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Bernward Joerges

Scams Cannot be Busted


Response to Steve Woolgar and Geoff Cooper, "Do artefacts have ambivalence !
"oses# bridges, Winner#s bridges and other urban legends in S$S"
Social Studies of Science, %& '(), *&&&, +,-!+,.
/age *
0n their en1o2able repl2 to "/olitics have 3rtifacts" Woolgar and Cooper 'W4C) sa2, earl2 on
and after having established that the un5nowable truth about Winner#s "oses!stor2 is 5nown
at Brunel at least since $hursda2 %6th 7ovember *&&%, that it "would be tempting to
conclude from all this fol5 5nowledge in favour of a resuscitation of "oses and hence in
support of Joerges8 case against Winner9 $o do so, however, would be to submit to :uite the
wrong parameters9 0n particular, it would be to impl2 that we are at or near a resolution of the
matter, that, for e;ample, we have definitivel2 established "oses8 true intentions9" 0nstead
the2 propose that the bridge!stor2 is itself "a d2namic, shifting and essentiall2 inconcludeable
narrative, 999 a form of urban legend9"
"Joerges" is set up here as somebod2 who has a case against Winner 'that is< to prove him
wrong), and the to be e;pected tu :uo:ue is inserted '"Joerges contests Winner8s account of
"oses8 motives but his anal2sis remains, in important senses, at the level of intention")9 So
before addressing some of the points W4C raise, 0 should li5e to ma5e :uite clear that m2
case against Winner in this comment was not about the "referential ade:uac2" of the bridge!
stor2, and 0 do not sa2 "that Winner and Caro don#t 5now what the2 are tal5ing about" 'this is
what "oses and m2 engineer!correspondents sa2)9 3lthough, to be able to ma5e m2 point, 0
had to raise the issue of referentialit2,
1
m2 case "against Winner" is twofold< '*) that, precisel2
because we can#t do without them, parables should be handled with care in teaching social
science, and '%) that what Winner asserts about technical artefacts is doubtful for an2
technical artefact, not onl2 for "oses# low bridges9
"oses# intentions do not pla2 an2 significant role in m2 own argument9 3nd to suggest that 0
told m2 own stor2 about "how it reall2 was" in the belief that m2 version is in an2 sense a
definitive version, loo5s to me li5e a deliberate misreading9 0 had thought 0 made it :uite clear
that 0 consider m2self as part of the Chinese whispers and that m2 "oses!stor2, too, could be
told differentl29 Since 0 put it together, 0 5now best where it is contestable and where it is far
from innocent theoreticall2< 0 have chosen with care specific episodes in the Chinese
whispers 'namel2 the conceptual opposites =atour and Woolgar) and 0 have chosen with
care revisionist historical sources concerning "oses, in order to argue against control
theories and to indulge m2 preference for more complicated 'and 2es< inconcludeable)
stories than Winner#s9
>rban legends, not parables999
>rban legends, W4C sa2, are "significantl2 more than 1ust parables9" $he idea to appl2
W4Cs sophisticated anal2sis of a somewhat unsophisticated genre
2
to Winner#s bridge!stor2
as an "urban legend for academics" appears attractive, at first glance9 0 find m2self ver2
much in agreement with the general drift of this anal2sis, if onl2 because it seems that urban
legends perform man2 of the things 0 thought parables perform9 But W4C turn to the notion
of urban legends because this better serves their purpose< to frame m2 comment as a
debun5ing e;ercise and to argue their "essential irresolvabilit2 of debun5ing"9
19 "?or Joerges, this bottom line account is one that emerges from close historical anal2sis," sa2
W4C9 But historicall2, as it were, the short and inconclusive bottom line account in the first version of m2
manuscript submitted to SSS met with one anon2mous reviewers comment that "the deconstruction part
is a bit without proof" and re:uires more technical detail9 0 obliged but also felt that it gave
disproportionate space to one sideline of the argument and e;pressed m2 feeling to the @ditor that "this
somewhat unbalances the piece" '=etter to David @dge %A9-.9&A)9
29 @ver wa5e up in a bathtub full of ice in a strange hotel room, minus a 5idne2 Bappens all the
time999
0t is not eas2 to sa2 what an urban legend is supposed to be9 0f 2ou loo5 at the candidates
and subclasses and related categories offered b2 wa2 of e;plication in the literature, 2ou get
an2thing from tall tales to horror stories to bug!warnings, hoa;es, spoofs and whatever ends
with "0t#s a $rue Stor2, 0 SwearC"9 But fuDD2 as the notion ma2 be, it seems to have a few
commonl2 accepted features 'which in m2 view would ma5e Winner#s stor2 not eligible)<
urban legends are almost b2 definition unfounded 'almost never based on an2 traceable
documents)E the2 have no author, nobod2 5nows who invented themE ever2bod2 tells them,
and the2 will alwa2s be around< scams cannot be busted9
Whenever 2ou have an anon2mous stor2 whose referentialit2 is utterl2 malleable and
ambiguous, sa2 W4C, 2ou have an urban legend9 $he essence of urban legends, if the2
have an essence, is their essential undebuncabilit29 Clothing the bridges!stor2 as an urban
legend presents the "oses!stor2 loo5 as essentiall2 undebuncable9 B2 declaring the "oses!
Stor2 an urban m2th W4C automaticall2 get their desired conclusion< it will spread and
spread and spread9
>rban legends also often are, as W4C point out, cautionar2 tales evo5ing horror,
amaDement, guilt9 =et me recall, in contrast, a few of the characteristics of parables in m2
meaning of this notion< the2 belong with doctrinal discourses, the2 are good for those who
alread2 5now, the2 are necessar2 for 5nowledge to travel, the2 are well designed to achieve
something, the2 relieve guilt9 /arables li5e "oses# bridges onl2 wor5 in the conte;t of a
circumscribed discourse 'control theories, including their criti:ue), whose traditional wisdom
the2 translate into a simple tale9 $his is wh2 0 do not agree with W4C when the2 insist that
li5e urban m2ths the bridges!stor2 is immortal9 7ot because it is, the wa2 WinnerFCaro told it,
a bit of a scam that can#t be busted, but because it#s affirmative telling will serve no function
outside the discourses of control 0 refer to 'which 0 misconstrue however, according to W4C)9
So 0 e;pect indeed that there will be fewer, not more citations of the stor2 in the future, as the
urban legends theor2 would predict9
/arable or urban legend< one must not be essentialist here, of course<
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the pudding is in the
eating9 0n m2 comment, 0 reference instances where Winner#s tale functioned li5e what 0
conventionall2 call a parable 'not in the instance of Woolgar though), whereas W4C refer to
actual and invented instances where Winner#s "iconic e;emplar" functioned as a moral tale
"about the dire conse:uences of boundar2 transgression," as the2 dar5l2 put it9
3 word on words and things
W4C find that "as used b2 Joerges, the distinction 'between words and things) assigns
ontological priorit2 to things over words, thereb2 permitting derogator2 references to
#semantic games# and to #mere words#9" 3gain, m2 :uaint and fragmented wa2 of using the
@nglish idiom must have prevented getting across m2 meanings< 0 introduce the otherwise
rather vacuous distinction between words and things because it allows me to pla2 a semantic
game on theoretical positions ever2 reader of SSS recognises9 $he game goes from 3ustin#s
familiar title 'where things obviousl2 are words) to #Bow to do things with things# 'a
paraphrase on Winner#s apparent position) through #Bow to do things with words# 'short for
what W4C call the "discourse position", but also, as it turns out, for Winner#s actual position
too)9 $he latter 0 then dub #Bow to do words with things# 'where things obviousl2 are words
about things that are not words)9
@speciall2, however, this little game allows me to situate m2self in a "conceptual geograph2",
as W4C sa2< Without having the space to do this in great detail, what 0 propose as an
alternative to Winner is not to loo5 for the power of things in their material form, but in the
words of those who spea5 for them G ver2 much along lines of linguistic anal2ses H la
Bourdieu, who ta5es his point from 3ustin#s familiar boo5 about how to do things with words999
39 W4C won#t tire to evo5e the essential :ualities of the :uintessentiall2 non!essential< endlessl2
malleable semiosis9 "0n reaching the conclusion that Winner got it wrong, Joerges ignores this essentiall2
ambivalent :ualit2 of artefacts9" "$he more important tas5 is to engage the essential ambivalence of
artefacts in general9" "3spects of the stor2 are alwa2s and will alwa2s be essentiall2 out of reach9"
2
So, sill2 as this semantic game ma2 be, 0 certainl2 am innocent of derogator2 references to
"mere words"9
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0 am also perfectl2 happ2 'following the eminent "e;ample of, inter alia,
Derrida, =atour, and Woolgar"
5
) with referring to both more tangible artefacts '"things") and
more intangible artefacts '"words") as te;ts G as long as it is permitted to as5 what
constitutes the difference between the two9 B2 constitute 0 do not mean an2 deep ontological
conditionE 0 mean how the distinction is culturall2 achieved and, in the face of it#s essential
and irreducible ambivalences, for all practical purposes of most people most of the time fairl2
well maintained9
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$o be told b2 W4C that no things are to be found an2where in m2 te;t< 0 mean, who would
have thought, but there are words about words, words about things, and words about
thingified words 'the artifacts of politics)9 0 onl2 be to be allowed to ma5e such distinctions in
tal5ing about these things, even if 0 grant that all these categories them are intrinsicall2 and
even essentiall2 ambivalent999 "2 distinguishing between words and things is not in an2
offensive wa2 ontological, then, impl2ing the idea that words are less real than things 'or
such)9 "a2 0 remind m2 critics that in this comment 0 declare a good stor2 to be the mightiest
thing9 Baving to e;plain this semantic game is somewhat embarrassing, of course9
Shifting conceptual geographies
$he same with m2 deplorable conceptual geograph2< "Joerges8 notion of a middle point
between two 'e:uivalent) e;tremes, his aspiration to build a bridge between two separate
places, thus implies a particular conceptual geograph2 to which we would not subscribe9" 0n
not subscribing W4C draw on Barbara Berrnstein Smith#s warning against "arguments which
aspire to a happ2 medium between two Ie;tremes8" 'W4C)9 0 can#t see that Berrnstein Smith
has more to sa2 about what e;actl2 constitutes the flaws of middle roads than that "supposed
middle wa2s commonl2 displa2 a distinct rightward or bac5ward tilt"9
7
But throughout her
boo5, Berrnstein Smith is concerned with the problem of intellectual oversimplification and
polariDation, "the tendenc2 for an arra2 of multiple, variousl2 differing, more or less shifting,
configurations of belief to move toward and become stabiliDed as contradistinctive and
mutuall2 antagonistic positions9"
8

So let me tr2 again to e;pose aspects of m2 dire conceptual map, again ver2 briefl2 and
necessaril2 oversimplified9 Congratulating Winner for having built his artifact ver2 well
indeed, 0 begged to disagree with his theoretical stance9 $his theoretical stance 0 too5 to be
one where arguments about evidence, "proof" and such things are subordinated to moral!
49 W4C accuse me of the mean position to grant things ontological priorit2 over "mere words" on
si; or seven occasions in their te;tE be it enough to state unambiguousl2 that the word "mere" or a similar
:ualification of words does not appear in m2 comment9
59 Cf9 W4C, note A9
69 0 wish W4C had said a word on the conceptual differences, regarding the te;ts called "things",
between, inter alia, Winner, =atour, and Woolgar9 ?or an argument about a curious tendenc2 of
constructionist technolog2 studies to combine the deconstruction of categorical distinctions with a failure
to loo5 into the wa2 these distinctions are 5ept in good repair, if necessaril2 shifting, in most functioning
cultures, see #/rosopopoietische S2steme#, in Bernward Joerges, Technik Krper der Gesellschaft
'?ran5furt< Suhr5amp, *&&6), %6,!A+9
79 Barbara Berrnstein Smith, Belief and Resistance: Dynamics of Contemporary Intellectual
Controersy, Cambridge, "ass9< Barvard >niversit2 /ress, *&&., ;viii9 0n fact this admirable boo5 is a
wonderful e;ample for the virtues of pursuing the middle road, in her case between what she calls
"traditionalists" and "revisionists" in philosoph2 of science 'where W4C would be e;treme revisionists, a
road Berrnstein Smith would not go down, 0 dare sa2, although she persistentl2 tilts leftward and
forward)9
89 0bid9, ;;v9
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political arguments 'and in that sense 0 put him in the same camp with "Woolgar"
9
)9 0 also
too5 it to be in tune with a might2 discourse in the social sciences< the discourse of control9 0n
contrasting that discourse with a discourse of contingenc2 'and in doing so to locate the
e;emplars of "=atour" and "Woolgar" together in a camp opposite from Winner#s), 0 find
m2self in agreement and in disagreement with certain views from all three protagonists9
10
So
0 e;pect to be as5ed for m2 wa2 out9 $o tal5 about a middle or a third wa2 as a wa2 out of a
dilemma is a common if unoriginal facon de parler, and 0 apologiDe9 But even in the awfull2
simplified terms of m2 comment, 0 construe the situation at least as a trilemma, a conceptual
Bermuda triangle with three corner points 'between realist control theor2 which 0 dub
Winnerian, realist contingenc2 theor2 which for brevit2#s sa5e 0 dub =atourian, and relativist
contingenc2 theor2 which for s2mmetr2#s sa5e 0 dub Woolgarian)9 3nd of course there is no
wa2, middle or third, out of this triangle9
0n practice, when 2ou deal with concrete cases where bridges and other technical artefacts
pla2 important roles, none of these and other purified positions and their respective parables
will fit the bill ver2 well, and hailing the protagonists will not help much either9 >nder the
world#s pressure to do something about the problems it continues to produce, 2ou have to
negotiate a version of what is the matter that somehow agrees with the politicians, e;perts,
spo5espeople of users, fellow academics and so on who come with the case at hand9 3nd
this version will rarel2 be essentiall2 ambivalent, not because this would be immoral, but
because it would be :uite impractical, and also, in man2 cases, :uite boring9 Sometimes it
ma2 be useful to 5eep it open, of course, at other times it ma2be useful, and even morall2
acceptable, to come up with a closed, that is relativel2 une:uivocal version9
Ju;taposing ontological, epistemological, and moral positions about words and things, or
control and contingenc2, which seemed so important in the 6-sF.-sFA-s, loo5s a bit tired
toda2 because the frontlines of intellectual controversies 5eep shifting in the &-s9 Jnce more,
at the peril of using politicall2 incorrect words, 0 will emplo2 the "words 4 things" formula<
$hings, as shorthand for nature, and words, as shorthand for culture, are being divided up
anew as to their 1urisdiction in the sciences9 3scending biological and in their wa5e other
evolutionar2 disciplines ma5e their inroads in naturaliDing large 1un5s of territor2 hitherto
under the rule of the moral and historical sciences9
11
Bistorical processes are declared to be
essentiall2 adaptations to changing 'b2 all means sociall2 produced) environmental
conditions which are framed in turn in biological terms9 $he stance is, ver2 much in
opposition to views emphasiDing the narrative nature of science, relentlessl2 scientistic< the
promise is to come up with empirical generaliDations 'concerning cultural evolution) of a
reach no positivistic!minded sociologist ever dreamt of9 3 strong "politics of e;planation" is
being pla2ed out9
12

Jn the other hand 0 see a form of science studies where nature as much as culture is
declared to be essentiall2 sub1ect to historical processes of some 5ind of sense ma5ing
99 Jn m2 conceptual map 'global scale) Woolgar in some wa2s stands closer to Winner than
=atour, because he as Winner is ver2 concerned with issues of rhetorical effect and persuasion 'or
argumentative ade:uac2, much lac5ing with "Joerges"999)9
109 3s W4C aptl2 put it< "technolog2 does and does not have politics9"
119 0n a wa2, a forerunner of this movement was earl2 wor5 on computers, see Bernward Joerges,
#0mages of $echnolog2 in Sociolog2< Computer as Butterfl2 and Bat#, Technolo!y and Culture, (*,
*&&-, %-(!%.9
129 Suffice it to name onl2 two protagonists which 0 happened to listen to recentl2 and whose boo5s
are translated in German< @dward J9 Wilson, Consilience: The "nity of Kno#led!e '7ew Kor5< Lnopf,
*&&A) and Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and $teel: The %ates of &uman $ocieties '7ew Kor5F=ondon<
W9W9 7orton 4 Compan2, *&&.)9 Jerome S9 Bruner for e;ample attempts, in The Culture of 'ducation
'Cambridge, "3< Barvard >niversit2 /ress, *&&.), a reconciliation of the narrative stance with a new
"evolutionar2 ps2cholog2"9
4
'including the attempt, forever doomed to be futile, to discover invariant natural laws,
because these laws are themselves forever newl2 invented and outstripped in an ongoing
historical process)9
13
Bere, e;planation becomes much less interesting, e;cept as a special
form of narration, than careful description and conte;tualiDing reconstruction9
Controversies about the relation between material form and social content G Winner#s theme
G have traditionall2 been pla2ed out as a "technolog2Fsociet2"!issue in technolog2 and urban
studies9 3long with naturaliDing histor2FhistorialiDing nature debates "technolog2F nature"!
issues come to the forefront9 Spea5ing schematicall2< "oses# low bridges were initiall2
presented as icons of social control via technolog29 0n W4C#s criti:ue, 0 suggested, the2 are
:ualified in terms of some 5ind of contingenc2 theor2 of socio!technical change '0 am sure
misconstrued b2 me)9 0n m2 own reconstruction of the "oses!stor2, the bridges can still serve
as "s2mbolic caricature" '"ichael 0gnatieff) for an intellectual movement, which puts into
center stage the natureFculture ne;us G where progressive technological change, whether
conceived in historical or evolutionar2 terms, is understood as progressive implantation of
natural things into social things or of societ2 into nature9
0 e;pect that with this movement, suppl2 and demand for e;pertise in technolog2 and urban
planning and politics will be reconfigured9 ?or a number of reasons 'onl2 one of them being
the application of a naive relativism to the sub1ect matter of biologists), social and cultural
scientists ma2 not be well e:uipped to hold their own against the evolutionar2!minded
competition< naturaliDation of the social 'e;pertise for cit2 cultures as biotopes) might sound
more persuasive than historialiDation of the natural 'e;pertise for cit2 natures as sociotopes)9
Jne of the reasons for reconstructing the "oses!stor2 along the lines 0 did was indeed that 0
counted on the possibilit2 that m2 own version might come to represent, "come to stand as a
moral tale about," as W4C sa2, the matter of the 7atureFCulture relation in the metropolis
and be2ond9
0n the future, practical and interesting answers to Winner#s ultimate moral concern G what
5ind of nature should 2ou ma5e 2ourself G will be informed more and more b2 e;pertise
5indled from reductionist evolutionar2 sciences claiming societ2 as their native land9 $his is a
good thing, to the e;tent that "nature" and material artefacts ta5en from nature cannot be
represented an2 more as the Jther of societ29 0t would be not so good, in terms of
emplo2ment and publishing prospects for social scientists and producers of urban legends, if
panopticon and babel tower would be e;changed for the anthill as the paradigmatic
architectural parable for urban artefacts9
Conclusion
0t will come as no surprise that W4C end on the note of an essential undeconstructabilit2 of
the bridges!stor29 While the substance of the legend will forever metamorphose, it#s "form will
remain essentiall2 unchanged9" $heir hope is that ! as of "Do artefacts have ambivalence" !
it will function as "a moral tale about the deficiencies of distinguishing between e;planation
and politics9" $hat suits me fine,
14
and 0 couldn#t agree more with W4C#s conclusion< "$his
leads us to recognise that Winner8s argument is not what it seems to be9 ?or it turns out that
Winner8s bridges are also artefacts constructed with the intention of not letting certain
arguments past9 $he2 are deliberatel2 designed to prevent the passage of interpretivist
arguments9"
15
$his is of course e;actl2 the first and ma1or point 0 wished to ma5e all along in
139 7e;t to Bruno =atour, an interesting protagonist of this intellectual movement 'also because he
concerns himself centrall2 with the creations of molecular biolog2) is Bans!JMrg Rheinberger 'see for
instance his To#ard ( &istory )f 'pistemic Thin!s: $ynthesi*in! +roteins in the Test Tu,e9 Stanford,
Cal9< Stanford >niversit2 /rerss, *&&.)9
149 3s long as these deficiencies do not call for the wholesale abolishment of the distinction, see
note , above9
159 @mphasis added9
5
m2 comment about the well!designed artefacts of politics ! e;cept for the particular intention
W4C ascribe to Winner for his deliberate designs upon his readers 'in m2 reading it was to
get a moral point across)9 $he2 can offer this pointe as their original conclusion b2 repeating
again and again that m2 ma1or concern is to debun5 Winner#s account ! in showing that
things ma2 have happened differentl2 then according to Winner9
16
3s for sa2ing that Winner
tells his pious tale about the low bridges with a deliberate intent to "prevent the passage of
interpretivist arguments," 0 will sta2 out of this more personal thing between Woolgar and
Winner9
169 @ven if m2 attempt at reconstruction ma2 indeed stri5e some readers as more plausible and
li5el2 than Winner#s 'or Woolgar#s invented timetable proveFspoof), W4C will have successfull2 busted
this particular scam if the2 can show that the legend of the bridges will undebun5abl2 alwa2s be with us9
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