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FEMINIST

THEOLOGY
Copyright 2007 SAGE Publications
(London, Thousand Oaks CA and New Delhi)
http://FTH.sagepub.com
Vol. 15(2): 236-255
DOI: 10.1177/0966735007072034
The Possibility of a Gender-Transcendent God:
Taking Macmurray Forward^
Esther Mclntosh
cedem@leeds.ac.uk
ABSTRACT
This paper borrows from philosopher John Macmurray's insights in order
to advance work in feminist theology relating to perceptions of God. Mac-
murray argues that we cannot have an adequate concept of a personal
God, if our concept of the human person is inadequate. He asserts that we
are persons by virtue of our agency and our personal relationships; hence,
the growth and development of persons requires communities of equals.
Belief in God, then, is an attitude expressed through behaviour that creates
and sustains such communities. As feminist theologians indicate, a 'male'
God is a stumbling block to equality; yet, thealogy remains on the periph-
ery of mainstream academic and Christian circles. Hence, this paper sets
the groundwork for a truly gender-transcendent concept of God, examin-
ing some contemporary language liturgies and employing Macmurray's
portrayal of a supreme agent, in an attempt to resolve the main problems
encountered by inclusive God-language.
Keywords: God, Macmurray, person, liturgy
1.1. Introduction
In this paper, I draw on the feminist critique of patriarchal and androcen-
tric God-language in the Christian tradition and seek a gender-transcen-
dent solution.^ When I refer to God as gender-transcendent I am using
the term gender to encompass biological sex and social construction of
gender. That is, I am suggesting that traditional God language implies
erroneously both that God is necessarily male and stereotypically
masculine. Hence, I argue for genuine gender-transcendence in God-
1. This paper was first presented at The Reimagining Feminist Theologies confer-
ence at Glasgow University.
2. I am grateful to Ursula King for suggesting that I use the term 'gender-transcen-
dent' instead of'gender-neutral'.
Mclntosh The Possibility of a Gender-Transcendent God 237
language, rather than a female or stereotypically feminine conception of
God. I engage with twentieth-century philosopher John Macmurray's
concept of the person, on the grounds that a properly construed concept
of the person is a necessary foundation for a personal understanding
of God. Then, I examine the issue of translation and the strengths and
weaknesses of recent attempts to produce inclusive language liturgies,
concluding that Macmurray's perception of God as a supreme agent
satisfies the feminist critique of traditional God-language and has the
potential to resolve many of the problems incurred by current inclusive
language liturgies.
1.2. Clarifying the Issue
At the outset, we should ask whether there is indeed any need to
attempt to think of God in gender-transcendent terms. The Western
world, at least, has a long tradition of speaking and thinking of God as
male; a tradition which Orthodox Jews and Chri,stians may be unhappy
to question. Moreover, the use of male terminology in Christian liturgy
is given implicit support by Janet Martin Soskice. She argues that fem-
inists can accept the language of fatherhood as a 'mobile symbol',^
without accepting the subordination of women. Contrary to Soskice's
claim, other feminist theologians have argued that accepting male lan-
guage is inseparably bound up with the acceptance of male dominance.
This stance must be taken seriously. Rosemary Radford Ruether and
Judith Plaskow, amongst others, are adamant that women will con-
tinue to be oppressed within the Jewish and Christian religions, as
long as our concept of God is one that emphasizes male dominance.*
Mary Daly, for example, famously stated 'Since God is male, the male
is God'.^ The logical form of this statement is invalid, and I suspect that,
in practice, the situation is the other way around. It is not the maleness
of God that leads to patriarchy, rather, as Daly herself suggests, patri-
archal systems stress male supremacy in their divinities.^ This is not to
deny, however, as feminist scholars have attested, that the construction
of a male God legitimizes the suppression of women.^
3. Janet Martin Soskice, 'Can a Feminist Call God "Father"?', in Teresa Elwes (ed.).
Women's Voices: Essays in Contemporary Feminist Theology (London: Marshall Pickering,
1992), pp. 15-29 (26).
4. Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and Cod-Talk (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983);
Judith Plaskow, Standing Again at Sinai (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991).
5. Mary Daly, 'The Qualitative Leap Beyond Patriarchal Religion', Quest 1.4 (1975),
pp. 20-40 (21).
6. Mary Daly, Beyond God the Father (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), p. 13.
7. For example, Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk.
238 Feminist Theology
So, we must consider the possibility of reconstructing human
conceptions of God in such a way as to promote the equal dignity of
women and men. In so doing, our conception must be philosophically
grounded, if it is to avoid being vacuous, and it is in this respect that
Macmurray's work furthers the feminist cause. Before engaging with
this we must first rule out the possibility that God is, in fact, male. On
the one hand, if, as a matter of fact, God is male (as some would still
wish to assert), then there is little that can he done to rectify the situ-
ation. This, however, seems to be a peculiarly conservative point of
view, since the term God implies a being who does not have a human
body and so is neither male nor female (at least, not in the human
sense). On the other hand, if all talk of God is metaphorical, as Sallie
McFague suggests, then the image of God as male can be revised.^ A
substantial amount of work has been done to establish a thealogy; a
feminine and feminist concept of the divine. Naomi Goldenberg and
Carol Christ are particularly noteworthy in this respect, but theal-
ogy remains on the periphery of mainstream academic and Christian
circles.^ Just as male metaphors exclude women's experience and iden-
tity, the Goddess may do likewise for men. Moreover, if a male God
legitimizes male power, it seems that the Goddess could lead to the
legitimizing of female superiority. Consequently, assuming that what
we mean by 'God' is something or someone without the female or the
male biology of humans, I believe that the equalizing of women and
men in religion requires a gender-transcendent concept of God. In
Grace Jantzen's words, we need a 'creative alternative'" and, assum-
ing that talk of a personal God borrows language from talk of our-
selves as persons, we need to correct our concept of the person before
we can conceive correctly of God.
2.1. Macmurray on the Person
Feminist scholarship has done much to highlight the oppression that
women have suffered as a result of dualisms. Nevertheless, the ideol-
ogy informing stereotypes of the feminine and the masculine persists,
especially within religion. Just as soldiers are trained to stop thinking
of the enemy as a person, in order to be able to engage in warfare, much
8. Sallie McFague, Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language (Phila-
delphia: Fortress Press, 1982).
9. Naomi Goldenberg, 'The Return of the Goddess: Psychoanalytic Reflections on
the Shift From Theology to Thealogy', Studies in Religion 16.1 (1987), pp. 37-52; Carol P.
Christ, Laughter of Aphrodite (New York: HarperRow, 1987).
10. Grace M. Jantzen, Becoming Divine: Towards a Feminist Philosophy of Religion
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), p. 25.
Mclntosh The Possibility of a Gender-Transcendent God 239
gender discrimination and religious intolerance can be linked to inad-
equate perceptions of other persons. For the most part and for obvious
reasons, feminist scholarship has concentrated on exposing the abuse
of women, rather than on formulating a theoretical definition of the
whole person.
John Macmurray's critique of mind-body dualism, in particular,
presents us with an alternative to traditional patterns of thought that
feminist scholarship may benefit from. Traditionally, the equation of
the male with the mind and of the female with the body has been seen
as a good reason for men to dominate women; that is, women are
said to be emotional and lacking the rationality which men possess.
Macmurray, however, overturns these dualisms, reuniting mind
and body and, potentially, male and female. We need to tease out
Macmurray's method and meaning here before engaging in a critical
assessment of it.
Essentially Macmurray's dissatisfaction with Cartesian dualism is
an empirical one. He insists that our lived experience is of embodi-
ment and of other persons." Grace Jantzen, amongst others, has said
much the same thing.'^ While Descartes identifies existence with
thought, Macmurray suggests that thinking is just one of the activities
that persons engage in; we do not always, or even very often, think
first and then act. Consequently, it is action rather than thought that
is primary. Furthermore, since action requires something or someone
that is acted on, the existence of that which is other-than-the-self is
confirmed. Macmurray states:
When I act I modify the world. Action is causally effective, even if it fails
of the particular effect that is intended. This implies that the Self is part
of the world in which it acts and in dynamic relation with the rest of the
world."
In other words, when we theorize from the standpoint of agency (action)
instead of from the standpoint of thought, we are no longer committed
to solipsism; on the contrary, we find ourselves in the midst of self-
other relations.
While Macmurray's definition of action is opaque at times, he does
put forward a philosophical defirution of the person which enables us
to assert that relationality is the fundamental experience of all persons.
Likewise, much feminist scholarship begins with the assertion that
women's experience is one of connection rather than isolation and com-
11. John Macmurray, The Self as Agent (London: Faber, reissued, 1995), p. 11.
12. Grace Jantzen, 'Connection or Competition: Identity and Personhood in Chris-
tian Ethics', Studies in Christian Ethics 5.1 (1992), pp. 1-20.
13. Macmurray, The Self as Agent, p. 91.
240 Feminist Theology
petition." What Macmurray adds here is an explanation of why this is
the case and one which includes all persons; thus, reconciling female
and male role divisions.
In addition, an essential aspect of Macmurray's redressing of the
mind-body split is the rebalancing of reason and emotion. Tradition-
ally, the emotions have been regarded as chaotic, unruly and in need
of suppression by reason. On the contrary, Macmurray argues that
the emotions can be reasonable. He states that 'feelings can be ratio-
nal or irrational in precisely the same way as thoughts, through the
correctness or incorrectness of their reference to reality'." Just as ratio-
nal action refers to action in terms of the nature of the other, rational
emotion is emotion that is appropriate to the nature of the object.
Again there is some opacity here. While the idea that emotions can
be appropriate to objects appears coherent, it does not seem that we will
always be in a position to know whether or not our emotions fall into
this category. Even so, since the emotions have been equated with the
female and reason with the male, the theoretical underpinning of their
reunification is one that feminists would do well to adopt. Ruether, for
one, has pointed out the manner in which traditional views on reason
and emotion have been closely linked to the subordination of women
by men. In an attempt to put paid to this view, she insists that men are
not inherently more intelligent than women and neither are women
inherently more loving than men.^^
Moreover, not only is the existence of the other a given when we start
with agency, it is also a fact of human survival. From conception we
depend on another person for our existence. As we grow to adulthood
we do not become independent heings, but interdependent persons;
we live as members of communities. This does not mean that the indi-
vidual is obscured by the community; rather, the interdependent rela-
tion is one in which the other person acts both as a support and as
opposition. According to Macmurray, there is a necessary rhythm of
withdrawal and return, giving all parties the opportunity to assert
individuality in the context of association.^^ In terms similar to Buber's,
Macmurray states:
human life, even in its most individual elements is a common life; and
human behaviour carries always, in its inherent structure, a reference to
14. Cf. Jantzen, 'Connection or Competition: Identity and Personhood in Christian
Ethics'.
15. John Macmurray, Reason and Emotion (London: Faber, reissued, 1995), p. 11.
16. Rosemary Radford Ruether, New Woman/New Earth (New York: Seabury,
1975).
17. John Macmurray, Persons in Relation (London: Faber, reissued, 1995), pp. 86-105.
Mclntosh The Possibility of a Gender-Transcendent Cod 241
the personal Other...the unit of personal existence is not the individual,
but two persons in personal relation...we are persons not by individual
right, but in virtue of our relation to one another... The unit of the personal
is not the 'I', but the 'You and I'.^^
In other words, we need each other to be ourselves. Hence, while the
fact of our coexistence would be grounds enough for seeking to harmo-
nize relations, Macmurray also claims that positively motivated rela-
tionships are necessary for human flourishing. Human beings grow as
persons through the expression of their nature; their ability to exercise
agency. When we act to prevent others from doing this our relations
are hierarchical, impersonal and negatively motivated. A fully posi-
tive personal relation is one in which all persons involved are free and
equal. Freedom implies the freedom to exercise agency, at whatever
level this is possible for the individual concerned.^' Equality implies the
elimination of superiority and dependence on a personal level, despite
functional inequalities.
This account is just what is needed in order to assert female-male
equality without pretending that there are no differences whatsoever.
Furthermore, Macmurray argues that equal relations are inclusive rather
than exclusive. That is, since equality is hased merely on common human-
ity, the intention to extend it to one human is irrational unless it includes
the intention to extend equality to all persons. When humans unite on
this basis, Macmurray explains, they are treated as persons; this is what
contemporary feminism wants for women and men.
Clearly, we can and often do engage with others as means to our
ends, but when we use them as instruments in this way, we do not,
Macmurray contends, relate to them as persons. Obviously, it is neces-
sary and acceptable to use others in a functional manner in a variety of
daily encounters, at work and at home; Macmurray is not saying that we
should never relate in this way and neither is feminism. On the contrary,
Macmurray asserts that the I-it relation is an essential component of the
I-Thou relation. Nevertheless, if a relationship is solely an I-it relation,
the other is treated as a subordinate.^" Echoing Kant then, moral action,
for Macmurray, involves caring for others as ends in themselves, which
means respecting their capacity for agency. The importance of this sort
18. Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 61; Martin Buber, J and Thou (trans. R.G.
Smith; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1937).
19. In other words, 'agency' does not mean rational capacity; it is one's ability to
act in terms of the nature of the other, whatever level of disability or ability is present.
For a fuller treatment of Macmurray's concept of the person in relation to disability,
see E. Mclntosh and J. Swinton, 'Persons in RelationJohn Macmurray and the Care of
Persons with Profound Learning Disability', Theology Today 57.2 0uly 2000), pp. 175-84.
20. This is not, then, an idealistic account of universal friendship.
242 Feminist Theology
of mutuality is an idea that is supported by psychoanalysis, and it has
been taken up by contemporary theologians such as Alistair McFadyen,
Anthony Thiselton and Frank Kirkpatrick, as well as feminist theolo-
gians such as Margaret Farley and Grace Jantzen.^^
2.2. Macmurray's Cod
We do not have to look far to find examples of people, especially
women, who have rarely been treated as ends and so, in one way or
another, have not been able to develop as whole persons; this claim
seems uncontentious. Moreover, Macmurray suggests that philos-
ophy which starts with the standpoint of agency, rather than that of
thought, 'moves steadily in the direction of a belief in God'.^^ Scientific
views of the world as evolutionary process are abstractions, since their
perception of the world is of events, rather than actions. As agents,
however, comprehending the unity of the world includes the percep-
tion of actions in that world. According to Macmurray, we cannot think
of the history of the world as one long event, we must think of the
world as one action. The reason for this is that, if the history of the
world were one long event, this would exclude actions and, yet, we do
act. Thus, he supposes that in order to think of the unity of the world
coherently, we must think of the history of action as if all agents were
intending the same outcome. Hence, Macmurray postulates a supreme
agent, whose act is the world and whose intention for the world is the
one which human agents ultimately follow.^^ Macmurray also argues
that this God-figure must be the creator of the world, on the grounds
that persons are part of Nature and depend on it for their survival;
thus, the supreme agent must represent the communion of humans and
non-humans. This aspect pre-empts the work of ecofeminism and its
21. Alistair L McFadyen, The Gall to Personhood (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990); Anthony C. Thiselton, Interpreting God and the Post-Modern Se//(Edinburgh:
T. & T. Clark, 1995); Frank G. Kirkpatrick, The Ethics ofGommunity (Oxford: Blackwell,
2001); Margaret A. Farley, 'Feminist Theology and Bioethics', in Lois K. Daly (ed.).
Feminist Theological Ethics: A Reader (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press,
1994), pp. 192-212 (197); Jantzen, 'Connection or Competition: Identity and Person-
hood in Christian Ethics'. Nevertheless, the first three are closely linked with trinitar-
ian theology, with the first two persons of the Trinity, at least, being regarded as male
and referred to in male terms. In addition, the relations of the Trinity, despite attempts
to assert the equality of the three persons, are understood frequently in hierarchical
termsa model which is often used in support of male heads of households, legitimiz-
ing the subordination of women.
22. Macmurray, The Self as Agent, p. 221.
23. Macmurray, The Self as Agent, pp. 220-22. Humans and the supreme agent intend
human flourishing.
Mclntosh The Possibility of a Cender-Transcendent Cod 243
moves to redress the traditional dualism of humans and Nature. Like
Ruether and McFague, Macmurray emphasizes the need for humans to
co-operate with and care for the natural world rather than dominating
and exploiting it.
Similarly, the supreme agent, as representation of the unity of
human actions, is the figure in whom person-to-person relations are
harmonized.^"* We have already seen that the agent-self exists only
in relation to the other. Human effort to promote positive relations,
however, lacks meaning unless we have a vision of a universal com-
munity. That is, we can only envisage universal community, and work
towards achieving it, through the image of an overarching source and
sustainer of that unity. Thus, our intention to advance free and equal
relationships is sustained by the image of a universal personal other.
For the symbolical universal other to encompass all persons, through
time, this figure must he hoth the founder of the group and its eternal
leader. Macmurray states that:
The necessity is...for a ritual head, a representative of the unity of the
community as a personal reality, so that each member can think his [or
her] membership of the community through his [or her] relation to this
person, who represents and embodies the intention which constitutes the
general fellowship.'^^
2.3. Assessment of Macmurray's 'Cod'
Although most of Macmurray's work pre-dates feminist theology, I
will argue that his account of a universal other is beneficial to femi-
nist theology; primarily, because it is gender-transcendent. According
to Macmurray, God is 'a necessary hypothesis';^* if this were true, we
would at least have a foundation (of sorts) for discussing the com-
position of the hypothesis, but the veracity of Macmurray's claim is
questionable. He bases the claim on the presupposition that, when we
start with the self as agent, the existence of the other is a given. While
24. Macmurray speaks frequently of relationship in rather than luith God, and
he defines the religious person as the person who advances community. Macmurray,
Persons in Relation, p. 165.
25. Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 164. There seems to be a tension in Macmur-
ray's work between God as a formal construct (merely that which is necessary to think
the unity of action) and a substantial God (creator and leader). He states 'luhat the Other
is and what 1 am remain problematical'. Macmurray, Persons in Relation, pp. 209-210
(author's italics).
26. John Macmurray, 'Letter to Richard Roberts', 22nd July 1925 (unpublished).
Macmurray would claim that those who do not hypothesize 'God' are starting with the
standpoint of thought; this leads to the disjunction of faith and reason and so to atheism.
Macmurray, The Self as Agent, p. 19.
244 Feminist Theology
this presumption is credible, I am not convinced that it verifies the
necessity of God as a hypothesis. Moreover, even if it does, it reveals
something about our psychology; it does not necessarily signify God's
existence, and yet, if this is a universal feature of our psychology, it
may well point toward an actually existing God, but not necessar-
ily. Even so, Macmurray avoids debating both the question: 'does
God exist?' and the traditional proofs that answer it, on the grounds
that they start from the standpoint of thought. From the perspective
of action, he asserts, 'There is...no question of proving existence, but
only of determining its character'.^^ This statement is less satisfactory
when it is applied to God than when it refers to the self. Essentially
Macmurray's emphasis on agency and relationality is more intelligible
than Cartesian dualism, and, even though I am not wholly persuaded
by his argument for theism, his account of God as a logical possibility
is commendable.^*
In effect his is an undogmatic or natural theology, insofar as it side-
steps the usual dichotomy of faith and reason. Macmurray maintains
that experience of God does not require special revelation; rather, God
is apprehended as 'that infinite person in which our finite human rela-
tionships have their ground and their being'.^' As with Hume, Mac-
murray offers a naturalistic explanation of both nature worship and
ancestor worship, and claims that monotheistic and universal religions
are an improvement on polytheistic and tribal religions, since they are
more able to represent the universal experience of human interrela-
tion. What Macmurray is proposing is the conception of the universe
as personal, but he is not advocating pantheism.^^ A finite agent, he
asserts, is immanent in existence, while transcending it; this is true of
the infinite agent also.
In this respect Macmurray's portrayal of God is similar to the account
given in Ruether's more recent work where she speaks of God as life
27. Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 214.
28. Plantinga has used possible worlds to argue that if God exists in a possible
world, then God exists in all possible worlds and so God necessarily exists in this world.
However, Le Poidevin and Mackie seek to show that God does not necessarily exist in
this world, since such a being would have to inhabit all possible worlds, but a being in
space and time could only inhabit one (while a being outside space and time does not
exist in any world). Alvin Plantinga, TIte Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1974); Robin Le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism (London: Routledge, 1996); J.L. Mackie,
TIte Miracle ofTlteism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
29. John Macmurray, TIte Structure of Religious Experience (London: Faber, 1936), p. 81.
30. David Hume, Dialogues Goncerning Natural Religion (ed. Martin Bell; London:
Penguin, 1990).
31. Macmurray, Persons in Relation, pp. 214, 223.
Mclntosh The Possibility of a Cender-Transcendent Cod 245
s.^^ Such a concept is capable of retaining both male and female
imagery, although the intention is to abandon traditional gendered
distinctions and think of God in gender-transcendent and/or gender-
inclusive terms. In my opinion, a weakness in Ruether's account is her
talk of the cosmos as God's body. As with McFague's version, such
language suggests either that we can destroy God by destroying the
world, or that mind-body dualism is still present in the being of God.
In the former case, God's existence is both reduced to the existence of
the world and, potentially, to human control, which seems to limit God
somewhat. In the latter case, it seems that it is only the existence of God's
mind that is independent of the existence of the world, suggesting that
mind and body are separable; a dualism which feminist theology seeks
to overcome. Perhaps Macmurray's idea of the supreme agent is less
substantial than traditional conceptions of God, hut it seems to resolve
mind-body dualism more thoroughly and so, in this respect, seems to
reflect more closely the meaning of the term God.^^
3.1. Objections to Change
An initial objection to this project may be that there is no need to
change the language of fatherhood; we accept that it is metaphori-
cal and that what we mean by 'God' is neither male nor female. Yet,
as Jane Williams has stated: 'One of the many results of the imagi-
native stranglehold of the Father/Son imagery is that it allows us to
believe that God is "really" male'.^"* Alternatively, it may be argued
that all we need do is recapture the female imagery present in the
biblical text, but this approach is inadequate for two main reasons.
First, as Ruether has argued, it is not sufficient to add female imagery
to an already powerful male image, since this does nothing to rebal-
ance patriarchal hierarchy; the female images remain additional and
subordinate to their male counterparts.^^ This leads into the second
inadequacy, as pointed out by Wainwright and Maitland,^^ which is
32. Rosemary Radford Ruether, 'Ecofeminism and Healing Ourselves, Healing the
Earth', Feminist Theology 9 (May 1995), pp. 51-62. Ruether and Macmurray also have
compatible views of immortality as consciousness/personality respectively.
33. Macmurray is reluctant to say that God is a material being. John Macmurray,
'Letter to Walter Jeffko', 13 August 1966 (unpublished).
34. Jane Williams, 'The Doctrine of the Trinity: A Way Forward for Feminists', in
Teresa Elwes (ed.). Women's Voices: Essays in Contemporary Feminist Theology (London:
Marshall Pickering, 1992), pp. 31-44 (38).
35. Rosemary Radford Ruether, 'The Female Nature of God: A Problem in Contem-
porary Religious Life', Concilium 143.3 (1981), pp. 61-66 (66).
36. Elaine Wainwright, 'A New Daring of the Religious Imagination: "God" in
246 Feminist Tlteology
that, far from challenging gender stereotyping, the oft cited image of
a hen gathering her chicks,^^ intended to appease feminists, suggests
both that nurturing is a female characteristic and that mothering is a
woman's primary purpose.
Hence, we must accept that the language of father, son and spirit
allows the Trinity (at least in its first two persons) to be imagined as
male (and, in the economic Trinity, as a hierarchy that is male at the
top); thus, alienating women and legitimizing their subordination in
religion and society. Consequently, the future of Christianity and the
deconstruction of patriarchy would be enhanced with a much wider
acceptance of alternative terminology. At the outset, I suggested that
the Goddess, while serving women well, reverses rather than resolves
the gender imbalance; the same problem arises with the use of the terms
mother, daughter and spirit.
In response it may be claimed that the terms father, son and spirit
are the best fit; in fact, it was Jesus who called God Abba. Yet, as Ful-
lerton acknowledges: 'the Holy Spirit encourages us in our liturgi-
cal weakness to make our address to God really become our address
to God, not a word-perfect reproduction of Jesus' address to God'.^*
Despite this promising realization though, Fullerton goes on to state:
'Except for its importation of an illicit masculinity into the life of God,
the language of "Father, Son and Holy Spirit" scarcely bears improve-
ment'.^' This statement betrays Fullerton's failure to grasp the signifi-
cance of the 'impartation of an illicit masculinity into the life of God',
which, as feminist theologians argue, isolates women and supports
male dominance.
3.2. Changing Liturgy
In the continuing struggle for sexual equality then, the language used
to refer to God in liturgy represents a particular problem, and one for
which there is no easy solution.*" Arguments for liturgical reform are
not new; for example, Gail Ramshaw and Marjorie Procter-Smith have
Feminist Theology', Goncilium 2001.1 (2001), pp. 94-103 (98); Sara Maitland, 'Ways of
Relating', in Ann Loades (ed.). Feminist Theology: A Reader (London: SPCK, 1996), pp.
148-57.
37. Mt. 23.37; Lk. 13.34.
38. J. Andrew Fullerton, 'God by Any Other Name?', Modern Theology 18.2 (2002),
pp. 171-81 (177) (author's italics).
39. Fullerton, 'God by Any Other Name?', p. 179.
40. I am referring to liturgy in the broad sense of fixed forms of public worship
employed in the Christian religion (including lectionaries of scriptural readings, prayers
and litanies, hymns and so on).
Mclntosh The Possibility of a Gender-Transcendent God 247
heen stressing the need for feminist liturgies for some time.''^ In particu-
lar, Procter-Smith claims that Christian identity is reinforced through
the liturgy heing used, and, since God is portrayed as male, there is very
little for women to identify with. Moreover, she notes that scriptural
texts collected in lectionaries hardly ever refer to female characters, and,
when they do, the reference to women is thoroughly negative. Never-
theless, at times female characters play a positive role in the scriptural
narrative; hence, the prohlem is that those compiling lectionaries fail to
see the significance of the female characters and so ignore them. Yet, on
the grounds that the purpose of compiling a lectionary is to select the
most appropriate and relevant scriptural texts, she contends that this
should lead to the inclusion of positive female figures and the exclusion
of texts promoting the suhordination or the wickedness of women.''^
Similarly, Janet Walton's examination of the Roman Catholic Liturgy
and its use of male language both for God and for human heings sug-
gests that God is known as male and experienced hy men, which seri-
ously undermines women."*^ Thus, Walton challenges the Church to see
feminism as a gift; a means hy which to include women's experiences
as part of the Christian life and to halt the traditions of a Church that
views women as inferior.'"
Serious responses to the challenges set forth by Procter-Smith and
Walton will seek to produce liturgies that are shaped hy the Christian
theological tradition and informed hy contemporary linguistic anal-
ysis. Hence, any successful challenge to traditional liturgies will he
grounded in an understanding of the role of liturgy and the nature of
translation. David Power states succinctly that liturgy is 'the expres-
sion in living and lively form of the church's faith and communion with
God'."*^ It seems that the terms living and lively are of central signifi-
cance here; that is, if communion with God is expressed through the
liturgy, the language of the liturgy needs to represent all those who use
it, in their given time and place. For women to he included in the medi-
41. Gail Ramshaw, God Beyond Gender: Feminist Christian God-Language (Minneapo-
lis: Fortress Press, 1985); Marjorie Procter-Smith, Praying With Our Eyes Open: Engender-
ing Feminist Liturgical Prayer (Nashville; Abingdon Press, 1995).
42. Marjorie Procter-Smith, 'Images of Women in the Lectionary', in Elisabeth
SchUssler Fiorenza (ed.). The Power of Naming (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books; London:
SCM Press, 1996), pp. 175-86.
43. Janet Walton, 'Ecclesiastical and Feminist Blessing', in Elisabeth Schussler
Fiorenza (ed.). The Power of Naming (New York: Orbis Books; London: SCM Press, 1996),
pp. 284-91 (286).
44. Walton, 'Ecclesiastical and Feminist Blessing', pp. 287-91.
45. David N. Power, 'The Experience of God in Christian Liturgy', Concilium 2001.1
(2001), pp. 11-16 (11).
248 Feminist Theology
ation of God, therefore, God needs to be referred to in female terms,
and yet the attempt to speak of the female divine is fraught with diffi-
culties. In Janet Morley's collection of inclusive language prayers, she
includes references to God as mother, on the basis that women need
female images with which to identify.''*' While the term mother may
appear to be the female equivalent of the term father and, as Wain-
wright and Johnson maintain, may be a necessary corrective to a tradi-
tion that images God as father, it places undue emphasis on the biology
of women, valorizing their capacity for motherhood and marginalizing
the infertile and childless.'"' Nevertheless, it would be rather cumber-
some to refer to God as 'she or he' every time the name arose, and so
the need for gender-transcendent terminology is evident.
3.3. Translation and Reception
Before assessing recent attempts to produce inclusive language litur-
gies, widespread resistance to such changes calls for the nature and
purpose of translation to be teased out. Translation has two main forms:
either a word-for-word literal translation; or, modern idioms may be
used so that the sense, but not the words, of the original are expressed.
With reference to the Bible, the New King James Version and the New
Revised Standard Version are attempts at literal translation, whereas the
New International Version: Inclusive Language Edition (also published as
Today's New International Version) aims to modernize the language of
its sources. E. Earle Ellis refers to literal translation as 'formal equiva-
lence' and to modernized translation as 'dynamic equivalence'.** There
are pros and cons with both forms of translation. On the one hand,
dynamic equivalence allows for a contemporary understanding and
feminist concerns to be incorporated, through the elimination of unin-
telligible and androcentric language, but such modernization means
that the portrayal of an ancient culture is largely lost. On the other
hand, while formal equivalence reproduces the ancient culture, it also
retains textual ambiguities and limits contemporary understanding.
In his assessment of these two types of translation, Ellis states: 'The
problem with the TNIV [Today's New International Version] is not only
its feminist predilection but more significantly its commitment to the
46. Janet Morley, All Desires Known (London: SPCK, expanded edn, 1992), pp.
91-92.
47. Wainwright, 'A New Daring of the Religious Imagination', p. 98; Elizabeth A.
Johnson, She Wlw Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse (New York:
Crossroad, 1992), pp. 47-57.
48. E. Earle Ellis, 'Dynamic Equivalence Theory, Feminist Ideology and Three
Recent Bible Translations', The Expository Times 115.1 (October 2003), pp. 7-12.
Mclntosh The Possibility of a Gender-Transcendent God 249
theory of "dynamic equivalence" translation'.*' First, Ellis is referring
to feminist predilection as a prohlem and, secondly, he is expressing
dissatisfaction with the nature of dynamic equivalence translations. In
my opinion there are a number of problems with Ellis' point of view.
It is irrational to oppose dynamic equivalence translations per se,
so long as formal equivalence translations co-exist. While hihlical
scholars ought to seek out formal equivalence translations and their
sources, it makes sense for others to use the most intelligihle transla-
tions availahle to them. Perhaps only formal equivalence translations
are referred to properly as translations, while dynamic equivalence
texts are referred to more accurately as paraphrases, hut this does not
detract from the value of the latter. From a pastoral point of view, if
the concern is to assist the laity in understanding the intention and
meaning of the hihlical text, dynamic equivalence translations will he
more useful than formal equivalence ones. Moreover, since even those
versed in hihlical Greek and Hehrew dehate linguistic amhiguities in
sources, and/or cannot agree on the original sources of the biblical
material, we cannot assume that the language of a formal equiva-
lence text is a word-for-word translation of the original. In addition,
Ellis' view of feminist predilection as a prohlem hetrays his failure to
understand the concerns of feminism in relation to patriarchal and
androcentric scripture. For example, use of a generic 'he' in reference
to humanity is not acceptahle hecause it is not generic; it excludes
and marginalizes women. Consequently, hihlical texts that do not use
inclusive language serve to alienate and suhordinate women, hut Ellis
does not see this as a prohlem.
On the whole it seems that Ellis' hankering after formal equivalence
translations rests on the mistaken presumption that texts are static and
that the meaning of the text will be imparted to the reader if we pre-
serve the words. On the contrary, as Silvia Arzt argues, no text is a
'thing in itself received passively hy the reader; rather, the reception
of the text is a creative process such that the meaning gleaned from it
is affected hy the reader's social, cultural and psychological circum-
stances.^" In other words, as Arzt contends, reading is gendered, and
the use of exclusive language renders textual understanding more dif-
ficult for women.^' Hence, exclusively male references to humanity and
a lack of positive female characters reinforce damaging gender stereo-
types and offer little for women to identify with. Moreover, the use of
49. Ellis, 'Dynamic Equivalence Theory', p. 9.
50. Silvia Arzt, 'Reading the Bible is a Gendered Act', Feminist Theology 29 (2002),
pp. 32-39 (32).
51. Arzt, 'Reading the Bible is a Gendered Act', pp. 33-34.
250 Feminist Theology
male language and imagery in reference to God further supports the
view that the female is inferior to the male.
Most of the research into God images assumes that the images are
internally constructed, as opposed to having an external source (God),
and yet God is imagined predominantly as male.^^ Despite years of
feminist critique and claims from feminist opposition that 'he' can be
used of God without implying maleness, the evidence is that feminist
concerns are still peripheral, while androcentric God-imagery sustains
its primacy. Clearly, the theological debate over the inerrancy of scrip-
ture, especially in relation to its portrayal of God, is a formidable chal-
lenge in the efforts to modernize sacred texts. Nevertheless, as Robert
Knowles Wallace reveals, even the use of inclusive language hymns is
resisted in general and deemed acceptable for women only.^^ However,
if it is women alone who have access to inclusive language hymns, the
assumption that women's concerns are of little importance to the wider
community remains unchallenged. By contrast, Alison Leonard argues
that imagining the female divine is a necessity (although not suffi-
cient in itself) both for women to achieve equality and for twenty-first
century spirituality to be moral.^*
According to Ann-Marie Priest, the French feminist philosopher.
Luce Irigaray goes a step further than proposing female imagery for
God; she contends that God is woman.^' When Irigaray makes this
claim, she is referring to the otherness of woman in relation to man,
and she is comparing this with the otherness of God in relation to
humanity. Thus, while Irigaray argues that 'woman' needs to be freed
from the patriarchal language and culture that obscure her, feminist
theology proposes that 'God' also needs to be freed from the patriar-
chal language and culture that imagine the divine as male.^* Similarly,
while Irigaray opposes the dissolution of the otherness of 'woman',
it is my contention that preserving the otherness of God requires
52. Mark A. Kunkel, Stephen Cook, David S. Meshel, Donald Daughtry and Anita
Hauenstein, 'God Images: A Concept Map', Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion
38.2 (1999), pp. 193-202 (201); see also Simone A. De Roos, Jurjen Iedema and Siebren
Miedema, 'Effects of Mothers' and Schools' Religious Denomination on Preschool
Children's God Concepts', Journal of Beliefs and Values 24.2 (August 2003), pp. 165-81
(179).
53. Robert Knowles Wallace, Moving Toivard Emancipatory Language (Lanham:
Scarecrow Press, 1999), pp. 241-42.
54. Alison Leonard, 'Journey Towards the Goddess', Feminist Theology 12.1 (2003),
pp. 11-35 (11).
55. Ann-Marie Priest, 'Woman as God, God as Woman: Mysticism, Negative
Theology, and Luce Irigaray', The Journal of Religion 83.1 Qanuary 2003), pp. 1-23 (3).
56. Luce Irigaray, This Sex Winch Is Not One (trans. C. Porter with C. Burke; Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 134.
Mclntosh The Possibility of a Gender-Transcendent God 251
gender-transcendent language. Hence, a liturgy which refers to God
as 'he' fails to escape the patriarchal hias of tradition, hut one which
refers to God only as 'she', despite operating as a necessary correc-
tive to centuries of exclusively male language, serves to exclude men
and remains marginalized. Most attempts to address feminist con-
cerns seem to favour the inclusion of female language alongside male
language, hut even these attempts are failing to hecome mainstream
and/or are met with fierce critique. Consequently, although the inclu-
sion of female images alongside male ones is a step in the right direc-
tion, I am asserting that it does not go far enough, since it gives the
impression that female images exist merely as additions or alterna-
tives to patriarchal ones.
3.4. Inclusive Language Liturgies
When the United States National Council of Churches introduced its
inclusive language lectionary in the 1980s, it made no attempt to replace
the official lectionary in use and the reaction to it was negative.^^ Simi-
larly, the Church of England's contemporary language version of its
hook of Common Worship is offered merely as an option, and it still
uses male language for God.^^ If, however, it is legitimate to use inclu-
sive language to express the intention of scripture (hoth in reference to
humanity and to God) and the inclusion of women is taken seriously
then inclusive language lectionaries ought to he used. As Patrick Miller
points out, there are no rational grounds for assuming that traditional
terminology, while familiar, is any more intelligihle or appropriate
than are modernized and less familiar terms.^' In addition, resistance
to new terminology may he hound up with an assumption that tradi-
tional images are hoth hihlically and theologically accurate, hut this is
not necessarily the case; furthermore, many images arising out of femi-
nist concerns draw on hihlical and theological scholarship.
The Church of Scotland's hook of Common Order {CO), according
to Kathryn Greene-McCreight, successfully eliminates trinitarian hier-
archy, hut only hy resorting to the gender stereotypes of father and
mother.^" Moreover, her most damning critique of the God of GO is that
57. See Patrick D. Miller, Jr, 'The Inclusive Language Lectionary', Tlieology Today
41.1 (April 1984), pp. 26-33.
58. The Archbishops' Gouncil of the Church of England, Common Worship, 2000-
2002. Church House Publishing, <http://www.cofe.anglican.org/commonworship/>
(Accessed 31 March 2004).
59. Miller, 'The Inclusive Language Lectionary', p. 33.
60. Kathryn Greene-McCreight, 'What's the Story? The Doctrine of God in Common
Order and the Book of Common Worship', in Bryan Spinks and Iain Torrance (eds.). To
252 Feminist Theology
'this God is nice'." That is, in its attempt to address feminist concerns,
CO has lost any sense of the otherness of God, thereby representing
God in a rather uninspiring manner.
It is, then, no surprise that inclusive language liturgies are not widely
used; however, failed or inadequate attempts are not sufficient grounds
for abandoning the enterprise. As Diann Neu claims, a church which
is theologically soimd is one that abandons patriarchy and addresses
the whole community in and through its liturgy.''^ Thus, if we seek
to use gender-transcendent terminology, instead of placing female
images alongside the traditional ones, we have two clear options; we
either depersonalize or neuter (desexualize) God. Non-personal images
from Nature that have hiblical support, such as a dove or fire, can he
used to refer to God in non-personal terms. Nevertheless, the use of
natural images in reference to God risks suggesting either pantheism or
animism, contrary to the beliefs of the Christian tradition. Alternatively,
we can avoid referring to God as a person by emphasizing God's other-
ness and referring to God in abstract terms; for example, Paul Tillich's
depiction of God as being.''^ However, such abstraction can be overly
detached and, hence, meaningless; furthermore, there is strong support
in the Christian tradition for conceiving of God as a personal God.
In my opinion it is theologically preferable to pursue the option of
neutering God; after all, the claim that God is not actually male and
transcends gender is not contentious. Sallie McFague's work on God as
lover and friend (but not her account of God as mother), represents one
method for achieving this." However, a weakness in McFague's por-
trayal, as highlighted by Rebecca Oxford-Carpenter, is that it leaves no
room for awe.^^ This seems to be a fair criticism inasmuch as McFague's
account loses a sense of the otherness of God. Like McFague, Oxford-
Carpenter proposes that we use multiple metaphors, which allow for
the inclusion of female and male imagery.^^ While no single metaphor
will be adequate alone, my concern with this approach is that the female
Glorify God: Essays on Modern Reformed Liturgy (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1999), pp.
99-114.
61. Greene-McCreight, 'What's the Story?', p. 114.
62. Diann Neu, 'Our Name is Church: Catholic-Christian Feminist Liturgies', in
Elisabeth Schlissler Fiorenza (ed.). The Power of Naming (MaryknoU, NY: Orbis Books;
London: SCM Press, 1996), pp. 259-72 (270).
63. Paul Tillich, Systematic Tlwology, I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951),
pp. 235-41.
64. McFague, Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language, pp. 177-92.
65. Rebecca Oxford-Carpenter, 'Gender and the Trinity', Tlieology Today 41.1 (April
1984), pp. 7-25 (21).
66. Oxford-Carpenter, 'Gender and the Trinity', p. 23.
Mclntosh The Possibility of a Gender-Transcendent God 253
images remain peripheral and that, where God is spoken of in trinitar-
ian terms, God will he imagined as two thirds male and only one third
female (such as Sophia), therehy continuing to valorize the male.
The liturgical challenge, therefore, is to achieve a meaningful, theo-
logically and hiblically sound gender-transcendence in referring to God.
This involves referring to God in inclusive language without losing a
sense of personhood, or hecoming too abstract, or losing a sense of oth-
erness. While the notion of personhood is retained hy terms such as
parent, child and spirit, which represent gender-transcendent alterna-
tives for the traditional father, son, spirit and avoid the equally proh-
lematic use of mother, daughter, spirit, they are not wholly adequate.
Any reference to God as a parent could encourage human infantil-
ism, rather than responsihility and co-operation. Moreover, if God is a
person, this must mean something radically different to what is meant
hy a human person. For these reasons, I am arguing that Macmurray's
account of a supreme or irvfinite agent has much to recommend it. Since
Macmurray's concept of the human person is grounded in agency and
relationality, referring to God as a supreme agent allows for a personal
and relational concept of God that retains otherness. Furthermore, Mac-
murray's account of God has no inherent gender, nor is it too abstract to
he intelligihle. In trinitarian terms, Macmurray's model could he used
to think of the Trinity as a community, rather than a hierarchy, of infi-
nite agents.
Care has to he taken to ensure that agency is not understood in
a way which marginalizes those with disabilities, and Macmurray's
concept allows for this. That is, since agency involves reason, emotion
and relationships, the focus is not on physical or mental capac-
ity. Admittedly, reference to God as a supreme agent is metaphori-
cal, so, as with all metaphors, it is not a definition; nevertheless, it
has meaning and is compatihle with hihlical and theological tradi-
tion without valorizing, stereotyping or marginalizing the female or
the male. In the end, we have to accept that language is hoth fluid
and inadequate; hence, we must adapt our language to fit our times,
without abandoning all continuity with the past, and opt for hest-fit
at any one time. In my opinion, Macmurray's notion of the supreme
agent achieves this.
4. Conclusion
As I mentioned earlier, feminism and feminist theology has, for good
reasons and with considerahle success, fought for equality hy focusing
on women's experience; theoretical engagement has heen seen as the
male way. However, as Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza has noted, femi-
254 Feminist Theology
nists need to be intellectual.^'' She argues that if feminists do not engage
with intellectual (that is, theoretical) debate their work will be tolerated
as 'women's affair'.^ That is, it will continue to exist as a supplement
to male scholarship, hut it will not succeed in changing the stuhhorn
framework of traditional theology. By bringing Macmurray's work
into conversation with discussions in feminist theology, the intention
of this paper has been to offer a philosophical account of the person
through which women's experience can be understood and the con-
tinuing struggle for liberation grounded. In addition to which, a philo-
sophical account of the person as holistic and relational serves as the
basis for a gender-transcendent concept of God, and, although Mac-
murray might not have envisaged this himself, a concept applicable to
feminist struggles.
As we have seen, liturgy represents a particular challenge in the
effort to speak of God in gender-transcendent terms. Current attempts
to heed the feminist critique have tended either to alienate men, hy con-
centrating on the Goddess, or have included female imagery alongside
male imagery, with the effect that female images remain peripheral or
additional, rather than equal, to male imagery, often reinforcing gender
stereotypes. In addition, we have seen that contemporary language lit-
urgies risk depersonalizing God and over-emphasizing abstraction, or
God is referred to in terms that lose a sense of otherness and awe. Con-
sequently, I propose the liturgical use of Macmurray's gender-transcen-
dent terminology of the supreme agent. In this way, I hope to retain
both a sense of personhood and a sense of otherness, thereby retain-
ing biblical and historical continuity with the Christian tradition, while
incorporating contemporary and non-patriarchal language for God.
In the future, it may be possible to use both the terminology of
fatherhood and that of motherhood interchangeahly. If a time comes
when women and men are equal in religion and society, then female
and male imagery (provided the distinction hetween them does not
rest on gender stereotypes) may be the best way to envisage a personal
God. However, in the current climate, where gender inequality is still
a reality in religion and society, supposedly gender-inclusive terminol-
ogy only serves to maintain the status quo.^' At this time, therefore.
67. Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, The Challenge of Feminist Biblical Interpretation
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), p. xviii.
68. Fiorenza, The Challenge, p. xviii. I am grateful to Tina Beattie for highlighting
the need to clarify that Fiorenza's use of 'intellectual' refers to theoretical discussion, as
opposed to the division of intellect and emotion.
69. If there is any doubt regarding the current status of women, see Natasha Walter,
The New Feminism (London: Virago, 1999).
Mclntosh Tlie Possibility of a Gender-Transcendent God 255
progress for women and for Christianity requires the use of gender-
transcendent language in an attempt to truly envisage a non-gendered
(or gender-neutral) God. Finally, while I have concentrated on women,
we should rememher Ruether's assessment of the prohlem: 'It is not just
that God is imaged as male, hut as male warrior elite. God is not imaged
as black male garhage collector either'.^" In advocating hoth Macmur-
ray's concept of the person and a gender-transcendent concept of God,
I am arguing for a fully inclusive theology and a more equal society.
A relational concept of the person is deliherately opposed to the per-
ception of any group of persons (women, hlacks, disabled) as inferior;
similarly, a less specific concept of God has more scope for offering the
diversity of persons an appropriate and inclusive image. Despite the
dissatisfaction with which some might respond to the opacity of Mac-
murray's portrayal of God, it is hy virtue of this flexihility that much is
gained and the feminist cause is hoth addressed and advanced.
70. From an interview with Sara Maitland, cited in Maitland, 'Ways of Relating',
p. 153.

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