E-FILED 2014 JUL 28 8:10 AM POLK - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR POLK COUNTY

ESTATE OF PAUL DEDRICK GRAY, by
BRENNA MARIE GRAY, Administrator of the
Estate; BRENNA MARIE GRAY, Individually,
and on behalf of ODG, the minor child of Paul
Dedrick Gray and Brenna Marie Gray,

Case No. LACL129854

Plaintiffs,
v.

RULING RE: MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DANIEL J. BALDI, D.O.; DANIEL J. BALDI,

D.O., P.C.; UNITED ANESTHESIA & PAIN
CONTROL, P.C.; CENTRAL IOWA
HOSPITAL CORPORATION; IOWA
HEALTH PAIN MANAGEMENT CLINIC;
IOWA HEALTH SYSTEM; UNITY POINT
HEALTH; BROADLAWNS MEDICAL
CENTER FOUNDATION, and
BROADLAWNS MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendants.

Introduction
A contested hearing was held on June 26, 2014 on the Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment. Counsel of record appeared. Also appearing was Defendant Dr. Daniel J. Baldi. The
Court heard he reported argument of counsel and took the matter under advisement. Upon
consideration of those arguments and having reviewed the court file, applicable law, briefs, and
being otherwise fully advised of the premises, the Court now finds that for the reason below, the
Motion should be GRANTED.
Background
On or about December 27, 2005, Dr. Baldi began treating Paul Dedrick Gray (Decedent).
Pet. 4. After Dr. Baldis examination and diagnosis, Decedent was prescribed various pain

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medications. Id. Dr. Baldi continued treating Decedent up to the date of his death on May 24,
2010. Id. At the time of Decedents death Plaintiff Brenna Gray (Gray) was pregnant with the
now born minor Plaintiff (ODG). Defs. Joint Reply Ex. 1. Plaintiffs allege Decedent died of an
accidental overdose and/or fatal combination of prescription medication caused by the acts of
omissions of Defendants. Id. It is this alleged wrongful death that forms the basis of Plaintiffs
claims for damages against these Defendants.
Gray was appointed administrator of Decedents estate on July 22, 2010, and filed the
current Petition on February 14, 2014. Defendants now seek summary judgment on the basis of
the Petition being filed after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.
Standard of Review
Under Rule 1.981(3), the Court may grant a partys motion for summary judgment if it
finds there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). The Court must look at the record as a
whole to determine the existence of genuine issues of material facts. Whalen v. Connelly, 593
N.W.2d 147, 152 (Iowa 1999). An issue is material only when the dispute is over facts that
might affect the outcome of the suit, given the applicable governing law. Junkins v. Branstad,
421 N.W.2d 130, 132 (Iowa 1988) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986)). The issue is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
The Court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Kolarik
v. Cory Intl Corp., 721 N.W. 2d 159, 162 (Iowa 2006) (citations omitted). To resist the motion,
the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts constituting competent evidence supporting a
prima facie claim. Hoefer v. Wis. Educ. Assn Ins. Trust, 470 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 1991)
(citations omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate if reasonable minds would not differ on

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the facts. Whalen, 593 N.W.2d at 152. Statute of limitations defenses may be raised on a motion
for summary judgment. Stahl v. Preston Mut. Ins. Assn, 517 N.W.2d 201, 202 (Iowa 1994).

Discussion
I.

Statute of Limitations Issue Pertaining to Claims of the Estate and Gray

Iowa Code section 614.1(9) sets forth the statute of limitations governing medical

malpractice actions and reads as follows:

a. Except as provided in paragraph b, those founded on injuries to the person or
wrongful death against any physician and surgeon, osteopathic physician and
surgeon, dentist, podiatric physician, optometrist, pharmacist, chiropractor,
physician assistant, or nurse, licensed under chapter 147, or a hospital licensed
under chapter 135B, arising out of patient care, within two years after the date on
which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have
known, or received notice in writing of the existence of, the injury or death for
which damages are sought in the action, whichever of the dates occurs first, but in
no event shall any action be brought more than six years after the date on which
occurred the act or omission or occurrence alleged in the action to have been the
cause of the injury or death unless a foreign object unintentionally left in the body
caused the injury or death.
Iowa Code 614.1(9)(a).
The application of this statute to wrongful death cases was discussed at length in Schultze
v. Landmark Hotel Corp., 463 N.W.2d 47 (Iowa 1990). There the court held that the limitation
period in subsection 9 commences on the date the death is discovered. Schultze, 463 N.W.2d at
48. The court, in construing the statute this way, essentially created a modified discovery rule
by commencing the limitation period beginning on the date the plaintiff knew, or should have
known, of the death. Id. at 50. The court provided several reasons for their decision. First,
requiring the plaintiff to know the death was wrongful would be to insert a modifier into the
statute where the legislature did not include it, thus contravening legislative intent. Id. at 49.
Second, death is a time certain and leaves no room for construction. Id. at 4950. The fact of
death itself should indicate a starting point for inquiry regarding a cause of action for wrongful

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death. Id. at 50. Third, a majority of jurisdictions do not apply the discovery rule to wrongful
death statutes containing similar language. Id. Lastly, it is not unfair to the plaintiff because all
the information from which the cause of death could be ascertained was available to plaintiff at
the time of [the] death. Id. at 51.
Plaintiffs here argue that the

case

Rathje v. Mercy Hosp. added the additional

requirement that a plaintiff must be aware of the cause in fact of the death in order for the
limitations period to begin.1 However, the Rathje Courts discussion was limited to the context
of injuries and did not extend to death cases. The Rathje Court discussed the case law, reasoning,
and legislative intent pertaining to the statute of limitations in injury cases, just as the Schultze
Court did for death cases. In fact, the Schultze decision was discussed in Rathje and there was no
indication there that the court desired to overturn Schutze. See id. at 456. Instead, the Rathje
court noted we observed the discovery rule was generally inapplicable to wrongful-death claims
because death from medical care is the type of event that should give rise to the duty to
investigate a cause of action. Id. (citing Schultze, 463 N.W.2d at 50).
The Iowa Court of Appeals recently affirmed that Schultze is controlling law as it applies
to wrongful death cases. The precise question presented in this casewhether the statute of
limitations for medical malpractice actions based on wrongful death begins to run on discovery
of the death or on discovery of the wrongful act that caused the deathwas decided in Schultze
v. Landmark Hotel Corp., 463 N.W.2d 47, 48 (Iowa 1990). Lightfoot v. Catholic Health
Initiatives-Iowa Corp., No. 120319, 2013 WL 1452932, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. April 10, 2013).
The Lightfoot Court rejected the plaintiffs attempts to limit or distinguish Schultze in light of
subsequent case law. Id.
Having determined the applicable statute of limitations, the essential facts in this case are
not in dispute. The parties agree Decedent died on May 24, 2010. Pls. Resis. Summ. J. 2. The
1

745 N.W.2d 443 (Iowa 2008)

4

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parties also agree Gray was appointed administrator of Decedents estate on July 22, 2010. Id.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, July 22, 2010, is the last
possible day on which the limitations period could have commenced. Plaintiffs Petition was
filed February 14, 2014well after the two year limitations period had expired. There is no
genuine issue of material fact and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law.
II.

Statute of Limitations Issue Pertaining to Claims on Behalf of ODG

Plaintiffs argue ODGs claims are timely under Iowa Code section 614.1(9)(b):
b. An action subject to paragraph a and brought on behalf of a minor who was
under the age of eight years when the act, omission, or occurrence alleged in the
action occurred shall be commenced no later than the minors tenth birthday or as
provided in paragraph a, whichever is later.

Plaintiffs assert that since ODG was under the age of eight at the time of Decedents death, and
the action was brought before ODGs tenth birthday, summary judgment is inappropriate.
However, Plaintiffs argument runs afoul of the plain language of the statute.
Plaintiffs admit Gray was pregnant with ODG at the time of the death and was not born
until roughly three months after the death. Pls. Supp. Br. 8. Plaintiffs claim that [a]rguments as
to whether [ODG] was a person are irrelevant as to her age. She has an age of negative months at
that point. Id. at 10. When interpreting a statute, if the languagewhen given its plain and
rational meaning is precise and free from ambiguity, no more is necessary than to apply the
words used in their ordinary sense in connection with the subject considered. McKillip v.
Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Iowa 1971). The plain language of the statute shows ODG
had to be a minor when the act, omission, or occurrence alleged in the action occurrednot
when the action was filed. Iowa Code 614.1(9)(b). In the ordinary sense, the word minor
refers to a living person and does not include someone with a negative age. See Estate of AyalaGomez v. Sohn, No. 112017, 2012 WL 4900919, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2012) ([A]

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minor is a person who is living.). Even though ODG is now a person who is living, that was
not the case at the time of the occurrence. As such, the Defendants are also entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law on this claim.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment is
hereby GRANTED. The Plaintiffs Petition is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE at Plaintiffs
costs.
Dated this 28th day of July, 2014.

E-FILED 2014 JUL 28 8:10 AM POLK - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

State of Iowa Courts

Type:

OTHER ORDER

Case Number
LACL129854

Case Title
ESTATE OF PAUL DEDRICK GRAY ETAL VS DANIEL J BALDI
DO ETAL
So Ordered

Electronically signed on 2014-07-28 08:10:14

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