Digest Remrev 5

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Digests
5
Acosta | Aguaviva | AAlcantara | Arceo | Bondoc | Canto
Calderini | Capanas | Chan | Dela Cruz | Diaz | Galman
Garcia | Go | Ingles | Lagarde | Manigbas | Morato |
JAReyes | Singzon | So | Soller | ATan | Telan | Ting | Uy

XXX. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

A. Interpleader (Rule 62)

OCAMPO V. TIRONA

Facts: Leonardo Ocampo alleged that he was the owner of a
parcel of land in Pasay City and that he bought it from Rosauro
Breton. Possession and management of the land was already
with him despite the TCT not being issued yet. Leonora Tirona
was the lessee of the land even before Ocampo bought it.
Upon acquisition of ownership by Ocampo, he sent a
formal notice to Tirona. Tirona religiously paid her rents until
the subject premises were declared under area for priority
development. As such, Tirona invoked her right to first refusal
and refused to pay her rent until the NHA processed her
papers.
Ocampo filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
against Tirona. Tironas defense was that Ocampo was not the
owner thus she shouldnt pay him rent. It should be noted that
Tirona kept changing the theory of her case stating that
Lourdes Rodriguez Yaneza owned the land when the case was
at the MTC and stating that Breton was the owner when the
case was appealed to the RTC.

Issue: Should the complaint for unlawful detainer prosper?

Decision: Yes.
First, the issue of ownership is not essential to an
action for unlawful detainer. The fact of the lease and the
expiration of its term are the only elements of the action. The
defense of ownership does not change the summary nature of
the action. The affected party should raise the issue of
ownership in an appropriate action, because a certificate of title
cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.
In actions for forcible entry and [unlawful] detainer,
the main issue is possession de facto, independently of any
claim of ownership or possession de jure that either party may
set forth in his pleadings, and an appeal does not operate to
change the nature of the original action.
Furthermore, Tirona was estopped from denying that
Ocampo had possession of the lease agreement. She paid her
rent to him until such declaration of the area for priority
development. The sale of a leased property places the vendee
into the shoes of the original lessor to whom the lessee bound
himself to pay.
Lastly (and more importantly), Tirona should have
used reasonable diligence in hailing the contending claimants
to court. Tirona need not have awaited actual institution of a
suit by Ocampo against her before filing a bill of interpleader.
An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not
know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting
claims on the property.
The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a
person who has property whether personal or real, in his
possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially,
without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in
whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants,
comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said
property or who consider themselves entitled to demand
compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among
themselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one
or the other thing.

The remedy is afforded not to protect a person
against a double liability but to protect him against a double
vexation in respect of one liability. When the court orders that
the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises in reality
a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in
such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a
complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.

MAGLENTE, ET AL VS. PADILLA in her capacity as Manila
RTC J udge, and several private respondents

Facts: Philippine Realty Corp (PRC) owned a parcel of land in
Intramuros, which it leased to petitioner Maglente. The lease
agreement included a right of first refusal in favor of Maglente,
as well as an agreement whereby PRC prohibited Maglente
from subleasing the property. Nonetheless, Maglente
subleased the property to the private respondents (madami sila
so di ko na lalagay names). Later on, PRC decided to sell the
property and offered the land to Maglente in accordance with
her ROFR. Maglente, together with her co-petitioners in this
case (di ko na din lalagay yung names nila kasi madami
masyado), as co-buyers, agreed to buy the property from PRC.
However, PRC received a letter from the private respondents
which expressed their desire to purchase the same property.
PRC filed a complaint for interpleader with the Manila
RTC to determine who between the 2 parties had the right to
purchase the property. The RTC ruled in favor of the Maglente
and her co-petitioners, ordering PRC to execute a deed of
sale. CA affirmed. The SC likewise upheld the CA decision
holding that there had already been a perfected contract
between PRC and the petitioners. So PRC executed a deed of
sale in favor of the petitioners, who then filed a motion for a
writ of possession, because the land was in the possession of
the private respondents. The respondents argued that the
RTCs decision did not declare the petitioners as owners
entitled to right of possession but merely determined that they
had the right to purchase. RTC ruled in favor of the
respondents and denied the writ of possession. So the
petitioners filed this special civil action for certiorari.

Issue: Whether a writ of possession should be granted to a
party with a ROFR in an interpleader case? NOOOOOO!

Held/Ratio: The decision in the interpleader case merely
resolved the question of who had the right to purchase the
property. The directive was only for the PRC to execute the
necessary deed of sale, nothing more. It was clear at that point
that petitioners were not yet the owners of the property. The
execution of the deed of sale was only preliminary to their
eventual acquisition of the property. Also, although in the SC
decision affirming the RTC the SC refrained from declaring the
petitioners as the owners since, pending the execution of the
deed of sale or delivery of the property, ownership had yet to
transfer to them at that time.
Thus, petitioners argument that the trial courts writ of
execution in the interpleader case carried with it the corollary
right to a writ of possession is without merit. A writ of
possession complements the writ of execution only when the
right of possession or ownership has been validly determined
in a case directly relating to either. The interpleader case
obviously did not delve into that issue.
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Furthermore, the rule is that the enforcement of a
judgment may not vary or alter the tenor of the judgment but
must strictly conform to it. The RTC cannot therefore be faulted
for refusing to issue a writ of possession to petitioners as its
issuance would not be in conformity with the judgment in the
interpleader case.

Some other matters discussed
A writ of possession shall issue only in the following
instances: (1) land registration proceedings; (2) extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) judicial foreclosure
of property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no
third party has intervened, and (4) execution sales.
12
Here,
petitioners seek the writ as a consequence of the trial courts
decision ordering the execution of a contract of sale/contract to
sell in their favor. The writ does not lie in such a case.
Petitioners cannot recover possession of the property
via a mere motion. They must file the appropriate action in
court against respondents to recover possession. While this
remedy can delay their recovery, the SC ruled that it cannot
permit an abbreviated method without subverting the rules and
processes established for the orderly administration of justice.

ARREZA v DIAZ

FACTS: Bliss Development Corporation is the owner of a
housing complex located in Balara Quezon City. It instituted an
interpleader case against Arreza and Diaz who were conflicting
claimants of the property. the RTC ruled in favor of Arreza. In
view of said decision, Bliss executed a contract to sell the
property to Arreza and Diaz was compelled to transfer
possession together with all improvements to Arreza.
Thereafter, Diaz instituted a claim against Arreza and
Bliss for the reimbursement of the cost of the improvements
which amounted to approximately 1.7 M inclusive of 8%
interest. Arreza filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res
judicata and lack of cause of action. RTC dismissed the Motion
to Dismiss and the Motion for Reconsideration of Arreza. This
prompted Arreza to file a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA
dismissed the petition saying that res judicata does not apply
because the interpleader case only settled the issue on who
had a better right. It did not determine the parties respective
rights and obligations.

ISSUE: Whether or not the claim for reimbursement is barred
by res judicata YES

HELD: An examination of the answer filed by Diaz showed that
he asserted his status as a buyer in good faith and for value
and he prayed that affirmative relief arising out of the rights of
a buyer in good faith and for value be granted. This only
means that Diaz expected that the court shall award him
damages in the form of reimbursement in case judgment is
rendered in favor of Arreza.
Diaz contends that in the pre-trial of the interpleader
case, reimbursement and damages was never put in issue.
Thus it could not have been the subject of the interpleader and
consequently, not barred by res judicata. Diaz says it was
incumbent on Arreza to include the damages as an issue. The
Supreme Court said that (1) it is not the duty of the petitioner to
do the lawyering against the respondent and (2) in a complaint
for interpleader shall determine the rights and obligations of the
parties and adjudicate their respective claims. Such rights,
obligations, and claims could only be adjudicated if put forward
by the aggrieved party in assertion of his rights. That party in
this case referred to respondent Diaz. The second paragraph
of Section 5 of Rule 62 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that the parties in an interpleader action may file
counterclaims, cross-claims, third party complaints and
responsive pleadings thereto, "as provided by these Rules."
The second paragraph was added to Section 5 to expressly
authorize the additional pleadings and claims enumerated
therein, in the interest of a complete adjudication of the
controversy and its incidents
Having failed to set up his claim for reimbursement,
said claim of respondent Diaz being in the nature of a
compulsory counterclaim is now barred.

B. Declaratory Relief (Rule 63)

Almeda v Bathala Marketing

Facts: Bathala Marketing leased the property belonging to
Almeda. It was a 4-year lease contract which started on May 1,
1997. The parties stipulated that the present rental price was
based on the present rate of assessment, and that in the event
that any new tax or burden was imposed by authorities, the
rental price will be increased to reflect such new tax or burden
(there was also a provision which provided for the decrease of
the rental price in the event that the taxes were lowered).
There was another provision which provided that in
the event of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of the
peso at the time of the establishment of the contract was to be
followed.
Come December 1997, Almeda advised Bathala that
VAT will now be applied to the rentals. Bathala contended that
since VAT was already in effect when the contract was entered
into, then no increase should be done. In January 1998,
Almeda told Bathala that the rent was to be increased by 73%
because of inflation. Bathala rejected the claim, saying that
only the court can pronounce extraordinary inflation.
Bathala instituted an action for declaratory relief.
After, Almeda filed an ejectment case against Bathala. Almeda
also moved for the dismissal of the declaratory relief because it
claimed that Bathala was already in breach of its obligation.
The RTC and CA ruled for Bathala.

Issue: Was the action for declaratory relief proper?

Held: Yes, it certainly was.
Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person
interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
executive order or resolution, to determine any question of
construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive
order or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his rights
and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in
such a petition is the question of construction or validity of
provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the general
rule that such an action must be justified, as no other adequate
relief or remedy is available under the circumstances.
[

The requisites are: 1) the subject matter of the
controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are
doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have
been no breach of the documents in question; 4) there must be
an actual justiciable controversy or the ripening of one between
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persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe
for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not
available through other means or other forms of action or
proceeding.
After Almeda demanded payment of adjusted rentals
and in the months that followed, Bathala complied with the
terms and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by
paying the rentals stipulated therein. Bathala religiously fulfilled
its obligations to petitioners even during the pendency of the
present suit. Bathala did not breach the contract. Thus, Bathala
is not barred from instituting the petition for declaratory relief.

Issue: Is declaratory relief proper given that there is already a
separate action for ejectment, and thus the issues should be
ventilated there?

In Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation
,
the SC
held that the petition for declaratory relief should be dismissed
in view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful
detainer. However, in that case, the unlawful detainer case had
already been resolved by the trial court before the dismissal of
the declaratory relief case. Here, the trial court had not yet
resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of
the declaratory relief petition. In fact, the trial court, where the
rescission case was on appeal, itself initiated the suspension
of the proceedings pending the resolution of the action for
declaratory relief.
There was a case where the declaratory relief action
was dismissed because the issue therein could be threshed
out in the unlawful detainer suit (Teodoro v Mirasol). But in that
case, there was already a breach of contract at the time of the
filing of the declaratory relief petition.
Thus, it is proper to entertain the instant declaratory
relief action, even with the pendency of the
ejectment/rescission case before the trial court. The resolution
of the present petition would write finis to the dispute, as it
would settle once and for all the question of the proper
interpretation of the two contractual stipulations subject of this
controversy.

MALANA V TAPPA

FACTS: Petitioners Carmen Danao Malana, et al. (Danao
heirs) alleged to be the owners of a land in Tugegarao which
they inherited from Anastacio Danao. During the lifetime of
Danao, he allowed Consuelo Pauig (family member of Tappa)
to build on and occupy the southern portion of the subject
property. Danao and Consuelo agreed that the latter would
vacate the said land at any time that Danao and his heirs might
need it. Danao heirs claimed that respondents Benigno Tappa,
et al. continued to occupy the subject property even after
Consuelos death, building their residences thereon using
permanent materials. Danao heirs also learned that Tappa, et
al. were claiming ownership over the subject
property. Averring that they already needed it, Danao heirs
demanded that respondents vacate the same. The call was
unheeded. Meanwhile, Danao heirs referred their land dispute
to the Lupong Tagapamayapa. During the conciliation
proceedings, respondents asserted that they owned the
subject property and presented documents ostensibly
supporting their claim of ownership. The heirs opposed this,
saying that the documents were falsified and highly dubious.
This notwithstanding, Tappa, et al. created a cloud upon the
heirs title to the property. Thus, the heirs filed a case for
Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages in the RTC.

Issue:
Did the judge commit grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio
dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction? No GAD.
Petition is dismissed. RTC should remand the records to the
MTC.

Held:
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person
interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an
executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief
sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and
determination of the validity of the written instrument and the
judicial declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder.
Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule
63. Section 1 states that an action for the reformation of an
instrument, to quiet title, and to consolidate ownership in a sale
with a right to repurchase may be brought under the RTC.
These remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief
because they result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the
litigants, often without the need of execution. Whereas the
Rules of Court uses may, the amended Judicial
Reorganization Act uses the word shall in determining
jurisdiction. JRA explicitly requires the MTC to
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions
which involve title to or possession of real property where the
assessed value does not exceed P20,000 (OMM) or P50,000
(MM). In this case, the assessed value of the subject property
is only P410.00; therefore, the jurisdiction is with the MTC, not
the RTC.
Further, an action for declaratory relief presupposes
that there has been no actual breach of the instruments
involved or of rights arising thereunder. The purpose of an
action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative
statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a
statute, deed or contract for their guidance in the enforcement
thereof, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach
thereof. Where the law or contract has already been
contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief,
the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the
action. In the present case, the case for quieting of title was
filed after Danao heirs already demanded, and Tappa refused
to vacate the subject property. Since the heirs had already
been deprived of the possession of their property, the proper
remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory
relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of
possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of
action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the
realty. Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on the
value of the property involved. Given that the property is only
at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over
an action to recover the same.

DBM VS. MANILAS FINEST RETIREES ASSOC.

FACTS: With the issuance of PD 765 in 1975, the Integrated
National Police (INP) was constituted and to be composed of
the Phil. Constabulary (PC), as the nucleus, and the integrated
police forces as components thereof. PD 1184 was then issued
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in 1977 to professionalize the INP and promote career
development. Then, in 1990, RA 6975 (PNP Law) was
enacted. Under Sec. 23 of this law, the PNP would initially
consist of the members of the INP, created under PD 765, as
well as the officers and enlisted personnel of the PC. About 8
years later, RA 8551 (PNP Reform and Reorganization Act of
1998) was enacted, amending the PNP Law and reengineered
the retirement scheme in the police organization. Under this
new law, PNP personnel stood to collect more retirement
benefits that what the INP members of equivalent rank, who
had retired under the INP Law. Thus, all INP retirees, lead by
the Manilas Finest Retirees Assoc., filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC of Manila, impleading DBM,
PNP, NAPOLCOM, CSC and GSIS as respondents. Said
petition alleged that INP retirees, although equally situated with
the PNP retirees with regard to retirement benefits prior to the
enactment of the PNP Law, were unconscionably and
arbitrarily excluded from the higher and adjusted benefits
accorded to the PNP retirees.
The RTC rules in favor of the INP retirees. It held that
the PNP Law, as amended, did not abolish the INP but merely
provided for the absorption of its police functions by the PNP.
Thus, INP retirees are entitled to the same benefits as the PNP
retirees. In the same decision, the RTC ordered the proper
adjustments of the INP retirees benefits and its immediate
implementation. Said decision was appealed by the DBM,
etc. to the CA. However, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in ordering the immediate
adjustments of the INP retirees benefits when the basic
petition filed before it was one for declaratory relief.

HELD/RATIO: NO. RTC and CA decisions are affirmed.
Although herein petitioners DBM, etc. had a valid
point, it must be remembered that the execution of judgments
in a petition for declaratory relief is not necessarily
indefensible. In PDIC v. CA, the SC categorically ruled:
Now, there is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for
declaratory relief that proscribes the filing of a counterclaim
based on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of the
complaint. A special civil action is after all not essentially
different from an ordinary civil action, which is generally
governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of Court, except that
the former deals with a special subject matter which makes
necessary some special regulation. But the identity between
their fundamental nature is such that the same rules governing
ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions if
not inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the
provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions.
Also, in Matalin Coconut Co., Inc. v. Municipal
Council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, the SC ruled:
x x x Under Sec. 6 of Rule 64, the action for declaratory relief
may be converted into an ordinary action and the parties
allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or proper,
if before the final termination of the case "a breach or violation
of an ordinance, should take place." In the present case, no
breach or violation of the ordinance occurred. The petitioner
decided to pay "under protest" the fees imposed by the
ordinance. Such payment did not affect the case; the
declaratory relief action was still proper because the
applicability of the ordinance to future transactions still
remained to be resolved, although the matter could also be
threshed out in an ordinary suit for the recovery of taxes paid
. In its petition for declaratory relief, petitioner-appellee
alleged that by reason of the enforcement of the municipal
ordinance by respondents it was forced to pay under protest
the fees imposed pursuant to the said ordinance, and
accordingly, one of the reliefs prayed for by the petitioner was
that the respondents be ordered to refund all the amounts it
paid to respondent Municipal Treasurer during the pendency of
the case. The inclusion of said allegation and prayer in the
petition was not objected to by the respondents in their answer.
During the trial, evidence of the payments made by the
petitioner was introduced. Respondents were thus fully aware
of the petitioner's claim for refund and of what would happen if
the ordinance were to be declared invalid by the court.
The SC sees no reason for treating this case
differently from PDIC and Matalin. This disposition becomes all
the more appropriate considering that the retirees, as
petitioners in the RTC, pleaded for the immediate adjustment
of their retirement benefits to which the herein petitioners, as
respondents in the same court, did not object to. Being aware
of said prayer, the petitioners then already knew the logical
consequence if, as it turned out, a declaratory judgment is
rendered in the retirees favor. At bottom then, the trial courts
judgment forestalled multiplicity of suits which, needless to
stress, would only entail a long and arduous process.
Considering their obvious advanced years, the respondents
can hardly afford another protracted proceedings.

MEJIA v. GABAYAN
*This is a confusing case, a lot of petitions were filed at paulit
ulit yung nangyayari, but the Declaratory Relief part was very
short, not the main issue*

FACTS: Mejia is the registered owner of a parcel of land
located in Isabela. The lot was a portion of a large tract of land
covered by a homestead patent granted to his father.
On August 13, 1978, the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) over
portions of the property to the following tenant-beneficiaries:
Carlos Ramos, Danceso Gavino, Francisca Rueme, Pedro
Gavino (some of respondents in present case)
In the meantime, the Courts decision in Alita v. Court
of Appeals was promulgated, wherein it was held that
properties covered by homestead patents were not covered by
PD No. 27.
Mejia filed a petition with the DAR, for the
exclusion of the property from PD No. 27. Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) issued an Order
recommending the denial of the petition.
Instead of pursuing his appeal in the DAR case, Mejia
opted to file a complaint in the RTC of Isabela against the
tenant-respondents for declaratory relief and recovery of
the possession of the property alleging that the parcel of
land was originally owned by his father to whom a homestead
patent was granted and that the land was not covered by PD
No. 27 as held by this Court in Alita v. Court of Appeals;
In their answer to the complaint, the tenant-
respondents averred that there was a pending petition with
DAR filed by Mejia for the exclusion of the property from the
coverage of PD No. 27; the action was beyond the jurisdiction
of the court because the dispute between the parties is
agrarian, and as such, within the original exclusive jurisdiction
of the Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board
(DARAB).
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On January 25, 1995, the RTC rendered a summary
judgment in favor of Mejia and against the tenant-respondents.
Tenant-respondents appealed the decision to the CA.
In the meantime, on May 23, 1995, the DAR Regional
Director issued an Order granting the petition of Mejia
exempting his property from the PD 27, BUT ordering him to
allow the respondents-tenants to remain in possession of the
property and to execute Leasehold Contracts in their favour.
Plus, DAR Sec ruled that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
action of Mejia (declaratory relief and recovery of possession
case). This order became final and executory.
Despite the DAR ruling becoming final and executory, Mejia
filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the
judgment in the RTC CASE. The trial court issued a writ of
execution. (The writ was implemented but Mejia failed to take
actual possession of the property)
(Basically there are 2 cases: 1) Agrarian case where
Mejia sought the exclusion of her land from PD 27 and 2) RTC
case for declaratory relief and recovery of possession of the
property. RTC rendered a judgement first ruling that the
property was exempt from PD 27. Subsequently, DAR
Secretary ruled the same BUT allowed the tenant-respondents
to stay in possession and to have Leasehold Contracts
executed in their favour. Mejia wants to implement the RTC
decision)
The issue now is, which decision should prevail?
Mejia avers that the RTC decision had long become final and
executory and can no longer be modified or set aside; that the
trial court was duty-bound to implement its decision; that the
Order of the DAR Secretary is not a supervening event barring
the enforcement of the RTCs final and executory decision.
The tenant-respondents, on the other hand, aver that RTC is
mandated to respect the Order of the DAR Secretary; that the
Order of the DAR is a special and exceptional circumstance
warranting the suspension of the execution of the decision of
the trial court in the higher interest of justice.

ISSUE: WON the execution of the RTC ruling should
suspended-- YES
The general rule is that it is the ministerial duty of the
court to order the execution of its final judgment. However,
Rule 135, Section 5(g) of the Rules of Court provides that the
trial court may amend and control its process and orders so as
to make them conformable to law and justice.
More importantly, it is the DAR who has jurisdiction
over the case. Having first acquired jurisdiction over the parties
and subject matter, DAR retained the same until final
disposition of the case.
Mejia ought to exhaust all administrative remedies
before seeking judicial recourse. Based on case law, an
action for declaratory relief is proper only if adequate
relief is not available through other existing forms of
actions or proceedings. A petition for a declaratory relief
cannot be made a substitute for all existing remedies and
should be used with caution. Relief by declaratory
judgment is sui generis and not strictly legal or equitable
yet its historical affinity is equitable. The remedy is not
designed to supplant existing remedies. The remedy is
purely statutory in nature and origin. A declaratory
judgment does not create or change substantial rights or
modify any relationship or alter the character of
controversies.

C. Review of Judgment of COA or
COMELEC (Rule 64)

D. Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
(Rule 65)

D.1 Certiorari

REPULIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by DEPED) v.
CARMEL DEVELOPMENT, INC.

FACTS: Carmel Development Inc. filed a complaint for
recovery of possession of a parcel of land in Caloocan city
occupied by Pangarap Elementary and High Schools, which
were established by DepEd so Carmel filed a case against
them and the Caloocan school board.
DEPED filed a motion for extension of time to file an
answer and later on filed a manifestation with motion to
dismiss. But Carmel filed a motion to declare the defendants in
default for failing to file an answer. This was granted by the
court and allowed them to present evidence ex parte.
DEPED filed a MR and motion to lift order of default
saying that it filed its motions on time and that Carmel failed to
notify and furnish it with a copy of the motion to declare in
default. DEPED also asserts that the case should be dismissed
on the ground of forum shopping, in violation of SC Admin
Order 04-94.
The trial court, in the interest of justice, lifted the order
of default but it denied the dismissal of the case. DEPED also
claims Carmel is forum shopping because there are 2 other
civil cases pending involving the same parties and subject
matter in the Caloocan RTCs. As proof, it attached duplicate
copies of the other trial courts orders. Since the TC denied
the MTD, DEPED filed a petition for certiorari (R65) seeking to
annul the trial courts orders. The CA dismissed this and the
MR was later denied.
DEPED presents the fact that the
Verification/Certification of Carmel was signed only by
Carmels counsels. DEPED also contends that there are 2
other civil cases pending in another branch of RTC Caloocan
but CA resolved that trial court rightfully denied the MD
because DEPED failed to attach the proper pleadings in those
other civil cases. (They filed only duplicate originals, not
certified true copies. CA held that under Section 1, Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is required that the
petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
assailed orders and not by mere duplicate originals. Hence this
petition.

ISSUE: W/N the case should be dismissed for not being
accompanied by certified true copies of the assailed decision
and resolution but only the duplicate originals.
W/N the CA acted with GADLEJ in denying the MD though the
pleadings show litis pendentia.
W/N the CA erred in ruling that Carmel complied with SC
Admin Cirular 04-94.

HELD/RATIO:
1. Yes, duplicate originals are allowed. Rule
46 should be harmonized with Rule 65.
The issue here is whether duplicate originals are
allowed or only certified true copies are allowed pursuant to
R65, Sec. 1 (because DEPED submitted duplicate originals).
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Page 6 of 23

Digests
5

Rule 46, Sec. 3 governs the filing for original actions
for certiorari and it states that the petition for certiorari be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified
true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject
thereof x x x. It also provides in Sec. 2 that the rule is
applicable to certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo
warranto actions. Except as otherwise provided, the actions
for annulment of judgment shall be governed by Rule 47, for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus by Rule 65, and for quo
warranto by Rule 66.
So Carmel interprets the phrase except as otherwise
provided that since there is a provision in Rule 65 states that
the petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of
the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof x x x. then
Rule 46 will not apply because it is contrary to the specific
provision in Rule 65.
However, the SC held that Rule 46 should be construed
in relation to Rule 65 without rendering any of its provisions
useless. This is evident in Section 6 of Rule 65 which provides
that [i]n petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals, the provision of Section 2, Rule 56, shall
be observed. Section 2 of Rule 56 which governs the
procedure in the Supreme Court, specifically original cases
filed therein, provides in turn:
Sec. 2. Rules applicable. The procedure in original cases for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas
corpus shall be in accordance with the applicable provisions of
the Constitution, laws, and Rule 46, 48, 49, 51 and 52 and this
Rule, subject to the following provisions:
a) All references in said Rules to the Court of
Appeals shall be understood to also apply to the
Supreme Court;
b) The portions of said Rule dealing strictly with and
specifically intended for appealed cases in the
Court of Appeals shall not be applicable; and
x x x.
This simply means that the following rules which are
of primary governance in the Court of Appeals, viz.: Rule 46
(Original Actions in the Court of Appeals), Rule 48 (Preliminary
Conference), Rule 49 (Hearings on Oral Argument), Rule 51
(Judgment), and Rule 52 (Motion for Reconsideration) have
been expressly made applicable to original actions in the
Supreme Court save for those portions which deal strictly with
and are specifically intended for appealed cases in the Court of
Appeals.
In fine, Rule 46 primarily governs original actions
for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals but Rule 65
generally serves to supplement the same. Rules 46 and 65
co-exist with each other and should be construed so as to
give effect to every provision of both rules.
In short, duplicate originals
1
are allowed.
2. Yes, the petition should be dismissed because of
litis pendentia.

1
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 3-96 defines
duplicate originals in this wise:
1. The duplicate original copy shall be understood to be that copy
of the decision, judgment, resolution or order which is intended for and
furnished to a party in the case or proceeding in the court or
adjudicative body which rendered and issued the same. xxx.
2. The duplicate original copy must be duly signed or initialed by the
authorities or the corresponding officer or representative of the issuing
entity, or shall at least bear the dry seal thereof or any other official
indication of the authenticity and completeness of such copy. xxx.
The Department of Education points out that aside
from Civil Case No. 18264, subject of the instant petition,
there are two other cases pending before another court
involving identical parties, issues and reliefs prayed
for. The Department of Education asserts that in Civil
Case No. 18264, Carmel seeks to recover possession
against the Department of Education and the School
Board the parcel of land allegedly occupied by Pangarap
High School. In Civil Case No. 17762, Carmel seeks to
enjoin Clarita M. Martinez, school principal of Pangarap
High School and a representative of the Department of
Education, from proceeding with the construction of
additional school buildings on the same parcel of
land. Meanwhile, Civil Case No. C-16181 is an action for
declaration of ownership and quieting of title involving the
same parcel of land. In sum, the Department of Education
argues that all three cases revolve around the same
parties' conflicting claims of ownership and
possession over the same parcel of land.
3. Yes, the Verification/Certification is defective for
being signed only by the counsel and not the
petitioner itself.
A cursory examination of Carmels complaint shows
that the certification against forum shopping found at the
end thereof was attested by its counsel Juan Victor R.
Llamas and not by plaintiff or any of the principal parties
as required by the rule. This is fatal to Carmels cause.
The certification against forum shopping must be by the
plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by the
attorney. It is mandatory that the certification be executed
by the petitioner himself, and not by the attorney.

D.2 Prohibition

CITY GOVT OF QC VS BAYANTEL

FACTS: BAYANTEL, is a legislative franchise holder under RA
3259, which required it to pay real property taxes to the govt.
When the LGC took effect, it granted local governments within
the Metro Manila Area the power to levy tax on real properties.
After LGC took effect, Congress amended BAYANTELs
original franchise, where it had the latter pay franchise tax
which is to be in lieu of all taxes. BAYANTEL owned several
real properties in QC. Govt of QC, by virtue of the Consti and
LGC, enacted QC Revenue Code, imposing real property tax
on all real properties in QC and withdrew tax exemptions in
general. They assessed BAYANTELs properties. Meanwhile,
RA 7925 ("Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the
Philippines") took effect, which aims to level the playing field
among telecommunications companies.
BAYANTEL sought to have its properties excluded
from paying real property taxes, but was denied. QC Treasurer
sent delinquency notices and issued warrants to levy the
properties for public auction. BAYANTEL, which originally
appealed to LBAA, withdrew its appeal and filed a petition for
prohibition with TRO with the RTC. RTC issued the TRO,
followed by a writ of preliminary injunction and ultimately
declared BAYANTELs QC properties as exempt from real
property tax.

Related to topic: QC Govt argues that RTC erred in giving due
course to the petition for prohibition as BAYANTEL failed to
avail of available administrative remedies provided in the LGC.
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Digests
5

The appeal mechanics under the LGC constitute Bayantels
plain and speedy remedy in this case.

ISSUE: W/N Bayantel is required to exhaust administrative
remedies before seeking judicial relief with the trial court.
NO.

RATIO: Section 2
2
of rule 65 governs petitions for prohibition.
Since BAYANTELs properties were already levied
because of nonpayment of real property taxes, an appeal
to the LBAA is not a speedy and adequate remedy. One of
the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion- of-
administrative remedies rule is when, as here, only legal
issues are to be resolved.
It should be noted that before an appeal to the LBAA
can be considered in this case, prior payment under protest of
P43M should be given. Given this reality, an appeal to the
LBAA may not be considered as a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy. It is thus understandable why Bayantel opted to
withdraw its earlier appeal with the LBAA and, instead, filed its
petition for prohibition.

Not so Important
OTHER ISSUE: W/N BAYANTELs properties are exempt from
real property tax under its legislative franchise. YES.

Bayantels franchise being national in character, the
"exemption" thus granted under Section 14 of RA 3259 applies
to all its real or personal properties found anywhere within the
Philippine archipelago. The LGC withdrew all exemptions but
Congress amended Bayantels original franchise. This means,
although the exemption under RA 3259 was impliedly repealed
by the LGC, such exemption was expressly revived under RA
7633. The LGC gives LGUs the power to tax real properties
not specifically exempted (like BAYANTELs properties).

D.3 Mandamus

LAMBINO V. COMELEC

FACTS: Lambino et al gathered signatures and filed a petition
with the Comelec for the holding of a plebiscite that will ratify
their initiative petition under the Initiative and Referendum Act
(RA 6735). In substance, their initiative petition sought to
amend the Constitution by adopting a unicameral-
parliamentary form of government. They claimed that their
petition was supported by at least 12% of all registered voters,
with each legislative district being represented by at least 3%
of its registered voters.
The Comelec denied the initiative petition for lack of
an enabling law governing initiative petitions. The Comelec
invoked the case of Santiago v. Comelec where the SC

2
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. When the proceedings of any
tribunal, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein, or otherwise, granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
declared RA 6735 inadequate to implement the 1987
Constitutions initiative clause.
Lambino now go to the SC seeking the issuance of
the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the
Comelecs resolution and to compel the Comelec to give due
course to their initiative petition.

ISSUE: Was there GAD in denying the Initiative petition? NO.

HELD: Petitioners failed to comply with the requirements of the
Constitution for conducting an initiative. The people signing the
proposal must sign the entire proposal and the proposal must
be embodied in the petition. These two elements are present
only if the full text of the amendments is first shown to the
people who express their assent by signing such proposal in a
petition. A signature sheet is meaningless if the person signing
has not first seen what he is signing. The signature sheet
which the people signed merely asked the people if they
wanted a change in the form of government into a
parliamentary system.
Moreover, the initiative petition contained matters
totally unrelated to the change in the form of government. This
forces people to sign a petition that effectively contains two
propositions, one of each they may find unacceptable.
Further, an initiative petition applies only to
amendments and not revision. A revision implies a change that
alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the
principle of checks and balances or separation of powers. The
initiative here is an a revision and not merely an amendment.
Lastly, RA 6735 provides that the people must sign
the petition. The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition.
Only petitioners and their counsels did.
No GAD can be attributed to the Comelec in
dismissing the initiative petition where it merely followed the
SCs ruling in the case of Santiago, and PIRMA v. Comelec.

Where was the Mandamus discussion in this case? -
There was none, perhaps the Court did not need to discuss
whether mandamus was proper for two reasons. First,
petitioners failed to show a clear legal right since their initiative
petition was fatally defective. Second, the Comelec did not
unlawfully neglect the performance of its duty since petitioners
did not comply with the requirements of an initiative petition.

ESQUIVEL VS OMBUDSMAN

Facts: PO2 Herminigildo Eduardo and SPO1 Modesto
Catacutan charged Mayor Antonio Esquivel and his brother
Baranggay Eboy Esquivel with illegal arrest, arbitrary
detention, maltreatment, attempted murder and grave threats.
Others who participated in the alleged crime were also
charged.
The charge was initially filed with the PNP-CIDG
(Criminal Investigation and Detection Group). Their initial
investigation shows that while Eduardo was about to eat lunch,
the 2 Esquivels together with others disarmed him of his
service pistol. He was then forced to board a vehicle and
brought to the Municipal Hall.
While on board the vehicle, Mayor Esquivel mauled
him and threatened to kill him. Upon arriving at the municipal
hall, the mayor ordered Eduardo to be killed. At this point,
Catacutan arrived to verify what happened to his teammate.
He was also threatened. The mayor struck Eduardo in the
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Digests
5

nape with a handgun while Eboy was holding him. Eduardo
lost consciousness. When he woke up, he was released but
not before being forced to sign a statement in the police blotter
that he was in good physical condition. Eduardo surmises that
this happened because the mayor believed him to be among
the law enforcers who raided a jueteng den wherein members
of a crime syndicate who are connected to the mayor where
arrested.
The records were forwarded by the PNP-CIDG to the
ombudsman. The deputy ombudsman recommended Mayor
Esquivel and Bgy. Captain Eboy Esquivel to be both indicted
for the crime of less serious physical injuries while Mayor
Esquivel alone for grave threats. Charges against the others
were dismissed. Ombudsman approved this resolution so
informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Esquivels brought the matter to the SC via certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the ombudsman when it failed to consider the
exculpatory evidence. Said evidence is the admission of
Eduardo that he was in good physical condition (the one he
was forced to sign). As such, Eduardo is stopped from claiming
that it was injured. Eduardo counters by saying this is issue is
factual in nature and thus, is not the proper subject of a
certiorari action. Also, it is alleged Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over the case.

Issue: Whether the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus was proper?

Held: NO!
(Note: This case is under mandamus only. There is
only 1paragraph in the case relating to mandamus. But Ill
discuss certiorari and prohibition as well)
Eduardo admitted signing the document but the
admission merely applied to the execution of such and not to
its truthfulness. Esquivels argument is evidentiary in nature
and its probative value can be best passed upon after a full
blown trial on the merits. As such, certiorari is not the proper
remedy. The SC is not a trier of facts.
Prohibition is a writ directed to the court itself,
commanding it to cease from the exercise of a jurisdiction to
which it has no legal claim. Here, Sandiganbayans jurisdiction
over the criminal cases is clearly found on law (since one of
the accused, Mayor esquivel, is of salary grade 27,
sandiganbayan had jurisdiction. It is only when none of the
accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
grade27 or higher will the rtc or mtc have jurisdiction). Being an
extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be resorted to when
the ordinary and usual remedies provided by law are adequate
and available.
40
Prohibition is granted only where no other
remedy is available or sufficient to afford redress. That the
petitioners have another and complete remedy at law, through
an appeal or otherwise, is generally held sufficient reason for
denying the issuance of the writ.
41
In this case, petitioners were
not devoid of a remedy in the ordinary course of law. They
could have filed a motion to quash the informations at the first
instance but they did not. Also, a writ of prohibition will not be
issued against an inferior court unless the attention of the court
whose proceedings are sought to be stayed has been called to
the alleged lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The foundation of this
rule is the respect and consideration due to the lower court and
the expediency of preventing unnecessary litigation. Here, the
issue of jurisdiction was raised only in the SC and not before
the sandiganbayan.
MANDAMUS: it is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its
chief use and not a discretionary duty.

The duty is ministerial
only when the discharge of the same requires neither the
exercise of official discretion nor judgment.

Hence, this Court
cannot issue a writ of mandamus to control or review the
exercise of discretion by the Ombudsman, for it is his
discretion and judgment that is to be exercised and not that of
the Court. When a decision has been reached in a matter
involving discretion, a writ of mandamus may not be availed of
to review or correct it, however erroneous it may be.

Moreover,
as earlier discussed, petitioners had another remedy available
in the ordinary course of law. Where such remedy is available
in the ordinary course of law, mandamus will not lie.

E. Quo Warranto (Rule 66)

LIBAN V GORDON
FACTS: Liban et al, officers of QC Red Cross Chapter filed a
Petition to declare Gordon as having forfeited his seat to the
Senate because he was serving as the PNRC (Red Cross)
Chairman of the Board of Governors.
Gordon was elected Chairman during his
incumbency, Liban alleges that it violated Sec 13 of Art 6 of the
Consti which prohibits Senators from holding any other office
or employment in the govt or the goccs. Accdg to
Camporedondo v. NLRC, PNRC is a government-owned or
controlled corporation.
Gordon in his response says that Liban et al have no
standing to file the petition which appears to be an action for
quo warranto, since it alleges that respondent committed an
act which constitutes a ground for forfeiture of his public office.
They dont claim to be entitled to the Senate office. Under
Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, only a
person claiming to be entitled to a public office usurped or
unlawfully held by another may bring an action for quo
warranto in his own name. Also its already barred by
prescription since it should be commenced within one year
after the and in this case, hes been working for PNRC for the
past 40 years. PNRC is also not a GOCC so the prohibition
doesnt apply.
In their Reply, Liban claims that its neither an action for
quo warranto nor an action for declaratory relief. They maintain
that the petition is a taxpayers suit questioning the unlawful
disbursement of funds, considering that respondent has been
drawing his salaries and other compensation as a Senator
even if he is no longer entitled to his office.

ISSUES:
1. W/N PNRC is a GOCC? NO, its a Private Organization
Performing Public Functions.
2. W/N Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution applies? No,
not an office/ employment under the control of Executive dept
so not considered as prohibited.
3. W/N Gordon should be automatically removed? No.
4. W/N Liban et al may legally institute quo warranto
petition against Gordon?

HELD: Liban et al Have No Standing to File this Petition

Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals.
An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or
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Digests
5

franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which by
provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his
office; or

Liban et al are alleging that by accepting the position of
Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, Gordon has
automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short, they
filed an action for usurpation of public office against Gordon, a
public officer who allegedly committed an act which constitutes
a ground for the forfeiture of his public office. Clearly, such an
action is for quo warranto, specifically under Section 1(b), Rule
66 of the Rules of Court.
Quo warranto is generally commenced by the
Government as the proper party plaintiff. However, under
Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may
commence such an action if he claims to be entitled to the
public office allegedly usurped by another, in which case
he can bring the action in his own name. The person
instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf
must claim and be able to show that he is entitled to the
office otherwise the action may be dismissed at any
stage. In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be
entitled to the Senate office and so have no standing to file the
present petition.

DIVINAGRACIA VS CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING
SYSTEM (CBS) AND PEOPLES BROADCASTING
SERVICE (PBS)

FACTS: CBS and PBS (C/PBS), two of the three networks that
operate Bombo Radyo Philippines, operate radio
broadcasting services by virtue of their legislative franchises
(RA 7477 and 7582). Under the RAs, there is common
provision, aimed towards the constitutional mandate to
democratize ownership of public utilities, that C/PBS should
offer 30% of its common stocks to the public. Following these
laws, NTC thus granted Provisional Authorities
3
to C/PBS.
DIVINAGRACIA then filed 2 complaints against
C/PBS, alleging that he was the owner of 12% of the shares of
stock of C/PBS separately, and that both stations failed to
make the 30% public offering of their stocks as mandated by
the RAs. For this failure, he prayed to cancel the Provisional
Authorities granted to C/PBS as well as in its legislative
franchises. NTC dismissed, saying it was not competent to
render a ruling on that issue, that the complaint was a
collateral attack on the legislative franchises of C/PBS, and
that the same is more properly the subject of an action for quo
warranto to be commenced by the Solicitor General in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to Rule 66 of
the Rules of Court.

CA: Affirmed.

DIVINAGRACIA counters that NTC has the power to cancel
Provisional Authorities and CPCs, or in effect, the power to
cancel the licenses that allow broadcast stations to operate.

3
This allowed them to install, operate and maintain various AM and
FM broadcast stations in various locations throughout the nation.
ISSUE: W/N NTC has the authority to cancel Provisional
Authorities and Certificates of Public Convenience it issued to
legislative franchise-holders. (Related Issue: W/N a quo
warranto is a more appropriate remedy? YES!)

HELD: There is in fact a more appropriate, more narrowly-
tailored and least restrictive remedy that is afforded by the law
for DIVINAGRACIA, which is quo warranto under Rule 66
4
.
The special civil action of quo warranto is a prerogative writ by
which the Government can call upon any person to show by
what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public
franchise. A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be declared in
a direct proceeding for the purpose brought by the State
because a franchise is granted by law and its unlawful exercise
is primarily a concern of Government.
Quo warranto is specifically available as a remedy if it
is thought that a government corporation has offended against
its corporate charter or misused its franchise. The
determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or
whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by
non-user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ
of quo warranto, the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs to
the State upon complaint or otherwise, the reason being that
the abuse of a franchise is a public wrong and not a private
injury.
DIVINAGRACIA argues that since their prayer
involves the cancellation of the provisional authority and CPCs,
and not the legislative franchise, then quo warranto fails as a
remedy. This is without merit, as the authority of the franchisee
to engage in broadcast operations is derived in the legislative
mandate. To cancel the provisional authority or the CPC is, in
effect, to cancel the franchise or otherwise prevent its
exercise. What could happen is that if the courts conclude that
private respondents have violated the terms of their franchise
and thus issue the writs of quo warranto against them, then the
NTC is obliged to cancel any existing licenses and CPCs since
these permits draw strength from the possession of a valid
franchise.

OTHER NOTES:

Licenses issued by the NTC such as CPCs and
provisional authorities are junior to the legislative franchise
enacted by Congress. The licensing authority of the NTC is not
on equal footing with the franchising authority of the State
through Congress. The issuance of licenses by the NTC
implements the legislative franchises established by Congress.
NTC cannot, without clear and proper delegation by Congress,
prevent the exercise of a legislative franchise by withholding or
canceling the licenses of the franchisee.
And the role of the courts, through quo
warranto proceedings, neatly complements the traditional
separation of powers that come to bear in our analysis.
DIVINAGRACIAs theory that NTC has the presumed authority
to cancel licenses and CPCs issued to due holders of
legislative franchise to engage in broadcast operations would
violate the separation of powers.

F. Expropriation (Rule 67)

4
Section 1: an action for the usurpation of a public office, position or
franchise may be brought in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises public office, position or franchise.
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Digests
5

BARDILLON v. BGY. MASILI OF CALAMBA

Facts: Respondent Bgy. Masili filed 2 complaints for eminent
domain owned by petitioner Bardillon. The 1
st
complaint was
filed with the MTC following a failure to reach an agreement on
the purchase offer of P200k. The MRC dismissed the case for
lack of interest for failure of Bgy. and its counsel to appear at
pre-trial.
The 2
nd
complaint was filed before the RTC over the
same lot and for the same purpose (erection of a multi-purpose
barangay hall). Bardillon filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of res judicata. Judge denied motion holding that the
MTC which ordered the dismissal of the first case had no
jurisdiction over the expropriation proceeding. RTC decided in
favor of Brgy. and issued a Writ of Possession.
CA dismissed petition, no grave abuse of discretion
because the 2
nd
complaint was not barred by res judicata,
since the MTC had no jurisdiction over the action. Bardillon
claims that since the value of the land is only P11k, the MTC
had jurisdiction over the case.

Issues:
Whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the case NO
Whether the dismissal before the MTC constituted res
judicata NO
Whether the CA erred when it ignored the issue of
entry upon the premises (writ of possession) - NO

Ratio:
Jurisdiction
An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of
money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of
its authority and right to take property for public use. As such,
it is incapable of pecuniary estimation and should be filed with
the RTCs.
The SC explained in Brgy. San Roque v. Heirs of
Pastor that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is
whether the government has complied with the requisites for
the taking of private property. The courts determine the
authority of the government entity, the necessity of the
expropriation, and the observance of due process. The subject
of expropriation suits is the governments exercise of eminent
domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Although the value of the property is estimated in monetary
terms, this is merely incidental to the suit. The amount is
determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of
the expropriation.

Res Judicata
One of the requisites of the doctrine of res judicata is that the
court that rendered the final judgment had jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties. Since the MTC had no
jurisdiction over expropriation proceedings, res judicata does
not apply even if the Order of dismissal may have been an
adjudication on the merits.

Legality of Entry into Premises
Bardillon argued that the CA erred when it ignored the RTCs
Writ of Possession over her property issued despite the
pending MR. SC not persuaded. The requirement for the
issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case are
governed by Sec. 2, Rule 67. On the part of the LGUs, it is
also governed by Sec. 19
5
of the LGC. The requisites for
authorizing immediate entry are: 1) the filing of a complaint for
expropriation sufficient in form and substance and 2) the
deposit of the amount equivalent to 15% of the FMV of the
property to be expropriated based on its current tax
declaration. In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ after it
had filed the Complaint and deposited the amount required
was proper.
The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a
matter properly addressed to the RTC in the course of the
proceedings. If petitioner objects to the necessity of the
takeover of her property, she should say so in her Answer.
The RTC has the power to inquire into the legality of the
exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine
whether there is a genuine necessity for it.

REPUBLIC V MANGOTARA

Facts: (Long and confusing case)
7 consolidated cases stemmed from the 1914 case of
Cacho v. Government of the United States (1914 Cacho case).

1914 Cacho Case
In the early 1900s, the late Dona Demetria applied for
the registration of 2 parcels of land in the Municipality of Iligan,
Moro Province (now called Iligan City, Lanao Del Norte). Only
the Government opposed Doa Demetria's applications for
registration on the ground that the two parcels of land were the
property of the United States and formed part of a military
reservation, generally known as Camp Overton.
The land registration court ruled that the applicant
Doa Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion of land occupied
and planted by the deceased Datto Anandog only; and her
application as to all the rest of the land solicited in said case is
denied. Moreover, the applicant should present the
corresponding deed from Datto Darondon on or before the
above-mentioned 30th day of March, 1913. Final decision in
these cases is reserved until the presentation of the said deed
and the new plan. Dissatisfied, Doa Demetria appealed to the
Supreme Court. SC affirmed the LRC Decision.
83 years later, the Court was again called upon to
settle a matter concerning the registration of the Lots in the
case of Cacho v. CA.

1997 Cacho case
Teofilo Cacho (Teofilo), claiming to be the late Doa
Demetria's son and sole heir, filed before the RTC a petition for

5
SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may,
through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or
welfare for the benefits of the poor and the landless, upon payment of
just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain
may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted:
Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take
possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation
proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at
least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property
based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated:
Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated
property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair
market value at the time of the taking of the property."

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reconstitution of two original certificates of title (OCTs). RTC
granted Teofilo's petition and ordered the reconstitution and re-
issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The original
issuance of these decrees presupposed a prior judgment that
had become final.
CA reversed the RTC Decision. Teofilo appealed to
the SC. The SC reversed the judgment of the CA and
reinstated the decision of the RTC approving the re-issuance
of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The Court found that such
decrees had in fact been issued and had attained finality, as
certified by the Acting Commissioner, Deputy Clerk of Court III,
Geodetic Engineer, and Chief of Registration of the then Land
Registration Commission. MR denied. Hence, the decrees of
registration were re-issued bearing new numbers and OCTs
were issued for 2 parcels of land in Dona Demetrias name.

THE ANTECENT FACTS OF THE PETITIONS AT BAR
The dispute did not end with the termination of the 1997 Cacho
case. Another 4 cases involving the same parcels of land were
instituted before the trial courts during and after the pendency
of the 1997 Cacho case. These cases are: (1) Expropriation
Case (2) Quieting of Title Case (3) Ejectment or Unlawful
Detainer Case and (4) Cancellation of Titles and Reversion
Case. These cases proceeded independently of each other in
the courts a quo until they reached the SC, that consolidated
the seven Petitions.
Note: Ill just discuss the expropriation issue, the case is very
long with lots of different issues

The Complaint for Expropriation was originally filed by the Iron
and Steel Authority (ISA), now the NSC, against Maria Cristina
Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), and the latter's mortgagee, the
Philippine National Bank (PNB). During the existence of ISA,
Pres. Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No. 2239,
reserving in favor of ISA a parcel of land in Iligan City. MCFC
occupied certain portions of this parcel of land. When
negotiations with MCFC failed, ISA was compelled to file a
Complaint for Expropriation.
When the statutory existence of ISA expired during
the pendency of Civil Case No. 106, the RTC-Branch 1 allowed
the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 106.
Alleging that the lots involved in the 1997 Cacho case
encroached and overlapped the parcel of land subject of the
case, Republic filed with the RTC a Motion for Leave to File
Supplemental Complaint and to Admit the Attached
Supplemental Complaint, seeking to implead Teofilo Cacho
and Demetria Vidal and their respective successors-in-interest,
LANDTRADE and AZIMUTH. However, the RTC denied the
Motion of the Republic for leave to file and to admit its
Supplemental Complaint. RTC agreed with MCFC that the
Republic did not file any motion for execution of the judgment
of this Court in the ISA case. Since no such motion for
execution had been filed within the prescriptive period of 5
years, RTC ruled that its Order dated November 16, 2001,
which effected the substitution of the Republic for ISA as
plaintiff in the case, was an honest mistake. MR of the
Republic denied because MCFC (the only defendant left in the
case) is NOT a proper party defendant in the complaint for
expropriation. Hence, the case was dismissed. The Republic
filed with the SC the consolidated Petition for Review on
Certiorari and Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65.

Issues:
1. Who are the proper parties in an expropriation
proceeding?
2. W/N forum shopping was committed by the Republic
with the filing of the expropriation and reversion
complaint

First Issue:
The court ruled that defendants in an expropriation
case are NOT limited to the owners of the property to be
expropriated, and just compensation is not due to the property
owner alone. They include all other persons owning, occupying
or claiming to own the property. In the American jurisdiction,
the term 'owner' when employed in statutes relating to eminent
domain to designate the persons who are to be made parties
to the proceeding, refer, as is the rule in respect of those
entitled to compensation, to all those who have lawful interest
in the property to be condemned, including a mortgagee, a
lessee and a vendee in possession under an executory
contract. Every person having an estate or interest at law or in
equity in the land taken is entitled to share in the award. If a
person claiming an interest in the land sought to be
condemned is not made a party, he is given the right to
intervene and lay claim to the compensation.
At the time of the filing of the Complaint for
Expropriation, possessory/occupancy rights of MCFC over the
parcels of land sought to be expropriated were undisputed.
Letter of Instructions No. 1277 expressly recognized that
portions of the lands reserved by Presidential Proclamation No.
2239 for the use and immediate occupation by the NSC, were
then occupied by an idle fertilizer plant/factory and related
facilities of MCFC. It was ordered in the same Letter of
Instruction that NSC shall negotiate with the owners of MCFC,
for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of
MCFC's present occupancy rights on the subject lands. Being
the occupant of the parcel of land sought to be
expropriated, MCFC could very well be named a defendant
in the case. The RTC evidently erred in dismissing the
Complaint for Expropriation against MCFC for not being a
proper party. Also erroneous was the dismissal by the
RTC of the original Complaint for Expropriation for having
been filed only against MCFC, the occupant of the subject
land, but not the owner/s of the said property. Dismissal is
not the remedy for misjoinder or non-joinder of parties.
The owner of the property is not necessarily an
indispensable party in an action for expropriation. According to
Rule 67, Section 1, expropriation proceedings may be
instituted even when "title to the property sought to be
condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines,
although occupied by private individuals." The same rule
provides that a complaint for expropriation shall name as
defendants "all persons owning or claiming to own, or
occupying, any part thereof or interest" in the property sought
to be condemned. Clearly, when the property already
appears to belong to the Republic, there is no sense in the
Republic instituting expropriation proceedings against
itself. It can still, however, file a complaint for
expropriation against the private persons occupying the
property. In such an expropriation case, the owner of the
property is not an indispensable party.
To recall, Presidential Proclamation No. 2239
explicitly states that the parcels of land reserved to NSC
are part of the public domain, hence, owned by the
Republic. Letter of Instructions No. 1277 recognized only
the occupancy rights of MCFC and directed NSC to
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5

institute expropriation proceedings to determine the just
compensation for said occupancy rights. Therefore, the
owner of the property is not an indispensable party in the
original Complaint for Expropriation.
Moreover, the right of the Republic to be substituted
for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106 had long been affirmed
by no less than this Court in the ISA case. The failure of the
Republic to actually file a motion for execution does not render
the substitution void. A writ of execution requires the sheriff or
other proper officer to whom it is directed to enforce the terms
of the writ. The Order of the RTC should be deemed as
voluntary compliance with a final and executory judgment of
this Court, already rendering a motion for and issuance of a
writ of execution superfluous.

Second Issue: The Republic did not commit Forum
shopping
Forum-shopping takes place when a litigant files
multiple suits involving the same parties, either simultaneously
or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Thus, it exists
where the elements of litis pendentia are present, namely: (a)
identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the
same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding
particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may
be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
Here, the elements of litis pendencia are wanting.
There is no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in
Civil Case No. 106 (expropriation) and Civil Case No. 6686
(cancellation of OCTs of Dona Demetria because the
certificates exceeded the areas granted by the LRC
reversion).

Expropriation vis--vis reversion
The Republic is not engaging in contradictions when it
instituted both expropriation and reversion proceedings for the
same parcels of land. The expropriation and reversion
proceedings are distinct remedies that are not necessarily
exclusionary of each other. The filing of a complaint for
reversion does not preclude the institution of an action for
expropriation. Even if the land is reverted back to the State, the
same may still be subject to expropriation as against the
occupants thereof.
Also, Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows
the filing of a complaint for expropriation even when "the title to
any property sought to be condemned appears to be in the
Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private
individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so
that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who
are the real owners."
Hence, the filing by the Republic of the Supplemental
Complaint for Expropriation impleading Teofilo, Vidal,
LANDTRADE, and AZIMUTH, is not necessarily an admission
that the parcels of land sought to be expropriated are privately
owned. At most, the Republic merely acknowledged in its
Supplemental Complaint that there are private persons also
claiming ownership of the parcels of land. The Republic can
still consistently assert, in both actions for expropriation and
reversion, that the subject parcels of land are part of the public
domain.
In sum, the RTC erred in dismissing the original
Complaint and disallowing the Supplemental Complaint. The
Court reinstates the Complaint for Reversion of the Republic.

REPUBLIC V. CA, REYES

FACTS:
- The Republic, through the DPWH, wrote a letter to
Rosario Reyes requesting permission to enter into a
portion (663 sqm out of 1043 sqm) of a parcel of land
owned by the latter in Cagayan de Oro City, for the
construction of an extension of a street.
- The Republic took possession of Reyes property without
initiating expropriation proceedings.
- Reyes filed a complaint claiming just compensation and
damages against the Republic with RTC.
- RTC appointed 3 commissioners to determine the FMV of
the property as well as the consequential benefits and
damages of its expropriation.
- The commissioners said the highest price for the subject
property was P4K per sqm. The Republic offered P 3.2K
per sqm. This was accepted by Reyes and filed an Urgent
Motion to Deposit the Amount of P 2,121,600 in May 1994.
However, the Republic deposited the check only in
October 1994.
- RTC ordered the commissioners to submit their report but
were unable to do so. So upon Reyes motion, the RTC
ordered the appointment of new commissioners. The new
commissioners made a report valuing the property higher
taking into consideration its location and the prevailing
market values of lots near it.
- The new commissioners stated in their report that the
Republic took not 663 sqm but 746 sqm. Hence, only 297
sqm was left. But that after deducting the setback area,
the usable/buildable area left to Reyes would only be a
little over 50 sqm. It is neither ideal for purposes of any
building because it is small and is triangular in shape.
- RTC: Just compensation = P 5,526,000 (later amended to
P 4,696,000). Also awarded damages. The Republic
appealed.
- CA: REMANDED the case. The commissioners
recommendations on just compensation were not
supported by valid documents. Also, it was unclear in the
RTC decision whether the trial court merely adopted the
commissioners recommendations or the court made its
own independent valuation of the subject property. Thus,
CA held that a reconvening of the commissioners or an
appointment of new commissioners to determine just
compensation was necessary. Moreover, consequential
damages should be awarded in lieu of actual damages for
private respondents alleged loss of income from the
remaining 297-sqm lot.
- The Republic filed a MR but was denied. Hence, this
appeal.

ISSUE: (1) W/N the case should be remanded; (2) W/N
consequential damages should be awarded.

HELD: (1) YES. The procedure for determining just
compensation is set forth in Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Section 5 of Rule 67 partly states that upon the
rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint
not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons
as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken.
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5

However, Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing of
complaint for eminent domain with the appropriate court by the
expropriator. If no such complaint is filed, the expropriator is
considered to have violated procedural requirements, and
hence, waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67,
including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just
compensation. When there is no action for expropriation and
the case involves only a complaint for damages or just
compensation, the provisions of the Rules of Court on
ascertainment of just compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule 67)
are no longer applicable, and a trial before commissioners is
dispensable.
In this case, petitioner took possession of the subject
property without initiating expropriation proceedings.
Consequently, private respondent filed the instant case for just
compensation and damages. To determine just compensation,
the trial court appointed three commissioners pursuant to
Section 5 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
None of the parties objected to such appointment.

The trial courts appointment of commissioners in this particular
case is not improper. The appointment was done mainly to aid
the trial court in determining just compensation, and it was not
opposed by the parties. Besides, the trial court is not bound
by the commissioners recommended valuation of the subject
property. The court has the discretion on whether to adopt the
commissioners valuation or to substitute its own estimate of
the value as gathered from the records.
However, the trial courts decision is not clear as to its
basis for ascertaining just compensation. The trial court
mentioned in its decision the valuations in the reports of the
City Appraisal Committee and of the commissioners appointed
pursuant to Rule 67. But whether the trial court considered
these valuations in arriving at the just compensation, or the
court made its own independent valuation based on the
records, was obscure in the decision. The trial court simply
gave the total amount of just compensation due to the property
owner without laying down its basis. Thus, there is no way to
determine whether the adjudged just compensation is based
on competent evidence. For this reason alone, a remand of
the case to the trial court for proper determination of just
compensation is in order.

(2) YES. Consequential damages are awarded if as a result of
the expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffers
from an impairment or decrease in value. Thus, there is a valid
basis for the grant of consequential damages to the property
owner, and no unjust enrichment can result therefrom.

NPC V. SANTA LORO VDA. DE CAPIN AND SPS. JULITO
QUIMCO AND GLORIA CAPIN

Facts: NPC is a GOCC duly organized under RA No. 6395.
Pursuant to its 230 KV Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project
(Project), NPC expropriated several parcels of land in Cebu to
be traversed and affected by its transmission towers and lines.
Among the lots affected were those of Capin and Sps. Quimco
(respondents).
To be able to enter the said properties, NPC obtained
from each them "Permission to Enter for Construction of
Transmission Line Project". These permits were signed by
respondents upon representation by NPC that it would pay
them just compensation for the intrusion into their properties.
Thereafter, NPC began to construct on the properties its power
lines and transmission towers, which were completed in 1996.
NPC paid the respondents the amounts of P8,015.90 and
P5,350.49, respectively. Only later did they discover that in
comparison to the measly sums they were paid by NPC, the
other landowners within their area who resisted the
expropriation in court or who entered into compromise
agreements with NPC were paid P448.30 to P450.00/sq. m. as
just compensation for the portions of their properties similarly
affected by NPCs Project.
Accordingly, they filed a Complaint for Rescission of
Agreement, Recovery of Possession of Parcels of Land,
Removal of Tower and Transmission Lines, Damages and
Other Reliefs, against NPC before the RTC. NPC countered
that their claim for compensation for the full value of their
properties was repugnant to Section 3-A of its Charter,
according to which, NPC is obligated only to pay the easement
fee equivalent to 10% of the market value of the land as just
compensation, plus the cost of damaged improvements. (In
short NPC was saying that there was no expropriation but only
easement.)
At the Pre-trial, the parties agreed that the only issue
for resolution by the RTC was the determination of the amount
of just compensation due. Hence, the RTC, upon motion of
respondents, issued an Order allowed them to file a Motion of
Summary Judgment. The RTC gave NPC a 15-day period from
receipt of such to file its Opposition to or Comment on the
Motion for Summary Judgment. RTC further granted NPCs
Motion for Extension of Time to file their comment. But despite
the 15 days extension given, NPC still failed to file its
Comment. Consequently, RTC deemed Capin and Sps.
Quimcos Motion for Summary Judgment submitted for
resolution.
RTC rendered a Resolution favoring respondents &
ordered NPC to pay damages of P448.33/sq. m. for the 3,199
sq.m. of respondents lots taken by NPC. NPC filed MR for
just compensation to be reduced to P25.00/ sq.m. and a
Supplemental MR for reduction of the interest rate (from 14%
to 6% per annum). RTC affimed its Resolution but reduced
imposable rate to 6%/annum from filing of the complaint, and
12% / annum from the time judgment become final and
executory until fully satisfied. NPC appealed to the CA. CA
affirmed the RTC. MR denied. Hence, the present Petition for
Review before the SC.

Issues: 1. W/N NPC only acquired an easement of right of way
on the properties (consequently making it liable to pay only an
easement fee not exceeding 10% of the fair market value of
the portion of their property actually affected by the
Interconnection Project, pursuant to Section 3-A(b) of its
Charter)?

Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property
with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-
of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on
property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines
also falls within the ambit of the term "expropriation." After
NPCs transmission lines were fully constructed on portions of
Capin and Sps. Quimcos lots, NPC imposed restrictions
thereon such as the prohibition against planting or building
anything higher than three meters below the area traversed by
said lines. In addition, Spouses Quimco, holders of a Small
Scale Quarry Permit, were also prohibited from continuing their
quarry business near NPCs transmission towers because of
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5

the great possibility that it could weaken the foundation thereof.
Hence, the respondents suffered substantial loss of income.
Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230
KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by
NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period
deprives respondents of its ordinary use.
NPCs acquisition of an easement of right of way on
the lands amounted to an expropriation of the portions of the
latters properties and perpetually deprived Capin and Sps.
Quimco of their proprietary rights thereon and for which they
are entitled to a reasonable and just compensation. Just
compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The
measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. The word
"just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word
"compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be
real, substantial, full and ample.

Moreover, the valuation of a property in the tax declaration
cannot be an absolute substitute to just compensation or
rather, the market value stated in the tax declaration of the
condemned property is no longer conclusive. It is violative of
due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that
the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. It is also
repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow
the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to
absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court which is
promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually
viewed the property, after evidence, arguments pro and con
have been presented, and after all factors and considerations
essential to a fair and just determination have been judicially
evaluated. 10% of the market value of the expropriated
property cannot in any way be considered as the fair and full
equivalent to the loss sustained by the owner of the property,
such would be 90% less than what is due him. Thus, Section
3A of NPCs Charter cannot prevail over the mandate of our
Constitution on the payment of just compensation.

2. W/N the RTC erred in fixing the fair market value for the lots
at P448.33/sq.m. based on a previous RTC decision in Civil
Case No. DNA-379 (which was further based on another
decision of the same RTC, Civil Case No. DNA-373)? *In Civil
Case No. DNA-379, the RTC ordered NPC to pay just
compensation of P448.33/sq.m. for the lot owned by the heirs
of Gingco which was similarly traversed by NPCs transmission
lines; whereas in Civil Case No. DNA-373, the RTC considered
the opinion values of the Committee on Appraisal in
determining the fair market value of the properties involved
therein.
Although it is a Decision in another case, the RTC can
take cognizance thereof when Capin and Sps. Quimco
presented the same for its consideration. The lot of the heirs of
Gingco and those of the herein Capin and Sps. Quimco are all
located within the same area, separated only by a lot owned by
the Loros. The lots owned by Capin and Sps. Quimco are even
more advantageously situated than the lot owned by the heirs
of Gingco since their properties are traversed by a barangay
road and near quarry areas of Llyons Richfield Industrial
Corporation. The lots of Capin and Sps. Quimco (effectively
taken in June 1996) and of the heirs (July 1996) were all
affected by the Interconnection Project and were taken by NPC
at about the same time. Since the personalities and properties
in both Civil Cases were essentially in similar situations, then
the just compensation awarded for the property in the former
case was a logical and reasonable basis for fixing or
determining the just compensation due in the latter.
Furthermore, NPC was given ample time to study, challenge,
and controvert the evidences (including the above case), yet it
failed to do so.

3. W/N the RTC erred when it resolved the complaint using the
Rules of Court on Summary Judgment (which apply only to the
ordinary taking of properties) when complaint is actually for
"reversed eminent domain," requiring the appointment of
commissioners for the determination of just compensation, as
provided under Section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court?
The present case stemmed an ordinary civil action for
the rescission of Capin and Sps. Quimcos agreement with
NPC, as well as recovery of the possession of the lots taken,
for failure of NPC to comply with its obligation to pay just
compensation for Capin and Sps. Quimcos properties.
Payment of just compensation or damages was an alternative
remedy, akin to specific performance by NPC of its obligation
under its agreement with Capin and Sps. Quimco, which would
prevent the rescission of the agreements altogether and the
return of the possession of the properties to Capin and Sps.
Quimco. The parties, at the Pre-Trial Conference, implicitly
agreed to pursue the remedy for payment of damages rather
than rescission of the agreement. Clearly, the proceedings
before the RTC were not for expropriation, but were for
damages, to which Section 5, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of
Court is irrelevant.
SC made reference to NPC v. CA, where it ruled that:
.. case ceased to be an action for expropriation when NPC
dismissed its complaint for expropriation. Since this case has
been reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages, the
provisions of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of the
just compensation to be paid were no longer applicable. A trial
before commissioners, for instance, was dispensable." NPC
herein cannot hide behind the mantle of protection of
procedural laws when it has so arbitrarily violated Capin and
Sps. Quimcos right to just compensation for their properties
taken for public use.

APO FRUITS V. CA

Facts: Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation, Inc.
(HPI) offered to sell their land pursuant to RA 6657
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, or CARL). The
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) referred their voluntary-
offer-to-sell (VOS) applications to Land Bank for initial
valuation. Land Bank fixed the just compensation
at P165,484.47/hectare, that is, P86,900,925.88, for AFC,
and P164,478,178.14, for HPI. The valuation was rejected,
prompting Land Bank, upon the advice of DAR, to open
deposit accounts in the names of AFC and HPI, and to credit in
said accounts the sums of P26,409,549.86 (AFC)
and P45,481,706.76 (HPI). AFC and HPI withdrew the
amounts in cash from the accounts, but afterwards, they filed
separate complaints for determination of just compensation
with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB).
When DARAB did not act on their complaints for
determination of just compensation after more than three
years, AFC and HPI filed complaints for determination of just
compensation with the RTC in Tagum City, acting as a special
agrarian court (SAC). Summonses were served to Land Bank
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and DAR, which respectively filed their answers. The RTC
conducted a pre-trial, and appointed commissioners to
determine the proper valuation of the properties.
The RTC rendered a decision valuing the land at
P103.33 per square meter (substantially the same price AFC
and HPI wanted). It ordered the DAR and Land Bank to pay
AFC and HPI P1,383,179,000.00 for the land and its standing
crops. Interest equivalent to the market interest rates aligned
with 91-day Treasury Bills, from the date of taking up to full
payment was imposed. It also ordered DAR and Land bank to
pay the Commissioners fees, and the attorneys fees, to be
computed at 2 % and 10% of the just compensation of the
land and standing crops plus interest equivalent to the interest
of the 91-Day Treasury Bills from date of taking until full
payment, respectively. They were also ordered to pay the
costs.
Land Bank filed an MR. The decision was modified
and an interest at the rate of 12% per annum was fixed from
the time the complaint was filed up to the time of the finality of
the decision. The same interest rate was imposed on the total
obligation from the time it became final and executor up to its
full payment. The interest on the attorneys fees and
Commissioners fees were removed. As to all other aspects,
the decision remained the same.
Land Bank filed a notice of appeal. The RTC denied it
saying the proper remedy was a petition for review since it was
acting as a SAC. To question the RTCs denial, Land Bank
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA granted the
petition and eventually nullified the RTCs orders.
AFC and HPI then filed a petition for review on
certiorari praying that the CA be reversed and that the RTC
decision be declared final an executory. The SC 3
rd
Division
said that the granting of the appeal was correct but that the
RTCs decision regarding the payment and amount should be
affirmed.
Land Bank filed an MR which the 3
rd
Division partially
granted. The new decision deleted the award of attorneys
fees. It also remanded the case to the RTC for a hearing on
the amount of Commissioners fees. Most importantly, it
deleted the 12% interest rate per annum in the total amount of
just compensation.
Both AFC and HPI and Land Bank filed MRs which
were denied. Entry of judgment was made on May 16, 2008.
Despite this, AFC and HPI still filed on May 28, 2008 several
motions, namely: (1) motion for leave to file and admit second
motion for reconsideration; (2) second motion for
reconsideration (with respect to the denial of the award of legal
interest and attorney's fees); and (3) motion to refer the second
motion for reconsideration to the Honorable Court en banc.
The case was referred to the SC en banc.

Issue: WON interest and attorneys fees should be awarded to
AFC and HPI.

Held: No! The second motion for reconsideration (with respect
to the denial of the award of legal interest and attorney's fees)
is denied, because, firstly, to grant it is to jettison the
immutability of a final decision a matter of public policy and
public interest, as well as a time-honored principle of
procedural law; and secondly, to award interest and attorneys
fees despite the fact that Land Bank paid the just
compensation without undue delay is legally and factually
unwarranted.

Ratio: (On the interest and attorneys fees) The taking of
property under CARL is an exercise by the State of the power
of eminent domain. A basic limitation on the States power of
eminent domain is the constitutional directive that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. Just compensation refers to the sum equivalent
to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the
price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and
ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair
value of the property as between one who receives and one
who desires to sell. It is fixed at the time of the actual taking by
the State. Thus, if property is taken for public use before
compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction
over the case, the final compensation must include interests on
its just value, to be computed from the time the property is
taken up to the time when compensation is actually paid or
deposited with the court.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, the Court
came to explicitly rule that interest is to be imposed on the just
compensation only in case of delay in its payment, which fact
must be sufficiently established. Significantly, Wycoco was
moored on Article 2209, Civil Code, which provides:
Article 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment
of money and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for
damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be
the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of
stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum.
(1108)
`The history of this case proves that Land Bank did
not incur delay in the payment of the just compensation. As
earlier mentioned, after AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell
their lands on October 12, 1995, DAR referred their VOS
applications to Land Bank for initial valuation. Land Bank
initially fixed the just compensation at P165,484.47/hectare,
that is, P86,900,925.88, for AFC, and P164,478,178.14, for
HPI. However, they rejected Land Banks initial valuation,
prompting Land Bank to open deposit accounts in the
petitioners names, and to credit in said accounts the amounts
equivalent to their valuations. Although AFC withdrew the
amount of P26,409,549.86, while HPI withdrew
P45,481,706.76, they still filed with DARAB separate
complaints for determination of just compensation. When
DARAB did not act upon their complaints for more than three
years, AFC and HPI commenced their respective actions for
determination of just compensation in the Tagum City RTC,
which rendered its decision on September 25, 2001.
It is true that Land Bank sought to appeal the RTCs
decision to the CA, by filing a notice of appeal; and that Land
Bank filed in March 2003 its petition for certiorari in the CA only
because the RTC did not give due course to its appeal. Any
intervening delay thereby entailed could not be attributed to
Land Bank, however, considering that assailing an erroneous
order before a higher court is a remedy afforded by law to
every losing party, who cannot thus be considered to act in bad
faith or in an unreasonable manner as to make such party
guilty of unjustified delay. As stated in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Kumassie Plantation:
The mere fact that LBP appealed the decisions of the
RTC and the Court of Appeals does not mean that it
deliberately delayed the payment of just compensation to
KPCI. x x x It may disagree with DAR and the landowner as to
the amount of just compensation to be paid to the latter and
may also disagree with them and bring the matter to court for
judicial determination. This makes LBP an indispensable party
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in cases involving just compensation for lands taken under the
Agrarian Reform Program, with a right to appeal decisions in
such cases that are unfavorable to it. Having only exercised its
right to appeal in this case, LBP cannot be penalized by
making it pay for interest.
The Third Division justified its deletion of the award of
interest thuswise:
AFC and HPI now blame LBP for allegedly incurring
delay in the determination and payment of just compensation.
However, the same is without basis as AFC and HPIs proper
recourse after rejecting the initial valuations of respondent LBP
was to bring the matter to the RTC acting as a SAC, and not to
file two complaints for determination of just compensation with
the DAR, which was just circuitous as it had already
determined the just compensation of the subject properties
taken with the aid of LBP.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, citing
Reyes v. National Housing Authority and Republic v. Court of
Appeals, this Court held that the interest of 12% per annum on
the just compensation is due the landowner in case of delay in
payment, which will in effect make the obligation on the part of
the government one of forbearance. On the other hand,
interest in the form of damages cannot be applied, where there
was prompt and valid payment of just compensation. Thus:
The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is
considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the
property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in
open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action
and competition or the fair value of the property as between
one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it being fixed at
the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if
property is taken for public use before compensation is
deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the
final compensation must include interests on its just value to be
computed from the time the property is taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In
fine, between the taking of the property and the actual
payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a
position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in
before the taking occurred.
It is explicit from LBP v. Wycoco that interest on the
just compensation is imposed only in case of delay in the
payment thereof which must be sufficiently established. Given
the foregoing, we find that the imposition of interest on the
award of just compensation is not justified and should therefore
be deleted.

REPUBLIC VS. HOLY TRINITY DEVELOPMENT INC.

FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), filed with the RTC a
Consolidated Complaint for Expropriation against landowners
whose properties would be affected by the construction,
rehabilitation, and expansion of the North Luzon Expressway.
The Holy Trinity Reality and Development Corporation was one
of the affected landowners.
TRB filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance
of a Writ of Possession, manifesting that it deposited a
sufficient amount to cover the payment of 100% of the zonal
value of the affected properties (in the total amount of
28,406,700 pesos) with the Land Bank of the Philippines,
South Harbor Branch (LBP-South Harbor), an authorized
government depository. TRB maintained that since it had
already complied with the provisions of Sec. 4 of RA 8974 in
relation to Sec. 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the issuance
of the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of the
RTC.
RTC issued an Order for the Issuance of the Writ of
Possession as well as the Writ of Possession itself. Holy Trinity
moved for reconsideration.
The Sheriff filed with the RTC a Report on Writ of
Possession stating that since none of the landowners
voluntarily vacated the properties subject of the expropriation
proceedings, the assistance of the PNP would be necessary in
implementing the Writ of Possession. Accordingly, TRB,
through OSG, filed with the RTC an Omnibus Motion praying
for an Order directing the PNP to assist the Sheriff in the
implementation of the Writ of Possession.
The Holy Trinity filed with the RTC a Motion to
Withdraw Deposit, praying that it be allowed to withdraw
22,968,000 out of 28,406,700, including the interest which
accrued thereon. RTC granted the motion (except as to the
interest) since Holy Trinity already proved its absolute
ownership over the properties and paid the taxes due to the
government.
RTC conducted a hearing on the accrued interest,
after which it directed the issuance of an Order of
Expropriation, and granted TRB a period of 30 days to inquire
from LBP-South Harbor whether the deposit made by DPWH
with the bank relative to the expropriation proceedings is
earning interest or not. TRB submitted a Manifestation to which
was attached the letter by Atty. Osoteo stating that the DPWH
Expropriation Account was an interest bearing current account.
RTC resolved the issue by ruling that the interest
earnings from the deposit of 22,968,000 (under the principle of
accession) are considered as fruits and should properly pertain
to the property owner (in this case, Holy Trinity). Upon motion
of TRB, it issued an Order of Expropriation. But later on, it
reversed itself stating that the issue as to who is entitled to the
payment of interest should be ventilated before the Board of
Commissioners. The CA reversed.

ISSUE:
WON Holy Trinity is only entitled to the amount equivalent
to the zonal value of the expropriated property and not to
the accrued interest? NO. Holy Trinity is also entitled to
the accrued interest.
Note: TRB is contending that Holy Trinity is only entitled to the
exact amount as defined in Sec. 4 of RA 8974 and Sec. 2 Rule
67 (hindi daw kasama ang interest).

RULING:
TRB failed to distinguish between the expropriation procedures
under RA 8974 and Rule 67. The former specifically governs
expropriation proceedings for national government
infrastructure projects. In the case of Republic vs. Gingoyon,
the SC ruled that under RA 8974, the government is required
to make immediate payment to the property owner upon the
filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession,
whereas in Rule 67, the government is authorized only to make
an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary.
In the case at bar, the proceedings deal with the
expropriation of properties intended for a national government
infrastructure project. Thus, the RTC was correct in applying
the procedure laid out in RA 8974, by requiring the deposit of
the amount equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of the
properties sought to be expropriated.
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The controversy though arises not from the amount of
the deposit but as to the ownership of the interest that had
since accrued on the deposited amount.
The SC agrees with the ruling of the CA. The critical
factor in the different modes of effecting delivery which gives
legal effect to the act is the actual intention to deliver on the
part of the party making such delivery. The intention of the
TRB in depositing such amount through DPWH was clearly to
comply with the requirement of immediate payment in RA
8974, so that it could already secure a writ of possession over
the properties subject of the expropriation and commence
implementation of the project. In fact, TRB did not object to
Holy Trinitys Motion to Withdraw Deposit with the RTC, for as
long as it shows (1) that the property is free from any lien or
encumbrance and (2) that it is the absolute owner thereof.
A close scrutiny of TRB's arguments would further
reveal that it does not directly challenge the CAs determinative
pronouncement that the interest earned by the amount
deposited in the expropriation account accrues to Holy Trinity
by virtue of accession. TRB only asserts that Holy Trinity is
entitled only to an amount equivalent to the zonal value of the
expropriated property, nothing more and nothing less.
The SC agrees in TRB's statement since it is exactly
how the amount of the immediate payment shall be determined
in accordance with Sec4 of RA 8974, i.e., an amount
equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of the expropriated
properties. However, TRB already complied therewith by
depositing the required amount in the expropriation account of
DPWH with LBP-South Harbor. By depositing the said
amount, TRB is already considered to have paid the same to
Holy Trinity, and Holy Trinity became the owner thereof. The
amount earned interest after the deposit; hence, the interest
should pertain to the owner of the principal who is already
determined as the Holy Trinity. The interest is paid by LBP-
South Harbor on the deposit, and TRB cannot claim that it paid
an amount more than what it is required to do so by law.
Nonetheless, the SC finds it necessary to emphasize
that Holy Trinity is determined to be the owner of only a part of
the amount deposited in the expropriation account, in the sum
of P22,968,000.00. Hence, it is entitled by right of accession to
the interest that had accrued to the said amount only.

G. Judicial Foreclosure (Rule 68)

HUERTA ALBA RESORT, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and SYNDICATED MANAGEMENT GROUP,
INC.,respondents.

FACTS. In a complaint for judicial foreclosure of mortgage with
preliminary injunction filed on October 19, 1989 before the
RTC, the Syndicated Management Group, Inc. (SMGI)
sought the foreclosure of 4 parcels of land mortgaged by
Huerta Alba Resort (Huerta) to Intercon Fund Resource, Inc.
(Intercon).
SMGI instituted the case as mortgagee-assignee of a
loan amounting to P8.5 million obtained by Huerta from
Intercon, in whose favor petitioner mortgaged the aforesaid
parcels of land as security for the said loan. RTC came out
with its decision granting herein private respondent SMGIs
complaint for judicial foreclosure of mortgage. Huerta
appealed, filed a petition for certiorari, MR, leave to present
second MR, but to no avail.
On March 14, 1994, the Resolution became final and
executory and was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
Accordingly, on July 15, 1994 a writ of execution issued and,
on July 20, 1994, a Notice of Levy and Execution was issued
by the Sheriff concerned, who issued on August 1, 1994 a
Notice of Sheriffs Sale for the auction of subject properties on
September 6, 1994.
On September 6, 1994, the scheduled auction sale of
subject pieces of properties proceeded and SMGI was
declared the highest bidder. Certificate of Sale was registered
with the Registry of Deeds on October 21, 1994. On February
10, 1995, the lower court confirmed the sale of subject
properties to SMGI. Conformably, the Transfer Certificates of
Title to subject pieces of property were then issued to the
private respondent.
SMGI filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Possession with the TC Huerta filed a Motion to Compel
Private Respondent to Accept Redemption. It was the first
time petitioner ever asserted the right to redeem subject
properties under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337, the General
Banking Act; theorizing that the original mortgagee (Insular),
being a credit institution, its assignment of the mortgage credit
to petitioner did not remove petitioner from the coverage of
Section 78 of R.A. No. 337. Therefore, according to Huerta, it
should have the right to redeem subject properties within one
year from registration of the auction sale, and concluded that in
view of its right of redemption, the issuance of the titles over
subject parcels of land to the SMGI was irregular and
premature.
TC denied private respondents motion for a writ of
possession, opining that Section 78 of the General Banking Act
was applicable and therefore, the petitioner had until October
21, 1995 to redeem the said parcels of land. CA reversed.

ISSUE. Whether or not the petitioner has the one-year right of
redemption of subject properties under Section 78 of Republic
Act No. 337 otherwise known as the General Banking Act. The
petition is not visited by merit.

RATIO. From the various decisions, resolutions and orders a
quo it can be gleaned that what petitioner has been adjudged
to have was only the equity of redemption over subject
properties. On the distinction between the equity of redemption
and right of redemption, the case of Gregorio Y. Limpin vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, comes to the fore. Held the
Court in the said case:
The right of redemption in relation to a mortgage -
understood in the sense of a prerogative to re-acquire
mortgaged property after registration of the foreclosure sale -
exists only in the case of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage. No such right is recognized in
a judicial foreclosure except only where the mortgagee is
the Philippine National Bank or a bank or banking
institution.
Where a mortgage is foreclosed extrajudicially, Act
3135 grants to the mortgagor the right of redemption within one
(1) year from the registration of the sheriffs certificate of
foreclosure sale.
Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, however,
no equivalent right of redemption exists. The law declares
that a judicial foreclosure sale, when confirmed by an order of
the court, x x shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties
to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to
such rights of redemption as may be allowed by
law. Such rights exceptionally allowed by law (i.e., even after
confirmation by an order of the court) are those granted by the
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charter of the Philippine National Bank (Acts No. 2747 and
2938), and the General Banking Act (R.A. 337). These laws
confer on the mortgagor, his successors in interest or any
judgment creditor of the mortgagor, the right to redeem the
property sold on foreclosure - after confirmation by the court of
the foreclosure sale - which right may be exercised within a
period of one (1) year, counted from the date of registration of
the certificate of sale in the Registry of Property.
But, to repeat, no such right of redemption exists in
case of judicial foreclosure of a mortgage if the mortgagee is
not the PNB or a bank or banking institution. In such a case,
the foreclosure sale, when confirmed by an order of the court.
x x shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the
action and to vest their rights in the purchaser. There then
exists only what is known as the equity of redemption. This is
simply the right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the
mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the
secured debt within the 90-day period after the judgment
becomes final, in accordance with Rule 68, or even after the
foreclosure sale but prior to its confirmation.
Section 2, Rule 68 provides that -
x x If upon the trial x x the court shall find the facts set
forth in the complaint to be true, it shall ascertain the
amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or
obligation, including interest and costs, and shall render
judgment for the sum so found due and order the same to
be paid into court within a period of not less than ninety
(90) days from the date of the service of such order, and
that in default of such payment the property be sold to
realize the mortgage debt and costs.
This is the mortgagors equity (not right) of
redemption which, as above stated, may be exercised by him
even beyond the 90-day period from the date of service of the
order, and even after the foreclosure sale itself, provided it be
before the order of confirmation of the sale. After such order of
confirmation, no redemption can be effected any
longer.
[8]
(Underscoring supplied)
As regards to whether Huerta failed to seasonably
invoke its purported right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337.
The Court held that it was too late in the day for petitioner to
invoke a right to redeem under Section 78 of R.A. No.
337. Petitioner failed to assert a right to redeem in several
crucial stages of the Proceedings.

BACALING V. MUYA

Facts: The spouses Ramon Bacaling were the owners of 3
parcels of land in Iloilo City. In 1955, the landholding was
subdivided 110 sub-lots and approved as "residential" or
"subdivision" by the National Urban Planning Commission
(NUPC) and the Bureau of Lands. It was referred to as
the Bacaling-Moreno Subdivision. A real estate loan of P600k
was granted to the spouses Bacaling by GSIS for the
development of the subdivision. To secure the repayment of
the loan, the Bacalings executed in favor of the GSIS a real
estate mortgage over their parcels of land including the sub-
lots. The Bacalings failed to pay the amortizations on the loan
and consequently the mortgage constituted on the sub-
lots was foreclosed by the GSIS. After a court case that
reached all the way to the SC,

Nelita Bacaling (by then a
widow) in 1989 was eventually able to restore to herself
ownership of the 110 sub-lots.
In 1972, respondents Felomino Muya, and 4 others
clandestinely entered and occupied the entire 110 sub-lots.
Muya claimed that they were legally instituted by Bacaling as
tenant-tillers and later on their relationship changed into a
leasehold. In 1980, they secured certificates of land transfer in
their names for the 110 sub-lots. Jose Juan Tong, bought the
sub-lots after Bacaling has repurchased the subject property
GSIS. To secure performance of the contract of absolute sale
and facilitate the transfer of title of the lots to Jose Juan Tong,
Bacaling appointed him in 1992 as her attorney-in-fact, under
an irrevocable special power of attorney.
Using the irrevocable special power of attorney executed in his
favor, petitioner Tong (together with Bacaling) filed a petition
for cancellation of the certificates of land transfer against
respondents with the Department of Agrarian
Reform(DAR). The DAR, however, dismissed the petition on
the ground that there had been no legitimate conversion of the
classification of the 110 sub-lots from agricultural to residential.
Bacaling and Tong appealed the adverse DAR Orders to the
Office of the President which reversed the DAR decision.
The OP Decision found that the sub-lots had been completely
converted from agricultural to residential lots as a result of the
declarations of the NUPC and the Bureau of Lands. Muya
elevated the OP Decision to the Court of Appeals. CA reversed
the OP Decision and validated the certificates of land transfers
in favor of respondents. Tong moved for reconsideration but
was denied.

Issues: 1. WON Muya, et. al. are agricultural lessees NO
(relevant to Judicial Foreclosure)
2. WON Tong has the requisite interest to litigate the
petition for review on certiorari -YES
3. WON the sub-lots are residential lots -YES

OP Decision reinstated, Certificate of Land Transfer to Muya,
et. al declared Viod Ab Initio, and they were ordered to vacate
the sub-lots.

Ratio: 1. The requisites in order to have a valid agricultural
leasehold relationship are: (1) The parties are the landowner
and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) The subject matter of
the relationship is agricultural land; (3) There is consent
between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) There
is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and (6) The harvest is shared between the landowner
and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
The first, third and sixth requisites are lacking. One
legal conclusion adduced from the facts in Government
Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals provides that
GSIS, not Bacaling, was the owner of the subject
properties from 1961 up to 1989 as a result of the
foreclosure and confirmation of the sale of the subject
properties. Although the confirmation only came in 1975, the
ownership is deemed to have been vested to GSIS way back
in 1961, the year of the sale of the foreclosed properties. This
is due to the fact that the date of confirmation by the trial
court of the foreclosure sale retroacts to the date of the
actual sale itself.
Thus, the respondents cannot validly claim that they
are legitimate and recognized tenants of the subject parcels of
land for the reason that their agreement to till the land was not
with GSIS, the real landowner. There is no showing that GSIS
consented to such tenancy relationship nor is there proof that
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GSIS received a share in the harvest of the
tenants. Consequently, the respondents cannot claim security
of tenure and other rights accorded by our agrarian laws
considering that they have not been validly instituted as
agricultural lessees of the subject parcels of land
The pendency of the GSIS case cannot be construed
as a maintenance of status quo with Bacaling as the owner
from 1957 up to 1989 for the reason that what was appealed to
this Court was only the issue of redemption, and not the
validity of the foreclosure proceedings including the public
auction sale, the confirmation of the public auction sale and the
confirmation and transfer of ownership of the foreclosed
parcels of land to GSIS. The ownership of GSIS over the
subject parcels of land was not disputed. There was no longer
any right of redemption in a judicial foreclosure proceeding
after the confirmation of the public auction. Only foreclosures
of mortgages in favor of banking institutions and those made
extrajudicially are subject to legal redemption. Since GSIS is
not a banking institution and the procedure of the foreclosure is
not extrajudicial in nature, no right of redemption exists after
the judicial confirmation of the public auction sale of the said
lots.

2. Petitioner Jose Juan Tong possesses adequate and
legitimate interest to file the instant petition. As transferee of
the sub-lots through a contract of sale and as the attorney-in-
fact of Nelita Bacaling, former owner of the subject lots, under
an irrevocable special power of attorney, petitioner Tong
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the instant
case as well as the orders and decisions in the proceedings a
quo.

3. The sub-lots are indeed residential. In Tiongson v. Court of
Appeals,

the "key factor in ascertaining whether there is a
landowner-tenant relationship xxx is the nature of the disputed
property. In the case at bar, the indubitable conclusion from
established facts is that the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots,
originally three (3) parcels of land, have been officially
classified as residential since 1955.

TERESITA MONZON VS SPS. RELOVA & SPS. PEREZ
VS ADDIO PROPERTIES (INTERVENOR)

Facts: Spouses Relova and Perez filed a petition for Injunction.
They allege that Monzon issued a PN in favor of sps. Perez.
The amount was P600K and secured by Lot2A. A deed of
absolute sale over the parcel of land was later executed in
favor of the Perez spouses. Same thing happened with sps.
Relova. A PN in the amount of P200k was issued secured by
Lot2B. A deed of conditional sale over the parcel of land was
later issued in favor of sps. Relova.
It appears that Monzon was indebted to the Coastal
Lending Corporation. Coastal Lending then extrajudicially
foreclosed the property of Monzon which included Lots2A and
2B. The winning bidder in this extrajudicial foreclosure was
Addio properties. Of the amount paid by Addio, there was a
residue of roughly P1.6M (indebtedness of Monzon was only
P3.4M++ while Addio paid P5M++ for the property thats why
theres an excess). This residue is in the custody of Atty. Luna
as Branch Clerk of Court.
The petition for injunction was filed to order Atty. Luna
to deliver the residue to spouses Relova and Perez instead of
delivering them to Monzon. Monzon argues that she had
already performed her obligation to the spouses Relova and
Perez via the dacion en pago. Also, it is argued that the funds
in the custody of Atty. Luna cannot be acquired by them
without a writ of preliminary attachment or a writ of
garnishment.
RTC: Atty. Luna should deliver the residue to spouses
Relova and Perez. At this point in time, Addio properties
intervened.
CA: Affirmed RTC

Issue: Whether the spouses Relova and Perez have a right to
the residue? NO!

Held: Spouses Relova and Perez rely on Section4, Rule68
of the Rules of Court: SEC. 4. Disposition of proceeds of
sale.--The amount realized from the foreclosure sale of the
mortgaged property shall, after deducting the costs of the sale,
be paid to the person foreclosing the mortgage, andwhen
there shall be any balance or residue, after paying off the
mortgage debt due, the same shall be paid to junior
encumbrancers in the order of their priority, to be
ascertained by the court, or if there be no such encumbrancers
or there be a balance or residue after payment to them, then to
the mortgagor or his duly authorized agent, or to the person
entitled to it.
However, Rule68 governs the judicial foreclosure of
mortgages. Extrajudicial foreclosures, as what happened in
this case, is governed by a different set of laws (Act3135 as
amended by Act4118). Unlike Rule68 which governs judicial
foreclosure sales, there is no rule covering extrajudicial
foreclosure sales that grants to junior encumbrancers the right
to receive the balance of the purchase price. The only right
given to them is the right to redeem the foreclosed properties.
But even if Rule68 is to be applied to extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgages, the right can only be given to 2
nd

mortgagees who are made parties to the judicial foreclosure. A
2
nd
mortgagee is not an indispensable party in a proceeding to
foreclose a 1
st
mortgage on real property because a valid
decree may be made as between the mortgagor and the 1
st

mortgagee without regard to the 2
nd
mortgagee. But the effect
of the failure to make the 2
nd
mortgagee a party to the
proceeding is that his lien on the equity of redemption is not
affected by the decree of foreclosure (I sort of dont get this.
Hehe)
The rule is now settled that a mortgage creditor may
elect to waive his security and bring, instead, an ordinary
action to recover the indebtedness with the right to execute a
judgment thereon on all the properties of the debtor including
the subject matter of the mortgage, subject to the qualification
that if he fails in the remedy elected by him, he cannot pursue
further the remedy he has waived. Case is remanded and
Spouses Relova and Perez are to manifest whether they want
their Petition for Injunction to be construed as a collection of
sum of money (different consequences whether the answer in
the affirmative or negative but I wont discuss this part
anymore).

H. Judicial Partition (Rule 69)

SEPULVEDA V. PELAEZ

FACTS: Atty. Pacifico Pelaez filed a complaint against his
granduncle, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr., for the recovery of
possession and ownership of his share of several parcels of
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land; and for the partition thereof among the co-owners. In his
complaint, the private respondent alleged that his mother
Dulce died intestate and aside from himself, was survived by
her husband Rodolfo Pelaez and her mother Carlota
Sepulveda. Dulces grandfather Vicente Sepulveda died
intestate and Dulce was then only about four years old. The
private respondent alleged that he himself demanded the
delivery of his mother s share in the subject properties on so
many occasions, the last of which was in 1972, to no avail.
The private respondent further narrated that his
granduncle executed an affidavit stating that he was the sole
heir of Dionisia when in fact, the latter was survived by her
three sons, Santiago, Pedro and Vicente. Pedro Sepulveda,
Sr. also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the City
of Danao for P7,492.00. According to the private respondent,
his granduncle received this amount without his (private
respondents) knowledge.
The trial court ruled that the private respondents
action for reconveyance based on constructive trust had not
yet prescribed when the complaint was filed; that he was
entitled to a share in the proceeds of the sale of the property to
Danao City; and that the partition of the subject property
among the adjudicatees thereof was in order. The petitioner
appealed the decision to the CA, which rendered judgment on
January 31, 2002, affirming the appealed decision with
modification. The petitioner now comes to the Court via a
petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC S judgment was validly
rendered

HELD: NO
The petition is granted for the sole reason that the
respondent failed to implead as parties, all the indispensable
parties in his complaint.
The failure of the private respondent to implead the
other heirs as parties-plaintiffs constituted a legal obstacle to
the trial court and the appellate courts exercise of judicial
power over the said case, and rendered any orders or
judgments rendered therein a nullity.
Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides that in
an action for partition, all persons interested in the property
shall be joined as defendants.
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of
real estate.- A person having the right to
compel the partition of real estate may do so
as in this rule prescribed, setting forth in his
complaint the nature and extent of his title
and an adequate description of the real
estate of which partition is demanded and
joining as defendants all the other persons
interested in the property.
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in
the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for
partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties. The
mere fact that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. has repudiated the co-
ownership between him and the respondent does not deprive
the trial court of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action for
partition, for, in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks,
first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject property;
and, second, the conveyance of his lawful shares.
Rodolfo Pelaez is an indispensable party he being
entitled to a share in usufruct, equal to the share of the
respondent in the subject properties. The plaintiff is mandated
to implead all the indispensable parties, considering that the
absence of one such party renders all subsequent actions of
the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as
to the absent parties but even as to those present. Without the
presence of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial court could
not validly render judgment and grant relief in favor of the
private respondent.
In the present action, the private respondent, as the
plaintiff in the trial court, failed to implead the following
indispensable parties: his father, Rodolfo Pelaez; the heirs of
Santiago Sepulveda, namely, Paz Sepulveda and their
children; and the City of Danao which purchased the property
from Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. and maintained that it had failed to
pay for the purchase price of the property.
To reiterate, the absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but
even as to those present. Hence, the trial court should have
ordered the dismissal of the complaint.

Just in case sir asks: 2 Stages in an action for judicial partition
1. The determination of whether or not a co-ownership in
fact exists and a partition is proper, that is, it is not
otherwise legally proscribed and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the
property
2. The second stage commences when the parties are
unable to agree upon the partition ordered by the
court. In that event, partition shall be effected for the
parties by the court with the assistance of not more
than three (3) commissioners. This second phase
may also deal with the rendition of the accounting
itself and its approval by the Court after the parties
have been accorded the opportunity to be heard
thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or
parties thereto entitled of their just shares in the rents
and profits of the real estate in question

I. Ejectment (Rule 70)

UY V. SANTIAGO

FACTS: The MTC rendered a decision in favor of Uy in 4
consolidated ejectment cases. Palomado et al appealed the
cases to the RTC which affirmed in toto the decision of the
MTC. Uy filed a motion for execution pending appeal while
Palomado filed a Petition for Review before the CA. RTC
Judge Santiago denied the motion for execution pending
appeal. Uy filed an MR which was likewise denied.
Uy filed a Petition for Mandamus for the issuance of a
writ of execution pending appeal. As basis for denying Uys
Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, Judge Santiago cited
Palomados compliance with the requirements to stay
immediate execution of judgment, namely: (1) perfection of
appeal; (2) filing of a supersedeas bond; and (3) periodic
deposit of the rentals falling due during the pendency of the
appeal.
Uy contends that Rule 70, Section 10, which
enumerated the above-mentioned requirements, has already
been expressly repealed by Rule 70, Section 21 and that the
execution of appealed ejectment decisions with the RTC
cannot now be stayed.

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Digests
5

Issue: w/n the decisions of RTC in appealed ejectment cases
pending appeal w/ CA are immediately executor YES!

RATIO: Sec. 19 is applicable only to ejectment cases pending
appeal with the RTC, and Sec. 21 applies to those decided by
the RTC. Under Sec. 19, the other party may file a
supersedeas bond to stay the appeal while under Sec. 21, the
decision of the RTC is immediately executory.
It is only execution of the MTC judgment pending
appeal with the RTC which may be stayed by a compliance
with the requisites provided in Rule 70, Section 19. On the
other hand, once the RTC has rendered a decision in its
appellate jurisdiction, such decision shall, under Rule 70, be
immediately executory, without prejudice to an appeal, via a
Petition for Review, before the CA and/or SC.
Palomados argument that execution pending appeal
would deprive them of their right to due process of law as it
would render moot and academic their Petition for Review
before the CA deserves scant consideration. Finding the
issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal a clear duty of
respondent Judge under the law, mandamus can and should
lie against him.

SERRANO ET AL V. SPS. GUTIERREZ

FACTS: Respondents Sps. Gutierrez filed a complaint for
forcible entry against herein petitioners. The lot subject of the
controversy is an untenanted agricultural land in Lubao,
Pampanga owned by Sps. Gutierrez. They alleged that herein
petitioners, by means of strategy and stealth, entered the lot
and constructed concrete structures and dumped truckload of
filling materials, all without knowledge and consent of the
spouses. The latter demanded that they leave, but Serrano et
al. refused. Serranos group claimed that the lot was part of
Albino Moraless estate and they were his heirs.
Pampanga MTC ruled that since the real issue
involved was a question of ownership and not mere
possession de facto, it had no jurisdiction and it dismissed the
case.
Sps Gutierrez appealed the case to RTC of Guagua
Pampanga, which ordered Serrano et al to vacate, since all
they could present were Tax Decs. Serrano et al appealed to
the CA questioning RTCs jurisdiction (because they claim
since the land is agricultural, DARAB should have jurisdiction)
and the adjudication of ownership by the RTC (since this is
only an ejectment case). CA upheld the RTC ruling.

Issues: w/n RTC had jurisdiction over the case YES. [issue
as stated in the case: did the RTC err in applying Rule 40, Sec
8
6
in deciding the ejectment case on appeal? No] Serrano et

6
Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of
jurisdiction.If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court
dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the RTC may affirm or
reverse it. In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC, if it has jurisdiction
thereover, shall try the case on the merits as if the case was originally
filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further
proceedings.
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal shall not
dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide
the case in accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice to
al argue that the MTC acted without jurisdiction in dismissing
the case, hence RTC cannot decide it on appeal. Petition
denied

Ruling: MTC clearly erred in dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction. RA 7691 states that ejectment cases fall
exclusively with the MTC, provided that when in such cases
defendant raises the question of ownership and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue on
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession. Rule 70, Sec 16 affirms
such provisional determination of ownership in ejectment.
Inferior courts have jurisdiction to resolve questions of
ownership whenever necessary to decide the question of
possession in ejectment cases.
Thus, the RTC also erred in agreeing with the MTC
decision to dismiss the case. It misapplied Sec 8 of Rule 40,
which involves lack of jurisdiction of the MTC (MTC
erroneously thought it had no jurisdiction). Nevertheless, RTC
could still its exercise appellate jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners submit that since the property is valued at
13.3k, then the case is removed from the RTC jurisdiction
which is limited to actions involving real property exceeding
20k OMM or 50k in MM. This is wrong. That provision pertains
to the original jurisdiction of the RTC. Because of its appellate
jurisdiction over cases decided by the MTCs, MCTCs, etc, the
amount of the lot is immaterial. All cases decided by the MTCs
are generally appealable to the RTC, irrespective of the
amount involved. RTC may resolve the case on the merits.
Finally, as regards the finding that it is the Sps
Gutierrez who are entitled to the property, the CA ruling is
affirmed. The spouses presented OCT, Deed of Sale and
TCTs to prove their ownership. Serrano et al only had Tax
Decs.

J. Contempt (Rule 71)

CURATA V. PPA
(This is a very painfully looooooooong case but I had to
trim it down to include only the essentials.)

FACTS:
This is an expropriation case initiated on October 14, 1999 by
the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) against 231 individuals or
entities who owned the subject lots. This is a consolidation of
several petitions, but central to these is the matter of just
compensation for the lots sought to be expropriated by PPA
for the Batangas Port Zone (BPZ) project (Phase II).

(Relevant facts, in brief)
The lower courts issued two compensation orders
directing PPA to issue just compensation to the landowners.
However, PPA filed separate/several appeals to these
compensation orders, as the defendants were practically
divided into three groups. Briefly, several orders were issued
by the court and noteworthy were the writs of execution
ordering PPA to pay the lot owners the just compensation and
the notice of garnishment issued to the Philippine Veterans
Bank. PPA naturally appealed the orders granting issuance of
the writs. During the pendency of one of the appeals of the
PPA, the CA issued a TRO enjoining respondent Judge

the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the
interest of justice
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Page 22 of 23

Digests
5

Paterno Tac-An from implementing the orders granting the writ
of Execution to one of the defendant groups. Despite that,
respondent judge still issued the said orders. Another order
was issued by the CA enjoining said judge from implementing
the orders and from proceeding with the Civil Case 5447 (PPA
v. One of the defendant owners). However, respondent judge
still proceeded with the case. PPA filed a petition citing
respondent judge for contempt.
On the other hand, the First Division of the Court
considered as moot the issue raised by PPA on the denial of
its contempt petition, in view of the compulsory retirement of
Judge Tac-an on July 8, 2007.

ISSUE: Whether the retirement of Judge Tac-an should still be
cited for contempt? YES.

HELD: The objective of criminal contempt is to vindicate public
authority. It is an effective instrument of preserving and
protecting the dignity and authority of courts of law. Any act or
omission that degrades or demeans the integrity of the court
must be sanctioned, lest it prejudice the efficient administration
of justice if left unpunished. Contempt of court applies to all
persons, whether in or out of government. Thus, it covers
government officials or employees who retired during the
pendency of the petition for contempt. Otherwise, a civil
servant may strategize to avail himself of an early retirement to
escape the sanctions from a contempt citation, if he perceives
that he would be made responsible for a contumacious act.
The higher interest of effective and efficient administration of
justice dictates that a petition for contempt must proceed to its
final conclusion despite the retirement of the government
official or employee, more so if it involves a former member of
the bench. While there is still no definitive ruling on this issue
when the respondent charged with contempt has retired, we
apply by analogy the settled principle in administrative
disciplinary cases that separation from service does not render
the case moot and academic.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court
finds Judge Paterno Tac-an guilty of indirect contempt of
court.
7

A person guilty of indirect contempt may be punished
by a fine not exceeding PhP 30,000 or imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) months or both. Judge Tac-an violated four
(4) resolutions/processes of the CA, namely: the January 10,
2000 TRO, the March 15, 2005 Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
the April 19, 2005 TRO and the June 3, 2005 Resolution, for
which he is hereby fined PhP 30,000 for each violation.

FUENTES V. ALBARRACIN

Facts: Judge Albarracin issued an ex-parte motion for
demolition of buildings and other properties of Fuentes, et. al.

7
His actsissuing the February 1 and 2, 2005 Orders implementing
the May 29, 2001 and November 18, 2004 Orders and the related
February 2, 2005 Notice of Garnishment in defiance of the January 10,
2005 TRO; setting the Bureau of Treasurys Manifestation and Motion
for hearing on April 25, 2005 in disregard of the March 15, 2005
injunctive writ of the CA; issuing the April 26, 2005 Order disobeying
the April 19, 2005 TRO and the March 15, 2005 writ of preliminary
injunction; and lastly, conducting a hearing on June 21, 2005 for Civil
Case No. 5447, thus violating the June 3, 2005 CA Orderare
contumacious, continuing acts in clear disobedience and disrespect of
the resolutions of the CA.
This stemmed from a forcible entry case filed by JS Francisco
and Sons against Fuentes, et. al., which was decided in favour
of the former. Fuentes filed for a petition for annulment of
judgment but Albarracin still issued for the demolition of the
buildings despite such pending petition. As a result, Fuentes,
et. al filed an administrative complaint for gross ignorance of
the law against Albarracin.
It was the contention of Fuentes that they did not
receive a copy of the ex-parte motion nor was the motion set
for hearing. Albarracin asserts that a hearing is not necessary
because the special writ of demolition had already been
granted after several hearings and the ex-parte motion was
merely for the enforcement or implementation of said writ. He
further denies Fuentes charge that the granting of JS
Franciscos motion which directed the sheriff to enforce the
special writ of demolition despite the pendency of the case for
annulment of reflects gross ignorance of the law. He argues
that the RTC where the forcible entry cases were elevated did
not issue any TRO or any injunctive relief to restrain him from
granting the motion to enforce/implement the writ of demolition.
The OCA stated that there was no gross ignorance of
the law on the part of Judge Albarracin and fined Fuentes, et.
al for filing a baseless administrative case.

Issue(s): Should the administrative complaint prosper? Was
the imposition of a fine against Fuentes, et. al proper?

Decision: No, the complaint should not prosper.
Gross ignorance of the law is more than an erroneous
application of legal provisions. In the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are generally not subject to disciplinary action, even
though such acts are erroneous. For liability to attach for
ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation
of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only
be found to be erroneous but, most importantly, it must be
established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred
or some other like motive. The evidence reveals that Judge
Albarracin notified Fuentes and conducted a hearing before the
issuance of the writ of execution and special writ of demolition
The imposition of fines against Fuentes was also
improper. They must be given an opportunity to refute the
charges by adducing evidence on specific charges against
them, not in a mere administrative case which involves a
matter different from the alleged culpability of Fuentes, et. al.
More importantly, assuming that there were delaying
tactics, remedial action may be enforced against them through
contempt of court proceedings.
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority,
justice or dignity of the court, such conduct as tends to bring
the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to
interfere with or prejudice parties, litigant or their witnesses
during litigation.
There are two kinds of contempt punishable by law:
direct contempt and indirect contempt. Direct contempt is
committed when a person is guilty of misbehavior in the
presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the
court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be
sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or
deposition when lawfully required to do so.
Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that
which is committed out of the presence of the court. Any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
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Page 23 of 23

Digests
5

obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice would
constitute indirect contempt. The employment of delaying
tactics to obstruct the administration of justice falls under this
latter category.
Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides for the following requisites prior to conviction of
indirect contempt: (a) a charge in writing to be filed; (b) an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within
such period as may be fixed by the court; and (c) to be heard
by himself or counsel. With respect to constructive contempts
or those which are committed without the actual presence of
the court, it is essential that a hearing be allowed and the
contemner permitted, if he so desires, to interpose a defense
to the charges before punishment is imposed. The proceedings
for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature.
Section 4 of Rule 71, however, provides that
proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio
by the court against which the contempt was committed by an
order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
There is no way for this Court to initiate indirect contempt
proceedings against Fuentes for the injury was not committed
against this tribunal, but against Judge Albarracin.

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