. In the
same
year, a
French diplomat based in Turkey, M. Schaefferp
went under a
fictitious
name on a secret mission
to Tajura
and
bought
a
desert
spot called
Obokh from the Governor
of
Tajura for 10,000 dollars. The French Government
announced
the fait
accompli
to Britain,
saying
that Obokh
was
bought
solely
for the
convenience of
French
merchants who needed a
coaling and provisioning station.
35
However, the inconvenience
and embarrassment
caused
to Britain by the insubordination
of
the Somali
or
33. Virginia, Thompson
and
Richard Adloffo Djibouti, And The
Horn
of
Africa
op. cit. chap.
1.
34. A detailed
and constructive account of
t1B Anglo-French
scramble
for territory-,
on
the Somali Coast is
given
by
Andrew Brockett
"'Anglo-French
Rivalry
on
the Somali
Coast in the 1860s", in Hadith, 2.1970
(East
African
Publishing House),
35. Ibid.
p.
128.
37
by the French-at
obokh
were negligible
in
comparison
to
the Egyptian
expansionism
of
the 1870'so based
on some
ancient., albeit questionable,
claims
by the Khedive
of
Egypt
on
behalf
of
the Ottoman Emperor. ' The
real stimulus
to Egypt's
sudden remembrance
of
her
masterts so-called
ancient rights was
the
opening of
the Suez
canal, an event
which
transformed the
geopolitical situation of
the Red
Sea:
"in
1869,, the Red Sea., formerly
a cul-de-sac at
Suez
i
where ships cargoes were
handled by
rail
across
the Egyptian isthmus to Alexandriao
was
open
to
shipping.
Africa became
an
Island,
voyages round
the Cape
were curtailed and
the
middle
East
pattern of. commerce and strategy.,
politics and
diplomacy
was
to impinge
on
the
Horn
of
Africa.
36
T. E. Marston too
observes
that,
"in
one
day,, the Red Sea,
economically a
back-
water of
the Indian Ocean, became
one of
the
main sea routes of
the
world.
"
37
Egyptian
occupation of
the Somali
coast was pre-
ceded
by her
purchase of
Massawa from the Sultan
of
Turkey
in 1866. In the
same year,
the
sult4n
issued
a
Firman
granting an undefined
territory
on
the Red Sea to the
Khedive, to be
administered
by him
under
the
overall
sovereignty of
Turkey.
38
Four
years
later, the Egyptian
36. The Somali Peninsula: A
new
light
On
imperial
motives
(-published by
e
Information Service
of
the Somali Govern-
ment)
1962.,
p.
19. The
author of
this book is
anonymous;
it is
violently anti-Ethiopian and anti-British and
is,,
therefore,
not a very reliable source of serious
historical
information.
37. T. E. Marstono Britain's Imperial Role in the Red Sea Area
1800-1878
(Ham7d--enConnecticut)
l9blo
P.
375.
38. A
useful account of
Egypt's interests into the Sudan., the
Red Sea Equatorial Africao
and
the East Coast
of
Africa is
given
by W. L. Langer The Diplomacy
of
Imperialism
(New
York) 1956.
1
Ct
I)
ship
"Khartoum"
arrived on
the Somali
coast and
landed
troops
at
Berbera
and
Bulhar.
39
The British
authorities
at
Aden
sent spies
to investigate Egyptian
activities.,
and
these
returned with reports confirming
thetatablish-
ment of
Egyptian
rule at
Bulhar
and
Berbera. Britain's
immediate
reaction was
to denounce Egypt's
action and
to
remonstrate with
the Khedive; Britain had
all along
recognized
the independence
of
the Somali
coast and
had
signed
treaties
with
its leading Sheildis
on
that
assump-
tion.
4o
Sir B. Frere
was commissioned
to
study
the
implications
and possible repercussions on
Britaints
position
in the Red Sea
of
Egyptian
occupation of
the
Somali
coast.
He
was,
in
addition,,
to
examine
Britain's
obligations
and
liabilities
under
her
previous
treaties
with
the Somali.
Frere
recommended
British
opposition
to Egyptian
designs, for the
area was, among many other
thingso
the lifeblood
of
Aden. Should the Somali Coast
fall
into the hands
of another power,
let
alone a
hostile
one,
he
argued,
there
coulfe no guarantee
that the Somali
Coast
would
continue
to
supply
Aden
with grains cattle,
JL-
woods hay
and
labour. Moreover, British
acquyse
.
ence
in
Egyptian
ambitions
would violate
Britaints treaties
with
the
coastal Sheikhs.
Above
all,
the
acceptance
by Britain
of
Egyptian
claims was
likely to
spur
the
other maritime
39. J. A. L. M.
-Hamilton Somaliland
(London)
1911,
p.
44-46.
40.
S. Touvals Somali Nationalisms
op. cit. p.
34.
3
powers
into
a race
for
similar
territorial footholds.
41
Britaints
objections
to the Egyptian
policy
failed to have the desired
effect on
the latter. Yet, it
was
inconceivable that Britain
would contemplate a mili-
tary
confrontation with
Egypt in defence
of
the Somali
Sheikhs. Britain
valued
her friendship
with
Egypt
more
than
she valued
the independence
of
the Somali Coast. In
view of
Egyptts determination to
rule
the domains
of
her
Ottoman
masters,
Britain decided
not only
to
recognize
Egypt
as
the de facto,
government
but
also
to
make
the
best
out of
it.
42
By 1875 Britain's tone had
changed:
"Trusting
in the-friendly
relations
between
England
and
Egypt, Her Majestyts Government
are
willing
to
recognize
the African Coastp
as
far
as
Cape Guardafue
as part of
the Ottoman
dominions
under
the hereditary
rule of
the
Khedive
of
Egypt,
upon
the
conditions
that
Zeilao Berbera, Tajura, Bulhar
and other parts
on
the Coast
shall
be declared free
portso
that the
unrestricted
importation into Aden
of
livestock,
provisions and other necessaries
at current prices shall
be
permitted, and no
monopolies allowed, and
that the Egyptian
Government
shall enter
into
a
formal'engage-
ment,
to
prohibit
the
export of slaves along
the
entire coast
....
"-
-
43
41.
F. o.
4o3/8
Memorandum by Sir B. Frere
on
Treaties
with
the Somalee
and other
tribes
on
the African Coast
of
the
Red Sea
and
Gulf
of
Aden
(Encl.
in G., Hamiltono M. P. to
Lord Tenterden, 7/8/1874 No. 33).
42.
It is
significant
to
note
that in 1875, gr-=a4ft
was
encouraging
Egyptian
expansion
into the Sudan
and
the
Juba
area,
in the hope that
she would stamp out slave
trade.
-
The Khedive "claimed for his Government the
posi-
tion
of
the head
of civilization on
the African
continent"
Richard Gray,.
-A
History-of the, Southern Sudan 1839-1882
o. U. P.
)
1961..
T-77176.
43.
F. 0
4o 8
The Earl
of
Derby to Major General Stanton.,
10/ii/l 75 No. 103.
40
It
was also
hoped that
"the
Khedive's desire is to develop the
resources of
the
country
by
establishing a
steady civilizing
Goverment in those
regions
which would ensure
to traders
or
travellers
that
protection which can
hardly be
said
to
have
existed
there
up
to the
present moment.
"
44
Between 1875
and
1877 Anglo-Egyptian
negotiations
took
place with a view
to
stipulating conditions upon which
Britain
was
to
recognize
Egyptian jurisdiction. A
convention
was subsequently
drawn
up providing
for British
recognition
of
Egyptian
rule
from the Suez to Cape Guardafue. It
included
a pledge
by the Khedive
"for
himself
and
his
successors,
that
no portion
of
the territory, to be thus formally incorporated
with
Egypt
under
his hereditary
rule, shall ever
be
ceded
to
any
foreign
power"45
The Convention
was supposed
to
assume a
full legal
status
after
its
ratification
by the Sultan
of
Turkey, the
overall
sovereign,
but
as
he
refused
to
endorse
ito the Convention
remained, strictly speaking, a
dead letter.
Britaints
relationship with
Egypt
was,
in
some
ways,, reminiscent of
Britaints
policy
towards Zanzibars
and#
in
other ways, a contradiction of
it. During the first half
of
the
nineteenth century
Britain
sought
to
use
the Govern-
ments of
Zanzibar
and
Egypt to
stamp out
the
slave
trade
as
well as
to keep
other maritime powers at arms
length; this
was
the
period when
the idea
of
direct
annexation
had
not
entered
the heads
of most of
the European
statesmen.
Thus,
in
order
to
achieve
the two
objectiveso
Britain had to
make
a modus vivendi with-the rulers of
the two
countries:
they
44.
Ibid.
45.
Hertslet, Complete Collection
of
Treaties
vol.
XVIIJ..
(London)
159.5.
p.
359-. 5bl.
di
would promise
to
imperial designs
return
for
which
internal
rivals,
over
the
neighbo-
Hence.,
abolish
the
slave
trade
and rebuff
the
of
the
other
European
countries,
in
Britain
would support
them
against
their
and acquiesce
in
some of
their designs
aring
territories.
46
in the 1860s Britain
supported
Sultan
Majidts
claims
to the
mainland of
East Africa. In 1872
Sir Bartle Frere
was advocating
that, in
view of
the
Khedivets
promise
to
abolish
the
slave
trade, he
should
be
supported
in his
southward expansionist ambitions.
47
There
was also similarity
in the
way
both Egypt
and
Zanzibar disappointed Britaints hopes. In
spite of a
series of anti-slave
trade
agreements
between Britain
and
Zanzibar,
a
Parliamentary Committee
which
investigated
the
slavery question
in 1871, found that the
slave
trade'
in East Africa, far from dropping, had
actually
increased.
In 1875 Britain forced the Sultan to
sign a new agreement
by
which
the
slave
trade
was
totally banned. Another
clause of
this
agreement re-affirmed
the Sult
+
Is
earlier
undertaking not
to
cede any of
his domains to
any other
European
country;
Egypt
was
to
make a similar undertaking
for the Somali Coast two
years
later. When Frere
visited
Egypt in 1872 he discovered that here., too,, the
slave
trade
The
46/
British
could support
the
ruler only as
long
as
he
remained agreeable
to them. In the
event of
his failing
.
to live
up
to their
expectations,
they
would
throw in
their lot
with a rival contender.
For
example,
Khedive
Ismail
was overthrown
in 18%
when
he defaulted
on
his
debts; in Zanzibar, the British intervened in 1856
when
Barghash tried to
seize power
from his brother Majid.
47.
R. Gray, A Hist(ry
of
the Southern Sudan
op. cit. p.
177;
and
W. E. F. Ward
and
L. W. White E
st
Africa: A
century of
Change
1870-1970
(London)
197lo-P- 10-
420
was still going on
in
spite of
the Khedive's
pronounce-
ments.
The Khedive re-iterated his determination to
put a
stop
to this trade, but he
wanted a substantial quid pro
quo
-a
port on
the Indian Ocean.
48
Britain's
recognition of
Egyptian
rule on
the
Somali Coast
was
thus
consistent with
the
policy pursued
both in East
and
North-East Africa. The interesting feature
of
this
policy was
its
contradiction.
This happened
when
the interests
of
the two British
proteges,
the Sultan
and
the Khedive,
clashed.
In 1875, for
example,
the Khedive,
in the belief that he had the backing
of
Britain,
sent an
expedition under
McKillop to Establish Egyptian
rule
from
a point on
the
southern
Somali Coast,, inland
as
far
as
the
Great
takes.
The
area envisaged
by the Khedivets imperial
dream,, howevero
embraced regions claimed
by the Sultan
of
Zanzibar
as
being
within
his domains. Thus,,
when
the
Khedive's
expedition reached
the River Juba, the Sultan
protested
to Kirk, the British Zzuxw44-Generalo
against
what
he
regarded as
Egyptian
encroachment on
his territory.
The
expedition was subsequently called
back,
much
to
McKillop's disappointment. The Khedive
was
later
appeased
by having his
claims on
the Somali Coast
recognized.
Egyptian
rule
did
not
live
up
to Britain's
expectations.
Only four
years after
the
establishment of
her
administration, she closed
the Port
of
Bulhar,
and
ignored Britaints
protests.
Egyptts
step
had disastrous
effects on
the Habr Awal living in the hinterland
of
Bulhar. They
wrote
to the British Resident
as
follows:
48.
Ibid. Chap. II.
A)
ff
** .
know,, 0 friend that
our country
is
BLhar
and since
the last four
months we
have been
oppressed
by the Turks
....
We
have
committed no offence nor
taken
aught
from the Turks
nor
from the English
....
Be it known to
you
that
we
have
merchandize
to bring to Aden,
and all our necessaries
are
from Aden. Now the Turks have
prevented
all
buggalows from
coming
to
us.
Novi 0 Sahib,
until
this
matter
is
settled we wish
to have
buggalows flying British
colours so
that
we
may send provisions
from Aden to Bulhar for
our people and
tribesmen. May God
settle
the
affair soon.
We
are
in
your
hands.
"49
Following the
refusal
by the Sultan
of
Turkey
to
ratify
the Convention
of
1877, Britain
and
Egypt
reached a mutual agreement
to
observe
it
all
the
same.
Yet, the document
remained unpracticable.
For
example,
shortly after
the
conclusion of
the Convention, Egypt
introduced
a variety of customs
duties
at
Berbera, Zeila
and
Tajura. This
was a
blatant
contravention of
the
clause
stipulating
free trade. By 1882 the duties
on exports
had
increased to the
extent
that the hinterland tribes
withheld
their
goods and
livestock
rather
than trade
at a
loss.
50
Although Egypt
spared no efforts
in declaring
her
commitment
to the letter
and spirit of
the
convention2
denying
all
Britaints
accusationso
the
salient
fact
was
that the
soaring
duties
she
introduced
reflected
Egypt's
desperate financial
position.
The
economic
benefits from
her imperial
acquisitions
had disappointed her
previous
expectations:
49.
Derya Kellila
(on
behalf
of
Habr Awal) to Capt. Hunter
(Encl.
in Brig. Gen.
-Schneider
to Marquis
of
Salisbury,
12/12/1974 No. 52).
50. F. O.
403/81/C Sir E. Malet to Earl Granville, 30/3/1882.
"the
many crippling commitments
incurred by
Ismail
proved
to be
suicidal;
his
numerous
enterprises
became
mutually
destructive. The
attempt
to
expand simultaneously
in Darfur,
Abyssinia, the Somali Coast
and
Equatoria,
involved him
(i.
e.
the Khedive) in
retreat,
retrechment and
failure in
all-these
fields.,
while
for Egypt itself the financial burden
was
disastrous".
51
Within
a
decade
of
Egyptian
rule on
the Somali
Coast..
she
began to lose her
grip on
the
area.
This
gradual weakening of
Egyptts
authority played
into the
hands
of
the
very countries
Britain
was anxious
to keep
away
from the Somali Coast. The French
purchase of
Obokh in 1862 had
stirred commotion
in Britain
and
Egypt.
However, Napoleon III's idiosyncratic imperial
aspirations
were
too deeply involved in European
political and social
scandals
to
pay much attention
to this desert
spot.
Thus,
Britain
allowed
the Obokh
question
to
rest., since
it
seemed
that France had
ceased
to be
a serious contender
for terri-
tory in the Red Sea
region.
By 1880, however, France had
solved most of
her
political problems and was ready
to
make a
fresh
start
in
Africa. This
was one of
the
ways she
hoped to
compensate
herself for the loss
of
Alsace-Lorraine to Germany,
as well
as retrieve
her
prestige which
had been damaged by
Napoleonfs
rule.
Thus, in
response
to
official encourage-
ment, a number of enterprising
businessmen
got
together
and
formed
companies, not only
to
exploit
the
resources of
the
existing
French
spheres of
influence, but
also
to
expand
them. In 1881.,, for i,
nstance, a
French
merchant,
Rivoyre,
51. R. Gray,, A History
of
the Southern S
For
,a
detailed
study of
Egypt's
expa
the 1860's
and
1870
s., see
Gray.
op.
nsionis-c
cit.
Ch.
.
cit. P.
152.
F-policies
in
a
431'-
founded
a
trading Company
at
Obokh,
and shortly afterwards
three
more companies appeared on
the
scene.
In 1884 French
officials
began to
sign
treaties
stipulating
French
protec-
tion
at
Tajura, Jibuti
and
Obokh.
52
By the time
of
Egyptian
withdrawal
in 1884, France had
made substantial
territorial
gains
in the Gulf
of
Tajura,
and
this
gave
her
a
firm
posi-
tion from
which
to bargain
with
Britain
over
the
sharing of
the
spoils
left by Egypt.
The Italian drive for
a
territory
on
the Red Sea
Coast began in 1869
when
the Italian Company, Rubattino,
bought
a piece of
land
at
Assab Bay from the local Sheikhs.
It
was needed
to
provide coaling and provisioning services
to the Italian traders.
53
Britain
and
Egypt
protested,
in
vain,, until
Egypt
resolved
to
send
her
ship
"Khartoum"
to
pull
down the Italian flag. This
resulted
in
some skir-
mishes
but the Italians
refused
to
quit.
54
By 1880 the
Italians had intensified their
activities all along
the
Somali Coast, ignoring Egypt's
protests and
threats. By
the
end of
1879 they had bought
most of
the islands in
Assab Bay
and entrenched
their
position at
Roheita.
55
As
a counter move against
Italian
challengesp
52. Virginia Thompson
and
Richard Adloff
op. cit. chap.
1.
53. Raffaele'Ciasea, Storia Coloniale del'Italia Contem-
poranea,
(Milan)
54. F. o.
4o38.
Extract
an
Italian
paper
"Opinione"
of
July llth 1870.
55. F. o.
403/81/A
The Secretary to the Admiralty to Lord
Tenterden
24/3/188o No.
68;
for
a
detailed
study of
Italy's imperial interests during this
period, see
C iglio LtItalia in Africa: Etiopia
-
Mar Rosso
165'7-1885
-(Rome) 1958;
and
Robert Hess., Italian Colonia-
lism
....
op. cit.
'I
--"
14
0
Britain
appointed a certain
Mr. Zohrab
as
her Consul
at
Assab Bay
and
Jeddah. His instructions
vient as
follows:
"the
object of your nomination
to be H. M. Consul
at
Assab Bay
as well as at
Jeddah is to
make
it
clear
that H. M. Government hold that Assab Bay
belongs to Egypt
and
to
no one else; with a view
to the
recent proceedings of certain
Italian
sub-
jects in the districtn.
56
Although Italy
persistently
denied
any political ambitions,
stressing
that
"Assab
will
be
of
importance to
us only
from
a
commercial point of view and possibly also
for
scientific purposes,
"
57
all evidence
indicated that Assab
and
Roheita
were swiftly
turning into
an
Italian
colony.
Zohrab
recognized
this
and
wrote:
"the
acquisition of
Assab Bay
and
the five
adjacent
islands has been
made
for
political
purposes
by the Italian Government,
and
the
purchase was
indirectly
made
through the
Rubattino Company to
prevent,
during the
negotiations, suspicion and opposition*"58
With
regard
to his
appointment and assignmento
Zohrab did
not
think he
would serve any useful purpose;
he
would
find
himself
.
"nothing
more nor
less than
a nonentityp
house-
less,
unheeded, uncared
for but
suspected and
disliked
....
Armed
with
the
credentials of an
unacknowledged and
hated
authority
(he
would
be)
regarded as one charged
to
compel submission
to,
that
authority, and
that England
was
determined
to
place
the
people under
the hated
yoke"
59
56. F. O.
4o3/81/A
Marquis
of
Salisbury to Consul Zohrabp
2/4/1880 No.
81.
57.403/81/A M- Caroli
(Italian
Foreign Minister) to Paget,
19/4/1880 No. 97.
-I
58.403/81/A Zohrab to Marquis
of
Salisbury 24/4/1880 No. 111.
59. Ibid.
fl
47
As Italy became the de facto
authority of
Assab,
rumours
began to
circulate
that France had been
encouraged
by the Italian
success, and was on
the
verge of annexing
Zeila. Since Egypt
was
ftweak
and vacillating
in
opposing a great power
and
(was)
not
likely to take
measureswhich
could
lead them into difficulties
with
Italy
unless
they
(the
Egyptians) have
a positive
assurance
that, if
necessary.,
they
will receive
more
than British
moral support"
060
Britain
realized
that the
only way she could salvage what
remained of
the
so-called
Ottoman domains
was
to
establish
her
own authority.
Therefore,, in 1880 Britain
seconded
Hunter, then Assistant Resident
at
Aden, to the
post of
Her Majesty's Consul for the Somali Coast,
stretching
from Tajura to Ras Hafoun.
61
Assab Bay
continued
to be the bone
of conten-
tion between Italy
and
Britain. Italy tried to
woo
Britain to
recognize
her
claims over
Assab Bay but Britain
was adamant.
She
replied
that
"Her
Majestyts Government
can adopt no other
course
than to
continue
to
respect
that
which
they believe to be the legitimate
sovereignty
of
the
coast and which, according
to their
judgment,
unquestionably resides
in the
ruler
of
Egyptp
governing under
the Firman
of
the
Sultan
of
Turkey.
"
62
The
paradox of
Britain's
policy was,
howeverx that this
firm
resolution could not
be backed
up
by
military
inter-
vention.
Britain
was averse
to the
use of violence
in
6o.
F. o.
4o3/81/A
Malet to-Earl Graiiville 1/6/1880 No. 121.
61.
F. O.
403/81/B
Maj. Gen. Loch to Marquis
of
Hartington
27/1/1881 No. 21.
62.
F. O.
403/81/B
Viscount Enfield to Lord Tenterden
2/7/1881 No. 117.
settling questions of sovereignty
in the Red Sea. Her
protests could,
therefore be ignored by Italy
and
France.
The
most striking example of
the ineffec-
tiveness
of
Britaints
policy was
to
evict
the Italians from Assab
applied
for British
military ass.
then decided to
go
it
alone.
On
ing Italo-Egyptian
confrontation
Office informed Cookson that
when
Egypt threatened
Bay by force.
63
Egypt
Lstance, in
vain, and
hearing
of
the impend-
at
Roheita, the Foreign
"the
matter
is
engaging
the
serious attention
of
H. M. Government,
and
I have instructed
you
by telegram to inform the Khedive's
ministers
that,
without raising any question as
to the
right of
Egypt to land troops
at
Roheita, H. M.
Government do
not recommend
that the
right
should
be
exercised
by their immediate disem-
barkation,
as such a proceeding might provoke
complications which might
be
avoided
by
further discussions between the Government's
concerned.
"
64
In the
same way as
Britain had found it
neces-
sary
to
recognize
the Egyptian de facto Government,, towards
the
end of
1881
she made a similar about-turn
in
respect of
her
policy
towards the Italians
at
Assab. Italy had
already
established
herself
at
Assab Bay,
and
Britain
could not go
so
far
as
to
oppose an otherwise
friendly
country
by force.
Thus, Britain
opened secret negotiations with
Italy
aimed
at working out
terms
upon which
Italy's
claims might
be
recognized
by Britain. Egypt
would
just have to be
63..
C. Cesari, La Somalia Italiana
(Rome)
134,
p.
198-2o3.
64.
F. O.
403/81/B
Earl Granville to Cookson 1/9/1881
No. 109.
49
presented with a
fait
accompli.
An Anglo-Italian
Conven-
tion
was subsequently
drawn
up and presented
to the
Egyptian Government; it
produced
"the
most painful
impression
upon
Moustapha
65
Pasha Fehmy, the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
"
In 1882 the Italian Government
promulgated
the
"Project
Law"
providing
for the
establishment of a civil admin'istra-
tion in Assab Colony
and
the
adjoining
islands.
Following the
withdrawal of
the Egyptians
Britain began to
make serious plans
for
occupying,
if
not
the
whole of
the Somali Coasto
at
least. the
area
to the
South
of
the Gulf
of
Aden. Hunter
was given authority
to
proceed at once with
the
signing of
treaties
with
the
Somali Sheikhs
stipulating
the,
establishment of
Britain's
sovereignty.
The Habr Awal
signed
two
agreements, one
in
July 1884
and another
in March 1885; the Gadabursi
on
llth
December 1884: the Habr Toljaala
on
26th December 1884
and
lst February 1886; the Aysa
(or
Esa)
on
31st December 1884;
the Habr Gerhajis
on
13th January 185
and
the Warsengeli
on
27th January 1886. In
conformity with
the Berlin
Agreemento Britain
notified
the Berlin Agreement
signa-
tories
of
these
annexations
in 1887.66 This
was
followed
by the
appointment of
L. P. Walsh
and
J. Peyton
as
H. M.
agents at
Berbera
and
Zeila,
respectively.
In
view of
Harar's
strategic
importance in
res-
pect
to trade
with
Ethiopia, Britain
was
keen to
prevent
65.
P. O.
403/81/B
Malet to Earl Granville 28/11/1881 No.
210.
66.
E. Hertsleto
Map
of
Africa by Treaty Vol. 1,
p.
409.
au
the
area
from falling into the hands
of
the
other
European
powers,
but
she was, at
the
same
time,
reluctant
to
attempt
outright annexation as such a step would
have
provoked
strong opposition
from Italy
and
France. Hence, Britain
decided to
re-instate an old and
forgotten dynasty,, in
the hope that Harar
would
thenceforth
stand on
her
own as
a sovereign state.
67
The
scramble
for territory between the European
powers was
by this time
gaining momentum.
Using Obokh
as
a
base, France began to
establish
bases
at
Ras Ali
and
Tajura. Turkey
protested,
in
vain.
Britain
which
had
already made a strategy
for
occupying
Zeila, tacitly
acquiesced
in the French
annexation of
Tajura,
expecting
France to
reciprocate
this
gesture
by blessing British
annexation of
Zeila.
68
In 1888
an
Anglo-French
entente
was concluded
delimiting their
respective spheres of
influ-
ence.
The boundary line
ran
from Loy Adu
(or
Loyada) to
Gildessa, dividing the Aysa between the two
powers and,
hence,
sowing seeds
for future troubles.
The irony
of
the
new situation was
that Turkey
protested against
the
partition of
her Red Sea domains.
Yet,
she
had
up
to this time
refused
to
endorse
the Anglo-
Egyptian Convention
which
had
explicitly recognized
her
overall sovereignty over
the
region.
By the twist
of cir-
cumstances,
Britain
was no
longer interested in the Conven-
tion
and, on reflection, must
have been happy that Turkey
had
refused
to
ratify
it.
67.
Military Report for 1907
op. cit.
98-100.
68.
A. Brockett,
op. cit. p.
100-101.
f-
1
Using her Assab
colony as a springboard.,
Italy
occupied
Massawa,
and would
have taken Harar had
she not
been forestalled by Ethiopia
which
toppled the
newly
established monarch, and
installed her
own
Governor,
Makonnen.
69
An
unexpected entrant
into this
scramble was
Germany,,
whose nationals entered secret negotiations
with
the Egyptian Governor
at
Berbera in 1884
over
the
possibility of allowing
the Germans
a
foothold
on
the
eve of
Egyptian
withdrawal.
The Germans
and
the Governor
were
deported
at
Britain's
request.,
but the Germans
made
a new
thrust
on
the Mijjertein Coast in 1885. Germany
was,
however,
at a
disadvantage for
she
had
made no
territorial
gains.
She therefore lacked
an operational
base. Her
movementsvere
thwarted by Italy
and
Britain,
and
in 1885
she withdrew
from the
race.
70
The Mijjertein
area remained outside
the
orbit
of
the European
scramble
for
quite a while.
Italian
efforts
to include the
area within
their
sphere of
influ-
ence
bore fruit in 1889. In this
year,
the Sultan
of
the
Mijjertein, Osman Mahamud.,
signed a
treaty
with
the Italians
by
which
he
recognized
Italian
sovereignty over
his terri-
tory. The Sultan
of
Obbia
signed
'a
similar'treaty
towards
the
end of
the
year.
In
practice,
however., the two Sultans
continued
to
govern
them
selves
for the
next
three decades.
71
69.
H. G. C. Swayne, Seventeen Trips
....
OP- cit- P-
115-
70. A. Brockett
op. cit. p.
153-157.
71. S. Touval, Somali Nationalism
op. cit. p.
40-47.
52
After
protracted arguments
between the Foreign
Office, the Government
of
India,
and
Egypt
as
to
who was
to take
charge of
the Somali Coast Protectorate, India
accepted responsibility
for the
administration of
the
area,
through the British Residency
at
Aden. In 1887 the Order-
in-Council for the Persian Coasts
and
Islands
was adopted
for the Protectorate. It
was
later
replaced
by the
Indian Penal Code.
The Protectorate
remained under
India's juris-
diction for thirteen
years.
The Indian Government had
been
given charge of a
territory
she
knew
very
little
about
and.,
to
some extent..
loathed
on account of
the Somali
repu-
tation for hostility towards
strangers, and
their insubor-
dination. India's
sole concern was,
thus, to
ensure a
continuous supply
by the Somali Coast
of goods and
live-
stock
for Aden. India
was not
interested in the develop-
ment of
the Protectorate itself.
72
The few developments
of
the Egyptian
era, such
as
the
water-workss reservoirs., a
light=house
at
Berbera
and
a
hospitals fell into disrepair. Lord Curzon
visited
Berbera in the 1890s
and was appalled
by the low
standard
of
living in the town. He later
remarked
that the Resi-
dentts living
quarters were unfit
for
a
decent dog.
73
The Government
of
India
soon
discovered that it
was unrealistic
to
confine
the
administration
to the
Coast
and
ignore
what
transpired in the interior. Trade
72. A. Brockett,
op. cit. p.
143-145-
73. Ibid.
p.
157-
on
the Coast
could not continue
to flow
smoothly
if the
interior
was
in
a state of
turmoil,
as
it
often was.
And,
needless
to
say,
the
only way
to
ensure stability
in the interior
was
to
establish an administrative
machinery
there. One
step
taken by the Government
of
India in the direction
of controlling
the
affairs of
the
interior
wasto commission
E. J. E. Swayne in 1885
and
again
in 1891 to
survey
the interior,
assess
the
atti-
tude
of
the
people and
determine the
extent of
the Pro-
tectorate.
74
Another
step was
to take
punitive measures
against
the
most unruly
Somali
sections.
In February,
therefore,
a punitive expedition was
taken
against some
sections of
the Habr Awal
whose
internal feuds had dis-
rupted
trade in the hinterland
of
Berbera;
shortly after-
wards
two
other expeditions were sent against
the Ayal
Ahmed
and
the Aysa living in Bulhar.
75
The
overall
effect of
these
expeditions was
to
extend
British influ-
ence
beyond the
coastal strip.
A
substantial number of
the Somali
came
into
contact with
Europeans for the first
time,
and were
impressed by the
overwhelming power of
rifles.
Helped by Francets flexible
attitude
towards the
arms
trade
and
by the
absence of an effective administra-
tion in the
eastern part of
the Protectorateo
the Somali
spared no efforts
in
purchasing
European
weapons.
By the
turn
of
the
century,
the traditional
spear
had lost
much
of
its
significance, and
the European
military power could
74. H. G. C. Swayne., Seventeen Trips
....
op. cit. p.
86-94.
75. L. P. Walsh, Under the Flag
and
Somali Coast Storie
op. cit.
Chap-ters 5
and
7.
now
be
challenSed.
It
was
during the
period of
the Indian Govern-
ment rule
that the Protectorate
assumed
definite borders.
The Anglo-French Agreement
of
1888 has
already
been
men-
tioned. The Protectorate's border
with
Ethiopia
remained
to be
settled, and steps
towards this
goal were
taken in
1896. The background deserves
a
brief
examination.
When
Menelik
succeeded
1-1 Pa6inen.. Johannes., in 1889,, the
guiding principle of
his foreign
policy was
to
push
Ethiopia's borders to
what
he believed to be her
natural
and
legitimate limits. Menelik's
vision embraced
the
entire
Horn
of
Africa..
eastern
Sudan
and parts of
East
Africa. These
claims went
hand-in-hand
with
the
accumu-
lation
of arms, a
factor
which alarmed
European
countries
which
had
at
first
not
taken Menelik
seriously.
Then
came
the Italo-Ethiopian Uccialli Treaty
of
1889 by
which
Italy
claimed
to have
converted
Ethiopia into
a
Protec-
torate. The
claim was
dismissed by Menelik.,
who
had
a
different
version altogether.
After
a
tense
period of
controversy and
feuding, the Ethiopians
confronted
the
Italians
at
Adowa in 1896
and
defeated them.
In the
aftermath of
Adovia, Ethiopia's
expan-
sionist
designs
assumed a more menacing character.
No
doubt, her
victory over
Italy had increased her
prestige
and confidence.
Her
military reputation
in Europe
was
enhanced,, and
those
who
had
regarded
her
as a
backward
country
began to
woo
her friendship. Britain became
anxious over
her Somaliland Protectorate
which
fell
within
the
orbit of
Menelikts, dream. What
policy.,
then,
was
Britain to
adopt
towards Ethiopia? Two
alternatives
PI&
presented
themselves. The first
was
to be firm
and
defend
all
those
areas which she was entitled
to by
virtue of
Hunter's treaties
of
the 1880s. But this
might preci-
pitate a military showdown with
Ethiopia,
and
Britain
did
not wish
to
run
the
risk of
having to
mount major
nilitary operations
in defence
of a
disputed frontier in
Somaliland. The
other alternative was
for Britain to
adopt a conciliatory attitude
towards Ethiopia
and accede
to her demands,
provided
Ethiopia
was prepared
to leave
Britain
with as much'territory as was sufficient
for the
livelihood
of
Aden
and
for the
prestige
-
or at
least the
semblance of
it
-
of
Britain. This
was
the
policy she
adopted.
The tragedy
of
Somaliland
was
its lack
of suf-
ficient
attraction
for Britain.
In
pursuit of
this
policy,
Britain
sent
Roddts
Mission to Menelik in 1897
with
the following instruc-
tions:
one of
the
principal objects of your
miLLion
is to
come
to
arrangements with
King
Menelik for
a
definite-understanding
as
to
the frontier between Abyssinia
and
the Pro-
tectorate
....
and
for friendly intercourse
and relations
between the British
and
Abyssinian
authorities., and
the inhabitants
on either
side.
"
76
Negotiations
opened
in April, but Menelik
seemed
to demand
more
than
seemed
feasible. Later, he
appointed
the Governor
of
Harar, Makonnen.,
'to
do the
bargaining
with
Rodd. Towards the
end of
the
year an
agreement was reached,
in
which
Rodd
agreed
to
surrender
some
13,500
square miles of what was originally claimed
76. J. R. Rodd., Social
and
Diplomatic Memories 2nd Series)
1894-19012 Egypt
and
Abyssinia (Lon-don) 1923,
p.
125.
-
56
to be
within
the British Protectorate. The boundary
was
to
cut across
the Gadabursi
and
Habr Awal in the
south
and south west, alienating most of
their
grazing areas
and wells
to Ethiopia. Foreseeing the inevitable
prob-
lems
of
the future, Rodd
and
Makonnen
agreed
that the
artificial
boundary
would
be ignored for
purposes of
grazing.
77
The Protectoratets
eastern
boundary
was agreed
upon
in 1894. On the basis
of
her treaties
with
the
Sultans
of
Mijjertein
and
Obbial Italy
announced
her
annexation of a stretch of
territory
on
the
north-
eastern part of
the Somali Coast in 1893. Although her
claims
included
some areas which
Swayne had
earmarked
as
belonging to Britain, the latter
was not
keen to
quarrel
over
desert
spots which were of no
immediate benefit to
Aden. With
a view
to
reaching an amicable agreement, an
Anglo-Italian Conference
was
held in Rome in 1894,
and
it
culminated
in the
signing of
the Anglo-Italian Proto-
col of
1894 by
which
the boundary between British Somali-
land
and
Italian Somaliland
was'defined.
78
The
reputation and prestige gained
by Ethiopia
after
Adowa led Britain to
re-examine
the
status of
the
Protectorate. British Somaliland
could not continue
to
be
peripheral
to Britain's imperial interests
while
France
and
Italy
were making use of
their
respective
territorial
77. Ibid.
P.
lio-189.
78. For
a
detailed
study of
the
establishment of
the
borders
of
Italian Somalilands
see
Touval
op. cit.
p.
40-45.
5?
acquisitions
in the Horn
of
Africa
as
bases for
gaining
favours from Ethiopia, the
new Powerful neighbour.
The
Foreign Office
needed a
free hand in the
affairs of
the
Protectorate in
order
to
participate
fully in the diploma-
tic
game, without restraint
from the India Government. In
any case,
the Government
of
India
was not
interested-in
the diplomatic feuds in the Horn
of
Africa. It had
also
indicated that, in the
event of an
Ethiopian
attack on
the British Protectorate, the Government
of
India
would
not send
troops to fight the Ethiopians.
79
In 1898,
therefore, India
was
happy to hand
over
the Protectorate
to the Foreign Office for
a compensation of
919PO50.80
The immediate
concern of
the Foreign Office
was
to
establish a civil administration and provide some
legal
framework for the
administration of
the Protectorate.
Lieut. Col. Hayes Sadler
was appointed
H. M. Consul-General,
and
the following
year an
Order-in-Council
was enacted
providing
for the
change of
the
name of
the Protectorate
from
"Somali
Coast Protectorate" to
"British
Somaliland
Protectorate". This
was
Britaints
official acceptance of
81
responsibility
beyond the
coastal strip".
It
was with great optimism
that Sadler
accepted
his
appointment.
Speculation had been
going on about
the
mineral, agricultural and commercial potential of
the
area.
Sadler
was
determined to
exploit
them
and make
the hitherto
unwanted region
into
a prosperous
Protectorate. Sadlerfs
79. A. Brockett,
op. cit. p.
283.
80.
Ibid.
81.
Ibid.
p.
287.
optimism was not without
foundation, for the Protectorate
was not
lacking in
marketable goodso of which
the
most
important
were myrrh.,
frankincense..
gums and skins.
82
Moreover, the
value of
trade for the
previous
four
years
indicated
a steady
improvement. With
an effective admini-
stration,
this
could
be improved further.
82.
A. Brockett
opdcit., p.
285.
el"*j
a r: l
VAUJE OF TRADE BETWEEN 1894-1900
(currency
:
Rupees)
Imports & Exports 1894-'95 1895-'96
,
1896-'97 1897-'98 1898-199 1899-100
Zeila
Berbera & Bulhar
4,671.. 855
3j777s787
6,117.
tO22
4,111,319
6..
578., 195
4$102Y508
4., 407., 670
4,8o8,432
5s556sggl
MAsl5l
5,695.. 202
5*583009
tl)
The finances
of
the Protectorate
showed a
similar
healthy trend; before 1900 the Protectorate
was
always able
to balance its budget,
and even realize a
surplus.
In the financial
year
1898-'99, for
example,
revenue'vias
914,135
against
Z5*865
expenditure;
in the
following
year revenue and expenditure stood at
Z25,000
and
Z20,722,
respectively
.
83
Whatever hopes Hayes Sadler
might
have
cherished
were nipped
in the bud by the
resistance movement of
Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan. The British
nielmamed
him the
'!
Mad Mullah"..
and
he is
generally
known in
Europe by that
epiphet.
This title is
considered
by the
Somali to be in bad taste,
and
he is
generally referred
to by the
respected religious
title
of
"Sayyid" (or
Sayid).
Sayyid Muhammad
was
born in
or about
1864
at
Kirrit., in the Ogaden. He belonged to the Bagheri
see-
tion
of
the Dolbahanta. He
was
brought
up
in
a religious
atmosphere,
for it
was
his fatherts
aim
to
give
him
a
sound
knowledge
of
Islamic faith
and
law. At
about
the
age of
fifteen he
was already an acknowledged authority
on
Islamic law. At the
age of
19 he became
a
Sheikh.
84
Thus, from his
childhoo4,
the Sayyid became
involved
with questions of religious morality and reform.
83.
Military Report for 1907s
OP. cit. P.
88.
84.
B. G. Martin, Muslim Brotherhoods in 19th Century Africa
(forthcomi
-),
Chap. IX., "Sayyid Muhammad Abdullah Hassan
of
Somali"nTss.
)
P.
5.
61
These
were enhanced
by his
constant pilgrimages
to Mecca.
He
returned
from his last
pilgrimage
in 1895
and settled
at
Berbera
where
"at
that time Muslims
and unbelievers
lived
together in large
numbers
"85
In the
course of
his
pilgrimages,
the Sayyid had become
a
follower
of
Muh
amm ad
ibn Salih
at
Rashidi, founder
of
the Salihiya brotherhood,
and
had been
made a
Khalifa
shortly
before his
return
to Berbera. His
primary
duty,
on return, was
to disseminate the Salihiya doctrine
which
stressed strict observance of
Islamic laws,, the
renuncia-
tion
of worldly pleasures and
luxuries,
abstenance
from
alcohol., smoking and
the
chewing of
kat
(a
narcotic
shrub).
The Sayyidts teaching
soon
brought him into
con-
flict
with
the
older
brotherhoods,
such as
the Qadiriyyao
Dandarawiya
and
Ahmadiya. These
were more
flexible in the
85.
Sheikh Jaamac Cumar Ciise, Tarikh
al-Sumal
fi-l-tusur
al-wusta wa-l-hadithah
(Cairo)
1565 (i.
e.
History
of
Somalia in Medieval
and.
Modern Times
P.
17. Sheikh
Jaamac Cumar Ciise is
a
Somali
elder-who writes
in
Arabic. Besides the
above
book he has
compiled
and
edited
the Sayyidts
poems.
The basic feature
of
his
book is the
anti-colonialist strain and
the
attempt
to
glorify everything about
the Sayyidts
movement.
Thus,
it
suffers
from the
same weakness as
the
writings of
people
like Jardine
op. cit. and
Drake-Brockman
op. cit.
which present a colonial
bias. Cumarts-book is
never-
theless
a, valuable source-of
information;
-it,. gives
the
patriotic version of
the Sayyidts history. Before the
recent
ban'by, the Somali Government
of
the Sayyid's
works,
Cumar
was
involved in
another research project
about
the
career of
the Sayyid. He
now
lives in
retire-
ment at
Bosaso, his
village-of
birth. I
am very grate-
ful to Miss'Lidwien Kapteijns for
allowing me
to
encroach on
her translations
of
Cumarts book
and
for
ansi, rerin&my other queries.
62
interpretation
of
the Koran. Finding his teaching
unwelcome at
Berbera, the Sayyid left for the interior
and started
teaching the Salihiya doctrines to the hinter-
land tribes. With his bases
at
Kirrit
and
Bohotleh.. the
Sayyid traversed the length
and
breadth
of
the Nogal
Valley
and
the Ogaden. At first the British
adminis-
tration
regarded
him
as one of
the devout
wadads, albeit
an overzealous one.
Within
a
few
months of
his departure
for the interior, howevero it
was reported
that
part of
his
message called
for the
expulsion of
the British, the
infidels
.
87
The
roots of
the Sayyidts
resistance must
be
sought
in the Somali
socio-political organization vis-a-
vis
the demands
of colonial rule.
The British
advance
and subsequent occupation of
the Somali Coast became
a
direct threat to the three
main pillars upon which
Somali
Society
was
founded,
namely,
their faith, their indepen-
dence
and
their
economic viability which
depended
on
the
trade between the
coast and
the interior. The imposi-
tion
of customs
duties, for
example, which were
introduced
by the Egyptians
and perpetuated
by the British,
ended
the
Somali freedom
of
trade. This
was one of
the
colonial
measures
the Sayyid
resented, and
he is
reported
to have
asked
the
customs master at
Berbera, did
you pay
the
customs
duties
when you
landed here. Who
gave you
permission
to
enter our country?
"83
87.
B. G. Martin
op. cit. p.
4-5.
88.
Ibid.
Even
more serious
than the loss
of economic
independence,
was
the danger
posed
to Islam by the
Catholic
mission at
Berbera. Since its
establishment
in
1894, the Mission had been
a
target
of
hostility from
all
sections of
the Somali. Evidently, the Sayyid
regarded
it
as one of
his
primary
duties to bring
about
its des-
truction. One Somali
source
has this to
say:
like
all other people
belonging to the
faith
of
Islam, Somalis do
not
like to inter-
fere in the
religious affairs of other people,
but they become
excited and even
dangerous
when
they
see others
interfering in their
religion.
That
unblessed
Church in Berbera belonged to
priests of
the Catholic
sect of
the Christian
religion
....
thetovm became full
of rumours
that the
priests were changing
the
religion of
some
Somali
children
....
The
priests
decided
to
open
the hidden
secret and
hang the
cross
round
the
necks of some poor children
they
were
looking
after.
Among the
religious
leaders in
the town
at
that time
who
had
complained several
times to the Governor
(sic)
against
the
mischie-
vous
doings
of
the
priestsp was awell
learned
Sheikh,
of
the
name
Sayid Muhammad Abdille Hassan
who
had just
returned
from Mecca
and
Medina.
"89
The Somali
suspicions were enhanced
by the
missionts role
as
the
refuge centre
for the
riff-raff of
town, delin-
quents and outcasts, and
by the Christian doctrines
which
criticized
Islamic
practices such as polygamy.
90
In
short..
the Sayyid's
movement aimed at expel-
ling the British from the
coast, as well as regenerating
89.
Private documents
of
Mahmud Ahmed Ali. I
am grateful
to M. A. Ali
who gave me copies, of
his
private papers
when
I
met
him
at
Hargeisa in August 1974. Ali
was
one of
the first-Somali
students
to
graduate
from
Gordon College,
and
he is today
respected
for his
efforts
to introduce
education
in British Somaliland.
90. The Mission
was eventually closed
in 1910
when
Britain
adopted
the
policy of coastal concentration
(the
history
of
the Mission
is discussed in
greater
detail in
Chapter
Pl
Islam
according
to the
precepts of
the Salihiya doctrines.
The first
cause of
direct
quarrel
between the Sayyid
and
the British
was over an
incident in
which a
Governm
-
ent
rifle was stolen.
Sadler
wrote
to the Sayyid
accusing
him
of complicity, and
the latter
replied:
"there
is
no god
but Allah,
and
Mohammed is
his
messenger.
Nought have I
stolen
from
you
or
from
any other.
Seek
what you want
from
him
who robbed you.
Serve
whom you
have
chosen
to
serve
91
The Sayyid is believed to have declared his jihad
shortly
after
this letter had been
sent.
As the Sayyid
wielded power
in the interior
and
threatened to drive the British into the
sea,
Sadler
urged
the British Government to
organize an expedition
against
him
at once.
The time
was,
however, inappro-
priate
for Britain;
she was pre-occupied
in the Ashanti
92
wars,
Jubaland
and
South Africa. The best Britain
could
do
under
the
circumstances was
to
send a
battalion
of
Yaos
who
had been
serving
in Mauritius, to
safeguard
Berbera.
93
By the
end of
the
year,
Sadler had
succeeded
in impressing
upon
the British Government the
serious-
ness of
the Sayyidts Dervish
movement.
The Foreign Office
proposed
to
send regular
troops from India but Sadler
objected
on
the
grounds
that
no
Indian
could possibly
endure
the
climate and
diet
of
Somaliland
for
a
long
91. Quoted
by Jardine
op. cit. p.
40.
92. McNeill,
In Pursuit
of
the Mad Mullah
op. cit.
p.
6-8.
.
93. F. O. 2/232 W. O. to Sadler
V211900.
041)
time. Instead, he
proposed
to
raise a
local levy
of
some
1.600
strong and
to
employ
the
services of
50 Pun-
jabi drillers. He
applied
for,
and acquired,,
Lieut. Col.
Swayne, then in Uganda, to be the
overall commanding
officer.
94
-
Meanwhile the Sayyid
was mobilizing and arming
the Dervishes. Intelligence Reports
estimated
his
following to be between
6,000
and
7sOOO,
of whom
1,000
were mounted,
500
armed with rifles., and others with
tra-
ditional
weapons.
It
was
further
stated
that..
"by
incessant
raiding
he
(i.
e.
the Sayyid) has
not only obtained
large
amounts of supplies
and stock,
but has
also
injured
our prestige
in the
southern portion of
the Protectorate
and at
times
practically supersedes our
authority.
11.5
Military
arrangements on
the British
side were
elaborate-if not substantial.
Besides the 50 Punjabi
drillers, 19 British
officers and
1,500 levies, the
British
armed"a substantial section of
the Habr Awal
who
decided to fight
on
the British
side.
Britaints
mili-
tary
equipment
included 2,000 Martini-Enfield
rifleso sword
bayonets
and scabbards,
1,000,000
rounds of ammunition
and
1
maxim gun.
Some L13j, 000
was spent on purchasing
military
96
equipment alone.
Ethiopia
was requested
to
co-Operatep
and
in March 1901 the British Goverment
sent
Major Tracy
94. F. O. 2/317 P. O. to 1-1-0.1/12/1900.
95. F. O. 2/317 Intelligence--Division
Report to P. O...
22/11/1900.
96. F. O. 2/317 W. O. to F. O.
4/12/1900.
66
to Addis Ababa to
work out
details
of
this
co-operation
with
the Ethiopian Government. The
proposed
Anglo-
Ethiopian
co-operation,
however,
was not entirely success-
ful
owing
to Ethiopiats
reluctance
to divulge her
military
plans, strategy and organiZation
to Tracy. Ethiopia
pre-
ferred to tackle the Sayyid
without pooling
her
military
resources with
those
of
Britain.
97
The
expedition was
launched
on
22nd April 1901p
using
Burao
as
the
main operational
base. The Foreign
Office instructed Swayne to
aim at capturing or
killing
the Sayyid. The difficulty facing the British
was
that
the British
officers..
being
unaccustomed
to the
countryp
found the
conditions extremely
trying. Moreover, it
was
difficult to locate the
whereabouts of
the Sayyid. At
the beginning
of
the
expedition,
for
example,
there
were
+0
confl6fting reports as, where
the Sayyidts force
was con-
centrated.
Some
claimed
to have
spotted
them
at
Ainabo
while others contended
that the Sayyid
and
his troops
were-at
Yaheli. It
was
later
confirmed
that the Sayyid
was,
in fact, in Mijjertein
country conspiring with
Sultan
Osm
an
Mahmud.
98
Swayne divided his force into two
columns, one
under
his
command.. and
the
other under
McNeill's. In
97. F. O. 2/480 Major Tracy
to F. O. 18/4/1901.
98. A Gaibi, Manuale di Storia Politico-Militare delle
Klonie
Italiane (Rome) 1921d,
p.
170-170. Gaibi
cohtends
that the Sayyid
was at-this
time
on good
terms
with
Sul-
tan Mahmudp
and
the latter
was
the
chief supplier of arms
to the Dervishes.
61
May 1901 Swayne's
column marched
to Eil Da-b, 90
miles
to
the
south of
Burao. The
expedition
then laid its hands
on
the Mahmoud Gerad
clan which was reported
to have
fraternized
with
the Sayyid; their
stock was seized and
a
handful
of people were shott
dead. McNeill's
column
came
following behind:
with
the
supplies, and camped at
SamalcLwhere he built
a
Zareba
(enclosure)
to
protect
the
captured stock.
On the 2nd
of
June the Sayyid's
men
made a
daring
raid on
the Zareba, in the
effort
to
stam-
pede and
then
recover
their
stock.
A
protracted engage-
ment
followed
and resulted
in the defeat
of
the Dervishes.
The British lost 10
men.
The
casualties on
the Sayyid's
sidewere not
known, but
were
believed to be
much
higher.
99
After the
reverse at
Samala, the Sayyid
re-
assembled
his
scattered
forces,
vanished
beyond the Haud
and was next reported safe and sound at
Mudug, in the
Italian territory. Swaynets forces, having failed to
catch
the Sayyid, t
urn ed on
the Aligheri
and punished
them for having
sheltered
him. The Foreign Office
was
by this time
getting rather alarmed
by the
escalation of
the hostilities. Instructions
were sent out
to Swayne to
99. Jardine, The Mad Mullah
of
Somaliland
op. cit. chap.
Sheikh Jaamac Cumar's
acc-unt of
the Anglo-Dervish
battles. leaves
much
to be desired. Although
much
space
is
allocated
to
-
the description
of
the battles,
his
accounts
fall
short of
hard facts; the
numbers of
the dead
are exaggerated and
the British
are
losing
all
the time. For
example
he
concludes
his
account
of
the Samala
engagement
thus:
"the
number of
British
soldiers
killed
could not
be
counted or estimated.,
but
the bodies
of
the
unbelievers
formed
piles, and
blood
was
flowing
as
dovmpouring
streams"
(P.
76).
63
leave the Sayyid
alone.
Being
a non-believer
in half-
measures,
Swayne ignored the instructions
and resum,
'ed
his hunt for the Sayyid. On the
Gth
July., the latter
was
cornered at
Ferdiddin
and attacked;
for two days the two
sides
fought
a
hit-and-run
engagement, with
inconclusive
results.
The foolhardy British
commanding officer
then
made
the blunder
of sending a mounted
corps of
75
men,
under
the
command of
Major Benyon.. to fl/sh the Sayyid
from his
well chosen
hideout.
The
corps ran right
into
its death-trap
where
they
were,, encireled
and
thoroughly
defeated. Half
of
them
were
killed,
and
the Sayyid too
incurred heavy losses in
men and equipment.
100
After
this
encounter,
the Sayyid
slipped
into the inhospitable
parts of
the
country.
In August the
expedition was called
off.
By December 1901 the Sayyid had
re-assembled
his
forces
and gained more adherents.
He
set up
his bases
at
Kirrit, Bohotleh
and
Lassader. Swayne
was
hustled from his
leave to
start organizing a new expedition.
In April 1902
he
was appointed
Commissioner
of
the Protectorate, thus
com-
bining
military and civil powers.
Swayne
realized
his
earlier mistake of under-
estimating
the Sayyidts
military strength.
He
reinforced
the forces then
at
his disposal
with
500 troops from
various
K. A. R. battalions,
and acquired an
Indian
contin-
gent
from. the British Central Africa force. The
whole
expedition consisted of
1,200 infantry,
60
mounted corps,
3
maxim guns2
2
seven-pounder guns,
1,000
camels.
In May
1902 the
expedition was
launched in
earnest.
100. Jardine, The Mad Mullah
of
Somaliland
op. cit. chap.
3.
(it)
Instead
of advancing
in two
columns,
the
expedi-
tionary force
was split
into four division..
one advancing
from Wadamagoo
another
from Burao,
a
third from Bohotleh
and a
fourth from Las Dureh. The
aim was
to hem-in the
Sayyid from
all possible angles and attack
him fr-on-wher-
ever
he
might
be. In June, the Sayyid
was reported at
Baran..
and
Capt. Osborn dashed there, but
arrived only
to
find that he had left for Erego. After
raiding
Baran
and
destroying
several villages,
the
expedition proceeded with
the
chase of
the Sayyid. Crossing the Haud became
a sore
trial
owing
to
scarcity of water and
intensity
of
heat.
By the time the force
were approaching
Erego, the Sayyid
had
slipped
between its
columns and returned
to the Nogal.
Swayne
and
his
men made an about-turn., re-crossed
the Haud
and
began the tedious business
of
looking for the Sayyid
in the Nogal Valley. nio
protracted
but inconclusive
engagements
took
place at
Gaolo
and
Las Anod. In the
meantime,
fresh troopswere brought in from the Gold
Coast.,
where
the Ashanti had just been
crushed.
The
most
serious encounter
took
place at
Erego
on
6th
October
1902.
The British lost 53
of
their
soldiers and
43
were
injured.
The
casualties on
the Sayyidts
side might
have
run
into
several
thousands.
101
The Erego
campaign,
like the
previous ones,
had
failed
either
to kill
or capture
the Sayyid. The
most
important
lessonlearnt from this
campaign was
that the
loyalty
of
the Somali levies
could not
be
entirely relied
upon:
V
101. Moyse-Bartlettj
The History
of
the K. A. R.
op. cit.
p.
166-169.
7,01
"it
must
be
remembered
that
our men
fighting
under
Christian
officers., were of
the
same
blood
as
the
enemy.
Many had brothers
and
cousins among
the Dervishes
who
had taunted
them during the fighting
at
Erego
with
infidelity to Islam
....
It
was a
thousand
pities,
therefore, that the 1901-1902
policy
had to be
abandoned,
but the demoralization
of
the levies
seemed at
the time to leave
no
alternative"
102
With
a view
to laying
a new strategy,
the
second expedi-
tion
was
hastily
called off
in October.
The third
expedition was unprecedented
in
strength., size and elaborate planning.
It
consisted of
more
than
4,000
foreign
regular
troops,
placed under a
higher
command,
in the
person of
Brigadier Manning. The
strategy
involved
a simultaneous attack on
the Sayyid
from the Italian territory
at
Obbia
and
from Berbera.
Ethiopia
was once more asked
to
cooperate.
In
order
to
alleviate
transport
problems, a special regiment of
Bombay Grenadiers
was assigned
the duty
of constructing
roads
from Berbera to Bohotleh, digging
wells at strate-
gic points and
handling
all matters relating
to
communi-
cation and
transport. Jardine describes this
expedition
as
"
an
imperial
adventure
the like
of which
has
seldom,
if
ever,
been
essayed
before
....
a
campaign against
the inscrutable
enemy whose
range of movements extended
from Cape Guardafue
to the Equator, from the
sea
into Abyssinia,
who offered no
target,
no city, no
fort,
no
land
and no possessions, no
tangible
military
objective.
"
103
102. Jardine, The Mad Mullah
of
Somaliland
op. cit. p.
84-85.
103. Ibid.
p.
94-95.
71
The
expedition was
launched
on
3rd January 1903.
By 24th March it had
established various
bases in the
interior. The
column advancing
from Obbia
made a
base
at
Galkayu,
while
the
one
from Berbera
split up
into
several columns with scattered
baset in the interior.
Towards the
end of
March, the Sayyid
was reported at
Galadi,
and
Manning despatched Capt. Plunkett to
recon-
noitre
the
area and report
back. Plunkett
set off with a
handful
of soldiers,
to Galadio but
on arrival
he dis-
covered
that the Sayyid had
already
left for Walwal in
the Ogaden. On the 16th April, the Sayyid
chose a well
shelteredpot'in
the Gum. buru hills.,
and awaited
his
pursuers.
Plunkett had
apparently
become
obsessed with
the desire to be the f irst
man
to
capture or
kill the
Sayyid to the
point of
losing
all sense of proportion
and self-restraint.
He decided to follow the Sayyid
into the Gumburu hills. Between 16th
and
17th Aprilo
the
column was encircled and nearly annihilated, and
Plunkett, 9
other officers and
89
rank md
file
were
killed. Meanwhile,
another column which
knew
nothing
about
the Gumburu fighting
encountered and engaged
a
Dervish force
at
Daratoleh. The Dervishes lost 150
men,
lo4
and
the British 15, including 2
officers.
The
results of
the Gumburu
and
Daratoleh
encoun-
ters, boosted the Sayyid's
morale and
led him to
write
to
the British
as
follows
:
104. A. Brockett..
op. cit., ch.
10.
#2p
"vie
have fought for
a year.
I
wish
to
rule my
own country and protect my own religion.
If
you
wish, send me a
letter
saying whether
there is
to be
peace or war
....
God
willing..
I
will
take
many rifles
from
you.,
bu
you wontt get any
rifles or ammunition
from
me.
I have
no
forts.,
no
houses, I have
no cultivated
fields,
silver
or gold
for
you
to take. If the
country was
cultivated or contained
houses
or property,
it
would
be
worth your while
to fight..
(but)
the
country
is
all
jungle
and
that is
of no use
to
you.
If
you wish war,
I
am
happy, If
you wish
peace
I
am, also content.
But if
you wish peace
go away
from
my country
to
your own.
If
you
wish war stay where you are.
"
105
The third
expedition was called off at
th*e
end
of
April 1903,
and
the following
month arrangements were
underway
to launch
a
fourth
one.
6,000
troops
were
brought in from India
and
Aden,,
and
Manninr-was
replaced
by Major-General Egerton. The latter's
arrival at
Berbera in July
coincided with reports about
the Sayyidts
increasing
prestige
in the interior. Egertonts
expedi-
tion
commenced
in December. On the first
of
this
month,
Lieut. Col. Kenna
was sent
to
reconnoitre
Jidbali,
where
the Sayyid's forces
were concentrated.,
to
ascertain
the
Dervish
strength and
their
exact
locality. After
a
thorough
survey of
Jidbali, Kenna
sent
for troops from
Badweina
and
Galadi. On the
eve of
the 18th December,
Egerton
made a massive and effective offensive which
routed
the Sayyidts forces from Jidbali, killed
nearly
700 Dervishes,
and put
the Sayyid
and
the Dervish
sur-
vivors
to flight towards Halin. According to Sheikh
Jaamac Cumar, this
was
the
only
battle lost by the Dervishes.
But the
numbers of casualties are
in
excess of what
is
recorded
in British documents. His
account of
the
105. Jardine, The Mad Mullah
of
Somaliland
op. cit.
122.
i)
Jidbali
goes as
follows:
ft
Unfortunately the
army of
the Dervishes
wa**defeated
in this battle.,
and about
6,700
of
them
were
killed
...
and until
today
you
can see on
the battlefield the heaps
of
bones
of
the
people who were
killed, the
empty
bullet-cases
and
footprints"lo6
From Jidbali, the Sayyid
made good
his
escape
to Illig, in Italian territory. In May
a
British
warship
was permitted
by the Italians to bombard Illig., but the
Sayyid
remained at
large. The following
month,
the
Sayyidwrote to the Italian
authorities..
applying
for
their
protection, and on
16th October the Italians
sent
Pestalozza, their Consul in Zanzibar, to
proceed
to Illig
and open
discussions
with
the Sayyid. The latter
ex. pressed
his hatred for the British
and
declared his
wish
to become
an
Italian
subject.
The Italians, though
suspicious of
the Sayyidts
motives, accepted
his
overtures
because they
were not prepared
to
undertake an expensive campaign against
the Dervishes. The Italians
were,
in
any case, already pre-
occupied with s. everal anti-colonial resistance movements
in
the
southern part of
Italian Somaliland. The Sayyid told
Prestalozza,
"my
people and
I
will
be the Italian Government's
people,, and we shall
be dependent
on
it., if it
will
favour
us and permit us
to build
a
town
on
the
coast".
107
106. Sheikh Jaanac Cumar Ciise., Tarild'i
op. cit.,
p-
79.
107. Muhammad Abdille Hassan to Pestalozza..
quoted-by
F. S. Caroselli Ferro
e
Fuoco
op. cit. P.
78-79.
I
74
The
meeting resulted
in the
signing of
the
Illig Agreement by
which
the Sayyid
was permitted
to
settle at
Illig. The Agreement
stipulated,
inter
alia,,
that the Sayyid
would enjoy political and religious
freedom
within
the
prescribed
territory.,
permit
trade
and
refrain
from
aggressive activities.
Part
of
the Agree-
ment
declared that
"there
shall
be
peace and
lasting
accord
between the
above-mentioned
Sayyid, Muhammad,
with, all
the Dervishes dependent
on
him..
and
the Government
of
Italy
and all
its depen-
dants
...
(and)
there
shall
be
peace
between
Dervishest-state
and
British Government
and
all
dependents
of
British Government
...
and
there
shall
be
peace
between the Dervishes
and
Abyssinia
...
"108
With
regard
to the Sayyidts territorial
sovereignty,
the
Agreement
stated:
"the
territory
assigned
to the Sheikh Muhammad
and
his followers is that
of
the Nogal
and
the
Haud
comprised within
the limits
of
the Italian
sphere of
interest. But, in
view of
the
special
Agreement between the. Governments
of
Italy
and
England,
after
the
return of
the Ergo
(Dervish
delegation)
sent
to
establish peace with
the
English
according
to Somali
customs, and
to
settle
formalities
necessary
for the
general
tranquillity, the English
shall authorize
Sheikh
Muhammad
and
his followers to
enter
their terri-
tories
(those
of
the English) in the
country of
the Nogal to feed their
cattle
there
according
to their former
custom.
"
109
The British
endorsed
the Illig Agreement
on
the 5th March
1905.
Britain
welcomed
the
conclusion of
the Illig
Agreement,
and
hoped that
she would
henceforth be
rid of
108. Hertzlet, Map
of
Africa by Treaty
op. cit. p.
1120-
122.
109. Ibid.
.5
the Dervish
problem.
As it turned
out,
the
settlement
was only
temporary. The Sayyid had
no
intention
of
abandoning
his
cause.
He
onlywanted
time to
recuperate.
Even before the Agreement had been
concluded,
the Sayyid
is
said
to have
made an announcement
to the
effect
that
Between
us and
the British there is
nothing
b;
*eternal
fighting
and
intense jihad. We the
Dervishes
(Darawiish)
think that this treaty
which
England demands from
us
(sic)
will
lead
to
nothing
but imperialist
military expeditions.
I love
war and
death
while strivinG
in the
way
of
God for the
sake of my country
in
order
to
reform our reliion and
to further the
cause of
our country
... 110
Following the
end of
Egertonts
expedition.,
the
British Government decided to transfer the British Somali-
land Protectorate from the Foreign Office to the Colonial
Office. The Colonial Office had
already relieved
the
Foreign Office in the Niger Coast, Central Africa, Uganda
and
the East Africa Protectorates. When it
came
to Somali-
land., the Colonial Office
was at
first
reluctant
to take-
over, advocating
that the territory be
returned
to the
Government
of
India
or
be disposed
of.
However, India
would not
have it. After
a great
deal
of
debate, the
Protectorate that
nobody wanted
to
administer and yet
nobody wanted
to lose,
was
handed
over
to the Colonial
office
on
lst April 1905.
110. Sheikh
Jaamac Cumar Ciise.. Tarildi
....
op. cit. p.
86.
(-)
IL.
0
2
0
Li
4,
(t
U
-l
0
z
U-.
0
-J
I
Q<, j>
0
i*I
l'i
Cie
21
vi
x4
L uj
1
-81
-
m-
%Wo "'
X,
C4
(
10 9*0;:
,
C
P
Fi
t: 0.. & j) a
%) '.
14
cr
1,
A
<
ac
jx
L5
S
>-
I
Lu
1
4
V)
.
5-7,
Lo
'2'
S
CHAPTER, II
THE PERIOD OF THE MILITIA AND THE
ILLIG PEACE AGREEMENT 1905-1908
Following the
signing of
the Illig Agreement in
March 1905, Britain's
most pressing concern was
to dis-
engage
herself..
as soon as she possibly could,
from the
interior
of
Somalilands
with a view
to limiting
adminis-
tration
'the
coastal strip.
The failure
of
the four
expeditions either
to
capture or
destroy the Sayyid had
become
an embarrassing
factor to the BAtish Goverrments
not only
from the
point of view of prestige
but
also
from
the
point of view of economy.
The Treasury hadspent
a
total
sum of
Z2,,
494,,
ooo
on
the
military operations
and
yet., even at
the
end of
the four
expeditions.,
the Govern-
ment could not say'-with any certainty
that the Sayyid had
been disposed
of.
The House
of
Commons took'up the Somaliland
,,
of.
State
issue. in March 19050
and pressed
the Secretary.
for, Foreign, Affairs to
account
for
what. many,
Members,
of
Parliament
regarded as a waste of
taxpayers'
money, on, a
worthless adventure.
2
The Secretary
of
Stateo in
order
to
placate-both
Parliament
and
the
public,,, announced,
to
the House
of
Commons,, the_,.
new., policy,
that
was
to. be
1. The Parliamentary
Debates
(authorized
Edition) 1905
Fourth Series
volume
1420 March 1 to March 14.
(Wyman-and
Sons Ltd.
)
column
180.
2. Ibid. A full House
of
Commons Debate
on
Somaliland is
found
on columns
741-806.
P4
C)
10
pursued
in Somalilands
as
follows:
"The
wisest and most prudent policy
to
pursue
in the future is to limit
our administrative
responsibility
to the
coast
line, but there is
a corollary
tothat
policy and
that is that
we
should arm
the tribes
and organize
them
so as
to be in
a position
to defend themselves in
the
event of any
future
emergency such as
that
with which
they have been,
recentlyconfronted".
The Government's decision
was
duly
communicated
to Col. Swayne, then Commissioner
of
the Somaliland Pro-
tectorate,
who was
instructed to
start arming
the tribes
as well as withdrawing
Government
equipment. and personnel
from the interior. The
reaction among
the Somaliland
local
authorities
to the Governmentts decision
was one of
disbelief
and alarm.
Swayne
wrote
to the Colonial Office
pointing out
his
objections
to the
policy of withdrawal
from-,. the interior. He
argued_that
"the
management of
their
own affairs
by the
tribes
without our
immediate
control means
the
domination
of one particular section
in
each
of
the
main
tribes by the
others.
This is
particularly
the
case with
the Habr Yunis#
who
at present
face the Dervishes
and are"the most
powerful
tribe in the
centre of oir
Proteo-
torate
4
Swayne then
expressed
his fear that in the"'event
of
inter-
tribal
clashes..
the losing
parties might seek
the'Sayyid's
assistance or
join his
camp'at
Illig
and
thereby
revive
his
strength.
The'Co=issioner
was'equally
hostile to the
idea
of arming
the tribes
with"'a view'to
leaiing, them to
defend.
themselves.
-
His,
objection
to this-particular idea
3. Ibid. Column 750.
C-0-535/1 Swayne to C. O. 18/5/1905.
was
that it
was
tantamount'to initiating
a civil war,
since
the"amed tribes-would
use
the
rifles given
to
them in
settling'their
internal disputes
rather
than in,,.
fighting the Dervishes., He
observed
that.,
"Our
policy of
total
evacuation means
that
we
must-be prepared
to issue
arms
in large
numbers,
sufficiently
large to
make
the
people secure
against
the Mullah. The immediate
effect of our
withdrawal..
however,,
unless we modify our policy
and
have local
control such as
that
given
by
a
paid
Militia
under our political officerss will
be to
re-commence
the*old
struggle
for
pre-
_dominance".
5
In
short
Swayne foresaw., in the
post'-withdrawal periodj,
chaos, which was
bound
ultimately
to
spread
to the
coast
and so
threaten
such administration as
the British
might
have
on
the
coast.
In the
event of such a state of
affairs arisingo
Britain
would
be forced
either
to
abandon
the Protectorate
altogether or
to
send military reinforce-
ments a policy which
had
already-been ruled out
to
restore
law
and order.
These
views werev
fortunately for
Swaynes
supported
by Sir W. Manning., Inspector General
of
the King's African Riflesi,
and
by Captain Cordeauxp the
6
Deputy Commissioner
of
the Somaliland Protectorate.
As
an alternat
ive to the
policy stated
by the
British Governmento Swayne
proposed a scheme which was
intended
as a compromise
between the two
other extreme
options,
p
namely complete evacuation or
the
assumption of
a vigorous administration
in the interior. Swaynets
5. ibid.
6.
C-0-535/1
Minute by H. J. Read
on
Cordeaux
(Acting
Commissioner)
to C. O. 20/*/1905. H. J. Read-,
(186,3-1949)
Principal Clerk
w. e.
f. lst April 1905*
chiefly concerned
with
East Africa; Asst. Under-Secretary 1916; Governor
of
Mauritius 1924.
scheme consisted
in the formation
of a
Militia,
and
his
guiding principle was-thats
"a
militia,
in
order
to
provide adequately
for
tribal defence
must
be
essentially a
tribal
militias raised and organized on a
basis
of
tribal
sections and sub-sections
7
The Militias
according
to the
schemes was
to be
controlled
by
political officers stationed at various points
in the
interior,
and
its
main
duty
would
be to
maintain
law
and
order, as well as
defend the
remote parts of
the interior
from
external attacks.
In
order
to forestall
possible
objections of
the
scheme on
the
grounds of economy,
Swayne
argued
that the
scheme was
intended to be
an
interim
arrangement,
the
objective of which was
to train the
Somali in
self-defence.
The
ultimate goal was
to bring
about
the
state of affairs
desired by the British Govern-
ments namelyo non-interference
in the internal
affairs of
Somaliland,
save
the
coastal area.
8
While the theoretical details
of
the Militia
scheme
were still
being
worked outs and
the Colonial Office
was
still pondering over
the
proposals
the immediate
problem
was
to devise
an ad
hoc
arrangement
to fill the
vacu=
that
was about
to be
created
by the
withdrawal of
the
expeditionary
forces
whose presence
had been
rendered
unnecessary
by the termination
of
the fourth
expedition
and
the
conclusion of
the Illig Peace Agreement. Swayne's
plan was
to issue
arms and ammunition
to the
"friendly"
tribes
and
then to
unite
them into
a number of encampments,,
the
rationale
being that it
was easier
for these tribes to
7. C. O.
879/87
Swayne to C. O. 23/8/1905 No. 160.
Ibid.
81
defend themselves
when
in big
groups
than
when
isolated
into
small communities.
The
most
important
armed encampments were estab-
lished
at
Bil Dab
and
Bohotleh,,
with
five hundred
and
four
hundred
rifles respectively.
The largest
ones
howevero
was
established among
the Warsengeli
and consisted of some
two
thousand
mens armed with sixty
five Remingtons
and sixty
five Martinis.
9
Having thus
armed and grouped
the
"friendly"
tribes., Cordeaux,, then Acting Commissionerp
summoned a
large
meeting of elders at
Sheikh in August 1905P
and
informed them
of
the Government's decision to
withdraw
all
the
regular
troops from the interior
and of
the
new
security arrangements.
Much to his
surprise.,
the
elders
did
not appear
to be
shaken
by the
newsp
but,,
-
instead#
they
asked
Cordeaux for
more arms and ammunition and
promised
to
sink
their internal
quarrels
in
a common cause
against
the Dervish depredations.
10
In the
meantime representations
to the British
Government
continued
to be
made with a view
to inducing
the Goverment to
accept
the
proposed
Militia
scheme.
The
Colonial Office, having
received
letters
and memoranda
from
reputable men such as
Manning
and
Lt. Col. Homby,
Officer Commanding Troops in Somaliland, began to
soften
its
attitude
in favour
of
the Militia
scheme.
Mr. Ommaney.,
for
example,
in the
course of commenting on
the
proposed
C. O. 535/1 Swayne, to C. O. 18/5/1905.
10. C. O.
879/87
Memorandum by Cordeaux
on
the Conference
with
tribal leaders
at
Sheikh,
n.
d.
(Encl.
in Cordeaux
to C. O. 31/8/1905 No. 169).
8
ir;
)
scheme, stated
that
ffagainst
withdrawal are our
treaty
obligations
to the tribes
and
the
effect which withdrawal
will
have
on our relations with
Abyssinia
and
our
influence, in the Sudan. If it is held
that
withdrawal
is
not possiblep
then Col.

Swayne's
proposal seems
to deserve
careful
consideration.
It
provides
for the
control'"''
of
the hinterland by the
appointment of seven
political officers# under whose charge would
be
a
tribal Militia".
11
The
proposed
Militia
scheme was put
before the
Cabinet in August 1905,
and endorsed
by the
same.
Follow-
ing this., Cordeaux
received a
telegram from the Colonial
Officep infoming him that the_
"scheme
for Militia has been
approved
by
'Cabinet
and awaits sanction of
Treasury. In-
the
meantime
it is inadvisable to
withdraw
all control.
You
may enrol
four hundred
paid
Militia to be trained
with
the
6th
Battalionj
K. A. R.,
who should
be
concentrated at
Burao
or
Odweina".
1.
,,
z-
In
order
to
safeguard against any
loopholes., the
Colonial Office invited
a number of military experts
to
express
their
views and suggestions on
the Militia Scheme.
Manning., for instance.,
was,
in
agreement with most of
the
details
of
the
scheme, as conceived
by Swayne
and
Cordeaux,
but
was opposed
to the idea
of placing
the Militia
under
civilian political officers, on
the,
grounds
that
since
the
primary
duty
of
the Militia,
was of a military nature,
the
officers responsible
for discharging this duty
should
have
13
had
military
training. On this
point
he
wa
-s
supported
by
11. C. O. 535/1 Minute by Ommaney to Cordeaux to C. O. 20/T/1905.
Ommaney..
-M.
F.
(1824-1925).
'- Entered Colonial Office-1874;
Crown Agent-1877-1900;
Permanent Under-Secretary 1900;
retired
190T
(succeeded
by. Hopwood).
12. C. 0
879/P7
C. O. to Cordeaux 26/8/1905;
see also
CAB:
41/3b/30, lst August 1905.
.-
13
-C .0-
535/1 Brigadier General Marming
1s
Memorandum
on
the
proposed
Militia
scheme
tor
Somaliland, 5/7/1905.
the Colonial Office
and
his
opinion eventually carried
weight, with
the
result
that.,
of
the
seven
Political
Officers
appointed
in
connection with
the Militia
scheme.,
only oneo
Mr. W. H. A. Byatt,
was a civilian.
He
was
appointed as an exceptional case on account of
his
sup-
posed ability
to deal
with
the Somali.
14
-
Towards theend-of August 1905-the Treasury
sanctioned
the Militia
scheme.
The
ultimate
target for
the
strength of
the Militia
was
1,500
of whom'seven
hundred
were
to
constitute
the Standing Militia
and
the
remainder
the Tribal
or
Karia Militia. The idea
of
forming two
organisations was one which came-by accident
rather
than design. Swayne
and
Cordeaux had
advocated
the formation
of
the Tribal Militia
and
had
not even con-
ceived
the idea
of a
Standing Militia. The'eircumstances
which
led to the formation
of
the Standing-Militia
were
connected with
the instructions
which
Cordeaux
received
from the'Colonial Office that.,
while
the Treasury's
sane-
tion
of
the
scheme was still
being
awaitedj
Cordeaux
should
proceed at once with
the
recruitment of
four hundred
menV
as an
initial'measure.
and
that he
should, attach
these four
hundred
men
to the
6th
Battalion,, King's African Rifles.
Manning
and
Cordeaux tried to
resist
this. innovation-of
the Colonial Office,,
arguing,
that, it',,
4,
Would-jeopardize
the
final ideal
which was
to
recruit a militia on
tribal
lines.
Cordeaux.,
for, instanoe*
expressed
the-view that
the
enrolment
of
the four hundred
men
14. C-0-535/2
C-0- to swayne
15/9/1905.
S, i
"would
jeopardize
success of any really
tribal
Militia
raised and organized on
the basis
of
tribal
sections and sub-sections, and controlled
by tribal
political officers.
If
such a militia
is in
contemplation
I
should prefer
to leave the
enlistment of men
to. the
political officers who
will
be
eventually required
to
command
them".
15
This'argument
was overruled
by the Colonial Office. The
latter
sent
further instructions'to the
effect
that Cordeaux
should proceed with
the
recruitment of
the four hundred
men
without raising more controversy
16
.
and
Cordeaux
had
no
option
but to
comply;
the
outcome was
the
emergence of a
Standing Militia*which had
not
been
conceived
by those
who
had
masterminded and advocated
the Militia
scheme.
Unlike the Standing Militia,, the Tribal Militia
was
to be divided, into twenty
or so sections which
-would
then be distributed into different tribal
sections'and
charged with
the duty
of protecting
the
grazing grounds.
The Standing Militia.,
on
the
other
hand,,
was
to have its
permanent
headquarters
at
Sheikh-and to be
used only
in
the
event of a serious,
disturbance.
-
The Standing Militia
was,
for
all
intents
and purposes, a semi-military corps.
'The
Political Officers
arrived-in
September
1905*
with
Capt Smithemanzasthe
overall commanding officer
of
the Militia-in
addition
to being in
charge of. -Ithe-Aidegallah
and
Western Habr. Awal
sections.
-Capt.
-Dansey,
was put
in
charge of
the First Double Company
of--the-'Standing-Militia
in
addition
to-being-,
responsible
for the Habr-. Yunis; Lieut.
Bell took
command'. of:
the Second Double Company
of
the Stand-
ing Militia'and-responsibility
for the Habr Toljaala; Capt.
15. C. O. 535/2 Cordeaux
to C. O. 17/8/1905.
16,. C,. O. 535/
.
0. to Cordeaux 22/8/1905.
?
c
01
Jorgensen
was allocated
the Third Double Company
and
the
Dolbahanta tribal
section.
The
rest of
the-Political
Officers,
namely,
Capt. L. W. D. Everett,, Lieut. F. R.
Tarleton
and
Leiut. W. Swirej,
were given no specific
companies
to
command
but
were supposed
to
assist
in the
training
of
the Militia
and
to
administer such areas as
might
be
assigned
to them by the
overall commanding
officer.
17
The training
of
the Militia took
place at
Sheikh.,
and each new recruit was scheduled
to
undergo vigorous
training for twenty
one
days. At the
end of
the training
the Tribal Militia
was given arms and
then despatched to
the
various grazing areass
the
guiding principle
being to
send each
individual to his tribal
area.
In defence
of
this
procedures
it
was contended
that
members of
the Tribal
Militia
were more
likely to be
accepted among
their
own
tribesmen than
anywhere else.
The Tribal Militia
was sup-
posed
to
pay occasional visits
to 'Sheikh for further
training,
replenishment of ammunition and submission of
reports about
the
security situation
in the
country.
The
Standing Militias
stationed at
Sheikh
as
it
wasp continued
to
receive military
training,
especially
in,
musketry,
whereas
the Tribal Militias though inspected
occasionally
by the Political Officerso
was
deprived
of sustained mili-
tary training
and constant supervision,
with
the
result
that it
always
left
much
to be desired in
so
far
as compe-
tence
and
discipline
were concerned.
The
main
differences
however, between the Tribal
and
Standing Militia
was
that
members of
the former
resided
in their
respective
tribal
17. C. O.
424/2
Swayne
to CD.
4/10/1905.
St"),
areas whereas
the latter
was. a conglomeration of
different
sections,
v
a
factor
which caused no-little strain within
the
organization.
18
The test
case, needless
to
sayo as
to the
via-
bility
and capability of
the Militia
was whether
it
could
fulfil the
objectives
for
which
it had been
created,
namely.,
the training
of
the
pro-British
tribes in
self-
defence
against
the Dervishes,,
with
the,
ultimate goal of
relieving
Britain
of all commitments
in Somalilando
save
the
coastal area.
Following the
conclusion of
the fourth
expedi-
tion,, Manning
-
the
man who
had
commanded
the third
expedition
-
expressed
the
optimistic view
that
"practical
destruction
of
the Aligheritribe
during the fighting
of
1903-1904
and-their
having fallen into disfavour in the Mullahts
camp
is the
most
important factor', in the
-
peace of
Somalilando
since-the
Aligh6ri
were
the
mainstay of
the-Mullah's Dolbahanta
-.
following.
-The
Dolbahanta'were-glways,
recog-,
nized as
being the-fighting
race of-Somaliland..
and
the Dervishes
were mainly of
the Dolbahanta
race.
I heldthe
opinionp and'Gen.
Egerton
held the
opinion also,,
that Jidbali battle
disposed
of,
the Mullah. Swayne
apparently
did
not
hold that
opinion and still
harps
upon
the
possibility of
further fighting the-Mullah".
19
Thuso
so
far'as Manning
could assess
the
situa-
tion, it
was not
to
much
the
conclusion'of-'.
the Illig
Agreement that
was significant
for the, future,
'prospects
of peace
in the.: Prote'otorate,,
-as
the'-resounding defeat*
which was
inflicted
on
the Dervishes duringthe
fourth'
18. C. O. 535/5 Swayne, to'C*O.
-28/3`/1906.
19. C. O.
535/1 Sir W. Manning's Memorandum
on
the Militia
Scheme for British Somaliland., 5/7/1905.
04
expedition.
This
view
bore
no relation
to the
actual
state of affairso
or
indeed, to the Sayyid's
assessment
of
his
position.
As
early as
April 1904
-
and
this
was
the time
when
the Sayyidts deputation
was'still
in
Berbera
for the
purpose
of obtaining
Britaints
signature
to the Illig Agreement
-
the Sayyid had this to
say
to
the Commissioner:
"If
any one comes
to
you
to fight,, they
will
have
orders
because
you
have fixed
wires2O
in
my country.
Understand that
on account of
this it is
a great
fault
on your part.
If
any
one comes
from
me
to loot
you or
fight they
are
beginning the
old
fitna
(i.
e.
hatred)
again.
Those
who said-EHaF
the Somali
could
not
fight
and
that the Mullah
and
his
men and
children would
be
caught without
difficulty
lied
.....
Wise
men
have
sense and stupid
people
have
none.
Now I
explain my meaningi,
that the Government
should go out of my country
in
one
hour. The
country
in
which we now
live
has
much
bush
and
is
very stony and
full
of
ravines.
Our
animals cannot subsist
there.,
and
we
do
not wish
that
our animals shall remain-in
the hills
and our
land
shall remain
taken
away
from
usp and we are ashamed as
long
as we
live
because
our
land is
not
in
our possession"'21
It
would appear,.
thereforep that
whatever set-
back
the Dervishes
might
have
experienced
from the fourth
expeditions
their
powers
let
alone
their determinations to
resume
hostile
activities against
the British
were very much
in
evidence.
Hences the Illig Agreement
was
doomed
right
from
the time
of
its inception, for the Sayyid had
not
the
intention of abiding
by it
and
the Italians had
neither
A
the
means nor
the
will
to
enforce
it. It
must
be
asked,
20. He
was referring
to the telegraphic line
which
had been
fixed between Berbera
and
Burao, during the
4th
Expedition.
21. C. O. 535/1 Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan to the British
Co=issioners as
translated by the Political Officer,
Wadamagoo
n-d-
(Encl.
to Political Officer.
9
Wadamago, to
Swaynep 11/4/1905
No.
861/M).
83
therefore,
why
the Agreement
was concluded
in the first
place
if the
main signatories
to it had
not
the inten-
tion
or
the
will
to
uphold
it.
Although the'Illig Agreement
stipulateds
inter
alia.,
that the Sayyid had become
an
Italian
subject and
that the Italian Goverment,
while allowing
him full
jurisdiction
over
his
subjects and area of
his
residenceo
reserved
the
right
to
appoint a political officer
to,
administer
Illig* it
was quite obvious
that the Italian
Goverment
was
incapable
of7exercising effective control
7
over
Illig
and
its inhabitants. Italy's
colonial
thrust
in Africa during the late
nineteenth
Century had
created
problems almost
too,
great
for the
resources and capacity
of
the
country.
In 1896,,
-,
to begin
with,
Italy had incurred
humiliating defeat
at
the hands
of
Ethiopia.,
a
factor
which
encouraged
her
colonial subjects elsewhere
to
rebel with-
it
impunity
against
Italian
rule.
TheMijjerteinp' for
examplep
repudiated
their Treaty
of
1889
with..
the Filonardi. Company*
which stipulated
their
acceptance of
Italian
protectionp
and resumed
their
southward expansion.
By 1901 the
situa-
tion became
almost untenable,
for theVljjertein-seemed
to
be bent
on capturing
the Benadir
coast.,.
Italyts.
prestige, -,
at
this time
was'saved
by her
pursuit'of
the
policy of
divide-and-rule
which acquired
for the Italians
the
co-
operation of
the
southern, section,
'of:. theMijjertein.. '-with
the
result.
that the
northern
MiJ
J
ertein.
', 'findb*-,
themselves
pressed
from the
south
by-thesouthern MLjjertein under
Yusuf Alis
and
bombarded by Italian
ships
from the
north,
were
left
with no choice
but to
concede
defeat. This,
however., did
not spell
the
end of
Italyts
colonial problems.
89
The Bimal
rose up
in
revolt
in 1905
and cut'off communica-
tion between Merea
and
Mogadishu. This had
very serious)
adverse effects on
the trade
of
the
area, and many
Arab
traders
began to turn their
attention
to Zanzibar. A
number of expeditions were sent
to break the Bimal
resis-
tance but this
was not achieved until
1908. Early in 1906,
an
Italian
official was not
far from the truth
when
he
admitted
that ul
have the impression that
not only
is
our
present
position
in Somalia false but it is-also beginning
to be
ridiculous".
22
Thus,, in
view of
Italy's
pre-occupation with
her
recalcitrant
subjectso not only
in Somaliland but
also
in
Britrea,
v
and
in
view of
her
memory of
the humiliation
at
Adowa
less than ten
years
before., it
must
have been
quite
obvious
that her
acceptance of an additional
burden in the
shape
of
the Sayyid
and
his Dervishes
was unrealisticp
to
say
the least. The key to
an understanding of why
Italy
signed
an agreement she very well
knew
she could not up-
hold,
p
is to be found in
a speech
by Signor Tittoni, the
then
Italian
minister
for the
colonies.
Pressed by
Parliament
to justify Italyts
entrance
into
a
treaty
relationship
with
the Sayyid.. Tittoni., in
reference
to the
place
Illig
and
to the
agreement
itselfp
stated
22.
Atti Parlamentari: Camera de Deputati,
March 1906,
;
as quoted
by Robert Hess, Italian'Colonialism
in'---'
Somalia
op. cit. p.
135. Italy's
colonial ro ems
" ffl: 71
are
=scussed
in
more
detail by R. Turton,,,,,
_,
The'--
Impact
of
Muhammad Abdille Hassan in the E.
-A.
Pro-
tectorate"p
J. A. H.
0
X0
4x (1969).
-9 p.
641-657.
-
0
9.3
"Is
it
a
town?
NO, because the huts
of-the
.
natives
are erected along
the
shore when
they
choose
to do
so, and
in time
of war, when
,
battleships
approach,
they
are
taken into the
interior
out of
the
reach of guns.
Therefore,
as a matter
of
facto if
we
had
not made peace
with
the Mullah he
could
have
stayed at
Illig
even without
our consent".
23
This
statement amounted
to
an admission
that., in
signing
the
agreement.,
Italy
did
nothing more
than
endorse
the
fait
accompli
Italy
wanted
to
make
the best
out of a
very embarrassing
and complicated development in the
northern part of
her
colony.
Some historians
will
wonder, with
justificationo
whether
it
would not
have
been
more prudento
from her
own point of viewp
for, Italy
to have tacitly
accepted,
the fait
accompli without
entering
into
a written
agreement
with
the Sayyid. By
formally declaring the Sayyid to be
an
Italian
subjects
the Italians
not only undertook
a responsibility
that
was
beyond their
power,,
to
carry
into
effect,
but they
also, played
into the hands
of
the British
who were
anxious
to
get rid of
the Dervish
problem.
Britain
must
have been
relieved
to learn
of
Italy's
acceptance". of
the
Sayyid
and
his Dervishes
as
Italian
subjectso
for Britain
would
thereafter hold Italy
responsible,
for,
any,, mischief
that
might
be
committed
by
the
Dervishes. Indeedo in
August 1905* the British Commissionero Swayneo held
a
meeting with
Pestalozza,
at which
Swayne
expressed con-
cern
at
Italy's failure to
restrain
their
newly-acquired
23. E. Sylivia Pankhurst, Ex-Italian Somaliland
(London)
1951*
P--31-
Characte-rl-s,
=ca
ly, Pankhurst does
not
indicate the
ultimate source of
the
quoted, speech.
However,
p
the
state of affairs
described therein
would
seem
to tally
with
the
situation as
described by
F. S. Caroselli, Ferro
e
Fuoco,
op. cit., p.
159-167.
9-1
t4
ILI
subject., who-had already written
toZBritish-authorities,
making such claims as were not stipulated
in the Illig
agreement.
Reporting
on
this
meeting.
9
Swayne informed
the Colonial Office that,
"I
explained
to Commendatore Pestalozza that
the indefinite
claims
to Bohotleh
and
Eil Dab
contained
in Mullah's
recent
letters had
made
an unfavourable
impression
on me,, as
the
raising of
these
claims presumed an
intention
to ignore
or repudiate
the
stipulations of
Italian-Dervish Agreement
as communicated and
accepted.
by
us"'24
That the Sayyid
placed very
little., if
any,
value on
the Illig-Agreement
was
demonstrated by the fact
that he
was already
threatening to
resume war against
the
British
even
before his delegates had left Berbera,
where
they had
gone
to
obtain
Britain's
signature
to the Agree-
ment.
In
some other
letterso howeverj the Sayyid
pro-
fessed to be
committed
to the Agreement
and accused others
of violating
it. In June 1905, for
example,
he informed
Swayne that-
again now you will
know
we are-pleased
in this
settlement.. and
there
shall
be
no
hostility f'mm
us, and
if
ever any, of our
people shall commence
hostility, I
shall advise
you on
the
matter and consult you, about
it
.....
You
should also
Itnow that the
whole world
(sic)
is
at peace and no
Somalis
shall
have
anything.
to fear from the Dervishes
25
In the
same
letter, the Sayyid laid blame
on others
by
alleging
that there
was a. grpup of people whom-he aptly
called
tale-bearers.
24. C. O. 535/3 Swayne to C. O. 20/12/1905.
-
25. The Sayyid
always made a
distinction between the
Dervishes
and non-Dervishes.
He
referred
to the
latter
as
"the
Somali" but, in fact, the' Dervishes
were also
Somali.
LP)
"The
Goverr=ent
may
think they
are good men
but they
are
deceiversp
and
the
greatest
is
Ali, the interpreter
of
the Navy
and
Magan.
"
He
also complained against
the Ethiopiansi,
saying:,
"they-have
sent a
big force
against m people
and now
is this that has
come
to
pass
26
It is interesting to
note
that the Sayyid, both in this
and subsequent
letters..
referred
his
grievances
to the
British
authoritiess notwithstanding
the fact thats by
virtue,
/of
the
agreement#
the Sayyid had
ceased
to be
a
British
subject and concern.
This
was an
indication that
the Illig
agreement meant nothing
to him
and.. whatever was
stipulated
in it, he
still regarded
the British
as
being
responsible and accountable
for
any plight
that he
might
suffer while at
Illig.
The Sayyid's
complaints against
the Ethiopians
and
the tale-bearers
were not without
foundation. Ethio-
pian
depredations
were a constant
feature
of
the Colonial
period
in Somaliland, though,
of courses
it
must
be
men-
tioned that the Somali too initiated their
own raids
against
the Ethiopians. As for his
complaint against
tale-bearers
such as
Magan
and
Ali, the latter became
very notorious
for his habit
of spreading rumours and
lies. In September 1905, for
examples
Ali
reported a
false
allegation
in Aden to the
effect
that
one of
the
Sayyid's top
adviserss
Abdullah Shaheris
then
on a visit
to Aden, had
gone
there to
smuggle arms
for the Dervishes.
A
police officer who
investigated the
allegation
later
reported
that
26. C. O. 535/1 Sayyid Muha=ad Abdille Hassan to Swayne
(translation)
n.
d.
(Encl.
in Swayne to C. O. 19/6/1905
No. 210).
i'd
"I
have the honour to
report
that Ali Said
made a statement
to the
effect
that
when
the
Mullith's
agent
Abdullah Shaheri left Aden for
Bunder Kassim last
month,
he
shipped along
with
him
some
8,000
rounds of rifle ammuni-
tion. On investigation, this
was
found to be
untrue"'27
As
azatter of
fact tale-bearers
were
found both in the
Sayyid's
camp and among
the
pro-British
tribes. Tale-
bearers in the Sayyid's
camp consisted mainly of
those
who
had defected from the British
side
to the Sayyid
during the
expeditionary periodp and so
did
not wish
to
see any rapprochement
developing bet*een the Sayyid
and
the British
which might result
in the
reconciliation of
the Sayyid
and
the British
and
the
rehabilitation of
the
former back into the British Protectorate. Unless
a
-specific
undertaking was made
by the British
not
to
punish
those
soldiers who
had defected'to the Sayyidp
the British
authorities would
be
at
liberty to
punish
them. Thusp
such people
had
everything
to
gain
from the
continuation of a state of
hostility between the Sayyid
and
the British in that,,
so
long
as
this
state of
hostility
lasted,
so
long
would
they
remain under
the
protection of
the Sayyid.
Tale-bearers
on
the Gover=ent's
side consisted,
mainly of
Government interprete I
rs, messengers and-inielli-
gence staff.
These
officials
had
received-generous"rewards
in
cash and
kind during the"exp6ditionary
period
bee
ause
the Government
was
heavily dependent
on
them for"Intelli-
gence work, communication..
-protection.,
and other related
27. C. O. 535/2 Assistant Resident in
charge of
Aden Police
to First Assistant Resident, Aden, 14/9/1905
(Enal.
in
Swayne to C. O. 20/g/1905).
flu
services which
the British
neededo given
the
strange and.,
inhospitable
conditions
in
which
the
expeditionary,
forces
found themselves. With-the termination-of the fourth
expedition and subsequent conclusion of
the Illig Agree-
ment,
these
officials, who
had
meant a great-deal
to the
British during the
period of,
hostilities between the
,
British
and
the Sayyid,,
saw
their
positions
threatened
by the fact that if
peace were restored, most of
them
would
lose their jobs
and
the few
who would
be
retained
would not receive as much as
they
used
to
receive
during
the time
of military operations.
Hence, these
officials#
determined
as
they
were,
to
perpetuate a state, of
tension
and,
if
possible, engineer a resumption of a military con-
frontation, dissAinated
all sorts of
lies
and rumours
regarding
the intentions
and activities of
the Sayyid.
Swayne
was so outraged
by their
activities
that he lamented
that,
if
war should unfortunately
break
out
aL,
it is
my
belief that it
will
have been
9
brought
about not
by the Mullah
nor
by
usp
but
a war engineered
by Somali hangers-on
of
,
Government, both
at
Aden
and
in Berberas
who
are working
for their
own-interests and
for
their
own private spites"..
q
Whereas the tale-bearers
and
the Ethiopian
raids
exacerbated
a situation which was already
delicatej
it
can-
not
be
contended
that these
were
the
rais6n
detat for the
Sayyid's
resumption of active
ho
stilities
in the Horn
of
Africa. The Sayyid had
never
despaired
of
his
primary aim
which was
to drive the British
out of
Somaliland. This
28. 'C. 'O. 532/2 Swayne
to C. O. 30/9/1905.
2-
t
9,5
was revealed
in his
numerous
letters to the British
and
in
various poems which
he
composed
before
and after
the
con-
I
clusion of
the Illig Agreement. One
very revealing poem
for
exampleo was composed shortly after
the Jidbali
battle
and
its intention
was
to
encourage
his followers
not
to be disheartened by the temporary
setback
but to
pull
themselves together
and resume
the
struggle against
the British.
(See
Appendix'r
It
would seems
therefore that the Sayyid's
decision to
sign
the Illig Agreement,,
let
alone
his
occasional pledges of commitment
to the letter
and spirit
of
the-sameo
was mere pretence.
Sylvia-Pankhurst
contends
that
if
.
it
seems clear
that he
either counted on
ti;
*continued
inactivity
of
the Italian Govern-
ment
to
afford
him
a
freedom
not granted
by the
Agreement,
or
the losses inflicted
upon
him
were soserious
that he
was compelled
to
grasp
any respite
to
recuperate".
29
If the
need
to
recuperate was what
induced the'
Sayyid to
sign
the
agreement,
then the
speed at which
he
recuperated was
beyond
what any of
his
adversaries could
have imagined
-
this
was certainly
true in the
case of
Manning
who
had
regarded
the Jidbali battle
as
the final
death blow to the Sayyidts
power.
In April 1905P
some
800
Dervishes
raided
the Ogaden
with
the
aim
of coming
to the
assistance of
the Bagheri, the-Sayyid's
clansmen..
who were
being harassed by the Ethiopians. In the
con-
frontation.
which ensued,
'at, Walwal., the Dervishes killed
15
of
their
enemies'and seized a
large
number of stock. -30
29. Sylvia Pankhurst.
9
Ex-Italian Somaliland
op. cit., p.
36.
30. C. O. 535/1 Swayne to CO. 2T/4/1905-
91L
By July 1905 the Dervishes
were making occasional raids
deep in the heart
of
the Protectorate. They
visited
Jidbali, the
very place where
they had
suffered severe
31
reverses
during the fourth
expeditionq and
Bohol Waraba,
while some
Dervish
parties secretly visited
the Govern-
ment posts of
Bohotleh
and
Eil Dab. In September 1905
the Dervishes
raided
Mudug
and
looted
some
10200
camels,
and a
few
months
later they
captured and controlled
the
entire
line
of wells
between Illig
and
the Bagheri
country.
The Sayyidts
position was strengthened
by the
absence of
Italian
authority at
Illigj,
a
factor
which enabled
the
Sayyid to
use
the
coast
for
purposes of purchasing arms
32
from Arab
arms smugglers
from the Arabian Coast
.
By the
end of
1905, it
was quite obvious
that
the Illig Agreement
was a
dead letter. The Colonial
Office
was exasperated and
baffled. W. D. Ellis
minutedo
that
......
if I interpret the
reports correctlyp
it
would
appear
that the treaty
with
the Mullah
which
the Italians
negotiated
is
about as
hollow
a piece of work as can
possibly
be imagined. The Mullah
who
has
accepted
Italian
protection promptly attacks
the M. ijjertein
who are sup-
posed
to
enjoy
the
same position
....
the fact is that
31. C. O. 535/1 British Somaliland Intelligence Report for
the
month of
June 1905,26/7/1905.
32. Before 1908 the
northern parts of
Italian Somaliland
were entrusted
to the Italian Consul in Aden. The first
serious attempt
to
effectively control
the
area was made
in October 1908,
when
Mogadishu
assumed
the
administra-
tive
responsibility and
the Sultan
of
Obbinwas
per-
suaded
to
accept an
Italian Resident. The
Kojertein
Sultaln followed
suit.
Even thens the Resident
was
accepted on
the
express undertaking
that he
would
be
nothing more
than the Sultaints
"friend
and adviser".
(CaroSelli
op. cit.., p.
119-120)o
the Italians
are a
broken
reed with no power
to do
any-
thing but to draw
up
treaties
not worth
the
paper
they
are written on.
Our
only
hope
of peace
is to
organise
our
tribes
so
that the Mullah
will
find it
safer
to
raid
the Italian
sphere"..
33
This
was an exceptionally
harsh
verdict, especially
in
view of
the fact that Britain had
herself
grappled with
the Sayyid for the
past six years
and
had
achieved virtually nothing
by
way of reducing
his
power.
Besides the Militia,
whose
inception has
already
been discussed* the Proteatoratets
other security arrange-
ments
included the Sixth Battalion, Kings African Rifles*
composed of
Indians
and stationed at
Berbera. Its func-
tion
was
to
safeguard
the
coastal
towns
of
Berberap Bulhar
and
Zeila,
and
in the
event of grave security
threats in
the interior* to
assist
the Militia. There
was also-a,.
small military
Police, 320
strong, which consisted of
Somali
and whose
function
was.
to do
ordinary police work
in the Protectorate..
34
The
sixth
Battalion.. Kings African
Rifles, had been
established-in
July 1904, that is, during
the
expeditionary period.
It then
consisted of,
Somali*
but following the
end of
the
military operationsp
a num-
ber
of
British
officers and various other-military
experts
argued., and convinced
the Colonial Officep-that
the, Somali
soldiers should
be disbanded
and replaced with.
Indians.
--.
33.., C. 0-535/2
Minute by Ellis
on
Swayne to C. O.
-
27/9/11905
Ellis W. D. Clerk in the C. 0
.
1895; lst'alerk-1899.
34. Douglas
Jardine's The Mad Mullah
--
of
Somaliland
(Herbert
Jenkins Ltd.
)
1923s
P.
159-160.
93
One
of
the
advocates of
this
change stated
that
"the
Somali does
not make a good soldier
for
garrison,
his
ways are nomadic and
he hates
the
routine of garrison work"
35
The
advocated change was supported
by the Colonial Office
Whichs
in the
course of soliciting
the India Office to
agree
to the
proposed recruitment of
Indian
soldiers
for
the Battalions
added a new measure
to the
arguments
hither-
to
advocated,
by
contending
that
"the
Somali
are
too
much
influenced by local-
and
tribal
sympathies
to
make
it
expedient
to
rely entirely upon
them".
36
-
The India Office
gave
its
approval, and
in October 1905
the Somali
soldiers were
disbanded
and replaced with
400
Indians.
Thus,,
with
the
reconstituted
6th
Battalion,
K. A. R., the 320-strong
military
Police
and
the Militiao
the
situation
looked
very promising
in
as
far
as
the
pros-
pects of peace were concerned.
Unfortunately for the
advocates and
the
architects of
these
various security
safeguardso
the future held
nothing
but disappointment.
only
a
few
months after
the inception
of
the
Militia, the
very man who
had
provided
-most
of
the theo-
retical
basis
upon which
the
militia was
founded
openly
expressed
his loss
of
faith in the
viability of
this
establishment.
Swaynets
main
disappointment
was, with-l'
the Standing Militia.
-an
innovation
of,
the-Colonial-10fficia.,
with reference
to
which
he-Inoted thatj,
35. C. O. 535/2 Notes by Sir W. Maming to
,
Swayne's letter
to C-0.
of
13/7/1905.
36. C. O.
879/87
C. O. to 1.0.23/8/1905.
"as
regards
the
companies generallyo
it is'to
be
observed
that they
are composed of men
drawn
from
all
tribes indiscriminately. The
standing
Militia is therefore in
no sense a
tribal
Militia
-
but it is
rather of
the
nature of a
Standing Levy
of
irregulars
....
As
regards
the
Karia
or
tribal Militia
which
is
or should
be
the
Feal
tribal defence
organization,
it
appears
from the
reports of
the Political Officers that
such organization as exists
is
merely nominal.
A
certain number of rifles
have been issued to
the tribes but in the
absence of any
local
super-
vision or control,
it is impossible to
expect
that
any real
defensive
organization should exist.
Moreover, it
appears
that the
actual number of
rifles
in
possession of
the tribes is
more
than
double those
of which
the Political Officers have
any record.
This
unsatisfactory condition, of
both the Standing
and
tribal Militia is,, I
venture
to think to be
attributed
to the fact that the
Political Officers have
so
far had
no-opportunity
of attending
to the
work
for
which
they
were
expressly sent out
-
namely,
that
of organizing
the tribes
on a
Militia basis. Their time has
been
almost entirely
taken
up with
duties
of a
military nature connected with
the training
of
the Standing Militia
-
duties
which
they have
found
uncongenial and
for
which,
in
many cases,
they
are not specially
trainedn.
37
More
anomalies
in the
organization of
the Militia
were exposed
by Maj. 0
tNeill
who
had
succeeded
Capt. -
Smitheman
as-overall commanding officer of
the'Militia.
He
pointed out, as
Swayne had
already
done, the-diffi-
culties pertaining
to the'fact that Political Officers
were supposed,
to
play a
double-role,
namely. -administra--
tion
of
the
various areas as well as
training
and super-
vising
the Standing Militia
at
Sheikh, As the two
',,
responsibilities were equally
demanding,, the Political
officers
found themselves in
a position
in--which they-
could not pay equal attention
to both,
'with
the
result
that
several months used,
to
elapse without any attention
being
paid
to the
administrative
duties.
38
ThusJ, the
37. C. O. 535/2 swame to C. O.
4/10/1905.
38. C. O. 535/5 Maj. O'Neill
to cordeaux 21/3/1906.
Government
control of
Tribal Militia
was minimal., and
this factor led to
serious'internal clashes
-
thanks to
the
rifles
issued by-the Government
-
and
to, the
widespread
shooting of game.
Another disturbing'phenomenon
which was
discovered by O'Neill
was
that the
men sent
by their
res-
pective
tribal
sections,
for
recruitment,
in the Tribal
Militia
were men of poor quality and calibre. '
Men
of
calibre and courageoapart
from their
unwillingness
to
join the tribal Militia
on'grounds of pride,
had
no wish
to
abandon
their families
and stock, even
for
a
few
weeks*
in 'order to
go
for training
at'Sheikho*and
thereafter to
be
under
the
constant supervision of,
the British Govern-
ment.
- Hence,, those
who opted
for
recruitment
into the
Tribal Militia
were generally
the detribalized
and
the
poor ones, who
had
no vested
interests
-
either moral or
material
in the traditional
social set up.
-
As
a
matter of
facto these
people were normally
handpicked by
the
elders, sent
to Sheikh for trainingp
and, upon
their
returno
had their
rifles and-ammunition
taken
away
from
them by the influential
elders.
In the
endo
therefore.,
Government
rifles and ammunition were appropriated
by the
elders who
had
received-no military
trainings
and used
not against
the Dervishes but'in
settling-tribal
disputes
39
and shooting game.
The, Standing Militia
was
in
no
less despicable
form. Its
multi-tribal character-was'a constant. source of
internal friction,
and.
-even
more serious
than the fac-
tional frictionso the-shortage
of
transport
animals was so
39. Ibid.
10
.I.
crippling
to the
mobility of
the
mounted companies as
to
render
their
existence v=Fabsurd.
The
problem was
caused
by the
unwillingness of
the*Somali to
sell
their
ponies and camels
to the Government. The few that
could
be
obtained were usually of very poor quality and,
if there
were any good oneso priority was always given
to the
6th
Battalion, Kings African Rifles., The Infantry Companies
too left
much
to be desired in
matters of
discipline
and
loyalty. These
companies were composed mainly of
the
Somali
soldiers who
had been disbanded from the
6th
Battalion
at
the time
of
its
reconstitution
with,
Indians.
Many
of
the disbanded
soldierso
though they despised the
Standing Militiao
were
forced to join it by
sheer need of
means of subsistence.
Neverthelesso they
continued
to
nurse a grudge against
the Government
and,, not surprisinglyi,
their loyalty
remained very suspect.
A
number of remedies were suggested
by the local
officials, and one which received
immediate
sanction
from
the Colonial Office
was
that
which recommended
the dis-
bandment
of
two Infantry Companies
which were considered
very un atisfactory.
The
other of
Cordeaux's
proposals
which
the Treasury
accepted after much procrastination
and reluctance on account of
the
expenses
it involvedp
was
that
a new set of officers. should
be
appointed,
to, take
charge of
the Standing Militias thereby,
relieving
the
Political Officers to,
concentrate on
the job for
which,
they
were primarily appointeds which was
to.
organize and
supervise
the Tribal Militia. On learning that the
new
proposal would cost an extra
Z2,000p the Treasury took
strong exception
to the idea
and made a point of reminding
102
the Colonial
office
that during the
previous-financial ,
year,
the Protectorate had
plunged
into the
red
-
and
had
to be
rescued
-
by
a sum of
F.
49P469.40
In December 1906,
however, the Treasury
gave way, and
four
more officers-
were sent
to the Protectorate to take
charge of
the
Standing Militia. An
additional change regarding
the
status and organization of
the Standing Militia
-a
change which was presumably
intended to improve both
efficiency and
discipline
-
was
that instead
of remaining
an
independent body* the Standing Militia
came under
the
general command of
the
officer commanding
the
6th
Battalion,,
K. A. R.
0
Lt. Col. Homby,
ands
for
all
intents
and purposes,
became
an
integral
part of
the
6th
Battalion* K. A. R. The
Political Officers
who
had hitherto
complained of
being
overburdened'with
the double
role of
taking
charge of
the
Standing Militia
as well as controlling
the Tribal
militia
were at
last
relieved of
the former
responsibility*
but
whether
this
was
the
solution
to the Protectorate's
prob'
lems
remained
to-be
seen.
The Sayyid's time
at
Illig throughout 1905
was
devoted to
purchasing arms and
to
enlisting new
followers.,
The
commissioner of
the British Protectorateapproached
the Colonial Office
with a request
for
a, steamer
to
patrol
the British
portion of
the
eastern coastal area_and.
for..,
a
Police Post to be
established at
Las-Khorai. '. Failing'
these two, the
commissioner applied
for
one, of
H. M. 'ships
to
make monthly
tours
of
the
eastern coastal area.
All
these
requests were
turned down by the Treasury-'on the
40.
C. O. 535/*[ Treasury to C. O. 17/2/1906.
grounds of expense.
41
The
only existing arrangement
for
checking gun smuggling consisted of
two dhows
which were
stationed at
Berbera but
were completely
ineffective, for
not only were
they
manned-by
the
old and retired sailors
with neither
the interest in the job they
were assigned
to
do,,
nor
the
energy
to face the hardships
pertaining
to
its but
also
because the
smugglers'
dhows
were usually
of a superior quality
than that
of
the
patrol
dhows.
42
Thus,, the
absence of any effective control of
the
eastern
coastal area worked
to the
advantage of
the Sayyid
who
was anxious
to
rearm
his followers in
readiness
for the
impending
escalation of
hostilities.
'
Encouraged by the British
and
Italian inactivity*
the Sayyid took it-
upon
himself to test the Italian
claim
to
sovereignty over
the Mijjertein
coast,, and
this he did
by
evicting an
Italian Consular Agent, Hersi Ismail* from
Bunder Kasim,, towards the
end of
1905. Hersi. Ismail fled
to Las Khorai
where
he
was rescued
by H. M.
ship
"Fox"
and
taken to Aden. The Italians took
no steps either
to
appoint
a new consular agent or
to
punish
the
.
Sayyid.
43
The Italian
failure to take
any retaliatory measures against
the Sayyid
confimed
the latterfs belief in the Italian
weakness* and
this
was a signal
for him to
step up
his
offensive.
41.
C. O. 5.35/, 3 Minute by Read
on
Swayne
to C. O. 27/12/1905.
42.
C. O. 535/2 SwaYne to J. B., Eustancei, Captain
and
Senior
Naval Officers Aden Division
23/g/1905-(Enal.
in Swayne
to CD. 26/g/1905).
43.
C. O.
879/87
Scallon,
Acting Political Resident, Aden to
Swayne
24/9/1905
(Encl.
in Swayne to C. O. 27/9/1905).
Ut
in
t
Next to fall
victim
to the Sayyid's'attack
wa's
Balambalj,
a small villages
50
miles west of
Hudin. Here
the Sayyid's
men'massacred a number of peoples seized a
large
number of stock and
then
slipped
back to Illig.
The'SouthemMijjerteinj,
under
Sultain Yusuf Ali.,
was
the
next
target. Following
a'devastating raid on
them, Yusuf
Ali
complained
to Swayne
as
follows:
"I
beg to bring to
your notice
that
a
force
of
the Mullah
recently attacked my subjects at
Obbiax inflicting
great
loss
of men, children
and property.
In
retaliation
I despatched
a
force from Obbia
which
killed
a number of
the
raiders and succeeded
in
recovering all
the
property"
*44
The Sayyid's forwaird'drive
proved such a success
that by the
middle of
1906 he
was
in
complet6 control of
Galkayu
and was already constructing a
fOrtthere. 'Using
this fort
as a
base, he
sent raiding'parties
as
far
as
'45
Walwal, Adadero
and
Mudug. A large
number of
dispossessed
and
displaced
refugees
took tf light'and
made
their
way
into the British Protectorate
where
they
caused a great
deal
of resentment among
the British Somali
subjects.
Whereas the Dervish depredations did
affect a
large
see-
tion
of peoples
the Esa Mahmud,
a section of-the
Mijjertein tribes bore the'sharpest brunt
of,
the S;
iyyid's
wrath.
The Esa Mahmud had been the
original--inhabitants
of
Illig before the Dervishes
occupied"it"and,
drove them
44.
C
.0
879/87
Yusuf Ali, to Swayne,
'
19th " Jumah Al, Awal
132j,
(Encl.
in Swayne to C. O. 27/9/1905 No. 207).
45.
Robert Hesso Italian Colonialism in Somalia
op. cit.,
p.
138-141. According
Eo
Hess, the Italians
were anxious
to
prevent
the Sayyid from joining hands
with
the
anti-
colonial movements
in Italian Somaliland. They
were
therefore happy to
see.
the Sayyid's
raids
turning in the
direction
of
British Somaliland
and
Ethiopia. For
a more
detailed
study of
the Sayyid's influence in Italian Somali-
land
see
C Cesario La Somalia Italiane
(Rome)
1935.,
p.
94-194;
Lso
Carosellij
op. cit-s-IT-160-165.
105
out.
The dispossessed
and
desperate Esa Mahmud fled into
the British Protectorate,
settling at
Hudin. From the
latter
place,
they
sent a
delegation
to the
commissioner
at
Berbera to
apply
for British
protection.
The
commis-
sioner
informed the Colonial
office
that
"the
gist of
their
argument was
that the
Italians had
established
the Mullah in their
country without consulting
them
or making any
provision
for their future livelihood: that
the Mullah
was constantly raiding
them
and
that they had
appealed..
in
vain,,
to the
Italians for
protection"
*46
The
commissioner made representations
to the Governor-of
Italian Somaliland
and
the latter
sent an official
to try
and effect a modus vivendi
between the, Esa Mahmud
and
the
Sayyid. Having
made several
trips between the Sayyidts
camp at
I llig
and
the Esa Mahmud, the
official reported
that he had
succeeded
in
persuading
the, Sayyid to
re-
admit
the Esa Mahmud to Illig,.
and
to
refrain
from
raiding
them. A
good number of
them
returned.
to Illig but
some of
them
refused
to do
so
for fear that the Sayyid
would not
honour his
promise.
As for the Rer Mahad,
a catastrophe
befell. them
in September
1907,
when
they
were attacked
by the Dervishes
near
Galadi, in the
southern
Mijjertein Country.
-The
Rer
Mahad lost
eleven men.
9
seven rifles and a
lot
of stock.
They took to their heels
and, made
their
way
into the
British Protectorate.
9
near
Bohotleh--,
The
tUen-acting-
Commissioner,
Malcolm Jones,
gratae on
the
grounds
that
declared them
personae non
46.
C. O. 55/8 Cordeaux
to C. O. 9/1/1907
(Intelligence
Report),.
10
G
"they
are now and will continue
to be
a source
of
trouble
with our
tribes
owing
to the likeli-
hood
-I
may say
the
certainty
-
of
friction
arising. over
the
question of grazing rights
and watering at
the
wells.
The
second and
more serious objection
is that I find the
posi-
tion
created
by their
presence
irregular
and
calculated
to lead the Mullah,
with whom we
are at peace,
to
suppose
that this
administra-
tion is
prepared
indirectly to take
sides against
him in his
quarrels with
the Mijjertein"'47
The
acting
Commissioner,
even without waiting
for instruc-
tions from London,
asked
the Rer Mahad to leave the British
territory,
and although a
few
of
them
compliedp
the
majority
ignored the
order, preferring
to
confront
the
British-protected tribes
rather
than the Dervishes.
Another
area of
turmoil during this
period of
the
renewed
Dervish
offensive was
the Ogaden,
where
the
Sayyid's
clansmen,,
the Bagheri,
were
the
chief
instrument
of
this
offensive.
Their target
was
those
sections of
the
Ogaden Somali
who
had
either refused
to throw in their lot
with
the Sayyid,
preferring
to
remain neutralo and
those
sections which were openly
hostile to the Sayyid- In June
1907, the Bagheri
upon receipt of
direct
orders
from the
Sayyid to
raid and
loot the Ba Hawadleh in the
western
Ogaden, launched
a massive attack on
their intended
victims,
looted
stock and
killed
an unknown number of
48
pr_ople.
It
will
be
observed
thato by
and
largep the
main concentration of
the Sayyid's
offensive
lay beyond
47.
C 0: 5/9 Malcolm Jones
(Acting
Commissioner)
to
C: O
/9/1907
-4
48.
C. O. 535/8 Cordeaux to H. M. Minister & Consul General
at
Adis Ababa,
4/6/1907-(Enel. in Cordeaux to
c. o. lo/6/1907)
.
10
the borders
of
the British Protectorate. Action tended
to begin
with a
Dervish
attack on a section of people
under either
the Italian
or
Ethiopian jurisdiction.,
followed by the flight
of
the
attacked section
into the
British Protectorate in the hope
of obtaining
British
protection.
Their
arrival was always resented
by the
British
protected
tribes
and
the latter
would
inevitably
organize
their
own raids against
the
new arrivals.
9
with
the
purpose of excluding
them from the limited
number of
wells and pasture areas.
The
authorities of
the British
Protectorate
were,
therefore* faced
with a very compli-
cated problem
in the
sense
that they
could not use
Govern-
ment
forces to
attack and expel a group of people running
away
from the Dervishes
and seeking refuge.
The Sayyid
was an enemy not only of
the
victims
in
question
but
also
of
the British Government itself. Thus, for the British
Goverr=ent to
attack and expel
by force
of arms a group
of people who
had
suffered at
the hands
of a common enemy
would
have
amounted
to
a masterpiece of contradiction
in
policy.
In
any case,,
the K. A. R.
and
the Militia had
not
been
established
for the
purpose of attacking and expel-
ling the
victims of
the Dervish depredations.,
but for the
purpose of
helping the
anti-Dervish
tribes to hold their
own against
Dervish
attacks.
There
was a possibilityj,
in
fact, that, had the British
authorities
insisted
on attack-
ing
and evicting
by force
of arms
the fleeing tribes.,
most
of
the latter
would
have been forced to throw in their lot
with
the Sayyid, thus
creating a situation
that
would
have
undoubtedly worried
the British
more
than the
presence of
the
undesirable refugees
in the Protectorate.
los
The British
authorities
were equally at a
loss
to know how to deal
with
their
own
"friendly"
tribes in
the
circumstances created
by the
arrival of
the
refugees.
It
could not
be denied that the
presence of
Ethiopian
and
Italian
subjeciS
in the British territory
was undesi-
rable.
Water
and good pasture were so
limited that the
British tribes
were
themsleves forced,
at certain
times
of
the
year,
to
cross
into tb Italian
and
Ethiopian
territories in
search of water and grazing areas.
The
arrival of more people,
therefore, tended to
aggravate
a situation which was already serious.
The British
authorities could not., with any
justification,
punish
their
subjects.,, who were
trying to
protect
their
wells
and grazing grounds
from foreign intruders. Thus,, the
Government tended to let things take their
own course..
but this
policy.,
far from
solving
the
problemj, worsened
the
state of
lawlessness.
The
situation was complicated
by the fact
that the Sayyid.,
whose
depredations
were
forcing
people
to flee into the British terbitory,
was nowhere
to''be
seen so as
to be tackled. The Goverment's tendency'to
turn
a
blind
eye
to the
state of
lawlessness
encouraged
various
tribal
sections
to intensify their intrnal
clashes and
to disobey: the
orders
issued by the Political
Officers.
The latter
were expected
to inVestigate
all
inter-tribal conflicts aseertain*'the
-
guilty party and
impose
whatever
fine
or punishment
that
was
deemed
appro-
priate.
In the
event of'the'convicted party refsing
to
4
comply with
the decision
of
the Political Officerso
the
latter
were supposed
to
apply coercive measures
by
using
109
either
the Militia
or,
in
case of a serious opposition.,
the K. A. R. In
practice
the
system
hardly
ever worked
satisfactorily.
In
a number of cases
the
convicted party
would refuse
to
comply with,
the
ruling of
the Political
Officers
and,
if
punitive action was suspecteds might
vanish
into the difficult
areas of
the Nogal Valley
or
cross
into
another
territory.
-
The
situation was exacerbated
by the
raids and
counter raids across
the borders
of
the Protectorate
which
took
place quite
independently
of
the Dervish
ques-
tion. The Aligheri
were a persistent
problem.
In April
1906, they
raided
the Ba-Hawadleh.,
killed ten
people and
seized nearly
lpOOO
camels.
49
When the Goverr=ent tried
to
recover
this
stock,
the Algheri
crossed-into
the Italian
territory, beyond the
reach of
the British Government.
This
unleashed a series of retaliatory raids
from the
-
Ogaden.
The
established method
for dealing
with such
inter-territorial
raids consisted
in the investigation by
the Political Officers
of
the total damage
and
loss
--
caused
by, the
raids.
In due
course,
the Government
of
the British Protectorate
would seek a meeting with,
the
Goverment
of
the territory from
where
the
raid emanated.
The latter
was also expected
to,
come with a complete
list
of
the
raids which emanated
fromthe-British, territory
and
of
the total damage
and
loss
caused
by them. Then the
claims of one
territory
were weighed against
those
of
the
other and
the territory
which was considered
to have
49.
C. O. 535/5 Cordeaux to C. O. 30/4/1906.
110
incurred the
greater
damage
and
loss
would receive
the
difference.
This
method was
far from
satisfactoryl, and
it
invariably led to further
raids.
In the first
place.,
the
tribes involved in the litigation
would make exorbitant
claims against each other when called upon
to
give evi-
dence. The
result was
that
neither side ever emerged
satisfied with whatever
decision
was reached
by the
officials, and
this inevitably
resulted
in fresh'raidso
each party
being
convinced
that the decision
which was
reached
had failed to do it justice. Secondly, it
was
all
too
easy
for the
officials
to
promise
to
collect
whatever
fine
was
imposed
or
implement
whatever resolu-
tions
were made,
but it
was never so easy
to
effect
these
in
actual
fact.
The futility
of
this
method was nowhere
better
exposed
than by'the failure
of
the tremendous
efforts
made
by Makonneno Ethiopian Governor
of
Harar,,
and-Swptyne.,
Commissioner
of
British Somaliland in March 1905, to
effect a settlement of all
the
outstanding claims arising
out of
the
raids and counter-raids
between the Ishaak
and
the Ogaden
tribes. A
meeting
took
place at
Jigjiga in
the
presence of
the
elders
from
aggrieved partiess and
the
aim of
this
meeting was stated
to be to*
"discuss
and settle
long-standing disputes
existing between the Somali tribes living
res-
pectively on
the British
and-Abyssinian
tribes
of
the border.,
as. regards raids of stock and
murders'committed
by both
parties, and
the
restitution
due for the
same".
50
50. C. O. 535/1 Swayne to C. O.
8/4/1905.
-
lii
The
meeting
lasted
six
days
and several resolutions were
made,
the
most
important
of which were
that the Ishaak
had
suffered greater
damage
and
loss
and so were
to
receive
983
camels
from the Ogaden tribes; that the
elders should swear
their
allegiance
to their
respective
Governments;
and,
lastly, that the Rer Harun
section of
the Ogaden
should
be disarmed., for it had
perpetrated
most of
the
raids.
The
meeting ended with orders
from
Makonnen
and
Swayne to their
respective subjects
to
com-
ply with
the decisions
of
the
meeting,,
but
nothing
happened for
several months.
For
reasons of prestige,
Ethiopia
sent
troopsp
but the Rer Harun
avoided
them by
retreating
into the
difficult
and unadministered parts of
the Ogaden
where
it
would
have been
very
dangerous for the Ethiopian
soldiers
to
pursue
them. In the last
resortj,
the
Ethiopian Government
requested and received
British
assistance.
The
6th-Battalion,
K. A. R.
was sent
to help
the Ethiopian
soldiers out of
their difficulties,
and
after
two
months of punitive action
in the Ogaden.
-
the
amount of stock stipulated
in the
agreement was collected
and
distributed
among
the Ishaak. The disarmament
of
the
Rer Harun, however, turned
out
to be
an
impracticable-pro-
51
position
and so
had to be
abandoned altogether.
This
limited
settlement
did
not satisfy
the Ishaak
and
it
enraged
the Ogaden tribes. It
stimulated,, rather
than
checked,
further
and more serious raids.
51. C. O.
879/87
Lt. Col. Homby
(Officer
Commanding Troops
in Somaliland) to Cordeaux 21/7/1905
(Encl.
in Cordeaux
to C. O. 27/7/1905 No. 106).
-0
112
Faced
with
the
repurcussions of
the Sayyidts
depredations
outside
the Protectorates let
alone
the
actual
imminence
of
his
return
+11
force;
with a
state of
lawlessness
arising out of
tribal feuds;
and
with
the
raids and counter raids-all along-the-border,
the Protectoratets
position-looked very grim and
desperate
in 1907. Britain
went
to
great pains
to find
a convincing
explanation
for the failure-of thesystemso
carefully and
elaborately worked out
by those
who were regarded as
experts on
Somali
affairs.
They had
advocated
the
estab-
lishment
of
the Militia
with a view
to training the Somali
in
self
defence
and with
the
ultimate
hope that
once
the
Somali had
resolved
their internal
problems and united
in
a common cause against
the Dervishesj, Britain
would wash
her hands
of
Somaliland
affairs except
for the
coastal
area.
Yet the
progress of
time
was not matched
by the
progress of
the ideal
as conceived
by the
advocates and
architects of
the Militia. If
anything,
it
was
the
reverse of
the ideal that
was actually
taking
place.
Italy became the immediate
scapegoat
for
Britaints
problems.
The former
was
blamed for failing
to
establish
an effective administration
in the
northern
part of
her Somaliland Colony. It
was
this
power vacuum.,
so
Britain
arguedj,
that
encouraged
Italian
subjects
to
raid across
the border into'the
British
territory.
52
Cordeaux
complained
that
52. C. O. 535/8 C-0. to P. O. 5/2/190T.
1I'
"with
regard
to the
general siiuation,
in
Italian Somaliland,
whatever may
be the inten-
tions
of
the Italian Government
with regard
to
future
policy,
their
policy
towards
affairs
in
Northern Somaliland during the
past
12
months,,
has been
one of complete
indifference
and
laissez faire".
53
That the Italians
exercised no effective power
over
the
northern parts of
her
colonys could not
be dis-
puted,
but Britain
was equally
ineffective
over
the
eastern part of
her Protectorate,
and
this
was
later
admitted
by Cordeaux
as
follows:
from the
outset
it
must
be
remembered
that the
weak point
in
our position, as
far
as
the Mullah is
concerned,
is the
unadminis-
tered Eastern
portion of our
Protectorate,
occupied
by the Dolbahantas Warsengeli
and a
small portion of
Ishaak tribes
.....
as
long
as
they
can
be kept
neutral, we shall not
have
much
to fear, but
once
their
weight
is thrown
into the Mullah's
scales
the
political equili-
brum
would
be
completely
destroyed".
54
The destruction
of
the
political equilibrum, which was
Cordeaux's
source of anxiety, occured early
in 1908,
when
the Warsengelip following
an arranged marriage
between the Sayyid
and
the daughter
of
the Warsengeli
Sultans threw their
weight
into the Sayyid's
scale and
placed all
facilities
of
Las Khorai
port at
the disposal
of
the Sayyid for the
purpose of purchasing arms and
for
trade. The Sayyid duly informed the Commissioner
of
the
Warsengeli decisions
warning
him that thenceforth the
British
ought
to
refrain
from interfering in Warsengeli
affairs.
It
was
hard for Cordeaux to believe that the
news was authentic and,
in
order
to
ascertain
the truths
53- C. O. 535/11 Cordeaux to C. O. 14/5/1908.
54.879/100 Memorandum by Cordeaux
on
the
affairs of
the
Somaliland Protectorates 1/10/1908.
111
he
sent a
Goverment dhow
on a normal patrol
duty to
Las Khorait disregarding the Warsengeli
warning
that
no
more
Government dhows
should
be
sent
to Las Khorai
or
to
any other part-of
the Warsengeli
coast.
To demonstrate
their
seriousness,
the Warsengeli
opened
fire
on
the
dhow
as
it
approached
the
coast and
forced it to turn
back.
55
.
Whereas Britain
constantly complained against
Italy's failure to
restrain
her
subjects
in the
northern
portion of
her
colony, she was, at
the,
same
time,
so
determined to
avoid confronting
the Sayyid
again.,
that
whenever
Italy
proposed anything
like
an
Anglo-Italian
joint
action against
the Sayyid, Britain
always
turned
it down. The idea
of an
Anglo-Italian
action was
brought
up
by Italy in 1908,
and
it involved the
proposal
that
Britain
and
Italy
should send warships
to blockade the
northern coast with a view
to
cutting off
the Sayyid from
the
outside world., and
thats in
addition.,
Britain
should
send a message
to the Sayyid to the
effect
that,
since
he had
violated
the Illig Agreements he
should no
longer
count on
Britaintsfriendship
and assistance.
56'
Italy
was
not willing
to
send
this
message
herselfo
and# obviouslyj,
the
reason was
that
she
did
not.. wish.
to
aggrav'ate,,
the-
already
delicate Italo-Dervish
relations.
Cordeaux
quite
rightly advised
the Colonial Office
against sending such
a message.
The idea
was vw* ridiculouss since'at-no
time had the Sayyid
ever counted on
Britaints friendship
55. Douglas Jardines The Mad Mullah
of
Somaliland
op. cit-p
p.
161.
56. C. O. 535/11 Cordeaux to C. O.
6/6/1908-
or assistance.
115)
With
regard
to Italy's
proposal
for
a
joint
I
blockade
of
the
northern coast..
both the Colonial
office
and
Cordeaux
rejected
it
on
the
grounds
that Italy had
hitherto
refused
to
establish an effective administra-
tion
on
the
northern portion of
her
colony and
that.,
unless
Italy
undertook
to do this, the blockade
would
have
no'practical effect.
57
Britain's
argument was
probably right,
but the idea
was worth
trying in
view of
the fact that
all
the
other methods
had
so
far failed to
check
the Sayyid's
growing power.
Thus Britain's
rejec-
tion
of
the idea
of an
Anglo-Italian
approach
to the
Dervish
problems and, worse still,
Britain's
adamancys
led to
a strained relationship
between Britain
and
Italy.
Britain
went as
far
as accusing
the Italians
of
deliberately trying to instigate the Sayyid to
raid
the British Protectorate. Britain's feelings
were
vividly expressed
by Col. Gough, Inspector General, K. A. R.
j,
when
he
stated
that
t'I
was so convinced of
the
probability of
the
Italians
endeavouring
to draw
us
into hostility
with
the Mullah, that I
wrote a memo on
the
subject early
in July last
year.
Everything
that has
occured since
has
confirmed
this
impression
....
The
only remark
that I
would
like to
make
is that Italian
co-operation
is
a
broken
reed".
58
The Italian
point of view with regard
to the
Dervish
problem was
thatj, by
violating
the Illig Agree-
ment,
the Sayyid had ipso facto become
a rebellious
57. Ibid.
(Minute
by Read).
58.535/11
Memorandum by Col. Goughp Inspector General
of
the K. A. R.,,
on
the
situation
in Somaliland.
lo/6/19o8.
Italian
subject.
Nevertheless, the Italians
maintained
that
since
the Sayyid
was an enemy of
both Britain
and
Italy he,
ought
to be tackled by both the
countries.
Italys in fact, drew
up specific plans as
to how the
joint
military'action should
be
organized..
but the'
Colonial Office
made
it
clear
that
"Our
position
in
regard
to the Mullah is, that
the Agreement
of
1905 is
still
in force,
except
in
so
far
as
it
can
be held to have
been
abrogated
by the Mullah's
violation of
the Agreement
with
the Italians
on which
the
former depended. It is true that there have
been
a number of petty raids
by the Dervishes
into
our
territory, but these have, I think,
been
no more serious
than
-the
collisions
which are continually
taking
place
between
other sections of
the inhabitants
of
Somali-
land,
and we are not
in
a position
to
say
that
our own
tribes have
entirely refrained
from
meddling with
the Mullahts
own people
or with
tribes
which were
known to be in
sympathy with
him
....
We
can
hardly join
-the
Italians
and
the Abyssinians in
regarding
him
as an actual enemy,
however
grave a
danger
he
may
bej,
potentially
"59
Bottomleyts tendency to
play
down-the
gravity
of
the
situation was nothing more
than
wishful
thinking
on
his
part.
A
more accurate assessment of,
the
state of
affairs was made
by Winston Churchill,
then Under Secre-
tary
of state
for the
colonies,
in 190T. It
was
he
who
first
shattered all
the
myths
that had
come
to
surround
the
whole novel
idea
of
the Militia'.
He had just
completed-an extensive-tour
of
various
British-overseas
territories.
-
The tour,, had
taken
him to'Maltao Cypruso'Somalilando.
the East Africa
Protectorate, and
Uganda. 'Although many'of
his
recommen-
dations and views were not accepted
by his
superiors,
the
59. C. O. 535/12 Minute by Bottomr
on
A. de Bosdarix
Italian Ambassador in London., to P. O. 23/4/1908.
tour
confirmed
the development
of
his imperial thought in
a constructive
direction. With the
single exception of
Somalilandp Churchill
supported
Chamberlaints doctrine
of
developing Britaints
"great
estates" overseas.
In the
East Africa Protectorate, for
example,
he
gave encourage-
ment
to the
settlers and, at
the
same
time,
urged
them to
strive
for
racial
harmony. And in Uganda he
advocated
the
ambitious
idea
of constructing a
dam
across
the
Victoria Nile
at
Jinja to harness the Ripon Falls. It
was
in Uganda,
more
than
anywhere else,
that Churchill
conceived a most promising
future
and
found himself
most
at home; having been
welcomed
by the
smartly
dressed
pupils of
Buddo School
with
the
appropriate song of*"Oh
10
dear,,
what can
the
matter
be?
",
he had tea
and construe-
tive discussions
(football
being
one of
the
main
topics)
with
the Kabaka. He
also
toured the.
country with
the
Governor, Hesketh Bell,
and got a
first hand
picture of
the development
schemes.
The impression he
got of
Somali-
land
was a sharp contrast;
it
was
barren
and
bankruptp
and
seemed
to him to be the
symbol of
the irrationalities
of
the
partition of
Africa.
60
Following his
visit
to Berbera in October 1907.,
Churchill
wrote a
long
report
in
which
he
exposed
the
weak points
in the Militia
system,
the
worthlessness of
60. Ronald'Hyam,
-.
Elgin
and
Churchill
at
the Colonial Office,
190,5-1908
(Macmillan(
19bb,
chap.
10. Churchill,. W. S.
(1674-1965). Entered Parliament 1901; "changed from Con-
servative
to Liberal 1904; Parliamentary Under-Secretary
for the
colonies-Dec. --1905
to April 1908;. President
of
Board
of
Trade 1908-10; Home Secretary, 1910-11; first
Lord
of
Admiralty 1911-15; Minister
of
Munitions 1917;
Secretary for
war and air
1919-21; Colonial See. 1921-22;
Chancellor
of
the Exchequer 1924-29; lst Lord
of admiralty'
1939-40; Prime Minister 1940-45
and
1951-55.
110
L

the Protectorate
and
the
real
imminence
of
the Dervish
massive attack.
Churchill
came
to the
conclusion
that
either
Britain
should
bring in troops
and more personnel
to
pacify
the Protectorate
and
defeat the Sayyid
or,
if
such a course could not
be
contemplatedj,
Britain
should
withdraw
from, theJnterior
and
limit her
administration
to
the
coast.
Although Churchillts ideas
were vindicated a
couple of years afterwards,,
the immediate
reaction
to his
report was very
hostile.
Commenting
on
the
unsound economic and political
position,
Churchill
pointed out
that,
"the
general position
in Somaliland is'not
satis-
factory
either
from
a
financial
or military point
of view.
The
revenues of
the
country which are
raised entirely on
the
coast might
be
sufficient
to
maintain a moderate civil and military estab-
lishment for the
purpose of
holding the
seaports
and patrolling
the
coastline.
They
are
far from
sufficient
to
support
the forces
necessary
to
rule
the interior,
and-there
is
no
likelihood
of
their becoming
so.
A
permanent grant-in-aid of
not
less than Z60,, 000
a year
is indispensable
to
the
present policy and
to the
armed strength
involved;
yet
this
expenditure and
these forces
do
not
in themselves
afford any real security
to the tribes
within our
demarcated bordero
and
a
large
expeditionary
force
must
be
sent with
that
object
if,
at any
time the Mullah
advances
in
earnest".
'
61.
Churchill
was equally critical of
the Tribal Militia
system
on
the
grounds
that the Goverment
rifles
issued to the
Militia
were
being
used
in
"impartial
depredations
upon neighbours not
similarly armed, and, upon refugees,
from-the,
Mullah's territory,,
*62
He
was also very
doubtful
whether
the
6th
Battalion, K. A. R.
61.
c. o.
879/97 uA
minute on
the Somaliland Protectorate", by
Winston Churchill., 28/10/1907.
62.
Ibid.
ii
and
the Standing Militia
were capable of
forming the back-
bone
of resistance
in the
event of a
determined Dervish
attack.
He
concluded as
follows:
"It
is
scarcely possible
to imagine
a more
uncomfortable situation.
In
spite of a
military expenditure utterly
disproportioned
to the
resources or
the
value of
Somaliland,
no security
is
obtained.
By far the
greater
part of
the British
sphere-is not
held
at all
and our obligations
to the friendly tribes,
which are always
invokedj,
are already plainly
in default. Yet
even
the
small portion of
the
country which
is held
cannot
be
main-
tained
against any serious attack".
63
Without
even waiting
for
a
discussion
of
his
report
by the
Cabinetj Churchill instructed Cordeaux that
should
the
Sayyid
make an advance.,
there
should
be
no attempt
to
oppose
him buto insteads
every effort should
be
made
to
defend
only
Berbera
pending
the
arrival of reinforcements.
Furthermore he instructed Cordeaux to
suspend
the
construe-
tion
of
forts
at
Burao
and
Sheikh, then in
progress* saying
that
"the
policy of making small
forts in the heart
of wild countries, which cannot
be held in
suffi-
cient
force, is
nearly, always
to be
condemned".
Such forts,, he
contended, while not serving any useful pur-
pose, provided
the
enemy with an easy
target for
attack.
64
In Churchill's
opinion,
Britain
must choose
either
to
send a military expedition
that
would
destroy
the Sayyid's
power once and
for
all or
to
withdraw
from
the interior
with a view
to
administering
the,
coastal area.
The first
alternative,
in,
-Churchill's
view, could not
be
contemplated
becausej,
quite apart
from the fact that the
Sayyid
was an
Italian
subjectp
the
whole
idea
of confronting
63.
Ibid.
64.
Ibid.
r) " N,
the Sayyid
and
thereafter
of establishing an effective
administration was out of
the
question
for financial
reasons.
The
second option, namelys withdrawal
from the
interior,
was all
that
remained,
in Churchillts
view, and
so should
be
adopted.
Churchill then
went on
to
pinpoint
certain economic advantages
that
would accrue
from the
policy of coastal concentration and one of
them
was
that
it
would
lead to
a reduction of
the
military establish-
ment
to
something
like 500,
and
this, in turn,
would
result
in
a saving of nearly
Z29,500
per annum.
The
total
expenditure of
the Protectorate during the 1906-
1907 financial
year
had
amounted
to Z107,100,
against
65
the total
revenue of
Z38,000. The deficit
was made up
by the
grant-in-aid
from the Treasury. Thus, Churchillts
argument
that the Protectorates far from being
a profit-
able enterprise, was actually a
burden to the British
tax-payero
could not
be disputed.
Both in the Colonial Office
and
Foreign Offices
Churchill's
report was opposed
by
nearly everyone who was
called upon
to
express
his
opinion.
Lucas
of
the Colonial
office, felt it his duty to
warn,
that
"there
is
considerable
danger in
abrupt change
of policy-and what we
have been.
-doing
has been.
most carefully
thought
out.
Our
policy
is to
have
a
few.
regular-troopso a standing
Militia
and a
tribal Militia,
gradually
to
organize
the Somali for defence,
and
to have
a working
compromis'e'between"shutting-ourselves
up-at
one., or..
two
ports and attempting
to hold
a,
large
stretch*, of country.
For
you cannot,
hold the
coast
in
any security. unless you
have
posts a
little inland.
-It
has been
all working-very
well and
in the direction
of economy and
I
am
obliged
to
express my great-regret
that there
65.
Ibid.
ow
should
be
a sudden
break involving the
proba-
bility
of renewed suspicion and unrest".
66
Read too
came out strongly
in
support of
Lucas. The
former,
upon receipt
of
Churchill's
reporto summoned
a
meeting consisting of
Cordeaux, then
on
leave., Gough
and
Hannyington,
an officer of
the
6th
Battalion, K. A. R.,
and
a
joint
memorandum was
issued
afterwards.
Among their
objections
to Churchill's
policy of coastal concentra-
tion, they
stated
that it
was
impossible to
rule
the
coast without ruling
its hinterland,
for
no sooner would
the interior be
abandoned
than the Sayyid
would return
in full force. The
abandoned pro-British
tribes
would.,
in
such circumstances,
have
no choice
but to
reconcile
themselves
with
the Sayyid
who would otherwise raid and
loot them. Ultimatelys therefore the
entire
interior
would rally
behind the Sayyid
and proceed
to threaten the
British
on
the
coast, or at
least,
stifle
the trade
of
the
coast
by
witholding goods
from the interior. The Memoran-
dum further
pointed out
that
wtthdrawal
from the interior
would
damage Britain's
prestige
in the
eyes of
both her
colonial subjects elsewhere and
the
other colonial powers.
In
case
Britain
would
lose
prestige
in her
colonial pos-
sessions elsewhere as a result of
her
withdrawal
from the
interior
of
Somaliland,
anti-British rebellions would
66.
C. O. 53519 Minute by Lucas
on
Churchill to Malcolm
Jones 20/11/1907. Lucas C. P.
(1853-1931).
Entered
C. O. 1877,
Asst. Under-sec. June 1897,
chiefly con-
cerned with
West Indies
and -Eastern
Colonies
and
Somaliland., Author Historical Geography
of
the
British Colonies; Head
of
Dom1n1ons dept. 1907-1911.
-A
r 1
144,
inevitably take
place, and should she
lose
prestige among
her
equals such as
France, Italy
and
Germany,
she would
have difficulty in
maintaining
her international
status
and reputation as a great power.
Moreover.. Britain had
signed
treaties
with several countries,
including
Ethiopia, by
which she
had
accepted various obligations
such as
the
prohibition of repugnant practices such as
slavery., slave
trades
smuggling of arms, excessive con-
"Mrcg-Vc
sumption of nlaot4e
drugs
and alcohol and many others;
if Britain
were
to
withdraw
from the interior-she
would
have
no means of
honouring
what she
had
undertaken
to do
in the
said
treaties.
67
From the
strategic point of view., withdrawal
was opposed on
the
grounds
that Ethiopiao
whose
dis-
integration
was expected anytime, might,
(in
the
event
of
its disintegrating) become
a
target for
scramble
between European
powers.
In
such a scramble,
it
was
argued,,
Britain
would
have
an advantage over
the,
other
European
powers
by having the British Somaliland Pro-
tectorate
as a springboard.
68
The Foreign Office,
when asked
to
offer
its
opinionj. came out strongly
in
support of,
the
views,,
,
already expressed
by the Colonial Officeo
and added a
new
dimension to the
sentiments
hitherto
expressed,
by
stating
that Britain
ought not
to
abandon,
the interior
67.
C. O. 535/9 Minute by Read
on
Churchill's
proposals
for
change of policy
in Somalilands 25/11/1907.
68.
Ibid.
14
of
Somaliland because
she
had
a moral obligation
to
pro-
tect Ethiopia,
a
friendly
country against
Dervish
assaults.
Sir E. Grey,
elaborating on
this
particular
point of view, said
that
"if
the British troops
and political officers
were withdrawn
from the
positions now occupied,,
the Mullah
could only
interpret
such action as
meaning
that he is to be left
a
free hand
so
long
as
he lets Berbera, Bulhar
and
Zeila
alone;
and a raid on
the Somalis in Abyssinia is
more
than likely to
result"
*69
It is interesting to
note
the
somewhat contradictory atti-
tudes
adopted
by the Colonial Office
and
the Foreign Office
regarding
Britain's interests in Ethiopia. The Colonial
Office
wanted
to
retain
the Somaliland Protectorate
so
that it
might
be
used as a
base'during the
scramble
between
Europeans
powers
for Ethiopia in the
event of
the latter's
-collapse.
In
other words, so
far
as
the Colonial Office
was concerned,
the
question of protecting
Ethiopia
either
from European
powers or
from the Sayyid
was none of
Britain's
concern.
Far from it., Britain
would partake
in the
scramble
for Ethiopian territory. The Foreign
Office.,
'on the
other
hand.,
supported
the idea
of retaining
British
administration
in the interior
of
Somaliland
so -
that it
might check and counteract
Dervish depredations
in Ethiopia. Greys however, did
not say whether
he
con-
sidered
it Britaints duty to,
protect
Ethiopia from
other
European
powers
in the
event of
the
collapse of
Ethiopia.
Against this
array of arguments.,
Churchilfs
report stood no chance of acceptance.
Nevertheless,
69.
C. O.
879/100
F-0- tO C-0- 15/5/1908 No.
12%
nothing of what was said would make
Churchill
relent-fmm
his
convictions, and
he defied his
critics
to
refute,
point
by
point,
the
various concrete
facts that he had
exposed.
He
saids
inter
alia.
that
"it
is
not
denied that. the friendly tribes
whom we
have
armed
do in fact
raid
their
neighbours with weapons supplied
by-H. M.
Government; that in the
event of
the Mullah
advancing..
large
reinforcements would
be
needed;
that in that
case, pending
their
arrival,
the bulk
of
the Ishaak tribes
would
be left to their fate; that
garrisons
--would
be isolated in impregnable
posts at
Sheikh
and
Burao
which would require
relieving
forces
within a
limited
period
of
time; that
neither
the Italians
nor
the
French
are such
fools
as
to
waste
their
money on attempting
the interior
control of
their
spheres of
influence in Somaliland
....
I
am all
the
more convinced
that the
policy
of coastal concentration
in Somaliland is
indispensable
unless an
improper
waste of
public money
is to be incurred,
".
70
-
Although Churchill
was
left
with no choice
but
to
concede
defeatO he
was convinced about
the desirability
for
change,
for-he believed that the
status quo could not
last long. His idea
of
the
policy of coastal, concentration
having been thrown,
overboard.,
Churchill
submitted an alter-
native proposal which was
that the British Protectorate
should
be
amalgamated with
Aden. In defence
of
this
pro-
posal,
he
stated
that the destinies
of
the Protectorate
and of
Aden
were
inextricably. intertwined.,
and., as a-
matter of
fact,,. Britaints-, interests in Adenvere the
original raison
aletat
for Br'itinls
acquisition-of
the
Somaliland Protectorate. He
went on
to
argue
that
70. C. O. 535/10, Minute-by Churchill 19/l/1908,.
on
Mr. Read's
Minute
on
Churchill's Proposals for Change
of
Policy in
Somalilando
25/11/1907.
12
4'-.
s
"Aden
is the
one place where all
the threads
of
the Somaliland tribal
politics combine.
Close
Aden to Somaliland trade
and
there is
no
tribe
that
cannot
be
pinched right up
to the Abys-
sinian
border
or
the Italian territory"
*71
From the
point of economy,
Churchill
saw many advantages..
one of which was
that,
should amalgamation
be
accepted,
the two territories
would
have
one overall administrative
officer
instead
of one
for
each as was
then the
case.
Where there
was unnecessary
duplicity
of services and
departments, there
would
be
a merger, as
for instance,
it
would
be
possible
to
"Join
the
armed
forcess interchange the
subordinate political officers;
let Aden
count
on
Somaliland troops, if
need
be, for
a siege,
and reinforce
Somaliland if there is
a
distur-
bance
72
The
proposal received
favourable
response
in
the Colonial Office
not so much on
the
strength of
its
either economic or administrative merits as
because it
mentioned
the
very wish which
the Colonial Office had
aiways cherished, namely,
to
shift responsibility
for
the Somaliland Protectorate to
someother
Ministry
or
anybody else who was prepared
to have it. Antrobus,
ventilating
the thinking in the Colonial Office.,
commented
that..
"I
wish
India Office
could
be induced to take
Somaliland. It
could
be
managed
from India
through Aden
much more easily
than from England
....
When
we were
taking
over
the-Protectorate-
from the Foreign Office,
we represented
that
India Office
ought-to
take-Somaliland
but the
71. C. O. 535/10
"Extract
from Churchill's letter to Sir
F. Hopwood
(rermanent
Under-see. C. O.
)
14/12/1907.
72. Ibid.
India Office
objected and persuaded
the Cabinet
to decide
against us".
7.3
Unfortunately for Churchill
and
the Colonial Office, the
India Office,
once more refused
to take
over
the Somaliland
Protectorate.
During the
second
half
of
1908, the
state of
affairs
took
a sharp
turn for the
worse
from the British
point of view.
As
already noted,
the Sayyid
won
the War-
sengeli over
to his
side
in 1907
and
then
made use of
Las
Khorai
port
for the
purpose of augmenting
the
volume of
his importation
of arms and ammunition.
The Sayyid'S
strength
both in
arms and
in followers-,
was,,,
by the
middle
of
1908, beyond dispute.
74
The Sayyid had, in
-
addition
to buying
arms and enlisting various
tribes to his
side.,
paid considerable attention
to the task
of organizing
the Dervish force. The Dervish force
consisted of nine
divisions, the
most powerful of which was
known
as'Sheikh
Yalay..
and was commanded
by the Sayyid's
unclej.
Omar
Hassan* This division
was about
1., 000
strong and was
composed, mainlys of
the Ba Ararsamao the Aligheri, the
Khayad., the Mahomed Gerad
and
the Hassan Agaz. The
second
divisiong known
as
the Ba Ba Galo-Wein,
was
900
strong and was commanded
by Musa Abdille
and
Yusuf
Abdille. This division.,
popularly referred
to
as
"the
73. C. O. 535/10 Minute by Antrobui
on
"the
eitract
from
Churchill's
letter to Sir F. Hopwood" 14/12/1907.,
Antrobus R. L'
(1853-1942).
Entered-C. O. 1877; Asst.
Under-see. 188T1909;. Senior Crown Agent 1909-18.
74. C. O. 535/9 Somaliland Intelligence Report for July
1907P 13/8/1907. According to this
report,
by the
end of
1908 the Sayyid had
succeeded
in
winning over
the
support of
the Warsengeli, the Bagheri
and a good
secti6n of
the Southern Mijjertein.
12
men who made
the Gallas 'run
away"s consisted chiefly of
the Nur Ahmed.. the Yehya,,
and
the Wais Deria. The third
division
was called
the Darbash; it
consisted of
600-
Dervishes drawn,
mainly,
from the Adan Madobap
and
the
Ba Arasama. The Men-Allah
was
the fourth
and consisted
of
the Bagheri, '
and
the Aligheri; it
was
800
strong and
was undr
direct
command of
the Sayyid
and
his
uncle-
Rahim, Hassan. The Tar-Goyar
(literal
meaning,
"men
who
out
the telegraph")
was
the fifth division
of some
700
Mijjerteins
and was commanded
by the Sayyid's third
wifei.
Hasna Doreh. The
sixth was
known
as
the Indo-Badan''
(literal
meaning
"many
eyes");
it
was
600
strong and was
commanded
by the Sayyid's fifth
wife,,
Berni Mahamed. The
seventh
divisionp the Rar-Hun,
(literal
meaning..
"bad
men")
consisted of some
470
Bagheri
and
Ogaden tribesmen. The
division is
said
to have
won
the derogatory title
on
account of
their
poor performance
during
a
looting
opera-
tion
on some sections of
the Mijjertein. The
eighth was
called
the Ba-Ogdon,
and was
based:, in the Bagheri
country..
The British knew
very
little
about
this
particular
divi-
sion, except
that it
was commanded
by
an
implacable
enemy of
the British,
one named
Fareh Kharshi. Last,
but
not
least,
of
the Dervish divisions
was
based in the
Warsengeli
country;
it
consisted of some
2,30 Dervishes.,
under
the
command of
the Sayyid's
sixth wifei,
Shanneh
Ali. Besides these'-major divisions.
-the
Dervishes held
small posts
in
places
like Halin, Bohol
and
Waraba.
75
75. C. O. 535/12 British Somaliland Intelligence Report for
Sept
.
l9o8.17/11/19o8. See
also
Sheikh Jaamac Cumar
Ciise,
op. cit. p.
32-33.
1
Towards the
end of
1908, the Sayyid had
every
reason
to feel
so confident as
to intensify his
offensive
against
the British.
-In
his
characteristic style,
he-
sent a number of
letters, to the Commissioner in
which
he
complained
against
the
conduct of
his
opponents.
-In
one
of
them he
stated, among other
things, that
we also complained against
the Italians
wh;
*esterj
incite
and annoy us very much, and
.
curse us
in
every way.
Being
cursed
is harder
for
us
to bear than having
our necks out off.
They
(the
Italians)
also captured our
dhow
and
hoisted
a
flag
on
it; they
also poisoned my
son who came
to
me very
ill
and
died
on
his
arrival;
his
property
is
still with
them. The
Mijjertein have
also captured
a
dhow belonging
to
me
loaded
with silk, and
the Italians did
not give
this back to
us
....
We
must-explain
to
you
that
we
do
not
know the Italiansj, but
we only
know
you,, and
the
good or evil
that they
do towards
or against us we attribute
to
you.
This is the
case with,
the Abyssinians too. We
have
only one ear
(sic)
and
if
we want
to have
peace and
to become friendly
we ask
it from
you
and not
from
anybody else.
Now.,
you
Cordeaux.,
try to do
good
to
us and not
harm,
and
let
us
be friendly
and give
back to
each other
his
property
** 76
Whether the Sayyid's
allegations were authentic
or not,,
the, importance'ofthisletter
lies in the light it
throws
on
the Sayyid's
attitude
towards his
relations with
the British,
and
the Italians. The Illig Agreement.
which
was supposed
to have
converted
him into
an-Italian subjecto
is
not even cited.
Heholds the British.
accountable-,
for
whatever problems
he
might encounter, making
it
abundantly
clear
that,
ftwe
do
not
know_the Italians., but
we only-know
you, and
the
good or evil
that they do towards
or, against us, we attribute
to-you. This is the
case with
the Abyssinians too".
76. Douglas Jardineo The Mad Mullah
of
Somaliland
op. cit.
p.
163-164.
12
In'August 1908 the Sayyid
went a step
further
by
sending a
definite
ultimatum
to the Commissioner to
the
effect
that the British
should withdraw
their
posts
from Bohotleh
and
the Ain Valley
or else
be
prepared
for
a resumption of open
hostilities. He then, informed the
Commissioner that
as
the Warsengeli had defected to his
side,
he
would come-to
their
assistance should
the
British take
punitive action against
them for their
defection.
77
The Sayyidts
ultimatum and
demands threw the
'Protectorate Goverrment into
great panic and confusion.
Cordeaux
sent a
telegram to London
explaining
the
new
developments
and proposing
immediate
emergency measures
to
cope with
the
situation.
Firstly, he
suggested--that
the
earlier
Italian
proposal
-
which
had been turned down
-
for
an
Anglo-Italian joint blockade..
-be
accepted.
Secondly
he
proposed
the
withdrawal of
the Police
post
from Bohotleh,
saying
that
owin&to
the-remoteness-of the
place,,
it
was
very vulnerable.
The Colonial Office
naturally would not
object
to the latter
proposal
but it turned down the first
proposal, understandably,
because it
would
have
reflected
unfavourably on
Britaints
prestige.
Having
opposed
the
Italian initiative towards the-idea
of an
Anglo-Italian
approach
to the Dervish
problemp
Britain
would'have caused
suspicion
in Italy, by bringingup the
same
idea, that
she
had
rejected only-a
few
months earlier.
The third
emer-
gencyZwhielf
was proposed
by Cordeaux
and accepted
by the
Colonial
Office
was An&-that
the
6th
Battalion, K. A. R.,
77. C. O. 535/11 Cordeaux to C. O. 22/8/1908.
-
hitherto
confined
to
a radius of
fifty
miles
from the
coast, should
be
sent
to the'Ain Valley'for the
purpose
of patrolling
the'area
and ascertaining
the Sayyidts
real
intentions.
The
other
intention for
sending
the
6th
Battalion, K. A. R., to the Ain Valley
was,
to
create an-
impression.,
albeit a
false
one, among
the^Dervishes that
CL
the British Goverment
was -, -, --osition
to defend the Pro-
"n4P
tectorate.
This
point was
hammered home in COrdeauxts
reply
to the Sayyid in
which
he
stated
that,
"with
regard
to the'men
whom
the Government
sent
to Bohotleh
and
the Ain Valleyp
you must
know
that-the
reason
for this is because'of the
troubles
caused
by the Buraad
(i.
e.
highway
robbers) and
the Warsengeli,
and not
because'
our mind
has turned from
peace
....
I
wish
to
inform
you., and you are aware.,
that the War-
sengeli are
British
subjects and
they
will
have
to
answer
to the British Government
alone
for
their
acts of
hostility. For this
reason,
I
cannot'call my men
from those
places
but
must
send more men
to
protect
the
people
from these
raids and
to keep the
peace".
78
This
exchange'of
letters,
soon gave way
to the
actual exchange of physical violence.
In September-1908
the-6th Battalion
was attacked
by the Warsengeli in the
Ain Valley. The
attackers were severely
handled'and
put
to flight, but'not before they'had
severely wounded
Lieut.
Rose. The
attackers
lost
a
few
of,
their'men but
could not
be
pursued
into the inhospitable
parts of
the Ain'Valley
79
This
partic
I
ular'confrontationo
the
where
they
vanished.
first
major'one,
between, the'British forces
and-the
Der-
vishes since
the-terminat ion-'of-the fO'Urth'expeditionii
was a cornerstone'in'the,
developmentS
which were
to follow.
78. C. 0
879/100
Cordeaux to Sheikh Mahomed bin Abdullah,
n.
d:
(Encl.
to Cordeaux to C. O. 26/8/1908 No. 15)
79. C. O. 535/11 Cordeaux to C. O. 12/9/1908.
"1
lt.,!
The Sayyid, it
will
be
recalled,
had
already warned
the
British
authorities against
their taking
punitive action
against
the Warsengeli
on account of
their defection to
the Sayyid's
side.
Cordeaux had
replied
to the
effect
that the Warsengeli
were
British
subjects and would
be
punished
if they disobeyed the British Goverment. The
confrontation of
September
wass
thereforeo
a
test
case
in the
sense
that the British had, true-to their
word,
inflicted defeat
on a party of
the Warsengeli;
would
the
Sayyid honour his
pledge
to
protect-the
Warsengeli?
The Warsengeli
were
the bone
of contention
between the Sayyid
and
the British,
and nmte of
the two
contenders seemed prepared
to
give
in to the
other.
In
order
to forestall
whatever retaliatory measures
the
Sayyid
might
have
made,,
Cordeaux
persuaded
the British
Government to blockade the Warsengeli
coast with a view
to
stifling
the
economic
life
of
the Warsengeli. This
was a policy which
Britain had
all along opposed ando
in
retrospect,, one
is inclined to think thato
probablys
more
tangible
results would
have been
achieved
if Britain
had
accepted
Italyts initial idea
of an
Anglo-Italian
blockade than
whatever was supposed
to be
achieved
from
a
blockade imposed by Britain
alone.
Britaints
actions
however,
can
be-defended by the
argument
that
at
the time
the Italians
proposed
the imposition
of an
Anglo-Italian
blockade the Sayyid had
not
become
a real
danger to the
British.
Now that the Sayyid had
not only given an ulti-
matum
to the British Government but had
also attacked
British
soldiersp
the
reason
for Britain's
earlier objec-
tion to the Italian
proposal, which was
that Britain
was
L;
unwilling
to
provoke
the Sayyid,
or at any rate,
to
initiate
new
hostilities,
was no
longer
relevant.
In
November igo8,. Britain dispatched,
a n=ber of warships
to
blockade the Warsengeli
coast.
80
Within
a
few
months of
the blockade,
a
handful,
of
Warsengeli
who were
beginning to feel the
pinch of
the
blockade
approached
Cordeaux
with a view
to
reaching some
negotiated agreement.
As
soon as
the
news of
this
rappro-
chement reached
the Sayyido he
sent a
force
of
200
armed
Dervishes to
attack
the
waverers, and another
force to loot
Eil Dab. In
retaliation*
Cordeaux
asked
for,
and acquiredo
two
companies of am
Indian Infantry from Aden to
garrison
81
Las Khorai. The blockade
and
the
garrison.,
however., had
very
little
practical effect on
the
situation, and, although
the Warsengeli did
eventually
defeat from the Sayyid, the
reasons
for their defection had
nothing
to do
either with
the blockade
or
the
garrison.
In fact, both the blockade
and
the
garrison were withdrawn after only
five
months
owing
to the
approach of
the
south-western
monsoon and
Kharif
winds,, which would
have
made
life
unbearable
for
the Indian
soldiers and
the
crewyof
the
warships.
The defection
of
the Warsengeli from the Sayyid
was connected with
the
severe
loss
of prestige
sustained
by the Sayyid towards the
end of
1908. The Sayyid's
troubles began
as
far back
as
1907
when
two
of
his-top
advisers,,
Abdullah Shaheri
and
Deria Arraleh, defected
from him
and
joined the
service of
the Italians in Aden.
80.
C. O.
879/100
Cordeaux to C. O. 13/11/1908 No. 93.
81.
c. O.
879/100
Cordeaux to C. O. 12/2/1909.
"1
i
The Sayyid denounced them
as
traitors
and
informed Cordeaux
that.,
"I
sent people
to
you who
I believed
were on my
side,
but I
now
find that they
are
likely to
make mischief
between
us.
They do
as
they like
and give
troubles to
me;
therefore I
shall not
be
responsible
for their doing. I do
not
trust
in them".
8.
The defection
of
Abdullah Shaheri
and
Deria Arraleh
was a
great
blow to the Sayyid; he
was so outraged
that he
killed the
entire
family
of
Abdullah Shaheri,
and
then
composed a poem
in
which
he boasted
about
his
actions.,
The
poem which was addressed
to Abdullah Shaheri
went
as
follows
:-
1. Whether
you
tremble like the
people of
Attosh
(sic)
when
the disaster fell
on
them;
2. Whether
you shed
tears
or whether
(like
a
wounded
lion)
you rage;
3. Whether
(with
a purpose
to disguise)
you
cover your
face
or make
it tense because
of anger;
Whether
you
hunt for
revenge or whether
you ensnare someone;
Whether
you
humble
yourself
to the
position
of a
disciple
or whether you make a.
living
as a
broker;
Whether
you
beg the English
who are
like dogs
as
if
you are
begging God;
82.
C. O. 535/8 Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan to Cordeaux
n.
d.
(Encl.
in Cordeaux to C. O. 5/4/190T.
") I
7. Whether
you are a man on whom calamity
has befallen,
or whether you
lament
with
Grief,
8.
In the
middle of
the
night while you are
asleep, whether you
have
nightmares and
jump;
9. Whether
you make an offering
for those
who
were
devoured by the hyena;
10. Whether
you wear a
dagger
or whether a
mourning cloth perpetually
covers you;
11. Whether
you
file
accusations
(in
the
courts) or whether you argue with
petitions;
12. Whether
you wander
in the
countryside and
the
wilderness and you rebel
from
us;
13. Whether
you wail or whether you cry
like
(a
moaning)
Camel;
14. Oj, Son
of
Shaheri!
you will never see your
sons agains,
15. And
you are
like
an
Amhara
and
like the
impure People.
Towards the
end of
1908.. Abdullah Shaheri
and
Deria Arraleh
went
to Mecca
on pilgrimage and returned
with a
letter
purported
to have been
written
by Sheikh
Salih, the head
of
the Salihaya Tariqa.,
-the
very man
to
whom
the Sayyid
professed absolute obedience and reverence.
The
gist of
the letter
was
to the
effect
that,
owing
to
the Sayyid's high-handedness in the
way
he treated his
fellow Muslimst Sheikh SalLh
would
have
nothing more
to
do
with
him
nor would
he
recognize
him
as a
true
member
10
ty
of
the Salihiya Tariqa. All in
all, 'the
letter denounced
the Sayyid
as an
infidel
and an
insane
man.
Although'the
Sayyid dismissed the letter
as a
fake.
'as
it
might mwell,
have beeno
83
it
nevertheless caused no
little
commotion
in
the Dervish
community and among
the tribes-whichhad
hitherto
supported
the Sayyid. The
majority of,
the Der-
vishes seem
to have
accepted
the Sayyid's
rebuttal of
the
letter but
a
few did take the letter to be
authentic and
actually organized a coup
dtetat
against
the Sayyid. The
coup
dletat
was
foiled
and'its engineers were executed.
*,
JL';
""-
othersXexiled or excommunicated.
Nothwithstanding the Sayyid's
efforts
to dis-
credit
the Mecca letter, it had
adverse effects on
his
leadership, the
most serious effect
being the disaffection
and
defection
of many of
his followers
such as
the War-
sengeli and'a good section, of
the., Dolbahanta. The British
lost
no
time in
capitalizing on
the. letter,
with a view
to
causing,
if
possible.,,
total desertion,
of
the Sayyidts
followers. Firstlyo the Protectorate
authorities pro-
duced
several copies of
the letter
and
distributed them
in Aden
and
throughout the Protectorate. Secondly,
a pro-
posal was made
to the Foreign Office that the latterp-_
-
83.
Sheikh Jaamac Cumar Ciise, Tarikh-op.,
cit. p.
96-97
According to Ciise, the Meocea
I-e7fter
was a result oi a
conspiracy
between Abdullah Shaheri-and-.
some, religious
teachers
of
the Salihiya Tariqa in Mecca. He
contends
that
Abdullah-Shaherij,.
whose
defection from-the Sayyid'Was
not
yet
known by Muhammad Salih..
complained
to the latter
about
the Sayyidlsconduct-..
-
Muhammad Selih then-, dictated
a
mildly-worded
letter to his
secretary
in
which
he
admonished
the Sayyid
and advised'him
to
change
his
alleged
behaviour.
The
secretaryo
however,
was
bribed by Abdullah Shaheri.
and
a
few
religious
teachers, to
change
the text
of
the letter
and
the,
result was
the letter
which
Abdullah Shaheri
brought
with
him
on
his
return
from Mecca.
A
JL
taking
advantage of
the
good relations
then
existing
between Turkey
and
Britain,
should ask
the Sultan
of
the
former
country
to induce the leaders
of
Mecca to
make a
formal denunciation
of
the Sayyid. The British
ambassa-
dor to Turkey., however,,
when requested
to
express
his
opinion on
the
matter, advised
the British Government
against
taking the
proposed
line
of action., saying
that
the Sultan
of
Turkey
exercised no real
influence
on
the
leaders
of
Mecca.
'In
the
ambassadorts viewo
Turkey
would
simply make
herself look
ridiculous
if
she acted
in the
sense
desired by the Somaliland Governmento
since
Mecca
was more
than likely to ignore Turkey's
suggestion
ors
at worst, she would magnify
the issue
and
thereby
spark
off quarrels
in the Muslim
world.
84
The
effects of
the Mecca letter
seem
to have
been
only
temporarys for the Sayyidfs
power.,
far from
fadingo
seemed
to
grow
from
strength
to
strength.
Had
Britain taken
advantage of
the Warsengeli
disaffection
by
establishing an effective administration
in the Warsengeli
country as well as giving
the Warsengeli
military support,,
the
situation would probably
have
changed
radically.
But
Britaints
apparent
indifference
to the Warsengeli disaffec-
tionp let
alone
to their
plight at
the hands
of
; M& Dervish
retaliatory attacks, meant
that
a good section of
the
Warsengeli had
no choice
but to
reconcile
themselves
with
the Sayyid,
while
those
who were
determined to defy him
did
so with
their
own resources and at
their
own risk.
84.
C. O.
879/100
H. M. Ambassador in Turkey to F. O.
4/4/1909
(Encl.
in F. O. to C. O. 16/4/1909); The Italian
Transla-
tion
of
the Mecca letter...
see
Caroselli.
op. cit.
P.
129-
131.
LJi
By the
end of
1908 the Nogal
and
the Ain Valley
had
already
fallen to the Dervishes. The Somali tribes,
hitherto friendly to Britain,
were
forced to flee in
panic
to Haisamo
and
Hudin. In March 1909.. Gough
admitted
the
failure
of
the Militia
system and urged
the British Govern-
ment,
to
abandon
it
altogether.
The
main
difficulty facing
the Militia
seemed
to be that the Dervishes
were superior,
not only
in
numbers
but
also and
this
was
the
most crucial
point
-
in
morale.
The British tribes,
apart
from being
on
the defensive,
were more
involved in their internal
squabbles
than in their
worry about
the Dervishes. The
latter,
on
the
other
handp
were
disciplined
and united
in
a common cause.
The Dervishes
who were, on
the
offensive,
normally made surprise-attacks on
their intended
victims
and
the latter invariably fled
upon
the first'advance
of
the Dervishes.
85
By December 1908, the Somaliland Government:,
could no
longer
escape
from-the fact that the
security
position was rapidly
deteriorating,
and
help from
outside
was
imperative. Cordeaux informed the Colonial: Office in
this
senses and
the, latter
responded
by
sending a rein-
forcement
of
400,
men of-.
ihe
K. A. R. from Nyasaland., U-ganda
and
the East Africa Protectorate.
-In-'additions
the India
Office
was requested
to hold-in
readiness
half-an Infantry
battalion
at
Aden to-proceed tothe'Trotectorate
in the
85.
C. O.
879/100
Memorandum-by Col. Gough
on
the Situation
in Somaliland
14Z3/1909
(Encl.
in Cordeaux to C. O.
18/3/19og, No. 126.
)
event of
the Sayyid launching
a
big
offensive.
86
In
spite of
the foregoing-precautionary
measures..
Britain
was
becoming increasingly
uncomfortable at
the
pros-
pect of resuming active campaigns against
the Sayyid. In
fact, it
was
Cordeaux's
persistent
demands,
accompanied
by
his
alarming reports,
that
gradually compelled
Britain to
take these
measures.
Hence,
while acceding
to Cordeaux's
requests,
the British Government did
not
fail to
warn
him
that.,
-
"His
Majestyts Goverment
are'not prepared
to
entertain
the
question of sending an expedition
against
the Mullah
and
they
are anxious
that
no
action should
be taken
which might entail
the
despatch
of an expedition
to
extricate any of
our
troops from Burao
or any other post
in the
interior. Subject to. this
condition,,
His
Majestyts Government
approve of your continuing
to hold Burao
87
This
amounted
to
saying
that the troops
should not
take
any
action unless
the Sayyid
actually
did
advance.
Having
made all
those
precautionary arrangementsj
Cordeaux.,
and
indeed the British Goverrment,
waited and
hoped that the Sayyid
would
begin his
attack
in full force.
The Sayyid
who
had
apparently got wind of
the
preparations
on
the British
side,
decided to
play a waiting game.
He
wrote more
threatening letters
and made a number of raids
but decided to
stay out of reach of
the British troops
which were stationed at
Burao
and
the Ain Valley, in
accor-
dance
with
instructions from the Colonial Office. Thus.,
86.
C. O.
879/100
C. O. to War Office 11/1/1909 No.
64.
87.
C. O.
879/100
C. O. to Cordeaux
.
30/11'/1908 No.
46.
410
I
ti i-I
the
situation remained
tense but indecisive. The Colonial
Office
was exasperated and
the Treasury irritated by hav-
ing to
sanction expenditure
to
solve an apparently
insoluble
problem.
To
make matters worse,
the Nyasaland
Government
was pressing
the Colonial Office
either
to
use
the Nyasaland
soldiers
for
a
definite
purpose or else
to
return
them to Nyasaland
Where'they were needed.
The
soldiers
themselves
were growing
impatient
with
having
to
wait
for
an enemy who was nowhere
to be
seen and
whose
intentions
were unknown; moreover
the Ain Valley
was particularly
trying
on
their health.
88
Thus., the
British Government
was
forced to
come
to
some
definite
decision
and, once mores
there
seemed
to be
only
two
alternative courses open
to Britain,
namely, either with-
drawal
-
partial or complete
-
or conquest.
The latter
alternative, as already noted,
had been
ruled out, and
the formers
while advocated
by
people
like Churchillp
did
not commend
itself to
all
those
who claimed
to have
the
strategic
interests
of
Britain, the
welfare of
the
Somali.
people,
the
glory of
the British Empire
and
the
philanthropic reputation of
the British
people, at
heart.
Before
coming
to the
painful
task
of choosing
which., of
the two
altematives,, should
be'adoptedv the
British Government thought it
worthwhile
trying
other
possible methods.
One
proposal which was conceived
by
the Colonial Office
and communicated
to Cordeaux
was one
88.
Sir G. Archer, Personal
East African Administra'
0
N. 4 2- %o-r 0
iland Pr
s of an
tor tuilver & boya
.
6za. ) is
Archer
was
The Governor
of
ectorate
from 1912 to 1922.
14-3
whichj,
in tone
and spirit, amounted
to blackmail. The
proposal was
to the
effect
that Cordeaux
should capitalize
on
the
arrival of
the K. A. R. troops by, informing the Savyid
that he
was
in
great peril as more
troops
were already on
the
way
to Somaliland
with a view
to launching
a new expedi-
tion
against
him. Having
said
this, Cordeaux.
should
then
express
Britaints
sympathy with
the Sayyidts difficulties
in
obtaining sufficient
food for his followers,
and should
pardon
him for
all
the
previous
Dervish depredations,
explaining
that the
said
depredations
were
forced
upon
the Dervishes by
sheer necessity.
Cordeaux
was
then to
conclude
his
communication
by
offering
the Sayyid
an annual
subsidy of
Z2,000
provided
he
promised
to
stop
his hostility
to the British.
89
Cordeaux thought the
proposal was absurd and
unrealistic and
he
accordingly
informed the Colonial
Office that he
was not prepared
to.
act
in the
sense
desired by them. He
argued
that
any raprochement
by the
British towards the Sayyid
would confirm
the latter's
belief
as
to Britain's
weakness and
helplessnesso--a
factor that
was
likely to
make
him
start
his
major offen-
sive sooner
than if he
were
left in
suspense.
-
The
other
possibility,
in Cordeaux's
opiniono was
that the Sayyid
might accept-the, subsidy
to
purchase more arms
for his
90
raids.
The, last,,
and most-interesting
innovation
as
to
89.
C. O. 535/12 Minute, by Read
on
Gough to C. 0.17/11/1908.
go. C. O.
879/100
Cordeaux to C. O. 16/12/1908 No. 57.
141
the
possible solution
to the Dervish
problem came
from
an
individual by the
name of
Sir A. Pearse,,
at
the
very
time
when
Britain
was at
her
wits' ends
to find
a solution
'
which
did
not
involve
either withdrawal or military
inter-
vention.
Presenting himself
as
the
possible answer
to
the long-standing Dervish
question,
Pearse*
stated
that
"I
used
to
meet
the Mullah
at
Berbera in
olden
days
and
have followed his
career.
I think he
is
now a
difficult
nut
to
crack
....
Still I
think he
can
be
squared
-
it
might
be
a some-
what
dangerous job to
go
to him but it
would
be
possible and must
be done in the
company of one
or
two
of
the best
of
the devout
of our own
Somalis. I
am quite prepared
to
go
but
with a
good military man
to
report on
the
situation and
see
if
we can gethold of
the Mullah
and
find
out
what
terms he
requires
for
a complete restora-
tion
of peace
...
I think he
could
be
persuaded
to leave
us alone
....
n9l
This
was a masterpiece of
jingoism, bearing
no relation
to
the facts
of
the Somaliland
situation, and
Cordeaux,
when
asked
to
express
his
opinion, quite rightly rejected
it.
The fact that Pearse had
met
the Sayyid
at
Berbera
many
years
back
was no sound reason
for
supposing
that he
could
persuade
him to lay down his
arms.
People like Pestalozza
had
met and
dealt
with
the Sayyid
on very
intimate terms
and yet
they
could not exercise any
influence
on
him
as
far
as
the Dervish
cause was concerned.
In
any case
it is
not
known
whether
the Sayyid thought highly
of
Pearse$
or
indeed., if he knew him
at all.
No
stone was
left
unturned
in the
search
for
a
solution
to the Dervish
problem,
and
it
seemed
that
Britain had
no choice
but to
go
back to the two
alternative
choices
which she
had
all along shuddered
to think
about,,
91. C. O. 535/13 Sir A. Pearse to Reado 13/12/1908.
142
namely,, either withdrawal or pacification.
With
a view
to
making up
her
mind one way or
the
otherj,
Britain
sent
Sir R. Wingate to the Protectorate in April 1909,
with
instructions to
study
the Somaliland
problem and
then
recommend
to the British Goverment
as
to the
policy
to be
adopted.
4
CHAPTER III
FROM WINGATE'S MISSION TO DUL MADOBA
(1909-1913)
Sir R. Wingate.. then Governor
of
the Sudan,
arrived
in the British Somaliland Protectorate in April
1909,,
accompanied
by General Rudolf Baron
von
Slatin
(commonly
known
as
Slatin Pasha)
who was
then Inspector
General
of
the Sudan. In the
course of giving
Wingate
instructions
as
to the
precise nature of
his
assignment,
the Colonial Office
was careful
to
warn
him
against
the
possibility of
forming the
opinion
that his
appointment
had been
motivated
by loss
of confidence on
the
part of
the British Government in the
abilities or
judgement
of
1
the Commissioner, Cordeaux. It
was claimed
that the
mission
had been
necessitated
by the fact that
"matters
appear
to be
entering on a phase when
it is
necessary
to
consider our
future
policy
in
Somaliland in
relation
to
other
British
or quasi-
British
possessions
in North, East Africa,,
-and.
I-
have therefore desired to
enlist your co-opera-
tion because
you-possess
in
an exceptional
degree
a
knowledge
of
the
political problems affecting
the
whole of
that
portion of
Africa"2'
The
assumption underlying
the
choice., of
Wingate
for this
mission was-that
his
experience
in, the Sudan
and
1. C. O.
.
879/100
C. O.
--,
to Wingate 15/4/1909 No 134.,
..
Captain
Cordeaux-joined the Indian Army in 1894;
Lecame
.
Assistant
Resident, Berbera.,
-1898;,
Deputy, Commissioner., Somaliland
1904; Commissioner
and
Commander-in-Chief
of
the British
Somaliland Protectorates 1906-1910.1
.I
2. C. 0-879/100 C. O. to Wingate 15/4/i9O9 No. 134.
14
Egypt., both
countries with
large Muslim
communities., would
enable
him to
understand and
handle the
problems of
British Somaliland,
which was also predominantly
Muslim
and
had
some affinity with
the Arab
world.
3
Wingate's
career
in Northern Africa
went as
far back-as1883,
when
he joined the Egyptian
army.
He
was
later
appointed
A. D. C. to Sir E. Wood, the Sirdar
of
the Egyptian
army.
In 1887 Wingate became
assistant adjutant-general
for
Intelligence,
and
two
years
later the Director
of
Military
Intelligence. He held the latter
post until
1899,,
when
he
was promoted
to the Governor-Generalship
of
the Sudan.
Wingatets
assistant on
this
mission,
Slatin
Pasha,, had
also spent a
long
and
distinguished
career
in
the Sudan. Both Slatin
and
Wingate had
played an
important
part
during the
suppression of
the Mahdist
movement., and
Slatin had been
captured
by the Mahdists
and
imprisoned.
at
Dara for
eleven years.
In 1895 he
escaped
from
cap-
tivity
and, on return
to Khartoumo
was appointed
Wingate's
deputy in the Intelligence Department.
-He
became Wingate's
close
friend
and confidant
but
a
bitter
enemy of
Kitchener,
the Governor-General
of
the Sudan. Early in 1899 Slatin
could not stand-Kitchener any
longero
so
he
resigned.
He
returned
towards the
end of,
that
year_following
Kitchener's
departure
and
the
succession
to the Governor-Generalship
of
Wingate.,: Slatin
was, appointed-Inspector-General of
the
Sudan,
a post which was specially created
for him
only
to
be
abolished when
he
resignedin
1914. During his tenure,
of office,,
Slatin became
a very powerful
influence in the
3. Robert Hesso Italian Colonialism in Somaliland
op. cit.
Chapt. I
and
II.
1415
administration of
the Sudan. He
was an
Austrian by birth
and a
doubtful Muslim
convert.
He
was notorious
for his
habit
of switching
from Islam to Christianity
and vice-
4
versa as
the
circumstances suited
him.
Before the
arrival of
the
missions
Cordeaux
was
briefed by the Colonial Office
about
the
purpose
for
which
the
mission was
being
sent.
In
addition
to the
points
already communicated
to Wingateo Cordeaux
was
informed
that
"the
present
Somaliland
question
iss indeed,
a
troublesom,
pressing, and
difficult
one
but it
is
only part of a
far larger
question which
appears
to be
coming up
for
settlement shortlys
namely,
the
policy
to be
pursued
by this
country
in N. E. Africa
generally on
the death
of
Emperor
Menelik,
and
the
probable
break
up of
Abyssinia.
This is
a matter of serious concern not only
to
Somaliland but to the Sudan, the East Africa Pro-
tectorate
and
Uganda,
and
it is desirable that
the four
administrations should not only
be
pre-
pared with some common plan of action when
the
eventuality arises,
but
should employ
the inter-
val
in taking
such measures as are possible
to
meet
it.
"
5
The
above
despatches tend to
create
the impression that
the British Somaliland Protectorateo hitherto
a
backwater
in Britain's
colonial
interests, had
suddenly
become the
focal.,
and
indeed
crucial, point
in Britaints interests in
Eastern
and
North Eastern Africa. In theorys therefores
Wingate's
mission was supposed
to
study
the Somaliland
situation
in this light
and
then
recommend
to the British
Government
such a policy
for the Protectorate
as would
4.
Gabriel Warburgo The Sudan Under Wingate: Administratia
in the Anglo-Eg:
an-
Sudan, lbgg-lglbj, (Frank Cass
and
Co. Ltd. )p
1971
P.
6. This Is
a scholarly study, which
is based-on
a
Ph. D. thesis, University
of
London, 1968.
C. O.
879/100
C-0- to Cordeaux 15/4/1909 No. 133-
1
115
reconcilej,,, on
the
one
hand., Britain's
need
to
safeguard
her imperial interests
in the Horn
of
Africaq
and... on
the
other,
her
anxiety
to
avoid any costly adventures
in the
Protectorate.
This
was an attempt
to
reconcile
the irre-
concilable.
Hence, Britaints
position
in Somaliland
was
paradoxical and self-defeating
for,
notwithstanding
the
proclaimed
importance
she attached
to the Protectorateo
she was,, at-the same
times
already committed
to the
policy
of withdrawal
from the interior
of
the Protectorate
long
before the
appointment of
Wingate's
mission.
Indeed, the
Governmentts decision to
withdraw
-
partially or entirely
was communicated
to-Wingate in
a
despatch
which stated
that
since
Britain
was
decidedly
opposed
to the
policy
of military
intervention
"some
alternative policy
to that
of catching
and
killing the Mullah
must
be determined.
Faced
with
the difficulties
of
the
situation
as a whole,
tired
of
having to
remain
indefinitely
on
the defensive,
weary with
holding
a worthless country at great military
and civil costs, a great
body
of opinion.
is
tending
more and more
to incline
with
favour
towards
a policy of complete evacuation or.,
as an alternative,
to
a withdrawal
to
certain
positions on
the
coast.
Evacuation
or such a
withdrawal would
in themselves be
satisfactory
to H. M. Govermment if,
after consideration of
the.
pros and cons, you could recommend either
one or
the
other of
these lines
of action.
Such
a policy should, of coursep
be
considered
either as combined-with,, -, -or.
apart
from'. the
policy of subsidizing
the Mullah.
"
6
6.
c. o.
879/100
C. O. to Wing
-
ate
15/4/
-
1909 No. 134. At the
Cabinet
meeting of
25th November 1908-(See CAB 37/100/107)
the
consensus of opinion was
in favour-of
withdrawal,
It.
was reported at
this
meeting
that the
previous expeditions,
which
had failed to dispose
of
the Dervish
movement,
had
cost
92-;
ly
million, and
that the
average annual grant-in-aid
was
Z6OxOOO. There be-ing
no
proof
that further
expedi
.
tions
would
fare
any'better.,
it
was
decided that, in the
first
place
the Sayyid
should
be
persuaded
to
accept a
peaceful settlement and,
if that failed
-
and
Earl Crewe,
the Secretary
of
State for the Colonies,
pointed out
that
it
would certainly
fail
-
Britain
should withdraw
her
administration
to the
coast.
147
Thus, it
will
be
observed
that
whatever was
stated, about
the Protectorate's importanceo let-alone
about
Wingate's
exceptional
knowledge
of
the
politics of
North-
East Africa, the Missionts
choice was
limited to two
options
-
namely,
to
recommend either complete evacuation
or withdrawal
to the
coast.
Yet, it
will
be
recalled
that,
when
Churchill
advocated
the latter
policy
in 1907, he
was
severely critized
by the Colonial Office, the Foreign
Office
and
the Somaliland
administration on
the
grounds
that
withdrawal
from the interior
would undermine
Britaints
position
both in Somaliland
and other
British territoriess
damage her
reputation and prestige among other
European
powers, reduce
her
effectiveness
in
meeting
her treaty
obligations and
tarnish the
philanthropic reputation of
the British
people.
7
The interesting
paradox of
the
newly
announced policy was
that,
while still professinj
to be
concerned with all
these ideals, Britain
was now committed
to the
very policy which
had
earlier on
been denounced
pre-
cisely
because it
would
have
rendered
their
realization
difficult. In fact, the
new policy went
further than
Churchill
ever
did by
contemplating
the
possibility of
total
evacuation.
It
would seem
that the Goverrment.
ts
official
/
pretence as
to the
reasons and circumstances
which
led to
the
appointment of
the
mission was motivated
by the
need on
the
part of
the British Government to
shield people
like
Cordeaux
and all
those
connected with
the disgraced-Illig
7. C. O. 535/9 Minute by Read
on
Churchill to Malcolm Jones,
Acting Commissionero
20/10/1907.
1c,
LL
Peace Agreement
and
the Militia from
embarrassment.
The
real explanation
for the
appointment of
Wingatets
mission
was
Britain's disillusionment
and
disappointment
with
the
Militia
and
the Illig Agreement
upon which
Britain had
placed
her hope
of
finding
a
lasting
solution
to the Pro-
tectorate's
problems.
Five
years of
trial
had
already
shattered
this hope
ands so
far
as
the British Govermment
was concerned,
there
was nothing
left
except
for Britain'
to
wash
her hands
of
the Somaliland
affairs and concentrate
her
attention on some other worthwhile
territories. The
British Governmentj it
would appear,
did
not wish
to
pub-
licize these factsp for to do
so would
have
reflected
unfavourably on
those
public officers who
had been involved
in the
propagation md subsequent
implementation
of
the
Militia
and
the Illig Peace Agreement. Hence, Wingate
was
assigned
the impossible task
of using
his
exceptional
know-
ledge
of
tIm
politics of
the
area
for the
purpose of recom-
mending a pre-determined policy.
The Colonial Office hoped,
evidently,
that if the
official position of
the British
Government
was made clear
to Wingate, the latter
would
endorse
the fait
accompli,
in
utter
disregard
of whatever
might
have been his
personal convictions&
This
would
have
been
very convenient
for the British'Government..
'which
was
anxious
to
avoid
being
accusedin
the Press-and Parliament
of acting arbitrarily and'foolishlys especially
in
case
withdrawal resulted-in some serious repercussionso as
indeed
Id.
),
it
was
bound to do.
Wingate
and
Slatin
arrived
in Somaliland
at a
time
when
the Protectoratets
administration was on
the
verge of collapse.
Apart from the
mounting
Dervish
pres-
sure,
the
problem of
transport
was proving
to be insur-
mountable, especially
during the
rainy seasons.
While it
was already a
difficult task to induce the Somali to
sell
their
camels and ponies
during the dry
seasons,
it became
almost
impossible to do
so
during the
rainy seasons.
The
main problem was
that the beginning
of a rainy season was
always a signal
for the SomaliO hitherto
confined
to the
limited
number of wells and grazing areas,
to
move at
liberty throughout the
area.,
taking
advantage of
the
abundant water and good pasture.
9
This
state of affairs
meant
that
not only was
it difficult for the
administra-
tion to locate the Somali
with a view
to
persuading
them
8.
The British Goverment
could not, of course,
have failed
to
anticipate
trouble in the
post-withdrawal periodo
but
there
seemed
to be
no other alternative.
The Somaliland
question
had thoroughly
vexed
the
most skilled statesmen,
and
the feeling that it
was
intolerable for the Treasury
to
continue spending so much money on a country which was
neither productive nor grateful, was genuine-among
the
high
ranks of
the Liberal Government. Withdrawal
was not
the kind
of policy
that the Liberals
would
have
recom-
mended without
having tried
every-other conceivable
solution.
One
writer observes
-
and correctly so
-
that
"throughout
the
whole range of,
British interests in
Africa, it
was only
in Somaliland that the Liberals
deliberately diminished the
area of responsibility
they
inherited"
(R.
Hyam, Elgin
and
Churchill
at
the Colonial
Office, 1905-1908
(Macmillan)
19M. P.
360.
9. Colonial Report for 1934 No. 1707
P.
7:
"Plentiful
rain
brings
good grazing
for the
camels and ensures
the Somali
a generous supply of camels' milk.
In this
condition
the
Somali
may
be
compared. with
the traditional Irishman.
When
well primed with
the liquor
of
his
country,
the latter
brandishes his
shillelagh and
looks for heads to
crack;
the
Somali
sharpens
his
spear and
begins to think
of
blood-
fueds to
settle and
flocks to loot.
"
-1
to
part with some of
their
animals
but..
even
those
who
could
be locateds
were most reluctant
to
sell
their trans-
port animals which
they themselves
needed
to facilitate
their increased
scale of movement.
Moreover,
many
Somali
who would normally sell
their
animals
during the hardships
of a
dry
season, out of need
for
add,
itional
means of sub-
sistence, would
have
no need
to
wish
to
sell
their
stock
during the
rainy season when
food
and water were
in
plenty.
10
Col. Gough,, the Inspector General
of
the K. A. R.
sounded a warning
to the Colonial Office to the
effect
that
unless
immediate
steps were
taken to
alleviate
the
transport
problem
the
position of
the
military
forces in
the Protectorate
would
be
untenable, more especially
should
the Sayyid take
advantage of
the
rainy season
to
attack
the troops
stationed
in the Ain Valley
and raid
the
scattered pro-British
tribes. He
pointed out
that,
"it
is desirable to lay
stress on
this
ques-
tion
of
transport,
as without
transport the
force in the
country can only cover a very
limited
area.
Also if the Dervishes threaten
to
make raids or even advance on any place
we will
be
unable
to
operate against
them.
He
suggested
that, if
at all
Britain intended to
retain
her hold
on
the interior
of
the Protectoratep
she should
acquire a properly organized and
fully
equipped
transport
camel corps
from India
without
delay. The Colonial Office
remarked
that
10. Sir G. Archer, Personal
and
Historical Memoirs
of
An East
African. Adminisrrajik, (Oliver &
Boyd)
1963
p.
64-65.
11. C. O. 535/14 Gough to C. O. 16/2/1909.
ill")' I
"the
cost of
these
camels
is
clearly
beyond
our means; and
if
we cannot even maintain our
position at
Burao
without
them, there
will
be
no alternative
but to
withdraw
to the
coast.
"
12
The Cabinet
met again on
10th March 1909
and
the
general
opinion was strongly
in favour
of withdrawal
to the
coast;
the Treasury
was not prepared
to incur the
necessary
expense
for
solving
the transport
problem, and a
decision
had
already
been taken
not
to
send any more expeditionary
forces to fight the Sayyid.
On
arrival
in Somaliland, Wingate decided to
give a
trial to the idea
of negotiating a settlement with
the Sayyid. This
was a policy which
had been
contemplated
during the
earlier years and rejected on
the
grounds
that
it
was unrealistic.
The Colonial Office,
even when
they
referred
to it in the
course of
instructing Wingate
as
to
the
precise nature of
his
assignment,
did
not
hold
out
much
hope in its feasibility. The idea
of negotiating a
settlement with
the Sayyid
was peripheral
to the
policy
of, withdrawal. which was already a
decided'issue.,
but
Wingate
was authorized
to
regard
the decided
policy
tteither
as combined withs or apart
fromp the
policy o.
f
subsidizing
the Mullah",,
On 30th March Wingate
wroteto.
the Sayyid
informing
him that he had
studied all
the letters
written
by him
and
had
come
to the
conclusion
that
12. C. O. 535/lk'kinute by Antrobus
on
Gough's
memorandum on
transport
problems
in the British Somaliland Protectorate,
16/2/1909.
13. C. o.
879/100
C. O. to Wingate 15/4/1909 No. 134.
'152
"with
regard
to the
complaints which you make
in
your
letters
relating
to the
raids which
the
'Government
tribesmen
made on your people, we
desire to inform
you
that
we
have
made all
inquiries
on
this
subjects and
it
appears
to
us
thaVyour
people were
the
aggressors
in the first
pla6e and
it
was
they
who
began the disturbances
esoo
It is beyond
all
doubt
and should
be
well
known to
you
that the highest
aim of
the Govern-
ment which
it
earnestly strives
to
attain
is to
bring, in
every possible way, prosperity, peaces
and
tranquillity to the
creatures of
the Almighty
Even if
anything
has
occurred which you con-
sider
to be
wrong, we assure you
that it
could
never
be
attributed
to the
representative of
the
Governments Capt.
dordeaux,
who conforms
in
all
his doings
and
decisions
with what
is
right and-
strictly
Just"14
The letter
concluded with an
invitation to the Sayyid
either
to
come personally
to Berbera
or
to
send
his
agents
to
negotiate a settlement with
the British.
The letter
was
delivered to the Sayyid by two
messengers who were
detained for two
months and
then
sent
back
withl5ur
letters
addressed
to the British Government.
They
were accompanied
by
a one man
Dervish delegation in
the
person of
Hirsi Koshin
who was
illiterate
and
far
advanced
in
age.
The
arrival of
Hirsi Koshin
seems
to
have
raised
Wingatets hope in the
possibility-of reaching
a modus vivendi with
the Sayyid.,
andj,
in
order not
to
prejudice
the impending
negotiations.,
lie
appealed,
to the
administration
to
avoid any action
that
was
likely to
up-
set
the Dervishes.
15
Unfortunately, for Wingate. Hirsi
Koshin
adopted an attitude which was, as, uncompromising as
14. C. O.
879/100
Wingate
and
Slatin Pasha.,. to, the Fakir Sayyid
Abdullah-bin, Mohammed Hassan
(Encl.
in Cordeaux, to
C. O. 30/4/1909 No. 145)
15. C. O.
879/100
Wingate to C. O. 2o/6/19og No. 153.
1)i
that
shown
by Wingate in his letter to the Sayyid.
Wingate had
unwittingly assumed
the
role of a
judge
of
a case
in
which,
for
all
intents
and purposes,
he
was
supposed
to be
a
litigant by
stating,
inter
alia,
that
the
pro-British
tribes
were
innocent
of any offence and
that it
was
the Sayyid's
people who were
to blame for
all
the
raids and other acts, of
lawlessness
which
had taken
place.
He
even went as
far
as saying, more or
less, that
Cordeaux
was
infallible
and so could not
be held
respon-
sible
for
anything
that
might
have
gone wrong.
This
attitude wass obviouslys not calculated
to
win
the
good
will of
the Sayyid
and.,
if
anything,
it demonstrated
Wingatets ignorance
of
the Sayyid's
character.
Whether the
attitude adopted
by Koshin
was
in
direct
retaliation
to that demonstrated in Wingate's
letter, is difficult to determine. It is,
nevertheless,
interesting to
note certain similarities
in the
way
Cordeaux is
portrayed
by Wingate to the
way
the Sayyid is
portrayed
by his
representative,
Koshin, Wingate
asserts.,
for
example,
that
whatever might
have happened,
"we
assure you
that it
could never
be
attri-
buted to Cordeaux,
who conforms
in
all
his
doings
and
decisions to
what
is
right and
strictly
just".
With
regard
to Hirsi Koshin, his belief in the
righteous-
ness of
the''Sayyid
was equally unshakable
for he is
said
to have been
"a
firm believer in the divine
nature of
the
Mullah's
mission which
is to
purge
the
country of
Christians
whose position
in Somaliland is incom-
patible
with
the Moslem Religion,
and
to
punish
those
who aid
them"
.
15
15. C. O.
879/100
Wingate to C. O. 20/6/19og No. 153.
Id'
Wingate became
convinced
that
no
tangible
results
were
likely to be
achieved
through that kind
of
diplomacy.
At the
end of
June he-left for England to
write up
his
report which, so
he thoughto
would
form the basis
of
Britain's future
policy
in the Protectorate.
-
Throughout the
period of
Wingatets
stay
in
Somaliland the Protectorate
experienced a
lull
of relative
peace.
For
some undisclosed reason,
the Dervishes
put a
temporary
restraint on
their
raids which
had been
gaining
momentum prior
to Wingatets
arrival.
It
seems
his
arrival
took them by
surprise, a
factor
which would
induce them to
retract with a view
to
studying what
they
might
have
con-
sidered as a
forerunner to
a new
British
policy.
Wingatets
departure in June
and
the
subsequent
three
months of
in-
activity on
the
part-of
Britain
must
have
convinced
the
Dervishes that
no new policy was
being
contemplated.
In September, therefore, the Protectorate
experienced a recrudescence of
Dervish
activity.
Early
that
month, a
force
of some
200 Dervishes
attacked a
Government
post near
Burao, killing 13 illaloes
(scouts)
and seizing several oftheir. rifles.
This incident
was
interpreted by the Colonial Office
as meaning
that the
Sayyid
considered
the
negotiations
to be
at an. end.
This
feeling
was confirmed shortly afterwards when
the Sayyid
executed one of
dA0eauxts
messengers who
had delivered
a
letter to him.
16
Prior to his-departure, Wingatehad left
strict
instructions
to the
effect
that,
pending
further instructions
16. C. O. 535/15 Cordeaux to C. O. 18/9/1909.
15)
5)
from London,
all military activities should
be
suspended
under all circumstances.
Thus,
much as
Cordeaux
would
have
wanted
to
revenge
the death
of
his
messenger
by tak-
ing
reprisals against such
Dervish
elements as might
be
within striking
distance
of
the Protectoratets forces, his
hands
were
tied. He
protested
bitterly that
"it
is
manifestly unfair
that the friendly
tribes
who are at present
being held back in
order
that the
negotiations with
the Mullah
may not
be
prejudicedo should
be deprived
of
all power of recovering
the
stock which
is
being taken
away
from them by the Dervish
raiders
17
He then
sought permission
to
mobilize
the
pro-British
tribes
with a view
to
encouraging
them to
advance against
the Dervish bases in the Ain Valley,
using
the K. A. R.
troops
as
the backbone
of
this
advance.
In defence
of
this
scheme,,
he
argued
that the
pro-British
tribes
were
totally incapable
of confronting
the Dervishes
on
their
own., and any attempt
to
make
them do
so
"would
be to throw them
right
into the Mullahts
hands
....
whereas
if they
can
first
gain some
initial
success with our moral supports
they
will
be
encouraged
to
rely more on
their
own
unaided efforts
in future. If they therefore
decide to
go
forwards it
may
be
necessary
to
move our mounted
troops
up
behind them to lend
colour
to the impression that
a general advance
is
under contemplation.
"
18
In
making
this
proposal.,
Cordeaux
was obviously
acting
in
ignorance
of
the decided
policy.,
_
He
was still
harping
on
the hope that the British Government
might
be
persuaded
to
resume an active policy-against
the Dervishes.
17. Ibid. I
18. C. O. 535/15 Cordeaux to C. O. 30/9/1909.
P-
Cordeaux's
scheme was
turned down,
and one
month
later Britain
officially repudiated
the Illig Peace
Agreement. Discussion had been
going on
for
some
time
between the Colonial Office
and
the Foreign Office
as
to,
whether
the Illig Agreement
was worth retaining.
In
one
of
these departmental discussions, Fiddes,
who was
assistant
Under Secretary
of.
State in the Colonial
Office,
commented
that
"the
Mullah has broken the Pestalozza Agreement
19
into little
pieces.
Under it he
came under
Italian
protectionp
he had
an assigned residence
in Italian territory
and
he
agreed
that there
should
be
peace and accord
between him
and
the
British Government
with all
its dependants,....
He has
raided our
dependants
and
killed
our
messengers
....
The Agreement is de facto
at
an end and
it
seems
to
me
that
as a mattgr of
self respect we are
bound to
say so".
20
Fiddes
was unanimously supported
both in the Colonial
Office
and
the Foreign Office. In October Italy
was
duly
informed that,
so
far
as
Britain
was concernedp
the Illig
Peace Agreement
was
firifthed
with, and
that Britain
would
21'
henceforth
act
in
whatever manner she
deemed fit.
It is doubtful
whether
Britaints
repudia-
tion
of
the
agreement was necessary or.,
indeeds
whether
it
served any useful purpose.
With
or without
her
recourse
to this line
of action,
the document, had
never
been
a
practical proposition.
'Thus.. Britaints
repudiation of
the
agreement., while making no practical contribution
19. The Illig-Peace Agreement,
was alternatively referred
to
as
the Pestalozza Agreement.
20. C. O. 535/16 Minute by. Fiddes
on
P. O. to C. O.
-
8/9/1909.
21. c. o.
879/100
F. O. to Rodd, Britaints Ambassador in Rome,
14/10/1909
(Encl.
in P. O. to C. O. 16/10/1909 No. 182).
ai
towards the
alleviation of
the Protectorate's
problems,
aggravated
the
already strained
Anglo-Italian
relations
in the Horn
of
Africa. Italy
protested,
in
vain,
that
Britain's decision
with respect
to the Illig Peace Agree-
ment was an act of
ingratitude
since
Italy's
original
intention in
accepting
the Sayyid
as an
Italian
subject
and
her
subsequent actions were
directed towards the
solution of
the Dervish
problem which
had
vexed
the
British for
a considerable
length
of
time. Italy
pre-
dicted that the
abandonment cC
the Agreement
would
have
Ila
disastrous
moral and material effect
in
Somaliland
where
Italian
and
British interests
are
intimately
allied".
22
The
report of
Wingate's
mission was completed
in August 1909
and submitted
to the Colonial Office,
where
it
was
kept
as a carefully guarded secret
document
so
that
neither
the
public nor
Parliament
could-have access-to
it.,
In April 1910
-
and
this
was
long
after
the
policy of
withdrawal
had been
put
into
effect
-
Parliament
renewed
its demands for the
release of
Wingatets
report
but,,
as
on all previous occasions,
the Secretary
of
Stake for the
Colonies
replied
that he
was unable
to
accede
to the
request
"because
it
was never,
intended for
publication".
23
The
reason
for the Governmentts determination to
withhold
Wingate's
report were
twofold.
'Firstly.,
the-report
22. C. O. 535/16 Italian Director
of
Colonial Affairs to
H. M. Ambassador-in Rome 3011111909
(Encl.
in F. O. to
C. O. 31/12/1909)
23. The Parliamentary Debates
(authorized
edition)
1910o
Vol. XVI, April 4 to April-22,
column,
860.
-
1,5)
S"
made no secret of
the
missionts'dissatisfaction with
the
performance of
Cordeaux, his
subordinatets and a number
of officers who
had
advocated and
implemented the Militia
system.
Thus,
with a view
to
shielding
these
officials
from the
embarrassment
they
would
have incurred through
Parliamentary
and
Press
criticism,
the Colonial Office
decided to
withhold
the
report altogether.
The
most
important
reason
for the Government's
refusal
to
pub-
licize the
report was,
however, that the
policy of with-
drawal
which was put
into
effect
in January 1910,
was
contrary
to the
recommendation of
the
mission as clearly
submitted
in the
report.
The
missions
though
perfectly aware of
the
decided
policy, refused
to be
used as a rubber-stamp,
preferring
to
examine
the Somaliland
situation
from their
point of view and
to'recommend
such a policy as
they
thought
most suitable and realistic.
It
was,
therefore,
natural
for the British Government to
suppress
the"
report,
for its
publication would
have
exposed
the incon-
sistency of
the
official policy and evoked sharp criticisms
against
the British Governmento
not only
for having ignored
expert advice without establishing, andAndeed proving,
that
withdrawal was a
better
policy,
but
also
for having, tried to
use
Wingate
and
Slatin Pasha,
men of-outstanding stature
in
the Colonial e2: Ed:
e: s-- as pawns
in the ill-conceived
policies
of
the Colonial Office, It. is interesting, that Battersby.,
who
had
no clue whatsoever as
to the
contents of
the
mission's reporto guessed correctly
in 1914 that
"had
there been
a single phrase
in General
Wingate's
report which could
be
construed
in
favour
of evacuation,
they
(i.
e.
the Colonial
Office)
would most certainly
have
made
the
I
- 0
,j
best
of
it;
and
the fact that
not a single
reference
is
made
to the
report after
it had
been
received, and
that its findings have been
rigidly excluded
from the Blue Books
seemed
to
warrant
the
conclusion
that its
counsel coin-
cided onthe main
issue
with
that
of
the
Commissioner
and
Inspector General
(of
the
K. A. R.
)
which
had been
so conspicuously
rejected".
24
The
mission's unfavourable
impression
of
Cordeaux
and
his
subordinates was, evidently, prompted
by Cordeauxts
negative and somewhat obstructive attitude
towards the
pro-
ceedings of
the
mission.
The
earlier assurance
by the
Colonial Office that the
appointment
of
the
mission
did
not reflect
the British Governmentts
opinion about
his
calibre and performance of
duty did
not apparently allay
his fears that this
was actually
the
case.
Right from the
start
Cordeaux took the
view
that the
mission,
by'inter-
viewing
Somali
elders, was proof
that he
no
longer
commanded
the
confidence or respect of
the British Govern-
ment, and
that it
was
bent
on undermining
his
position.
Commenting
on
Cordeaux's
attitudej
the
report
cites an
incident
of
27 April, 1909
when
Slatin, Pasha inter-
viev! ed a group of
Somali
elders
in Berbera_in. the
absence
of
Cordeaux. Slatin
received-several complaints..
the
most
important being that the Commissioner
was a
detached
man
and never consulted
the
elders on questions of policy.
Sub-
sequent events are reported as
follows:
24. H. F. Prevost-Battersby Richard Corfield
of
Somaliland
(Edward
Arnoid Ltd. ) 1914
p.,
l
"On
returning
to the Bangalow
which
the
Commissioner had
placed at our
disposals
we
found Captain Cordeaux in
a somewhat nervous
state, and after a short
talk he declared
that he had thought the
matter over and
had
decided,
at
the
conclusion of
the
mission,
to
send
in his
resignation as
his
prestige
would
have
so seriously suffered as
to
make
it impossible for him to
uphold
his
authority".
25
Wingate tried, in
vain,
to
convince
Cordeaux that the
pur-
pose of
the
mission was not
to
undermine
his
position, and
finally
came
to the
conclusion
that Cordeaux
and
Dansey.,
the
officer commanding
the, Militia
were'adopting
that
kind
of attitude
because
ffneither
of
them fully
understands
the
character of
the
natives.
If they
were
thoroughly
acquainted with
the
way
in
which
a native
thinks
and acts
they
would recognize
that the Somali like
nearly every
Arab, is
an
opportunist and would make allowance
for
their
attempts
to
obtain what
they
suppose
are
their
rights"'26
When it
came
to
recommending a new policy
for
the Protectora te, the
missionts views were not substan-
tially different from those
expressed
in 1907 by te
critics of
Churchill's
proposal
for the
policy of coastal
concentration.
The
report admitted
that the Protectorate
was a
financial burden to the British taxpayer., but,,
at
the
same
time.,
recognized
the Protectorate
as
being
important for Britain's
strategic
interests in North East
25. C. O. 537/44 Repo:
t
on
Sir R. Wingatets Special Mission
to Somalilands
appendix
Vp
p.
26. Ibid.
p.
175. In
spite of
the
report's unfavourable
remarks about
Cordeaux, the latterts
careervas not
adversely affected.
He
was
transferred to Uganda
as
Governor in 1910, to St. Helena in 1912
and
then to
the Bahamas in 1920. This
was good evidence
that the
Colonial Office did
not
hold him
personally responsible
for the Somaliland
problems.
Africa. It
was also a vital source of supply
in food-
stuffs
for Aden. While it
would
have been
economically
advantageous
to limit the
administration
to the
coastal
strip,
the
report,
like Churchillts
critics, pointed out,
it
was
impossible,
so
long
as
the Sayyid
remained a
threat
to British interests, to
control
the
coast without control-
ling the hinterland,
and
difficult to
reconcile withdrawal
with
Britaints
claims
to
prestige and power
.
2T
The
report added a new measure
to the
arguments
advanced
by Churchillts
critics and
this
was
that
while.,
on
the
one
hands it
was
inadvisable for Britain to
with-
draw from the interior
unconditionally,
it
was, on
the
other, also
true that the British
administration was so
unpopular with
the Somali that it
was
tolerated
only
because they dreaded the
prospect of
Dervish
rule more.
In the
absence of
the Dervish threat, it
was argued,
the
Somali
who
had hitherto
professed
their loyaltyto the
British
would
happily bid farewell to British
rule.
The
tenor
of
the
argument was,
briefly, to the
effect
thatp
given a choice
between British
and
Dervish
rule.,
the
former, though
a
lesser
evil, was nearly as
detestable
as
the latter.
28
The
report sums up
the foregoing
points
as
follows:
-
if
considering all
these., facts, I doubt
whether,
under more peaceful conditions
than those
pre-
vailing,,, an evacuation of
the
country would
cause very great
distress. Undoubtedly
a cer-
tain
number of people would regret our retire-
ment-which would
damage their
private
interests
-
many receiving monthly pay
-
but
a
large
27. C-0 537/44 Report
on
Wingate's Special Mission
op. cit.
P.
i75-182.
28. Ibid,
p.
180.
1
ri 2
section of
the
population would
be indifferent
and not a
few
would
be
pleased
to
see
the departure
of
foreigners
who,
from their
point of view, were
a
doubtful benefit
....
We have
not
been
able
to
make our regime
popular and
to
gain
the
sympathy
of
the
majority of our subjects'"29
It
was,, nevertheless,
emphasized
that
Ila
retirement
from
a country which we
have
occupied and administered
for
so many years
is
at
this
moment out of
the
question.
It
would
not only expose our
tribes to the terrible
revenge of
the Dervishes, but
would also
damage
British
prestige over
the
whole worlds
in
addi-
tion to the
actual
bad
effects
it
would
have
on
the
neighbouring powers
in Africa. But
as soon
as
the Mullah
ceases
to be
a power
-
an object
which must
be
attained
in
one way or another
-
I
recommend a
thorough
re-organization
of
the
Somaliland Protectorate. "
30
The
re-organization advocated
by the
mission was
that.,
as soon as
the Dervish threat
disappeared, the Somali
"It
should
be
given
"a
real and effective
Home Rule"O the
main
feature
of which would
be
a
body
of
Akils
and
Sultans. The
former
would
form
some
kind
of representative assembly and
would
have the
power of electing
the Sultans. The latter
would
be
accountable
to the
assembly and would receive
monthly subsidies
from the British Government
on
the
express
W".
'&4
understanding
that they
iF6F-4
not cede-the
territory to
any
other power and would maintain
law
and order
in the
country.
The
missioh,
however,
recognized and admitted
the futility
of
these
administrative proposals whose realization,
depended
on
the
undertaking which
had-already been
ruled out.
The-
missionts
dilemma
was pointed out as
follows:
29. lbid
p.
180-182.
30. lbid
P.
180-182.
31
IW
e.
mg,
I
U)
"It
must
be
remembered
that, the introduction
of
this
scheme
depends
on
the disposal
of
the
Mullah
....
Undoubtedly the
only policy
-
as
long
as
the Mullah is
alive
-
is to take
such
steps as shall result
in his destruction, but
such a policy
has been declared to be
at pre-
sent outside
the
range of-practical politics.,
and we,
therefore,
refer
to it
rather
from the
academic
than the
practical standpoint".
32
The
missionts recommendations must
have
caused
disappointment to the British Government. Wingate's
insistence
upon
the
necessity
for the'destruction
of
the
Dervishes
as a pre-condition
for
withdrawal was not a new
idea in the history
of
the Protectorate.
In 1904 the
British Government had
wanted
to
withdraw unconditionally,,
but the
advocates of
the Militia had
prevailed upon
the
colonial office and successfully persuaded
the Government
to
change
its
mind.
The
argument
then
was, as
it
was now,
that it
was obligatory
for Britain to destroy
or contain
the Dervishes before
she could even contemplate'withdrawal.
It
was subsequently
thought that the Militia
scheme would
operate
towards this
objective,
thereby
enabling
Britain
to
wash
her hands
of
the Protectorate,
save
the
coastal
strip.
Similarly, Wingate's
report reiterated
Britain's
obligations
towards"her friendly tribes. Whereas, "however,
the
opponents of withdrawal
in 1904
were able
to
offer,
alternative suggestions as
to the future
policy$
Wingate's
mission simply rep eated and emphasized
the, 'case for destroy-
ing the Dervishesj, leaving the
onus of
finding the
method
for doing
so on
the'sh6ulders
of-,
the Britishbovernment.
The
reason,
it
would seem, was simply
that the
mission
could
think
of no new
ideas
short of military action
-
and
32. Ibid.
p.
282.
iG:
this
was clearly out of
the
question
-
by
which
the Pro-
tectoratets
problems could
be tackled
and solved.
For
the
past
five
years
Britain had tried, in
vain, every con-
ceivable method, ranging
from diplomacy, threats, limited
military action, commercial
blockade, blackmail to bribery.
Thus, it
would
have been futile,
and even silly,
for the
mission
to
revert
to
any of
the
above or similar method!;
which
had
already proved
ineffective
against
the Dervish
movement.
The
order
to
withdraw all
British
personnel and
equipment
from the interior
was given
to Cordeaux in
November 1909.33 Cordeaux
requested
the Colonial Office
to
remove
him from Somaliland before the
Policy of with-
drawal
was put
into
effect
because it
was
totally
repugnant
to his
personal conscience.
He
was
transferred
to Uganda
and
the Commissionership
was offered
to De Brath,
then
commanding officer at
Aden., but he
also
turned down
the
offer on
the
same grounds as
Cordeaux.
34
The Colonial
Office then
offered
the job to Manning, the
man who
had
commanded
the third
expedition
in 1903,
and
the'latter.,
surprisingly, accepted
it. If
anybody ought
to have
refused
to
carry out
the
policy of withdrawal on account
of personal conscience,
it
should surely
have been Manning
who
had
opposed withdrawal
in 1905
saying
that
33. C. O.
879/100
C. O. to Cordeaux 12/11/1909 No. 188.
34. C. O.
879/100
C. O. to 1-0- 11/12/1909 No. 203.
-J
( '.
ti
I'
"the
withdrawal of
the'administration to the
coast and
the leaving
of
the tribes to their
own
devices in the interior is
a policy which
will mean
that the
coast
iself
will
be
un-
tenable.
"
35
By this he
meant
that
withdrawal was
bound to
plunge
the
interior into
a
State
of civil
disorder
which would
have
ultimately spread
to the
coast.
Regarding the Dervish
question.,
Manning brushed
aside every
hint that., despite
their
setback at
Jidbali, they
might recoup and
become
a
menace
to the British
again.
To this fear, Manning
replied
that the Dervishes
would never recover
because
"the
practical
destruction
of-the
Aligheri
tribe during the fighting
of
1903-1904
and
their having fallen into disfavour in the
Mullah's
camp
is the
most
important factor
in the
peace of
Somaliland
... 36
Here then
was
Manning.,
the
man-who
had
opposed withdrawal
in the
most vehement
termss
accepting a responsibility
which required
him to
effect
the
withdrawal of
the British
administration
from the interior
of
Somaliland in the face
of mounting
Dervish
pressure.
Manning
arrived at
Berbera
early
in January 1910
and
the
process of withdrawal started shortly afterwards.
He
expressed
the
optimistic
hope that
although withdrawal
might
lead to
some skirmishes,
in the
course of
time
some
kind
of
balance
of, power
between the Dervishesiand
the
pro-
British tribes
would evolve.
This
prediction was not only
fallacious but-it
was also at variance with what
Manning
had
a
11
along advocated.
', NoZwith'standing
th
Ie
views
he
had
expressed
in 1905; he
came-forward with
the idea that
35. C. O.
879/87
Memorandum by Sir W. Manning
on
the Militia
Scheme for Somaliland,
4/7/1905
No. 72.
36. Ibid.
.0
ft
1-
c
"I
think that it is
certain
that there
will
be
raids and some
disorder in the interior
at
first, but in
course of
time,
a similar condi-
tion
of affairs will arise as
that
which exists
from Ras Hafoun to Obbia
where
Osman Mahmoud,
the Mullah,
and
Ali Yusuf37
are at continual
enmity and where raids and reprisals are con-
stantly occurring, and where
the fortunes
of
war
favour
at some seasons
the Mullah
and at
others
his
enemies".
38
With
regard
to the
pro-British
tribes, Manning
stated
that
"a
little
rough usage
in the future
will probably
bring
out
the
right spirit"
'39
and
by this he
meant
to
say
that
once
the
pro-British
tribes
had been left
on
their
own,
they
would
learn, through the
hard
way,,
to depend
on
their
own resources and
initiative
in
self-defence.
The
analogy
between the
situation
in the Protec-
torate
and
that
obtaining
from Ras Hajoun to Obbia
was
fallacious. The
conflicts
in the latter
region were of
a
different
order and scale
from those between the Der-
vishes and
the
pro-British
tribes. The
raids and counter-
raids
in the Ras Hafoun
and
Obbia
region were of a purely
local
nature., and
their
aims were
limited to
either cap-
turing
stock or settling a
local dispute. The
conflicts
between the Dervishes
and
the
pro-British
tribes
wereo on
the
other
hand,
rooted
in the
whole question of
British
colonial position
in Somaliland. The Sayyid had declared
37. Osman Mahmott d
(or
Mahmud)
and
Ali Yusuf
were
the Sultans
of
the Northern-and Southern Mijjertein,
respectively,
and were,
therefore, Italian
subjects.
In
practice,
how-
ever,
they
were
independent
since
the Italians did
not
exercise any authority.
in the
area.
38. C. O. 535/18 Manning to C. O. 22/2/1910.
39. Ibid.
I ro
-, I
the British
and
their
allies-as
the
arch-enemies of
Islam.,
taking
upon
himself the duty
of waging a
jihad
against
both. In the
event of
British
withdrawals
the Dervishes
were
bound to
wreak
their
revenge upon
the
pro-British
tribes
not only with a view
to
punishing
them for-their
collaboration with
the British but
also
for the
purpose
of
forcing them into
submission
to the Dervish
movement.
The Dervishes
would stop at nothing
less than
either
total defeat fors
or
total
submission
from, the
pro-
British tribes.
4o
It is
quite possible
that Manning
was
alive
to the
gravity of
the dangers
pertaining
to the
policy of withdrawal
but
was only playing
them down-for
the
sake of rationalizing a policy which was
beyond his
power
to
change.
This
was probably
his technique for
coming
to terms
with
his
conscience.
Manning devoted-February to issuing
arms
to the
40.
The Sayyid is believed to have been
challenged
by
some
influential Dervishes to justify his
ruthlessness
towards his fellow Muslims
who supported
the British.
His
answer was given
in
a poem,, part of which went as
follows
:-
1. A
man who
has been
a servant
to the Ferenji
(i.
e.
Europeans) from the day
of
his-birth till
now;
2. Or
who carries
their toolso
or saddles
their
camels;
Or
who
becomes their
guard, or secretly co-
operates with
them
......
Shall be treated in the
name of
Islamo
and according
to'tNe
profession of-the
faith
...
He
was not commended
to
us
by God
...... -
16
1-'-1
pro-British
tribes
and
to
urging
them to form tribal
encampments
for
self-defence,,
in
preparation
for the
British
withdrawal
from the interior. The
march
to the
coast commenced on
6th
March 1910
and was completed
in
three
weeks'
time. On
arrival at
Berbera,
steps were
immediately taken to disarm
and
disband the Somali
soldiers,,
the
police and
the Government illaloes. The Akils
were paid off and
discharged,
and
the
system of
Akils
was replaced with a
new scheme consisting of
large tribal
encampments.
Each
encampment was supplied with
large
quantities of arms and
ammunition and placed under an elected
headman
who received
a monthly subsidy
from the
coastal administration.
The
rationale
behind the
encampment system was
to the
effect
that the
most effective method of
halting,
and even
repulsing,,
the Dervish
advance was
to have
armed encamp-
ments on
the three
main
fronts
of
the Dervish thrust
-
namely,
the Warsengeli, Bagheri
and
the
actual
Dervish
force
commanded
by the Sayyid. Manning
considered
the
Akils
system
to be
unsuitable and
inadequate in the
post-
withdrawal circumstances,,
for it
was
based
on
British
recognition of
the
numerous sections of every
tribe.
The
encampment system entailed
the,
recognition of a
tribe
as a whole as
being
so viable a political entity
as
to be
capable of
forming
a united and strong anti-
Dervish
force. Thus, the large body
of
Akils
was replaced
by
a
handful
of encampment
headmen
who were responsible
for
keeping law
and order within
their
respective encampments
as well as commanding
their
respective encampments
in
any
anti-Dervish confrontations.
Manning's
scheme was
based
169
on
the hypothesis that the Sayyid's
own military
organiza-
tion
was
founded
on
his
recognition
of
the large tribal
groups such as
the Warsengeli
and
the Bagheri
rather
than.
the
smaller sections.
The best,
and
indeed
most effective
way of
dealing
with
the Sayyid, it
was considered, was
to
learn his tactics
and attempt
to
excel
him
at
them.. The
British
could,
in
any case$ afford
to
supply
their Somali
allies with such modern weapons as
the Sayyid
would never
be
able
to find for his followers.
And the fact that the
Sayyidts
reputation
had been dealt
a severe
blow by the
Mecca letter
was considered
to be
another
factor
which
was
bound to tip the
scales
in favour
of
the
pro-British
tribes:
"The
over-powering
dread
of
the Dervishes is
disappearing,
and
I feel
sure
that if
we
support with arms and ammunition
the deserters
from the haroun
(i.
e.
the Sayyidts
encampment)
they
will collect and
form
a number of combina-
tions
which will
hold the Mullah
party and
prevent
them from
making any serious raids
....
the Ishaak
who must
be
responsible
for the
Warsengeli
and
Bagheri
parties
have been
so
long
protected
from the fear
of
Dervish
raids
that tribal
cohesion which
in former days did
exist
is
now partly
lost
....
I have impressed
upon,
them the
necessity of naming a
leader.,
and
they
say
they
will
try. With the
arms
they
possess and with
the
arms
that I
propose
to
issue, they
should
be
sufficiently
formidable
to-withstand
separate attacks.
"41
Manningfs
encampments were abolished
by Byatt ten
months
afterwards onthe grounds
that they
'Tresulted-in-failure
to-obtain their,
real object.,
that
of efficient'control of
the tribes.
"
.
42
The
most
important
encampments were established
among
the Yahelli.,
whose
leader
was earmarked
for
a monthly
41.
C. O. 535/18 Manning to C. O. 9/2/1910.
42.
C. O.
879/103
Byatt to C. O.
8/12/1910
No. 233.
1)
17,
Pay of
Rs. lsOOO; the Habr Gerhajis
encampment chose
Sultain Deria
as
their leader
and
the
administration
allocated
him
a monthly pay of
Rs. 100; the leaders
chosen
to lead the Habr Awal
and
Habr Yunis
encampments were also
,
43
allocated
Rs. 100
per month.
Thus, by the
end of
March
Britain had
washed
her hands
of
the interior
of
the
Somaliland Protectorate. Only
a small staff was
left to
administer
Berbera., Zeila
and
Bulhar,,
while
the task
of
maintaining security
in these
coastal
towns devolved
on
the Indian
element of
the disbanded K. A. R. Battalion.
44
The
next
important
problem was
to decide
on
the
future
of
the Catholic Mission
which
had been in
existence
at
Berbera
since
1894. The
mission
had been
started
by
Father Louis Lasserre,
a
Morocco-based
missionary, against
the
advice of
the Foreign Office
and
the local
officialso
who
foresaw
stiff resistance
by the Somali to the
missionts activities.
Its
sixteen years of
hard
work
in
the Protectorate had been
a complete
failure
owing
to the
hostility
of
the Somali
religious
leaders
and
the
refusal
of
the Somali
parents
to
send
their
children
to the
mis-
sionts school.
During Wingate's
visit.,
the
most persis-
tent
complaint
he
received was
that the
mission was
inimical to Islam
and so should
be
removed.
Wingate
criticized
the
way
Cordeaux had hitherto handled the
religious affairs of
the__Protectorate,
saying
that the
removal of
the
mission-ought
to have been
recommended a
43.
c. o.
879/103
manning to C. O. 30/3/1910.
44.
C. O. 535/18 Manning to C. O. 29/4/1910.
11
long time before. He
actually attributed-a great
deal
of
Somali
antipathy
towards the British to the
activities of
the
mission.
He
went on
to
point out
that the
mission,
while
being
a principal cause of
friction
was, at
the
same
time
not making any practical contribution
to the
welfare of either
the Somali
or
the
administration.
45
Unlike
most missionary organizations elsewhere
in
colonial
Africa, the
mission
did
not,
for
example,
have
any medical
facilities, let
alone medically
trained
personnel, and was,
therefore, dependent
on
the Government
medical
facilities.
46
It
was more of a
liability than
an asset
to the
administra-
tion.
After
withdrawal,
Manning
urged
the Colonial
Office to
expel
the
mission without
delay. In
addition
to the
reasons already given
by Wingate, Manning
explained
that in
view of
the
changed circumstances,
the
mission would
be
a subject of
Dervish
propaganda
to
rally
the Somali
on
the
religious
bandwagon. It
would also
be
a
target
of actual violent attack, and
this factor had
already made
it
necessary
for the
administration
to
place
a guard of
25 Indian
soldiers on
its
premises as a pre-
cautionary measure.
The
mission was,
therefore,
ordered
to
close
down
at
the
end of
April
and allowed
to take'with
it
such of
its-converts
as wished
to
accompany'it
to its
new site
in Aden.
45.
C. 0 537/44'Report
on
Wingate's Special Mission
op.
cit: p.
83.
46.
Ibid.
1)
LIo..
Wingate's
recommendation
for the
expulsion of
the
mission was consistent with
his
general principles
about
the issue
of
Christian
proselytization
in
predomin-
antly
Muslim
societies, and was
in line
with
Britaints
general policy on
the
same subject.
Wingate's
attitude
was, apparently,
influenced by Cromer
who, as
Consul
General in Cairo,
warned
Wingate in 1899 to be
aware.,
while
dealing
with
the Northern Sudan, that
f1so
far
as
I know., the
ordinary
Arab
cares only
for two thins,
namely,
(1)
his
religion
(2)
his
piastres
...
47
-I-v
Cromer then
went on
to
counsel
Wingate to
restrict
Christian
proselytization among
the Muslim
communities of
the
Northern Sudan
and
to
avoid
heavy taxes. Indeed,
all
through his
career
in the latter territoryo Wingate
was
determined to
restrict
Christian
activities
in the
pre-
dominantly Muslim
areas.
Wingate's
predecessor.,
Kitchener.,
had
also
followed
a similar policy, as
is indicated by his
instructions to his junior
staff
to
"be
careful
to
see
that
religious
feelings
are
not
in
any way
interfered
with,, and
that the
Mohammedan
religion
is
respected"
48
The
policy of withdrawal
took both Parliament
and
the
public
by
surprise
for it had
remained a guarded
secret of
the British Government
until
the time
of
its
implementation. This fact
evoked
hostile
reaction
in the
House
of
Commons
and
the Press. one
member of
Parliament
remarked..
for instance, that
47.
G. Warburg, The Sudan Under Wingate
op. cit. p.
26.
48.
Ibid. 95.
173
"it
is
a most contemptible
thing that,
without
giving
Parliament the
chance of
discussing
at
all what
is to be the
policy adopted with regard
to these
people
....
we and
the Somali
should
be
allowed
to
wake up one morning and
find that the
Somali
are going
to be
abandoned
to the Mullah"
49
The Times described the
withdrawal as
"one
of
the
most
deplorable
acts ever committed
by
a
British Government
....
It is
clearly shown
that the Mullah bluffed the Kingts Government
out of a country misnamed a
Protectorateo
caused
Ministers to
remove
their troops in headlong
flight to the
coast., and
induced them to desert
tribeso
very numerous
in
aggregate, who are now
suffering
in their
properties and
their
persons
for their
misplaced
confidence
in the
gracious
favour
and protection
of
H. M. the Queen-Empress
which
they
were promised
by treaty".
50
These
criticisms embarrassed
the Government to
the
extent
that Thesiger,
Inspector
General
of
the K. A. R.,
suggested
that the
press
be
officially requested
to
stop
publishing what
he termed the
"unauthentic
rumours".,
but
Fiddes
opposed
the
suggestion on
the
grounds
that
"we
should
b,
e getting out of
the frying
pan
into the fire if
we
have
any-arrangements with
Reuter".
51
Not least
of
the
protesters against
British
withdrawal were
the Ethiopian
and
Italian Governments.
Following their
receipt of a note
in
which
the
policy of
withdrawal was officially announced
for their information,
Italy
expressed grave concern over
the fact that Britain
had
armed
her tribes
and
left them
on
their,
own.
Italy
was worried
-
and rightly so
that these
armed
tribes
49.
The Parliamentary Debates
(authorized
edition)
Vol. XV,
March 14 to April. l. Column, 1099. The full text
of
the
Somaliland debate is
on
1094-1100.
50. An
article
by the Military Correspondent
of
The Times,
,
8/4/1910.
51.
-C.
O. 535/18 Minutes by Thesiger
and
Fiddes
on
The Times
-article about
Somaliland
affairss
8/4/1910.
17
would use
their
rifles
to
raid
deep into Italian terri-
toryj,
a
factor
which would automatically
force the
victims
of
these
raids
to
obtain arms
for
self-defences
through
smuggling.
52
The British Government
was adamant.
It
replied
to the
effect
that the
arms
issued to the British
tribes, far from
upsetting
the balance
of power, were
"not
sufficient
to
enable
them to
cope on equal
terms
with
the Ogaden, Bagheri,
and other
tribes
who
had
no
difficulty in
obtaining an ample
supply of arms
through Abyssinian territory. In
the
present condition of
things H. M. Government
must
take
measures
to
enable
their tribes to
make
head
against
the
unlimited supply of arms
which
tribes beyond the border
can obtain
from
Abyssinian.
53
The Ethiopian Government
made strong protests
to Thesiger, H. M. Minister in Addi/Ababa,
against
Britaints
i
policy of
issuing
arms and ammunit
-
on
to her tribes
with a
view
to
abandoning
them to their
own
defence. Ethiopia
con-
sidered
the
policy as constituting a
danger to their
interests
and as contrary
to
all previous agreements
between
Britain
and
Ethiopia. The latter
even went as
far
as
threatening to
cancel
these
agreements
in the
event of
Britain insisting
on pursuing-the policy of arming
her
tribes but the threat
was not carried out.
54'
52. C*O- 535/21 P. O. to C. O. 13/5/1910. ' This'despatch
was
reporting on a meeting
between the F. O.
and
the Italian
Ambassador in London,
at which
Italy!
s attitude'to
Britain's
policy of withdrawal was expressed.
53. C. O. 535/21 F. O. to Italian Ambassador in London.. 131611910
(Encl.
in F. O. to C. O. 131611910).
-
54. Dr. David Hamilton.,
"Ethiopiats
Frontiers: The Boundary
Ageements, And Their Demarcation"
(unpublished
D. Phil.
'Thesiss
Oxford) 1974
p.
82.
Thesiger
was
inclined to
take
sides with
the Ethiopians
and even
tried to have
the
policy reversed.
But Manning
considered
Thesiger's
views as rather exaggerated, and
the Colonial, Office
was already
too
committed
to the
policy
to be
swayed
by
Ethiopiats
protests.
17
-1
British
withdrawal
from the interior
of
Somali-
land
was
followed by
an unprecedented state of
lawlessness
and violence which spread
to the Protectorate's borders
and eventually
threatened Britaints'position
on
the
coast.
A
section of
the Warsengeli,
who
had
reconciled
their dif-
ferences
with
the Sayyid in
order
to
avoid
Der
,
visli reprisals,
were
the first, to fall
victim
to the MijeAein
raiders.
Shortly
afterwards
they
were again attacked
by the Musa
Aboker. The Mijjertein
were
Italian
subjects
-
at'least
in theory
-
and
the Musa Aboker
were
British-subjects
who
professed
friendship to the British. During the
second
attack,
the Warsengeli
were'roughly-handled, many of
them
being forced to flee from their territory. The
plight of
this
section of
the Warsengeli
-
the declared
supporters
of
the Sayyid
-
seems
to have
vindicated
Manningts
earlier
optimistic remarks about
the tenacity
and strength of
the
encampment systems and
the irrecoverable
weakness of
the
Dervish
movement.
To his
earlier remarks
he
added,
that
"I
believe that the,
system of
tribal defence
which
I have instituted
will provide a solution
of
the
actual
defence
against
Dervish
attack.
This
would
be
a condition of affairs which was
never reached while we occupied
the interior.
"
55
In the light
of what was soon
to follow, Manning's judge-
ment was absolutely wrong.
In fact it
would appear
that
his tendency to
submit exaggerated reports about
the
bright future
of
the Protectorates let
alone about
the
viability of
the%encampment-scheme, was motivated-more
by
his
anxiety
to be
relieved of
his duties in Somaliland
than by
a genuine
belief in the
stability of
the
status,
-
55. C. O.
879/103
Maming to C. O. 29/4/1910 No. 123.
17
quo.
Thus, before he
could persuade
the Colonial Office
to
appoint
his
replacementp
Manning had to
establish
that the
system
he had
advocated and set up was working
satisfactorily and
that the future held
out prospects
for
more
improvement in the
situation.
Otherwise, the Colonial
Office
would
have..
most probably,
insisted
on
his
staying
on
in Somaliland
until
there
was real
improvement in the
security of
the
pro-British
tribes,
and
it is doubtful
whether
Manning
would
have taken kindly to the idea
of
remaining
in Somaliland for
an
indefinite
period.
He
concluded
his
report
to the Colonial Office
as
follows:
"it
may
be
considered
that the
policy, as en-
trusted to
me
by H. M. Government, for the
evacuation of
the interior has been
carried
out, and
by the
end of
June
my presence
in
the Somaliland
Protectorate
will no
longer be
required".
56
The Colonial Office
granted
him his
request and, at
the
end of
Junep Byatt
was appointed
to
replace
Manning
as
the
Commissioner
of
the British Somaliland Protectorate.
Manning
was
transferred to Nyasaland
as
Governor.
57
I
Even before Manning's departureo the
state of
lawlessness
was already growing gradually
both in
gravity
and scale.
In the
middle of
May 19100 the Protectorate
experienced another outburst of violence when a
Bagheri
56. Ibid.
57. Byatt's
career
in Somaliland
went as'far
back
as
1905
when
he
was appointed an
Assistant Political
officer
in
the British Somaliland Protectorate.
'He
became Secretary
to the Administration
the follow
,
ing
year and acted as
Commissioner
between June
and
December 1910. He
was
transferred
from Somaliland to Gibraltar in May 1914.
177
force.,
apparently at
the instigation
of
the Sayyid,
attacked a party of pro-British
tribes
at
Balliwein, but
was
driven
off after a protracted engagement.
Both
sides
suffered considerable
loss in
men and stock.
This inci-
dent
was
then followed, by
a rumour
-
albeit an unfounded
one
-
to the
effect
that the Sayyid
was either
dead
or
seriously
incapacitated to the
extent
that, there
was no
likelihood
of
his becoming
a
leader
of
the Dervishes
again.
Manning
reported
that
fino
news whatever
has been
obtained
from the
haroun
and persistent rumour
is
current
that
the Mullah has
either
been killed
or
has died
It is
now credibly reported
that the DervisheL
are either collected
in
parties with
their
stock undecided what
to do in
view of
the
Mullahts'death
or
that they
are still near
the
haroun
without orders,
due tO illness.
"
58
That the Sayyid
and
his followers, far from
being in the
condition attributed
to them by Manning,
were still a power
to
reckon with, was
demonstrated in
June 1910
when a group of
the Sayyidts followers
committed
an outrage against
the British
at
the
coastal
town
of
Hais.
Prior to
withdrawal,
the
coastal
towns
on
the
eastern coast
of
the Protectorate
-
namely,
Hais, Mait
and
Karam
-,
had
been
nominally administered
through two
customs posts,
which were
disbanded in
accordance with
the
policy of
withdrawal.
The Musa Ismail Turwa
section of
the Gadwein
immediately declared themselves
adherents of
the Sayyid,
and seized
the
opportunity created
by the
power vacuum
to
declare Hais
port exclusively
theirs, thus
challenging
the traditional
rights of
the Musa Areh
section
to
use
58. c. o.
879/100
Manning to C. O. 30/5/1910 No. 138.
178
the facilities
of
the Hais
port.
The Musa Ismail Turwa
actually
debarred
any
dhows,
except
those belonging to
the Dervisheso from
anchoring
in the
port.
Britain's
inability to
react
to this blatant
act of
defiance by
the Musa Ismail Turwa
was a signal
for the latter to
humiliate Britain
even
further.
'and
this they did by
exhuming and
incinerating the body
of a
British
sailor
who
had been buried
at
Hais
several years
before.
59
Manning
urged
Britain to bombard the town
with a war-
ship,
but the Colonial Office did
not receive
the
proposal
favourablyo
and
Byatt,
who succeeded
Manning
shortly after
the incidento
was
definitely
opposed
to
such actiono on
the
grounds
that the boTbardment
of
Hais
would alienate several People who
had hitherto
remained
friendly to the British,
and would also punish many
people who might not
have taken
part
in.,
or even con-
donedo the
outrage.
As
analternative,
Byatt
proposed
-
and
the Colonial Office
endorsed
-
that
a warship
be
sent
to
capture
the
actual culprits and
take them to Berbera
for trial
and punishment.
Byatt's
scheme was put
into
effect
in August,
and
three
months
latero the
culprits who
had been locked
up
in
prison at
Berbera,
were released
following
payment
by the Hais inhabitants,,
of
Rs. 1#500
as
fine
060
While it,
was relatively easy
for Britain,
even
in the
circumstances of
the
post-withdrawal period.,
to
take this kind
of
limited
punitive action on
the
coastal
59. C. O.
879/103
Manning to C. O. 27/6/1910 No. 164.
6o.
c. o.
879/103
Byatt to C. O. 24/11/1910 No. 225.
179
towns., it
was practically
impossible for
similar
measure
to be taken
against
the hinterland tribes. The inhabi-
tants
of
the
coastal'towns
depended for their livelihood
on
trade
with
the
outside world and other occupations
relating
to the
maritime mode of
life. And this
meant,
in turn, that
any
blockade
of
the
ports such as
that
which was
imposed
on
Hais in the
course of capturing
the
culprits, was
bound to threaten the
very source of
liveli-
hood
of
the
coastal
dwellers. Moreover,
whereas
it
was
not so easy
to
punish
the interior, tribes
with
the
meagre
military resources of
the
post-withdrawal
period,
the
coastal
towns
could easily
be bombarded by
a warship.
Thus, the
coastal
towns, being
vulnerable
to British
reprisals, often acquiesced
in British demands
more
easily
than the interior tribes
which.,
in the
circumstances
created
by Britain's
withdrawal
to the'coast,,
were out of
reach of
the British
power.
-
Towards the
end of
1910 the Dervishes began to
make good
their
earlier reverses.
September highlighted
the
resumption of a
fully-fledged Dervish
offensive.
In
the
middle of
that
month some
11200 Dervishes-attacked
and
thoroughly
routed a combined
force
of nearly
8,000
Mijjertein
and
Warsengeli
at
Damer, killing 300 Warsengeli
and
115 Mijjertein,
and
losing
400
of
their
own men.
The
Mijjertein
and
Warsengeli,
made a
desperate
effort
to
re-
taliate but
were again
defeated
and
dispersed
at
Behin.
61
In the
middle of
October the Dervishes.,
evidently
encouraged
by their
previous victoryo made
three
more
61.
c. o.
879/103
Byott to C. O. 2/11/1910 No. 302.
19

daring
raids against sections of
Warsengeli
and
Dolbahanta
near
Bohotleho killed 78
people and seized a
large herd
of stock.
62
This
was
followed by the
establishment of a
Dervish
post at
Bohotleh,
which enabled
them to
mono-
polize
"one
of
the
most valuable and
important
watering places
in the Ain Valley".
63
"The
behaviour
of
the Dolbahantatl,,
Byatt lamented,,
"has
been
most
disappointing. They
were
fur-
nished with more rifles and more ammunition
than the Mullah is
able
to
command., yet
they
cannot protect
themselves.
"64
The Dervish bid for
military supremacy was sup-
j
plemented
by their drive to
gain
diplomatic
recognition
and support.
In August 1909, for
example,
the Sayyid
despatched
an emissary
to the Governor General
of
Harar
for the
purpose of soliciting
Ethiopian
recognition and
support
for the Dervish
cause.
The British Consul in
Harars
on
hearing
of
this development,
alerted
the Foreign
Offices
and
the latter took
steps
to
get a re-assurance
from the Ethiopian Government that
no support of any
kind
would
be
extended
to the Dervishes. The
re-assurance was
given and
the Governor General
of
Harars Deziaz Balchas
who was
believed to be
sympathetic
to the Dervish
cause,
was recalled
to Addis Ababa
and given a stern warning.
65
62.
Ibid.
63.
Ibid.
64.
c. o.
879/103
Byott to C. O. 2/12/1910 No. 309.
65.
Dr. David Hamilton
"Ethiopiats
Frontiers: The Boundary
Agreements. And Their Demarcation"
(Unpublished
D. Phil.
Thesis, Oxford) 1974,
P.
79. As-a-result
of
Britain's
pro-
testss Balcha
was relieved of
the Governorship
of
Harar,,
and
Tafari Makonnen
appointed
in his
stead.
13
Having been thwarted in Harar., the Sayyid
turned to
various
local Sheikhs both
within and without
the Protectorate. For
example, early
in 1911 he
wrote
to Sheikh Suliman Saleh
of
the Gadwein informing him
of
his jihad
and seeking assistance
in
arms and men.
The
Sayyid's
message was as
follows:
"This
letter is
sent
for two
reasons.
One is
to
give you salaams, you and your
fiendso,
and
relations and
disciples,
and
the
second
is to
inform
youo oh my
brother, that the
country
suffers
from two
evils.
One is the
quarrel
between
us and
the Europeans in
which we pray
God to help
us against
them;
and
the
second
evil
is Abdullah Shaheri, the liar
and mischief
maker
....
He
went
to Mecca
and
forced
many
people
to
go with
him to
slander me
before
Sayyid Mohammed Salehe"66
Similar letters
and emissaries were sent
to the
Ethiopian
chiefs on
the Benadir-Ethiopian border,
where
Fitaurari Daditarre, the local
chief
in the
area, was
thought to be
sympathetic
to the Dervish
cause.
Follow-
ing
protests
from Britain
and
Italy, the
chief was re-
67
called
to Addis Ababa
and stripped of
his
position.
Next
on
the Sayyidts list,
were
the Habr Yunis
amongst whom a very
influential leader., Jama Hirsi., had
emerged
into
a position of authority.
The Sayyid
addressed a
letter to the Hamud Turwa
section of
the
HabrY
unis,
denying
any complicity
in the
various raids
which
had been
perpetrated'against
them. The letter
66.
C. O. 535/23 Muhammad Abdille Hassan
of
Gadwein 10/12/1910
(Encl.
to Byo'
This letter
was captured
by
an
Akil
messenger who was on
his
way
to the
was
believed, however, that
several
been
sent
to
a number of
Sheikhs.
to Suleman Saleh
,
tt to C. O.
4/2/1?
11).
from the Sayyid
s-
Gadwein Sultan. It
letters had
already
67.
C. O. 535116 F. o. to C. O. 22/10/1909.
continued:
"Oh
my
brothers, I
am separate
from the
people
who
disturbed
you, ando
by the
name of
God, I
dontt like them,
and
I
always pray
the Almighty
God for
your welfare and,
the
suffering of your
enemies.
I
am not
trying for
a
kingdom
nor
bartering
myself
for
worldly affairs.
Oh
my
brothers
it
I
want
to have friendly
consultations
with you
. 68
It is
also
believed that the Sayyid's
messengers
went as
far
south as
the Northern Frontier Districto
claim-
ing to be in
possession of
the Sayyidts
message of goodwill
and encouragement
to the Marehan
who were resisting
British
and
Italian
rule.
In
i909,0-for
example..
Abdulahi Mogo Igo
wrote
to the Marehan
claiming
to have been
appointed
governor of
Jubaland by the Sayyid,
and
it
was also
rumoured
that Amin bin Mohammad,,
an uncle of
the Sayyid.,
was
in
southern
Somalia,
evidently under
the Sayyidts
instructions,
claiming
that the latter hadmade
an alli-
ance with
the Ethiopians.
69
11
The
actual
impact
of
the Sayyidts diplomatic
activities
is difficult to
assess.
Nevertheless, there
was a genuine
belief both in the Northern
Frontieis-
trict
and
in the Italian
colony
that the Sayyid_was,
directly,
or
indirectlyp
connected with
the
numerous
anti-colonial movements
in those territories. It
would
seem.,
however, that his impact
-
and vice-versa
-
on
the
68.535/23
Muhammad Abdille Hassan to the Hamud Turwa.,
Habr Yunis,
'n.
d.
(Encl.
in Salkeld, Acting Commissioner,
to C. O. 2/6/1911).
69.
R. Turton.,
"The
impact
of
Mohammad Abdille Hassan in the
East Africa-Protectoratett, in J. A. H., Xs
4
(1969)
p.
649-651.1
-LoJ
southernmost parts of
Somaliland
was only marginal, and
Dr. Turton
would seem
to be
correct
in
observing
that
"the
main
impact
of
Sheikh Mohammad
on
the
administrative officials
in Jubaland
appears
to have been
more psychological
than
a con-
sequence of
the
actual spread of
his
rebel-
lion.
"
70
,
The Sayyid's
efforts were,
however,
not all
in
vain.
His
diplomatic initiative
among
the Habr Yunis, for
example,
bore fruit,
with
the
result
that Jama Hirsi declared
all
the Habr Yunis to be
adherents of
the Sayyid.,
and
launched
a campaign
to
win over
the
vacillating
elements
to the
Sayyid's
side.
The
anti-British-activities of
the Habr
Yunis
and
their
widespread
depredations
against
the
pro-
British tribes
caused such
disruption in trade
and
destruc-
tion
of
life
and property
that Byatt
was compelled, not-
withstanding
the
official policy of non-interference..
to
invite Jama Hirsi, to Berberas
ostensibly
for
peaceful
negotiations.
Jama Hirsi
accepted
the invitation but,
on arrival at
Berbera, he
was arrested and subsequently
deported to Mombasa. The
arrest and
deportation
of
Hirsi
is
said
to have
"caused
no small surprise among
the Habr Yunis
but it has been
received with general satis-
faction by
other
tribes".
71
Unfortunately for Byatt, Jama Hirsi
escaped
from his deten-
tion in Mombasa,, boarded
an
Italian
ship and eventually
ended up among
his
people, where
he
received a
hero's
welcome and gained such prestige,
both for himself
and
for the Dervishes,
as
he
would never
have
achieved
had he
70. Ibid.
p.
656.
71. c. o..
879/110
Byatt to C. O. 31/l/1912.
31
,4
not
been deported.
72
Not
all
the diplomatic
activities of
the
post-
withdrawal period originated
from the Sayyid. Various
overseas
Muslim
communities which
had
come
to know
of
the
Sayyidts
movement with
different degrees
of accuracy,
initiated
communication with
the Sayyid., imploring him to
remain
firm in his
cause, which was also
their
cause.
A
section of
the Muslim
community
in the Yemen.,
so worried
were
they,
about
Italy's
encroachments
in Libya
and other
areas of
the Ottoman Empire,,
and
believing that the Sayyid
shared
the
same worrys wrote
to inform him that
"the
matter which we write
to
you about
is the
infidel, the Italian. He is
still encroaching
on
the Mohammedan
countries and occupying
them
by force. The Koran
obliges all
Muslims to
help
each other
in
a war against
infidels. It
is
an offence
for Muslims to
stay
idle
while
their fellow Muslims
are
fighting
a
jihad.
"
73
Another interesting diplomatic
move came
from
the Muslim
community
in Germany
which,
like that in, the
Yemens
was concerned about
Italian
expansionist policies
in
northern
Africa. This
community, which was
based in
Berlin,
wrote
to the Sayyid
reminding
him that
"the
Ottoman Government, the
successor
to the
Great Kaliphate, has been transgressed
against
and oppressed
by the Italian Governments the
oppressor, which
has
created war
in the Province
of
Tripoli in Africa
....
-and.
theMohammedan
-
nations are one according
to God's
statement
in
the Koran
....
The Koran
enjoins all
Muslims to
fight the holy fight for Godts
sake".
74
72. C-0-879/110 Byatt to C. O.
6/3/1913
No. 146.
73. C-0
879/110
Mohammed bin Hassan,
a
Sheikh in Yemen, to
the Somali Mullah,, 7/2/1912
(Encl.
in Byatt to C. O. 20/3/1912)
This letter
came
in the
ordinary mail
bag
and was seized at
Berbera.
74.879/110 The. Mohammedan inhabitants
of
Germany to Muhammad
Abdille Hassan,
n.
d.
(Encl.
in Byatt to C. O. 12/6/1912).
This letter
was also seized
from the
ordinary mail
bag-at
Berbera.
13-
ti
Since these
overseas
letters
were captured
before they
reached
the Sayyid, it is difficult to know
what
his
reaction would
have been had he
received
them. It iso
however,
very unlikely
that he
would
have
sent
Dervish
forces to fight the Italians in
northern
Africa. It is,
in fact, doubtful
whether
he
was as worried
by the
Italian
activities
in
northern
Africa
as
he
was
by the
British
rule
in Somaliland. And it is
somewhat
ironical
that the Sayyid,
who
had
repeatedly said
that his
quarrel
was with
the British
rather
than the Italians,,
should
have
been
expected
by the
overseas
Muslim
communities
to
send
troops
against
the Italians in
northern
Africa. This
underlines
the ignorance
of
these
overseas communities
about
the
real nature and cause of
the Sayyid's
move-
ment.
The
main achievement of
the Sayyidts diplomatic
and military campaigns was
that it
secured
for the Der-
vishes
the
sympathy and support of certain
tribes
which
had hitherto
either remained
indifferent to his
cause or
had
actually
been hostile to him. This fact
not only
boosted his
morale and prestige.
but it
also enabled
him
to
use
the facilities
and services of
his
new allies
to
purchase great quantities of arms and ammunition which
he
needed
for his
offensive against
the British
and
their
allies.
In December 19 10 the Sayyid took the
most
daring
step of
his
career
by informing the British that he
meant
to drive them
out of
Berbera,
and
followed
up
this threat
by
mobilizing
a
force
at
Gadwein,
apparently
for this
pur-
pose.
Although Byatt
regarded
the threat
as a mere
bluff,
he
nevertheless admitted
that the
news of an
imminent
Dervish
attack
had
created panic and restlessness
in
Berbera. In
order
to
prepare
the town for
any eventuality,
he
requested
Aden to hold-some
400
Indian
soldiers
in
readi-
ness
for immediate despatch to Berbera
should
the
need
arise.
75
The
establishment of a
Dervish base
at
Gadwein
put many pro-British
tribes in
and around
that
area
into
headlong flight towards Berbera. Byatt
reported
the
situation:
not only
is
every
tribe
now on
terms
of
open
hostility
with every other
tribe, but
each
is divided
against
itself by differences
between the
sections and sub-sections.
Raiding
and
fighting
are a matter of every
day
occur-
rence, and
the total
amount of
bloodshed
which
has taken
place
is little
short of alarming.
The
roads
to the interior
are no
longer
safe,
so
the
representatives of
the
more
distant
tribes
are unable
tocome down to the
coast
in
order
to discuss their
affairs with
the Govern-
ment, and
those
on
the
coast
fear to leave for
the
purpose of
looking
after
their interests
inland
76
With
regard
to the tribal
encampments on which
Manning
had banked
a great
deal
of optimistic
hope, Byatt
noted
that
"it
does
not
follow
as might
be
supposed
that
our
le.
bes, being
well armedo are safe against
outs%e attack.
I feel
certain
that, if
ever
the Mullah
was
to
advance,
internal dissertions
would render
their
opposition of
little
effect.
"
77
Britain's inability to
restore
law
and order
75. C. O.
879/103
Byatt to CO. 10/12/1910 No. 235.
76. C. O.
879/103
Byatt to C. O. 23/8/1911 No. 272.
77. Ibid.
undermined
the
prestige of
the Protectorate
administration
to the
extent
that
a good number of
the Somali Government
employees
began to
speak
loudly
of
their
contempt and
dis-
respect
for the
administration.
In
order
to
salvage what
little
remained of
Britain's
prestige,
Byatt initiated his
own
diplomatic
campaign
intended to detach
several
tribes
from the Sayyid
as well as
discredit the latter. He
per-
suaded
the British Government to detail H. M.
ship
"Medea"
for duty in Somaliland
so
that he
might use
it in his dip-
lomatic
offensive on
the
eastern coastal
towns. The
objec-
tive
of
his trip to these towns
was
to
ascertain
"the
present state of
the Warsengeli tribe.,
and
their
attitude
towards the Government
....
and
also
to
get
into touch* if
possible, with
the
Gadwein
with a view
to detaching them from the
Mullahts following,
or at
least
shaking
their
allegiance
to him".
78
His first
meeting was with
the Warsengeli
at
Las Khorai,
where
they
promised
to desert the'Sayyid
on condition
he
agreed
to, issue them
with sufficient arms and ammunition
for
self-defence.
Byatt
not only acceeded
to this
request
but he
also restored
their Sulta/n's
monthly allowance which
he had
earlier'on suspended on account of
the Sulta/ns doubt-
ful loyalty to the British.
-At
Mait he
met
the Gadwein.,
except
the Musa-Ismail Turwa
section who
turned down his
invitation. Byatt
observed
that those
who
turned
up
"behaved
quietly,
but
showed a most
indepen-
dent
spirit.,
-
and Were obviously
Dervish
at
heart"
*79
At Hais he
met more groups'of
Gadwein,, including
a
handful
of some
Musa Ismail Turwa
section who
had
refused
to turn
78. c. O.
879/103
Byatt to C. O. 18/10/1911 No. 296.
79. Ibid.
18
111
up at
Mait. After
a
lengthy dialoguep Byatt left them in
"a
less truculent
mood, some of
them
going so
far
as
to
shake
hands
at Parting.
"80
In
addition
to the tour
of
the
eastern coastal
area,
Byattfs
other
diplomatic
strategy
took the form
of
inviting
various
tribal
elders
to Berbera
with a view
to
persuading
them to leave the Sayyid. The Habr Toljaalap
having ignored Byatt's invitation for two
months, even-
tually turned
up at
Berbera. To his
suggestion
that they
should rebuff
the Sayyid's
overtures
for friendship, they
promised
to do
sop and even
to
stop
feuding
among
them-
selves,
if Byatt
could
increase the
number of
their
salaried
Akils from two to fourteen.,
and
if he issued
them
with more arms and ammunition.
81
He
conceded
both
requests.
His invitation to the Habr Yunis
wasp
howeverp
rejected at
the instigation
of
Jama Hirsip
whose arrest
and
deportation has
already
been discussed,
and
Byatt
was
left
with no choice
but to
admit
failure
with res-
pect
to the Habr Yunis.
82
In
a personal
letter to Fiddesp Byatt
confessed
that the Habr Yunis tribe
"is
beginning to
cause me very considerable
anxiety
....
they
are now
breaking in
every
direction. They have
molested
the Aidegalla
in the
west;
they have looted
stock
from Bulhar
belonging to that town; they have
raided
the
Habr Toljaala,
and
lastly they have deliberately
attacked
the Dolbahanta. The
sufferers at
their
hands
will
lay
complaints,
and when
they
see, as
they
shortly must,
that they
obtain no redress,
they
will also
lose
confidence
in
us and
take
redress
Into their
own
hands,
so
that the
80.
Ibid.
81.
C. O. 535/24 Byatt to C. O. 311111911.
82.
Ibid.
%
example of
the, Habr Yunis
will probably
be
followed by
all-the other
tribes"*83
Byatt's
prediction
did
not
take long to
materia-
lize. Towards the
end of
November 1911 the Dolbahantap
who
had just
received
fresh
supplies of arms and ammunition
from Byatt, informed the latter that they had
no
intention
of confronting
the Dervishes
unless supported
by British
troops. Byatt lamented:
"it
seems useless
to
provide a people so
improvident
and
irrational
with a means of
defence
which
they
are unable
to turn to
any good account".
84
and,,
in
reply,
Butler
minuted
that
"the
friendly tribes
are as unhappy and short-
sighted
in their
external and
in their internal
relations.
We
are condemned
to be
spectators
of
the
sorry process of
disintegration;
"
then Fiddes
added, rather
despondently, that
"it
is
a great pity
that there is
no
freelance
Englishman
who could go among
these
people.,
and
by
personal
influence
work
them
up
to
combined action against
the Mullah".
85
The Dolbahanta., having declared their determina-
tion to take
no action on
their
own, were attacked
by
a
force
of nearly
350 Dervishes
at
Eil Dab in January 1912p
and
thoroughly
routed,
losing
some
4,000
camels and
60
of
their
men.
The following
month
they
were again attacked
and
dispersed by
a
Dervish force
of nearly
200
strong.
These depredations
caused so much commotion and panic
that Byatt
reported
that the Dolbahanta
83.
C. O. 535/24 Byatt to Fiddes 23/11/1911.
84.
c. o.
879/110
Byatt to C. O. 27/2/1912 No. 20.
85.
Minutes by Butler
and
Fiddes
on
C. O.
879/24
Byatt
to Fiddes 23/11/1911.
ffare
alarmed,, and
have
no
heart
except
for
retreat.
In the town there is
considerable
excitement and
I
am convinced
that
no
tribe
would attempt
to
oppose advance
if
any were
made".
86
The Dervishes followed their
success over
the
Dolbahanta by
assembling a
force
at
Eil Dur Elan., in
readiness
to
advance on
the Habr Toljaala. The latter.,
notwithstanding
their
newly acquired arms and
their
pledges
to Byatt, took to their heels
and made
for
Berbera,
on receipt of
the
news of
the Dervish
mobiliza-
tion.
87
The
plight of
the Dolbahanta
and
the Habr
Toljaala
was a signal
for the Dervishes to
attempt what
Byatt had
all along refused
to believe
would
happen
-
namelyj,
the
actual
harrassment
of
Berbera itself. The
Dervishes began by
moving
their
main
force to Eilafweina
and
then
sending word
through the Berbera-bound fleeing
tribes to inform the British
of
the impending danger. A
party of
Dervish
scouts
then
visited
the town
at night,
intimidated the inhabitants
and
left
a
Dervish
mark
88
(resembling
the letter H)
on
trees
and
buildings.
Other
similar parties with a similar mission were sent
to Las Dureh., Buraoj, Bulhar., Huguf
and
Hais.,
where
they
89
caused panic and general commotion.
The
problems of
the
administration
were exacer-
bated by the demand
of
the
refugees and
the inhabitants
that the British
should
provide
them
with real security
86.
C. O.
879/110
Byatt to C. O. 27/2/1912 No. 20.
87.
C. O. 537? 27 Byatt to C. O. 29/2/1912.
88.
C. O.
879/110
Byatt to C. O. 29/2/1912 No.
40.
89.
C. O.
879/110
Byatt to C. O. 14/3/1912 No. 52.
191
or remove
their
administration altogether.
Byatt
was,
thus., forced to
acquire an additional
force
of
320
Indian
soldiers
from Aden,
and, at
the
same
time, he
invited the Inspector General
of
the K. A. R. to
visit
the Protectorate
and make a personal assessment of
the
situation with a view
to
recommending
the
proper course
of action
to the British Government. After
studying
the
state of affairso
Thesiger?
admitted
that the future held
prospects
for
a worsening of
the
situation*
but he
could
find
no solutiontD offer since
the
"effective
garrisoning of
Berbera
and
BUlhar
require not
less than
600
troops,
and
it
appears
to be impossible to
obtain
this'
number
from
other
Protectorates"
90
The
main reason
it
was
difficult to
obtain
this
number of
troops from
other
Protectorates
was
that the duty
of
garrisoning,
let
alone garrisoning
in Somaliland,
was
unpopular with soldiers.
Thus,
whereas many soldiers
were quite prepared
to
go
to Somaliland for
active service
a
they hated to
serve
there in&rrison
capacity.
It
was,
therefore,
unlikely
thatp
after
the
unhappy experience of
the K. A. R. troops in the Ain Valley
a
few
years
befores
any
British territory
would willingly recommend
her troops
for
garrison
duty in Somaliland-91 The Indian
soldiers
from Aden hated
garrisoning no'less
than the African K. A. R.
soldierso
but
owing
to the
proximity of
Aden to Somaliland
it
was easy and cheap
to
relieve
the
soldiers after short
intervals
of
time. To
send
African
soldiers
from distant
go. C. O.
879/110
Thesiger to C. O. 28/3/1912 No. 53.
91. Ibid.
11 3o.
d
territories to Somaliland
and
thereafter
relieve
them
at
the
same
frequency
was out of
the
question on account of
the,
expense
it
would
have involved.
Neither the
arrival of
the 320 Indian
soldiers
nor
the issue
of more arms
to the
pro-British
tribes
could
eitherraise
the
morale of
the latter
or
halt the-Dervish
offensive.
Shortly
after
the
arrival of
the Aden
rein-
forcements the Dervishes
made another raid on
Bohotleh..
killed
a small number of people and captured stock.
92
Worse
still,
this
particular
Dervish
raid coincided with
a serious
inter-tribal
clash
between the Dolbahanta
and
the Mijjertein
which went on unabated
during the Dervish
onslaught.
93
In the
middle of
April the Dervishes began
to
construct a
fort
at
Bohotleh
with which
they,
evidently,
hoped to form
'hoonvenient
base for
communication with
the
Bagheri
country whence
the Mullah hopes to
obtain ammunition and an addition
to his
following. The
whole
Ain Valley
up
to Burao
has been deserted.
"94
By the
end of
March 1912 it
was quite obvious
that,
unless
Britain took
some
definite
step
to
salvage
their
position,
the
situation would, within a short
time,
get out of control.
Byatt
wrote:
"it
has for
some
time been
growing apparent
that
the
system of
tribal defence inaugurated in
pur-
suance of
the
policy
then laid down has been
giving way
in
spite of all efforts
to
support
it"
95
92. C. O.
879/110
Byatt to C. O. 22/3/1912 No. 55.
93. C. O.
879/110
Byatt to C. O. 29/3/1912 No. 58.
94. C. O. 535/27 Byatt to C. O. 18/4/1912.
95. C. O.
879/110
Byatt to C. O. 29/3/1912 No. 58.
I
191
The Colonial Office too
admitted
that
"there
is
no prospect at present of our
finding
-
as
Sir W. Manning hoped
we should
do
-
among our
Somali
a
leader
with suffi-
cient
influence to
unite
them
against
the
Mullah.
"
96
Thus.,
although
this
admission,
did
not,
by
any means, con-
stitute a repudiation of
the
policy
then being
pursued,
the
general climate of opinion
in the Colonial Office
was
now
disposed to
accept some modification
in the
official
policy.
Byatt took
advantage of
this
mood
by
writing a
long
memorandum
in,,
which
he
exposed
the flaws
and
fallacies
of
the tribal
encampment system, and
then
argued
that,
"the
policy now
in
operation
has disappointed
expectation;
it has been
given a
full
and com-
plete
trial
and
it has failed. It is leading
to
a steady
diminution
of
Government
prestige
and
it
promises a worse condition of affairs
in the future than
at present
....
The
commer-
cial possibilities of
the
country are not
capable of
further developmentp
and
therefore,
the decision
as
to the future
must
depend
chiefly upon considerations of political
expediency,
but the
considerations of
the
cause of
humanity
may also
be taken into
account"
,
97
Byatt then
proceeded
to
evaluate
the
various
courses of action which might provide
the
answer
to the
impasse. His
views on
the
prospects of a
full
military
expedition were
that,
although previous expeditions
had
failed to destroy the Sayyid.,
a new one might prove
decisive
because the Sayyid had
now moved
to
within striking
distance,
and, since
he had
constructed
forts, he
would
try to defend
them in the
event of an attack.
On top
of
that$
according
to Byatt's
appraisal of
the
situation,
the Sayyid's
96. C. O. 535/27 Minute by Read
on
Byatt to C. O. 21/3/1913.
97. C. O. 535/27 Memorandum by Byatt
on
the Political Situa-
tion in the British Somaliland Protectorate, 30/4/1912.
depredations
and ruthlessness
towards his
own
followers
had
already alienated a substantial part of
hi's
supporters.
Thus, in the
event'of a well organized attack
by British
forces, he
would not
find the
same
kind
of support among
the
ordinary people as
he had
enjoyed
during the
earlier
expeditions.
Nevertheless, Byatt
recognized
the
useless-
ness of
his dwelling too
much on
this
point since
Britain
had
already ruled out
the
possibility of sending another
expedition
to fight the Dervishes. There
was
the
possibility of establishing military posts along
the
main
trade
routes
to
ensure
the
safety of
trade
caravans.
Though this
measure might,, at
its face
value., appear
attractive,
Byatt did
not
think
much of
it:
"it
would not offer any certain
hope
of
finality.
"98
The
other possible course
of
action was
for Britain to
abandon
the Protectorate
altogether
but
such a
line
of
action
had
already
been
considered and
dismissed
on
the
grounds
that it
would
have"done irreparable damage to
Britaints
prestige.
In Byatt's
opinion,
there
was yet
one-expedient
"which
might
be tried, but
would
have to be
tried
without undue
delay. This is the
main-
tenance
on
the
coast of a small mobile striking
forceo
which could
be
used
to
maintain order
by
coercion within a radius of
50
miles or so of
Berbera,
and
to keep the
roads clear.
It
should
consist of a
Camel Corps
of natives of
the
country not
less than 70
strong',
99
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
1
i. - 0
Byattts
proposal was received with reservation
in the Colonial Office, for it
was
deemed to
reverse
"to
a certain extent
the
policy
laid down by
the Cabinet
after prolonged
discussion, that
our administration should
be
confined
to the
two-or three
principal
towns
on
the
coast.
"
100
The
most objectionable point about
the
proposed new scheme
was,
however, that it did
not suggest anything
that had
not
been tried before. The Militia
system.,
for instance..
-had
been formed for the
purpose of maintaining
law
and order
through
persuasion and,
if
need
be,
coercion.
It had
failed. Then the K. A. R. troops
were
brought in from
Nyasaland., Uganda
and
the East Africa Protectorate to
form
a
backbone to the Militia, but
since
they
were
denied the
right
to take
any
initiative
against
their
intended
enemiesp
the
venture
became
a
fiasco
when
the
enemy refused
to
show-up.
Byattts Camel Corps
scheme
contained all
the
vices of-these earlier policies and
none of
their
virtues.
The Camel Corps.. like the Militiap
was not
intended to
confront
the Dervishes but
only
to
urge
the
pro-British
tribes to do
so with
the
arms and
token
support given
by the Camel Corps. In
a sense,,
the Militia
scheme was a
better
policy,
for
at
least it
could and
did
operate up
to the Ain Valley. The Camel
Corps, like the K. A. R. troops,
was not supposed
to-
initiate
any offensive against
the Dervishes,
no. matter
how
small a
Dervish force
might
be. Far from that, the
Camel Corps
would
be
expected
to
withdraw
to Berbera in
the
event of
itsbeing
challenged
by
a
Dervish force. By
100. C. O. 535/27 Read's
minute on
Byatt's
memorandum on
the
situation
in the Protectorate, 30/4/1912.
comparisono
howevero the K. A. R., being
professional soldiers,
were well equipped and qualified
to deal
with a military
situation such as
that
created
by the Dervish
movement;
the Camel Corps
was not
intended to
rise
to the
same
level
of proficiency either
in
skill or numerical strength.
Moreover, it
was
lack
of
foresight
on
the
part of
Byatto
with
the
approval of
the Colonial Office, to limit the
area of operation
for the Camel Corps to
a radius of
50
miles
from Berbera. Inter-tribal fighting
and
the Dervish
operations were not
limited to the
same area, and whatever
took
place
beyond the
prescribed area was
bound to
spill
over
to the
coastal strip.
0
Thus., the Camel Corps
which
had
no control over
the
source of
turmoil,
was
to
under-
take the impossible task
of grappling with only
the
effects and not
the
causes of
the
problem ando even
then,
without
the
skillp resources or
discretionary
powers
necessary
for the task.
Byatt
went
to London in May 1912
and, while
there,
managed
to brush
aside whatever objections
the
Colonial Office
that
one of
the
Camel Corps
was
garrison
troops
seems
to have b
effect
that his
felt
against
the
scheme.
He
pointed out
most
important
accomplishments of
the
that it
would
lead to
a reduction of
the
borrowed from Aden. The Colonial Office
een swayed
by Byatt's
assurance
to the
scheme
tTwould
be
cheaper
than the
cost of garrisoning
system
in force".
101
The Cabinet
approved
the Camel Corps
proposals
in June 1912.,
101. C. O. 535/27 Byatt to C. O. 26/5/1912.
4
thus bringing the total
military establishment-to
150
Camel Corps, 320 Aden troops,
and
200 Indian
contin-
102
gent of
the disbanded
6th
Battalion, K. A. R.
The
raising and
training
of
the Camel Corps
commended
in July
and was completed
towards the
-end
of
the
year.
On Byattfs
recommendation,
Richard Corfield
was appointed overall commanding officer of
the
new
force,
and
Gibb
and
Dunn his
assistants.
103
Corfield
was selected
for the
post on account of
his
previous experience
in deal-
ing
with
turbulent
situations
in Africa. In 1900 he had
served
in Baden-Powell's Scouts
organization which was
responsible
for
quelling what remained of
the Boer
resis-
tance. In 1903,
with-the return
to
normality of
the South
African
situation,
Corfield became
redundant and was
forced to
return
to England. He found life in England
too dull for his liking, for he
was a man of an
impul-
sive nature with a strong craving
for
adventure and war.
Of his impatience to
get out of
England, he
wrote:
"I
think
of
trying America, Colombia, Equador
or somewhere;
there is
always a revolution
going on'there"
104
His
plan
to leave for South America
was cut short
by
a
Colonial Office
appointment
in October 1905 to British
Somaliland
as a political officer
in the-newly formed
militia.
He
spent
five
years
in Somaliland
and-left
in
102. Byatt had
originally suggested a
Camel
-Corps of
70
strong
but he later
raised
the figure to 150.
103. Prevost-Battersbys Richard Corfield
of
Somaliland
p.
192-194.
104. Ibid. Prevost-Battersby
was given access
to Corfield's
letters by the latterts family. This
particular
letter
from Corfield to his
personal
friend is
quoted on p-27-
Q CI.
LF Q
1910.,
on
the
eve
British
withdrawal
from the interior.
In Somaliland he
was generally regarded as someone who
tended to
overstep
the
prescribed
instructions
with
regard
to the
nature and
bounds
of
his duty, but
since
he
always emerged victorious
this
quality
in him
was
often overlooked.
In
any case
this
was
the time
when
Britain's
policy of
inaction
was so
irksome to-many
of
his
colleagues
that they
would
have liked to
act
like
him,, if it
were not
for the fact that they
were
imbued
with a
less daring temperament.
105
In November 1910 Corfield
was given a new
job
in Northern Nigeria
as a political officer
but he found
life there
quite
boring
owing
to the
relative absence of
political
turmoil. He had loved Somaliland,
and
he longed
to
go
back. His
wishes came
true in 1912
when
he
was
appointed
to
command
the Camel Corps. While the Camel
I Corps
was
being
recruited and
trained, the
state of
law-
lessness in the interior
was steadily going
from bad to
worse.
Early in June, the Habr Yunis
and
Habr Toljaala
who
had taken
refuge near
Burao
were
followed by the Der-
vishes and
thoroughly defeated. They lost 1,000
camels
and six men.
lo6
Then in August Archer., the Acting Commis-
sioner, went
to Las Khorai
and
Hais
with a view
to
ascertaining whether
the Gadwein
and
the Warsengeli
were
still
friendly to the British
as
they had
promised
Byatt.
He found them
not only
hostile to the British, but
also
at grips with one another.
Nearly
40
Gadwein
and
22
105. Ibid. Chapter VII.
lo6. c. o.
879/100
Byatt to C. O.
6/6/1912
No.
84.
I
9`3
Warsengeli had
already
lost their lives in the feud.
107
During this
same month.,
the Dolbahantap
who
had been
flocking to Berbera in
successive waves seem
to have
resolved
to
move en masse,
leaving the interior
entirely
to the Dervishes. Archer
reported
this
phenomenon as
follows:
"the
general retreat northwards of
the Dolba-
hanta is
confirmed, and
the
country south and
east of
the line from Hanik-Burao-Aik is
now
said
to have been
completely evacuated
by
our
friendly tribes.
"
lo8
The Colonial Office
could
do
nothing
but hope that the
Camel Corps,
once
it had
stSted
its
operations, would
K
alleviate
the'problem. Read
minuted:
"we
are pushing on, as rapidly as possible,
with
the formation
of
the Camel Corps,
and we
must
hope for
an
improvement
when
the force
takes the field.
"
109
The Camel Corps took the field in December 1912,
leaving Berbera
with a month's provisions, and establishing
a
base
at
Mandera,
42
miles
inland
along
the Berbera-
Hargeisa
road.
This
spot
had
previously
been
a
favourite
target for the Habr Yunis
raiders,
this being
an
important
caravan route.
110
Corfield
was authorized
to take
puni-
tive
action against
the
raiders,
but
was, at
the
same
time,,
warned
that
,
"the
creation of
the Corps does
not
in
any
way
imply
a reversal of
the
accepted policy of
coastal concentration.
The fundamental
reason
for the
raising of
the Corps is the
necessity,
107. C. O.
879/100
Archer to C. O. 30/8/1912 No. 97,
108. C. O. 535/28 Archer to C. O. 7/8/1912.
109. C. O. 535/28 Archer to C. O.
V8/1912
Minute by Read.
110. C. O. 535/28 Byatt to C. O. 5/12/1912.
6
il)
which
two
and
half
years of
lawlessness have
clearly
demonstrated, to keep
open
the trade
routes
for
caravans visiting
the
coast and
also
to
put an end
to that
constant
internal
warfare among
the friendlies
which renders
them incapable
of resisting aggression
from
the
outside.
"
ill
Byattfs instructions to Corfield
were clearly
contradictory and,,
therefore,,
self-defeating.
On the
one
hand he insisted that the
official policy of non-
interference in the internal
politics of
the Somali had
not
been
affected
by the inception
of
the Corps,
and, on
the
other,
he
assigned
the force the duty
of restoring
law
and order, within
the
prescribed
area., a goal which.,
needless
to
say, could not
be
achieved without any
inter-
ference in the internal
politics of
the tribes.
That
the inception
of
the Camel Corps
actually constituted a
change of policy was confirmed
by Byatt's further instruc-
tions
as
to the
method
to be
used
by Corfield in the
course of performing
his duties:
'Ve
must now start with a clean slate,
taking
notice of and awarding punishment only
in those
cases of
looting
and
fighting
which occur
hence-
forth
....
but the Government
will reserve
the
right of
interfering
and enforcing restitution
in
any such
former
cases as
it
sees
fit to take
up
...
The Constabulary is to be
regarded as a
striking
force
which may
be
used
to
repress
dis-
order and
to insist
on compliance with any
decision
arrived at
in Berbera.
"112
What if the Camel Corps
was
threatened by
a strong
Dervish
force? Corfield
should, under such circumstances,
111. C-0-535/28 Byatt to Corfield 3/12/1912
(Encl.
in Byatt
to C. O. 5/12/1912).
112. Ibid.
201
flavoid
being
attacked or surrounded
-
the
Corps
should,
in those
circumstanceso retire
to the
coast.
"
113
The fiction that it
was possible
tolmaintain law
and order within-a radius of
50
miles
from Berberao
while
turning
a
blind
eye
to
what obtained
in the
area
beyondp
was exposed shortly after
the Camel-Corps had taken
posi-
tion
at
Mandera. Towards the
end of
December 1912 the
Dervishes
raided a group of
Dolbahanta
who
had
ventured
into the Ain Valley in
search of water and grazing
for
their
stock.
Since this
area was
beyond the
prescribed
area,
the Camel Corps
remained
inactive
at
Mandera,
and
only gave more arms and ammunition
to the
elders who
went
to Corfield
seeking military assistance.
A few
weeks
later, the Dervishes
made another attack on a
party of pro-British
tribesmen
near
Bohotleh
and
Dul
Madoba., killingtwo
men and seizing plenty of stock.
Once
more,
the Camel Corps
could
do
nothing since
the
scene of attack was
beyond the
permitted radius.
114
The
policy of
having British troops
stationed at
Mandera
but
unable
to
assist
the
pro-British
tribes being
harrassed
a
few
miles awayj,
turned
out
to be
worse
than
having
no
British force
at all as
had been thecase
since
withdrawal.
At least then the
peopleo seeing no
British.
troops
arounds expected no assistance of any sort, and
had to take
what measures
they thought fit to
protect
themselves. But to have British troops
at
Mandera
which
could not move as
far
as
Burao, Bohotleh
or
the Ain
113. Ibid.
114. C. O. 535/28 Byatt to 26/12/1912.
Valley
was something quite perplexing
to the
pro-British
tribes. Their
confidence
in the British
was shaken
to
the
core, and some sections of
the Dolbahanta
-
the Mahmud
Gerad
and
the Farah Gerad
-
threatened to defeat to the
Sayyid if the British
could not make up
their
mind.
This
particular
threat
was alarming
to Byatt, for these
sec-
tions had been
supplied with plenty of arms and ammunition
which
they
would automatically
hand
over
to the Sayyid in
the
event of
their defection.
115
In the
circumstances,
it
was
inevitable that
Byatt had to
seek permission
to
extend
the
operations
of
the Camel Corps
up
to the Ain Valley,
arguing
that
if this
were
done,
"it
would attract a
large body'of friendlies
and could, without
difficulty defeat
and
drive
out
the Dervish
parties now
there"'116
Since this
proposal
involved
a
fundamental
change of
the
official policy,
it
was referred
to Harcourt,
who replied
that
"this
was not
the
object
for
which
the Camel
Corps
was provided, and
it is
contrary
to the
115. C. O. 535/30 Byatt to C. O. 31111913.
116. Ibid.
203
express policy of
H. M. Government. It
carmot,
therefore be
assented
to.
"
117
Byatt
wrote
back
pointing out
that
whatever
be the
official policy,
the 50
miles
limit
was unrealistic and
even
dangerous. If this
could not
be
modified,
then the
Camel Corps
ought
to be disbanded. After
a protracted
discussion in the Colonial Office, Byatt
was
informed
that the Camel Corps
could now operate as
far
as
Burao
and
Ber,
nearly
100
miles
from Berbera, but
not as
far
as
the Ain Valley. Commenting
on
this
revision of policys
Battersby
states, albeit with some exaggeration,
that
"within
a month of
the first
movement of
the
Corps, the fiction
of
its being
a coastal con-
stabulary was completely abandoned"
118
117.535/30 Minute by Harcourt
on
Byatt to C. O. 31/l/1913.
Lewis Harcourt
(1863-1922).
Educated
at
Eton, but
unable
to
attend
Cambridge due to ill-health. Between
1881
and
1904 he declined
appointments
in the Public
Service,
preferring
to
serve
his father, Sir William
Harcourt,
as
Private Secretary. He
entered
Parliament
in 1904
and was
Secretary
of
State for the Colonies
from 1910 to 1915. He
was a progressive
Liberal,
and
often
did
not see eye-to-eye with
Grey
and
Asquith,
the
so-called
"Liberal
Imperialists". His
attitude
towards Somaliland
was
by
no means representative of
his
general position on
the
question of
Britain's
role
in the Empire. Elsewhere he
advocated
develop-
ment and encouraged
it
-
construction of railway
lines
in Central
and
West Africa;
construction of
Kilindini
Harbour;
no self-Government
forthe
white settlers
in
B. E. A. P.;
promotion of peasant agriculture
in Uganda;
union of southern and northern
Nigeria;
research
into
the
sleeping sickness etc.
Only in Somaliland did he
advocate retrocession.
In
so
doing he
was partly
follow-
ing the
policy of
his
predecessor.,
Earl Crewe,
and partly
reflecting
the influence
of
his fatherts
parsimonious
policy which, as
Chancellor
of
the Exchequer, he
pursued
so vigorously, going as
far
as
to
advocate,
in 1892,
that Britain had
already
"acquired
as much
Empire
as
the
nation can carry"
(see
H. L. Hall, The Colonial
Office,,
(Longmans)
1937-p. 181).
118. Prevost-Battersby, Richard Corfield
of
Somaliland
p.
215-216.
U
The
operations of
the Camel Corps began in
earnest
in December 1912. The first target
were
the
Sulagudab
section of
the Habr Yunis
whose constant raids
on
the trade
caravans
had dealt
a crippling
blow to the
trade
and security of
the
area stretching
from Berbera to
Burao. Having
received permission
to
move against
the
intended
victims,
Corfield
could nct' conceal
his jubilia-
tion:
"I
am
immensely looking forward to the
move, and
the
eyes of
the
whole
country are upon
it. To
the
natives,
it is
quite an epoch-making affair
after
the Government's
sphere of action
having
been
confined
to the
coast
for
nearly
three
years".
119
It is
evident*
thereforeo that Corfield's
conception of
his duty.,
and
his
enthusiasm
did
not
tally
with either
the
instructions
given
to him
or
to the
official policy.
Neverthelesso Corfield's
operations against
the
Sulagudad
were so successful
that the latter
paid
the fine
he imposed
on
them
and made a solemn promise not
to
cause
trouble
again.
The
success of
this
operation evidently
had
a salutary effect on several other
tribes
which
had
hitherto
adopted an
intransigient
attitude
towards the
Britisho
and
Byatt
made a point of capitalizing on
it.
He
reported
that
"by
taking'advantage
of
this
success of
the
constabulary., "it
has been
possible
to
make a
comprehensive settlement at
Berbera
and-
Mandera
of
two
old
bitter feuds between the
Habr Yunis
and
Habr Awal".
120
He
went on
to
contend:
119. Ibid.
p.
208-209.
120. C. O. 535/30 Byatt to C. O. 23/1/1913-
\
1"%
\
Ih 'i
I
"it
is
now possible
for
unprotected
travellers
to
proceed either
to Burao
or
to Hargeisa'1121
In
spite of
these
encouraging reports,
from the
point of view of
the British, Harcourt
was
"still
nervous at
the
camelry going so
far
as
Burao"
122
Harcourtts
pessimism seemed unjustified at
the time
since
the Cammelry
was
doing
well.
The following
month
Corfield
raided
the
recalcitrant
tribes in Hargeisa,
captured
their
stock and
distributed them to the
aggrieved parties
.
123
In March the future began to look
so promising
that Byatt
recommended
-
and
the Colonial Office
endorsed
-
the
with-
drawal
of
the 320 Indian
soldiers
borrowed from Aden.
The Camel Corps
spent
April 1913
moving
between
Burao
and
Hargeisa
settling
disputes
and punishing
the
stubborn elements.
The Aidegallah
and
the Habr Awal., for
examples
had been feuding for
several months
before
Corfieldts
arrival.
In
addition, several
Habr Awal
sec-
tions
were at grips with one another.
Corfield investi-
gated all
these
cases
in detail, imposed fines
on
those
he found
guilty and punished
those
who remained stubborn.
may now
be hoped"..
Byatt
wrote at
the
end of
Corfield's
operations,
"that
no
further fighting
will
take
place
in
the
western
district for
some space of
time,,
although some space of
time
must necessarily
elapse
before the
old
feelings
of
hostility
will
disappear"'124
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid. Minute by Harcourt.
123. Prevost-Batterby, Richard Corfield
of
Somaliland
p.
230-232.
124. C. O. 535/30 Byatt to C. O.
8/5/1913-
206
The tendency
of
Byatt to
allow
Corfield
a
free
t
hand,
even when
it
was apparent
that he
was violating
the
earlier
instructions,
was a signal
for Corfield to
act
in
obedience
to his
well-known
temperamental
and psychological
inclinations. Nevertheless, Corfield
was. quite alive
to
the fact that, in
so acting,
he
was
infringing the
offi-
cial policy.
He
wrote
to his
personal
friend:
"if
only
the Colonial Office
would give us
leave to have
a go at
him
with plenty of ammuni-
tion
and some money
to break him
up.
I
am always
urging
this but the Colonial Office
are as
timid
as
hares"125
In the
middle of
June Corfield took
a step which
clearly
demonstrated his impatience
with
the
restraints
imposed
on
him by the
official policy.
On the 12th June
1913
a messenger
found Corfield
at
Burao
and reported
that
a strong
Dervish force
was
in the
process of advancing
against
the Ararsame
section of
the Dolbahanta
near
Oadweina,
on
the Burao-Bohotleh
road.
The
victims were
reported
to be in headlong flight
and
the Dervishes in
hot
pursuit.
Corfield
set out at once with
the inten-
tion
of giving military assistance
to the Ararsama but,
en route,
he discovered that the incident had been
grossly
exaggerated,
and
the Dervish
raiders numbered not more
than twelve. Although the incident
passed
without
trouble.,
the
very
fact that Corfield had
set Out with
the intention
of engaging
a
Dervish force
was a
blatant
violation of
the
instructions given
to him by Byatt.
Archer felt in duty
bound to
warn
Corfield that
125. Prevost-Battersbys
Richard Corfield
of
Somaliland
p.
236.
2ff 7
ff
though
nothing whatsoever unforeseen
occurred
on
this
occasion, and
though there is
no reason
to doubt that the
arrival of
the Camel Corps
on
the
scene at
this juncture
could
have had
other
than
a steadying effect on our
tribesmen in
full
retreat, yet
I
cannot pass over
the inci-
dent
without
drawing
your attention
to the
explicit nature of
the instructions
conveyed
to
you
from time to time
on
the
subject of con-
fining the Camel Corps
operations
to the immediate
vicinity of
Burao
with
Ber
as an extreme
limit for
occasional patrols"
126
During the first five
months
following the incep-
tion
of
the Camel Corps, the Dervishes
confined
their
operations
to the
southernmost parts of
the Protectorate,
trying
as
hard
as possible,
to
avoid a
head-on-collision
with
the Camel Corps. The
possible explanation
is that
they
wished
to
ascertain
the
real
intentions
of
the British
and
the
strength of
the
new
force. Some interesting
developments took
place within
the Dervish
movement
during
this
period.
The
most
important
was
the
construction of a
fort
at
Teleh
and
the transfer
of
the Sayyid's haroun to
that
place.
Hitherto, the haroun had
shifted
from
one
place
to
another,
but by the
middle of
1913 it
was an
established
fact that Taleh
was, more or
less, the
perma-
nent centre of
the Sayyid. He
moved out occasionally
either
to inspect the
other
forts
which were scattered
in different
places,, or
to
command expeditions
but he
always
invariably
returned
to Taleh
where
he
conducted
the
greater part of,
his
administrative and
diplomatic
duties.
127
The Dervishes
seem
to have
started constructing
126. c. o.
879/110
Archer to Corfield 23/6/1913
(Encl.
in
Archer to C. O. 23/6/1913-
127. C. O.
879/110
Archer to C. O. 23/6/1913 No. 172.
203
forts in,
or shortly
before, 1912, beginning
with a
fort
in the BaSheri
country at
Laba Bark
128
.
followed by
another
at
Bohotleh,,
129
and a
third
at
Damer.
130
After this, the
Dervishes
were constructing
forts
everywhere
they happened
to have
a
base. During the
expeditionary period
the
Dervishes had derived
much of
their
strength
from their
deployment
of guerrilla
tactics
against
the British forces.
Owing to the Dervishes'
exceptional
knowledge
of
the
country and
their
great mobility,
the
regular'troops were
always
forced to fight
on
the Dervish terms. The latter,
well
knowing the futility
of engaging
British troops in
a
pitched
battle,
always preferred
to take their
enemy
by
surprise,
inflict
as much
damage
as
they
could., and
then
vanish
into the inhospitable
parts of
the
country where
the
expeditionary
forces
could not venture without serious
risks.
Describing the difficulty faced by the
expedition-
ary
forces, Archer
notes
that
"searching
for the Mullah
was
like
searching
for
a needle
in the
proverbial
haystack".
131
The
construction of
forts, therefore$
constituted
a
fundamental
change of military strategy on
the
part of
the Dervishes. It
meant
that, in the
event of
fresh
hostilities
with
the British taking
place,
the Dervishes,
instead
of
depending
on
their
mobility, would resort
to
defending their forts. Theywouldo in those
circumstances..
128. c. o.
P79/110
Byatt to C. O. 10/2/1912 No. 26.
129. C. O.
879/110
Byatt to C. O. 18/4/1912 No.
68.
1-30. C. O.
879/ilO
Archer to C. O. 26/9/1912 No. 100.
131. G. Archer, Personal Memoirs
of
An East African Adminis-
trator
OP- cit. P.
63.
15'
be forced to
engage
British troops in
a pitched
battle,
a
factor
whichq
for the first time in Dervish history,
would enable
the British troops to
aim at
definite
targets.
It is
not
known
why
the Dervishes
embarked on
this
new strategy.
One
possible explanation
is that,
after
British
withdrawal'from
the interior., the Sayyidts
military and
diplomatic
campaigns
increased both his
prestige and
the
scale of
the
sphere of
his influence to
the
extent
that he
needed permanent centres
to
use as
administrative
headquarters
as well as command posts.
It
is
also conceivable
that the influx
of guns
in the Sayyid's
camp
inflated the latterts
confidence
in
what
he
was
capable of accomplishing militarily.
Thus, he
might
have
begun to
nurse
the idea that he
was capable of
holding
his
own against
the British in
a
direct
confrontation.
In
such circumstancess
there
would
be
no need
for the
Dervishes to
revert
to the
old
tactics
which
had been
forced
on
them by their
admitted relative military
'
inferiority. Thus, the
construction of
the forts
might
have been
a
deliberate
change of policy, resulting
from
the Dervishest
newly acquired confidence.
Whatever
might
have
motivated
them, the
construction of
forts
was a
tac-
tical blunders for it
was
inconceivable that the Dervishes
could
defeat British troops in
a pitched
battle.
Archer's
reminder
to Corfield to
stick
to the
instructions issued to him
evidently made no
impact
on
the latter. Only two
months
later he led the Camel
Corps to its destruction
at
Dul Madoba. On the
8th
of
August 1913 Corfield,
who was
then
at
Burao,
received
210
reports
that
a
big Dervish force
was raiding
to the
south
of
Burao,
as
far
as
Idoweina. Archer
who
happened to be
at
Burao
was approached
by Corfield
and some elders with
a request
for the Camel Corps to
proceed at once
to deal
with
the
situation.
Archer
was, as was
his
usual attitude,
reluctant
to
grant
the desired
permission
but he
eventually
allowed
Corfield to
go on*a reconnaissance mission and
then
return
to
report on
the
situation.
He
asked
Summers, then
commanding
the Indian
contingent of
the
6th
Battalion, K. A. R.
j,
to
accompany
the Camel Corps., the idea being,
presumablyj,
that he
would act as a check against any rash action
by
Corfield-132 ' The latter's force
amounted
to three
officerss
namelys
Corfield,, Dunn
and
Summers,
61
Camelryj,
15
pony mens and
6
volunteers.
They
were armed with
140
rifles,
8,200
rounds of ammunition and a maxim-gun.
They
were
joined,
en route,
by
600
spearmen,
150 horsemen
and
1 _AIA
2,000
riflemen
belonging to different
pro-British
tribes.
"'
On the
evening of
8th
August, the Camel Corps
and
its followers
camped near
Idoweina,
which
is 30
miles
to the
south of
Burao.,
and
from here they
could see
Der-
vish camp
fires
a
few
miles away.
Summers
proposed
with-
drawal
but Corfield brushed
aside
the idea.
134
On the
morning of
9th August the Dervishes
began to
move
towards
Dul Madoba
with
the
stock
they had looted. It
was at
this
132. C. O. 535131 Archer to C. O. 19/8/1913-
133. Ibid. See
also
F. S. Caroselli,
Ferro
e
Fuocolop.
cit.
P.
153.
134. Prevost-Battersby,
Richard Corfield
of
Somaliland
op. cit.. p.
245.
211
juncture that Corfield decided to
cut
the Dervish line
of retreat with a view
to
recovering
the
stock.
The
Dervish force,
about
2,000
strong, was
intercepted
at
Dul Madoba,
and a
fierce
confrontation
followed
almost
immediately.
The
pro-British
tribes
who
had followed the
Camel Corps fled
on
hearing the first
shots,
thus leaving
the Camel Corps to
go
it
alone.
The
maxim-gun was silenced
by
rifle
fire
early
during the
action., and
Corfield
was
shot
through the head
almost at
the
same
time. On
one
occasion
hand-to-hand fighting
ensued.
After five hours
of confrontation
the Dervishes
withdrew,
leaving 35
of
the Camel Corps deads 21
wounded and
3
missing.
The Der-
vishes, who were under
the
command of
Yusuf Abdillahi
Hassan, the Sayyidts
uncle,
lost
nearly
200
men.
135
Summers
admitted afterwards
that if the Der-
vishes
had
not called off
the
offensive,
the Camel Corps
would
have
certainly
been
annihilated
to
a man.
The Dul
Madoba
confrontation was one of
the
rare cases where
Bellocts
often quoted remark
to the
effect
that
"whatever
happens
we
have
got
the
maxim-gun and
they have
not
'136
did
not
hold
good.
At Dul Madoba the
maxim-gun was put
out of action
by
a
Dervish bullet.
-Nevertheless.,
in
a
majority of cases elsewhere
in
colonial
Africa, the
maxim-
gun always
tipped the
scales
in favour
of
Europeans;
135. C. O. 535/31 Archer to C. O. 19/8/1913. Also Interview
with
Dahir Afqarshe,
at
the Somali Academy, Mogadishu,
3rd August 1974;
and with
Mohamed Haji Hussein,
popu-
larly known
as
"Sheeko
Hariir"
(good
story
teller),,
Somali Academy,.
4th
August 1974. The battle
of
Dul
Madoba is known in Somali
as
Ruuga
(i.
e.
the
grinding
of
bones).
136. Webster
and
Boahen, The Revolutionary Years West Africa
Since 1800
(Longmans)
1968
p.
242.
2iz
"in
the final
analysis
it
was
the
maxim-gun
which compelled respect, obedience,
humiliation
and subjection".
137
137. Ibid.
p.
253.
1
CHAPTER IV
THE RE-OCCUPATION OF THE INTERIOR 1914-1918
The British
regarded
the
outcome of
the
confron-
tation
at
Dul Madoba
as a
disaster,
while
the Dervishes
evidently regarded
it
as
their
most
distinguished
victory
in the history
of
their
struggle against
the British. The
Sayyid, in his
characteristic style, crowned
the
victory
with a powerful poem
in
which
he
poured scorn on
his
enemy and praise on
the Dervish fighters. Later
on
he
composed another poem
intended for Corfield's
sister.,
after
the Sayyid had
apparently received
information-'to
the
effect
that
she was about
to lead
an expedition
to
avenge
her brotherts death. The
poemo after praising
God for the death
of
Corfield,
concludes as
follows:
1. His
sister,
the Midgan
(i.
e. outcaste)
is,
said
to be
mourning;
2.
(It
is
said) she
has
worn
black
mourning
dresses
and-cries endlessly;
1. See Appendix'I. This
poem was
translated by Dr. B. W.
Andrzejewski
and
Professor I. M. Lewis in their book
Somali Poetry. An Introduction
(Oxford
U. P.
)
1964
P.
72-74.
244
Ili
She is like
one possessed
by the devil,,
so
let her
continue
to
mourn-2
Archer's immediate
concern was
to take
such
measures as would ensure
the
security of
Berbera, in
case
the Dervishes decided to follow
up
their
action of
Dul
Madoba
with a mass
invasion
of
the
coast.
He
acquired
315 Indian troops from Aden3
and a warship
from Muscat
to
patrol
the
coast.
4
Both the Colonial Office
and
the
Somaliland
administration were at one
in the
view
that
the
setback at
Dul Madoba
should not
lead to further
diminution
of
British
prestige.
Thus, the Commissioner
2. This
poem was
translated
with
the help
of
Abdisalam Y.
Mohamed,
a research student
in the Somali language,
and checked
by Dr. B. W. Andrzejewski, Reader in
Cushitic Languages
at
S. O. A. S. The
original
Poem is
found in Sheikh Jaamac Cumar Ciise, Wasaaradda Hiddiya
Tacliinta Sare. Diiwaanka Gabayadii Sayid Maxamad
Xasan (M
gadishu)
1974
p.
M7.
The
source of
the
rumour
regarding
the intentions
attributed
to Corfield's
sister
is
not
known. It
might
have been
started
by
a
malicious
Dervish
or might
have been fabricated by the
Sayyid
with
the
conceivable object of
keeping the Dul
Madoba
episode a
live issue in the Dervish. Besides
the
above
book..
-
"A
collection of
the Poems
of
Sayid
Muhammad Hassan"
-Sheikh
Jaamac Cumar Ciise is
also
the
author of
Tarikh
al-Sumal
fi-l-lusur
al-wusta wa-
1-hadithah
(Hi-story
of
Somalia in
medieval and modern
times)
op. cit.
3. c. o.
879/110
1.0. to C. O. 12/8/1913 No. 190.
4.
c. o.
879/110
Admiralty to C. O. 12/8/1913.
/
suggested,, and
the Colonial Office
concurreds
that the
Camel Corps
should
be increased from its former
strength
of
150 to twice that
number.. and
that
a new commanding
office,
together
with
four
more officerso should
be
appointed
to take
charge of
the
new
force.
5
The Dul Madoba
episode marked a
turning
point
in Britain's
policy
towards her Somaliland Protectorate.
Hitherto Britain's
policy
had been
committed
to
a steady
diminution
of
her
responsibilities
in the interior,
leaving the task
of restoring
law
and order within a
limited
radius of
Berbera to Corfield's Camel Corps.
The
results of
the Dul Madoba
encounter called
for
a
re-examination of
Britain's
record
in Somaliland,
a re-
assessment of
the
merits and
demerits
of
the
policies
she
had hitherto
pursued or shunned, and a
definite
decision
as
to the future. For the
previous eight years
Britain had been
confronted with
two inevitable
alter-
natives, either
to
vacate
the Protectorate
or
to
pacify
it. Considering
either course
too
ghastly
to be
contem-
plated, she
had
persistently avoided
both,
choosing,
instead, to
experiment with middle courses.
After Dul
Madoba, Britain
could not possibly continue
to
vacillate,
for her
whole
future in Somaliland
was now at stake.
If
she
decided to
concede
defeat, then there
was no alter-
native
for her but to
abandon
the Protectorate. If
she
was not prepared
for this
course
then
she
had to take
such
measures as were necessary
for
restoring
the
prestige and
position which
the
engagement at
Dul Madoba had
eroded.
5. MSS. AFR. S-552
p.
15-17.
i6
The Dul Madoba
episode captured
the headlines
of
the British
press, and stimulated
Parliamentary interest
in the
affairs of what was progressively
becoming
one of
the
most
insignificant
parts of
the British Empire.
Archer's
verdict as
to
who was responsible
for the Dul
Madoba debacle
was
definite:
"I
wish
to
say
that it is
with
feelings
of
the
greatest reluctance and
the
most profound regret
that I have to lay to the
charge of a
dead
man
and a gallant officer
that he
acted
in
a
hazardous
manner without a
full
sense of
his
responsibility
A
rash act
has involved the Government
of
iL"Protectorate
in
a severe setback
....
For
this Mr. Corfield
who
had
previously
done
such
excellent work
has
paid
the
penalty with
his
life".
6
Harcourt
was
in
complete agreement with
Archer
and
he duly
told the House
of
Commons that Archer's
"disobedience*
unfortunatelys resulted
in the
loss
of
his
own and other
lives; but the
instructiods
which were
issued to Mr. Corfield
and
the Camel Corps
are absolutely and abun-
dantly
clear.
"
7
These
views were,
however,
not shared
by
a good
number of
Members
of
Parliamento let
alone
the
press and
the
public.
At
any rateo
the
most
important issue,
so
far
as
these
were concerned, was not so much
to indulge in
endless
rperimination as
to bring
pressure upon
the British
Government to
change
its
policy.
Dul Madoba
provided all
those
who
had
criticized
British
withdrawal
from the
interioro
with an opportunity
for
renewing
their
criticisms
6.
G. Archer, Personal
and
Historical Memoirs
of an
East
African AdMinistrator
op. ci P.
75.
7. House
of
Commons Parliamentary Debates
(Official
Edition)
1914, Vol. LVIII, February 10 to 27. The full debate
on
-
the Somaliland
situation
is
on column
1619-1690.
217
as well as vindicating
their
views which
had been
over-
ridden.
Thus, Corfield became
a martyr
for the
cause of
British imperialism in Somaliland. One Member
of
rarlia-
ment categorically stated
that
"I
refuse
to
call what
happened
a
disaster. I
say unhesitatingly
that, if there
was a
disasterp
it
occurred after
the fighting
and not
before
....
I believe
with all my
heart, that the blow to
British
prestige was
dealt
when
the Camel Corpso
depleted
as
it
was, went
down to the
coasto
instead
of remaining at
the
place where
it
could
have done,
with
the
assistance of
the Indian
contingent and
the troops
sent
from Aden"-8
Referring to Harcourt's
censure of
Corfield the
same man
regarded
Harcourtts
remark as
"callous;
it
was ungenerous;
it lacked that
consideration which men
in high
positions,
for
whom other men work., generally grant
to those
who
have
either succeeded or
failed. I
am not
all
that
sure
that Corfield
made a mistake
in
doing
what
he did.
"
The
press was even more ruthless
in its
criticism of
the
Government.
A
correspondent of
the
"Daily
Express"j,
Alan Ostler,
took
exceptional
interest in the Somaliland
affairs, going so
far
as
to
pay a personal
visit
to the
Protectorate. In
one of
his
numerous articles,
he
pointed
out
that the
set-back at
Dul Madoba had
already
damaged
British
prestige among
her
subjects
both in Somaliland
and
elsewhere
in the British Empire,
and,
"this
in itself,
as any white man
from Aden to
Addis Ababaj
and
from Suakim to Mombasa
can
vouch
for from
personal experienceo
is
a
bad
thing for British
prestige
....
even
in the
streets of
Aden I have
myself
had
experience
of
this. Somalis there, instead
of saluting
8.
Ibid. Speech by G. Parker, M. P.
column
1625.
9. Ibid. Column 1627.
I
-! .
a
Sahibp
will ostentatiously
turn
away
their
heads
or
draw
a corner of
their
robe or
head-
dress
over
their
mouths
-
an oriental
insult.
I have
even seen
them
spit at
the
sight of
English
officers".
10
Ostler then
vient on
to
charge
that
"ill-faith
and
treachery
might explain
the fact
that
we
have
suffered
friendlies to be
robbeds
killed
and mutilated without attempting
to
protect
them. But there is, to the
native minds
only one explanation when we suffer an
English
Officer's
murder
to
pass away unavenged; and
that
explanation
is
cowardice
....
Men
who
really
know believe that Mr. Corfield did the
only
thing
possible
in
an attempt
to
save a
desperate
situation created
by the
parsimony
of
Downing Street
....
The
reputation of
the
Englishman is
gones
his
prestige
lowered in
Africa. The
consequences of
these things
will
be
obvious
to
all
but the
cranks who
ddminate
the British
policy at
home
and abroad.
"
11
In
another article
he talked
of
the
"torture
of
British Somaliland
subjects:
horrors that
rival
the
atrocities of
the
Congo
if
p
and claimed
that the interior
of
the Protectorate
was
"the
scene of
horrors
and atrocities quite as
terrible
as
those
of
the Congo
or
Portuguese
East Africa,,
over which
the British
public
has
expended so much sympathy".
12
10.
"Daily
Express",. 14th October 1913. Report by Alan
Ostler,
writing
from Dire Dawa in Ethiopia. With
a view
to keeping into
close
touch
with what was
being
said
in
the Press, the Colonial Office
made a point of collecting
such newspaper articles as were considered
important
and
hard-hitting. These
were circulated
in the
normal way
through the hierarchy
of
the Colonial Office. In this
way,
the Colonial Secretaryo
who was under severe criticism
in Parliament,
was
kept
well
informed
of public opinion,
and
thoroughly
advised
in
what
to
say
in Parliament. These
newspaper articles
-
at
least
most of
them
-
have been
preserved and are
to be found
side-by-side with
the
ordinary
despatches in the P. R. O. files.
11. Ibid.
12.
"Daily
Express" 13th November 1913. Article by Ostler.
211,131
Ostler's
articles received wide publicity and stirred
public
interest in Somaliland
affairs.
One Member
of
Parliament
responded
by
expressing
to the
"Daily
Express"
his
admiration
"in
the
strongest
terms for the
stand which
your paper
is taking for Imperialism
....
I
can only say
that
as soon as
Parliament
meets
we must
have
a
debate,
and
let Mr. Harcourt
face the
music",
13
Encouraged by the
public response
to his
reportso
Ostler
went
beyond the
scope of
his
mission and profession
in his
efforts
to
establish
himself
as
the
champion of
British imperialism
and spokesman
for the humanitarian
cause
in Somaliland. In December 1913 he left Harar for
the British Protectorates in
utter
defiance
of
Byatt's
ruling.
He
stopped at
Gibeli
and
found Ethiopians looting
the Somali
camels and
killing
people, whereupon
he
installed himself
as
judge
and administrator, so
that
flas
a result of my
inquiry
and
in the
absence
of any authority,,
I have
expelled
these Ethiopians
from Somaliland
and ordered
them to
return at once
across
the frontier
with a
letter to the Governor
of
Harar
asking
him by
what right
he
sends a
body
of armed men
into British territory
with neither
travelling
permits nor shooting
licences.
"
14
Ironicallyo Ostler himself
possessed neither shooting
licence
nor
travelling documents. Ostler's behaviour
at
Gibeli
which
demonstrated his foolhardiness
more
than
any-
thing
elseo and should
have been
censured on
that
account,
won
him
more praise
from,
among many otherso
the Editor
of
13.
"Daily
Express" 15th November 1913* letter by Joynson-
Hickso M. P.
14.
"Daily
Express"
8th
December 1913. Article by
Ostler.
'3)
the
"Daily
Express"
who regarded
Ostler's
conduct as
one which
"tells
a story more apt
to the
spacious
days
of
Queen Elizabeth
when
Englishmen
with roving
missions and
invincible faith in themselves
planted
the flag
and made an
Empire., than for
the
more effete civilizations of
the twentieth
century.
And the
charm of
the
story
is that
Mr. Ostler is
quite unconscious of
the heroic
nature of
his
enterprise.
This
young man
expelled
the
raiders
from the
village,
driving
them before him in the
name of
England. For
a
parallel
to this
remarkable affair one must go
to Kipling
and
his Plain Ta les from the
HillsI.
15
The
"Morning
Post" joined the
general outcry against
Britain's
policy
in Somaliland. Prevost-Battersby
who
later
wrote a
book
entitled
"Richard
Corfield
of
Somaliland", became the
main source of ammunition
for
the
"Morning
Post". He
contended
that
"the
disaster
which
has befallen the Camel
Corps in Somaliland is
one
the
certainty of
which
has long been foretold".
and proceeded
to
chide
the British Government for
shunning
responsibility
in Somaliland
so as
to
save a
few
paltry
pounds, and
for
abandoning a people so
"charming,
bombastic,
poetics wonderfully
good-humouredo occasionally
brave,
with a
tinge
of slav melancholy
in their
composition
16
The
"Fall
Mall Gazette"
alone
took
a
different line
on
the
issue,
and was critical of
Ostler's jingoistic
method of
conduct.
The
paper was
15.
"Daily
Express"
8th
December 1913. Article by the
Editor.
16.
"Morning
rost" 22nd November 191.3. Article by
Battersby.
9).
"not
in the least impressed by the
rather
silly story of
the Daily Express
young man
who ordered some
Abyssinians
out of
the
village near
the frontier
of
British
Somaliland Protectorate
......
it is
not
our
intention to
support any attempt
to
embroil
Great Britain
afresh
in this
waste
corner of
the
earth.
"
17
The
press offensive suffered a setback
towards
the
end of
December
when
its
spearhead,
Ostlers
arrived
in Berbera
and was arrested on charges of
having
violated
the Protectorate's
arms and
immigration
rules.
Following
his
refusal
to
pay a court
fine
of
Rs. 2,000, Ostler
was
sentenced
to
one month's
imprisonment,
and
it
was not
until
the Colonial Office intervened that Byatt
agreed
to
release and
depart him.
18
While the
press and
Parliamentary
controversy
raged
in Britain, the Dervishes lost
no
time in
consoli-
dating
and expanding
their
strongholds.
In September they
ransacked
Burao
and captured nearly
6,000
stock
belonging
to the
pro-British
tribes. The latter
were
left
with no
choice
but to flee to Berbera in
a state of complete
destitution. The
administration was
forced to
open a
relief camp
to
accommodate and
feed
some
1,779
refugees
who
had left
everything
behind. These
refugees were
.
given a ration of one pound of rice per
them for
adults,
half
of
that for infants
and
"a
sufficient allowance of water and
firewood"19
17.
"Pall
Mall Gazette" 18th December 1913.
18. C. O.
879/115
Byatt to C. O. 23/11/1913 No.
4.
19. C. O.
879/115
Archer to C. O. 14/3/1914 No.
45.
412
2
In
return
for these
relief measuress
those inmates
of
the
camp who
had
some energy
left in them
were made
to
do
such
duties
as removing sand, cleaning and various
other manual
duties.
Following the Dervish
action at
Buraop the
Sayyid
established
his base
at
Shimber Berriss found
at
the head
of
the Ain Valley,
where a
Dervish fort had just
been
completed.
He despatched
some
400
veterans of
the
Dul Madoba
action
to hold the fort,
a
factor
which
led
Byatt to
observe
that
"the
occupation of
Shimber Berris
marks a
definite
move
forward
on
his
part.
"
20
Using Shimber Berris'as
a spring-boardj,
the Dervishes
made
four
consecutive raids against
the Musa Aboker
section of
the Habr Toljaala tribe in October 1913. In
the first
attack a
force
of
150 Dervishes
attempted
to
loot
stock
but
were
foiled
and
driven
off.
In thqr6tubse-
quent raids,
howevers
a
Dervish
party of no more
than 12
horsemen drove
off some
300
camels
from the Arori
plainss
some
12 to 14
miles south of
Buraos
without meeting any
resistance.
21
The Dervish
raids went
hand-in-hand
with a crash
programme of
fort
construction
throughout the interior. By
the
end of
1913
a
large
number
had been
completedp
the
most
important being those
at
Talehp Jidalis UrgaiO Shimber
Berrisp Damero Bohotleh
and
Laba Barh in the Bagheri
I
Sr
20. C. O. 535/31 Byatt to C. O. 23/10/1913-
21. Ibid.
a
9)-.
-J
country.
22
Byatt
was convinced
that the Dervishes
were
pushing
their front
gradually
towards Berberas
and
he
duly
reported
the desperate
situation as
follows:
"In
the
will or
the
abilities of
the friendlies
to defend their lives
and property
I have
very
little belief. Their tendency has been,
and
will
be to demand that the Government
should
protect
them,
and
in default
of such protections
to
retire as
far
as practicable
from the danger
zone
....
The Dolbahanta
who
three
years ago
were strongly armed and were
the first line
of
defence in the Ain, have,
as
is known to
you,
dwindled in
strength, numbers and cohesion.
The
prospect
is
either
that they
will
be
absorbed
into the
ranks of
the Dervishes
or
that they
will
drift from the Protectorate
and seek shelter
in Italian
or
Abyssinian terri-
tory
....
As to the Habr Awal their
attitude
is
obscure.
Many
of
them
are content with
the
Goverment
efforts
to
restore
inter-tribal
peace
but
some show a rebellious spirit which
is being
fostered by the
notorious
Jama Hirsi. Should the
Habr Toljaala
eventually
be defeated by the
Mullah,
other
tribes
will
lose heart
and
flock
to Berbera.
"2,
Read
could
find
no
better
comment
to
make
than to lament
that
"it
appears
that
we are on
the
verge of
total
collapse
in Somaliland. Of the threetribes
which offer any prospect of a rally,
the
Dolbahanta
are
done for., the Habr TolJaala
are
doubtful
and
the Habr Awal
more
than
doubtful.
"
24
22. MSS. AFR. S-552
op. cit. p.
14. Also"Interview
with
Dahir Afqarshe,
at
the Somali Academy* Mogadishu
on
3rd
August 1974. According to this informant,,
who was
him-
self
born in the fort
of
Taleho the Dervishes built
nearly
35 forts in
all, and some of
them had
up
to
85
buildings
each.
23. C. O. 535/31 Byatt to C. O. 23/10/1913.
24. Ibid. Minute by Read.
22
.
11
Faced
with public pressure
in England
and with
the deteriorating
situation
in the Protectorate, the
British Government
started
to
show signs of giving
in to
demands for
a change, or at
least
modificationo of policy.
The
pace
had been
set
by Archer
shortly after
Dul Madoba
in
a memorandum
in
which
he
used
the Dul Madoba
episode
as a case study
for
re-assessing all
the
principles and
beliefs
upon which
the
whole edifice of
Britain's
policy
was
founded. Firstlyo the fiction
created and nurtured
by Manning to the
effect
that the Dervish
movement was
in
decline had to be discarded
altogether.
Prior to Dul
Madoba it
was
believed that the Mecca letter had
shattered
the Sayyidts
prestige
beyond
recovery and
that the
entire
Dervish
movement
had dwindled to
something
like 1#500
strong.
During the Dul Madoba
action alone
the Dervish
force
was estimated at
2,000
riflemen and
it
was
learnt
later that
a
bigger force based
at
Galadi had
not actually
participated
in the
confrontation.
From his investigationsp
Archer
came
to the
conclusion
that,
"so
far
as
it is
possible
to tell, the Dervish
strength at
the
present
time
may not
be less
than 5,000 to
6,000
fighting
men or more.
There
can
be
no
doubt
at all
then, in the light
of present
knowledge, that the Dervishes,
so
far from being
a
begligible
quantity, are a
force in the land be
reckoned with.
"
25
The
other
important
question arising out of
Dul
Madoba
was
the degree to
which
the British Goverment
could rely on
the
pro-British
tribes in
a situation of
Ik
25. C. O. 535/31 Archerts
memorandum on
the
situation
in the
Somaliland Protectorate
arising out of
the
action of
Dul Madoba, 26/8/1913.
22
1'
combat with
Dervish forces. Shortly before the Dul
fqadoba
action a
large
number of pro-British
tribes had
followed Corfield,
promising
to
stand
by him
under any
circumstances.
On hearing the first
shots,
however, they
had
all
deserted the Camel Corps, leaving it to
meet
its
fate
at
the hands
of
Dervish
riflemen.
Archer's
opinion
was
that
not much reliance should
be
placed on
the Somali
when
it
came
to
engaging
the Dervishes in battle,
or even
in
suppressing
local
uprisings.
Thus, he
recommended
that
it
natives, other
than Somalis,
should
be
enlisted
as
far
as possible
in the force.
"26
The third
principle which
had
crumbled
to
pieces
as a result of
Dul Madoba
was
the
whole philosophy of
the
Camel Corps
as conceived
by Byatt. The
establishment was
based
on
Byatt's belief that it
was possible
for the
British to
control only a
limited
area of
the Protectorate
while
ignoring
whatever
transpired in the
area
beyond the
prescribed
limits. It
was also
held that the Camel Corps
could successfully urge
the
pro-British
tribes to
advance
against
the Dervishes
on
their
own, using
the
arms and
ammunition supplied
by the British. Dul Madoba
reduced
all
these
notions
to
absolute
ignominy.
Archer
pressed upon
the British Government the
necessity
for
making a
decision
either
for
a complete
evacuation of
the Protectorate
or
its
pacification.
All
the
other middle courses, of which
Corfield's Camel Corps
was
the latest, had disappointed
expectations.
27
Byatt,,
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
22
who was
then
on
leave,
re-inforced
Archerts
arguments
and suggested
that Britain'should
start re-occupying
certain
key towns in the interior,
such as
Sheikh
and
Burao
or else wash
her hands
of
the Protectorate.
Fiddes
admitted
that
"the
whole policy of coastal concentration
was
based
on
the theory that the friendliesp
after more or
less hammering,
would
be
welded
into
a
force
capable of
holding their
own against
the Mullah. When that theory
broke down the
end of
the
policy
became
only
a matter of
time"'28
On the
prospect of complete evacuation,
Fiddes described
it
as
"unthinkable".,
for
"it
would react
in the East Africa Protectorate
an4 elsewhereo and would eventually cost more
than
another expedition against
the Mullah.
With the Dervishes
at
Burao,
coastal concentra-
tion is doomed.
"
29
Fiddes
was at one with
Byatt in
advocating
the
need,
for
re-occupying
Burao but Harcourt
was adamant.
He
could
only accede
to the
proposal
for
re-occupying-Sheikh
"under
the
circumstances and
for the
presentp
but this
must not
be
regarded as committing
me
in
any way
to the
occupation of
Burao
....
We
cannot give up, our policy of coastal concen-
tration
merely
because Corfield
committed a
blunder.
"
30
Thus,, Archer
was authorized
to
occupy
Sheikh
with
200
Indian
soldiers
borrowed from Aden,
on
the
express under-
standing
that he
would not'manipulate
the
occupation of
Sheikh to
occupy
Burao
as well.
31
28. Ibid. Minute'by Fiddes, Assistant Under Secretary in
the Colonial Office.
29. Ibid. Minute by Fiddes.
30. Ibid. Minute by Harcourt.
-
31. C. O. 535/31 C. O. to Archer 12/9/1919.
22
71
As
regards
Archerts
proposal
to
recruit
foreign
soldiers
into the
reconstituted
Camel Corps, the Colonial
Office
welcomed
the idea but the
problem was one of
finding
willing recruits.
The Yaos
were contemplated
but Byatt had doubts
as
to their
suitability as a
camelry,
let
alone whether
they
would agree
to
serve
in
Somaliland. The Sudanese
were considered
but there
were
doubts
as
to
whether
the Governor-General
of
the Sudan
would welcome
the idea
of recruiting
Sudanese
soldiers
for
service
in Somaliland. The issue
wassabsequently
shelved, at
least for the
moment, so
that the
reconstruc-
tion
of
the Camel Corps to its
new strength of
300
should
not
be delayed.
32
The
question of re-occupying
Buraos though
dismissed
by Harcourt,
remained a
bone
of contention
in
the Colonial Office. The issue
was revived
by Byatt
after
his
return
from leave,
and supported
by Read. The
latter
contended
that
"the
permanent occupation of a post
in the
interior, like Burao,
would
be
a reversal of
the
present policy
but it looks
as
if
we shall
have to
choose
between
a modification of
that
policy and a
total
withdrawal
from Somaliland.
If.
as seems probable,
the tribal defence breaks
down
entirely,
Berbera is filled
with a mob of
destitute
and
discontented
nativess and all
the
control over
the interior is lost, it
seems
that
we cannot, except at very great cost, main-
tain
our'position evy-alp
4
aw-
Q; AP res&4i-en
for long
even on
the
coast
...
"
33
32. C. O. 535/31 Byatt to C. O. 12/11/1913;
see also
Caroselli
op. cit. p.
241.
33. Minute by
ead,
Principal Clerk,
on
C. O. 535/31 Archerts
Memorandum
on
the
situation
in the Somaliland Protec-
torate
arising out of
the
action of
Dul Madoba,
26/8/1913.
r.
It
22,
Fiddes,,
who
had
earlier on
been
silenced
by Harcourt,
re-
affirmed
his belief in the
necessity
for
re-occupying
Burao.,
flands
though it is
a modifications
I do
not
admit
that it is
a reversal of policy.
I
feel
confident
that total inaction
at present
would
lead to
a reversal of policy,
for
we
cannot afford
to
allow ourselves
to be driven
out of
Somaliland by the Mullah.
"
34
Harcourt
who
had been
a
lone
voice
in
opposing
the
re-occupation of
Burao
was supported
by Anderson, the
Under Secretary
of
State for the Colonies. The latter
was opposed
to the
re-occupation of
Burao
on
the
grounds
that it
would not solve
the Dervish
problem,, nor was
it
differento in
principleo
from the discredited
notion
that
it
was possible
to hold
and administer certain parts of
the Protectorate
and
ignore
others.
The tribes
residing
beyond Burao
and
Sheikh
would continue
to be harassed by
the Dervishes,
and
inter-tribal
clashes among
the
pro-
British tribes living beyond the two
stations would
continue unabated.
Thus,
as-far as
Anderson
could
judge..
"Burao
does
not appear
to
present much advan-
tage
over
Berbera
as
the headquarters
of our
mobile
force
.....
In the
circumstances
the
only
thing to be done is to
press on with
the
completion of
the
camelry and meantime
to
encourage
the Habr Toljaala
as
Mr.,
-Byatt
is
doing. I donft know
whether
it
would
be
of
any use sending an officer. among
them-to
encourage and
teach them to take
care of
themselves.
"
35
'
34. Ibid. Minute by Fiddes.
35. Ibid. Minute by Anderson, Under Secretary.
Andersonts latter
suggestion
betrayed his ignorance
of
Somaliland history,
and, not surprisingly,
it
was
ignored by those
who
knew how
many
times the
same
idea
had been tried
without success.
Harcourt
stood
by his
views with considerable
determination
until
finally he
was overruled
by Cabinet in February 1914. Even theno he
would
insist
on
having
positive proof
from the
advocates
of
the
re-occupation of
Burao, that
"Burao
was a
better base than Berbera; that it
was more easily
held; that friendlies
were
less
likely to
come
there destitute
and
discontented
than to Berbera
-
and
that if they did
we
should
be better
able
to
provide
them
with
food*and
contentment
than
at
Berbera.
' '36
Harcourt
was equally pessimistic about
the idea
of
increasing the Camel Corps to 300
strong,
for
"we
should wait
to
see
if
we can raise
the
Camel Corps to 300
of suitable men and
then,
if
we are
lucky
enough
to
obtain a commander
who will obey orders;
to
see
if the doubled
force
can usefully and safely carry out
the
operations
designed for the
original
force.
Let it be
clearly understood
that the Camel
Corps
at
300 is
not
intended
-
and
is
not
to
be
used
-
for
any purposes except
those for
whi ch
the
original
force
was raised.
"
37
As far
as
the Colonial Office
was concerned,
Harcourt's
ruling
had
put a seal
to the Burao
question.
The issue
was,
however, far from
settled as
far
as"
the Somaliland
administration was concerned,
To the
local
administrative officerso
the
question of occupation
or non-occupation of
Burao
was not a subject
for
academic
speculation as
it
was,
to
a certain extents
for the Colonial
Office. It
was a serious
issue
which affected
them directly.
36. Ibid. Minute by Harcourt.
37. Ibid. Minute by Harcourt.
9.
If Britain's
refusal
to
re-occupy
Burao led to the Dervish
invasion
of
Berbera
and aggravated
the
refugee problem,
these
officers who were on
the
spot,
together
with
their
Somali
allies, would
fall
victim
to the Dervish invaders,
and
the Colonial Office
would only
lament
over
the
event
which would already
be too late to
rectify.
The local
administration,
therefore, had
no choice
but to
press on
relentlessly with
their
campaign
for the
re-occupation
of
Burao. In November Byatt
resumed
his
alarm about
the
deteriorating
situations reminding
the Colonial Office
that the Dervish
base
at
Shimber Berris
was
Ila
source of serious menace
to the
safety of
stock grazing
between Burao
and
Ber.
11
38
Shimber Berris fort
was
the
main spring-board
for the
Dervish
raids on
the Dolbahanta, the Habr Toljaala.,
and
the Habr Awal. With the
establishment of
the S
mber
Berris bases the
grazing area
to
which
the
pro-British
tribes
could graze
their
stock without
harassment did'
not exceed a radius of
60
miles
from Berbera. Byatt
was
convinced
that the
pro-British
tribes
would eventually
have
no choice
but to
come
to terms
with
the Sayyid
so
as
to
regain access
to the
grazing areas
in the Ain
Valley.
39
The
only solution, so
far
as
Byatt
was concerned,
was
for Britain
not only
to
re-occupy
Burao but
also make
that
station
the
permanent
headquarters
of
the Camel Corps,
Anderson
who
had
earlier on supported
Harcourt
seemed
to
38. G. Archer., Personal
and
Historical Memoirs
of an
East
African AdmIn-istrator
opo cit. p.
bo.
39. C. O. 535/31 Byatt to C. O. 10/12/1913.
3
.4
J.
be
no
longer
so sure as
to the
wisdom of
his
original
judgement,
and
he
was worried
that
"the
occupation of
Shimber Berris,
cutting
off as
it does,
our coast
friendlies from the
Ain Valley
means
their destitution
and absorp-
tion by the Mullah.
"
4o
He thought that the
matter should
be decided by the
Cabinet
and
Harcourt
was of
the
same opinion.
While the Burao
question awaited
Cabinet
decision, the Dervish
offensive was gaining
in
momentum
and scale.
In the
middle of
December 1913 the Dervisheso
issuing from their Shimber Berris fort,
made
three
succes-
sive raids
in the
neighbourhood of
Ber
and
Burao. In the
first
raid a section of
the Habr Toljaala
was
dispersed,
losing 20
camels and one man.
In the
second,
the Ba Idris
lost 100
camelso and
in the third
which
took
place
in the
Arori
plainso south-west of
Burao, the Dervishes killed
11
men,
burnt
villages and seized
500
camels.
41
Byatt
observed a very
disquieting
phenomenon:
"two
sections of
the Dolbahanta located beyond
Ber,
who were most easily accessible
to the
Dervish
party, were
left
unmolested, which gives
good ground
for-the
suspicion
that they have
already arrived at an understanding with
the
Mullah
s
headmen
at
Shimber Berris.
"42
-
This
particular piece of news, whether or not
it had
any
foundation,
caused such panic
in the Colonial Office that
Harcourt,
who
had hitherto been the
main stumbling
block
in the
way of change of policyo
began to
shift position.
Anderson
came up with a completely new
idea to the
effect
40.
Ibid. Minute by Anderson.
41.
C. O. 535/ Byatt to C. O. 20/12/1913.
42.
Ibid.
19,
that two
aeroplanes should
be detailed for
patrol
duty
in the Protectorate. Their
main
function
would
be to
follow the Dervish
movement and report
to the Camel
Corps.
43
Harcourt
recommended
the
project as
"extremely
useful
44
*
The
and
Byattts
opinion was
duly
sought.
latter
welcomed
the
proposal and
thought the two
aero-
plees could successfully and usefully co-ordinate
their
activities with
those
of
the Camel Corps.
45
The final
decision, however, lay
with
the Admiralty
which could
not endorse
the
project without examining all
the technical
and
financial
problems
involved. The
matter was
then
referred
to the Admiralty
with strong recommendations
from Harcourt. Unfortunately for the Colonial Office,
the
project was nipped
in the bud by the
outbreak of
World War I
which placed such a
demand
on
the Royal Air
Force
aircraft
that Somaliland
problems were
temporarily
overshadowed.
In January 1914 the Sayyid
wrote
to Byatt
proposing
-
or rather
dictating
-
what amounted
to
a
partition of
the Protectorate between the Dervishes
and
the British. The Sayyidfs letter
stated.,
inter
alia,
that
"I
ask you
for
peace and settlement.
Do,
not
refuse
it
and
do
not on
this
occasion
listen
to the
words of otherso
but listen to
my words,
for it
will
be
well
for
you and
for
all
the
people
to do
so.
The land is divided between
43.
Ibid. Minute by Anderson.
44.
Ibid. Minute by Harcourt.
45.
C. O. 535/34 Byatt to C. O. 13/1/1914.
23";
us.
The hill
of
Shimber Berris is
our
boundary. We have
come
to
our
boundary, to
the
place which was
taken
away
from
us
by
11
force, but God has
now restored
it to
us.
46
Byatt
attributed
the Sayyidts
motives
to
"the
season of
drought
and scarcity which now
makes
it difficult for him to
move with any
facility, he hopes by his letter to delay
any
advance
from Sheikh
such as
he
confidently
expects
to
see,
in the
meantime redoubling
his
efforts
to
absorb sections of
the
friendlies into his following.
"47
Byatt
was evidently correct.
Subsequent Dervish
activities
bore
no
indications
of an
inclination towards
peace, nor
were
they
confined
to Shimber Berris, the
stated
boundary.
That Byatt
was not
interested in the Sayyid's
overtures
was confirmed
by the treatment he
meted out
to the
messenger
who
brought the Sayyidts letter to Berbera.
Soon
after
delivering the letter, the
messenger, whose
behaviour
was
tl
ILA
composed of confidence and
impudence"T"
was arrested and
locked
up.
Byatt's
action caused some
discomfort
in the Colonial Office. Certainly, Anderson
was apprehensive about
"the
detention
of
the Mullahts
messenger
t,
49
and
Harcourt, though
sharing
the
same
feelings.,
preferred
not
to interfere because
46.
D. Jardine, The Mad Mullah
of
Somaliland
op. cit. p.
255.
47.
C. O. 535/34 Byatt to C. O. 29/1/1914-
48.
Ibid.
49.
Ibid. Minute by Anderson.
234
"Mr.
Byatt knows his
men and
his Mullahtt.
50
The Cabinet
met
in the
middle of
February 1914
to
resolve
the Somaliland
controversy, and a number of
definite decisions
were
taken. Firstly, the Camel Corps
was
to be increased to 500
strong
instead
of
300,
and
the
Indian Contingent
of
the disbanded
6th
Battalion K. A. R.
was
to be
re-inforced with
200 Indian
recruits
from India. It
was agreed
that, in
view of
the
expressed
doubts
about
the
reliability of
Somali
soldiers,
the Camel Corps
should
include
a
foreign
element.
The
onus of
finding
suitable
and willing recruits was
left
on
the
shoulders of
the
local
administrations as was
the task
of recruiting
200
additional
Indians.
51
The
most
important Cabinet decision
was one concerning
Burao:
as soon as
the Camel Corps
was
ready.,
Burao
was
to be
re-occupied and
the Dervishes
were
to be driven
out of
Shimber Berris.
On the 24th February 1914 Harcourt
announced
the
new policy
to the House
of
Commons
as
follows:
"The
effect of
this
small
Dervish
outpost
has
been to
out off
the friendly tribes from the
grazing
lands
which are essential
to them in
the dry
season
....
Since Dul Madoba
most of
them have lost
nerve and courage, and
they
require
from
us,
I think
quite naturally,
both
moral and
material support.
They
must
have the Ain Valleys
and
if they have
no support
from
us
they
must
make
terms
with
the Dervishes
and
join the Mullah.
That is
not only undesirables
but it is
also an
impossible
result and
I have to
consider what
steps
I
should
take to
prevent
it.... I do
not
propose
to the House
any extended occupation of
the interior; I
certainly
do
not propose any
expedition against
the Mullah; I intend to
occupy
Burao
as a
base for
our
Camel Corps,
and
to
occupy
Sheikh,
a post
half-way between Berbera
and
Burao".
52
50. Ibid. Minute by Harcourt.
51. Jardine, The Mad Mullah
of
Somaliland
p.
235-239.
52. Parliamentary Debates
(Official
Edition) February 10 to
February 27,1914, Vol. LVI Column 1644-1645.
e% p-
Whether Harcourt
was ready
to
admit
it
or not,
the
re-occupation
of
Burao
constituted a
fundamental
departure from the
policy of coastal concentration.
That
this
was so was confirmed
in the
assignment of
the
new
Camel Corps,
which was
to
"provide
that
moral and material support
to
the friendlies
which will give
them
courage
and opportunity
to
graze
in the Ain Valley"
*53
In
a
despatch to Byatt, Harcourt
was even more explicit.
He
assigned
the Camel Corps the duty
of enabling
the
pro-
British tribes
t1to
avail
themselves
of
their
grazing grounds
without molestation
by the Mullahn.
54
This
meant,
in
effect,
that,
unlike
Corfieldts Camel Corpso
the
new
force
was not
to
retreat
to the
coast when con-
fronted by
a
Dervish threat,,
nor was
it to limit its
operations
to
certain prescribed areas.
Lt. Col. Cubitt
was appointed
thef)verall
commanding officer of
the forces in the Protectorate. He
is described by Carton de Wiarto
who
later
rose
to the
rank of
Lieutenant General
and won numerous
decorations,
as
"a
first-class
soldier and a
fine leader
of
men
....
the troops felt it
and responded
immediate ly"55
Ismay
was second
in
command., and
Lawrence
was specifically
given
the
command of
the Camel Corps.
53. Ibid.
54. Jardine, The Mad Mullah
of
Somaliland
p.
239.
55. Carton de Wiart.. Happy Odyssey: The Memoirs
of
Lieu-
tenant-General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart, V. C., K. B. E.
0
C. B.
2
C. M. G.., D. S. O. (Wyman & Sons Ltd.
T-1955
p.
41.
The
recruitment of
the 200
additional
Indian
soldiers
for the K. A. R. battalion
presented no problem
to Ismay
who was sent
to India to do the job. But
all
efforts
to find
suitable and willing recruits
to
consti-
tute
a
foreign
element of
the
new
Camel Corps bore
no
fruit.
56
Ethiopia, Arabia
and
Nyasaland told Byatt
bluntly that
none of
their
soldiers would go
to
Somaliland. Sudan
was also
dubious but the Governor-
General
was polite enough
to invite Byatt
or
his
rep-
resentative
to
go
there
and
try his luck. Byatt
sent
Breading,
an officer
in the Camel Corps, to do the job,
and
the latter travelled the length
and
breadth
of
the
Sudan
only
to
return
four
months
later,
empty
handed.
Somaliland
had
nothing particularly attractive
to
offer
to the Sudanese. Those
who
had
any ambition
for
a
military career could
find
plenty of opportunities
in
the Anglo-Egyptian
army.
The Somaliland
climate and
its
diet
-
or rather
the
absence of
it
-
were
themselves
sufficiently
repugnant
to,
scare away any non-Somali who
might
have
wished
to
serve
in Somaliland.
-
Moreover.,
Somaliland
salaries were not so
high
as
to
compensate
for the
other
disadvantages for
which
Somaliland
was
reputed.
Hence, Breading,,
reporting on
his
mission,
stated,
inter
alia,
that
it
my recruitment experience
has
shown me
that
there
are plenty of excellent untrained men
56. c. o.
879/115
Archer to C. O. 14/6/1914 No. 56.
7
who willingly volunteer
for foreign
service
if
the
pay and conditions are sufficiently attrac-
tive
57
In Somaliland they
were not.
The Indian
soldiers serving
in Somaliland did
not suffer as much as
the African
soldiers serving with
the
Camel Corps
or sent as reinforcements
during
emergency.
The Indians
were normally stationed on
the
coast where
supplies and amenities were relatively abundant.. risks
and
health hazards
minimal, and relief easily available.
African
soldiers, on
the
other
hand,
were normally sent
into the interior
where communication with
the
outside
world was rare, amenities and
facilities
negligible and,
owing
to Britain's
policy of
inaction hitherto
pursued,
time
and energy wasted.
With the failure
of
Breading's
recruitment campaigno
the idea
of
including
a
foreign
element
in the Camel Corps
was
temporarily dropped.
While
arrangements were underway
to
raise and
train the 500
strong
Camel Corps, the Dervishes took the
boldest
step of
their history by descending
on
Berbera
with a
force
of
horsemen.,
and shooting up
to 200
rounds
of ammunition
before they
were repulsed.
58
In 1912,
as
has
already
been
mentioned, small
Dervish
parties
had
visited
Berbera
and other coastal
towns, intimidated the
residents at night and
then
slipped
back into the interior,
leaving Dervish
marks on
trees
and
buildings. Their
action
57. C. O. 535/37 Capt. Breading to the Adjutant General,
Egyptian Army,
6/6/1914 (Encl.
in F. o. to C. O. 20/6/1914).
58. MSS. AFR. S. 552
op. cit. p.
14.
Li
of,
12th March 1914, however,
amounted
to
a
direct
military
challenge
to the British for'supremacy
over
the
one area
which
Britain had hitherto believed to be beyond the
zone
of
Dervish
ambitions.
The Dervish
raid on
Berbera
claimed
no
lives
and
did
only minor
damage to
property,
but the
panic which gripped
Berbera
was overwhelming.
People
started
to
run aimlessly, some
heading for the European
residential quarters and others wading
into the
sea or
swimming out
to the dhows in the harbour. Archer, then
acting
Commissioner,
reported
the town
as
having been
seized
by
"great
consternation and confusion",
59
and
described the
sense of security as
having been
"rudely
shaken".
6o
He
warned
that
fla
small
Dervish
raiding
party, at all events, can gain access
to Berbera
without
warning.. and..
to
meet a changed situation,
fresh disposi-
tions
are needed.
f,
61
The British Somaliland Protectorate had by
now
got used
to learning
only
through the hard
way of
experience.
There
was
hardly
any policy
initiated
with-
out
the Protectorate first
suffering a catastrophe.. more
often
than
not already
foretold,
or without
the interven-
tion
of
the British
public,
Parliament
and
the
press.
When it
came
to Somaliland the Colonial Office
seemed
to
close
its faculties
of positive
imagination-and
originality.
In 19100 for
exampleo
Britain
withdrew
59. C. O. ' 535/34 Archer to C. O. 19/3/1914.
6o.
Ibid.
61.
Ibid.
23
from the interior
against
the
advice of
Wingate
and other
experts, only
to
regret
it later
when
the territory fell
into
a state of chaos as
had been
predicted.
Then
came
Corfield's Camel Corps in 1912
which was
formed
notwith-
standing
the
well
known fact,
admitted
by the Colonial
Office, that
Itthe
policy seems
to have the
same
feature
which was considered so objectionable
in
our
position
during the last
operations against
the Mullah
-
that the
new
force
will always
be
on
the defensive.
"62
The Camel Corps
was mauled
in 1913, but,
even after
thats
the British Government
resisted
proposals
for
a change
or modification of policy until
it
was
forced by
a
general outcry
in the
press and
in Parliament. With
regard
to the
safety of
the British
position at
Berbera.,
the
clandestine
Dervish
visits of
1912
ought
to have
stimulated a re-examination of
the
whole
defence
system
of
the town. After
all..
if the British lost Berbera
they
would
have lost the
only
thing they
possessed
in
Somaliland. Yet
nothing was
done
and
the
administration
seemed
to take
comfort
in
cherishing
the hope that the
Dervishes
would never go so
far
as
to invade the town.
The fact that they did
not
do
so after
Dul Madoba
probably
confirmed
this belief. Thus,
as was
the
case with
the
British
withdrawal
in 1910
and again with
Corfield's
death in 1913,
nothing short of
bitter
experience
-
the
actual
invasion
of
Berbera
-
could and
did
press upon
the British Government the
need
for investigating the
62.
C. O. 535/27 Minute by Read
on
Memorandum by Byatt
on
the Political
situation
in British Somaliland Protec-
torate, 30/4/1912.
24
whole question of
the defence
system
for Berbera.
Following the Dervish
action of
12th March..
Archer
observed
that if the Dervishes
wanted
to
resume
their
raid on
Berbera there
was nothing
to
stop
them
since
the Meriya Pass, the
corridor connecting
Shimber
Berris
and
Berbera, had been deserted by the
pro-British
tribes. Pending the
completion of
the
raising of
the
Camel Corps
and
the
arrival of
the 200 Indian
soldierss
Archer
acquired
200
additional
troops from Aden
"for
the
purpose of
holding the
redoubts
surrounding
the town.
"63
As for the long-term
security arrangementso
Archer
put
forward
a number of suggestions.
The
most
important
of
these
was one
for
erecting wire entangle-
ments all round
the town
and connecting
the
wires
to
a
number of posts manned
by Government
scouts.
64
Archerts
proposals received
immediate
sanction
from the Colonial
Office,
and
Major Saunders, R. E., Assistant Commanding
Royal Engineer, Aden.,
was sent
to
make a
detailed
plan
for the
erection of
the
wire entanglements.
In May 1914
Berbera
was surrounded with wire entangelements at
the
cost of
Z2,005-
(See
map showing
Major Saunder's
plan.
)
The
recruitment and
training
of
the
new
Camel
Corps
went-on unhampered
by Breading's
abortive mission
in
the Sudan. Archer
who succeeded
Byatt in May 1914 had to
modify
the
original scheme which
had been based
on
the
assumption
that foreign
recruits would
be found. The
63.
C. O. 535/34 Archer to C. O. 19/3/1914.
64.
Ibid.
ENTNNGLF-MENTS
W iyt
Evtmje
mtKts
f
-ty
Beveo.
Ifu
VI
w-
--
---
(D--
`
"Jot
milks
4
km
21,
-BEZBEIZA
S\ vrt4
tin
vvait
7
%; "
'
l%
Q
gx)k%
SY-E'TCH
MILF-S
-
I IL
-i
444
Ilbo Woll
' 'r
modified scheme consisted
in
mounting
150
men of
the
Indian
contingent and enlisting
Somali for the
Constabulary
up
to
450,
thus
making a combined mounted
force
of
600
strong.
65
By the
middle of
May 1914
preparations
for
the
re-occupation of
Burao
were well advanced and
the
training
of
the Camel Corps
was progressing satisfac-
torily. Archer
preferred a gradual and somewhat cautious
advance.
Sheikh had
already
been
occupied and
it
was
to
be the base for
organizing
further
advance.
In the
middle
of
June the Camel Corps
moved
to Galoli, 17
miles south of
Sheikh,
and set up a
base. Galoli became the
new
training
camp and was
held by 350 Camel Corps.
66
Harcourt,
notwith-
standing
his knowledge'of the
ultimate
intentions
of
the
Camel Corps,
was unnerved
by Archerts
pace of precudure,
and
he duly inquired from Archer
whether or not
it
was
true that he
was about
to
attack
Shimber Berris. Hepro-
ceeded
to
warn
the Commissioner that
"I
am much concerned about
the
situation and
intentions
attributed
to
you
....
bear in
mind and
deal
with
the following
points:
(a)
Declared
policy of
H. M. Goverment
as
re ards any expedition against
the Mullah
(b
Uncertainty
as
to forces that
would
be
found
at
Shimber Berris
(c)
Training
and
efficiency of
Camel Corps
at
the time
of
advance
(d)
Extent
of assistance
to be
expected
from friendlies
(e)
Prospect
of
present
force being
able
to-preserve
grazing
grounds
from
attack after clearing
the Ain
Valley.
"67
65.
C. O.
879/115
Archer to C. O. 14/6/1914 No. 56.
66.
C. O. 535/35 Archer to C. O. 17/6/1914.
67.
C. O. 535/36 c. o. to Archer 16/7/1914.
24:
Archer
replied
to
say
that he
should
be trusted
as
he
would not
take
a premature action.
In July 1914 the
whole
future
of
Britaints
forward
policy was put
in the balance by two
simul-
taneous but independent
episodes.
Firstly, the Dervishes
established
another
base
at
Jidali* thereby
putting
them-
selves
in
a position
to dominate the Makhir Coast
and
its
hinterland.
68
A
number of
tribes
which
had been dis-
possessed
of
their
stock and grazing rights
by the
establishment of
the Shimber Berris fort, had fled to
the Makhir Coast
and
found
new opportunities
in fishing,
tradingo
sailing and other occupations pertaining
to
a
coastal
mode of
life. With the
establishment of another
base
at
Jidali, this
opening was also closed
to them,
making
their future
grim.
By the
end of
September Dervish
depredations from Jidali had
embraced
the Warsengeli
country, cutting off
the Warsengeli from Las Khorai
and
the Gadwein from Hais
and
Mait. A
good number of
the
Gadwein
had
already
decided to
come
to terms
with
the
Sayyid
so as
to
regain
their
access
to their
ports,
but
the Warsengeli
whose
Sultan, Ina Ali Shirreh, had fallen
out
with
the Sayyid, bore the
sharpest
brunt
of
the
Dervish
blockade
of several ports on
the Warsengeli
coast.
69
68.
C. O. 535/35 Archer tO C-0.31/7/1914.
69.
C. O. 535/35 Archer to C. O. 25/9/1914.
2,,

The
second episode which connived,
though
unintentionally, with
the
Jidali-based
depredationss
to
jeopardize Britain's forward
policy, was
Britain's
entry
into World War I. Henceforwardo Somaliland
problems
were relegated
to
a position of secondary
importance
in
Britain's
scale of priorities.
The demise
of
Anderson's
scheme of aeroplanes
for Somaliland has
already
been
cited.
Towards the
end of
July Archer
asked
if
a warship
could
be despatched to bombard Dervish
positions on
the
Makhir Coast.,
and
Parkinson,
a second class clerk
in the
Colonial Office..
remarked
that
"Mr.
Archer
could
hardly have
chosen a more
improbable time to
ask
for
a warship.
"70
The Admiralty
added
that there
was
ftno
likelihood
of
the
possibility of
detailing
one of
H. M. Ships
at once
to demonstrate
along
the Makhir Coast.
"
71
Thus,
although
Archer
was not asked
to
call off
the
plans
already sanctioned,
the
message was clear:
he
was
to
rely
on such resources
-
in
manpower and equipment
-
as
he
possessed and should avoid
taking
any action
that
might
involve Britain in
an escalated conflict with
the Dervishes.
This
was a
time
when
Britain
could not afford
to
send rein-
forcementso
warships and aeroplanes
to Somaliland.
In September Archer
submitted a
detailed
plan of
how he
proposed
to
occupy
Burao
and clear
the Ain Valley
of
the Dervishes. He
planned
to
move
in-Novembers
occupy-
ing Burao
and
Las Dureh,
simultaneously.
The
occupation
of
the latter
place
had
not
been
conceived
in the
original
70. Ibid. Minute by Parkinson, Second Class Clerk.
71. C. O. 535/36 Admiralty to C. O. 2/8/1914.
4,51
plan
but had been
necessitated
by the
establishment
of
the
Dervish fort
at
Jidali. The British
occupation
of
Las
Dureh
would prevent
the Dervish
operations
from
extending
further
west.
Cubitt
was
in
complete agreement with
Archer
regarding
the
necessity
for
re-occupyinIg
Las Dureh
because
"the
occupation of
this
place would serve a
valuable
base for the
mobile column on
its
patrols.
"
72
The
other proposal was
that the
new
Camel Corpsj
since
by
virtue of
its
new numerical strength and
its
new assign-
ments$
had become
a military organization rather
than
a
political
oneo should
be
regularized so as
to form
part
of
the K. A. R. Thirdly, Archer
proposed
the
recruitment
of
50 Somali
reserves
into the Camel Corps, thus
raising
the
strength of
the force to 500
.
73
The Colonial Office had
no
objections
to
any of
Archerts
proposals.
Although the
Camel Corps
was not converted
into
a new
battalion
of
the
K. A. R.
0
it became, for
all
intents
and purposes, an
integral
part of
it.
74
In October the Colonial Office
gave a
final
approval
to Archer's
proposed
line
of action,
but
reminded
him
once more
that
72. C. O. 55/35 Cubitt to Archer 28/8/1914
(Encls.
in Archer
to C. O. 16/g/1914).
73. Lieut. Col. Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles,
op. cit.
o
(London)
1956,
p.
4lb-420.
74. In March 1915 the"Protectorate inaugurated the
"Somaliland
Native Forces Ordinance 1915"
which placed
the
new
Camel Corps
on
the
same
footing
as
the K. A. R.
with regard
to
salary scales, conditions of service
and code of conduct.
24-6
"the
European
war makes
it impossible to
send
either reinforcements of officers or men or
additional guns and ammunition
to Somaliland
for the
present
75
Burao
and
Las Dureh
were occupied on
7th
November 1914,
and
the
advance against
Shimber Berris
commenced
two days later.
76
The fort
consisted of some
6
blockhouses,
with walls reaching up
to 20 feet high,
12 feet thick
at
the base
and
6
towards the top. Shimber
Berris
was a strategic spot.
It
was a steep escarpment
surrounded
by hills,
valleys,
thick
scrub and
boulders.
The fort
was remarkably well situated, covering all
approaches and overlooking
the
ravine where
the
wells
were
located. The blockhouses
were storeyed and made
of pieces of stone and rook of varying sizes, closely
packed
together
and cemented with mud.
77
Archerts
claim
that the Dervish forts
were
built by Arabs from the Yemen78
would appear
to
reflect more of
the then European bias
than
anything
else.
Whereas there is
no
basis for
believing that the Yemen
was at any
time
a source of
migrant
labour
and
technical knowledge for the Dervish-
held
parts of
Somaliland, Somali traditions
are, on
the
other
hand,
unanimous
in
attributing
the Dervish forts
to Dervish labour
and expertise.
Moreovero if it
were
75. C-0- 535/35 C. O. to Archer 28/lo/1914.
76. C. O. 535/36 cubitt to Archer 28/11/1914
(Encl.
in
Archer to C. O. 7/12/1914).
77. C. O. 535/36 Cubitt to Archer 28/11/1914
(Encl.
in
Archer to C. O. 7/12/1914).
78. C. O. 535/36 Archer to C. O. 7/12/1914.
0
true that the Dervishes depended
on
Arab labour
and
technology, the fact
would
have been
mentioned
by the
Dervish defectors
and
the Government
spies.
Consequently,
Britain
would not
have failed to
make representations to,
or
take
punitive action against, whichever
Arab
country
was responsible
for
aiding
the Dervishes in the
sense
suggested
by Archer. When Lij Yasu, for instance, began
to
make approaches
towards the Sayyid,
going as
far
as
sending
Ethiopian
envoys and a
German
mechanic
to the
Sayyido
the facts
were
known,
reported
in despatches,
and
Britain took
such action as she
deemed fit in the
circumstances.
79
It is inconceivable that Britain
would
have
refrained
from
reacting similarly
if the Arabs had
been involved in the building
of
the Dervish forts.
The
storming of
Shimber Berris fort
on
the
19th November turned
out
to be
a more'difficult
task than
had been imagined. In the
early
hours
of
the
morning
the
Camel Corps
advanced
to
within
3
miles of
the fort
without
being
noticed
by the Dervishes. The force dismounted
and
tried to
rush
the fort. The Dervishes
soon
discovered
their
peril and put up a stiff resistance.
Pierce
fighting
ensued up
to 3.00
P. m. when
the Camel Corps
called off
the
attack and withdrew
to Bohotleh. The
Dervish
casulties were
believed to have been in hundreds.
on
the British
side,
Capt. Symons
and
3
rank-and-file
--
were-killed,, and several were wounded
including
de Wiart
and
Lawrence.
8o
From Bohotleh Cubitt
sent
for
a seven-
79. Jardine, The Mad Mullah
of
Somaliland
p.
246-247.
80.
C. O. 535/36 Archer to C. O. 24/11/1914.
218
pounder gun, more arms and ammunition
from Burao,
and
the
attack on
Shimber Berris
was resumed on
the 23rd
November. The
second attack,
like the
previous one,
yielded no results, and
Cubitt
was surprised
to discover
that
"the
seven-pounder gun made
hardly
any
impres-
sion on
the
walls, even
though brought by
Captain Dobbs to
within
100
yards of
the
fort
... Off
81
Although the fort
was not
demolished the Dervishes
were
driven
out
during the
second engagement.
The Colonial
office was satisfied with
the
outcome of
the two
opera-
tions
and
Harcourt
remarked
that
"this
is
a very admirable record.
If Major
Cubittts father is
alive or
if he has
a wife
here I
should
like to
send
him
or
her
extracts
from this despatch.,
"82
No
sooner
had the Can.
el
Corps
retired
to Burao
than the Dervishes
returned
to their fort
and started
repairing
it. The two
actions at
Shimber Berris
called
for
a re-examination of
the British
military
tactics in
Somaliland
before
any
further
operations could
be
contem-
plated.
The idea
of creating a
Camel Corps had been based
on
the British
experience of
their
earlier encounters with
the Dervishes. The
advocates of
the Camel Corps had based
their
arguments on
the fact that, in
all
the
previous
encounters with
the Dervishes, the latter's
strength
lay
in their
exceptional powers of mobility and
knowledge
of
I
81-
C-0.535/35 Cubitt to Archer 28/11/1914
(Encl.
in
Archer to C. O. 7/12/1914).
82.
Ibid. Minute by Harcourt.
l
9,
the
countryo which
they invariably
resorted
to
whenever
the tide
of war
turned
against
them
or after
they had
scored a major victory.
The
whole
idea
of using a
Camel
Corps
against
the Dervishes
was,
therefores
motivated
by
the belief that the
most effective way of
tackling the
Dervishes
was not
to
send
infantry forces
as
had been the
case
during the 1901-1904
expeditions,
but to deploy
a
Somali Camel Corps
which would
fight the Dervishes
on
their
own
terms
and excel
them intheir
own
tactics. All
these
assumptions were shattered at
Shimber Berris, for
"this
was
the first
occasion
in the histor
,7
of
t
Somaliland in
which
forts
were encountered
83
The
new
Dervish
strategy of
defending fixed
positions suited
the British
military strategists;
this
was
the kind
of mili-
tary disposition they
were accustomed
to. Moreover, it
removed
the
earlier
hazards
which
the British forces had
risked whenever
they found it
necessary
to
pursue
the
Dervishes
into the
remote parts of
the
country about which
they knew
so
little. Thus, Archer informed the Colonial
office
that
"to
deal
effectively with a stronghold such as
Shimber Berris,
requires a
force
unhampered
by
animals,
liberally
supplied with explosives,
provided with a modern mountain gun, and
to
remain on
the
spot
for four
or
five dayso
which
necessitates a
large
amount of water
being
carried, and
thus
a
transport
column.
"84
Archer
and
Cubitt
were convinced
that future
operations
83.
C. O. 535/51 Memorandum
on
Dervish tactics
of
1914 to
1917,
n.
d.
(Encl.
in Summers to C. O. 9/2/1918);
prepared
at
Burao Military headquarters.
I
84.
C. O. 535/36 cubitt to Archer 28/11/1914
(Encl.
to in
Archer to C. O. 16/12/1914).
2
J3,
should rely more on
infantry forces
and
less
on
the Camel
Corps.
Archer left for England
at
the
end of
November to
discuss
the Somaliland
situation with
the Colonial Office
and
to
enlighten
the latter
as
to how the
new
Dervish
tactics
were
likely to
affect
the British
policy.
.
Owing to Britain's
pre-occupation with
the World
War, I., Archerts
request
for
additional
infantry forces
did
not get a
favourable
reception
in the Colonial Office.
The
administrationo
therefore,
was
left
with no alternative
but to try
and complete
the Shimber Berris
operations
with
the forces
and equipment at
their disposal.
85
Explosives
and machine guns were ordered
from Aden,
arriving
in the
middle of
January 1915. On the 3rd
and
4th
February 1915
the
attack on
Shimber Berris
was resumed, and
for two
successive
days the fort
came under
heavy bombardment.
The
Dervishes
put up a
desperate
resistance
but
were
driven
out
on
the
second
day
of
fighting, leaving 32
of
their
men
dead. The fort
was razed
to the
ground with explosives,
and a
Government
post was established
in its
place.
86
The
operation
was
described in the Colonial Office
as
"most
excellent and satisfactory.
"
87
The destruction
of
the Shimber Berris fort
was
by
s
85.
C. O. 535/36 Archer to c. o. 16/12/1914.
86. 'MSS.
AFR. S.
891-907: "An
excerpt
from
papers written
in
1924 by the Governor Sir 0. Summers
and
in 1925 by Sir A.
Lawrence, then Senior District Officer
and
later Governor,
with
brief
addendum which refers
to the
political organiza-
tions
which are now active
in the Protectoraten.
This
excerpt was written
by the Department
of
the Director
of
Intelligence
and
Security, in November 1952. It is dep-
posited
in Rhodes House., Oxford.
87.
C. O. 535/39 Minute by Machtig, Second Class Clerk,
on
Archer to C. O.
6/2/1915.
3,
no means
the
end of
Britain's
worries.
The Dervish fort
at
Jidali
was still a crucial point
in the Dervish bid
for
supremacy
in the Eastern
region of
the Protectorate,
while
the Taleh fort
catered
for the
southern parts.
Nevertheless, the destruction
of
Shimber Beris fort
brought
a measure of relief
to the
pro-British
tribes
hitherto bottled
up on
the
coastal areas.
In
order
to
consolidate
Britaints
position
in the British
controlled
parts of
the Protectorate, Archer initiated
a number of
administrative
innovations. Firstly, the Camel Corps,
whose
headquarters
were now at
Burao, began to
establish
posts and
to
make extensive patrols
in the Ain Valley,
avoiding
those
areas such as
Taleh
and
Jidali
where
the
Dervish
power was still supreme.
The Government
post at
Shimber Berris
was placed under
76 illaloes,
and other
posts were set up at
Kirrit
(30
illaloes), Oadweina
(20
illaloes), Ber
(20
illaloes), Dongorreh
(15
illaloes),
88
Duberrin
(41
illaloes)
and
Biyo Dader
(20
illaloes).
The
other administrative
innovation
consisted
in
amalgamating
the
administration of
the
western region
of
the Protectorate
with
the
consulate of
Harar. This
particular expedient arose out of a series of
intricate
external and
internal
problems.
Archer's initial
motive
in
recommending
this
amalgamation seems
to have been his
desire to
get rid of
Lawrence, the Commanding Officer
of
the Camel Corps,
who was on
bad
personal
terms
with
Cubitt,
88.
Intelligence Report for February 1915
(Encl.
in
C0 535/39 Cubitt, then
acting
Commissioner, to
c: o: 16/3/1915-
the
overall commanding officer.
Archer
explained
that he
was anxious
to
remove
Lawrence from the
command of
the
Camel Corps
and
have him transferred to Harar
as
Vice-
Consul because
"in
his
position of command
he has
not proved
an unqualified success and
is
not
the
man
fit
for it. His
vievis about running
things is
not
Cubbitt's.
and
he is inclined to be
obstrue-
tivet'.
89
Later
on,
in the
same
despatch, however, Archer
who
apparently realized
the inadequacy
of
his first
argument,
asserted
that Lawrence
should
be transferred to Harar
for he
was
"the
best
man
I have for the Job.
"90
Archer did
not
bother to
substantiate
his
reasons
for
supposing
that Lawrence,
whom
he
regarded as unsuitable
for
service
in Somaliland,
would
be
successful
in Harar.
Later
on
Archer
shifted
the
weight of
his
argument
to the
fact that, in
view of
the
constarit
frontier
clashesp
flan
officer with consular status on one side of
the border
and political
bowers
on
the
other
would
be in
a most
favourable
position
to
put
a stop
to these
occurrences.
There
are cer-
tainly
many grievances
to be investigated,
and
it is
clear
that Major Lawrence's duties
would
take him to the
neighbourhood of
the frontier.
"
91
Archer then
went on
to
elaborate
his
plans
for
co-
ordinating
the
administration of
Harar
with
that
of
the
western area of
the Protectorate,
and concluded
that
"the
scheme now propounded
iso in
effect,
that
two
officers
based
on
Harar
and
Berbera
should
undertake
the
work of
the three districts
of
89.
C. O. 535/35 Archer to C. O. 12/10/1914.
90. Ibid.
91. C. O. 535/35 Archer to C. O. 28/lo/1914.
25
Harar., Hargeisa
and
Berbera,
using
Hargeisa
as
the half
way
house
where
they,
can meet
to
discuss tribal
and
frontier
problems.
"
92
Harcourt had
no objection
to
giving
the
scheme a
trial
but the Foreign Office had to be
consulted as
it
was
responsible
for the Harar
consulate.
The Foreign Office
took
up
the
scheme
but
when
they
gave
their
approval
early
in December, Archer had
alreadytaken
the
arbitrary
action of posting
Lawrence to Harar in
place of
Dodds
who
had
vacated
the
post.
93
In
asking
the Colonial Office to
endorse
the fait
accompli,
Archer
capitalized on
the
appointment
by the Ethiopian Government
of,
Abdullah Sadik
as'the
Governor
of
the Ogaden.
94
The latter
was suspected
of
being in
sympathy,
if
not
in
actual
touch,
with
the
Dervishes.
Thuso Lawrence's dual
role was supposed
to
enable
him to keep
an eye on
the
activities of
Abdullah
Sadik
until
such a
time
as
Britain
might succeed
in
persuading
Emperor Lij Yasu to
remove
him.
The last
administrative
innovation initiated
by Archer
was
his
recommendation
for the
promotion of
the
Officer
commanding
troops to the
rank of
deputy Commis-
sioner
The
rationale
behind this
was
that the
occupation
by the British
of more areas
had increased the
volume of
administrative work which
the Commissioner
could no
longer
handle
unaided.
Thus., the
officer commanding
the troops,
having
assumed
the title
and rank of
deputy
commissioner,
could assist
the Commissioner
and
deputize for him
when
92. Ibid.
93. C. O. 535/36 Archer to C. O. 9/12/1914.
94. Ibid.
or;
necessary.
'-'
Having
put
the Shimber Berris
question
to
rest
and
instilled
some
kind
of order over a substantial part
of
the Protectorate, the Somaliland
administration natu-
rally
focused its
attention on
the
remaining
thorn in the
flesh
of
the
administration, namely,
the Dervish forts
of
Taleh
and
Jidali. It
was at
this juncture that the
Somaliland
administration and
the British Government
parted company.
The British Government felt that,,
under
the
circumstances,
Somaliland had
already claimed more
than
reasonable attention, and,
therefore.,
could not,
with any
justification, demand
more until
the
war was
over.
96
Three
months after
the fall
of
Shimber Berris,
Archer
and
Cubitt
came up with elaborate schemes
for
another advance against
Jidali
and
Taleh,
either simul-
taneously
or one at a
time. They
regarded
the
period
between October
and
November
as
the
most suitable
time
for launching the
attack,
this being the
wet season
with
its
abundant water and pasture
for the
camels.
The two
officers were counting on
the hope that the
Dervishes
would use
the
same
tactics
as
those they had
used at
Shimber Berris. The first
scheme concerned
the
destruction
of
the Jidali fort first
and
foremost before
tackling Taleh. In this
scheme some
1,300 troops, half
of
them being infantry troops from
outside, were
to be
involved. The
actual pattern of attack was
to the
effect
95. C. O. 535/40 Archer to C. O. 17/7/1915.
96. Moyse-Bartlett, The Kingts African Rifles,
op. cit.,
p.
418-420.
5-5,
that
"the
troops from
outside should
be dis-
embarked at
Berbera,
should march
to Las
Dureh, join
with
the
mounted column
there
and, proceeding via
Elafweina,
should
attack
Jidali from the
south".
97
The
alternative scheme consisted
in launching
a simul-
taneous
attack on
Jidali
and
Taleh, thereby dealing
a
death blow to the
most
important Dervish
strongholds.
The
scheme would
have to be
undertaken
by
a
force
totalling 3000 trooPss
of whom only
1,050-were to be
obtained
from local
sources.
If the latter
scheme were
to be
approved,
the
naval
force
would
be
required
to
send a warship
to
shell
Dervish
positions on
the Makhir
coast and effect a
blockade
against
Dervish
ports.
The
first
scheme was estimated
to
cost
Z14,000
or more and
the
alternative scheme
Z70,000
or more.
99
The two
schemes were submitted
to the Colonial Office
where
they
were studied, appreciated and
then
shelved.
Machtig
who cared
to
comment on
the
schemes
described
them
as
"interesting"j,
but
regretted, as was
to be
expected,
that
"in
view of
the
men and material required,
neither of
the two
schemes could
be
put
through
at
the
present moment.
"
100
97. C. O. 535/39 Memorandum by Cubitt
on
future
operations
against
the Dervishes, 17/5/1917
(Encl.
in Archer to
C-0- 19/5/1915).
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid. Minute by Machtig.
The Dervish
reverses at
Shimber Berris
and
the
destruction
of
their fort
was a severe
blow to their
prestige and morale.
Although the Shimber Berris
action
could not
be followed
up with more operations against
the
remaining
Dervish forts, Archer
endeavoured
to
capi-
talize
on
the
episode with a view
to discrediting the
Sayyid
and causing mass
defections
of
his followers
and
sympathisers.
Two
months after
the
action,,
Archer
went
to the Makhir
coast under cover of a warship
temporarily
borrowed from Aden,
and related
the
story of
the Shimber
Berris
operations
to the Gadwein
who
had hitherto
consti-
tuted
a substantial
fraction
of
the Sayyid's following,
and
to the Warsengeli
who were already on
bad terms
with
the Dervishes. According to Archerts
assessment of
his
achievement on
this trip, the Warsengeli
confirmed
their
hatred
of
the Dervishes,
and a majority of
the Gadwein
lost
confidence
in the Sayyid
and resolved
to
migrate
to
Las Dureh,
out of
their
reach.
101
By the
middle of
1915 the Sayyid
was making a
determined
effort
to
regain
his
prestige as well as
revive
the
morale of
the Dervish
movement.
Early in June
the Dervishes deserted the Jidali fort
and mobilized
them-
102
selves
in the fort
of
Taleh. The
motive
behind this
move seems
to have been the
need
to
pool
their. depleted
resources
in
one place rather
than leave them
scattered.
By
so
doing, the Dervishes
would
be in,,
a
better
position
to hold their
own against
the British in the
event of
the
101. C. O. 535/39 Archer to C. O. 18/5/1915.
102. C. O. 535/39 Archer to C. O. 30/6/1915.
a.
2.
latter deciding to
attack again.
The irony
of
the Dervish
move
from Jidali
was
that it
co-incided with
the
migra-
tion
of
the Gadwein from the Makhir
coastal area
to Las
Dureh in
order
to
avoid
Jidali-based Dervish
attacks.
Thus,
with
the
migration of
the Gadwein
and
the departure
of
the Dervishes from their Jidali fort, the
whole area
between Las Adey
(Lat.
100 N:
460
38' E)
and
Musha Haled
0 103
(Lat.
11 N:
480
23' E)
was
left
almost uninhabited.
In
order
to
regain
his
prestige among
the local
sheikhs,
the Sayyid launched
a characteristic
diplomatic
campaign
in
which
he
chided
them for their
vacillation
in
a cause which called
for their
unity.
In
a
letter to the
Musa Arreh, the Sayyidts
message went as
follows:
"From
Muhammad Abdille, the faithful, to the
Musa Arreh,
and especially
to Said Mahomed,
Ali Mahomed, Mahomed Yusuf, Elmi Yusuf, Ahmed
Ismail, Arraleh Ismail, Mahmood Farah* Dualeh
Said
etc.
....
This letter is
sent
to the
followers
of
Islam, Salaams to
you all and
to
all
the believers. Furthermore I let
you
know
that
your
deeds have
spoiled my
life
and yours
also; and you
have broken the
oath
that
was
between
us.
You have forsaken the true
religion and
done
evil
before Allah. By
going
to the English
you
forsake Islam
and
become
infidels. May I
never
join the English. You
are all my
brothers
and
I
advise you
to
return
to the true God. Do
not
die
as
kafirs. Do
not
join the British Government
and
the
religion of
the
unbelievers
...
A
man who
joins the kafirs
becomes
a
kafir himself, for
so
I
read
in the
.4
books
of
the Koran".
104
103. Ibid.
104. C. O. 535/39 Muhammad Abdille Hassan to the Musa Arreh,
and especially
to Said Mahomed
etc. n.
d.
(Encl.
in
Archer to C. O. 30/6/1915).
The Sayyid's
efforts
to
regain
his
prestige
among
the disaffected tribes
seems
to have
yielded more
disappointments than
success.
The Dervish
movement
seemed
to be
set on an
irretrievable downward trend
owing
to the defection
of
the
one-time staunch
supporters of
the Sayyid
such as
the Gadwein, the
Warsengeli
and
the Mijjertein. The decline
of
the Der-
vish movement strengthened
Britaints hand in her forward
policy and
boosted the
morale of
the local
administration.
In July 1914 Archer
was absolutely confident
in the
security of
the British
position
that, for the first
time in the history
of
the'Protectorate.. he
offered
to
send
troops to help Aden
out of
its
problems
in
case
the
anticipated
Turkish invasion
of
that
place
became
a reality.
105
Archer
could not
have imagined
a more
fitting
and generous gesture
to
make
to Aden than to
offer military assistance
in
case
it
was needed.
All
through the history
of
the Protectorate Aden had
always
I C,
-
been the first hope
of redemption whenever
the British
position was
threatened. It
was now
Aden
rather
than
the Protectorate
which stood
in
great peril, and
Archer
was ready
to
return
Aden's
earlier services
by
offering
to
send
troops
should
they be
needed.
As it turned
out,
Aden did
not require any
troops from Somaliland,
and so
Archer's
offer was not
taken
up.
lo6
By September the Camel Corps
could patrol
deep
105. C. O. 535/40 Archer to C. O. 17/7/1915.
lo6. C. O. 535/40 Archer to C. O. 27/7/1915.
2
".
9
3
into the heart
of
the Ain Valley
without
Dervish
molesta-
tion
-
further
evidence of
the
weakened
Dervish
position
and relatively strengthened position of
the British
administration.
Archer
was
jubilant
at
"the
remarkable change which
has taken
place
during the last
year
in the internal
situation
in Somaliland
....
About this time last
year we
were contemplating with some anxiety
thelbrward
move
from Sheikh
and
Galoli to Burao in the
view
of
the
proximity of
the Dervish forces in the
Ain Valley.
"107
In December 1915 the Sayyid
suffered another
blow
when
28
Dervishes defected to the British
with
their
arms en
masse., a
factor
which
led Archer to
comment
that
"this
was
the first
occasion since
1909;
and
others will probably
follow
...
"
lo8
If Britain
s offensive
demonstrated
at
Shimber
Berris had been
maintained,
the decline
of
the Dervish
movement would probably
have
continued unabated until
it
reached
the
point of extinction.
Britain's inability to
maintain
her
offensive gave
the Dervishes the
opportunity
they
so
badly
needed
to
manoeuvre and campaign
for their
moral and material regeneration.
The Dervish
efforts were
assisted
by
a number of external
factors,
some of which
were
intertwined in the
politics of
World War I
and others
in the
politics of
Ethiopia.
Ethiopian
politics
began to
work
in favour
of
the Dervish
movement
during the last two
years of
Lij
Yasuls
reign as
Emperor
of
Ethiopia. He
succeeded
Menelik
107. C. O. 535/40 Archer to C. O. 3/9/1915.
108. C. O. 535/40 Archer to C. O. 29/12/1915.
2
11'11
in 1913
at
the
age of
17. He
was said
to be
a man of
low
calibre and unstable character.,
109
but this
could
very well
be
a
biased
view
based
on
the fact that,
unlike
his
predecessors,
he
was a sympathiser with
Islam. It
was unthinkable
in those days
-
and even
in the
recent
ones
-
for the Emperor
of
Ethiopia to become
a
Muslim
or associate closely with
Islam. The Ethiopian Coptic
Church
was,
by
ancient
tradition, the
custodian of
the
19,
welfare and
livelihood
of
the
state, and vice-versa.
Thusj, Lij Yasu's
religious
tendencies
amounted not only
to
apostasy
but
also
to treason in
the
eyes of
the
majority of
his
subjects.
This led to his downfall.
Whatever
was
the
quality of
Lij Yasu's
character and
calibre
from the
point of view of
his
non-Somali subjects,
he
was
held in high
esteem
by
a substantial proportion of
the Somali tribes in the Ogaden
and
in the British Somali-
land Protectorate.
Lij Yasu's
reign
began to have
a
bearing
on
the
affairs of
the Protectorate in December 1914
when
Abdullah Sadik
was appointed
to the Governorship
of
the
Ogadeno
a
factor
which worried
Archer to the
extent
that
he
proposed a number of administrative changes
in the
western part of
the Protectorate. Archer
regarded
the
log. Jardine, The-Mad Mullah
of
Somaliland
p.
245-246.
A. S. Caplan does
not share
Jardine's
views as
to the
character of
Lij Yasu. Caplan, for instances describes
Lij Yasu
as
11
...
a very young man,
fairly intelligent
and
full
of
life;
surrounded
by the
oldo suspicious
friends
of
his
grandfather"
See, A. S. Caplan,
"British
Policy Towards Ethiopia, 1909 to 1919"
(Unpublished
Thesis for the University
of
London,
1971)
P.
93.
2ii
appointment of
Abdullah Sadik
as
the beginning
of a
grand plan on
the
part of
Lij Yasu to
"invite
the Mullah to
extend
his
sway over
the
whole of
the Ogaden
country
to the
con-
fines
of
Abyssinia itself,
when once
the
ground
has been
prepared
by Abdullah Sadik,
in
return
for
which
he
would undoubtedly
render valuable assistance
to Abyssinia
when emergency arose.
"
110
The
sort of emergency
in
which
Ethiopia
would require
Dervish
assistance was
likely to
arise
if the European
powers,
then
at grips with one another,
decided
at a
post-war peace conference
to dismember Ethiopia
and parcel
her
out
between themselves. According to Archer's hypo-
thesis., Lij Yasu
was
bent
on winning
the
goodwill of
the
Sayyid
as a precaution.
Whether
or not
Archerts hypo-
thesis is
a correct explanation of
the
motives which
propelled
Lij Yasu into flirtations
with
Islam
at
the
risk of
his
pers onal career.,
is hard to determineo
and
is, in
any case, peripheral
to this
study.
The
most significant point
is that Lij Yasuls
pro-Islamic and pro-Dervish policies caused considerable
difficulty to the British
administration across
the
border
and seemed
to
give a new
lease
of
lifeO
albeit a
temporary
one,
to the declining fortunes
of
the Dervish
movement.
ill
Rumours
of
Lij Yasu's
communication with
the Sayyid through Abdullah Sadik
started
to
circulate
from the
very moment
the latter
got
his
appointment
to
the Ogaden. In the
middle of
1915 Archer told the
110. C. O. 535136 Archer to C. O. 19/12/1914.
111. F. S. Caroselli, Ferro
e
Fuoco
op. cit. p.
239-242.
k.
s
Rg
";;
Colonial Office that
"Abdullah
Sadik
and
Kanyazmatch Kedani, two
of
his Mahommedan
councillors., are
in high favour
and
it is known that
envoys
have been
sent
from Abyssinia to the Mullah,
certainly on
2
occasions
during the last few
months.
n
112
Archer
sought permission
to
proceed
to Addis Ababa
with
a view
to discussing the
whole problem created
by Lij
Yasu's
policies., with
H. M. Minister in Addis Ababa
and
the'Ethiopian Government., but the Colonial Office
wondered
"whether
it
would
be
wise at
the
present
junc-
ture to try to bring
pressure on
the Ethiopian
Government
over
this
question.
"
113
The trip
was postponed, and
it did
not
take
place until
Lij Yasu had been
overthrown.
By the
end of
1915 Ethiopia
had
advanced
from being
merely a neighbouring country
with a
hostile head
of
Government to being
a
base for the
propaganda and
intrigues
of
the Central Powers
against
the
Allied Powers.
114
The first
signal
that Ethiopia
was
drifting towards this
position appeared
in November 1915
when a
German, Professor Frobeniuso
arrived
in Addis
Ababa.,
allegedly on a mission
to
make contingent plans
for
a
German
attack on
the British East Africa Protectorate
and
the Somali
coast.
115
Whatever
might
have been
112. C. O. 535/40 Archer to C. o.
8/7/1915.
113. C-. 0.535/4o Minute by Machtig-on Archer to C-0-31/7/1915.
114. AS Caplanj,
"British
Policy towards Ethiopia 1909
t 119"
op. cit.
Chapter II
and
IV.
115. C-O'e 535/41 W-0. to C. O. 23/11/1915. Nothing is known
of
Frobeniusts
subsequent activities or,
his
ultimate
mission.
G
'),
Frobeniust
errand,
his
presence
in Addis Ababa
and
his
cordial relations with
Lij Yasu
caused some
discomfort
to the British Goverment.
The
relations
between the Sayyid
and
Lij
Yasu
warmed up considerably
during the first half
of
1916. In January
of
that
year
the Sayyid
sent a gift
in
the
shape of a machine gun
to Lij Yasu. This
was
the
same machine gun which
the Dervishes had
captured
from
the British during the 1901-1904
expeditions.
Dodds.,
who
had
returned
to the Harar
consulate, reported
the
arrival of
the Sayyidts
envoys
in Harar to Thesiger in
Addis Ababa
and
to Archer. The latter
suggested
that
a secret
deal
should
be
made with
Lij Yasu by
which
the latter
would
hand
over
the
weapon
to the British
in
exchange
for
a cash payment or
for
a new machine
gun.
116
Machtig
regarded
the idea
of exchanging
a new
weapon
for
an old one as curious and self-defeating2
and
he
was not
impressed by Archer's
argument
that
such an exchange would
have the
effect of counter-acting
the
rumours
then
circulating regarding
Lij Yasuts
sup-
port
for the Dervishes.
117
The
proposal
was
then
referred
to the Foreign Office
and
the latter
authorized
Dodds to do his level best to-obtain the
machine gun.
His
effortso
however,
were unsuccessful and
the
weapon
was presented
to Lij Yasu in May
at a ceremony
in Addis
116. C. O. 535/42 Archer to C. O. 31311916;
see also
Caroselli
op. cit. p.
219.
117. Ibid. Minute by Machtig.
Ababa.
118
2 Fj
Within two
months of
the departure
of
the
Sayyidts
mission
to Lij Yasu, the latter
was already
sending consignments of arms and ammunition
to the
Sayyid through Abdullah Sadik.
119
In
addition,
the
Sayyid
was visited
by
a number of
Ethiopian
and
Turkish
delegations. Archer
reported
that the delegations
"apparently
presented
the Mullah
with a
Turkish
flag,
and
he is
said
to have
promised
to fly
this
over
the fort
at
Hais
at
the time
when
Turkish troops land there to join hands
with
him
and march on
Berbera"
120
Although the
projected
Turco-Dervish invasion
of
Berbera
did
not materialize..
these
contacts seem
to have
restored
a
degree
of prestige and morale
in the Dervish
movement.
In April 1916, the Sayyid
who
had kept
relatively quiet
since
the Shimber Berris
engagement, resumed
his taunting
letters to the British. In
one of
these he
proceeded as
follows:
"I
Muhammad bin Abdille Hassan do hereby tell
the British that they have
greatly oppressed
me and raised up many enemies against me,
seeking
to
extinguish
the light
created
by
God. The British
committed a mistake of
starting
hostilities
against
Dervishes
and
looting
stock.
Had
you
tried to
make a settle-
ment
between
us
there
would
have been
no
fighting between
us and no
distress brought
to this
country
....
And
now
I tell
you
that
if
you repent and are
desirous
of rectifying
your
dealings
with us and will grant us
sufficient respect and wealth
that
will
satisfy uso and allow us
to live in
our own
country among
the Somalis.,
and will open
the
l18. C. O. 535/44 Thesiger to F. O. 11611916.
119. C. O. 535/44 Thesiger to F. O. 10/4/1916.
120. C. O. 535/42 Archer to C. O. 1/3/1916.
235
sea
for
our
trade then I
will make peace
between
you and
the Sultan
(i.
e. of
Turkey)
and
he
will accept my word.
If
you are
prepared
to listen to
what
I
say,
then
send
me a
British Officer
with an
interpreter bear-
ing
with
him
a suitable gift, and
this
should
be done
sw'ftly*"121
Thus., the
contacts
between the Sayyid
on
the
one
hands
and
Lij Yasu
and
the Central Powers,
on
the
other, seem
to have
given
the Sayyid
an
insight,
albeit
a
distorted
ones
into the international
politics of
the
time, leading him into the belief that, in his
position
as a confidant of
the Sultan
of
Turkey
-
for
so
he
evidently
regarded
himself
-
he
could
dangle his
supposed good
offices
before Britain
with a view
to blackmailing the
latter into
conceding
to his demands. The World War Is
therefore,
gave
the Dervishes
a new weapon with which
they hoped to bargain
with
the British for their freedom
from British
colonialism.
The Dervishes
were studying
the
course of
World War I
with
keen interest. They knew
that Britain had
encountered enem
ies
who could match
her
military power.
At least, Britain
could not
do to
the Central Powers
what she
had done to the Dervishes
at
Shimber Berris. The fact that the Dervishes
were
implicitly
recognized
by Britaints
enemies not only as
an alternative
form
of representative authority
for the
Somali, but
were also regarded as a crucial military
factor
which might
tip the balance in favour
of
the
Central Powers$
must
have been
a source of great confidence
121. Mohammed bin Abdulle Hassan to the British Government
n.
d.
(Encl.
in C. O. 535/44 summers to C. O. 5/4/1916.
lk
and moral regeneration.
Thus,,
provided
Britain
was
prepared
to
concede
to the Sayyid's
conditions,
the
latter tended to
see
himself
as
the key to
a possible
settlement and restoration of peace
between Britain
and
the Central Powers, his
new allies.
'1
The Sayyidts
conception of
his
position on
the
arena of
international
politics of
the time
was a gross
over-estimation of
the true
value of
his
status and
that
of
the Dervish
movement.
The
question of
British
with-
drawal from the Protectorate
-
one of
the Sayyid's
condi-
tions
-
was one which
had long been dismissed. After Dul
Madoba, Britain
was
bent
on
the
ultimate re-occupation of
the Protectorate,
and
the Shimber Berris
action was
just
one stage
in Britainfs drive towards that
ultimate objec-
tive. Conversely, the decline
of
the Dervish
movement
had been
unleashed
by their defeat
at
Shimber Berris
and
the
subsequent
defection
of
the Dervish followers
and
supporters.
Thus, the faith
and expectations cherished
by Lij Yasu
and
the Central Powers in the Dervish
move-
ment were
based
on
their
erroneous
knowledge
of
the
real
position
in the Dervish
movement.
By the
middle of
1916 Ethiopian-based
propaganda
against
the Allied Powers
was
beginning to
cause concern
to Britain,
notwithstanding
Archerts
re-assurances as
to
the loyalty
of
the
pro-British
tribes. Archer informed
the Colonial Office that
I
"the
general
loyalty
of our ovm
Somali tribes
may
be
counted on at present
....
The
mistake
he
(Lij
Yasu)
and our enemies
in Abyssinia
make
is that-they believe the Mullah, Mahomed
Abdulla Hassan, is held in
veneration and res-
pect
by the Somali tribes.
"
122
122. C. O. 535/42 Archer to C. O. 15/6/1916.
2U
Archer's
re-assurance
had been
necessitated
by Britain's
anxiety about
the
possible repurcussions
in the Protecto-
rate of a
Turkish
manifesto published and circulated
in
Addis Ababa,
urging all
Muslims to
unite against
the
Allied Powers,
"the
enemies of religion;
ji123
The
manifesto went on
to
charge
that
"three
of
the Christian
nations,,
England,, France
and
Russia,
our strongest enemies since
the
beginning,
made an alliance
together in
order
to destroy Islam;
and
their intention
was
to
destroy the temples
of
Mecca
and
Medina
....
German
and
Muslim
armies
have
already
destroyed
the Christian
nations. * vis,,
England,, France
and
Russia. Oh! Somali Moujahedin
(fighting
Muslims),
you who are
famous for
your solid
religiousness and calm
temper, the
present
day
is the day
of
trial
...
Collect
yourselves and
be
united under
the flag
of
the
messenger of
God; throw down the fortifications
of
Berbera
and
Zeilah
and
Jibuti
and
Bulhar
....
Concen-
trate
your
forces
under
the
command of
Sayyid
Muhammad bin Abdullah Hassan
-
consult
him; do
not
disobey his
will;
follow his
opinion
...
"
124
A
month
later,
another
document
couched
in
similar
languages
was
displayed in Harar. According to Dodd's description
of
0
the document, the language
used was of a
123. In the Summer
of
1917 the Italians
were
tipped by
Sultan Osman Mahmud
about a certain
Sheikh Shirwa
'bin
Mahmud
who was responsible
for delivering
letters
between the Sayyid
and
Ali Said Pasha,
a
high
ranking
Turkish
military officer
based
at
Lahej, in Aden.
From the letters
which were subsequently captured
from this
messenger,
it
was
learnt that the Sayyid
had
already agreed,
in
principle,
to
place
himself
under
Turkish
protection and was prepared
to
sign a
formal treaty to that
effect.
(See
Robert Hess,
"The
Mad Mullah
of
Northern Somalia".. in J. A. H..,
v, 3.1964
p.
430-431).
124. C0 535/42
"Manifesto
from Turkish
sources
in Abyssinia"..
n:
d:
(Encl.
in Archer to C. O. 15/6/1916.
2V, '!
3
.9
"most
insulting
nature
to the British
nation
and of a most
inflammatory
character.
"
125
Dodds demanded the
suppression of
the document but the
acting
Governor
of
Harar., Fitaurari Gabri.,
showed
"culpable
neglect and most
decided indifference
to the friendship
of
the British in
allowing
the
publication of
the
address.
nl26
In August Lij Yasu's
activities
brought
more
threatening
omens
to the Protectorate. Rumours
started
to
circulate according
to
which
Lij Yasu
was planning a
joint Ethio-Dervish invasion
of
Hargeisa. This
parti-
cular rumour was re-inforced
by Lij Yasuts departure for
Harar
and
then Jigjiga
where
he
stayed until shortly
before his
overthrow.
Archer's
confidence
in the loyalty
of
the
pro-British
tribes
remained unshak, able.
He
reported
that
"there
is
no
indication
whatsoever at present
of unrest among our
Somali tribes;
and provided
that factional fighting
of a religious nature
does
not
break
out
just
over our
borders,
and
assuming
that Lij Yasu does
not precipitate
matters
by
some act of open
hostility
against
us,
I
cannot see, personally, any
immediate
cause
for
alarm.
"
127
The
rumour regarding
the Ethio-Dervish invasion
of
Hargeisa
came
to
nothing, as
did the
speculation about an
imminent
marriage
between Lij Yasu
and
the Sayyidts daughtero
or
125. C. O. 535/42 Dodds to Thesiger 21/7/1916
(Encl.
in
Archer to C. O. 25/7/1916)..
126. Ibid.
127. C. O. 535/43 Archer to C. O. 26/8/1916.
indeed
about an
imminent
meeting
between the Sayyid
and
Lij Yasu.
128
The failure
of
the latter
project was
attributed
to the inability
of
Lij Yasu
and
the Sayyid
to
agree
to
a venue
for the
meeting.
The Sayyid is
said
to
have insisted
on
holding the
meeting
in the fort
at
Taleh
while
Lij Yasu
wanted
the Sayyid to
come over
to iijiga.
129
The failure
of
the two
projects
to
materialize
did
not
dishearten Lij Yasu
nor mar
his
good relations
with
the Dervishes. The former is
said
to have joined
Muslim
prayers at
Jigjiga, dressed like
a
Muslim
and
entertained
Somali
elders
from
across
the border.
130
In
the
middle of
September
-
and
this
was only a
few
weeks
before the
coup
dletat in Ethiopia
-
Lij Yasu
crowned
his friendly
gestures
towards the Dervishes by
sending
them
a
German
mechanic named
Emil Kirsch to
repair
Dervish
rifles and manufacture ammunition
for them*131
Emil Kirsch
who apparently went with
different
expecta-
tions from
what
he
actually
found, took
up a career
which
turned
out
to be both frustrating
and
humiliating.
To begin
with,
the Sayyid
would not receive
him in
audience
for fear
of
being
contaminated
by
an
infidel. The Sayyid
used
to
cover
his
mouth and nostrils whenever
Kirsch
was
128. C. O. 535/43
"A
Precis
of
Abyssinian Intelligence..
received
in Somaliland during the
week ending
16th
September 1916.
(Encl.
in Archer to C. O. 16/9/1916).
129. Ibid.
130. A
very useful and constructive account of
the
relations
between the Sayyid
and
Lij Yasu is
given
by John
Drysdaleo The Somali Dispute
(London)
1964, Chapter 3.
131. Jardine, The Mad Mullah
of
Somaliland
p.
247; Also
C. O. 535/43 "K
Pecis
of
Abyssinian Intelligence,
received
in Somaliland during the
week ending
30/9/1916
(Encl.
in Archer to C. O. 30/g/1916).
I
reported anywhere within
the Sayyidts
neighbourhood.
Above
all,
Kirschts
assignment proved
to be impracti-
cable.
There
were neither
the
spare parts
for
repairing
the
rifles nor
the
necessary raw materials
for
manufac-
turing
gun powder.
He
sought permission
to leave but
was
instead
arrested and
detained. His
career ended
tragically
when
he
escaped
from the Taleh fort
and
died
of
fatigue
just
a
few
miles
from Alula.
132
Although Archer
professed
full
confidence
in
the loyalty
of
the
pro-British
tribes, he
would
have
run
considerable risks
if he had
simply
turned
a
blind
eye
to
the Ethiopian-based
propaganda.
Thus., during Lij Yasuls
reign,
Archer
was pre-occupied with
devising
strategies
and producing evidence
to
counter-act
the
allegation
emanating
from Ethiopia. Archer's
starting point was-the
Ogaden
which
the Turks,
with
the
approval of
Lij Yasu,
were using as a stage
for
rallying th;
Somali
on
both
sides of
the border behind
pan-Islamic slogans.
Archer's
strategy
for
counter-acting propaganda
originating
from
this
area consisted
in
setting up a rival
base in the
British Protectorate for
propagating
a
different
version
of what
World War I
was all about.
The British
were
deter-
mined
to
play
Lij Yasuls
game since
the
normal channels of
diplomacy
seemed
to be inapplicable under
the
circumstances.
Summers, then
acting
Commissioner#
invited the Ogaden tribes
and
the
pro-British
tribes for
a meeting at
Hargeisa in
June 1916. The
aim of
the
meeting was
twofold,
namely,
132. Jardineo
The Mad Mullah
of
Somaliland
p.
246-248.
to
settle all
the
outstanding claims and
disputes
which
had
accumulated since
Lij Yasu began taking
an unfriendly
attitude
towards the British,
and
the
second aim was
to
give
the Somali the British
version of
the issues involved
in the War
as well as
the British
side of
the
report as
to
the developments
on
the
war
front.
133
Unfortunately for
the British, Lij Yasu
was
informed
of
Summerts
plans and
sabotaged
the
whole project
by instructing the Jigjiga
authorities
to forestall Britain's
plans with a meeting
of
Ogaden tribes
at
Jigjiga
where
the Turkish
version of
the
war was
to be
repeated and stressed.
134
Lij Yasuls
scheme was,
however,
not entirely successful,
for in July
a number of
Ogaden tribes turned
up at
Hargeisa
and con-
ferred
with
the British tribes,
under
the
chairmanship of
the Protectoratets
administration.
Reporting
on
the
out-
come of
the Meeting Archer
stated
that
"whatever
eventuality may arise
in Abyssinia.,
we are
in
a sufficiently strong position on
this
side of
the border to frustrate Turco-
Abyssinian intrigues
emanating
from Harar
and
Addis Ababa
...
The
salient
factoro
of course,
is that if Abyssinia
repudiates
her
respon-
sibilities and
fails to
maintain
law
and order
among
Somalis
on
her
side of
the border,
we
must adopt whatever steps self-interest
may
seem
to dictate to
exercise
the
necessary
control.
"
135
The Colonial Office
was satisfied with
Archer's
report,
except
that Machtig
was worried
that
133. C. O. 535/42 Summers to C. O.
-31511916.
134. C. O.
-'535/42
Summers to C-0- 15/6/1916.
135. C. O. 535/42 Archer to C. O. 20/7/1916.
27P?
w
"Mr.
Archer is inclined to be
a
little too
optimistic as regards
the future, but it is
evident
that
good work
has been done.
"
136
The
success of
the Hargeisa
meeting reinforced
Archerts belief that the
pro-British
tribes
and a substan-
tial
proportion of
the Ogaden tribes
would not accept
the
religious
twist
given
to the War by Lij Yasu
and
the
Turks. In
order
to
ensure continuous vigilance over
the
British-controlled
areas,
Archer transferred the head-
quarters of
the
administration
to Sheikh,
a more central
spot
than Berbera,
and
that is
where
they
remained
throughout the War.
137
With
a view
to dealing
a
death
blow to the Ethiopian-based Turkish literature, Archer
organized a
trip
of
Somali
elders
to Egypt, the
aim
being to
give
them
a
first hand
experience of what was
actually obtaining at
the
war
front. The
other objec-
tive
was
to disprove the
alleged
Muslim 'solidarity with
the Central Powers. Muslim
countries such as
Egypt
and
Mecca had
rebuffed-Turkish overtures and
thrown in their
lot
with
the Allied Powers. *-
,
The Colonial Office
wel-
comed
the
proposed
trip,
and a
team
of
Somali
elders
left for Egypt in July 1916. En
route,
the leader
of
the
party,
Castle-Smith, took
care
to
show
to his
proteges
1.36. Ibid. Minute by Machtig.
137. G. Archer, Personal
and
Historical Memoirs
of an
East
African AdminisLrator,
p.
bb.
"the
Alliest
shipping, plying
to
and
fro to
various parts
both
east and west without
let
or
hinderance. I
also made
it
clear
that
no-
German
vessels
had traversed those
waters
(i.
e.
the Red Sea) for the
past
two
years and would
be
unable
to do
so until a peace was arranged"
138
On
arrival at
the Suez Canal the
party was shown
the Turkish
prisoner of war camp consisting of
inmates handed
over
by
Sheriff Hussein
of
Mecca to the British. They
were also
shown
British
warships and a railway
line
running
the
length
of
the
canal.
They
were
then taken to
various
other prisoner of war camps, of which
the Kantara Camp
"created
the
profoundest
impression
of all upon
the
minds of our men, as
it is
an enormous camp
and extends
for
some miles along
the bank
of
the
canal.
"
139
Towards the
end of
August the
party visited
Cairo
via
Ismailia. They
were
taken to Mosques.,
more prisoner of
war camps,
development
projects and places of
tourist
attraction.
-
Summing
up what
he believed to have been the
achievement of
the trip, Castle-Smith
reported
that
"it
showed clearly
how futile had been the
attempt of a
Muslim Power
(i.
e.
Turkey)
to
question
the British
supremacy, and also
the
price paid
for
making
that
attempt.
1'140
It
will
be
observed,
therefore., that Britain's
policy
during the
war, and most especially
during Lij
Yasu's
reign, was
to isolate the Dervishes from the
pro-
British_tribes
by
preventing
the Ethiopian-based
propaganda
from
gaining roots among
the
pro-British
tribes. If the
religious
twist
attributed
to World War I had been
accepted
138. C. O. 535/43 Castle-Smith
to Archer
4/9/1916 (Encl.
in
Archer to C. O. 21/9/1916.
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid.
27
by the
pro-British
tribes, Britain
would
have faced the
prospect of a mass
defection
of
her tribes to the Sayyid,
the
appointed champion of
the Islamic
cause
in this
struggle.
That the Ethiopian-based
overtures
failed to
gain ground must
be
attributed partly
to the
counter-,
measures
taken by the Somaliland
administration and partly
to the long-standing
and
deeply
rooted antagonism
between
the Somali
and
the Ethiopians. This
antagonism, rooted as
it
was,
in
religious and cultural
differences
and rein-
forced by Ethiopia's
expansionist
designs
over
Somali
territory,
could not
be
erased overnight
by Lij Yasuls
half-hearted
and suspicious
devotion to Islam. That the
relations
between Lij Yasu
and
the Dervishes,
whatever
their
outward semblance, remained
basically
superficial
was
demonstrated by the failure
of
the two
parties
to
come
to
any substantial agreement or co-ordinate
their
respective resources.
In fact, beyond their
mutual
hatred
of
Britain, the Dervishes
and
Lij Yasu had
nothing
in
common.
The Somali
explain
the Sayyidts
apparent
acceptance of
Lij Yasuts
overtures with a
Somali
proverb
to the
effect
that
"Your
enemyts enemy
is
your
friend.
"
141
Thus, the Sayyid
was prepared
to
show a
friendly
attitude
to the Ethiopians
as
long
as
the latter
pursued a
hostile
policy
to the British, but this did
not necessarily end
the deeply
rooted
Dervish
suspicions of
the Ethiopians.
141. Interview
with
Dahir Afqarshe
at
the Somali Academy,
Mogadishu
on
Y8
194;
and with
Musa Galaal Ali,
8/
same venue,
7
8Y197
and
13/8/1974.
'I'j
Throughout the War the
main
Dervish base
remained
at
Taleh. It
was
believed that Lij Yasu tried, but failed,
to
persuade
the Sayyid to transfer his headquarters to the
142
Bagheri
country.
Apart from the Sayyid's
offer
to
mediate
between Britain
and
Turkey, the
other significant
development in the Dervish
movement was
their
re-occupation
of
their fort
at
Jidali
which
they had deserted in the
middle of
1914,
suspecting
that the British
might
launch
another attack.
Since the Dervish
move co-incided with
that
of
the Gadwein from the Makhir
coast
to Las Dureh.,
and since
Britain
considered
the time inopportune for
attacking
Jidali, the hinterland
of
the Makhir
coast
became
a no-man's
land
until
the
return of
the Dervishes
to the Jidali fort.
143
The
arch enemies of
the Dervishes throughout the
war period were
the Gadwein
and
the Warsengeli,
who
had
been
at one
time the Sayyidts
staunchest supporters.
Shortly
after
their
re-occupation of
Jidalis the Dervishes
attacked
the karias
of
the Gadwein
at
Las Dureh,
killing
144
20
people and capturing
2., 000
camels.
A
subsequent
Dervish
raid on
the Dolbahanta., however.,
ended
disastrously
for the Dervishes,
as
did their
attempt
to
win
back the
Warsengeli. In
pursuit of
the latter
objective,
the Sayyid
sent a
deputation to
woo
back the Warsengeli in September
1915 but the latter
executed
the
entire party and sentback
142. C. O. 535/4o Intelligence Report for August 1915
(Encl.
in Archer to C. O. 2/9/1915).
143. Ibid.
144. Ibid.
27 5)
insults to the Sayyid.
145
The
same month
the Dervishes
started
building
a
fort
at
Gardo, in the Mijjertein
country,
but
were
driven
off
by the Mijjertein.
146
Towards the
end of
1915 the Dervish
reverses
in the battlefield
were exacerbated
by
a severe
drought
which
depleted their
stock and
brought distress
within
the Dervish
camp.
Out
of sheer need
for
water and pasture
the Dervishes
were
forced to
split up
their forces
and
stock with a view
to
pursuing what
little
water and
pasture
they
could
locate
within
their
sphere of
influence.
147
The dispersal
of
the Dervishes
enabled a
number of
disgruntled
elements
to defect to the British
as soon as
they
got
beyond the immediate
reach of
the
Sayyid- The defection
of so many
Dervishes, in turn,
increased the Sayyid's
ruthlessness
in
punishing
suspects
as well as captured
defectors. This
created a vicious
cycle 'within
the Dervish
organization.
The
more
defec-
tions the Dervish
movement suffered,
the
more ruthless
the Sayyid became,,,
and
this., far from being
a
deterrent.,
actually stimulated more
defections. The Colonial Office
was satisfied with
the
way
the
situation was
developing.
Machtig
remarked
that,
"it
would
be
no exaggeration
to
say
that the
situation
in Somaliland is better than it
has been
at any
time during the last ten
years.
"
148
145. C. O. 535/40 Intelligence Report for September
and
October 1915
(Encl.
in Archer to C. O. 29/11/1915).
146. Ibid.
147. C. O. 535/42 Intelligence Report for November
and
December
1915
(Encl.
in Archer to C. O. 22/2/1916).
I
148. Ibid. Minute by Machtig.
I'll
27s
Fiddes
agreedTAith
this
observation
but
was only worried
that
"it
will
be
unfortunate
if the Mullah
succeeds
in bringing the Warsengeli
over
to his
side
again"
149
During the last
nine months of
Lij Yasuts
reign.,
relations
between the latter, Turkey
and
Germany
on
the
one
hand,
and
the Sayyid,
on
the
other, reached
their
highest
peak.
Although these
external contacts made
little
substantial change
in the fortunes
of
the Dervish
movemento
they taught the Somaliland
administration a very
important lesson,
namely
to keep
a close eye on events
beyond the borders
of
the Protectorate. If
ever
the
Dervish
movement were
to become
a real and serious
threat
again
it
would, most
likely, have had to
obtain moral and
material support
from
external sources.
Internally, the
British
were confident of
their
position which
had been
strengthened
by the
effective administration
they had
established over
their
sphere of
influence
and
by the
continuous
defection
of
the Dervishes to the British.
Thus, the
administration
became
sensitive about
those
events which,
though beyond the borders
of
the Protec-
torate,
seemed
to have
an
impact
on
it. Ethiopian-based
propaganda, already
discussed,
were a case
in
point.
In February 1916
another
bad
omen
for the
Protectorate
-
or so
it
was regarded
by the Somaliland
I-
administration
-
appeared
in the
shape of
the Jubaland
0
149. Ibid. Minute by Fiddes.
uprising which claimed
the life
of
Elliott..
a
British
administrative officer
in the
area.
150
This
particular
episode seemed
to
worry
Archer
more
than Lij Yasuts
intrigueso for, in his
view,
it
was
"necessary
to bear in
mind
that
all
this
country
is
one, whether called
Jubaland
or
Somaliland;
and arbitrary
lines drawn
across
the
map
to
define the different
spheres make
little
difference.
"
151
ArchtFr
contended
that
a
link-up
of
the Jubaland
uprising
and
the Dervish
resistance movement might precipitate
unless
Britain took
prompt measures against
both,
beginning
with
the Dervishes
and
then the Jubaland
uprising next.
His
reasons
for
advocating action
in that
sequence was
that
"to
achieve
the
utmost effect you must
deal
with
the fountain head,
and
that is the Mullah
of
Somaliland".
152
The Colonial Office did
not share
Archerts
order of
priorities.
They
considered
the Jubaland
situation
to
be
more urgent
than the 16-years
old
Dervish
movement.
Thus, the Colonial Office
went ahead with
the
suppression
of
the Jubaland
uprising, reminding
Archer,
at
the
same
time, that
150. MSS. AFR. S.
424,
ff. 37-41. Llewellin, J. L. B. L.,
"Account
of
the
sack of
Serrenleh
(Serenli)
obtained
from
a
Magabul
who
took
part
in the
attacki
1916.
"
This document is found in Rhodes Houseo Oxford.
Llewellin,
a
British Official
in the N. F. D.,
collected
the
story
from two
mens namelyp
Mohammed
Ibrahim
and
Ali Salim. See
also
R. Turton..
"The
Impact
of
Muhammad Abdille Hassan".,
op. cit..,
J. A. H..,
X,
4 (1969),
p.
641-157.
151. C. O. 535/45 Archerts
memorandum on
the
affairs of
the
Protectorate as affected
by the
affairs
in Jubaland,
15/3/1916.
152. Ibid.
273
"Operations
against
the Mullah
must await
ttl5,3
the
completion of
the East Africa
campaign.
"I
On the
6th
of
May 1916 the Dervishes, in
revenge
for the Warsengeli
massacre of
their
messengers, made a
surprise attack on
Las Khorai, killed
a
handful
of
Warsengeli
and
damaged
property.
This Dervish force,
of about
1,500
strong, was under
the
command of
Ibrahim
Bogul
who was
the Dervish
officer
in
charge of
the Jidali
fort.
154
Summers
applied
for
and acquired a warship
from
Aden
which shelled
the Dervish forces
at
Las Khorai
and
sent
them
scuttling
back into the interior.
155
A few
days later, however, the Dervishes
made good
their
set-
back
of
Las Khorai by
raiding a party of
the Musa Aboker
who
had
ventured within
the
neighbourhood of
the Taleh
fort
against
the
advice of
the Goverment illaloes. The
Dervishes
waited until
their intended
victims were
deep
within
the Dervish-controlled
zone, and
then
struck with
a
force
of nearly
1., 000
riflemenp
killing 100
men and
seizing plenty of
the Musa Aboker
stock-156
These two
episodes
led Archer to
ask
for
a
permanent
force to
garrison
Las Khorai,
arguing
that
since
the Warsengeli had
maintained
their hostility towards
the Sayyid, they deserved
an assured protection
from his
revenge.
157
The
proposal got a sympathetic reception
in
153. Ibid. Minute by Machtig.
154. C. O. 535/42 Summers to C. O. 16/5/1916.
155. Ibid.
156. C. O. 535/42 intelligence Report for May
and
June 1916
(Encl. in Archer to C. O. 18/7/1916).
157. C. O. 535/44 Archer to c. o.
8/8/1916.
9r'
the Colonial Office, though Machtig feared that
"it
will
be found impossible in
present circum-
stances
to
send any
troops to Las Khorai. It
would,
in
any case
I
be
a
departure
(though
not
necessarily a
bad
one)
from the
official policy
to
send a garrison
to-a
place
like Las Khorai
which
is
outside
the
present
British
sphere
... 158
Machtig's fears turned
out
to be
unjustified,
for the War
Office
agreed
to despatch
a company of
Indian troopss the
58th Vaughants Rifles, then
on active service
in Egypt, to
garrison
Las Khorai.
159
In September 1916, the force took
up
their
position at
Las Khorai
and,
by
so
doing,
added
one more piece of
territory to the British
sphere of
influence.
The
occupation of
Las Khorai by the British
was a severe
blow to the Dervishes for it
closed
to them
one of
their
most
important
ports, so vital
for trade
and
communication with
the
outside world.
Although the
occupa-
tion
of
this
port was
intended to hurt the Dervishes
and
benefit the Warsengeli, the latter
seem
to have felt
uneasy
to have British troops
right
in their
midst.
That the Warsengeli dreaded the Dervishes
could not,
it
seems,
be disputed but the
prospect of
their being
under
the
constant supervision of
the British
was
hardly
a source
of comfort
to*them. When Archer toured-the
area at
the
end
of
1916 he found the Warsengeli in
an unfriendly mood, and
deemed it
necessary
to-warn their Sultan that
unless
that
attitude changed
he
would punish
the Sultan. Archer's
method worked.
It demonstrated the
strength of
the British
158. Ibid. Minute by Machtig.
159.
Ibid. Minute by Read. Read
was
informed
of
the War
Office decision by telephone,
so
he
wrote
this
minute
to
inform the
rest of
the
officers
in the Colonial Office.
ZJ1.
position
in that
area.
16o
The
overthrow of
Lij Yasu towards the
end of
September 1916 brought
some relief
to the British
and
eased
the
pressure
in the
western section of
the Protec-
torate. The
new
Ethiopian Government
was
headed by
Woizero Zauditu,
as
Empress,
and
Ras Tafari
as
the
regent
and
heir to the throne. Although Lij Yasu
made a
des-
perate effort
to
return
to
power, and
by
so
doing
plunged
the
country
into
a most
bloody
civil war,
his
forces
were
thoroughly
routed and
defeated by the
new
regime.
Thesiger informed the Foreign Office that
"the
Goverment is
now
in the hands
of
those
who are
friendly to
our cause.
"
161
Thus.. Archer
could now
divert his
attention
to the
problems
of administration, and, especially,
to the Dervish
question.
On the
side of administration,
the
most pressing
problem was
to deal
with
the
accumulated
border
claims and
disputes
whose solution
had been
suspended owing
to Lij
Yasu's
policies.
Archerts trip to Addis Ababa
which
had
been
postponed
in 1915
could now
take
place.
In February
1917, therefore, Archer left for Addis Ababa
where
he
hoped to discuss the border
problems
both
with
Thesiger
and
the
new
Ethiopian
regime.
He
also
timed his
visit
to
co-incide with
the
coronation of
Zauditu,
a ceremony
he
160. C. O. 535/43 Archer to C. O. 19/12/1916.
161. F. o. 371/2594 Thesiger to Grey No. 95,28/9/1916
as quoted
by Caplan,
nBritish
Policy towards Ethiopia
1909-191911
op. cit. p.
231.
was anxious
to
witness.
162
At
a meeting with
Ras Tafari, Archer
complained
about
E-%Jopials failure to institute
an effective
administration
in the Ogaden. He
suggested
to Tafari
that Ethiopia
should authorize
Britain to
set up a
British
administration
in the Ogaden
while undertaking
to
continue
to
respect
Ethiopian
sovereignty
in the
area.
Tafari
was apparently well
disposed towards the idea but
the
rest of
the
ministers rebuffed
it. Archer
returned
empty
handed
and
lamented that
"the
frontier
question, as every other question
in Abyssinia,
seems shelved
indefinitely,,
with
little hope
or prospect of solution.
"
163
However., Archer took
solace
in his belief that
Itsigns
are not wanting
that the
general
break-
up of
Abyssinia
may
be
near at
hand,
and
indeed
the
process of
disintegration
seems already
to
have began.
"
164
In the
event of
Ethiopian disintegration,
so
he
contended,
Britain
would naturally partake
in its
partitionj aiming
first
and
foremost, for those
areas such as
the Ogaden
and
Harar,,
which were contiguous
to the Protectorate. Archerts
enthusiastic predictions as
to the future
of
Ethiopia, let
alone
his
grandoise projects
in the
event of
Ethiopian dis-
integration,
provoked a stinging comment
from Read:
162. C. O. 535/46 Archerts Report
on
his
visit
to Adis Ababa,
27/3/1917.
r
163. Ibid.
164. Ibid. Also
see
Robert L. Hess,
"Italy
and
Africa: '
Colonial Ambitions in the First World War" in the Journal
of
African History,
volume
IV
(1963)
P.
105-126. 'This
article
discusses
Ethiopia's
problems caused
by her
internal,
political
intrigues,
and exacerbated
by the
interference
of
European Powers,
especially
Italy,
which
were anxious
to
see
Ethiopia break
up.
23
"the
break-up
of
Abyssinia has been before
us
for the last five
years
....
In
any case
the
matter
is
rather one
for Mr. Thesiger, the
Sudan
and
the Foreign Office than for the
Commissioner
of
Somaliland
and
the Colonial
Office"'165
There
was
then the turmoil
on
the Italian
side
of
the border to deal
with.
The
source of
trouble in
this area arose out of
the
old
tribal
clashes and claims
between
the Mijjertein
and
the Warsengeli. Summers took
up
the
matter
during Archer's trip to Addis Ababa,
and
instructed
Capt. Wallero the Officer
commanding at
Las
Khorais
to
meet
Major Crispi, from the Italian Somaliland,
with a view
to disposing
of
the
many problems and claims
between
the two tribes.
166
The
meeting
took
place at
Bunder
Kassim in July
and a number of
disputes
and claims
were
dealt
with.
The French
side of
the border too left
much
to
be desired.
It
was a source of
illicit
arms
trade for
the
border tribes. As
early as
August 1916 Archer had
proposed
that,, in
view of
the imminent break-up
of
Ethiopia,
Britain
should, while making contingent plans
for
the
annexation of
Harar
and
the Ogaden,
also consider
the
possibility
of
buying Jibuti from the French
or of
exchanging
another
territory for it. The
acquisition of
Jibuti
by the British,
according
to Archer,
would enable
Britain
to
stamp out arms smuggling which
the French had
hitherto
failed to do,
and, above all, a combination
of
165. C. O. 535/46 Minute by Read
on
Archerts Report
on
his
visit
to Adis Ababa 27/3/1917.
166.
C. O. 535/46 Summers to Waller 22/2*1917
(Encl.
in
Summers to C. O. 22/2/1917).
23
.1
z6
Harar
and
Jibuti
would
"enable
us
to tap the trade
of
Eastern
Abyssinia
proper.
"
167
Since the
realization of
these ideals
was
dependent
on
the
collapse of
Ethiopia., Archerts
proposals were
appreciated and shelved.
168
During his
visit
to Addis
Ababa in February 1917, howevero Archer became
more
convinced
than
ever
before that the break-up
of
Ethiopia
was near and
inevitableo
and so
he
revived
his
earlier
proposals
for the
annexation of
Jibuti together
with
Harar. Talking
about
the former
place,
Archer
argued
that the
only solution
to the Jibuti-based
arms
traffic
was
"to
buy
out
the French
at
Jibuti
....
The
French
must
be told that
arms
traffic
at
Jibuti
cannot
be tolerated
any
longer by
Britain
and
Italy. The French then
should
be
persuaded
to
accept some
territorial
concession
in West Africa in
exchange
for
Jibuti.
"
169
Read's
snub.. which amounted
to
saying
that these
projects
were none of
Archerts business, has
already
been
cited.
Not least
of
Archer's
pre-occupations
during
World War I
was
his
endeavour
to keep the Dervish
problem
a
live issue in the Colonial Office,
so
that it
might not
be
completely overshadowed
by the War. One
of
his tech-
niques
for doing this
was
to
seize upon every opportunity
and occasion
that had
some connection, or could
be
construed
167. C. O. 535/43 Archer to Sir G. Fiddes 29/8/1916.
168. Ibid. Minute by Machtig.
169. C. O. 535/46 Archer's Report
on
his
visit
to Adis
Ababa, 27/3/1917.
to have
some connection., with
Somaliland
affairs., with a
view
to
reviving,
for the
attention of
the British
Government, the Dervish issue. One
such occasion was
when
the Jubaland
uprising
broke
out.
This
presented
Archer
with an opportunity
for
reminding
the Colonial
Office
about
the
gravity of
the Dervish
problem, and
this
he did by trying to
convince
the Colonial Office
-
though
without success
-
that the Dervish,
movement was
the
"fountain
head"
of
the Jubaland
uprising.
There
seems
to be
no
foundation for Archer's
claim
but it
served
his
purpose.
Another
opportunity
for Archer to
raise
the
Dervish issue
came
in September 1916
when
the Allied forces
in Egypt
ran short of camels, a
factor
which
led the
British Government to look for
sources of replenishment.
Archer
offered
to
sell
them
up
to
8,000
camels on condi-
tion the British Government
agreed
to
construct a motor-
road
from Berbera to Burao. In defence
of
his
request,
Archer
argued
that the
road would
facilitate the
movement
of
troops during the
operations against
the Dervishes.
170
Archer
estimated
the
cost of
the
project
to
amount
to
Z60,000,
and
the Colonial Office
urged
the Treasury to
sanction
it,
claiming, and rightly so,
that the
purchase
of
Somali
camels
had denuded the
countryts solemeans of
transport to
a
dangerous level
.
Unfortunately for Archer,
the Treasury turned down the
proposal on
the
grounds
that
the
estimated cost was prohibitive under
the
circumstances
and
that
170. C. O. 535/43 Archer to C. O. 22/9/1916.
"%
"the
undertaking
involves demands
upon sea-
transport,
supplies of petrol and motor cars
or
lorries
which
it
may not
be
easy
to
meet
These
considerations,
in their Lordships'
opinion, render
it
most undesirable
to
proceed
with
the
scheme
in
present circumstances.
"
171
C,
-
Archer threpened to
stop
further
shipment of camels
to
Egypt
until
his
condition was met
but the Colonial Office
overruled
him
with a
directive that
"the
early
despatch
of camels
to Egypt is
an
imperative
necessity
for
successful conduct of
operations
by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force
The Army Council, therefore, hope that
you
will use your utmost endeavours
to
supply as
many camels as possible
for
shipment
to
Egypt.
"
172
During the first half
of
1917 the Dervish
fortunes took
a sharp plunge
for the
worse.
The British
occupation of
Las Khorai forced the Dervishes to direct
their
operations eastwards with a view
to
obtaining an
outlet on
the Mijjertein
coast.
Here they
met a
formidable
obstacle
in the
shape of
Ali Kenedid, Sultan
of
Obbia,
who was
determined to keep the Dervishes
at
arms
length. Throughout December 1916 the Dervishes
and
the Mijjertein
were engaged
in
protracted clashes as
the
former tried to
gain a stronghold on
the Mijjertein
coast.
,
These
clashes culminated
in
a major engagement at
Las Anod
in
which
the Mijjertein
"captured
practically
the
whole of
the Dervish
stock
in this
region amounting
to
some
500
camels and many
thousand head
of cattle and
sheep.
Many Dervishes
were
killed
and
the
sur-
vivors
took,
refuge
in the forts".
173
171. C. O. 535/50 Treasury to C. O. 5/4/1917.
172. C. O. 535/47 C. O. to Archer 30/10/1917.
173. C. O. 535/46 Archer to C. O. 2/l/1917.
f
23
In
retaliation,
the Dervishes
attacked
the
northern
Mijjertein,
under
Sultan Osman Mahmud,
and
drove
off a
big herd
of stock.
The
northern
Mijjerteins, however,
chased and overtook
the Dervishes,
recovering all
their
stock.
Archer informed the Colonial Office that
"from
our point of view,
the
existing
hostility
between the Dervishes
and
the Mijjertein is
extremely satisfactory; and
if
shortly we are
to
make a
forward
move,
there
seems
little
chance
that the Mullah
will
this time be
able
to
obtain a refuge
in the
north-eastern cover
of
Africa.
"
174
In February the Dervish
community at
Taleh
suffered yet
another catastrophe when
they
were attacked
by dysentery
which
dissipated the Dervish force
and caused more
defec-
tions.
175
These
reverses and natural
disasters
evidently
eroded
the Dervish
morale
to the
extent
that the Sayyid
was
forced to
organize
bold
raids against
the British
zone,
the
motive
being to
give
the impression, both to
his
enemies and
followers, that the Dervish
movement was
still a
force to
reckon with.
The
other motive was,
obviously,
to
replenish
the Dervish
stock which
had been
depleted by the Mijjertein
raids and
by the drought. On
the 19th May 1917 the Dervishes
made a surprise attack on
Ber, dispersed the
people and seized
their
stock.
The
raid was reported
to Burao the
same
dayp
and
Summers
set
out with
two
companies of
the Camel Corps in
pursuit of
174. Ibid.
175. C. O. 535/46 Intelligence Report for January
and
-February
1917
(Encl.
in Summers to C. O. 12/3/1917).
the
raiders.
The latter
were overtaken at
Wirirs
a small
village
to the
north or
Waridad,
and a sharp exchange
of
fire
ensued$
ending
in the flight
of
the Dervishes
and
recovery of
the
stock
they had
captured.
176
Ten days
later, the Dervishes raided
to the
south of
Gondoweina,
Hillss
west of
the Ain Valley$
captured stock and
killed
a
handful
of people.
Summers
sent
the Camel Corps to
locate
the
main-Dervish
force,,
and one of
the
patrol
parties$
under
Corporal Osman Hersi$
gained contact with
the Dervishes at
Gadleh,
some
15
miles south west of
Garrero$ and opened
fire. In the
engagement which
ensued
the Dervishes
were routed and
defeated$ losing
four
of
their
men and
five
ponies.
The Camel Corps
suffered
no casualties.
177
It
will
be
observed,
therefore, that the Dervish
efforts
to
re-establish
their
military power over certain
areas
in the British-controlled
zone were..
by
and
large.,
unsuccessful.
These intermittent
clashes culminated
in
a major confrontation,
the
most serious since
Shimber
Berriss
in October 1917. The
circumstances
leading to
the
episode were as
follows: On
6th
Octobers information
reached
Burao to the
effect
that
a
force
of
400
Dervishes
were
looting
and raiding
Las Dureh. The Camel Corps
moved out at a strength of
10 British
officers,
347
rifles
and
6
machine guns, under
the
command of
Major Breading.
176.535/47
Summers, O. C. Troops, to Archer 22/5/1917
(Encl.
in Archer to C. O. 25/5/1917).,
177. C. O. 535/47 summers to Archer 29/6/1917
(Encl.
in
Archer to C. O. 18/7/1917).
3
131
The
pursuit of
the Dervishes
was
launched but it
was not
until
9th October
that
a
force
of
300 Dervishes
was con-
tacted
at
Eil Dur Elan, to the
south of
Las Dureh.
The
Dervishes
took
up a strong position on
the hill
sides
and
in the
caves at
the
mouth of
the Endow Pass to
cover
the
withdrawal
of
the looted
stock.
During the five hours
of
fighting
the
machine guns
did tremendous
executiono
and
tipped the balance in favour
of
the British.
The
surviving
Dervishes
cleared out of
the
caves and made
for the hills
of
Gud Anod
where
the Camel Corps did
not
f
eel
inclined
to
venture.
178
In
spite of
the
crumbling power of
the Dervishes,
the Sayyid
seemed
determined
not
to betray this fact to
his
enemies.
The
raids
he
sent against
the British-held
territory have
already
been
attributed,, partlys
to this
motive.
The
other
technique, it
seems, consisted
in
maintaining
his tradition
of challenging
the British
through
correspondence.
In this
exercise,
he
seemed
to
draw his faith
and moral strength
from his belief that
the British
were
in the
process of
losing the War
at
the
hands
of
the Turks. Thus,
whatever setbacks
the Dervishes
might
incuro in the
end
it
would make no
difference
since
the British
were
the
ultimate
losers. This
position was
demonstrated
in
a
letter the Sayyid
wrote
to the British,
just
when
the Dervish fortunes
were at
their lowest
ebb.
This
was
in March 1917
and
the Sayyid
proceeded as
follows:
178. C. O. 535/48 Intelligence Report for September
and
October 1917
(Encls.
in Archer to C. 0.16/11/1917).
I
"I
tell
you, you
fool, by
now you well
know,
and
I know
what
the Turks have done to
you,
and what
the Germans have done to
you, you
the British Government. The
suggestion
is
that I
was weak and
had to look
outside
for
friends;
and
if indeed this
were
true
and
I
had to look for
assistance,
it is because
of
the British
and
the trouble
you
have
given
me.
It is
you who
have joined
with all
the
people of
the
world: with
harlots,
with
wastrels, and with slaves.
Just because
you
are weak
....
It is
a, sign of your weakness.,
this
alliance of yours with
the Somalis,
Jiberti, Mogadisho
people, and sweepers., and
Arabs,
and
Sudanese,
and
kafirs,
and perverts,
and
Yemens,
and
Nubis,
and
Indians
and
Baluchis,
and
French,
and
Russians,
and
Americans,
and
Italians,
and
Serbians,
and
Portuguese,
and
Japanese,
and
Greeks,
and
Cannibals.,
and
Sikhs..
and
Banias.,
and
Moors,,
and
Afghans..
and
Egyptians
......
they
are
strong and
it is because
of your weakness
that
you
have had to
solicit
them
as
does
a
prostitute
... 179
The Sayyid's
other source of encouragement
during the
period of serious
troubles besetting the Dervish
movement, was
the Ogaden
where a
Muslim
personality
named
Kedani
rebelled against
the E thiopian Government
and
declared his intention
of continuing
Lij Yasu's
pan-
Islamic
policies.
By May 1917 Kedani
was
believed to be
on
the best
of
terms
with
the Sayyid,
and a
lot
of propa-
ganda, reminescent of
Lij Yasu's days,
were already
circulating
in the Ogaden
and across
the border into the
British Protectorate.
180
Fortunately for Archer,
who was
already contemplating
the
closure of
the border
and
des-
patching
the Camel Corps to
patrol
the border
area,
Kedani
was
killed in June 1917 during
an
inter-tribal
clash.
181
179. Jardine, The Mad Mullah
of
Somaliland
p.
249.
180. C. O. 535/47 Archer to Thesiger 25/5/1917
(Encl.
in
Archer to C. O. 25/5/1917).
181. C. O. 535/47 Archer to C. O. 30/6/1917.
23L
Machtig's
comment was
that the death
of
Kedani
was
"satisfactory,
so
far
as
Kedani is
concernedo
but is
not
likely that
an
improvement in the
general situation on
the Southern frontier
will result,
in the
absence of control on
the
Abyssinian
side.
11
182
Throughout the first half
of
1918 the British
position
in the Protectorate
continued
to
grow stronger.
In the few
clashes which
took
place
between the Dervishes
and
the British
with
their
allies..
the latter
continued
to have the
upper
hand. On the llth February 1918, for
exampleo a
Dervish force
of
60
encountered some
25 illaloes
at
Bohotleh
and engaged
them for
nearly
3 hours. The
Dervishes
were routed and
driven
off with a
loss
of
6
of
their
men, a rifle and seveal camels.
183
Then
a
few
days later the Dervishes
made a surprise attack on
the
karias
of
the Dolbahanta
at
Garrero, killing
a
dozen
or
so people and capturing
300
camels.
The Camel Corps
set
out
in
pursuit
but this time failed to
gain contact.
184
On the
8th
May
a party of
30 illaloes from Eil Dur Elan
moved out
in
pursuit of a
Dervish force
which
had
made a
small raid near
Geba-Geba, killing
one woman and
taking
a
boy
prisoner.
The illaloes
came up with
the Dervisheso
estimated at
30
riflemen, mar
El-Danano. After
a sharp
exchange of rifle
fire, the Dervishes fled, leaving
seven
of
their
men
dead
and several wounded.
The Camel Corps.
182. Ibid. Minute by Machtig.
183. C. O. 535/51 Intelligence Report for January
and
February
1918
(Encl.
in Summers to C. O. 15/3/1918).
184. Ibid.
sustained no casualties
.
185
The
only substantial
Dervish
achievement
in 1918
was
their
construction of a new
fort
at
Wardair
(Lat.
70 21
Long.
450 4')
in Ethiopian territory. The fort
was com-
pleted
in March
and placed under
Khalif, the Sayyid's
brother,
with
400
Dervishes
under
his
command.
This fort
opened up a new
front forthe Dervish bid to
control
the
grazing grounds
to the
south and south-west of
Burao.
This development
was particularly menacing
for the Ishaak
and
the Habr Yunis
whose stock
depended
on water and
pasture
in this
region.
186
The
completion of
the Wardair
fort
caused some anxiety
in the Colonial Office
which
Machtig
expressed as
follows:
"the
completion of a
fort
at
Wardair
-
south
of
Burao
and well
in Abyssinian territory
-
marks a new and somewhat
disquieting
phase
in
the
situation; new
because hitherto the Mullah
has held
a
line
running
from the Gulf
of
Aden
to
near
Bohotleh;
and
disquieting because it
opens a new
line
of communication
for the Der-
vishes,
and
forces
our
troops
which
face
eastwards,
to
guard
the
south as well.
It is
not
to be
supposed.,
however,, that the Mullah
will make
Wardair
a
base for large
offensive
operations;
he
cannot
have
enough men
for
that.
"
187
Lack
of sufficient men was probably one
important
reason why
the
opportunities afforded
to the Dervishes by
the fort
were not exploited
to the
same extent as was
the
case with
the forts
at
Shimber Berris
and
Jidali. The
most
185. C. O. 535/52 Intelligence Report for May
and
June 1918
(Encl.
in Summers to C. O. 15/3/1918).
186. C. O. 535/51 Summers to C. O. 18/3/1918.
187. Ibid. Minute by Machtig.
2.9
3
important
explanations
however.. lay in the
new and
important developments in the War
situation
towards the
end of
the
year.
In the
middle of
November Germany
surrendered and an armistice was conclud. ed.
Thus,
Britain
could now
turn her
attention
to the Somaliland
problems, *
Archer
requested
that General Hoskins,
who
had been
commanding
in East Africa.,
should proceed via
Berbera for the
purpose of
investigating the
situation
and recommending
to the British Government the
necessary
requirements
for the disposal
of
the Dervish
problem.
Archer's
proposal was accepted, and
Hoskins
arrived at
Berbera
towards the
end of
November to
make
his investi-
gations.
198
Thus,
whatever
luck the Wardair fort had in
store
for the Dervishes
was nipped
in the bud by the
end
of
the
war and
the
subsequent
expedition
which
destroyed,
once and
for
all,
Sayyid Muhammad
Abdille Hassants
Dervish
movement.
188. C. O.
535/52 Archer to C. O.
8/12/1918.