Leibnizs Philosophy (B)

Possible Worlds and the Types of Necessity: According to Leibniz, od !as not constrained to create one
partic"lar !orld# There are $any possible !orlds in ods $ind# There co"ld possibly ha%e been a
"ni%erse !itho"t carbon, or "nicorns !itho"t horses# This sho!s that the act"al !orld !ith its things and
la!s is not in fact logically necessary & against 'pinoza, it co"ld ha%e been $ade differently (()n
*reedo$, c#+,-.)# Leibniz $a/es the f"rther point that not all possibilities are co$possible# 0o$possible
possibilities are ones that do not e1cl"de one another, and !e find these act"alised in o"r created !orld#
2%ery possible !orld is a collection of co$possibles# 3o!e%er, there are so$e possible things and la!s
that cannot e1ist if !e do# 4n the sa$e !ay !e !o"ld not be able to e1ist if they e1isted# This is his
strongest criticis$ of 'pinoza5 it is logically i$possible that e%erything possible be act"al# The "ni%erse
cannot be co$plete in the latters sense (ROM, 6, -)#
B"t here again there see$s to be a clash !ith the principle of s"fficient reason# 3o! can o"r !orld
be necessary if it is one of a n"$ber of possible !orlds7 The sol"tion that Leibniz proffers lies in a
distinction he $a/es bet!een logical necessity and hypothetical or conditional necessity# 4t !as not
logically necessary that od choose to $a/e this partic"lar !orld !ith its partic"lar species and la!s, for
!e can assert that it co"ld be other!ise !itho"t any contradiction# 4n p"rely logical ter$s, therefore, this
!orld is indeed contingent# i%en a certain antecedent conditions, ho!e%er, the !orld is in another !ay
necessary# The antecedent conditions are those of a od !ho has a certain nat"re and acts in a certain
$anner# 4t !as necessary in this condional sense that he $a/e the !orld that he did# 3ad he $ade a
different !orld he !o"ld ha%e been a different od# )n this acco"nt there are tr"ths of reason that ha%e
necessity in relation to the !ay od is (DM, +85 M, 98&995 OUOT)#
As the perfect being od !ills the best, and he therefore chose to $a/e the !orld !ith the
$a1i$"$ of perfection# Altho"gh this !as his o!n free act it !as conditionally necessary gi%en his
goodness# 3e did not ha%e to create a !orld, b"t !hen he did so it !as the best possible !orld# Thro"gh
ods nat"re a principle of perfection or of the best is operati%e as far as is possible# Leibniz at ti$es
e:"ates this principle of the best !ith that of s"fficient reason, and if this is the case, e%erything that
happens !ill "lti$ately be for the best (DM, +85 ROM, ., ++, ;<)#
Leibnizs %ie! that this is the best of all possible !orlds !as later satirised by =oltaire in Candide
(+69.)# =oltaire cast Leibniz as >r# Pangloss, !ho sees good reasons for the $ost horrendo"s e%ils and
disasters# 3o!e%er ?escher has arg"ed that this is a parody of Leibnizs act"al position & it is possible to
isolate at least three for$s of opti$is$, only one being that of Leibniz# (a) Absol"te opti$is$: 2%erything
that happens is for the best, and e%il is an ill"sion# (b) 4nstr"$ental opti$is$: )n this %ie! e%il is act"al,
both present and real, b"t al!ays ser%es or leads to a greater good# (c) 0o$pensatory opti$is$: 2%il is
real, and does not al!ays lead to a greater good, and tho"gh a good al!ays co$pensates for an e%il, it
does not al!ays do this ade:"ately# At the o%erall le%el, ho!e%er, the good o"t!eighs the bad# When !e
loo/ at the entire pict"re as opposed to one s$all part of it, e%il is an integral part of a $agnificent and
har$onio"s "ni%erse# Leibnizs o!n acco"nt steers bet!een the instr"$ental and co$pensatory %ariants#