SPOUSES ABAD V. CA G.R.

NO 84908 (1989)

FACTS: Four persons (Herminigildo Aquino, Juanito Dichoso, Damian Garcia and Felix
Abad) agreed among themselves to contribute to a certain fund to purchase a parcel of
land from Narciso Adaya.
1. To conform with the rules and regulations of PHHC, Adaya executed a deed of
assignment naming Aquino as the only assignee of the subject parcel of land
2. To ensure that the rights of the other co-owners will be protected, Aquino in turn,
executed an affidavit stating that:
a. while he is the sole assignee in the deed of assignment, Dichoso, Garcia and
Abad are also assignees as they have contributed an equal share in the
payment made on the property
b. Aquino recognized acknowledged the three as co-owners of the property and
after an TCT has been issued in his name, he would execute the necessary
deed of absolute sale to each co-owner
3. Subsequently, a TCT was issued in the name of Aquino. Abad, then, asked
Aquino to make good on their agreement and execute a deed of sale to cause
the issuance of title in Abads name. Aquino refused. As such, Abad had an
adverse claim annotated at the back of Aquinos TCT
4. Abad filed an action to compel Aquino to execute the requisite instrument
recognizing his co-ownership over the property and for RD to issue a TCT in his
favor
5. RTC held in favor of Abad and order to Aquino to execute a deed of sale in favor
of Abad
6. Afterwards, Abad learned that private respondent Dayap intended to build a
fence around the subject property. Abad filed a suit to enjoin Dayap from
building said fence
7. Dayap claimed that the lot had belonged to them as it was within the property
they bought from Aquino
8. RTC held in favor of Abad and ordered Dayap to desist from fencing the area.
Upon appeal, CA reversed RTC decision citing that the earlier case against
Aquino cannot bind Dayap as they were not included as parties to the case
9. Dayap alleged that he is the rightful owner of the property as he had purchased
the property from Aquino in good faith and for value and that he is in possession
of said property

ISSUE: Who has a better right to the property as between petitioner Abad and private
respondent Dayap

HELD: Abad has a better right to the property as a co-owner.

With respect to the allegation of private respondents that they purchased the property in
question from Herminigildo Aquino in good faith and for value in 1972, such sale could
not have covered a definite portion of the land under co-ownership. It is well-
settled that a co-owner has no right to sell a divided part, by metes and bounds,
of the real estate owned in common.

This doctrine was reiterated in Mercado vs.
Liwanag, where it was held that a co-owner may not convey a physical portion of the
land owned in common.

Applying the foregoing principles, Aquino, a mere co-owner, could not have validly
sold to private respondents a specific part of the land he owned in common with
petitioner and two others as described in the Deed of Sale executed by him in
favor of private respondents. Private respondents, therefore, cannot claim title to
that definite portion of the land owned in common, wherein they have made and
were about to begin other constructions at the time the complaint for injunction
was filed by petitioners in the lower court.

With regard to the contention of private respondents that they have a better right to the
property since they have occupied and are presently in possession of the same, it is but
proper to reiterate the well-established rule that mere possession cannot defeat the
title of a holder of a registered Torrens title to real property.

It is indeed
questionable that up to now, private respondents merely have in their possession a
deed of absolute sale executed way back in 1972 to evidence their claim of ownership.
Petitioners, on the other hand, have the affidavit proving their right as co-owner of the
lot, their adverse claim annotated at the back of the Torrens title of Aquino, and a final
judgment in their favor. The transfer certificate of title covering the disputed lot is now in
the name of petitioner spouses. Such title is entitled to respect and great weight until
somebody else can show a better right to the lot.

All constructions built by private respondents in good faith may be removed by them
following the provisions in the Civil Code on builders in good faith.





















DEL CAMPO V. CA G.R. NO 108228 (2001)

FACTS: A parcel of land was divided among 8 co-owners, namely: Salome 4/16,
Consorcia 4/16. Alfredo 2/16, Maria 2/16, Jose 1/16, Quirico 1/16, Rosalia 1/16 and
Julita 1/16.
1. Salome sold her 4/16 share for P200 to Soledad Daynolo. Thereafter, Solded
took possession of the land and built a house thereon. A few years later,
Soledad mortgaged the subject portion in favor of Jose Regalado as security fro
a debt
2. Meanwhile, Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo sold a portion of the land to
Regalado.
3. Some years later, Soledads heir paid the mortgage debt and redeemed the
mortgaged portion from Regalado, s evidenced by a deed of discharge of
mortgage. Soledads heirs, then, sold the redeemed portion to petitioners Del
Campo
4. Regalado caused the reconstitution of the OCT of the property. The reconstituted
OTC initially reflected the shares of the original co-owners but the title was later
transferred to Regalado who caused the subdivision of the entire property.
among these smaller lots was Lot no 162-C-6
5. Spouses Del Campo, then, filed a complaint for repartition, resurvey and
reconveyance of the land, claiming that they owned Lot no 162-C-6 which was
erroneously included in the TCT issued to Regalado. Petitioners alleged that they
occupied the area as residential dwelling since its purchase in 1951 and they
also paid the corresponding taxes
6. The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that while Salome could alienate
her pro-indiviso share in Lot 162, she could not validly sell an undivided part
thereof by metes and bounds to Soledad from whom the petitioners derived their
title. The trial court also reasoned that petitioners could not have a better right to
the property even if they were in physical possession of the same and declared
the property for taxation purposes, because mere possession cannot defeat the
right of the Regalados who had a Torrens title over the land.

ISSUES:
1. Would a sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an undivided property held in
common be valid
2. Is respondent Regalado estopped from denying Del Campos right and title over
the disputed area
3. Under the facts and circumstances duly established by evidence, are petitioners
entitled to repartition, resurvey and reconveyance of the property in question

HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: The mere fact that Salome purportedly transferred a definite portion of
the co-owned lot by metes and bounds to Soledad, however, does not per se render the
sale a nullity. In Lopez v. Vda de Cuaycong, SC held that: The fact that the agreement
in question purported to sell a concrete portion of the hacienda does not render
the sale void, for it is a well-established principle that the binding force of a
contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. Applying this
principle to the instant case, the transaction entered into by Salome and Soledad
could be legally recognized in its entirety since the object of the sale did not even
exceed the ideal shares held by the former in the co-ownership. As a matter of fact,
the deed of sale executed between the parties expressly stipulated that the portion of
Lot 162 sold to Soledad would be taken from Salomes 4/16 undivided interest in said
lot, which the latter could validly transfer in whole or in part even without the consent of
the other co-owners. Salomes right to sell part of her undivided interest in the co-
owned property is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-
owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its. Since Salomes clear
intention was to sell merely part of her aliquot share in Lot 162, no valid objection
can be made against it and the sale can be given effect to the full extent.

While it is well-settled that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion of
a co-owned property prior to partition among all the co-owners, this should not signify
that the vendee does not acquire anything at all in case a physically segregated area of
the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the co-owner/vendors undivided interest
could properly be the object of the contract of sale between the parties, what the
vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as
co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under their
transaction. In other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner
and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in common. Even if a
co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share
but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Since a co-
owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one
co-owner will only transfer the rights of said co-owner to the buyer, thereby
making the buyer a co-owner of the property.

SECOND ISSUE: the intervening years between the date of petitioners purchase of
the property and 1987 when petitioners filed the instant complaint, comprise all of 36
years. However, at no instance during this time did respondents or Regalado, for that
matter, question petitioners right over the land in dispute. In the case of Vda. De
Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals,

it was held that where the transferees of an
undivided portion of the land allowed a co-owner of the property to occupy a
definite portion thereof and had not disturbed the same for a period too long to be
ignored, the possessor is in a better condition or right than said transferees.
(Potior est condition possidentis). Such undisturbed possession had the effect of a
partial partition of the co-owner property which entitles the possessor to the
definite portion which he occupies. Conformably, petitioners are entitled to the
disputed land, having enjoyed uninterrupted possession thereof for a total of 49
years up to the present.

The lower courts reliance on the doctrine that mere possession cannot defeat the right
of a holder of a registered Torrens title over property is misplaced, considering that
petitioners were deprived of their dominical rights over the said lot through fraud and
with evident bad faith on the part of Regalado. Regalado knew of the fact that he did not
have a title to the entire lot and could not, therefore, have validly registered the same in
his name alone because he was aware of petitioners possession of the subject portion
as well as the sale between Salome and Soledad.

Consequently, respondents are estopped from asserting that they own the subject
land in view of the Deed of Mortgage and Discharge of Mortgage executed
between Regalado and petitioners predecessor-in-interest. As petitioners correctly
contend, respondents are barred from making this assertion under the equitable
principle of estoppel by deed, whereby a party to a deed and his privies are
precluded from asserting as against the other and his privies any right or title in
derogation of the deed, or from denying the truth of any material fact asserted in
it.

THIRD ISSUE: The attendance of fraud in its issuance created an implied trust in favor
of petitioners and gave them the right to seek reconveyance of the parcel wrongfully
obtained by the former. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust ordinarily
prescribes in ten years. But when the right of the true and real owner is recognized,
expressly or implicitly such as when he remains undisturbed in his possession,
the said action is imprescriptible, it being in the nature of a suit for quieting of
title. Having established by clear and convincing evidence that they are the legal
owners of the litigated portion included in TCT NO. 14566, it is only proper that
reconveyance of the property be ordered in favor of petitioners.























PADA-KILARIO V. CA G.R. NO 134329 (2000)

FACTS: Jacinto Pada had 6 children: Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina
and Ruperta. He died intestate; his estate included a parcel of land (residential and
coconut land)
1. During the lifetime of Jacinto, his half-brother Feliciano obtained permission from
him to build a house on the northern portion of the property. Petitioner Pada-
Kilario (Felicianos granddaughter) has been living there since 1960
2. Sometime in May 1951, the heirs of Jacinto entered into an extra-judicial partition
of his estate. They executed a private document which, however, was not
registered with RD
3. In 1978, Juanita (Ananias heir) sold the right of his father Ananias as co-owner
the subject property
4. In 1993, Maria (Marcianos heir) sold her fathers share to private respondent
Silverio. Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner vacate the
northern portion of the subject lot. In view of the failed attempts at an amicable
settlement, Silverio filed an ejectment suit against petitioner Pada-Kilario\
5. Petitioners argued that the northern portion of the property has been donated to
them by the heirs of Amado. They also contended that the extrajudicial partition
executed in 1951 was invalid and ineffectual since no special power of attorney
was executed by either Marciano, Amador or Higino in favor of their respective
children who represented them in the extra-judicial partition. Moreover, it was
effectuated only through a private document that was never registered in the
office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
6. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner
spouses
7. Upon appeal, RTC reversed the decision and held in favor of Silverio citing that
said conveyances executed by Juanita Pada and Maria Pada Pavo were never
questioned or assailed by their co-heirs for more than 40 years, thereby lending
credence on the fact that the two vendors were indeed legal and lawful owners of
properties ceded or sold.
8. Petitioner filed a petition for review before CA; CA dismissed said petition
ISSUE: WON CA erred in not ruling that petitioners, as co-owners, cannot be ejected
from the premises considered that the heirs of Amado donated to them their undivided
interest in the subject property

HELD: No, CA did not err in the ruling.

The extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs made in
1951 is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law
requires partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to be
valid. The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a partition
be put in a public document and registered, has for its purpose the protection of
creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is
to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity
of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not undermined when
no creditors are involved. Without creditors to take into consideration, it is
competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution
thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules
from which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or other
formality is essential for the partition to be valid. The partition of inherited property
need not be embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards the heirs
that participated therein.

The requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object
the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable
property, must appear in a public instrument, is only for convenience, non-compliance
with which does not affect the validity or enforceability of the acts of the parties as
among themselves.

The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily
and spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status. When they discussed
and agreed on the division of the estate Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that they did
so in furtherance of their mutual interests. As such, their division is conclusive,
unless and until it is shown that there were debts existing against the estate
which had not been paid. No showing, however, has been made of any unpaid
charges against the estate of Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is no reason why the heirs
should not be bound by their voluntary acts.

The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs of
Amador Pada, of donating the subject property to petitioners after forty four (44)
years of never having disputed the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that
allocated the subject property to Marciano and Ananias, produced no legal effect.
In the said partition, what was allocated to Amador Pada was not the subject
property which was a parcel of residential land in Sto. Nino, Matalom, Leyte, but
rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut land in the interior of Sto. Nino St., Sabang,
Matalom, Leyte and one-half of a parcel of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom,
Leyte. The donation made by his heirs to petitioners of the subject property, thus,
is void for they were not the owners thereof. At any rate it is too late in the day for
the heirs of Amador Pada to repudiate the legal effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition
as prescription and laches have equally set in.

Petitioners are estopped from impugning the extrajudicial partition executed by
the heirs of Jacinto Pada after explicitly admitting in their Answer that they had
been occupying the subject property since 1960 without ever paying any rental as
they only relied on the liberality and tolerance of the Pada family. Their
admissions are evidence of a high order and bind them insofar as the character
of their possession of the subject property is concerned.

Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject property by sheer
tolerance of its owners, they knew that their occupation of the premises may be
terminated any time. Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing
in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
Thus, they cannot be considered possessors nor builders in good faith. It is well-
settled that both Article 448 and Article 546 of the New Civil Code which allow full
reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on
land with the belief that he is the owner thereof.





































RESUENA V. CA G.R. NO 128338 (2005)

CASE DOCTRINES
Co-owners right to file an action for ejectment; occupation by tolerance
Respondents action for ejectment against petitioners is deemed to be instituted
for the benefit of all co-owners of the property since petitioners were not able to
prove that they are authorized to occupy the same.
Petitioners lack of authority to occupy the properties, coupled with respondents right
under Article 487, clearly settles respondents prerogative to eject petitioners from Lot
No. 2587. Time and again, this Court has ruled that persons who occupy the land
of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same
upon demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against them.

FACTS: Juanito Borromeo, Sr. is the co-owner and overseer of certain parcels of land
located in Pooc, Talisay, Cebu, designated as Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 of the Talisay-
Manglanilla Estate. He owned six-eighths (6/8) of Lot No. 2587 while the Sps. Bascon
owned two-eights (2/8) thereof. On the other hand, Lot No. 2592 is owned in common
by Borromeo and the heirs of one Nicolas Maneja. However, the proportion of their
undivided shares was not determined a quo.
1. Tining Resuena, Alejandra Garay, Lorna Resuena, Eleuterio Resuena, and
Unisima Resuena resided in the upper portion of Lot No. 2587, allegedly under
the acquiescence of the Spouses Bascon and their heir, Andres Bascon. On the
other hand, petitioner Eutiquia Rosario occupied a portion of Lot No. 2592,
allegedly with the permission of the heirs of Nicolas Maneja, one of the original
co-owners of Lot No. 2587. Borromeo claimed that they have occupied portions
of the subject property by virtue of his own liberality.
2. Borromeo developed portions of Lots Nos. 2587 and 2592 occupied by him into a
resort known as the Borromeo Beach Resort. In his desire to expand and extend
the facilities of the resort that he established on the subject properties,
respondent demanded that petitioners vacate the property. Petitioners, however,
refused to vacate their homes.
3. On 16 February 1994, Borromeo filed a Complaint for ejectment with the MTC
against the petitioners.
4. MTC decision (summary proceeding): dismissed the complaint. Borromeo had no
right to evict the petitioners because the area was owned in common and there
was no partition yet.
5. RTC decision: reversed the MTC decision. It held that Article 487 of the Civil
Code, which allows any one of the co-owners to bring an action in ejectment,
may successfully be invoked by the respondent because, in a sense, a co-owner
is the owner and possessor of the whole, and that the suit for ejectment is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners.
6. CA decision: affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE: WON Borromeo can lawfully evict the petitioners
HELD: Article 487 of the Civil Code, which provides simply that any one of the co-
owners may bring an action in ejectment, is a categorical and an unqualified authority
in favor of respondent to evict petitioners from the portions of Lot. No. 2587.

This provision is a departure from Palarca v. Baguisi, which held that an action for
ejectment must be brought by all the co-owners. Thus, a co-owner may bring an action
to exercise and protect the rights of all. When the action is brought by one co-owner for
the benefit of all, a favorable decision will benefit them; but an adverse decision cannot
prejudice their rights.

Respondents action for ejectment against petitioners is deemed to be instituted
for the benefit of all co-owners of the property since petitioners were not able to
prove that they are authorized to occupy the same.

Petitioners lack of authority to occupy the properties, coupled with respondents right
under Article 487, clearly settles respondents prerogative to eject petitioners from Lot
No. 2587. Time and again, this Court has ruled that persons who occupy the land
of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the s
same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against them.

























PAULMITAN V. CA G.R. NO 61584

CASE DOCTRINES
A sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-
owners is not null and void
The sale did not prejudice the rights of respondents to one half (1/2) undivided
share of the land which they inherited from their father. It did not vest ownership
in the entire land with the buyer but transferred only the seller's pro indiviso
share in the property and consequently made the buyer a co-owner of the land
until it is partitioned.
Xxx
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the
consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of
the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property."

Redemption of the property by one of the co-owners does vest ownership of the entire
property;
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While
a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to
consent to a partial redemption," the redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of
the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the
part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the
property and consolidate title thereto in his name (Supra, art. 1607). But the
provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire
property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership."

Right of a co-owner to compel other co-owners to contribute to the expenses of
preservation and taxes (Art. 488)
Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the entire lot by virtue of the
redemption she made, nevertheless, she did acquire the right to be reimbursed for half
of the redemption price she paid to the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental on
behalf of her co-owners. Until reimbursed, Fanesa holds a lien upon the subject
property for the amount due her.

FACTS: Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, died in 1953, leaving two parcels of land (lot no.
757 and lot no. 1091) located in the Province of Negros Occidental. Agatona begot two
legitimate children, namely: Pascual Paulmitan, deceased and Donato Paulmitan.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa is Donato's daughter while, Rodolfo Fanesa, is Juliana's
husband. Pascual Paulmitan, on the other hand, is survived by the respondents, who
are his children, namely: Alicio, Elena, Abelino, Adelina, Anita, Baking and Anito, all
surnamed Paulmitan.
1. Until 1963, the estate of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan remained unsettled and the
titles to the two lots mentioned above remained in the name of Agatona.
2. However, on August 11, 1963, Donato Paulmitan executed an Affidavit of
Declaration of Heirship, extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot No. 757
based on the claim that he is the only surviving heir of Agatona Sagario. The
affidavit was filed with the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental who, on
August 20, 1963, cancelled the OCT in the name of Agatona Sagario and issued
a TCT in Donato's name. The other lot (Lot No. 1091), was sold by Donato on
May 28, 1974 in favor of Juliana P. Fanesa, his daughter.
3. Before such sale, sometime in 1952, for non-payment of taxes, Lot No. 1091 was
forfeited and sold at a public auction, with the Provincial Government of Negros
Occidental being the buyer. A Certificate of Sale over the land was executed by
the Provincial Treasurer in favor of the Provincial Board of Negros Occidental.
4. On May 29, 1974, Juliana P. Fanesa redeemed the property from the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental for the amount of P2,959.09.
5. Upon learning of the transactions, respondents children of the Late Pascual
Paulmitan filed on January 18, 1975 with the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental a Complaint against petitioners to partition the properties plus
damages.
6. RTC decision: dismissed the complaint with regard to Lot No. 757 ruling that
prescription has accrued. This order has become final for failure to file an appeal.
With respect to Lot No. 1091, RTC favored the respondents. It held, as
descendants of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan they were entitled to one-half (1/2) of
Lot No. 1091, pro indiviso.
7. CA decision: affirmed the RTC.

ISSUE 1: WON the heirs of Pascul Paulmitan are entitled to share of Lot No. 1091.
HELD: From the time of the death of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan to the subsequent
passing away of her son Pascual in 1953, the estate remained unpartitioned. Article
1078 of the Civil Code provides: "Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of
the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the
payment of debts of the deceased." Donato and Pascual Paulmitan were, therefore, co-
owners of the estate left by their mother as no partition was ever made.

When Pascual Paulmitan died intestate in 1953, his children, the respondents,
succeeded him in the co-ownership of the disputed property. Pascual Paulmitan's right
of ownership over an undivided portion of the property passed on to his children, who,
from the time of Pascual's death, became co-owners with their uncle Donato over the
disputed decedent estate.

Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claims ownership over Lot No. 1091 by virtue of two
transactions, namely: (a) the sale made in her favor by her father Donato Paulmitan;
and (b) her redemption of the land from the Provincial Government of Negros
Occidental after it was forfeited for non-payment of taxes.

When Donato Paulmitan sold on May 28, 1974 Lot No. 1091 to his daughter Juliana P.
Fanesa, he was only a co-owner with respondents and as such, he could only sell that
portion which may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership. The sale
did not prejudice the rights of respondents to one half (1/2) undivided share of
the land which they inherited from their father. It did not vest ownership in the
entire land with the buyer but transferred only the seller's pro indiviso share in
the property and consequently made the buyer a co-owner of the land until it is
partitioned. In Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, the Court, through Justice Irene R.
Cortes, outlined the effects of a sale by one co-owner without the content of all the co-
owners, thus: "The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in
Article 493 of the Civil Code. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign
or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to
the co owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.

As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole
property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other
co-owners who did not consent to the sale [Punsalan v. Boon Liat, 44 Phil. 320
(1923)]. This is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or
other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only
what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in
common. [Ramirez v. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909)]. Consequently, by virtue of the
sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with respect to their
proportionate shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to
private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became a co-owner of the
disputed parcel of land as correctly held by the lower court since the sales produced the
effect of substituting the buyers in the enjoyment thereof [Mainit v. Bandoy, 14 Phil. 730
(1910)].

From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the
consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of
the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property."

Applying this principle to the case at bar, the sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan of
the land to his daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did not give to the latter
ownership over the entire land but merely transferred to her the one half (1/2)
undivided share of her father, thus making her the co-owner of the land in
question with the respondents, her first cousins.

ISSUE 2: WON redemption by one of the co-owners of the property entitles her the
ownership of the entire property.
HELD: The redemption of the land made by Fanesa did not terminate the co-
ownership nor give her title to the entire land subject of the co-ownership.
Speaking on the same issue raised by petitioners, the Court, in Adille v. Court of
Appeals, resolved the same with the following pronouncements: "The petition raises a
purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the property held
in common?

Essentially, it is the petitioners' contention that the property subject of dispute devolved
upon him upon the failure of his co-heirs to join him in its redemption within the period
required by law. He relies on the provisions of Article 1515 of the old Civil Code, Article
1613 of the present Code, giving the vendee a retro the right to demand redemption of
the entire property. There is no merit in this petition.

The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his share
alone (CIVIL CODE, art. 1612; CIVIL CODE (1889), art. 1514.). While the records show
that petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor,
that did not make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the
existing state of co-ownership (Supra, art. 489). There is no doubt that redemption of
property entails a necessary expense. Under the Civil Code: ART. 488. Each co-owner
shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to the expenses of
preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the
latter may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided
interest as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver
shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership.

The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While
a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to
consent to a partial redemption," the redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of
the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the
part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the
property and consolidate title thereto in his name (Supra, art. 1607). But the
provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire
property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership."

Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the entire lot by virtue of the
redemption she made, nevertheless, she did acquire the right to be reimbursed for half
of the redemption price she paid to the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental on
behalf of her co-owners. Until reimbursed, Fanesa holds a lien upon the subject
property for the amount due her.











ADILLE V. CA G.R. NO L-44546 (1988)

CASE DOCTRINES
Necessary expenses for the preservation of the co-owned property; a co-owner who
redeems the co-owned property does not acquire ownership over its entirety
Necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to his right to
collect reimbursement from the remaining co-owners. There is no doubt that
redemption of property entails a necessary expense.

The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While
a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to
consent to a partial redemption," the redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of
the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the
part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the
property and consolidate title thereto in his name. But the provision does not give
to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It does not provide for
a mode of terminating a co-ownership.

Registration of the property does not vest ownership
Neither does the fact that the petitioner had succeeded in securing title over the parcel
in his name terminate the existing co-ownership. While his half-brothers and sisters are,
as we said, liable to him for reimbursement as and for their shares in redemption
expenses, he cannot claim exclusive right to the property owned in common.
Registration of property is not a means of acquiring ownership. It operates as a
mere notice of existing title, that is, if there is one.

Implied trust
ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is,
by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person
from whom the property comes.
We agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that fraud attended the registration of
the property. The petitioner's pretension that he was the sole heir to the land in the
affidavit of extrajudicial settlement he executed preliminary to the registration thereof
betrays a clear effort on his part to defraud his brothers and sisters and to exercise sole
dominion over the property. The aforequoted provision therefore applies.

Prescription to extinguish a co-ownership; requisites
Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have
been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership).
The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions:
(1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership;
(2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners;
(3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and
(4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the property for the period required by law.
Registration under the Torrens system is not equivalent to notice of repudiation
It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it
has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud. It
is therefore no argument to say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice
of repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that
registration operates as a universal notice of title.

FACTS: Felisa Alzul is the owner of the parcel of land in question located at Legaspi
City. In her first marriage, she begot a child (Rustico Adille). In her second marriage, her
children were Emeteria, Teodorica, Domingo, Josefa and Santiago, all surnamed Asejo.
1. Sometime in 1939, Felisa sold the property in pacto de retro. The period of
redemption was 3 years. She was not able to repurchase it because she died in
1942.
2. After Felisas death and during the period of redemption, Rustico Adille
repurchased, by himself alone, and after that, he executed a deed of extra-
judicial partition representing himself to be the only heir and child of his mother
Felisa with the consequence that he was able to secure title in his name alone.
Consequently, in 1955, the OCT in the name of his mother was transferred to his
name.
3. Upon learning this, his half brothers and sisters filed a case for partition with
accounting of the property.
4. RTC decision: in favor of Rustico Adille, sustaining his position as the absolute
owner.
5. CA decision: reversed the RTC.

ISSUE 1: WON by virtue of redeeming the property, a co-owner acquires exclusive
ownership over the property.
HELD: The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to
his share alone. While the records show that the petitioner redeemed the property
in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not make him the
owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-
ownership.

Necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to his right to
collect reimbursement from the remaining co-owners. There is no doubt that
redemption of property entails a necessary expense. Under the Civil Code:
ART. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute
to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes.
Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so
much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses
and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership.
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While
a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to
consent to a partial redemption," the redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of
the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the
part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the
property and consolidate title thereto in his name. But the provision does not give
to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It does not provide for
a mode of terminating a co-ownership.

Neither does the fact that the petitioner had succeeded in securing title over the
parcel in his name terminate the existing co-ownership. While his half-brothers
and sisters are, as we said, liable to him for reimbursement as and for their
shares in redemption expenses, he cannot claim exclusive right to the property
owned in common. Registration of property is not a means of acquiring
ownership. It operates as a mere notice of existing title, that is, if there is one.

ISSUE 2: WON Rustico Adille is a trustee of his co-heirs.
HELD: The petitioner must then be said to be a trustee of the property on behalf of the
private respondents. The Civil Code states:
ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is,
by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person
from whom the property comes.

Fraud attended the registration of the property. The petitioner's pretension that he was
the sole heir to the land in the affidavit of extrajudicial settlement he executed
preliminary to the registration thereof betrays a clear effort on his part to defraud his
brothers and sisters and to exercise sole dominion over the property. The aforequoted
provision therefore applies.

ISSUE 3: WON prescription has terminated the co-ownership.
HELD: It is a well-established principle that prescription bars any demand on property
(owned in common) held by another (co-owner) following the required number of years.
In that event, the party in possession acquires title to the property and the state of co-
ownership is ended. In the case at bar, the property was registered in 1955 by the
petitioner, solely in his name, while the claim of the private respondents was presented
in 1974. Has prescription then, set in?

No, prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have
been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in
turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership;
(2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3)
the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession
through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property
for the period required by law.

The instant case shows that the petitioner had not complied with these requisites. We
are not convinced that he had repudiated the co-ownership; on the contrary, he had
deliberately kept the private respondents in the dark by feigning sole heirship over the
estate under dispute. He cannot therefore be said to have "made known" his efforts to
deny the co-ownership. Moreover, one of the private respondents, Emeteria Asejo, is
occupying a portion of the land up to the present; yet, the petitioner has not taken pains
to eject her therefrom. As a matter of fact, he sought to recover possession of that
portion Emeteria is occupying only as a counterclaim, and only after the private
respondents had first sought judicial relief.

It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it
has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud. It
is therefore no argument to say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice
of repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that
registration operates as a universal notice of title.






































AVILA VS. SPOUSES BARABAT G.R. 141993 [2006]

FACTS: The property in controversy is registered in the name of Anunciacion Bahena
vda. De Nemeo, upon her death, ownership of the lot was transferred by operation of
law to her five children, petitioners Narcisa Avila, Natividad Macapaz, Francisca
Adlawan, Leon Nemeo and Jose Bahena. These heirs built their respective houses on
the lot.
1. Respondent Benjamin Barabat leased a portion of the house owned by Avila.
Avila offered to sell her house and share in the lot to her siblings but no one
showed interest in it. She then offered it to respondents who agreed to buy it.
Their agreement was evidenced by a private document.
2. Respondent stopped paying rentals to Avila and took possession of the property
as owners. They also assumed the payment of realty taxes on it.
3. Sometime in early 1982, respondents were confronted by petitioner Januario
Adlawan who informed them that they had until March 1982 only to stay in Avilas
place because he was buying the property.
4. Considering the sale to the spouses Adlawan as prejudicial to their title and peaceful
possession of the property, they demanded that Avila execute a public document
evidencing the sale of the property to them but Avila refused.
5. Respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title with the RTC. The trial court rendered
its decision in favor of respondents. It declared the private document as a valid and lawful
deed of sale. It nullified the subsequent deed of sale between Avila and the spouses
Adlawan. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
6. Petitioners rely on Article 1623 in relation to Article 1620 of the Civil Code to justify
their right of redemption.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner has the right of redemption according to article 1620.

HELD: The Court ruled in favor of respondents.
Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares
of all the other co-owners or any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the
alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only
do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in
common.
x x x x x x x x x
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except
within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor,
as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property,
unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice
thereof to all possible redemptioners.

Petitioners right to redeem would have existed only had there been co-ownership
among petitioners-siblings. But there was none. For this right to be exercised, co-
ownership must exist at the time the conveyance is made by a co-owner and the
redemption is demanded by the other co-owner or co-owner(s). However, by their own
admission, petitioners were no longer co-owners when the property was sold to
respondents in 1979. The co-ownership had already been extinguished by partition.
The regime of co-ownership exists when the ownership of an undivided thing or
right belongs to different persons. By the nature of co-ownership, a co-owner
cannot point to any specific portion of the property owned in common as his own
because his share in it remains intangible and deal. Every act intended to put an
end to indivision among co-heirs is deemed to be a partition. In the case at bar,
the particular portions pertaining to petitioners had been ascertained and they in fact
already took possession of their respective parts. The following statement of petitioners
in their amended answer as one of their special and affirmative defenses was revealing:
F-8. That all defendants [i.e., petitioners] in this case who are co-owners of lot 348 have
their own respective buildings constructed on the said lot in which case it can be safely
assumed that that their respective shares in the lot have been physically
segregated although there is no formal partition of the land among themselves.
The purpose of partition is to separate, divide and assign a thing held in common
among those to whom it belongs. By their own admission, petitioners already
segregated and took possession of their respective shares in the lot. Their respective
shares were therefore physically determined, clearly identifiable and no longer ideal.
Thus, the co-ownership had been legally dissolved. With that, petitioners right to
redeem any part of the property from any of their former co-owners was already
extinguished. As legal redemption is intended to minimize co-ownership, once a
property is subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the community
ceases to exist and there is no more reason to sustain any right of legal
redemption.













HERNANDEZ VS. QUINTAIN [1988]

FACTS: Petitioner Perla Hernandez bought a parcel of land covering an area of 46.40
sqm from Sancho Manlapuz for P3,000. The lot, was originally part of a larger parcel of
land which belonged to the spouses Crispulo Manlapaz and Antonia Villanueva. After
their death, their children Zosima, Jose, Sulpicio, Iluminada, Damaso, Sancho and
Ernesta, extrajudicially partitioned the land.
1. Sancho sold the lot adjudicated to him to petitioner, while Jose, whose portion
was adjacent to that of Sanchos sold the same to Ernesta.
2. Ernesta filed a complaint seeking the redemption of the lot bought by petitioner,
claining that she was not informed by Sancho of the sale of the lot to petitioner,
and depositing with the trial court, P3,000 as the redemption price.
3. Petitioner claimed that since there was already an extra-judicial partition of the
land executed by the heirs, Ernesa could no longer exercise any right of
redemption.
4. The trial court, finding that private respondent was a co-owner, allowed her to
redeem the property.

ISSUE: WON Ernesta has the right of redemption

HELD: The basis and origin of the right of legal redemption granted under Article 1620
of the Civil Code, and relied upon by the trial court, is the existence of a co-ownership
as defined under Article 484 of the Civil Code: "There is co-ownership whenever the
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons."

For co-ownership to exist, the co-owner must have a "spiritual part of a thing"
which is not physically divided. The Court further emphasized that if the party
seeking to redeem is the owner of a portion which has been concretely
determined and Identifiable he cannot be considered a co-owner, and thus not
entitled to the right of redemption granted under Article 1620.

In Umengan, correctly cited by petitioner, the court said that the right of legal
redemption under Article 1620, given to a co-owner in case any one of the other co-
heirs or co-owners sells his share to a third person, cannot be invoked where the
property had already been partitioned judicially or extrajudicially. And in Salatandol, the
Court held that where the portion belonging to the parties has been Identified and
localized, so that co-ownership, in its real sense, no longer exists, legal redemption will
no longer lie.

The parties here have stipulated that the property inherited has been partitioned, and
the lot in question was adjudicated in favor of the vendor Sancho Manlapaz likewise
shows that the inherited property had been subdivided and the heirs had taken
possession of their respective portions. With the subdivision of the inherited property,
the co-ownership among the heirs had thus ceased to exist and hence, private
respondent can no longer assert any right of legal redemption of the lot now owned by
petitioner.
VDA. DE REYES VS. CA 199 SCRA 646 [1991]

FACTS: Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of approx. 70 hectares. He sought to
bring the said land registered under Torrens System but he died in 1921 w/o the title
being issued to him. The application was prosecuted bu his son Marcelo Reyes, who
was his administrator for his property.
1. In 1936 the property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavinos heirs. It appears
that 2 lots one of which is Lot No. 1-A-14 were allotted to Rafael Reyes Sr.
2. Rafael Reyes Sr. sold a parcel of land with and area of 23,431 sqm to private
respondent Dalmacio Gardiola. The parcel corresponds to Lot 1-A-14 of the
subdivision plan although it was not specifically mentioned.
3. In 1967, the heirs of Gavino executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate based on the subdivision plan, the lot that was intended for Rafael Reyes
Sr. was adjudicated to his only son and heir Rafael Reyes Jr. Private respondent
Rosario Martillano signed the deed in representation of her mother, Marta Reyes,
one of Gavinos children. Several Transfer Certificate covering the subdivided
lots were issued in the names of the respective heirs but these titles were kept by
Candido Hebron.
4. In 1969, some of the heirs of Gavino files a case of Annulment of Partition and
Recovery of Possession before the CFI. The case was dismissed and Hebron
was ordered to deliver to the heirs all transfer certificate in his possession.
5. After obtaining the TCT for Lot 1-A-14 from Hebron, petitioner, as successor-in-
interest of Rafael Reyes Jr. filed a case for recovery of possession or in the
alternative, for indemnification accounting and damages, having discovered that
they are the lawful owners of the property.
6. Private respondent asserted that they are the owners of the said lot, having
bought the same from Rafael Reyes Sr.; that the issuance of TCT is null and void
for such sale was known to Rafael Reyes Jr.; that they have been in possession
of the property and have been paying the land taxes; and that petitioners are
barred by prescription and/or latches.
7. The trial court concluded that the petitioners title over the subject property is
valid and regular and thus they are entitled to its possession and enjoyment. The
trial court contend that there is no evidence that the heirs of Gavino Reyes
entered into any written agreement of partition in 1936 based on the subdivision
plan;. The trial court held that the continued possession by private respondents,
which it found to have started in 1943, did not ripen into ownership because at
that time, the property was already registered, hence it cannot be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. CA reversed the trial courts decision.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner has the right to reconvey the said property.

HELD: No
The trial court erred in holding that there was no partition among the children of Gavino
Reyes in 1936 since there is no written evidence in support thereof; yet, it admits that
there was a survey and subdivision of the property and the adjudication of specific
subdivision lots to each of the children of Gavino. The partition made by the children
of Gavino Reyes in 1936, although oral, was valid and binding. There is no law
that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid. The requirement
that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for its purpose the
protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs
themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as
constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition
not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when there
are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are
involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for
distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law. There is
nothing in said section from which it can be inferred that a writing or other
formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an
oral partition is valid.
Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral partition is
valid and why it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition among heirs or
renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of
real property for the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from one
to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property by
the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the
inheritance.
Upon the death of Gavino Reyes in 1921, his heirs automatically became co-owners of
his 70-hectare parcel of land. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent. The estate of the decedent would then be held in co-
ownership by the heirs. The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his share or
interest in the property subject to the condition that the portion disposed of is eventually
allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership.
The Court held that every co-heir has the absolute ownership of his share in the
community property and may alienate, assign, or mortgage the same, except as
to purely personal rights, but the effect of any such transfer is limited to the
portion which may be awarded to him upon the partition of the property. In the
case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio
Gardiola is his share in the estate of his deceased father, Gavino Reyes. It is the
same property which was eventually adjudicated to his son and heir, Rafael
Reyes, Jr., represented in turn by his heirs-petitioners herein-in the extrajudicial
settlement of 1967.
The participation of private respondent Rosario Gardiola in the Extrajudicial Settlement
did not place private respondents in estoppel to question the issuance since she signed
it in representation of her deceased mother, Marta Reyes, a daughter and an heir of
Gavino Reyes. She did not sign for and in behalf of her husband, Dalmacio Gardiola,
vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr.
Petitioners, as mere successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael
Reyes, Sr., can only acquire that which Rafael, J r. could transmit to them upon
his death. The latter never became the owner of Lot No. 1-A-14 because it was
sold by his father in 1943. The issuance of TCT No. T-27257 in the name of Rafael
Reyes, Jr., in so far as Lot No. 1-14-A is concerned, was clearly erroneous because he
never became its owner. An extrajudicial settlement does not create a light in favor
of an heir. It is but a confirmation or ratification of title or right to property. Thus,
since he never had any title or right to Lot No. 1-14-A, the mere execution of the
settlement did not improve his condition, and the subsequent registration of the deed
did not create any right or vest any title over the property in favor of the petitioners as
heirs of Rafael Reyes, Jr. The latter cannot give them what he never had before.