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Ninal vs.

Bayadog
328 SCRA 122

FACTS:

Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children
namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the
latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and
8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted
an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the
marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said
marriage was void for lack of marriage license.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos
marriage after his death?

HELD:

The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be
exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years
because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma,
only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five
years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated
by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.

Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be
questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a
void marriage.
Rodolfo San Luis vs. Felicidad San-Luis

Bigamy Void Marriage
During his lifetime, Felicisimo (Rodolfos dad) contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit
on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However,
on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos. He had
no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992. Upon death of his dad Rodolfo sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and
the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Rodolfo claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee. Felicidad presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State
of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2 Article 26 of the Family Code.
Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article
256.
ISSUE: Whether or not Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo is bigamous.
HELD: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would
have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse.
However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry
Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. InGarcia v. Recio, the Court
laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record
of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly
show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
The case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by
Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Republic vs Iyoy (G.R. No. 152577)
Posted: August 8, 2011 in Civil Law
Tags: Divorce, Marriage
0
Facts:
The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on
certiorari praying for thereversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment
of the RTC declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void
based on Article 36.
On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In
1984, Fely went to the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce
papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an Americanand had a child. Fely went back to the
Philippines on several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of one of her children inwhich
she used her husbands last name as hers in the invitation.
March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Felys acts brought
danger and dishonor to the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus
submitted his testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation
where Fely used her newhusbands last name as evidences.
Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and
thatsince 1988 she was already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the
evidences sufficient and granted thedecree; it was affirmed in the CA.
Issue:
Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?
Held:
The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said
Article.
Finally, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty
even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one
of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
Republic vs. Orbecido
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church
of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and
Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years
later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned
from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain
Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2
of Article 26 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino
citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry under Philippine law.
LLORENTE VS. CA
345 scra 592
Nationality Principle
Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a parish priest. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo
departed for the United States and Paula was left at the conjugal home. Lorenzo was naturalized by the United
State. After the liberation of the Philippines he went home and visited his wife to which he discovered that his wife
was pregnant and was having an adulterous relationship. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce. Lorenzo
married Alicia LLorente; they lived together for 25 years and begot 3 children. Lorenzo on his last will and testament
bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their 3 children. Paula filed a petition for letters administration over
Lorenzos estate. The RTC ruled in favor of Paula. On appeal, the decision was modified declaring Alicia as co-
owner of whatever properties they have acquired. Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry. Who are entitled to inherit
from the late Lorenzo Llorente?
HELD: In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce. In the same case,
the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorce abroad provided that they are valid according to their national law.
The Supreme Court held that divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of the intrinsic validity of
Lorenzos will and determine the successional rights allowing proof of foreign law. The deceased is not covered by
our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity since he was a foreigner.

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