BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO V CAMACHO

FACTS:
Petitioner alleges that assuming the assailed law is constitutional, its
Lucky Strike brand should be reclassified from the premium-priced to
the high-priced tax bracket. Relying on !R Ruling "o. #$%-&##$ dated
'ay $#, &##$, it claims that it timely sought redress from the !R to
ha(e the market sur(ey conducted within three months from product
launch, as pro(ided for under Section )*+
&$
of Re(enue Regulations
"o. $-,-, in order to determine the actual current net retail price of
Lucky Strike, and thus, fix its tax classification. .urther, the upward
reclassification of Lucky Strike amounts to depri(ation of property right
without due process of law. /he conduct of the market sur(ey after two
years from product launch constitutes gross neglect on the part of the
!R. 0onse1uently, for failure of the !R to conduct a timely market
sur(ey, Lucky Strike2s classification based on its suggested gross retail
price should be deemed its official tax classification. .inally, petitioner
asserts that had the market sur(ey been timely conducted sometime in
&##$, the current net retail price of Lucky Strike would ha(e been
found to be under the high-priced tax bracket.
ISSUE: whether or not the petitioner3s contention is tenable
RULING:
/hese contentions are untenable and misleading.
.irst, !R Ruling "o. #$%-&##$ was re1uested by petitioner for the
purpose of fixing Lucky Strike2s initial tax classification based on its
suggested gross retail price relati(e to its planned introduction of Lucky
Strike in the market sometime in &##$ and not for the conduct of the
market sur(ey within three months from product launch. !n fact, the
said Ruling contained an express reser(ation that the tax classification
of Lucky Strike set therein 4is without pre5udice, howe(er, to the
subse1uent conduct of a sur(ey x x x in order to determine if the actual
gross retail price thereof is consistent with 6petitioner2s7 suggested
gross retail price.4
&&
!n short, petitioner acknowledged that the initial tax
classification of Lucky Strike may be modified depending on the
outcome of the sur(ey which will determine the actual current net retail
price of Lucky Strike in the market.
Second, there was no upward reclassification of Lucky Strike because
it was taxed based on its suggested gross retail price from the time of
its introduction in the market in &##$ until the !R market sur(ey in
&##8. 9e reiterate that Lucky Strikes2 actual current net retail price
was sur(eyed for the first time in &##8 and was found to be
from P$#.8) to P$$.:8 per pack, which is within the premium-priced
tax bracket. /here was, thus, no prohibited upward reclassification of
Lucky Strike by the !R based on its current net retail price.
/hird, the failure of the !R to conduct the market sur(ey within the
three-month period under the re(enue regulations then in force can in
no way make the initial tax classification of Lucky Strike based on its
suggested gross retail price permanent. ;therwise, this would
contra(ene the clear mandate of the law which pro(ides that the basis
for the tax classification of a new brand shall be the current net retail
price and not the suggested gross retail price. !t is a basic principle of
law that the State cannot be estopped by the mistakes of its agents.
Last, the issue of timeliness of the market sur(ey was ne(er raised
before the trial court because petitioner2s theory of the case was wholly
anchored on the alleged unconstitutionality of the classification free<e
pro(ision. =s a conse1uence, no documentary e(idence as to the
actual net retail price of Lucky Strike in &##$, based on a market
sur(ey at least comparable to the one mandated by law, was
presented before the trial court. >(idently, it cannot be assumed that
had the !R conducted the market sur(ey within three months from its
product launch sometime in &##$, Lucky Strike would ha(e been found
to fall under the high-priced tax bracket and not the premium-priced tax
bracket. /o so hold would run roughshod o(er the State2s right to due
process. ?erily, petitioner prosecuted its case before the trial court
solely on the theory that the assailed law is unconstitutional instead of
merely challenging the timeliness of the market sur(ey. /he rule is that
a party is bound by the theory he adopts and by the cause of action he
stands on. @e cannot be permitted after ha(ing lost thereon to
repudiate his theory and cause of action, and thereafter, adopt another
and seek to re-litigate the matter anew either in the same forum or on
appeal.
&8
@a(ing pursued one theory and lost thereon, petitioner may
no longer pursue another inconsistent theory without thereby trifling
with court processes and burdening the courts with endless litigation.
9@>R>.;R>, the motion for reconsideration is A>"!>A.