G.R. No.

L-29274 November 27, 1975

SEC. QUIRICO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations,
and the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (PARGO), petitioner,
vs.
HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, and FERNANDO MANALASTAS,
Assistant City Public Service Officer of Manila, and ALL OTHER CITY OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES SIMILARLY SITUATED,
respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc.",
which reads as follows:
IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents
[petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from
further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private
respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under
Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code,
1
the President of the Philippines
created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966.

2
Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following functions and responsibilities:
3

b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling
(physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the
government and the public interests, and to submit proper recommendations to the President of the
Philippines.
c. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and
gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed
wealth ... .
h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints against the acts,
conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper charges with the
appropriate agency.
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee
under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or
subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.
4

Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando
Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as
witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare
and testify in a certain investigation pending therein."
Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25, 1968 with the Court of First Instance of
Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order
docketed as Civil Case No. 73305 and assailed its legality.
On July 1, 1968, respondent Judge issued the aforementioned Order:
IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents
[petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from
further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private
respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under
Section 530 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).
Because of this, petitioners 5 elevated the matter direct to Us without a motion for reconsideration first filed on the fundamental
submission that the Order is a patent nullity.
6

As unfurled, the dominant issue in this case is whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas
in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.
It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the organization and the
analysis of evidence.
7
Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and
licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending, legislation,
and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done.
8
An administrative
agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in
proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken
9 and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries
into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions.
10

We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which,
in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation"
11
with the authority "to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects
to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character."
12
Such subpoena power
operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not
bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function under sub-
paragraph (b). The functions enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with
the principal aim of meeting the very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious activities and
anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory
functions would therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under
sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when
and in what function should the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the established rule
that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none.
Nor could We impress upon this subpoena power the alleged strictures of a subpoena issued under the Rules of Court
13
to
abridge its application. The seeming proviso in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code that the right to summon witnesses
and the authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise shall be "subject in all
respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character" cannot be validly seized
upon to require, in respondents' formulation, that, as in a subpoena under the Rules, a specific case must be pending before a
court for hearing or trial and that the hearing or trial must be in connection with the exercise of the court's judicial or adjudicatory
functions
14
before a non-judicial subpoena can be issued by an administrative agency like petitioner Agency. It must be
emphasized, however, that an administrative subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. Clearly, what the Rules speaks
of is a judicial subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a competent court, and not an administrative subpoena. To an
extent, therefore, the "restrictions and qualifications" referred to in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code could mean
the restraints against infringement of constitutional rights or when the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive and when the
relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear.
15

Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is
involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown
16
and even before the issuance of a complaint.
17
It is not necessary, as in
the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to
one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose.
18
The purpose of the subpoena is to discover
evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies.
19
Its obligation
cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized
purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed to have information that might shed some helpful light.
20
Because judicial
power is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations it does not follow that
an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry.
The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in order to get
evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it wants assurance that it is
not. When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform
itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law.
21
In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for
enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is
reasonably relevant.
22

There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn statements implicating certain
public officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous transactions
23
fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that
the information sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in possession,
24
is
reasonably relevant to the investigations.
We are mindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative investigations, generally, in scope similar to
adversary proceedings.
25
In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr.,
26
the Court ruled that since the administrative charge of unexplained wealth
against the respondent therein may result in the forfeiture of the property under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a
proceeding criminal or penal in nature, the complainant cannot call the respondent to the witness stand without encroaching
upon his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Later, in Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners,
27
the same
approach was followed in the administrative proceedings against a medical practitioner that could possibly result in the loss of his
privilege to practice the medical profession. Nevertheless, in the present case, We find that respondent Fernando Manalastas is
not facing any administrative charge.
28
He is merely cited as a witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of
anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President
of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges.
29
Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of
future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise.
30
Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando
Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against self-incrimination.
A question of constitutional dimension is raised by respondents on the inherent power of the President of the Philippines to issue
subpoena.
31
More tersely stated, respondents would now challenge, in a collateral way, the validity of the basic authority,
Executive Order No. 4, as amended in part by Executive Order No. 88. Unfortunately, for reasons of public policy, the
constitutionality of executive orders, which are commonly said to have the force and effect of statutes
32
cannot be collaterally
impeached.
33
Much more when the issue was not duly pleaded in the court below as to be acceptable for adjudication now.
34
The
settled rule is that the Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.
35

Nothing then appears conclusive than that the disputed subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico Evangelista to respondent
Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal competence of the Agency to issue.
WHEREFORE, the aforequoted order of respondent Judge, dated July 1, 1968, is hereby set aside and declared of no force and
effect.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a motion for
reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the majority
opinion of this Court:
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para una
determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo fijado para el pago
de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado se termine la obra;
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente, con ell, sin
tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica en la
cual tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la misma;
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin tiempo fijo de
duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como
consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la
Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un
determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado deser empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato
en virtud del paro.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by the majority
of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it
necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and
unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent
the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles
from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his
CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio
Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective representation
are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and continuous
civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a
modern labor legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has always been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor
Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence
they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would
necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent National Labor Union,
Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion for a new trial of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the
Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this,
however, we deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly procedure in
cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and
emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the
entire record of the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial
evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken
contains what transpired during the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing
counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of
counsel have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth
Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere
receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is
invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as
will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial
functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes
between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or
affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and
settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards
wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-
laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial
or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and
certified by the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with
by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing,
endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.)
When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all industries established in a designated locality,
with a view to determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or
share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners.
(Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or
conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to
determine specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of
executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to
joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point
out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to
"act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not
be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its
mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the
specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award,
order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy,
appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this
Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said
to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely
ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character. There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304
U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the
rudimentary requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the
rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S.
298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the
right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is
conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or
consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot
be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards
vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power
anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844,
promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and
Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power
v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6
Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The
statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious
purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the
mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the
administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860;
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431;
United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable
flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57
Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be
protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty
actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence
and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the
purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory.
(Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural
dispute or any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of
the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may
delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem
necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies
coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing
examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our
case there is no such statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement
between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst
for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union,
Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically
discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the
petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National
Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and
functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his
substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to
the petition "are of such far reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and
reversal of the judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By
and large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the
movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be
relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be
remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be
relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-56540 October 31, 1984
COSME LACUESTA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
BARANGAY CASABAAN, MUNICIPALITY OF CABANGAN, PROVINCE OF ZAMBALES, and TEOFILO RONQUILLO, defendants-
appellees.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:+.wph!1
This is an appeal certified to us by the then Court of Appeals as involving a pure question of law.
Plaintiff-appellant, Cosme Lacuesta, was the agricultural lessee of a landholding consisting of 1.6610 hectares, situated in
Barangay Casabaan, Cabangan, Zambales. He was devoting a 5,000 square meter portion thereof to the planting of palay.
By virtue of expropriation proceedings against the land-owners instituted by defendant-appellee, Barangay Casabaan (the
Barangay, for short), before the Court of First Instance of Zambales ( the Expropriation Case), the said Barangay was placed in
possession of the same 5,000 square meter portion. Lacuesta was not a party in that case. The Barangay thereafter started
converting the area into a public plaza and constructed a basketball court, a rural health center, a barangay hall and a stage.
While the Expropriation Case was pending, a claiming that he had been illegally deprived of the right to cultivate the portion
expropriated, Lacuesta, litigating as a pauper, filed before the Court of Agrarian Relations of Zambales (CAR, for short), a
Complaint for Reinstatement and Damages against the Barangay, represented by its Captain, Teofilo Ronquillo. Lacuesta claimed
that the entry of the Barangay into the litigated portion without his consent was illegal as its deprived average annual income of
17.5 cavans of palay or its money equivalent, and that by reason he suffered moral damages of P2,000.00
In its Answer, the Barangay contended that the 5,000 square meter portion was upland, not suited for the planting of palay or
corn, but for sugar cane, as shown by the Tax Declaration covering it; that it was awarded possession by virtue of a lawful Court
Order in the Expropriation Case, and that Lacuesta's claim of an annual palay harvest of 17.5 cavans of palay is unfounded.
On July 17, 1980, the CAR rendered judgment dismissing the case essentially on the ground that for reasons of comity, it may not
interfere in the acts of another Court of equal rank, and who has first acquired jurisdiction over the expropriation case." The CAR
further held that Lacuesta was not entitled to actual damages since the palay had already been harvested at the time of
expropriation, nor to disturbance comp ensation since dispossession was not due to the causes enumerated in Section 36(l) of the
Code of Agrarian Reforms (R.A. No. 3844). 1
Lacuesta assailed that judgment before the then Court of Appeals claiming that it is the CAR "which has jurisdiction to determine
whether (he) ha(d) the right to be reinstated in the cultivation of the landholding.
2
He also cited Section 12(n) of P.D. No. 946,
roviding that the Court of Agrarian Relations has original and exclusive jurisdiction over: t.hqw
xxx xxx xxx
(n) Expropriation proceedings for public purpose of all kinds of tenanted agricultural land, whether
instituted by the State, its political subdivisions and instrumentalities, or corporations and entities
authorized by law to expropriate.
The legal poser is, as between the Court of First Instance (CFI) and the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR), which Court has
jurisdiction over the expropriation of a tenanted landholding?
Although the abovequoted provision of P.D. No. 946 explicitly vests jurisdiction in the CAR, it should be noted that P.D. No. 946
became effective only on June 17, 1976 or posterior to the Expropriation Case instituted on October 8, 1975. Jurisdiction,
therefore, vested in the Court of First Instance where we find that no irregularity had been satisfactorily established.
The reinstatement prayed for by Lacuesta is obviously impossible of accomplishment because the public plaza had been
constructed and there is no longer any area he could still cultivate.
On the issue of damages, procedurally, that should have been more properly raised in the Expropriation Case, since it was the case
first instituted and it was the CFI that had first acquired jurisdiction. The Barangay had raised that point in its "Opposition to
Motion for Issuance of Restraining Order and/or Issuance of Preliminary Injunction" but it evoked no reaction from Lacuesta. On
the other hand, the Barangay, too, can be faulted for not having included Lacuesta as a party in the Expropriation Case as required
by Section 1, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
But procedural lapses should not prejudice Lacuesta, whose right to security of tenure as a tenant is, in our opinion, also entitled
to protection even where the power of eminent domain is exercised. Although Lacuesta admits that he is not entitled to
disturbance compensation because that is only granted to a tenant-agricultural lessee whose landholding has been converted by
his landowner/lessor for non-agricultural purposes and not where a tenanted farmholding is expropriated, yet, it is our opinion
that Lacuesta should be entitled to some compensation for the deprivation of his farmholding. Since the amount Lacuesta claimed
as damages in the Complaint has not been satisfactorily rebutted, he may be awarded 17.5 cavans of palay or its money
equivalent, for a period of five years, applying by analogy the same period granted in cases where payment of disturbance
compensation is warranted.
3

Lacuesta is not entitled to the moral damages that he prays for since it cannot be said that the Barangay had acted with malice
and in bad faith.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby modified in that defendants-appellees shall pay plaintiff-appellant damages of 17.5
cavans of palay or its money equivalent in 1975, the year that expropriation took place, for a period of five years. No costs.
SO ORDERED.


November 30, 1963
G.R. No. L-17169
ISIDRO C. ANG-ANGCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. NATALIO P. CASTILLO, ET AL., respondents.
, J.:
On October 8, 1956, the Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co., Inc. wrote a letter to the Secretary of Commerce and Industry
requesting for special permit to withdraw certain commodities from the customs house which were imported without any dollar
allocation or remittance of foreign exchange. Said commodities consisted of 1,188 units of pepsi-cola concentrates which were not
covered by any Central Bank release certificate. On the same date, the company addressed an identical request to the Secretary of
Finance who was also the Chairman of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank. Senator Pedro Sabido, in behalf of the company,
likewise wrote said official urging that authority be given to withdraw the abovementioned concentrates. Not content with this
step, he also wrote to Dr. Andres Castillo, Acting Governor of the Central Bank, urging, the same matter. Then Secretary
Hernandez wrote another letter to Dr. Castillo stating, Senator Sabido is taking this to you personally. Unless we have legal
objection, I would like to authorize the withdrawal of the concentrates upon payment of all charges in pesos. Please expedite
action.
Almost at the same time, the Import-Export Committee of the Central Bank, thru Mr. Gregorio Licaros, submitted to the Monetary
Board a memorandum on the joint petition of the company and Sabido Law Office for authority to withdraw the concentrates
from the customs house stating therein that it sees no objection to the proposal. The Monetary Board, however, failed to take up
the matter in its meeting of October 12, 1956 for the reason that the transaction did not involve any dollar allocation or foreign
exchange, and of this decision Mr. Licaros was informed.
Having failed to secure the necessary authority from the Central Bank, on October 13, 1956, the counsel of the Pepsi-Cola Far East
Trade Development Co., Inc., approached Collector of Customs Isidro Ang-Angco in an attempt to secure from him the immediate
release of the concentrates, but this official seeing perhaps that the importation did not carry any release certificate from the
Central Bank advised the counsel to try to secure the necessary release certificate from the No-Dollar Import Office that had
jurisdiction over the case. In the morning of the same day, Mr. Aquiles J. Lopez, of said Office, wrote a letter addressed to the
Collector of Customs stating, among other things, that his office had no objection to the release of the 1,188 units of concentrates
but that it could not take action on the request as the same is not within the jurisdiction of the No-Dollar Import Office within the
contemplation of R.A. No. 1410. The counsel already referred to above showed the letter to Collector of Customs Ang-Angco who
upon perusing it still hesitated to grant the release. Instead he suggested that the letter be amended in order to remove the
ambiguity appearing therein, but Mr. Lopez refused to amend the letter stating that the same was neither a permit nor a release.
Secretary of Finance Hernandez having been contacted by telephone, Collector of Customs Ang-Angco read to him the letter after
which the Secretary verbally expressed his approval of the release on the basis of said certificate. Collector Ang-Angco, while still
in doubt as to the propriety of the action suggested, finally authorized the release of the concentrates upon payment of the
corresponding duties, customs charges, fees and taxes.
When Commissioner of Customs Manuel P. Manahan learned of the release of the concentrates in question he immediately
ordered their seizure but only a negligible portion thereof remained in the warehouse. Whereupon, he filed an administrative
complaint against Collector of Customs Ang-Angco charging him with having committed a grave neglect of duty and observed a
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the customs service. On the strength of this complaint President Ramon Magsaysay
constituted an investigating committee to investigate Ang-Angco composed of former Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, as
Chairman, and Atty. Arturo A. Alafriz and Lt. Col. Angel A. Salcedo, as members. Together with Collector Ang-Angco, Mr. Aquiles J.
Lopez, was also investigated by the same Committee, who was also charged in a separate complaint with serious misconduct in
office or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the State. As a result, Collector Ang-Angco was suspended from office in the
latter part of December, 1956.
After the investigation, the committee submitted to President Magsaysay its report recommending that a suspension of 15 days,
without pay, be imposed upon Ang-Angco chargeable against the period of his suspension. On April 1, 1957, Collector Ang-Angco
was reinstated to his office by Secretary Hernandez, but the decision on the administrative case against him remained pending
until the death of President Magsaysay. After around three years from the termination of the investigation during which period
Ang-Angco had been discharging the duties of his office, Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo, by authority of the President,
rendered a decision on the case on February 12, 1960 finding Ang-Angco guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, and considering him resigned effective from the date of notice, with prejudice to reinstatement in the Bureau of
Customs.
Upon learning said decision from the newspapers, Collector Ang-Angco wrote a letter to President Carlos P. Garcia calling
attention to the fact that the action taken by Secretary Castillo in removing him from office had the effect of depriving him of his
statutory right to have his case originally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service, as well as of his right of appeal to the Civil
Service Board of Appeals, whose decision under Republic Act No. 2260 is final, besides the fact that such decision is in violation of
the guaranty vouchsafed by the Constitution to officers or employees in the civil service against removal or suspension except for
cause in the manner provided by law.
In a letter dated February 16, 1960, Secretary Castillo, also by authority of the President, denied the request for reconsideration.
Not satisfied with this resolution, Collector Ang-Angco sent a memorandum to President Garcia reiterating once more the same
grounds on which he predicated his request for reconsideration. Again Secretary Castillo, also by authority of the President, in
letter dated July 1, 1960, denied the appeal. In this instance, Secretary Castillo asserted that the President virtue of his power of
control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, can take direct action and dispose of the administrative case in
question inasmuch as the provisions of law that would seem to vest final authority in subordinate officers of the executive branch
of the government over administrative matters falling under their jurisdiction cannot divest the President of his power of control
nor diminish the same.
Hence, after exhausting all the administrative remedies available to him to secure his reinstatement to the office from which he
was removed without any valid cause or in violation of his right to due process of law, Collector Ang-Angco filed before this Court
the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a petition for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory
injunction. The Court gave due course to the petition, but denied the request for injunction.
The main theme of petitioner is that respondent Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo in acting on his case by authority of the
President in the sense of considering him as resigned from notice thereof, violated the guaranty vouchsafed by the Constitution to
officers and employees in the classified service in that he acted in violation of Section 16 (i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959 which
vests in the Commissioner of Civil Service the original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases against officers and
employees in the classified service, deprived him of his right of appeal under Section 18 (b) of the same Act to the Civil Service
Board of Appeals whose decision on the matter is final, and removed him from the service without due process in violation of
Section 32 of the same Act which expressly provides that the removal or suspension of any officer or employee from the civil
service shall be accomplished only after due process, and of Section 4, Article XII of our Constitution which provides that No
officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed except for cause as provided for by law. Since petitioner is an officer who
belongs to the classified civil service and is not a presidential appointee, but one appointed by the Secretary of Finance under the
Revised Administrative Code, he cannot be removed from the service by the President in utter disregard of the provisions of the
Civil Service Act of 1959.
Respondents, on their part, do not agree with this theory entertained by petitioner. They admit that if the theory is to be
considered in the light of the provisions of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the same may be correct, for indeed the Civil Service Law
as it now stands provides that all officers and employees who belong to the classified service come under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Commissioner of Civil Service and as such all administrative cases against them shall be indorsed to said official whose
decision may be appealed to the Civil Service Board of Appeals from whose decision no further appeal can be taken. They also
admit that petitioner belongs to the classified civil service. But it is their theory that the pertinent provisions of the Civil Service
Law applicable to employees in the classified service do not apply to the particular case of petitioner since to hold otherwise
would be to deprive the President of his power of control over the officers and employees of the executive branch of the
government. In other words, respondents contend that, whether the officers or employees concerned are presidential appointees
or belong to the classified service, if they are all officers and employees in the executive department, they all come under the
control of the President and, therefore, his power of removal may be exercised over them directly without distinction. Indeed,
respondents contend that, if, as held in the case of Negado v. Castro, 55 O.G. 10534, the President may modify or set aside a
decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals at the instance of the office concerned, or the respondent employee, or may even do
so motu propio, there would be in the final analysis no logical difference between removing petitioner by direct action of the
President and separating him from the service by ultimate action by the President should an appeal be taken from the decision of
the Civil Service Board of Appeals to him, or if in his discretion he may motu proprio consider it necessary to review the Boards
decision. It is contended that this ruling still holds true in spite of the new provision wrought into the law by Republic Act 2260
which eliminated the power of review given to the President because the power of control given by the Constitution to the
President over officers and employees in the executive department can only be limited by the Constitution and not by Congress,
for to permit Congress to do so would be to diminish the authority conferred on the President by the Constitution which is
tantamount to amending the Constitution itself (Hebron v. Reyes, L- 9124, July 28, 1958). Indeed this is the argument invoked by
respondent Castillo in taking direct action against petitioner instead of following the procedure outlined in the Civil Service Act of
1959 as may be seen from the following portion of his decision.
In connection with the second ground advanced in support of your petition, it is contended that in deciding the case directly,
instead of transmitting it to the Commissioner of Civil Service for original decision, his Office deprived the respondent of his right
to appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals. This contention overlooks the principle that the President may modify or set aside
a decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals at the instance of either the office concerned or the respondent employee, or may
even do so motu proprio (Negado vs. Castro, 55 O.G, No. 51, p. 10534, Dec. 21, 1959). There would therefore be no difference in
effect between direct action by the President and ultimate action by him should an appeal be taken from the decision of the
Commissioner of Civil Service or the Civil Service Board of Appeals. The result is that the Presidents direct action would be the
final decision that would be reached in case an appeal takes its due course.
Thus, we see that the main issue involved herein is whether the President has the power to take direct action on the case of
petitioner even if he belongs to the classified service in spite of the provisions now in force in the Civil Service Act of 1959.
Petitioner sustains the negative contending that the contrary view would deprive him of his office without due process of law
while respondents sustain the affirmative invoking the power of control given to the President by the Constitution over all officers
and employees, belonging to the executive department.
To begin with, we may state that under Section 16 (i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959 it is the Commissioner of Civil Service who has
original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases of all officers and employees in the classified service for in said
section the following is provided: Except as otherwise provided by law, (the Commissioner shall) have final authority to pass upon
the removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officers and employees in the competitive or classified service and upon
all matters relating to the employees. The only limitation to this power is that the decision of the Commissioner may be appealed
to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, in which case said Board shall decide the appeal within a period of 90 days after the same
has been submitted for decision, whose decision in such case shall be final (Section 18, Republic Act 2260). It should be noted that
the law as it now stands does not provide for any appeal to the President, nor is he given the power to review the decision motu
proprio, unlike the provision of the previous law, Commonwealth Act No. 598, which was expressly repealed by the Civil Service
Act of 1959 (Rep. Act 2260), which provides that the decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals may be reversed or modified
motu proprio by the President. It is, therefore, clear that under the present provision of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the case of
petitioner comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having been deprived of the procedure
laid down therein in connection with the investigation and disposition of his case, it may be said that he has been deprived of due
process as guaranteed by said law.
It must, however, be noted that the removal, separation and suspension of the officers and employees of the classified service are
subject to the saving clause Except as otherwise provided by law (Section 16 *i+, Republic Act No. 2260). The question then may
be asked: Is the President empowered by any other law to remove officers and employees in the classified civil service?
The only law that we can recall on the point is Section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code, the pertinent portion of which
we quote:
(b) To remove officials from office conformably to law and to declare vacant the offices held by such removed officials. For
disloyalty to the (United States) Republic of the Philippines, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may at any time
remove a person from any position of trust or authority under the Government of the (Philippine Islands) Philippines.
The phrase conformably to law is significant. It shows that the President does not have blanket authority move any officer or
employee of the government but his power must still be subject to the law that passed by the legislative body particularly with
regard the procedure, cause and finality of the removal of persons who may be the subject of disciplinary action. Here, as above
stated we have such law which governs action to be taken against officers and employees in classified civil service. This law is
binding upon President.
Another provision that may be mentioned is Section (D) of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides:
Power to appoint and remove. The Department Head, the recommendation of the chief of the Bureau or office concerned, shall
appoint all subordinate officers and employees appointment is not expressly vested by law in the (Governor-General) President of
the Philippines, and may remove or punish them, except as especially provided otherwise, in accordance the Civil Service Law.
The phrase in accordance with the Civil Service is also significant. So we may say that even granting for administrative purposes,
the President of the Philippines is considered as the Department Head of the Civil Service Commission, his power to remove is still
subject to the Civil Service Act of 1959, and we already know with regard to officers and employees who belong to classified
service the finality of the action is given to the Commissioner of Civil Service or the Civil Board of Appeals.
Let us now take up the power of control given to President by the Constitution over all officers and employees in the executive
department which is now in by respondents as justification to override the specific visions of the Civil Service Act. This power of
control couched in general terms for it does not set in specific manner its extent and scope. Yes, this Court in the case of Hebron v.
Reyes, supra, had already occasion to interpret the extent of such power to mean the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter,1 to distinguish it from the power of general supervision over municipal government, but the
decision does not go to the extent of including the power to remove an officer or employee in the executive department.
Apparently, the power merely applies to the exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate and not over the actor or agent
himself of the act. It only means that the President may set aside the judgment or action taken by a subordinate in the
performance of his duties.
That meaning is also the meaning given to the word control as used in administrative law. Thus, the Department Head pursuant
to Section 79(C) is given direct control of all bureaus and offices under his department by virtue of which he may repeal or modify
decisions of the chiefs of said bureaus or offices, and under Section 74 of the same Code, the Presidents control over the
executive department only refers to matters of general policy. The term policy means a settled or definite course or method
adopted and followed by a government, body, or individual,2 and it cannot be said that the removal of an inferior officer comes
within the meaning of control over a specific policy of government.
But the strongest argument against the theory of respondents is that it would entirely nullify and set at naught the beneficient
purpose of the whole civil service system implanted in this jurisdiction, which is to give stability to the tenure of office of those
who belong to the classified service, in derogation of the provisions of our Constitution which provides that No officer or
employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law (Section 4, Article XII,
Constitution).Here, we have two provisions of our Constitution which are apparently in conflict, the power of control by the
President embodied in Section 10 (1), Article VII, and the protection extended to those who are in the civil service of our
government embodied in Section 4, Article XII. It is our duty to reconcile and harmonize these conflicting provisions in a manner
that may give to both full force and effect and the only logical, practical and rational way is to interpret them in the manner we do
it in this decision. As this Court has aptly said in the case of Lacson v. Romero:
To hold that civil service officials hold their office at the will of the appointing power subject to removal or forced transfer at any
time, would demoralize and undermine and eventually destroy the whole Civil Service System and structure. The country would
then go back to the days of the old Jacksonian Spoils System under which a victorious Chief Executive, after the elections could if
so minded, sweep out of office, civil service employees differing in Political color or affiliation from him, and sweep in his Political
followers and adherents, especially those who have given him help, political or otherwise. (Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil. 740, 754)
There is some point in the argument that the Power of control of the President may extend to the Power to investigate, suspend
or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to
the classified service for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint
(Lacson V. Romero, supra), but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them
that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that the Congress may
by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department (Article VII,
Section 10 [3], Constitution). With regard to these officers whose appointments are vested on heads of departments, Congress has
provided by law for a procedure for their removal precisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil Service
Act of 1959.
We have no doubt that when Congress, by law, vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of departments it may limit
and restrict power of removal as it seem best for the public interest. The constitutional authority in Congress to thus vest the
appointment implies authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may enact in relation to the
officers so appointed. The head of a department has no constitutional prerogative of appointment to officers independently of
legislation of Congress, and by such legislation he must be governed, not only in making appointments but in all that is incident
thereto. (U.S. v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483)
In resume, we may conclude that the action taken by respondent Executive Secretary, even with the authority of the President, in
taking direct action on the administrative case of petitioner, without submitting the same to the Commissioner of Civil Service, is
contrary to law and should be set aside.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that petitioner be immediately reinstated to his office as Collector of Customs for the Port of
Manila, without prejudice of submitting his case to the Commissioner of Civil Service to be dealt with in accordance with law. No
costs.


G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his
capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for
the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said
examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members
of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said
examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed
by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the
Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in
good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to
practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in
excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases "does not involve
entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so
that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and
other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; .
. . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition or
qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph,
requires more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the
action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines,
which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a
similar examination as that prescribed by respondent. . . .
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes the Commissioner of Patents
to prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before the United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly
authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding tests or examinations the
passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first
time that the right of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or
otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines
1

and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or
quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the
patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim
in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where
the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am.
Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having
no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No
valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode
Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors,
and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their
rights in patent cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application
of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as
well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but
practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the
existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent
Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare.
Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others in the Philippines
before the invention thereof by the inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than
one year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for more than one
year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to patent belongs to the true and actual
inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28
enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29,
the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition
for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of
Patents in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three years from the day
the patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being worked in the
Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the
demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of
the patentee's refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by him to the license,
purchase or use of the patented article or working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new
trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary to public
health or public safety. All these things involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal
knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involve
questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides
that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to cancel a patent or to
obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court
from any final order or decision of the director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office and the acts, orders and
decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the
appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not
the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the Head of the Patent Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and extensions, exercises quasi-
judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any
person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting and delivering of a
patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his
action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In passing on an application the commissioner should
decide not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the
article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar,
because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination
or other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the
bar practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and documents, such as,
the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an
application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and technical description of
said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to practice or to do business
before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act
No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an
examination similar to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following
provisions of said Rules of Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. A register of an attorneys and a register agents are kept in the Patent Office on
which are entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in
the preparation and prosecution of applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of
these rules shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.
(a) Attorney at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any United States Court or the
highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with the
provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the
register of attorneys.
x x x x x x x x x
(c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he shall apply to the
Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested
information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral character
and of good repute and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to
render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the presentation
and prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may determine whether
a person seeking to have his name placed upon either of the registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory
proof of good moral character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must be
submitted and an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of an examination
may be waived in the case of any person who has served for three years in the examining corps of the Patent Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized
by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules and
regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties
before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of
applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute, are possessed of
the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise
to competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or
other business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing,
suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from further practice before his office any person, agent
or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the
said rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any
applicant or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective applicant, or other person having
immediate or prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any
such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the
petition of the person so refused recognition or so suspended by the district court of the United States for the District
of Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis
supplied)
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of law just reproduced, then
he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and
pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United States Patent Law as
regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary
qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may
take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important
point. Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to determine the
qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and make regulations or
general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service and to
carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as
the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the
Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of
the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the
provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureau of Customs and
Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern the transaction of business in and to enforce the law
for said bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the necessary sanction, to
require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent
Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the
business in the same area are more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,
assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods,
imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer
practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and
in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office
involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as
the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-
judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring
members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and
practice before the Patent Office. No costs.

G.R. Nos. L-7771-73 May 31, 1955
PHILIPPINE MOVIE PICTURES WORKERS' ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
PREMIERE PRODUCTIONS, INC., respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
With the view taken by the Court of these cases, there is no need of making a long and elaborate statement of the facts involved.
The petitioner in each of these cases, Philippine Movie Pictures Workers' Association later referred to as the Association, is a labor
organization whose members were employees and laborers of the respondent Premiere Productions, Inc., referred to later as the
Company, a corporation engaged in the production of movie pictures. On October 2, 1951, respondent company filed a petition
with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) for permission to lay-off its personnel working in three of its departments, numbering
about 44 on the ground that it was losing in the operation of its business. Judge Arsenio C. Roldan, presiding judge of the CIR after
an ocular inspection of the company's premises, and after conferring with the personnel he found therein, granted the petition
and the personnel were laid off.
After shutting the studios, the company filed another petition with the CIR for permission or authority to lease its equipments,
studios, and other facilities to Eddie Infante, Braulio Calma and others. The association objected to the proposed lease on the
ground that it was an attempt by the company to make use of its properties through other persons which would mean
disturbance of the status quo while the dispute between the association and the company was pending. Then the company filed a
motion to withdraw its petition saying that it was convinced that the lease of its properties was a mere exercise of its proprietary
rights, and that court permission was unnecessary. The motion was granted. Thereafter, on February 7, 1952, the company
transferred some of its equipment to Polo, Bulacan to be leased and used as in fact they were used by one Artemio Marquez in
the filming of the picture "Bakas Ng Kahapon". For this action of the company the association on February 9, 1952, filed an urgent
petition with the CIR, incidental case No. 98 V-8, for contempt and for injunction on the ground that the company had no right to
remove its equipment from its studios to be leased to Marquez without court authority. Thereafter, the company again leased its
equipment and facilities to one Efren Reyes for the filming of the picture "Larawan Ng Buhay". The association again filed another
urgent petition, incidental case No. 598 V-10, for contempt and injunction. Again, on March 5, 1952, the company leased its other
sound equipment to one Manuel Vistan for the filming of the picture "Troubador" and to Artemio Marquez in filming the picture
"Boys Town". The association again filed another petition, incidental case No. 598 V-11, for contempt and injunction.
After the company had answered the three petitions for contempt and injunction, by agreement of the parties, these three
incidental cases were heard jointly. During the hearing held before Presiding Judge Roldan and in the presence of one Martin
Dolorico, a Commissioner of the CIR, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts and stated therein their respective contention,
after which, both parties submitted the cases for decision without further evidence. This was on October 7, 1952. However, no
decision was immediately rendered because both parties asked for time to enable them to bargain collectively, the negotiations
commencing in January, 1953 and lasting until July of the same year. In the meantime, on April 18, 1953, the association filed a
"Supplemental petition to annul lease contracts and for contempt of court and for injunction", and on June 14, 1953, the
association filed a "Motion for production of document" under section 1, Rule 21, of the Rules of Court, alleging that the movie
company had in the meantime entered into other contracts of lease, and asking that Dr. Ciriaco Santiago, president of the movie
company or his representative produce before the court the contracts referred to for purposes of inspection, copying or
photographing thereof, and to set for hearing the urgent petitions of February 9, 1952 and April 18, 1953 regarding the simulated
leases.
Thereafter, Commissioner Martin Dolorico filed his report, which report was approved and completely adopted by Judge Roldan in
his decision rendered on July 29, 1953, wherein he found that the leases of the equipment, studios and other properties of the
movie company to third parties were not simulated but genuine, and that they were valid; that it was entirely proper for the
movie company to lease its equipment which was lying idle because of the shutting down of its studios so as to make money and
perhaps enable it to rehabilitate itself financially and to re-employ the same personnel who had been laid off, that the association
should not object to these leases because it was the understanding at the time that they were laid off that in case it was later
decided by the court that they had been improperly made to stop working, they would not only be reinstated but they would also
be given backpay for the entire period of the lay-off. As to the supplemental petition to annul he lease contracts and for contempt
of court and for injunction filed on April 18, 1953 and the motion filed on June 14th, Judge Roldan held that they would be heard
separately from the incidental cases, for purposes of expediency. The decision ended by denying the three petitions for injunction
and for contempt of court.
Upon motion for reconsideration by the association and over the opposition of the company, the CIR in banc by resolution dated
November 13, 1953, reconsidered the decision aforementioned and set it aside, as premature, saying that before rendering a final
decision, the court should have awaited further presentation of evidence on the supplemental petition of April 18, 1953, "so that
all ingredients for the proper disposal of the case would have been complete." The resolution was penned by Judge Jose Bautista
and concurred in by Judges Castillo and Yanson. Judge Roldan wrote a dissenting opinion concurred in by Judge Juan E. Lanting.
The association has now filed these petitions for review by certiorari, not only of the decision of Judge Roldan but also of the
resolution of the majority of the CIR, to set the same aside, and for the rendition of another decision holding the leases entered
into by the movie company to be illegal and that the company and its officers and agents be held to have committed contempt of
court in entering into those leases without authority of the CIR.
The majority of the Tribunal believe that it is unnecessary to go into the merits of the present cases, because the resolution of the
majority of the CIR setting aside the decision of Judge Roldan, left the cases without any decision to appeal from, and that said
resolution is in the nature of a mere interlocutory order, which is not subject to appeal.
In view of the foregoing, these petitions for certiorari are hereby denied, and the cases are ordered remanded to the CIR for
further proceedings. No costs.

G.R. No. L-2821 March 4, 1949
JOSE AVELINO, petitioner,
vs.
MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
In G.R. No. L-2821, Avelino vs. Cuenco, the Court by a vote of six justices against four resolved to deny the petition.
Without prejudice to the promulgation of a more extended opinion, this is now written briefly to explain the principal grounds for
the denial.
The Court believes the following essential facts have been established:
In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Taadare quested that his right to speak on the next session
day, February 21, 1949, to formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was
approved.
On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the session Senator Taada and Senator Taada and Senator Prospero Sanidad
filed with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution enumerating charges against the then Senate President and ordering the
investigation thereof.
Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate session hall at the appointed time (10:00
A.M.), and the petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner delayed his appearance at the session hall until about 11:35 A.M.
When he finally ascended the rostrum, he did not immediately open the session, but instead requested from the Secretary a copy
of the resolution submitted by Senators Taada and Sanidad and in the presence of the public he read slowly and carefully said
resolution, after which he called and conferred with his colleagues Senator Francisco and Tirona.
Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting to order. Except Senator Sotto
who was confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in the United States, all the Senator were present.
Senator Sanidad, following a long established practice, moved that the roll call be dispensed with, but Senator Tirona opposed said
motion, obviously in pursuance of a premeditated plan of petitioner and his partisans to make use of dilatory tactics to prevent
Senator Taada from delivering his privilege speech. The roll was called.
Senator Sanidad next moved, as is the usual practice, to dispense with the reading of the minutes, but this motion was likewise
opposed by Senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy.
Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Taada repeatedly stood up to claim his
right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech but the petitioner, then presiding, continuosly ignored him; and when after the
reading of the minutes, Senator Taada instead on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he would order
the arrest of any senator who would speak without being previously recognized by him, but all the while, tolerating the actions of
his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously shouting at Senator Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime the latter would ask for
recognition of Senator Taada.
At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by pre-arrangement. At about this same time
Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of the petitioner's followers, was recognized by petitioner, and he moved for adjournment of
session, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy to muzzle Senator Taada.
Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this opposition was seconded by herein
respondent who moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a vote. Another commotion ensued.
Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein respondent also reiterated his opposition to the adjournment
and again moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a vote.
Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked out of the session hall followed by Senator
David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while the rest of the senators remained. Whereupon Senator Melencio
Arranz, Senate President Pro-tempore, urged by those senators present took the Chair and proceeded with the session.
Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of record it was so made that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by
the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to
continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate.
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be designated to preside over the session which suggestion
was carried unanimously. the respondent thereupon took the Chair.
Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was approved Gregorio Abad was appointedActing Secretary, because the Assistance
Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner when the latter abandoned the session.
Senator Taada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege speech. Thereafter Senator
Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same
was unanimously approved.
With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad
introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and designated the
Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously approved.
Senator Cuenco took the oath.
The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting president of the Philippines Senate.
By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioners asked the Court to declare him the rightful President of the Philippines
senate and oust respondent.
The Court has examined all principal angles of the controversy and believes that these are the crucial points:
a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?
b. If it is has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
c. Should the petition be granted?
To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy
(Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the constitutional
grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the
judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged
affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer
affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if,
as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate
Session Hall not in the Supreme Court.
The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede might lead into a crisis,
even a resolution. No state of things has been proved that might change the temper of the Filipino people as a peaceful and law-
abiding citizens. And we should not allow ourselves to be stampeded into a rash action inconsistent with the calm that should
characterized judicial deliberations.
The precedent of Werts vs. Roger does not apply, because among other reasons, the situation is not where two sets of senators
have constituted themselves into two senates actually functioning as such, (as in said Werts case), there being no question that
there is presently one Philippines Senate only. To their credit be it recorded that petitioner and his partisans have not erected
themselves into another Senate. The petitioner's claim is merely that respondent has not been duly elected in his place in the
same one Philippines Senate.
It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to the respondent makes it advisable, more than
ever, to adopt the hands-off policy wisely enunciated by this Court in matters of similar nature.
The second question depends upon these sub-questions. (1) Was the session of the so-called rump Senate a continuation of the
session validly assembled with twenty two Senators in the morning of February 21, 1949?; (2) Was there a quorum in that session?
Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Reyes deem it useless, for the present to pass on these questions once it is held, as they
do, that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case. What follows is the opinion of the other four on those four on those sub-
questions.
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation
of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from
passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been
approved only by ten or less.
If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In other words, was there the
majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon
say there was, firstly because the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen
senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas
Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three senators. When the Constitution declares that a
majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the
members constitute "the House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of
"the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate
less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes
furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent
members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just
the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.
In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who
may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator
Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful
President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators,
the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session
hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about
quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all
their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.
As already stated, the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to dismiss the petition. Without costs.

G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS
AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO
CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on
leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The warring personalities are important enough but
more transcendental are the constitutional issues embedded on the parties' dispute. While the significant issues are many, the
jugular issue involves the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style.
First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
was elected Vice-President. Some ten (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he would rescue them from life's
adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely eroded his
popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend
of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
1
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate
Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled "I Accuse." He accused the petitioner of receiving
some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the
petitioner took from Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was
referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and
the Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation.
2
The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then headed by Representative
Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the expos of Governor Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez,
Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement
in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to step down from the presidency as he had
lost the moral authority to govern.
3
Two days later or on October 13, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the
cry for the resignation of the petitioner.
4
Four days later, or on October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino also demanded
that the petitioner take the "supreme self-sacrifice" of resignation.
5
Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus. Early on,
or on October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services
6
and later asked for
petitioner's resignation.
7
However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign.
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the Council of Senior Economic Advisers,
resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister Cesar Virata, former Senator Vicente Paterno and
Washington Sycip.
8
On November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from the Department of Trade and Industry.
9
On
November 3, Senate President Franklin Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected
from the ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.
10
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the
Articles of Impeachment
11
signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to
the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as
Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentebella.
12
On November 20, the Senate formally opened the
impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., presiding.
13
The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment trial started.
14
The battle royale was
fought by some of the marquee names in the legal profession. Standing as prosecutors were then House Minority Floor Leader
Feliciano Belmonte and Representatives Joker Arroyo, Wigberto Taada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib
Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of private
prosecutors led by now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as defense
counsel were former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza, former
City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flaminiano, former Deputy Speaker of the House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty.
Raymund Fortun. The day to day trial was covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing rating. Its high and
low points were the constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic point of the December hearings was the
testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she was one foot away from
petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents involving a P500 million investment agreement
with their bank on February 4, 2000.
15
After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas. When it resumed on January 2,
2001, more bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioner's
Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that the petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr.
Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading.
16
Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-10
17
the
senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held
P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of
the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President.
18
The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous
outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches
full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.
On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their collective resignation. They also
filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment tribunal.
19
Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the
indefinite postponement of the impeachment proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue of
resignation of the public prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the motion.
20
January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-kilometer line of people holding lighted
candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize
the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to
show their concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted
more and more people.
21
On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive
Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30
p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the
growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the
armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.
22
In the presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of thousands of
cheering demonstrators, General Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed
Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this government."
23
A little later, PNP Chief, Director General
Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement.
24
Some Cabinet secretaries,
undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts.
25
Rallies for the resignation of the
petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced he was ordering his lawyers to
agree to the opening of the highly controversial second envelope.
26
There was no turning back the tide. The tide had become a
tsunami.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of
power started at Malacaang'' Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior Deputy Executive
Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of
the Presidential Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was represented by now Executive
Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary of Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez.
27
Outside the
palace, there was a brief encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada protesters which resulted in stone-throwing and
caused minor injuries. The negotiations consumed all morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer
the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines.
28
At 2:30
p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacaang Palace.29 He issued the following press statement:
30

"20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and
serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be
a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with
gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future
challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:
31

"Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this
declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m. on January 20.
23
Another copy was transmitted to Senate
President Pimentel on the same day although it was received only at 9:00 p.m.
33
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties of the
Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:
"A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath of Office
as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice Acting on the urgent request of
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines,
addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request
was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolve unanimously to confirm the authority given by
the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer
the oath of office of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of
January 20, 2001.
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper
party."
Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special envoys.
34
Recognition of respondent
Arroyo's government by foreign governments swiftly followed. On January 23, in a reception or vin d' honneur at Malacaang, led
by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats recognized the
government of respondent Arroyo.
35
US President George W. Bush gave the respondent a telephone call from the White House
conveying US recognition of her government.
36
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of Representatives.
37
The House then
passed Resolution No. 175 "expressing the full support of the House of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency,
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines."
38
It also approved Resolution No. 176 "expressing the support of the
House of Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of
the Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of
the nation's goals under the Constitution."
39
On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act.
40
A few days later, she also signed into law the
Political Advertising ban and Fair Election Practices Act.
41
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President.
42
The next day, February 7, the
Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr.
43
Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan
Ponce Enrile, and John Osmena voted "yes" with reservations, citing as reason therefor the pending challenge on the legitimacy of
respondent Arroyo's presidency before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were absent.
44
The
House of Representatives also approved Senator Guingona's nomination in Resolution No. 178.
45
Senator Guingona, Jr. took his
oath as Vice President two (2) days later.
46
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and has been
terminated.
47
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated "for the record" that she voted against the closure of the impeachment
court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question
of whether Estrada was still qualified to run for another elective post.
48
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyo's public acceptance rating jacked up from 16% on January 20,
2001 to 38% on January 26, 2001.
49
In another survey conducted by the ABS-CBN/SWS from February 2-7, 2001, results showed
that 61% of the Filipinos nationwide accepted President Arroyo as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed
that President Arroyo is accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in
Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes: 58% in the ABC or
middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass class, and 54% among the E's or very poor class.
50
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against
him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on
October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of
the Code of Conduct for Government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation,
Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-
00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and
property, plunder, etc.; (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder,
indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco,
Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the
petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as members, viz: Director Andrew
Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order
directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in
answer to the aforementioned complaints against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting
any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that
may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted." Thru another
counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be
the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and
declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant
to the provisions of the Constitution." Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the
respondents "to comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001." On February 13, the Court
ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents' comments "on or before
8:00 a.m. of February 15."
On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the hearing, Chief Justice Davide, Jr.
51

and Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban
52
recused themselves on motion of petitioner's counsel, former Senator Rene A.
Saguisag. They debunked the charge of counsel Saguisag that they have "compromised themselves by indicating that they have
thrown their weight on one side" but nonetheless inhibited themselves. Thereafter, the parties were given the short period of five
(5) days to file their memoranda and two (2) days to submit their simultaneous replies.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press statement for "Gag Order" on
respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:
"(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of
the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged
resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of being cited
for contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar
while they are still pending decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from
resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office against petitioner, Joseph E.
Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the respondent Ombudsman
may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held
on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and academic."
53

The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed submitted for decision.
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:
I
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II
Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on
leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution
of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is
immune from criminal prosecution.
IV
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I
Whether or not the cases
At bar involve a political question
Private respondents
54
raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question, and hence, are beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases at bar assail the "legitimacy of the
Arroyo administration." They stress that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power; that she has already
taken her oath as the 14
th
President of the Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has been
recognized by foreign governments. They submit that these realities on ground constitute the political thicket, which the Court
cannot enter.
We reject private respondents' submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the shroud on political question
but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine
which rests on the principle of separation of powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in the mills of
constitutional law.
55
In the United States, the most authoritative guidelines to determine whether a question is political were
spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case or Baker v. Carr,
56
viz:
"x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non
justiciability on the ground of a political question's presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of
'political questions', not of 'political cases'."
In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer delineation of the inner and
outer perimeters of a political question.
57
Our leading case is Tanada v. Cuenco,
58
where this Court, through former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure." To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded
the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.
59
Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou
shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction.
60
With the new provision, however, courts are given
a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of
doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political
thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid language to "x x x review, in
an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x."
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino,
et al.
61
and related cases
62
to support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of
respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political question. A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are
inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the government of former President Aquino was the result of a successful revolution
by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the Freedom Constitution
63
declared that the Aquino government
was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people "in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution,
as amended." In is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people power is
beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the
government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine is the oath under
the 1987 Constitution.
64
In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has
stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency under the authority of the 1987 Constitution.1wphi1.nt
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the
people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of
speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the
President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of
judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of
the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal
questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of
grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights was one of the reasons of our 1898
revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion call for the recognition of freedom of the press of the
Filipinos and included it as among "the reforms sine quibus non."
65
The Malolos Constitution, which is the work of the
revolutionary Congress in 1898, provided in its Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express his
ideas or opinions, orally or in writing, through the use of the press or other similar means; (2) of the right of association for
purposes of human life and which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the right to send petitions to the authorities,
individually or collectively." These fundamental rights were preserved when the United States acquired jurisdiction over the
Philippines. In the Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by President McKinley, it is specifically
provided "that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably
assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances." The guaranty was carried over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1966.
66
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,
67
and the 1973
68
Constitution. These rights are now safely
ensconced in section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances."
The indispensability of the people's freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now self-evident. The reasons are well
put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual fulfillment; second, it is an essential
process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all
members of society; and fourth, it is a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more stable community of maintaining
the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus."
69
In this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly
provides a framework in which the "conflict necessary to the progress of a society can take place without destroying the
society."
70
In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,
71
this function of free speech and assembly was echoed in the
amicus curiae filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association which emphasized that "the basis of the right
of assembly is the substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk rather than force; and this means talk for all and by
all."
72
In the relatively recent case of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,
73
this Court similar stressed that " it should be clear even to
those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all should listen. For
in a democracy, it is the people who count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers."
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper
interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II,
74
and section 8
75
of Article VII, and the
allocation of governmental powers under section 11
76
of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential
immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the
1803 case of Marbury v. Madison,
77
the doctrine has been laid down that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is . . ." Thus, respondent's in vocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the
dark.
II
Whether or not the petitioner
Resigned as President
We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political question. Indeed, it involves a
legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records of the case and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner
denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the President
was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.
The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution which provides:
"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President, the Vice
President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability,
removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or,
in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the
President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.
x x x."
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when
respondent took her oath as the 14
th
President of the Public. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual
question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment.
78
The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be
written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacaang
Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner
resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow the succession of events
after the expos of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigated. The more detailed revelations of
petitioner's alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed
in the House of Representatives which initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express speed, it
gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of Representatives. Soon, petitioner's powerful
political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and former
Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his
Secretary of Trade and Industry.
As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people's call for his resignation intensified. The call reached a new
crescendo when the eleven (11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open the second envelope. It sent the people
to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of January 16 was over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress of
their grievance. Their number grew exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire.
As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner. The window is
provided in the "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer.
79
The Angara Diary reveals that in the morning of January 19, petitioner's loyal advisers were worried about the swelling
of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided to create an ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m.,
petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: "Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas
na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)"
80
An hour later or at 2:30 p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a
snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May
where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. At
3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of the petitioner and dramatically
announced the AFP's withdrawal of support from the petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent Arroyo. The seismic
shift of support left petitioner weak as a president. According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner
to consider the option of "dignified exit or resignation."
81
Petitioner did not disagree but listened intently.
82
The sky was falling
fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified
exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that petitioner would be allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support him
and his family.
83
Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said
he would never leave the country.
84
At 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, "Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I
would have five days to a week in the palace."
85
This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to
resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.
The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary Angara and requested, "Ed,
magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power."
86
There was no
defiance to the request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that at this stage, the problem was already about a
peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20 a.m. of January 20, that fateful
Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition period of five days after the petitioner's resignation;
(2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate
the name of the petitioner.
87
Again, we note that the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot
feign ignorance of this fact. According to Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and the
following entry in the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz:
"x x x
I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations. The President immediately stresses that he
just wants the five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to clear his name.
If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
The President says. "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape,
bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want any more of this it's too painful. I'm tired of the red
tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
I just want to clear my name, then I will go."
88

Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said "x x x Ayoko na
masyado nang masakit." "Ayoko na" are words of resignation.
The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the following happened:
"Opposition's deal
7:30 a.m. Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagal's spokesperson) Rene Corona. For this
round, I am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.
Rene pulls out a document titled "Negotiating Points." It reads:
'1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001, that will be effective on
Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the Presidency of the Republic of
the Philippines.
2. Beginning to day, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the new administration
shall commence, and persons designated by the Vice President to various positions and offices of the
government shall start their orientation activities in coordination with the incumbent officials concerned.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall function under the Vice
President as national military and police authority effective immediately.
4. The Armed Forced of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the security of the
President and his family as approved by the national military and police authority (Vice President).
5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with the alleged savings
account of the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with the rules of the Senate, pursuant to
the request to the Senate President.
Our deal
We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:
The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and undertake as follows:
'1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which time President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada will turn over the presidency to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
'2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of their person and
property throughout their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and his families are guarantee
freedom from persecution or retaliation from government and the private sector throughout their natural
lifetimes.
This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through the Chief of
Staff, as approved by the national military and police authorities Vice President (Macapagal).
'3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate sitting as an impeachment court will authorize the
opening of the second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof that the subject savings account does not
belong to President Estrada.
'4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January 2001 (the 'Transition
Period"), the incoming Cabinet members shall receive an appropriate briefing from the outgoing Cabinet
officials as part of the orientation program.
During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function Vice President
(Macapagal) as national military and police authorities.
Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall obtain all the necessary
signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful implementation and observance thereof.
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in
"Annex A" heretofore attached to this agreement."
89

The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be noted that during this second
round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time
were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement, which was premised on the resignation of the petitioner was further refined.
It was then, signed by their side and he was ready to fax it to General Reyes and Senator Pimentel to await the signature of the
United Opposition. However, the signing by the party of the respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking. The Angara diary
narrates the fateful events, viz;
90

"xxx
11:00 a.m. Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the five points to effect a
peaceful transition. I can hear the general clearing all these points with a group he is with. I hear voices in
the background.
Agreement.
The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which resignation shall be
effective on 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the presidency of the Republic of
the Philippines.
x x x
The rest of the agreement follows:
2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence on 20 January 2001,
wherein persons designated by the Vice President to various government positions shall start orientation
activities with incumbent officials.
'3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the safety and security of
the President and his families throughout their natural lifetimes as approved by the national military and
police authority Vice President.
'4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice President as national
military and police authorities.
'5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the impeachment trial, the
contents of which shall be offered as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to the
President.
The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex "B" heretofore
attached to this agreement.
11:20 a.m. I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed by our side and
awaiting the signature of the United opposition.
And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has decided that Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.
'Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (why couldn't you wait? What about the
agreement)?' I asked.
Reyes answered: 'Wala na, sir (it's over, sir).'
I ask him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?'
And General Reyes answers: ' Oo nga, I delete na natin, sir (yes, we're deleting the part).'
Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross.
But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this matter is already
moot and academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first provision and faxes the documents, which have
been signed by myself, Dondon and Macel, to Nene Pimentel and General Reyes.
I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the signatures of the other side,
as it is important that the provisions on security, at least, should be respected.
I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide will administer the
oath to Gloria at 12 noon.
The President is too stunned for words:
Final meal
12 noon Gloria takes her oath as president of the Republic of the Philippines.
12:20 p.m. The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.
The president is having his final meal at the presidential Residence with the few friends and Cabinet
members who have gathered.
By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at Mendiola. Only the PSG is
there to protect the Palace, since the police and military have already withdrawn their support for the
President.
1 p.m. The President's personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada family's personal
possessions as they can.
During lunch, Ronnie Puno mentions that the president needs to release a final statement before leaving
Malacaang.
The statement reads: At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath
as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I
have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I
do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with
gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future
challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
MABUHAY!"'
It was curtain time for the petitioner.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press
release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit
with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace
and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that
he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the
opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4)
he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's
reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his
supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the part tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner
sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:
"Sir.
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to
exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting
president.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.
91
The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss,
may even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court
these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never
referred to by the petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence when he
issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily
unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for the time bearing. Under any
circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press
release of the petitioner clearly as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press released, still, it commands scant legal
significance. Petitioner's resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will
especially if the resignation is the result of his reputation by the people. There is another reason why this Court cannot given any
legal significance to petitioner's letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he could not resign as a matter of law. He
relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his
resignation, viz:
"Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminals or
administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code on bribery."
A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the petitioner. RA No. 3019 originated form
Senate Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill, when it was submitted to the Senate, did not contain a provision similar to
section 12 of the law as it now stands. However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill,
"reserved to propose during the period of amendments the inclusion of a provision to the effect that no public official who is
under prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or is under administrative investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign
or retire."
92
During the period of amendments, the following provision was inserted as section 15:
"Sec. 15. Termination of office No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an
investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under the
Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official form office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this Act
for an offense committed during his incumbency."
93

The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the second paragraph of the provision and
insisted that the President's immunity should extend after his tenure.
Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter passed. Section 15 above became section
13 under the new bill, but the deliberations on this particular provision mainly focused on the immunity of the President, which
was one of the reasons for the veto of the original bill. There was hardly any debate on the prohibition against the resignation or
retirement of a public official with pending criminal and administrative cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law
ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a protective shield
to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-
Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for
that would be a violation of his constitutional right.
94
A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign.
Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution,
such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against him. He cannot
use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.
There is another reason why petitioner's contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show that when petitioner
resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-
00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit.
Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of
RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not
suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars
him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming
arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the
process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public
and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the
proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against petitioner when he
resigned.
III
Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President.
We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the
presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As aforestated, the inability claim is contained in the January 20, 2001 letter of
petitioner sent on the same day to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge
the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate authority under the
Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11
of article VII."
95
This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is
only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
"SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be
discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of
the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of
his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue.
For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance
with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within
twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting
separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President
shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office."
That is the law. Now, the operative facts:
1. Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President
and Speaker of the House;
2. Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20,
2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;
3. Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House
Resolution No. 175;
96

On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 176
97
which states:
"RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO
OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER
ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION'S GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, as a consequence of the people's loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police and
majority of his cabinet had withdrawn support from him;
WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo was sworn in as President of the Philippines on 20 January 2001 before Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr.;
WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had extended their
recognition to Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a policy of national healing and
reconciliation with justice for the purpose of national unity and development;
WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved if it is divided, thus by
reason of the constitutional duty of the House of Representatives as an institution and that of the individual
members thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the people, the House of Representatives must ensure to
the people a stable, continuing government and therefore must remove all obstacles to the attainment
thereof;
WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all efforts to unify the nation, to
eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political wounds, and to be an instrument of national
reconciliation and solidarity as it is a direct representative of the various segments of the whole nation;
WHEREAS, without surrending its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all the foregoing, for the
House of Representatives to extend its support and collaboration to the administration of Her Excellency,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in nation-building, the national interest
demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption into office by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, to extend its
congratulations and to express its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the
Nation's goals under the Constitution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General"
On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 178
98
which states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SENATOR
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency of
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy
shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting
separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader
Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and
courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having
served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the Philippines
qualities which merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House of Representatives
confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General"
(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioner's letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) members of the Senate
signed the following:
"RESOLUTION
WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for meaningful change and
challenge;
WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation needs unity of purpose
and resolve cohesive resolute (sic) will;
WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative measures in unity despite
diversities in perspectives;
WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo and resolve to discharge and overcome the nation's challenges."
99

On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82
100
which states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SEM. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency of
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy
shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting
separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and
courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statemanship, having served the
government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of
the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the land - which qualities
merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
as Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate"
On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83
101
which states:
"RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment Court is functus officio
and has been terminated.
Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court on Monday, January 15, Tuesday, January 16
and Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be considered approved.
Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the "second envelope" be
transferred to the Archives of the Senate for proper safekeeping and preservation in accordance with the
Rules of the Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only upon written approval of the
Senate president.
Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate"
(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 "certifying to the existence of vacancy in the Senate and calling on
the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the
Senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13
th
) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.'
(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo as President.
(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any sector of government,
and without any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to
claim that his inability to govern is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the
President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary.
Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and
thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as president of the Philippines.
Following Taada v. Cuenco,
102
we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power or this is an issue "in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of the government." Or to use the language in Baker vs.
Carr,
103
there is a "textually demonstrable or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly,
the Court cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the power and duties of the presidency. The question is
political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided by this
Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave
on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision
that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
IV
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.
Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent Ombudsman should be
prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity
from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.
Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a revisit of our legal history executive immunity will be most enlightening. The doctrine
of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and
Crosfield,
104
the respondent Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands. J.E. Harding and C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for
damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him to China. In granting a writ of prohibition, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Johnson, held:
" The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to
touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded
and unrestrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the
law, could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference
of courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either that a person injured by the executive authority by an
act unjustifiable under the law has n remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply,
that the governors-general, like the judges if the courts and the members of the Legislature, may not be
personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance of his
official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the mater is properly presented to it and the
occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General illegal and void and place as nearly as
possible in status quo any person who has been deprived his liberty or his property by such act. This remedy
is assured to every person, however humble or of whatever country, when his personal or property rights
have been invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is
mulct the Governor-General personally in damages which result from the performance of his official duty,
any more than it can a member of the Philippine Commission of the Philippine Assembly. Public policy
forbids it.
Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be personally sued at all in
relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the
discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an
analogy between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a
case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercised discretion in
determining whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from
personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without
authority, provided he actually used discretion and judgement, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining
whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, in determining the question of his authority. If he
decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his authority was one over which two men,
reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he s not protected if the lack of authority to
act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its determination. In such case, be acts, not
as Governor-General but as a private individual, and as such must answer for the consequences of his act."
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted immunity from suit, viz "xxx. Action
upon important matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the chief executive spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect
engendered for the person of one of the highest officials of the state and for the office he occupies; a tendency to unrest and
disorder resulting in a way, in distrust as to the integrity of government itself."
105

Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on executive immunity. Then came the tumult of the
martial law years under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973 Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and
one of the amendments involved executive immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated:
"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for
official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of this
Constitution.
In his second Vicente G. Sinco professional Chair lecture entitled, "Presidential Immunity and All The King's Men: The Law of
Privilege As a Defense To Actions For Damages,"
106
petitioner's learned counsel, former Dean of the UP College of Law, Atty.
Pacificao Agabin, brightened the modifications effected by this constitutional amendment on the existing law on executive
privilege. To quote his disquisition:
"In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and fortifying the
absolute immunity concept. First, we extended it to shield the President not only form civil claims but also
from criminal cases and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so that it would cover even acts of the
President outside the scope of official duties. And third, we broadened its coverage so as to include not only
the President but also other persons, be they government officials or private individuals, who acted upon
orders of the President. It can be said that at that point most of us were suffering from AIDS (or absolute
immunity defense syndrome)."
The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept of executive immunity in the 1973
Constitution. The move was led by them Member of Parliament, now Secretary of Finance, Alberto Romulo, who argued that the
after incumbency immunity granted to President Marcos violated the principle that a public office is a public trust. He denounced
the immunity as a return to the anachronism "the king can do no wrong."
107
The effort failed.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the People Power revolution in 1986.
When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution.
The following explanation was given by delegate J. Bernas vis:
108

"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision
for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out
second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973
Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence
that the President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him
that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigation's, as the President-in-exile in
Hawaii is now facing litigation's almost daily?
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that
during his tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was
to make that explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam President.
I think the Commissioner for the clarifications."
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument that he cannot be
prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner
Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on
February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio."
109

Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached
and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a
submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been
subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the
Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the
President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:
110

"xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for
example, and the President resigns before judgement of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment
court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation
would render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of
it may continue in the ordinary courts."
This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez
111
that 'incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being
brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that
the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot
demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment
proceedings. His reliance on the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan
112
and related cases
113
are inapropos for they have a different
factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against
petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the
imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of
a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and
wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability
for unlawful acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts
illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.
114
Indeed, critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the privilege
especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon,
115
US
President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents relating to his
conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct
Justice and other offenses, which were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's
Watergate Hotel during the 972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator.
President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among others, that the President was not subject to judicial
process and that he should first be impeached and removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial
proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to
subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail
over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v.
Fitzgerald,
116
the US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the president from civil damages covers only "official acts."
Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones
117
where it held that the
US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of
the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust.
118
It declared as a state policy that "the State shall
maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruptio."
119
it
ordained that "public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."
120
It set the rule that 'the
right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or
transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, latches or estoppel."
121
It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.
122

It created the office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to "investigate on its own, or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust improper or inefficient."
123
The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy.
124
These
constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for
criminal acts committed during his incumbency.
V
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner
Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed
against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed
bias and is all set file the criminal cases violation of his right to due process.
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during
the investigation and trial of high profile cases.
125
The British approach the problem with the presumption that publicity will
prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a
threat.
126
The American approach is different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive
publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e.,
substantial; probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the trials or annul convictions in high
profile criminal cases.
127
In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,
128
later reiterated in the case of Larranaga vs. court of Appeals, et al.,
129
we
laid down the doctrine that:
"We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial
publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all
high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is
not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances accused's right to a fair trial
for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the criminal field xxx. The press
does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting
the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial
of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so
permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the
minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases.
The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast
tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of
life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the
world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they
lose there impartially. xxx xxx xxx. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court
evidence and on-camera performances of parties to litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and
publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage
of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al.,
we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled
that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have
been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at a bar, the
records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellants as a consequence of the
extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does
not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity, which is incapable
of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias
and he has not discharged the burden.'
We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon, etc.
130
and its companion cases, viz:
"Again petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing
preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the
substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.
xxx
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its
excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure,
few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary
investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even
today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime.
Indeed, even the principal actors in the case the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their
sympathizers have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair
trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and public. In the seminal case
of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was
xxx
a. The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice
demonstrates conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were adopted, criminal
trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the
proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of
participants, or decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community
therapeutic value of public trials was recognized when a shocking crime occurs a community
reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice
serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility
and emotion. To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal process satisfy the
appearance of justice,' Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L ED 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can
best be provided by allowing people to observe such process. From this unbroken,
uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be
concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under
this Nation's system of justice, Cf., e,g., Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct
1038.
b. The freedoms of speech. Press and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment,
share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the
functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedom such as those of speech and press, the First
Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning
to those explicit guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means,
in the context of trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit
government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at
the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant,
having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free
exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which the draftsmen deliberately linked it. A
trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally and representatives of the media
have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance
the integrity and quality of what takes place.
c. Even though the Constitution contains no provision which be its terms guarantees to the public
the right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have
been recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend
criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend
such trials, which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech
and of the press be eviscerated.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held
that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have
been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we
find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the
investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot
just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are
basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to
consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-
page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they considered any extra-
record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was
conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery
motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the
disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of
prejudicial publicity." (emphasis supplied)
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to
discharge his burden of proof.
131
He needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired
capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary
investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been
made by the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of the
pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot
second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote petitioner's
submission, the respondent Ombudsman "has been influenced by the barrage of slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the
threats and pressures directed at him by the mobs."
132
News reports have also been quoted to establish that the respondent
Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of the petitioner
133
and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating the
petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the
petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as
to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is
entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman
flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigation prosecutors the independence to
make their own findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors.
134
They can be reversed but they can
not be compelled cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like
unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter
believes that the findings of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the
proper court.
VI.
Epilogue
A word of caution to the "hooting throng." The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a different dimension and then move
to a new stage - - - the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the majority for instant justice will hit a higher decibel
while the gnashing of teeth of the minority will be more threatening. It is the sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman to
balance the right of the State to prosecute the guilty and the right of an accused to a fair investigation and trial which has been
categorized as the "most fundamental of all freedoms."
135
To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice and less to
prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall have a circus-free atmosphere.
He has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls "the impatient vehemence of the majority." Rights in a democracy are
not decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power of
number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the definition of the rule of law. If
democracy has proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has respected the right of the minority to convince the
majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the key to man's progress from
the cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander to some people's prejudice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure
14
th
President of the Republic are DISMISSED.


[G.R. No. 176478, February 04, 2008]

LORNA A. MEDINA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), represented by the Audit
Team of EUFROCINIA MAWAK, SUSAN PALLERNA, and MA. DOLORES TEPORA, Respondents.

DECISION
TINGA, J,:

While highlighting the interplay between the powers of two constitutional offices, one mandated as the
government monitor of public fund expenditures and the other as the sentinel against graft and
corruption in government, this case resolves some questions about the extent of their powers.

This is a petition for review on certiorari
[1]
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking
the reversal of the Decision
[2]
and Resolution
[3]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89539. The
Court of Appeals decision affirmed the two joint orders issued by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon finding herein petitioner Lorna A. Medina guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty. The
Resolution of the same court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said decision.

The instant petition originated from the audit conducted by respondent Commission on Audit (COA) on
the cash and accounts handled by petitioner in her official capacity as Municipal Treasurer of General
Mariano Alvarez, Cavite. In the Joint Affidavit
[4]
executed by herein respondents Eufrocinia M. Mawak,
head of the audit team, and Susana L. Pallerna, Ma. Dolores C. Tepora and a certain Nelson T. Alvarez,
who were all state auditors of the Provincial Auditors Office of Cavite, they all stated that they had
examined petitioners financial records covering 19 August 1999 to 26 September 2000 and discovered a
total cash shortage in the aggregate amount of P4,080,631.36. They thus directed petitioner to
immediately restitute the shortage within 72 hours from receipt of the demand letter but petitioner
allegedly failed to comply. The state auditors submitted a report to the Provincial Auditors Office and
recommended the relief of petitioner from her post as municipal treasurer and the filing of criminal
charges against her.

COA, represented by the aforementioned state auditors, filed an administrative case docketed as OMB-L-
A-04-0361-F before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, charging petitioner with grave
misconduct and dishonesty. As directed, petitioner filed a Counter-Affidavit
[5]
and a Position Paper
[6]

mainly raising the following defenses: (1) the audit team was not independent and competent; (2) the
computation of her accountabilities was overstated and erroneous; (3) the audit team failed to verify
documents such as bank reconciliation statements, general ledgers and cashbooks presented during the
cash count; (4) the documents in support of the audit report were not signed, hence, were self-serving;
(5) the cash shortage in the amount of P379,646.51 under the SEF and Trust Fund as well as the
disallowed amount of P585,803.37 had no basis as the same pertained to a previous audit and, thus,
should have been excluded from the computation of the total shortage; (6) the cash items amounting to
P883,952.91 in the form of reimbursement expense receipts should not have been disallowed because
they were actually received by individual payees; (7) petitioners cash on hand accountability was
overstated because a collection was not immediately recorded; and (8) the audit team erroneously
credited petitioners accounts to another cashier.

In a Decision
[7]
dated 8 November 2004, Deputy Ombudsman Victor C. Fernandez approved the
recommendation of the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer to dismiss petitioner from service
based on the existence of substantial evidence of a discrepancy in petitioners account totaling
P4,080,631.36. The said decision noted petitioners supposed failure to file a counter-affidavit and
position paper despite due notice.

On 29 November 2004, petitioner filed an urgent motion
[8]
stating that she complied with the directive to
file a counter-affidavit and position paper and praying that the defenses therein be considered in
reversing the 8 November 2004 decision. The motion was treated as a motion for reconsideration of the
said decision.

On 31 January 2005, Deputy Ombudsman Fernandez issued the first assailed Joint Order
[9]
denying
petitioners urgent motion. Although the order acknowledged the erroneous statement in the 8
November 2004 Decision stating that petitioner failed to submit a counter-affidavit, nevertheless, it
affirmed the Resolution and Decision both dated 8 November 2004. Deputy Ombudsman Fernandez
ruled that petitioners Counter-Affidavit and Position Paper did not present exculpatory arguments that
would negate the allegation of discrepancy on petitioners accounts. He also held that petitioners
concerns relating to the conduct of the audit should have been raised at the time of the audit or
immediately thereafter, and that petitioners failure to produce the amount of cash shortage despite
demand created a presumption that she appropriated public funds under her custody for her own
personal use.
[10]


Petitioner sought reconsideration
[11]
on grounds of newly discovered and material evidence and grave
errors of fact and/or law prejudicial to her own interest. The purported newly discovered evidence
consisted of petitioners request for reconsideration of the audit report filed and still pending before the
office of the audit team head, herein respondent Mawak, and letters sent by petitioners counsel to the
provincial auditor of Cavite questioning the audit and requesting a re-audit of petitioners accounts.

In the second assailed Joint Order dated 22 March 2005,
[12]
Deputy Ombudsman Fernandez denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration. He reiterated that petitioners allegations as regards the
incompetence of the audit team and the errors in the audit report were matters which may be properly
ventilated during trial. He explained that petitioner failed to produce the missing funds despite notice
thereof creating a presumption that the same were appropriated for personal use and for the purpose of
preliminary investigation, such findings warranted the filing of criminal charges against petitioner. The
deputy ombudsman held that petitioners belated request for re-audit could not be considered newly
discovered evidence and denied the request for a formal investigation on the ground that petitioner was
afforded due process when she filed her counter-affidavit and position paper.
[13]


Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review
[14]
questioning the denial
of her request for a formal investigation, the penalty of dismissal, and the sufficiency of the evidence
against her.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in the assailed Decision dated 23 October 2006.
[15]
It held
that petitioner was not entitled to a formal investigation and it affirmed the deputy ombudsmans factual
finding that petitioner was guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty. The appellate court also denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated 30 January 2007.

Hence, the instant petition
[16]
seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision on the following
grounds: (1) the Court of Appeals failed to order a formal reinvestigation, to reopen and review the
records of the administrative case, to consider newly discovered evidence attached to petitioners motion
for reconsideration of the deputy ombudsmans Decision and to consider material allegations in the
motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision; (2) petitioner was able to overcome the presumption
that she appropriated the missing funds for personal use; (3) the filing of the administrative case was
baseless; and (4) the penalty of dismissal was unwarranted.

The instant petition reiterates the issues brought up before the Court of Appeals, namely: whether
petitioner was deprived of her right to due process, whether the penalty of dismissal is proper and
whether petitioners guilt for grave misconduct and dishonesty is supported by substantial evidence.

Invoking her right to due process, petitioner, on one hand, insists that she is entitled to a formal
investigation, citing the Administrative Code of 1987, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 48 (2)
[17]
and
(3).
[18]
On the other hand, in support of its argument that the propriety of conducting a formal
investigation rests on the sound discretion of the hearing officer, respondent COA, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), relies on Administrative Order No. 07, as amended by Administrative Order
No. 17, Rule III, Section 5,
[19]
governing the procedure in administrative cases filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman.

The validity of Administrative Order No. 07, Rule III, Section 5 is not in dispute. However, petitioner
argues that said provision is inferior to the provision in the Administrative Code which entitles the
respondent to a formal investigation if he so desires.

Petitioners theory is erroneous.

Administrative Order No. 07, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, particularly governs the
procedure in administrative proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman. The Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman was issued pursuant to the authority vested in the Office of the
Ombudsman under Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989. When an
administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it makes a new law with the force and effect
of a valid law. Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority
conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute.
[20]


On the other hand, the provisions in the Administrative Code cited by petitioner in support of her theory
that she is entitled to a formal investigation apply only to administrative cases filed before the Civil
Service Commission (CSC). In particular, Section 48(2) and Section 48(3) are subsumed under Subtitle
A of Title I, which pertains to the CSC and to the procedure of administrative cases filed before the CSC.
The administrative complaint against petitioner was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman,
suggesting that a different set of procedural rules govern. And rightly so, the Deputy Ombudsman
applied the provisions of Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman in ruling that the
prerogative to elect a formal investigation pertains to the hearing officer and not to petitioner.

On various occasions,
[21]
the Court has ruled on the primacy of special laws and of their implementing
regulations over the Administrative Code of 1987 in settling controversies specifically subject of these
special laws. For instance, in Hon. Joson v. Exec. Sec. Torres,
[22]
the Court held that the Local
Government Code of 1991, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of
1991, and Administrative Order No. 23 (A.O. No. 23)
[23]
govern administrative disciplinary proceedings
against elective local officials, whereas the Rules of Court and the Administrative Code of 1987 apply in
a suppletory character to all matters not provided in A.O. No. 23.
[24]
The aforesaid ruling is based on the
principle of statutory construction that where there are two statutes applicable to a particular case, that
which is specially intended for the said case must prevail.
[25]


More significantly, in Lapid v. Court of Appeals,
[26]
the Court expressly upheld the applicability of The
Ombudsman Act of 1989 and the implementing rules and regulations thereof to the exclusion of the
Local Government Code and the Administrative Code of 1989 on the issue of the execution of the
Ombudsmans decision pending appeal. The Court noted that petitioner therein was charged before the
Office of the Ombudsman and accordingly, The Ombudsman Act of 1989 should apply exclusively. The
Court explained, thus:
There is no basis in law for the proposition that the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 and
the Local Government Code on execution pending review should be applied suppletorily to the provisions
of the Ombudsman Act as there is nothing in the Ombudsman Act which provides for such suppletory
application. xxx xxx xxx

And while in one respect, the Ombudsman Law, the Administrative Code of 1987 and the Local
Government Code are in pari materia insofar as the three laws relate or deal with public officers, the
similarity ends there. It is a principle in statutory construction that where there are two statutes that
apply to a particular case, that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail over the
other. In the instant case, the acts attributed to petitioner could have been the subject of administrative
disciplinary proceedings before the Office of the President under the Local Government Code or before
the Office of the Ombudsman under the Ombudsman Act. Considering however, that petitioner was
charged under the Ombudsman Act, it is this law alone which should govern his case.
[27]

Thus, as between the Administrative Code of 1987 and Administrative Order No. 07, as amended, issued
by the Office of the Ombudsman, the latter governs in this case which involves an administrative
complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and which raises the question of whether petitioner is
entitled to a formal investigation as a matter of right.

Even assuming the Administrative Code is applicable, still there is a formidable hindrance to petitioners
prayer for a formal investigation. The records show that petitioner sought a reinvestigation only as an
afterthought, that is, after the deputy ombudsman had already rendered a decision on the
administrative complaint. The reinvestigation should have been requested at the first opportunity but
definitely before the rendition of a decision.

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the denial of petitioners request for a formal investigation is not
tantamount to a denial of her right to due process. Petitioner was required to file a counter-affidavit and
position paper and later on, was given a chance to file two motions for reconsideration of the decision of
the deputy ombudsman. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to
explain ones side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties
are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are
sufficiently met.
[28]


Petitioners assertion that the Court of Appeals refused to reopen and review the case and ignored
material issues and arguments in her motion for reconsideration of the 23 October 2006 Decision in
violation of her right to due process, is quite hollow.

The appellate court disposed of petitioners contention that she was able to controvert the accusations
against her in this wise:
Regarding the second, third and fourth assigned errors, We judiciously believe that the issues raised
therein are essentially factual in nature. The rule is that the findings of fact in administrative decisions
must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or
preponderant. It is not for the reviewing court to weight the conflicting evidence, determine the
credibility of the witnesses or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative
agency on the sufficiency of evidence. It has been consistently held that substantial evidence is all that
is needed to support an administrative finding of fact which means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.
[29]

Nothing prevents the Court of Appeals from adopting the factual findings and conclusion of the deputy
ombudsman on the ground that the findings and conclusions were based on substantial evidence. Well-
settled is the rule that the findings of fact of administrative bodies, if based on substantial evidence, are
controlling on the reviewing authority. It is settled that it is not for the appellate court to substitute its
own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility
of the witnesses. Administrative decisions on matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect and
can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.
[30]
Guided by this
principle, the appellate court correctly affirmed the finding of guilt for grave misconduct and dishonesty.

Unfazed, petitioner now asks this Court to once again review the factual findings and conclusions of the
Deputy Ombudsman which had already been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Whether the finding of
petitioners guilt for grave misconduct and dishonesty is supported by substantial evidence, suffice it to
say these are factual issues calling for a review of the records of the case. Clear and unmistakable is the
rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Just as well entrenched is the doctrine that pure
issues of fact may not be the proper subject of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court as this mode of appeal is generally confined to questions of law. Only questions of law, not
questions of fact, may be raised before the Supreme Court in a petition for review under Rule 45. This
Court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the petitioners in the lower courts and
analyze, assess and weigh them to ascertain if the court a quo and the appellate court were correct in
their appreciation of the evidence.
[31]


Anyhow, the Court adopts the following findings of the Court of Appeals which are borne out by the
records of the case:
x x x It is a fact that an examination was conducted on the cash and accounts of respondent and that a
shortage was found. While the latter argues that the auditors did not observe the proper procedure in
conducting an examination and as a consequence of which, she was not able to justify the alleged
shortage, we take note that the latter was given the opportunity to make such explanation when the
auditors sent her a demand letter.
[32]

On the penalty of dismissal which petitioner claims is too harsh, petitioner argues that the mitigating
circumstances of this being her first offense and of the unreasonable length of time in filing the
administrative case should be considered in her favor.

Jurisprudence is replete with cases declaring that a grave offense cannot be mitigated by the fact that
the accused is a first time offender or by the length of service of the accused. In Civil Service
Commission v. Cortez,
[33]
the Court held as follows:
The gravity of the offense committed is also the reason why we cannot consider the first offense
circumstance invoked by respondent. In several cases, we imposed the heavier penalty of dismissal or a
fine of more than P20,000.00, considering the gravity of the offense committed, even if the offense
charged was respondents first offense. Thus, in the present case, even though the offense respondent
was found guilty of was her first offense, the gravity thereof outweighs the fact that it was her first
offense.
[34]

Also, in Concerned Employees v. Nuestro,
[35]
a court employee charged with and found guilty of
dishonesty for falsification was meted the penalty of dismissal notwithstanding the length of her service
in view of the gravity of the offense charged.

To end, it must be stressed that dishonesty and grave misconduct have always been and should remain
anathema in the civil service. They inevitably reflect on the fitness of a civil servant to continue in office.
When an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of such officer or
employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the publics faith and
confidence in the government.
[36]


WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89539 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.


G.R. No. 155831 February 18, 2008
MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. ROGELIO I. RAYALA, respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 155840 February 18, 2008
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; RONALDO V. ZAMORA, in his
capacity as Executive Secretary; ROY V. SENERES, in his capacity as Chairman of the National
Labor Relations Commission (in lieu of RAUL T. AQUINO, in his capacity as Acting Chairman of
the National labor Relations Commission); and MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 158700 February 18, 2008
The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; and
ALBERTO G. ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, petitioners, vs. ROGELIO I.
RAYALA, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced "superiority" which is enough to dampen an employees
spirit and her capacity for advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it changes her life.
1

Before this Court are three Petitions for Review on Certiorari assailing the October 18, 2002 Resolution
of the CAs Former Ninth Division
2
in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026. The Resolution modified the December 14,
2001 Decision
3
of the Court of Appeals Eleventh Division, which had affirmed the Decision of the Office
of the President (OP) dismissing from the service then National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
Chairman Rogelio I. Rayala (Rayala) for disgraceful and immoral conduct.
All three petitions stem from the same factual antecedents.
On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the
NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
To support the Complaint, Domingo executed an Affidavit narrating the incidences of sexual harassment
complained of, thus:
x x x x
4. Sa simula ay pabulong na sinasabihan lang ako ni Chairman Rayala ng mga salitang "Lot,
gumaganda ka yata?"
5. Sa ibang mga pagkakataon nilalapitan na ako ni Chairman at hahawakan ang aking balikat
sabay pisil sa mga ito habang ako ay nagta-type at habang nagbibigay siya ng diktasyon. Sa
mga pagkakataong ito, kinakabahan ako. Natatakot na baka mangyari sa akin ang mga
napapabalitang insidente na nangyari na noon tungkol sa mga sekretarya niyang nagbitiw gawa
ng mga mahahalay na panghihipo ni Chairman.
6. Noong ika-10 ng Setyembre, 1998, nang ako ay nasa 8
th
Floor, may nagsabi sa akin na
kailangan akong bumaba sa 7
th
Floor kung nasaan ang aming opisina dahil sa may koreksyon
daw na gagawin sa mga papel na tinayp ko. Bumaba naman ako para gawin ito. Habang
ginagawa ko ito, lumabas si Chairman Rayala sa silid ni Mr. Alex Lopez. Inutusan ako ni
Chairman na sumunod sa kaniyang silid. Nang nasa silid na kami, sinabi niya sa akin:
Chairman: Lot, I like you a lot. Naiiba ka sa lahat.
At pagkatapos ako ay kaniyang inusisa tungkol sa mga personal na bagay sa aking buhay. Ang
ilan dito ay tungkol sa aking mga magulang, kapatid, pag-aaral at kung may boyfriend na raw
ba ako.
Chairman: May boyfriend ka na ba?
Lourdes: Dati nagkaroon po.
Chairman: Nasaan na siya?
Lourdes: Nag-asawa na ho.
Chairman: Bakit hindi kayo nagkatuluyan?
Lourdes: Nainip po.
Chairman: Pagkatapos mo ng kurso mo ay kumuha ka ng Law at ako ang bahala sa
iyo, hanggang ako pa ang Chairman dito.
Pagkatapos ay kumuha siya ng pera sa kaniyang amerikana at inaabot sa akin.
Chairman: Kuhanin mo ito.
Lourdes: Huwag na ho hindi ko kailangan.
Chairman: Hindi sige, kuhanin mo. Ayusin mo ang dapat ayusin.
Tinanggap ko po ang pera ng may pag-aalinlangan. Natatakot at kinakabahan na kapag hindi
ko tinanggap ang pera ay baka siya magagalit kasabay na rito ang pagtapon sa akin kung
saan-saan opisina o kaya ay tanggalin ako sa posisyon.
Chairman: Paglabas mo itago mo ang pera. Ayaw ko ng may makaka-alam nito. Just
the two of us.
Lourdes: Bakit naman, Sir?
Chairman: Basta. Maraming tsismosa diyan sa labas. But I dont give them a damn.
Hindi ako mamatay sa kanila.
Tumayo na ako at lumabas. Pumanhik na ako ng 8
th
Floor at pumunta ako sa officemate ko na
si Agnes Magdaet. Ikinwento ko ang nangyari sa akin sa opisina ni Chairman. Habang
kinikwento ko ito kay Agnes ay binilang namin ang pera na nagkakahalaga ng tatlong libong
piso (PHP 3,000). Sinabi ni Agnes na isauli ko raw ang pera, pero ang sabi ko ay natatakot ako
baka magalit si Sir. Nagsabi agad kami kay EC Perlita Velasco at sinalaysay ko ang nangyari.
Sinabi niya na isauli ko ang pera at noong araw ding iyon ay nagpasiya akong isauli na nga ito
ngunit hindi ako nagkaroon ng pagkakataon dahil marami siyang naging bisita. Isinauli ko nga
ang pera noong Lunes, Setyembre 14, 1998.
7. Noong huling linggo ng Setyembre, 1998, ay may tinanong din sa akin si Chairman Rayala
na hindi ko masikmura, at sa aking palagay at tahasang pambabastos sa akin.
Chairman: Lot, may ka live-in ka ba?
Lourdes: Sir, wala po.
Chairman: Bakit malaki ang balakang mo?
Lourdes: Kayo, Sir ha! Masama sa amin ang may ka live-in.
Chairman: Bakit, ano ba ang relihiyon ninyo?
Lourdes: Catholic, Sir. Kailangan ikasal muna.
Chairman: Bakit ako, hindi kasal.
Lourdes: Sir, di magpakasal kayo.
Chairman: Huh. Ibahin na nga natin ang usapan.
8. Noong Oktubre 29, 1998, ako ay pumasok sa kwarto ni Chairman Rayala. Ito ay sa
kadahilanang ang fax machine ay nasa loob ng kaniyang kwarto. Ang nag-aasikaso nito, si Riza
Ocampo, ay naka-leave kaya ako ang nag-asikaso nito noong araw na iyon. Nang mabigyan ko
na ng fax tone yung kausap ko, pagharap ko sa kanan ay nakaharang sa dadaanan ko si
Chairman Rayala. Tinitingnan ako sa mata at ang titig niya ay umuusad mula ulo hanggang
dibdib tapos ay ngumiti na may mahalay na pakahulugan.
9. Noong hapon naman ng pareho pa ring petsa, may nag-aapply na sekretarya sa opisina,
sinabi ko ito kay Chairman Rayala:
Lourdes: Sir, si Pinky po yung applicant, mag-papainterview po yata sa inyo.
Chairman: Sabihin mo magpa-pap smear muna siya
Chairman: O sige, i-refer mo kay Alex. (Alex Lopez, Chief of Staff).
10. Noong Nobyembre 9, 1998, ako ay tinawag ni Chairman Rayala sa kaniyang opisina upang
kuhanin ko ang diktasyon niya para kay ELA Oscar Uy. Hindi pa kami nakakatapos ng unang
talata, may pumasok na bisita si Chairman, si Baby Pangilinan na sinamahan ni Riza Ocampo.
Pinalabas muna ako ni Chairman. Nang maka-alis na si Ms. Pangilinan, pinapasok na niya ako
ulit. Umupo ako. Lumapit sa likuran ko si Chairman, hinawakan ang kaliwang balikat ko na
pinipisil ng kanang kamay niya at sinabi:
Chairman: Saan na ba tayo natapos?
Palakad-lakad siya sa aking likuran habang nag-didikta. Huminto siya pagkatapos, at nilagay
niya ang kanang kamay niya sa aking kanang balikat at pinisil-pisil ito pagkatapos ay
pinagapang niya ito sa kanang bahagi ng aking leeg, at pinagapang hanggang kanang tenga at
saka kiniliti. Dito ko inalis ang kaniyang kamay sa pamamagitan ng aking kaliwang kamay. At
saka ko sinabi:
Lourdes: Sir, yung kamay ninyo alisin niyo!
Natapos ko rin ang liham na pinagagawa niya pero halos hindi ko na maintindihan ang na-isulat
ko dahil sa takot at inis na nararamdaman ko.
4

After the last incident narrated, Domingo filed for leave of absence and asked to be immediately
transferred. Thereafter, she filed the Complaint for sexual harassment on the basis of Administrative
Order No. 250, the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7877 in the Department of Labor and
Employment.
Upon receipt of the Complaint, the DOLE Secretary referred the Complaint to the OP, Rayala being a
presidential appointee. The OP, through then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, ordered Secretary
Laguesma to investigate the allegations in the Complaint and create a committee for such purpose. On
December 4, 1998, Secretary Laguesma issued Administrative Order (AO) No. 280, Series of 1998,
5

constituting a Committee on Decorum and Investigation (Committee) in accordance with Republic Act
(RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.
6

The Committee heard the parties and received their respective evidence. On March 2, 2000, the
Committee submitted its report and recommendation to Secretary Laguesma. It found Rayala guilty of
the offense charged and recommended the imposition of the minimum penalty provided under AO 250,
which it erroneously stated as suspension for six (6) months.
The following day, Secretary Laguesma submitted a copy of the Committee Report and Recommendation
to the OP, but with the recommendation that the penalty should be suspension for six (6) months and
one (1) day, in accordance with AO 250.
On May 8, 2000, the OP, through Executive Secretary Zamora, issued AO 119,
7
the pertinent portions of
which read:
Upon a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record, I concur with the findings of the Committee
as to the culpability of the respondent [Rayala], the same having been established by clear and
convincing evidence. However, I disagree with the recommendation that respondent be meted
only the penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day considering the
circumstances of the case.
What aggravates respondents situation is the undeniable circumstance that he took advantage
of his position as the superior of the complainant. Respondent occupies the highest position in
the NLRC, being its Chairman. As head of said office, it was incumbent upon respondent to set
an example to the others as to how they should conduct themselves in public office, to see to it
that his subordinates work efficiently in accordance with Civil Service Rules and Regulations,
and to provide them with healthy working atmosphere wherein co-workers treat each other
with respect, courtesy and cooperation, so that in the end the public interest will be benefited
(City Mayor of Zamboanga vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 785 [1990]).
What is more, public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest discipline (Gano vs.
Leonen, 232 SCRA 99 [1994]). Thus, a public servant must exhibit at all times the highest
sense of honesty and integrity, and "utmost devotion and dedication to duty" (Sec. 4 (g), RA
6713), respect the rights of others and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, and good
morals (Sec. 4(c)). No less than the Constitution sanctifies the principle that a public office is a
public trust, and enjoins all public officers and employees to serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency (Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution).
Given these established standards, I see respondents acts not just [as] a failure to give due
courtesy and respect to his co-employees (subordinates) or to maintain good conduct and
behavior but defiance of the basic norms or virtues which a government official must at all
times uphold, one that is contrary to law and "public sense of morality." Otherwise stated,
respondent to whom stricter standards must apply being the highest official [of] the NLRC
had shown an attitude, a frame of mind, a disgraceful conduct, which renders him unfit to
remain in the service.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Rogelio I. Rayala, Chairman, National Labor
Relations Commission, is found guilty of the grave offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct
and is hereby DISMISSED from the service effective upon receipt of this Order.
SO ORDER[ED].
Rayala filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the OP denied in a Resolution
8
dated May 24, 2000. He
then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure before this Court on June 14, 2000.
9
However, the same
was dismissed in a Resolution dated June 26, 2000 for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.
10
Rayala
filed a Motion for
Reconsideration
11
on August 15, 2000. In its Resolution
12
dated September 4, 2000, the Court recalled
its June 26 Resolution and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) for appropriate action.
The CA rendered its Decision
13
on December 14, 2001. It held that there was sufficient evidence on
record to create moral certainty that Rayala committed the acts he was charged with. It said:
The complainant narrated her story complete with details. Her straightforward and uninhibited
testimony was not emasculated by the declarations of Commissioner Rayala or his witnesses. x
x x
Moreover, Commissioner Rayala has not proven any vicious motive for Domingo and her
witnesses to invent their stories. It is very unlikely that they would perjure themselves only to
accommodate the alleged conspiracy to oust petitioner from office. Save for his empty
conjectures and speculations, Rayala failed to substantiate his contrived conspiracy. It is a
hornbook doctrine that conspiracy must be proved by positive and convincing evidence (People
v. Noroa, 329 SCRA 502 [2000]). Besides, it is improbable that the complainant would concoct
a story of sexual harassment against the highest official of the NLRC and thereby expose
herself to the possibility of losing her job, or be the subject of reprisal from her superiors and
perhaps public ridicule if she was not telling the truth.
It also held that Rayalas dismissal was proper. The CA pointed out that Rayala was dismissed for
disgraceful and immoral conduct in violation of RA 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees. It held that the OP was correct in concluding that Rayalas acts violated
RA 6713:
Indeed, [Rayala] was a public official, holding the Chairmanship of the National Labor Relations
Commission, entrusted with the sacred duty of administering justice. Occupying as he does
such an exalted position, Commissioner Rayala must pay a high price for the honor bestowed
upon him. He must comport himself at all times in such a manner that the conduct of his
everyday life should be beyond reproach and free from any impropriety. That the acts
complained of were committed within the sanctuary of [his] office compounded the
objectionable nature of his wrongdoing. By daring to violate the complainant within the solitude
of his chambers, Commissioner Rayala placed the integrity of his office in disrepute. His
disgraceful and immoral conduct warrants his removal from office.
14

Thus, it dismissed the petition, to wit:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and Administrative
Order No. 119 as well [as] the Resolution of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 00-E-
9118 dated May 24, 2000 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
15

Rayala timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Justices Vasquez and Tolentino voted to affirm the
December 14 Decision. However, Justice Reyes dissented mainly because AO 250 states that the penalty
imposable is suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day.
16
Pursuant to the internal rules of the CA, a
Special Division of Five was constituted.
17
In its October 18, 2002 Resolution, the CA modified its earlier
Decision:
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated December [14], 2001 is MODIFIED to the effect that the
penalty of dismissal is DELETED and instead the penalty of suspension from service for the
maximum period of one (1) year is HEREBY IMPOSED upon the petitioner. The rest of the
challenged decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Domingo filed a Petition for Review
18
before this Court, which we denied in our February 19, 2003
Resolution for having a defective verification. She filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court
granted; hence, the petition was reinstated.
Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review
19
with this Court essentially arguing that he is not guilty of any
act of sexual harassment.
Meanwhile, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CAs October 18, 2002 Resolution. The
CA denied the same in its June 3, 2003 Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, by a majority vote, public respondents Motion for Reconsideration, (sic) is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic then filed its own Petition for Review.
20

On June 28, 2004, the Court directed the consolidation of the three (3) petitions.
G.R. No. 155831
Domingo assails the CAs resolution modifying the penalty imposed by the Office of the President. She
raises this issue:
The Court of Appeals erred in modifying the penalty for the respondent from dismissal to
suspension from service for the maximum period of one year. The President has the prerogative
to determine the proper penalty to be imposed on an erring Presidential appointee. The
President was well within his power when he fittingly used that prerogative in deciding to
dismiss the respondent from the service.
21

She argues that the power to remove Rayala, a presidential appointee, is lodged with the President who
has control of the entire Executive Department, its bureaus and offices. The OPs decision was arrived at
after affording Rayala due process. Hence, his dismissal from the service is a prerogative that is entirely
with the President.
22

As to the applicability of AO No. 250, she argues that the same was not intended to cover cases against
presidential appointees. AO No. 250 refers only to the instances wherein the DOLE Secretary is the
disciplining authority, and thus, the AO does not circumscribe the power of the President to dismiss an
erring presidential appointee.
G.R. No. 155840
In his petition, Rayala raises the following issues:
I. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE ACTS OF HEREIN
PETITIONER DO NOT CONSTITUTE SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS LAID DOWN BY THE En
Banc RULING IN THE CASE OF AQUINO vs. ACOSTA, ibid., AS WELL AS IN THE
APPLICATION OF EXISTING LAWS.
II. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, INTENT IS
AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT IN A CASE FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT. THE HONORABLE
COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT IT IS AN OFFENSE THAT IS MALUM
PROHIBITUM.
III. THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AND NOW,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HAS MISAPPLIED AND EXPANDED THE
DEFINITION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE UNDER R.A. No. 7877, BY
APPLYING DOLE A.O. 250, WHICH RUNS COUNTER TO THE RECENT
PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.
23

Invoking Aquino v. Acosta,
24
Rayala argues that the case is the definitive ruling on what constitutes
sexual harassment. Thus, he posits that for sexual harassment to exist under RA 7877, there must be:
(a) demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor; (b) the same is made a pre-condition to hiring,
re-employment, or continued employment; or (c) the denial thereof results in discrimination against the
employee.
Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and establish any sexual favor, demand, or request
from petitioner in exchange for her continued employment or for her promotion. According to Rayala,
the acts imputed to him are without malice or ulterior motive. It was merely Domingos perception of
malice in his alleged acts a "product of her own imagination"
25
that led her to file the sexual
harassment complaint.
Likewise, Rayala assails the OPs interpretation, as upheld by the CA, that RA 7877 is malum prohibitum
such that the defense of absence of malice is unavailing. He argues that sexual harassment is
considered an offense against a particular person, not against society as a whole. Thus, he claims that
intent is an essential element of the offense because the law requires as a conditio sine qua non that a
sexual favor be first sought by the offender in order to achieve certain specific results. Sexual
harassment is committed with the perpetrators deliberate intent to commit the offense.
26

Rayala next argues that AO 250 expands the acts proscribed in RA 7877. In particular, he assails the
definition of the forms of sexual harassment:
Rule IV
FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Section 1. Forms of Sexual Harassment. Sexual harassment may be committed in any of
the following forms:
a) Overt sexual advances;
b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of affection;
c) Request or demand for sexual favors including but not limited to going out on dates, outings
or the like for the same purpose;
d) Any other act or conduct of a sexual nature or for purposes of sexual gratification which is
generally annoying, disgusting or offensive to the victim.
27

He posits that these acts alone without corresponding demand, request, or requirement do not
constitute sexual harassment as contemplated by the law.
28
He alleges that the rule-making power
granted to the employer in Section 4(a) of RA 7877 is limited only to procedural matters. The law did
not delegate to the employer the power to promulgate rules which would provide other or additional
forms of sexual harassment, or to come up with its own definition of sexual harassment.
29

G.R. No. 158700
The Republic raises this issue:
Whether or not the President of the Philippines may validly dismiss respondent
Rayala as Chairman of the NLRC for committing acts of sexual harassment.
30

The Republic argues that Rayalas acts constitute sexual harassment under AO 250. His acts constitute
unwelcome or improper gestures of affection and are acts or conduct of a sexual nature, which are
generally annoying or offensive to the victim.
31

It also contends that there is no legal basis for the CAs reduction of the penalty imposed by the OP.
Rayalas dismissal is valid and warranted under the circumstances. The power to remove the NLRC
Chairman solely rests upon the President, limited only by the requirements under the law and the due
process clause.
The Republic further claims that, although AO 250 provides only a one (1) year suspension, it will not
prevent the OP from validly imposing the penalty of dismissal on Rayala. It argues that even though
Rayala is a presidential appointee, he is still subject to the Civil Service Law. Under the Civil Service
Law, disgraceful and immoral conduct, the acts imputed to Rayala, constitute grave misconduct
punishable by dismissal from the service.
32
The Republic adds that Rayalas position is invested with
public trust and his acts violated that trust; thus, he should be dismissed from the service.
This argument, according to the Republic, is also supported by Article 215 of the Labor Code, which
states that the Chairman of the NLRC holds office until he reaches the age of 65 only during good
behavior.
33
Since Rayalas security of tenure is conditioned upon his good behavior, he may be removed
from office if it is proven that he has failed to live up to this standard.
All the issues raised in these three cases can be summed up in two ultimate questions, namely:
(1) Did Rayala commit sexual harassment?
(2) If he did, what is the applicable penalty?
Initially, however, we must resolve a procedural issue raised by Rayala. He accuses the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), as counsel for the Republic, of forum shopping because it filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026 and then filed a comment in G.R. No. 155840
before this Court.
We do not agree.
Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in
one forum, of seeking and possibly securing a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal
or special civil action for certiorari.
34
It consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment.
35

There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity of the parties or, at least, of
the parties who represent the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief
prayed for, as the latter is founded on the same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding
particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration or will constitute litis pendentia.
36

Reviewing the antecedents of these consolidated cases, we note that the CA rendered the assailed
Resolution on October 18, 2002. The Republic filed its Motion for Reconsideration on November 22,
2002. On the other hand, Rayala filed his petition before this Court on November 21, 2002. While the
Republics Motion for Reconsideration was pending resolution before the CA, on December 2, 2002, it
was directed by this Court to file its Comment on Rayalas petition, which it submitted on June 16, 2003.
When the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Republic filed its own Petition for Review with
this Court on July 3, 2003. It cited in its "Certification and Verification of a Non-Forum Shopping" (sic),
that there was a case involving the same facts pending before this Court denominated as G.R. No.
155840. With respect to Domingos petition, the same had already been dismissed on February 19,
2003. Domingos petition was reinstated on June 16, 2003 but the resolution was received by the OSG
only on July 25, 2003, or after it had filed its own petition.
37

Based on the foregoing, it cannot be said that the OSG is guilty of forum shopping. We must point out
that it was Rayala who filed the petition in the CA, with the Republic as the adverse party. Rayala
himself filed a motion for reconsideration of the CAs December 21, 2001 Decision, which led to a more
favorable ruling, i.e., the lowering of the penalty from dismissal to one-year suspension. The parties
adversely affected by this ruling (Domingo and the Republic) had the right to question the same on
motion for reconsideration. But Domingo directly filed a Petition for Review with this Court, as did
Rayala. When the Republic opted to file a motion for reconsideration, it was merely exercising a right.
That Rayala and Domingo had by then already filed cases before the SC did not take away this right.
Thus, when this Court directed the Republic to file its Comment on Rayalas petition, it had to comply,
even if it had an unresolved motion for reconsideration with the CA, lest it be cited for contempt.
Accordingly, it cannot be said that the OSG "file[d] multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment."
We now proceed to discuss the substantive issues.
It is noteworthy that the five CA Justices who deliberated on the case were unanimous in upholding the
findings of the Committee and the OP. They found the assessment made by the Committee and the OP
to be a "meticulous and dispassionate analysis of the testimonies of the complainant (Domingo), the
respondent (Rayala), and their respective witnesses."
38
They differed only on the appropriate imposable
penalty.
That Rayala committed the acts complained of and was guilty of sexual harassment is, therefore, the
common factual finding of not just one, but three independent bodies: the Committee, the OP and the
CA. It should be remembered that when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made by
quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded great respect and even finality by the courts.
39
The
principle, therefore, dictates that such findings should bind us.
40

Indeed, we find no reason to deviate from this rule. There appears no valid ground for this Court to
review the factual findings of the CA, the OP, and the Investigating Committee. These findings are now
conclusive on the Court. And quite significantly, Rayala himself admits to having committed some of the
acts imputed to him.
He insists, however, that these acts do not constitute sexual harassment, because Domingo did not
allege in her complaint that there was a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor as a
condition for her continued employment or for her promotion to a higher position.
41
Rayala urges us to
apply to his case our ruling in Aquino v. Acosta.
42

We find respondents insistence unconvincing.
Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or
omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each
can proceed independently of the others.
43
This rule applies with full force to sexual harassment.
The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof defines work-
related sexual harassment in this wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. Work, education or
training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent
of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having
authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education
environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other,
regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the
object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment
or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable
compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual
favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in a way would
discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said
employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employees rights or privileges under existing labor laws;
or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the
employee.
This section, in relation to Section 7 on penalties, defines the criminal aspect of the unlawful act of
sexual harassment. The same section, in relation to Section 6, authorizes the institution of an
independent civil action for damages and other affirmative relief.
Section 4, also in relation to Section 3, governs the procedure for administrative cases, viz.:
Sec. 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related, Education or Training
Environment. It shall be the duty of the employer or the head of the work-related,
educational or training environment or institution, to prevent or deter the commission of acts of
sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for the resolution, settlement or prosecution
of acts of sexual harassment. Towards this end, the employer or head of office shall:
(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in consultation with and jointly
approved by the employees or students or trainees, through their duly designated
representatives, prescribing the procedure for the investigation or sexual harassment
cases and the administrative sanctions therefor.
Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the proper courts for
unlawful acts of sexual harassment.
The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this section (a) shall include, among
others, guidelines on proper decorum in the workplace and educational or training
institutions.
(b) Create a committee on decorum and investigation of cases on sexual harassment.
The committee shall conduct meetings, as the case may be, with other officers and
employees, teachers, instructors, professors, coaches, trainors and students or
trainees to increase understanding and prevent incidents of sexual harassment. It shall
also conduct the investigation of the alleged cases constituting sexual harassment.
In the case of a work-related environment, the committee shall be composed of at least one (1)
representative each from the management, the union, if any, the employees from the
supervisory rank, and from the rank and file employees.
In the case of the educational or training institution, the committee shall be composed of at
least one (1) representative from the administration, the trainors, teachers, instructors,
professors or coaches and students or trainees, as the case maybe.
The employer or head of office, educational or training institution shall disseminate or post a
copy of this Act for the information of all concerned.
The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayalas culpability is not to be determined solely on the basis of
Section 3, RA 7877, because he is charged with the administrative offense, not the criminal infraction, of
sexual harassment.
44
It should be enough that the CA, along with the Investigating Committee and the
Office of the President, found substantial evidence to support the administrative charge.
Yet, even if we were to test Rayalas acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would
still be administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a "demand, request or requirement of
a sexual favor." But it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be
articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the
acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing Domingos shoulders, running his fingers across her neck
and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for school
expenses with a promise of future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual
overtones all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual
favor.
Likewise, contrary to Rayalas claim, it is not essential that the demand, request or requirement be
made as a condition for continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is enough that
the respondents acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the
employee.
45
That the acts of Rayala generated an intimidating and hostile environment for Domingo is
clearly shown by the common factual finding of the Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that
Domingo reported the matter to an officemate and, after the last incident, filed for a leave of absence
and requested transfer to another unit.
Rayalas invocation of Aquino v. Acosta
46
is misplaced, because the factual setting in that case is
different from that in the case at bench. In Aquino, Atty. Susan Aquino, Chief of the Legal and Technical
Staff of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), charged then CTA Presiding Judge (now Presiding Justice)
Ernesto Acosta of sexual harassment. She complained of several incidents when Judge Acosta allegedly
kissed her, embraced her, and put his arm around her shoulder. The case was referred to CA Justice
Josefina G. Salonga for investigation. In her report, Justice Salonga found that "the complainant failed to
show by convincing evidence that the acts of Judge Acosta in greeting her with a kiss on the cheek, in a
`beso-beso fashion, were carried out with lustful and lascivious desires or were motivated by malice or
ill motive. It is clear from the circumstances that most of the kissing incidents were done on festive and
special occasions," and they "took place in the presence of other people and the same was by reason of
the exaltation or happiness of the moment." Thus, Justice Salonga concluded:
In all the incidents complained of, the respondent's pecks on the cheeks of the complainant
should be understood in the context of having been done on the occasion of some festivities,
and not the assertion of the latter that she was singled out by Judge Acosta in his kissing
escapades. The busses on her cheeks were simply friendly and innocent, bereft of malice and
lewd design. The fact that respondent judge kisses other people on the cheeks in the 'beso-
beso' fashion, without malice, was corroborated by Atty. Florecita P. Flores, Ms. Josephine
Adalem and Ms. Ma. Fides Balili, who stated that they usually practice 'beso-beso' or kissing on
the cheeks, as a form of greeting on occasions when they meet each other, like birthdays,
Christmas, New Year's Day and even Valentine's Day, and it does not matter whether it is
Judge Acosta's birthday or their birthdays. Theresa Cinco Bactat, a lawyer who belongs to
complainant's department, further attested that on occasions like birthdays, respondent judge
would likewise greet her with a peck on the cheek in a 'beso-beso' manner. Interestingly, in one
of several festive occasions, female employees of the CTA pecked respondent judge on the
cheek where Atty. Aquino was one of Judge Acosta's well wishers.
In sum, no sexual harassment had indeed transpired on those six occasions. Judge Acosta's
acts of bussing Atty. Aquino on her cheek were merely forms of greetings, casual and
customary in nature. No evidence of intent to sexually harass complainant was apparent, only
that the innocent acts of 'beso-beso' were given malicious connotations by the complainant. In
fact, she did not even relate to anyone what happened to her. Undeniably, there is no manifest
sexual undertone in all those incidents.
47

This Court agreed with Justice Salonga, and Judge Acosta was exonerated.
To repeat, this factual milieu in Aquino does not obtain in the case at bench. While in Aquino, the Court
interpreted the acts (of Judge Acosta) as casual gestures of friendship and camaraderie, done during
festive or special occasions and with other people present, in the instant case, Rayalas acts of holding
and squeezing Domingos shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, and the
inappropriate comments, were all made in the confines of Rayalas office when no other members of his
staff were around. More importantly, and a circumstance absent in Aquino, Rayalas acts, as already
adverted to above, produced a hostile work environment for Domingo, as shown by her having reported
the matter to an officemate and, after the last incident, filing for a leave of absence and requesting
transfer to another unit.
Rayala also argues that AO 250 does not apply to him. First, he argues that AO 250 does not cover the
NLRC, which, at the time of the incident, was under the DOLE only for purposes of program and policy
coordination. Second, he posits that even assuming AO 250 is applicable to the NLRC, he is not within its
coverage because he is a presidential appointee.
We find, however, that the question of whether or not AO 250 covers Rayala is of no real consequence.
The events of this case unmistakably show that the administrative charges against Rayala were for
violation of RA 7877; that the OP properly assumed jurisdiction over the administrative case; that the
participation of the DOLE, through the Committee created by the Secretary, was limited to initiating the
investigation process, reception of evidence of the parties, preparation of the investigation report, and
recommending the appropriate action to be taken by the OP. AO 250 had never really been applied to
Rayala. If it was used at all, it was to serve merely as an auxiliary procedural guide to aid the
Committee in the orderly conduct of the investigation.
Next, Rayala alleges that the CA erred in holding that sexual harassment is an offense malum
prohibitum. He argues that intent is an essential element in sexual harassment, and since the acts
imputed to him were done allegedly without malice, he should be absolved of the charges against him.
We reiterate that what is before us is an administrative case for sexual harassment. Thus, whether the
crime of sexual harassment is malum in se or malum prohibitum is immaterial.
We also reject Rayalas allegations that the charges were filed because of a conspiracy to get him out of
office and thus constitute merely political harassment. A conspiracy must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. His bare assertions cannot stand against the evidence presented by Domingo. As
we have already ruled, the acts imputed to Rayala have been proven as fact. Moreover, he has not
proven any ill motive on the part of Domingo and her witnesses which would be ample reason for her to
conjure stories about him. On the contrary, ill motive is belied by the fact that Domingo and her
witnesses all employees of the NLRC at that time stood to lose their jobs or suffer unpleasant
consequences for coming forward and charging their boss with sexual harassment.
Furthermore, Rayala decries the alleged violation of his right to due process. He accuses the Committee
on Decorum of railroading his trial for violation of RA 7877. He also scored the OPs decision finding him
guilty of "disgraceful and immoral conduct" under the Revised Administrative Code and not for violation
of RA 7877. Considering that he was not tried for "disgraceful and immoral conduct," he argues that the
verdict is a "sham and total nullity."
We hold that Rayala was properly accorded due process. In previous cases, this Court held that:
[i]n administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1)
the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of
counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a
tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by
said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the
hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.
48

The records of the case indicate that Rayala was afforded all these procedural due process safeguards.
Although in the beginning he questioned the authority of the Committee to try him,
49
he appeared,
personally and with counsel, and participated in the proceedings.
On the other point raised, this Court has held that, even in criminal cases, the designation of the offense
is not controlling, thus:
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged
or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law
made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts
therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be
sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every
element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and
essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the
information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable
him to suitably prepare his defense.
50

It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts to disgraceful and immoral conduct.
51

Thus, any finding of liability for sexual harassment may also be the basis of culpability for disgraceful
and immoral conduct.
With the foregoing disquisitions affirming the finding that Rayala committed sexual harassment, we now
determine the proper penalty to be imposed.
Rayala attacks the penalty imposed by the OP. He alleges that under the pertinent Civil Service Rules,
disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension for a period of six (6) months and one (1)
day to one (1) year. He also argues that since he is charged administratively, aggravating or mitigating
circumstances cannot be appreciated for purposes of imposing the penalty.
Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense is suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one
(1) year, while the penalty for the second offense is dismissal.
52
On the other hand, Section 22(o), Rule
XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
53
and Section 52
A(15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
54
both provide that the
first offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one
(1) day to one (1) year. A second offense is punishable by dismissal.
Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold office during good behavior until he or she
reaches the age of sixty-five, unless sooner removed for cause as provided by law or becomes
incapacitated to discharge the duties of the office.
55

In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the proper disciplining authority, who would
determine whether there is a valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This power,
however, is qualified by the phrase "for cause as provided by law." Thus, when the President found that
Rayala was indeed guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not have
unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than the penalty provided by law for such offense. As
cited above, the imposable penalty for the first offense of either the administrative offense of sexual
harassment or for disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to
one (1) year. Accordingly, it was error for the Office of the President to impose upon Rayala the penalty
of dismissal from the service, a penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of a second
offense.
Even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala took advantage of his high government position,
it still could not validly dismiss him from the service. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service,
56
taking undue advantage of a subordinate may be considered as an
aggravating circumstance
57
and where only aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present,
the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
58
Hence, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on Rayala
is suspension for one (1) year.
Rayala holds the exalted position of NLRC Chairman, with the rank equivalent to a CA Justice. Thus, it is
not unavailing that rigid standards of conduct may be demanded of him. In Talens-Dabon v. Judge
Arceo,
59
this Court, in upholding the liability of therein respondent Judge, said:
The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that complainant is one of his
subordinates over whom he exercises control and supervision, he being the executive judge. He
took advantage of his position and power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires.
Instead of he being in loco parentis over his subordinate employees, respondent was the one
who preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior position.
In yet another case, this Court declared:
As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by more exacting work ethics. He failed to live
up to his higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity. And
when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides a justifiable
ground for his dismissal for lack of trust and confidence. It is the right, nay, the duty of every
employer to protect its employees from oversexed superiors.
60

It is incumbent upon the head of office to set an example on how his employees should conduct
themselves in public office, so that they may work efficiently in a healthy working atmosphere. Courtesy
demands that he should set a good example.
61

Rayala has thrown every argument in the book in a vain effort to effect his exoneration. He even puts
Domingos character in question and casts doubt on the morality of the former President who ordered,
albeit erroneously, his dismissal from the service. Unfortunately for him, these are not significant factors
in the disposition of the case. It is his character that is in question here and sadly, the inquiry showed
that he has been found wanting.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the October 18, 2002 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026 is AFFIRMED. Consequently, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 155831,
155840, and 158700 are DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.


[G.R. No. 168309, September 25, 2008]

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER, VS. MARIAN D. TORRES, MARICAR D. TORRES
AND COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION), RESPONDENTS.

R E S O L U T I O N

NACHURA, J.:

For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration
[1]
of private respondents Marian and Maricar Torres of
our Decision dated January 29, 2008 reversing and setting aside the Decision dated January 6, 2004 and
the Resolution dated May 27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and reinstating the Decision dated
November 9, 2001 of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman found
private respondents administratively guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct and falsification of official
documents.

Private respondents raise the following grounds -
I. With all due respect, the Honorable Court erred in its finding that the respondents in this case
are administratively liable for dishonesty, grave misconduct and falsification of official
document.
II. With all due respect, the Honorable Court erred in ruling that damage has been caused to the
government by the actuations of the respondents as shown in the manner of handling their
daily time records and that the existence of malice or criminal intent is not a prerequisite to
declare the respondents administratively culpable.
III. With all due respect, the Honorable Court erred in ruling that the Office of the Ombudsman was
correct in not dismissing the case outright.
IV. With all due respect, the Honorable Court erred in ruling that the doctrine laid down in
Aguinaldo vs. Santos is not applicable to respondent Maricar.
[2]

With respect to the first ground, private respondents insist that the nature of their positions required
them to be on call 24 hours in a day, such that they would at times render more than eight hours of
work for their father. They argue that they are not supposed to actually stay in the office as required of
ordinary employees. Maricar even cites the fact that she has been regularly attending evening classes
from Monday to Friday at the University of the East (UE) College of Law since 1999 when she first
enrolled, since the said school does not offer any day classes for law students. She further claims that
the Office of the Ombudsman could not have concluded that she falsified her Daily Time Records (DTRs)
for the period 1995-1997 because it was not able to examine them during the investigation. Similarly,
Marian posits that her DTRs for the period May 1996 to December 1997 were not examined by petitioner
through Graft Investigation Officer I Moreno F. Generoso (GIO Generoso). Private respondents now ask:
How could petitioner have validly concluded that their DTRs for those periods were falsified if they were
not even seen and scrutinized by GIO Generoso?

As to the other grounds raised in the motion, private respondents merely reiterate the arguments they
raised in their Comment
[3]
and their Memorandum
[4]
before this Court.

On the alleged absence of criminal intent or malice on the part of private respondents to falsify their
respective DTRs during the subject periods of government employment, the argument that there was no
damage caused the government by their acts, the error of the Office of the Ombudsman in not
dismissing the complaint outright, and the supposed applicability of Aguinaldo v. Santos
[5]
to Maricar's
case, this Court observes that these were the very same arguments that we already passed upon in our
Decision
[6]
promulgated on January 29, 2008.

At this point, we reiterate, albeit briefly, our discussion on these matters.

The existence of malice or criminal intent is not a mandatory requirement for a finding of falsification of
official documents as an administrative offense. What is required is simply a showing that private
respondents made entries in their respective DTRs knowing fully well that they were false. The offense is
in the nature of malum prohibitum, such that respondents' commission of the act with full knowledge of
the falsity of the entries on the DTR is sufficient to hold them liable. The element of damage is also not
absolutely necessary, since this case does not pertain to the felony of Falsification under the Revised
Penal Code. Further, it remains arguable that there could have been damage caused the government, as
public money was paid for hours of work not actually rendered.

On the issue of prescription, we reiterate that the Office of the Ombudsman, under R.A. No. 6770, has a
wide range of discretion whether or not to proceed with an investigation of administrative offenses
beyond the expiration of one (1) year from the commission of the offense.
[7]


Likewise, it is a well-entrenched jurisprudential principle that the dismissal of the criminal case involving
the same set of facts does not automatically result in the dismissal of the administrative charges against
private respondents.
[8]


Our ruling in Aguinaldo also cannot benefit Maricar because she was not a re-elected public official when
she won as Councilor of Malabon City. Prior to her election, she held an appointive position - Legislative
Staff Assistant - having been appointed thereto by her own father, former Councilor Edilberto Torres. It
is very clear that in Aguinaldo, condonation of an administrative offense applied only to an elective
public official who was re-elected during the pendency of an administrative case against him.

However, we find the motion partly meritorious.

The Office of the Ombudsman made the factual finding that Maricar and Marian falsified their DTRs for
the periods 1995 to 1997 and May 1996 to December 1997, respectively, even without the DTRs being
presented, simply for the reason cited by GIO Generoso that the payrolls, which he examined during the
investigation, pertaining to these periods, could not have been legally prepared without actually being
supported by the corresponding DTRs pursuant to the auditing rules and regulations of the Commission
on Audit (COA).
[9]


While it is true that factual findings of administrative agencies that are affirmed by the CA are conclusive
upon and generally not reviewable by this Court, the rule admits of the following exceptions, to wit: (1)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when the findings went beyond the issues of the case or are contrary to the
admissions of the parties to the case; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court or the
administrative agency; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the pleadings are not disputed; (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (11) when certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties were manifestly
overlooked, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
[10]


Given the particular circumstances surrounding this case, it cannot be justly and validly inferred that
private respondents indeed falsified their DTRs without the presentation of the corresponding DTRs
themselves, since these DTRs were supposed to be the subject of the falsification. A party to an
administrative case must prove his affirmative allegation with substantial evidence, and the complainant
before the Office of the Ombudsman could not have established proof of the falsification absent the
alleged falsified documents.
[11]


Thus, Maricar, who was found administratively guilty of falsification of her DTRs for the period 1995-
1997 even without the DTRs having been presented during the investigation, should be exonerated.
With respect to Marian, she was found liable for falsifying her DTRs for the period 1996-2000, but
offered in evidence at the investigation were only her DTRs for May 1998 to December 2000 (all
indicating that she worked from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.), which were available; and the Certificates of
Matriculation subpoenaed from Centro Escolar University which evidently showed stark conflict with her
class schedules. She should thus be held administratively culpable, but only with respect to the DTRs for
the period May 1998 to December 2000. Accordingly, the administrative penalty should be
correspondingly reduced from one (1) year suspension without pay to six (6) months suspension without
pay. However, since Marian is no longer employed with the local government of Malabon City and the
penalty of suspension cannot be imposed upon her, she should, instead, be penalized with a fine,
following judicial precedents.
[12]
Under the premises, a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 would be
sufficient.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED and the Decision dated January
29, 2008 is MODIFIED, such that Maricar Torres is exonerated from administrative liability while Marian
Torres is instead imposed an administrative penalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00.

SO ORDERED.



[G.R. No. 160846, February 22, 2008]

BENJAMIN B. GERONGA, Petitioner, vs. HON. EDUARDO VARELA, as City Mayor of Cadiz City,
Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

The Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Benjamin B. Geronga
(petitioner) assails that portion of the October 15, 2002 Joint Decision
[1]
of the Court Appeals (CA)
affirming his dismissal from the service under Resolution No. 992107
[2]
dated September 17, 1999 and
Resolution No. 000715
[3]
dated March 21, 2000 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC); as well as the
October 1, 2003 CA Resolution
[4]
denying his Motion for Reconsideration.

The facts are of record.

Petitioner works as Engineer IV at the General Services Department of the local government of Cadiz
City. In 1996, he was involved in two administrative cases: 1) Administrative Case No. 96-04
[5]
for
Unjust Vexation, Contempt, Insubordination, Conduct Unbecoming a Public Officer, and Alarm and
Scandal; and 2) Administrative Case No. 96-05
[6]
for Grave Misconduct and Engaging in Partisan Political
Activity. Impleaded with petitioner in Administrative Case No. 96-05 were Edwin Nuyad (Nuyad) and
Nick Ambos (Ambos), also employees of the local government of Cadiz City.

The two administrative cases were referred by Cadiz City Mayor Eduardo Varela (respondent) to City
Legal Officer Marcelo R. del Pilar (Del Pilar) for investigation. After investigation, Del Pilar issued in
Administrative Case No. 96-04 a Resolution/Recommendation dated December 1, 1997 for the dismissal
of petitioner for grave misconduct.
[7]
In Administrative Case No. 96-05, Del Pilar issued a separate
Resolution/Recommendation dated December 4, 1997, recommending the dismissal of petitioner, Nuyad
and Ambos for grave misconduct and partisan politics.
[8]
Respondent approved both recommendations.
[9]


Consequently, on January 8, 1998, respondent issued to petitioner Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05,
addressed to petitioner, to wit:
Attached is a copy of the Resolution/Recommendation of the City Legal Officer which this office has
approved in toto and considered an integral part hereof.

We find the recommendation as contained therein to be just and proper under the premises.

In view hereof, you are hereby meted a penalty of dismissal from the service as recommended effective
January 09, 1998.

For strict compliance.
[10]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner received copy of Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 on January 9, 1998.
[11]
Without assistance
of counsel, petitioner filed with the CSC a Notice of Appeal, stating:
Appellant respectfully serves notice that he is appealing his DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE by the City
Mayor of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Eduardo G. Varela, contained in the latter's Memorandum
Order No. 98-V-05 dated January 08, 1998.
[12]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Still without assistance of counsel, petitioner, together with Nuyad and Ambos, filed a Joint
Memorandum in which he discussed Administrative Case No. 96-05 only, and completely omitted
reference to Administrative Case No. 96-04.
[13]


Acting on the appeal, the CSC issued Resolution No. 990717 dated March 25, 1999, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Edwin Nuyad, Nick Ambos and [petitioner] is hereby granted. Accordingly,
Mayor Eduardo G. Varela is directed to reinstate Nuyad, Ambos and [petitioner] to their former positions
or, if no longer available, to comparable positions.
[14]

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
[15]
questioning the order to reinstate Nuyad, Ambos and
petitioner. Respondent pointed out that petitioner cannot be reinstated anymore because the latter
failed to appeal from his dismissal in Administrative Case No. 96-04, which consequently became final
and executory.

The CSC partly granted the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent in Resolution No. 992107, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of Mayor Eduardo G. Varela is partly granted.

His prayer for the reversal of CSC Resolution No. 990717 dated March 25, 1999 is hereby denied.
However, his request for the non-reinstatement of [petitioner] in view of the finality of the
decision in Administrative Case No. 96-04, finding [petitioner] guilty of Grave Misconduct for
which he was meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service is granted.

Accordingly, CSC Resolution No. 990717 dated March 25, 1999 is hereby modified insofar as the non-
reinstatement of [petitioner] is concerned. In all other matters, the said resolution stands.
[16]
(Emphasis
supplied.)
Both petitioner and respondent filed Motions for Reconsideration
[17]
but the CSC denied the same in
Resolution No. 000715.
[18]
They filed with the CA separate Petitions for Review,
[19]
which were later
consolidated.
[20]


In the October 15, 2002 Joint Decision
[21]
assailed herein, the CA dismissed both petitions and affirmed
CSC Resolutions No. 992107 and No. 000715.

Only petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
[22]
which the CA denied in its October 1, 2003
Resolution.
[23]


Petitioner is now before this Court, seeking resolution of the following issues:
1. Whether or not the dismissal of the petitioner under Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05
constitutes a denial of his constitutional right to due process;
2. Whether or not the petitioner was denied due process under the Resolution/Recommendation of
the City Legal Officer in Adm. Case No. 96-04 as adopted in toto by the City Mayor;
3. Whether or not the dismissal of the petitioner became final for failure to appeal;
4. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission acted properly and within the bounds of its own
rules and regulations in entertaining the motion for reconsideration of Mayor Varela from its
Resolution No. 990714 dated March 25, 1999; and
5. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the dismissal of the petitioner.
[24]

We shall first resolve the fourth issue whether the CSC may entertain respondent's motion for
reconsideration of its decision exonerating petitioner.

Petitioner points out that after ordering his exoneration under Resolution No. 990717, the CSC could no
longer entertain a motion for reconsideration filed by respondent who is not even a proper party. He
argues that in acting upon the motion for reconsideration of respondent and worse, in modifying
Resolution No. 990717, the CSC violated Section 38, Rule III, in relation to Section 2(l), Rule I of
Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999 or the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (URACCS); and the CA erred in affirming it.
[25]


Petitioner is mistaken.
Sections 37 (a) and 39 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807,
[26]
otherwise known as The Philippine Civil
Service Law, provide:

Section 37. (a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving
the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office x x x.

Section 39. (a) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the
decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration is
seasonably filed, which petition shall be decided within fifteen days x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
In addition, Section 47 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987)
[27]

reiterates that the CSC may entertain appeals only from (a) a penalty of suspension of more than thirty
days; or (b) a fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary; or (c) demotion in rank or salary or
transfer; or (d) removal or dismissal from office.

Interpreting the foregoing provisions, the Court has earlier held that, in an administrative case, only a
decision involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension of more than 30 days, fine exceeding 30-day
salary, demotion, transfer, removal or dismissal is appealable to the CSC; hence, a decision exonerating
an employee cannot be appealed.
[28]
Moreover, given the nature of the appealable decision, only said
employee would qualify as the party adversely affected who is allowed to appeal; other persons, such
as the appointing or disciplining authorities, cannot appeal.
[29]


Consonant with the foregoing interpretation, the CSC adopted Section 2(l), Rule I and Section 38, Rule
III of the URACCS
[30]
in implementation of the pertinent

provisions of P.D. No. 807 and E.O. No. 292,
[31]
to wit:
Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms. x x x (l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the
respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case has been rendered.

x x x x

Section 38. Filing of Motion for Reconsideration. - The party adversely affected by the decision may file a
motion for reconsideration with the disciplining authority who rendered the same within fifteen (15) days
from receipt thereof
The present view is different. In a long line of cases,
[32]
beginning with Civil Service Commission v.
Dacoycoy,
[33]
this Court has maintained that a judgment of exoneration in an administrative case is
appealable, and that the CSC,
[34]
as the agency mandated by the Constitution to preserve and safeguard
the integrity of our civil service system, and/or the appointing authority, such as a mayor
[35]
who
exercises the power to discipline or remove an erring employee, qualifies as parties adversely affected
by the judgment who can file an appeal. The rationale for this is explained in the concurring opinion of
Associate Justice now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy:
In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by the Civil Service Law. For what
the law declares as final are decisions of heads of agencies involving suspension for not more than
thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days salary x x x. It is thus non sequitur
to contend that since some decisions exonerating public officials from minor offenses can not be
appealed, ergo, even a decision acquitting a government official from a major offense like nepotism
cannot also be appealed.
[36]

Thus, through Resolution No. 021600,
[37]
the CSC amended the URACCS, by allowing the disciplining
authority to appeal from a decision exonerating an erring employee, thus:
Section 2. Coverage and Definition of Terms. x x x (l) PARTY ADVERSELY AFFECTED refers to the
respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary case has been rendered or to the disciplining
authority in an appeal from a decision exonerating the said employee.
In fine, the exoneration of petitioner under CSC Resolution No. 990717 may be subject to a motion for
reconsideration by respondent who, as the appointing and disciplining authority, is a real party in
interest. The CSC acted within the rubric of Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy in allowing said
motion for reconsideration.

The next question then is whether the CSC was correct in granting the motion for reconsideration of
respondent, and the CA, in agreeing with it.

The CA and CSC declared as final and executory the decision of respondent in Administrative Case No.
96-04, finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and sentencing him with a penalty of dismissal from
government service, on the sole ground that the latter failed to appeal from said decision. The CSC
found:
x x x It is worthy to note that a copy of the Decision dated December 1, 1997 in Administrative Case No.
96-04 issued by [respondent[ was received by [petitioner] himself on January 9, 1998. This is very
apparent on the face of the Decision. Hence, upon receipt of the same, [petitioner] had the option
whether or not to bring the said decision on appeal to the Commission. Considering that he failed to
appeal the said Decision within the prescribed period of fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof, the same
became final and executory.
[38]
(Emphasis supplied.)
The CA added that the appeal which petitioner interposed from the decision in Administrative Case No.
96-05 cannot be treated also as an appeal from the decision in Administrative Case No. 96-04 because
the Joint Memorandum before the CSC mentions only Administrative Case No. 96-05, not
Administrative Case No. 96-04.
[39]


The Court does not completely agree.

The CSC is under the impression that in Administrative Case No. 96-04, respondent issued a Decision
dated December 1, 1997, and that it is said decision which petitioner should have appealed. The CA
shared the notion. Both are wrong. What is dated December 1, 1997 is merely the
Resolution/Recommendation issued by Del Pilar in Administrative Case No. 96-04. The formal decision of
respondent is Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 dated January 8, 1998.

There is a material difference between a mere recommendation to dismiss an employee and an
administrative decision/resolution sentencing him with dismissal.

Under Section 35,
[40]
Rule III of the URACCS, a recommendation to dismiss is that contained in a formal
investigation report issued by a hearing or investigating officer and submitted to the disciplining
authority for approval. Falling under this category are the December 1, 1997
Recommendation/Resolution in Administrative Case No. 96-04 and the December 4, 1997
Recommendation/Resolution in Administrative Case No. 96-05 issued by Del Pilar as investigating
officer. While they contain the approval of respondent as disciplining authority, both
Recommendations/Resolutions merely state findings of probable cause that petitioner is guilty of the
administrative charges filed against him, and recommend that he be dismissed. As we held in Rubio v.
Munar,
[41]
such recommendations are not the proper subject matter of an appeal to the CSC.

In contrast, a decision/resolution of dismissal is that rendered by the disciplining authority after receipt
of the recommendation of the investigating/ hearing officer,
[42]
and on the basis of his independent
assessment of the case.
[43]
Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 is one. It was issued by respondent after
receipt of the recommendations of Del Pilar. While it incorporates by reference said recommendations,
Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 goes further by categorically declaring petitioner guilty of the
administrative charges and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal. It is therefore the decision
rendered by respondent as disciplining authority which may be appealed or be subject of execution, if
already final.
[44]


Furthermore, it bears emphasis that Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 is the decision of respondent not
just in Administrative Case No. 96-05 but also in Administrative Case No. 96-04. While the language
employed in Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 refers to a singular Resolution/Recommendation of Del
Pilar, what were actually attached to the Memorandum were the December 1, 1997
Resolution/Recommendation in Administrative Case No. 96-04 and the December 4, 1997 Resolution in
Administrative Case No. 96-05. These attachments were served on petitioner and personally received by
him on January 9, 1998 at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, at exactly the same date and time he received
Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05.
[45]


Thus, Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 being the decision of respondent in both Administrative Case No.
96-04 and Administrative Case No. 96-05, it is crucial to emphasize that in the Notice of Appeal which
petitioner filed, he distinctly stated that what he is appealing to the CSC is his dismissal as contained in
[respondent's] Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 dated January 08, 1998.
[46]
By so doing, petitioner
effectively included in his appeal not just Administrative Case No. 96-05 but also Administrative Case
No. 96-04. Therefore, respondent erred in concluding that Administrative Case No. 96-04 had become
final and executory for failure of petitioner to appeal the same to the CSC.

Unfortunately for petitioner, the CA and CSC did not anymore look into the merits of the decision in
Administrative Case No. 96-04 simply because he raised no issue or argument against it.
[47]

Understandably, the CA and CSC could not be faulted for doing so; they were merely adhering to a basic
rule that in any proceeding, a party who fails to cite specific grounds or raise particular arguments is
deemed to have waived them.
[48]


Such rule, however, is not sacrosanct. It yields to the imperatives of equity, which often arise in
administrative cases where at stake is the security of tenure of labor, the protection of which no less
than the Constitution guarantees.
[49]
Deprivation of security of tenure may be justified only for the
causes specified and in the manner prescribed by law. Should there be doubt in the legality of either
cause or mode of dismissal, public interest demands the resolution of the doubt wholly on its substance,
rather than solely on technical minutiae.
[50]


In Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Angara,
[51]
the respondents-employees failed to
appeal from a decision in which the CSC ordered their reinstatement but omitted to award them
backwages. The Court condoned their technical lapse and granted their belated claim so as to fulfill the
guarantee of monetary compensation which the law itself extends to those arbitrarily dismissed.

Also, in Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania,
[52]
the respondent-employee failed to question a CSC
resolution which omitted to award her backwages. Despite said resolution having attained finality,
the Court allowed its modification so as to entitle the respondent-employee to backwages:
To prevent respondent from claiming back wages would leave incomplete the redress of the illegal
dismissal that had been done to her and amount to endorsing the wrongful refusal of her employer or
whoever was accountable to reinstate her. A too-rigid application of the pertinent provisions of the
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service as well as the Rules of Court will not
be given premium where it would obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in the light
of the prevailing circumstances in the case under consideration.
[53]

So too must the Court allow petitioner redress from the decision of respondent in Administrative Case
No. 96-04. While petitioner, unaided by legal counsel, may have omitted to raise specific grounds
against the decision insofar as Administrative Case No. 96-04 is concerned, it cannot be denied that he
intended to appeal from it. The least he deserves then is a scrutiny of the legal and factual bases of his
dismissal.

As it turns out, upon review, said decision, insofar as it relates to Administrative Case No. 96-04, is
patently void.

Two fundamental requirements
[54]
of due process in administrative cases are that a person must be duly
informed of the charges against him; and that he cannot be convicted of an offense or crime with which
he was not charged.
[55]
A deviation from these requirements renders the proceeding invalid and the
judgment issued therein a lawless thing that can be struck down anytime.
[56]


In the present case, the records of Administrative Case No. 96-04 reveal that petitioner was dismissed
for an act which was not alleged in the administrative charge filed against him.

Administrative Case No. 96-04 sprung from a Sworn Complaint
[57]
dated March 15, 1996 filed by Rodrigo
Mateo (Mateo) against petitioner for unjust vexation, gross misconduct, insubordination, conduct
unbecoming a public officer and alarm and scandal,
[58]
allegedly committed through the following acts:
a) his refusal to comply with several orders issued by respondent and Mateo for the filing of daily time
records;
[59]
and b) his having challenged Mateo to a fistfight.
[60]
The Subpoena
[61]
which Del Pilar issued
to petitioner required the latter to answer the incidents cited by Mateo in his Sworn Complaint. Even the
evidence which Del Pilar summarized in his December 1, 1997 Resolution/Recommendation pertains
solely to said incidents.
[62]


Surprisingly, the conclusion which Del Pilar arrived at in his December 1, 1997
Resolution/Recommendation, and which became the basis of the dismissal of petitioner, has no bearing
whatsoever on the offenses with which the latter was charged under the Sworn Complaint nor to the
incidents/acts described therein. Rather, the conclusion pertains solely to the alleged defamatory
statements which petitioner made in his April 1, 1996 Letter-Answer to the Sworn Complaint, thus:
That respondent having failed and refused to file his answer in the above-entitled case, this office has to
resolve the case on the basis of the evidence on records [sic].

There is no doubt that the findings of the City Prosecutors Office, Cadiz City, of probable cause for libel
on the basis of the communication of April 1, 1996 by [petitioner] cannot be disturbed x x x. It appears
that the defamation against complainant Mateo contained in said letter dated April 1, 1996 by
[petitioner] is not considered privilege communication as found by the Cadiz City Prosecutor's Office.
Such an act of [petitioner] in defaming complainant Mateo in a letter dated April 1, 1996 sent
to this office furnishing copies of said letter to the City Mayor Eduardo G. Varela, Atty.
Abelardo Gayatin, Jr., and Atty. Jessie Caberoy of the Civil Service Commission instead of
filing an answer to complaint filed against him no doubt constitute[s] Grave Misconduct
which would warrant dismissal from the government service.
[63]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Nowhere in the records of Administrative Case No. 96-04 does it appear that petitioner was charged with
grave misconduct, or that he was held to answer for his alleged defamatory statements in his April 1,
1996 letter. Thus, the December 1, 1997 Resolution/Recommendation of Del Pilar dismissing petitioner
on that ground, and Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 of respondent approving said resolution/
recommendation were issued in utter contempt of the right of petitioner to due process. Both are void
ab initio and should be treated as inexistent
[64]
-- it is as if no December 1, 1997
Resolution/Recommendation was issued in Administrative Case No. 96-04, and therefore, Memorandum
Order No. 98-V-05 could not have approved and adopted a void resolution/recommendation. In effect,
there was nothing for petitioner to appeal from in Administrative Case No. 96-04.

Therefore, Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 and the December 1, 1997 Resolution/Recommendation
constituted an unlawful deprivation of petitioner's security of tenure, insofar as Administrative Case No.
96-04 is concerned. The CA and CSC gravely erred in upholding them.

That said, however, the nullity of Memorandum Order No. 98-V-05 and the December 1, 1997
Resolution/Recommendation leaves Administrative Case No. 96-04 unresolved. Although the Court may
already decide said case based on the records before us, the better policy is for us to defer to the
prerogative granted under Section 17,
[65]
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, to the primary disciplining
authority, the incumbent mayor of Cadiz City,
[66]
whether or not to pursue said administrative case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Joint Decision dated October 15, 2002
and Resolution dated October 1, 2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE only insofar as Benjamin B.
Geronga is concerned; Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 992107 dated September 17, 1999 and
Resolution No. 000715 dated March 21, 2000 are ANNULLED. The December 1, 1997
Resolution/Recommendation of Cadiz City Legal Officer Marcelo R. del Pilar and Memorandum Order No.
98-V-05 of Cadiz City Mayor Eduardo Varela in Administrative Case No. 96-04 are also ANNULLED.
Administrative Case No. 96-04 is REMANDED to the incumbent city mayor of Cadiz City for proper
disposition.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.


[G.R. No. 166051, April 08, 2008]

SOLID HOMES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. EVELINA LASERNA AND GLORIA CAJIPE, REPRESENTED
BY PROCESO F. CRUZ, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
seeking to annul, reverse and set aside (1) the Decision
[1]
dated 21 July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 82153, which denied and dismissed the Petition filed before it by the petitioner for lack
of merit; and (2) the Resolution
[2]
dated 10 November 2004 of the same court, which denied the
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:

On 1 April 1977, respondents Evelina Laserna and Gloria Cajipe, represented by their attorney-in-fact,
Proceso F. Cruz, as buyers, entered into a Contract to Sell
[3]
with petitioner Solid Homes, Inc. (SHI), a
corporation engaged in the development and sale of subdivision lots, as seller. The subject of the said
Contract to Sell was a parcel of land located at Lot 3, Block I, Phase II, Loyola Grand Villas, Quezon City,
with a total area of 600 square meters, more or less. The total contract price agreed upon by the parties
for the said parcel of land was P172,260.00, to be paid in the following manner: (1) the P33,060.00
down payment should be paid upon the signing of the contract; and (2) the remaining balance of
P166,421.88
[4]
was payable for a period of three years at a monthly installment of P4,622.83 beginning
1 April 1977. The respondents made the down payment and several monthly installments. When the
respondents had allegedly paid 90% of the purchase price, they demanded the execution and delivery of
the Deed of Sale and the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of the subject property upon the final
payment of the balance. But the petitioner did not comply with the demands of the respondents.

The respondents whereupon filed against the petitioner a Complaint for Delivery of Title and Execution of
Deed of Sale with Damages, dated 28 June 1990, before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB). The same was docketed as HLURB Case No. REM-073090-4511. In their Complaint,
respondents alleged that as their outstanding balance was only P5,928.18, they were already demanding
the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and the TCT of the subject property upon final payment
of the said amount. The petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Answer,
[5]
together with its Answer
[6]
dated 17
September 1990, asserting that the respondents have no cause of action against it because the
respondents failed to show that they had complied with their obligations under the Contract to Sell,
since the respondents had not yet paid in full the total purchase price of the subject property. In view of
the said non-payment, the petitioner considered the Contract to Sell abandoned by the respondents and
rescinded in accordance with the provisions of the same contract.

On 7 October 1992, HLURB Arbiter Gerardo L. Dean rendered a Decision
[7]
denying respondents prayer
for the issuance of the Deed of Sale and the delivery of the TCT. He, however, directed the petitioner to
execute and deliver the aforesaid Deed of Sale and TCT the moment that the purchase price is fully
settled by the respondents. Further, he ordered the petitioner to cease and desist from charging and/or
collecting fees from the respondents other than those authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957
[8]

and similar statutes.
[9]


Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner appealed
[10]
the aforesaid Decision to the HLURB Board of
Commissioners. The case was then docketed as HLURB Case No. REM-A-1298.

On 10 August 1994, the HLURB Board of Commissioners rendered a Decision,
[11]
modifying the 7
October 1992 Decision of HLURB Arbiter Dean. The decretal portion of the Boards Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the [D]ecision of [HLURB] Arbiter Gerardo Dean dated 07
October 1992 is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
1. [Herein respondent]
[12]
is hereby directed to pay the balance of P11,585.41 within the (sic)
thirty (30) days from finality of this [D]ecision.
2. [Herein petitioner] is hereby directed to execute the necessary deed of sale and deliver
the TCT over the subject property immediately upon full payment.
3. [Petitioner] is hereby directed to cease and desist from charging and/or collecting fees other
than those authorized by P.D. 957 and other related laws.
[13]
(Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner remained unsatisfied with the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, thus, it
appealed the same before the Office of the President, wherein it was docketed as O.P. Case No. 5919.

After evaluating the established facts and pieces of evidence on record, the Office of the President
rendered a Decision
[14]
dated 10 June 2003, affirming in toto the 10 August 1994 Decision of the HLURB
Board of Commissioners. In rendering its Decision, the Office of the President merely adopted by
reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the Decision of the HLURB Board of
Commissioners.

Resultantly, petitioner moved for the reconsideration
[15]
of the 10 June 2003 Decision of the Office of the
President. However, in an Order
[16]
dated 9 December 2003, the Office of the President denied the same.

The petitioner thereafter elevated its case to the Court of Appeals by way of Petition for Review under
Rule 43
[17]
of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 82153, raising the
following issues, to wit: (1) the Honorable Office of the President seriously erred in merely adopting by
reference the findings and conclusions of the HLURB Board of Commissioners in arriving at the
questioned [D]ecision; and (2) the Honorable Office of the President seriously erred in not dismissing
the complaint for lack of cause of action.
[18]


On 21 July 2004, the appellate court rendered a Decision denying due course and dismissing the
petitioners Petition for Review for lack of merit, thus affirming the Decision of the Office of the President
dated 10 June 2003, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant [P]etition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
[19]
(Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision but, it was denied by the Court of Appeals
in a Resolution dated 10 November 2004.

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioner raises the following issues for this Courts resolution:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, WHICH MERELY ADOPTS BY
REFERENCE THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE
[HLURB], IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT THE
DECISION SHOULD BE BASED ON THE FINDINGS OF FACTS AND LAW TO ARRIVE AT A
DECISION; AND
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT CONSIDERING THAT THE
COMPLAINT OF THE RESPONDENTS LACKS CAUSE OF ACTION.
[20]

In its Memorandum,
[21]
the petitioner alleges that the Decision of the Office of the President, as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, which merely adopted by reference the Decision of the HLURB Board of
Commissioners, without a recitation of the facts and law on which it was based, runs afoul of the
mandate of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides that: No decision
shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on
which it is based. The Office of the President, being a government agency, should have adhered to this
principle.

Petitioner further avers that a full exposition of the facts and the law upon which a decision was based
goes to the very essence of due process as it is intended to inform the parties of the factual and legal
considerations employed to support a decision. The same was not complied with by the Office of the
President when it rendered its one-page Decision dated 10 June 2003. Without a complete statement in
the judgment of the facts proven, it is not possible to pass upon and determine the issues in the case,
inasmuch as when the facts are not supported by evidence, it is impossible to administer justice to apply
the law to the points argued, or to uphold the rights of the litigant who has the law on his side.

Lastly, petitioner argues that the Complaint filed against it by the respondents stated no cause of action
because the respondents have not yet paid in full the purchase price of the subject property. The right of
action of the respondents to file a case with the HLURB would only accrue once they have fulfilled their
obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price for the subject property. Hence, the respondents
Complaint against the petitioner should have been dismissed outright by the HLURB for being
prematurely filed and for lack of cause of action.

The Petition is unmeritorious.

The constitutional mandate that, no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,
[22]
does not preclude the validity of
memorandum decisions, which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law
contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.
[23]
In fact, in Yao v. Court of Appeals,
[24]
this Court has
sanctioned the use of memorandum decisions, a specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate
courts in accordance with the provisions of Section 40,
[25]
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended,
[26]
on the
grounds of expediency, practicality, convenience and docket status of our courts. This Court
likewise declared that memorandum decisions comply with the constitutional mandate.
[27]


This Court found in Romero v. Court of Appeals
[28]
that the Court of Appeals substantially complied with
its constitutional duty when it adopted in its Decision the findings and disposition of the Court of
Agrarian Relations in this wise:
We have, therefore, carefully reviewed the evidence and made a re-assessment of the same, and We
are persuaded, nay compelled, to affirm the correctness of the trial courts factual findings and the
soundness of its conclusion. For judicial convenience and expediency, therefore, We hereby adopt, by
way of reference, the findings of facts and conclusions of the court a quo spread in its decision, as
integral part of this Our decision. (Underscoring supplied)
In Francisco v. Permskul,
[29]
this Court similarly held that the following memorandum decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City did not transgress the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII
of the 1997 Philippine Constitution:
MEMORANDUM DECISION

After a careful perusal, evaluation and study of the records of this case, this Court hereby adopts by
reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and finds that there is no cogent reason to disturb the same.

WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto. (Underscoring supplied.)
Hence, incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the
decision of the lower courts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court.
[30]


However, also in Permskul,
[31]
this Court laid down the conditions for the validity of memorandum
decisions, to wit:
The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the
conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the
challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the
memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct
access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement
attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40
of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower
court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.

It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision of the
lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts and the
law on which it is based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should suggest that
such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision
being adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of
incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.

The Court finds necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest it
become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for the validity that this
kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by
both parties and easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications
involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum
decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal
is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it.

x x x x

Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein set forth
both as to the form prescribed and the occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation
will summon the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and strike
down the flawed judgment as a lawless disobedience.
[32]

In the case at bar, we quote verbatim the Decision dated 10 June 2003 of the Office of the President
which adopted by reference the Decision dated 10 August 1994 of the HLURB Board of Commissioners:
This resolves the appeal filed by [herein petitioner] Solid Homes, Inc. from the [D]ecision of the
[HLURB] dated [10 August 1994].

After a careful study and thorough evaluation of the records of the case, this Office is convinced by the
findings of the HLURB, thus we find no cogent reason to depart from the assailed [D]ecision. Therefore,
we hereby adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the aforesaid
[D]ecision, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex A.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
[33]

(Emphasis supplied).
It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution need not apply to decisions
rendered in administrative proceedings, as in the case a bar. Said section applies only to decisions
rendered in judicial proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled Judiciary, and all of its provisions have
particular concern only with respect to the judicial branch of government. Certainly, it would be error to
hold or even imply that decisions of executive departments or administrative agencies are oblige to meet
the requirements under Section 14, Article VIII.

The rights of parties in administrative proceedings are not violated as long as the constitutional
requirement of due process has been satisfied.
[34]
In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. CIR, we laid
down the cardinal rights of parties in administrative proceedings, as follows:
1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
3) The decision must have something to support itself.
4) The evidence must be substantial.
5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision.
7) The board or body should, in all controversial question, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered.
[35]

As can be seen above, among these rights are the decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; and
that the decision be rendered in such a manner that the parties to the proceedings can know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. Note that there is no requirement
in Ang Tibay that the decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based. For as long as the administrative decision is grounded on evidence, and expressed in a manner
that sufficiently informs the parties of the factual and legal bases of the decision, the due process
requirement is satisfied.

At bar, the Office of the President apparently considered the Decision of HLURB as correct and sufficient,
and said so in its own Decision. The brevity of the assailed Decision was not the product of willing
concealment of its factual and legal bases. Such bases, the assailed Decision noted, were already
contained in the HLURB decision, and the parties adversely affected need only refer to the HLURB
Decision in order to be able to interpose an informed appeal or action for certiorari under Rule 65.

However, it bears observation that while decisions of the Office of the President need not comply with
the constitutional requirement imposed on courts under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, the
Rules of Court may still find application, although suppletory only in character and apply only whenever
practicable and convenient. There is no mandate that requires the application of the Rules of Court in
administrative proceedings.

Even assuming arguendo that the constitutional provision invoked by petitioner applies in the instant
case, the decision of the OP satisfied the standards set forth in the case of Permskul.

Firstly, the Decision of the Office of the President readily made available to the parties a copy of the
Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, which it adopted and affirmed in toto, because it was
attached as an annex to its Decision.

Secondly, the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the HLURB Board of Commissioners have been
embodied in the Decision of the Office of the President and made an indispensable part thereof. With the
attachment of a copy of the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Decision of the Office
of the President, the parties reading the latter can also directly access the factual and legal findings
adopted from the former. As the Court of Appeals ratiocinated in its Decision dated 21 July 2004, the
facts narrated and the laws concluded in the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners should be
considered as written in the Decision of the Office of the President. It was still easy for the parties to
determine the facts and the laws on which the decision were based. Moreover, through the attached
decision, the parties could still identify the issues that could be appealed to the proper tribunal.
[36]


Thirdly, it was categorically stated in the Decision of the Office of the President that it conducted a
careful study and thorough evaluation of the records of the present case and it was fully convinced as
regards the findings of the HLURB Board of Commissioners.

And lastly, the facts of the present case were not contested by the parties and it can be easily
determined by the hearing officer or tribunal. Even the respondents admitted that, indeed, the total
purchase price for the subject property has not yet been fully settled and the outstanding balance is yet
to be paid by them. In addition, this case is a simple action for specific performance with damages, thus,
there are neither doctrinal complications involved in this case that will require an extended discussion of
the laws involved.

Accordingly, based on close scrutiny of the Decision of the Office of the President, this Court rules that
the said Decision of the Office of the President fully complied with both administrative due process and
Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

The Office of the President did not violate petitioners right to due process when it rendered its one-page
Decision. In the case at bar, it is safe to conclude that all the parties, including petitioner, were well-
informed as to how the Decision of the Office of the President was arrived at, as well as the facts, the
laws and the issues involved therein because the Office of the President attached to and made an
integral part of its Decision the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, which it adopted by
reference. If it were otherwise, the petitioner would not have been able to lodge an appeal before the
Court of Appeals and make a presentation of its arguments before said court without knowing the facts
and the issues involved in its case.

This Court also quotes with approval the following declaration of the Court of Appeals in its Decision on
the alleged violation of petitioners right to due process:
The contention of the [herein] petitioner that the said [D]ecision runs afoul to the Constitutional
provision on due process cannot be given credence. The case already had gone through the Offices
of the HLURB Arbiter and the Board of Commissioners where petitioner was given the
opportunity to be heard and present its evidence, before the case reached the Office of the
President which rendered the assailed [D]ecision after a thorough evaluation of the evidence
presented. What is important is that the parties were given the opportunity to be heard
before the [D]ecision was rendered. To nullify the assailed [D]ecision would in effect be a
violation of the Constitution because it would deny the parties of the right to speedy
disposition of cases.
[37]

Petitioners assertion that respondents complaint filed with the HLURB lacked a cause of action deserves
scant consideration.

Section 7 of the 1987 HLURB Rules of Procedure states that:
Section 7. Dismissal of the Complaint or Opposition. The Housing and Land Use Arbiter (HLA) to
whom a complaint or opposition is assigned may immediately dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction or
cause of action. (Emphasis supplied).
It is noticeable that the afore-quoted provision of the 1987 HLURB Rules of Procedure used the word
may instead of shall, meaning, that the dismissal of a complaint or opposition filed before the HLURB
Arbiter on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or cause of action is simply permissive and not directive.
The HLURB Arbiter has the discretion of whether to dismiss immediately the complaint or opposition filed
before him for lack of jurisdiction or cause of action, or to still proceed with the hearing of the case for
presentation of evidence. HLURB Arbiter Dean in his Decision explained thus:
This Office is well aware of instances when complainants/petitioners fail, through excusable negligence,
to incorporate every pertinent allegations (sic) necessary to constitute a cause of action. We will not
hesitate to go outside of the complaint/petition and consider other available evidences if the same is
necessary to a judicious, speedy, and inexpensive settlement of the issues laid before us or
when there are reasons to believe that the [com]plaints are meritorious. Administrative rules should be
construed liberally in order to PROMOTE THEIR OBJECT AND ASSIST THE PARTIES IN OBTAINING A
JUST, SPEEDY AND INEXPENSIVE DETERMINATION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
(Mangubat vs. de Castro, 163 SCRA 608).
[38]
(Emphasis supplied).
Given the fact that the respondents have not yet paid in full the purchase price of the subject property
so they have yet no right to demand the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and the TCT,
nevertheless, it was still within the HLURB Arbiters discretion to proceed hearing the respondents
complaint in pursuit of a judicious, speedy and inexpensive determination of the parties claims and
defenses.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals already sufficiently addressed the issue of lack of cause of action in
its Decision, viz:
The Offices below, instead of dismissing the complaint because of the clear showing that there was no
full payment of the purchase price, decided to try the case and render judgment on the basis of the
evidence presented. The complaint of the respondents does not totally lack cause of action
because of their right against the cancellation of the contract to sell and the forfeiture of their
payments due to non-payment of their monthly amortization.

xxxx

The HLURB Arbiter in his [D]ecision, stated that it is undisputed that the contract price is not yet fully
paid. This was affirmed by the HLURB Board of Commissioners and the Office of the President. No less
than the respondents admitted such fact when they contended that they are willing to pay their unpaid
balance. Without full payment, the respondents have no right to compel the petitioner to execute the
Deed of Sale and deliver the title to the property. xxx.

xxxx

Lastly, notwithstanding such failure to pay the monthly amortization, the petitioner cannot
consider the contract as cancelled and the payments made as forfeited.

Section 24, PD 957 provides:
Section 24. Failure to pay installments. - The rights of the buyer in the event of his failure to pay
the installments due for reasons other than the failure of the owner or developer to develop the project
shall be governed by Republic Act No. 6552. x x x.
Section 4, RA 6552 or the Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act provides:
Section 4. In case where less than two years of installments were paid, the seller shall give the buyer
a grace period of not less than sixty days from the date the installment became due. If the buyer fails to
pay the installments due at the expiration of the grace period, the seller may cancel the contract after
thirty days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or the demand for rescission of the
contract by a notarial act.
It is therefore clear from the above provisions that the petitioner cannot consider the [C]ontract to [S]ell
as cancelled. The requirements above should still be complied with.
[39]
(Emphasis supplied).
Hence, during the hearing conducted by HLURB Arbiter Dean, it became apparent that respondents
cause of action against petitioner is not limited to the non-execution and non-delivery by petitioner of
the Deed of Sale and TCT of the subject property, which is dependent on their full payment of the
purchase price thereof; but also the wrongful rescission by the petitioner of the Contract to Sell. By
virtue thereof, there is ample basis for HLURB Arbiter Dean not to dismiss respondents complaint
against petitioner and continue hearing and resolving the case.

As a final point. Based on the records of this case, respondents have tendered payment in the amount of
P11,584.41,
[40]
representing the balance of the purchase price of the subject property, as determined in
the 10 August 1994 Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, and affirmed by both the Office of
the President and the Court of Appeals. However, the petitioner, without any justifiable reason, refused
to accept the same. In Ramos v. Sarao,
[41]
this Court held that tender of payment is the manifestation
by debtors of their desire to comply with or to pay their obligation. If the creditor refuses the tender
of payment without just cause, the debtors are discharged from the obligation by the
consignation of the sum due. Consignation is made by depositing the proper amount with the judicial
authority, before whom the tender of payment and the announcement of the consignation shall be
proved. All interested parties are to be notified of the consignation. Compliance with these requisites is
mandatory.
[42]
In the case at bar, after the petitioner refused to accept the tender of payment made by
the respondents, the latter failed to make any consignation of the sum due. Consequently, there was no
valid tender of payment and the respondents are not yet discharged from the obligation to pay the
outstanding balance of the purchase price of the subject property.

Since petitioner did not rescind the Contract to Sell it executed with the respondents by a notarial act,
the said Contract still stands. Both parties must comply with their obligations under the said Contract. As
ruled by the HLURB Board of Commissioners, and affirmed by the Office of the President and the Court
of Appeals, the respondents must first pay the balance of the purchase price of the subject property,
after which, the petitioner must execute and deliver the necessary Deed of Sale and TCT of said
property.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.