PRE-BAR REVIEW NOTES

IN POLITICAL LAW
(Prepared by Judge ESTELA ALMA A. SINGCO)



ARTICLE I
NATIONAL TERRITORY

- Archipelago as defined by Article 46 of UNCLOS:
A group of islands, including parts of the islands,
interconnecting waters and other natural features which are
closely interrelated that such islands, waters, and other natural
resources form an intensive geographical, economic, political
entity or to have historically regarded as an archipelago.

- Archipelagic State- means a State constituted wholly by one
or more archipelagos and may include other islands.

- Archipelagic Baselines- basis: UNCLOS: how to treat
Kalayaan Group of Islands (KIG) and Scarborough shaol:
whether to include or to exclude them from the baselines;
and/or consider as part of the regime of islands.

- Kalayaan Islands (constituted under RA 1596)- part of
Region IV-B, Province of Palawan but under the custody of
DND. Found some 380 miles west of the southern end of
Palawan.

- Scarborough shaol (Bajo de Masinloc)- also known as
scarborough reef, panatag shoal and Huangyan Dao. Found in
the South China Sea, part of the province of Zambales. A shaol
is a traingle shaped chain of reefs and islands (but mostly rocks.
55 kilometers around with an area of 150 square kilometer. Its
123 miles west of Subic Bay. Basis: terra nullius; 200 EEZ

- Spratly Archipelago- international reference to the entire
archipelago wherein the Kalayaan chain of islands is located.
The Philippines essentially claims only the western section of
Spratlys, which is nearest to Palawan.

- RA 9552 (March 10, 2009)- It defines the general
configuration of the archipelago, including the extended
continental shelf and exclusive economic zone to make it more
compliant with the UNCLOS.

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- It redrew the countrys baseline to comply with the UNCLOS
requirements for archipelagic state, in the process excluding the
disputed Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough shoal
from the main archipelago and classifying them instead as
regime of islands. They excluded from the baselines. The
national territory constitutes a roughly triangular delineation
which excludes large areas of waters within 600 miles by 1,200
miles rectangular enclosing the Philippine archipelago as
defined in the Treaty of Paris.


- Regime of islands (Art. 121 of UNCLOS) consists of islands
or naturally formed areas of land surrounded by water that
remain above water during high tide. The principle forces
claimant states over a certain territory to maintain peace in the
area because no country can claim exclusive ownership of any
of these islands.

- Magalona, et al. vs. Exec. Sec., GR No. 187167, August 16,
2011- Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago,
adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would
have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III.
First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing
of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from
the general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article
47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines
shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent
(3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125
nautical miles.

Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty
over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades,
these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from
the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, such that any
straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint
will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago.

- Constitutional issues:

Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters
EEZ; claims over Sabbah and Spratly islands
Delineation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of
Paris vs. RA 9552

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- Right of innocent passage- archipelagic sea lane passage and
right of overflight

- 200-Economic Zone (includes Territorial Seas and
Contiguous Zone) READ: UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea.

- Contiguous Zone (12 nm from the end of territorials seas)
- Teritorial seas/maritime domain (12 nm from baseline)
- Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters

- Reagan vs. CIR, 30 SCRA 968- An exception to the full and
complete power of a nation within its territories is by virtue of
the consent of the nation itself. The embassy premises of a
foreign power are within the territorial domain of the host State.
The ground occupied as embassy premises is not the territory of
the foreign State to which the premises belong.

- Kalayaan Island Group
a) historic right
b) P.D. No. 1596, dated June 11, 1978
c) effective occupation
d) principle of contiguity because of proximity
e) part of the continental shelf
c) RA 3046 & RA 5446
c) RA 9552

- Freedom islands to which Spratly islands belong- basis: terra
nullius

ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES

- Republicanism

- Separation of Powers
- Principles of Blending of Powers and Checks & Balances
- under the principle of separation of powers, courts cannot
interfere with the exercise by the legislature of its authority to
conduct investigations in aid of legislation (Senate Blue Ribbon
vs Majaducon, GR # 136760, July 29, 2003; Executive
privilege -Neri vs. Senate Committee, GR. No. 180643, Mach
25, 2008)

- Judicial Review: Requisites (Francisco, et al. vs. HR,
et al., November 10, 2003; ABAKADA Guro Party List, et
al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, September 1, 2005;
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David et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006).

Local governments: With Rep. Act No. 7160, the union of
legislative and executive powers in the office of the local chief
executive under the BP Blg. 337 has been disbanded, so that
either department now comprises different and non-
intermingling official personalities with the end in view of
ensuring a better delivery of public service and provide a
system of check and balance between the two. The avowed
intent of Rep. Act. No. 7160, therefore, is to vest on the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan independence in the exercise of its
legislative functions vis-a-vis the discharge by the Governor of
the executive functions. (Atienza vs. Villarosa, May 10,
2005).

Non-Delegation of legislative power ( Abakada Guro
Party List vs. Executive Secretary, September 1, 2005;
Epira case-Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17,
2007).

Permissible delegation:
1. tariff powers of the President (Sec. 28 (2) Art. VI)
2. emergency power of the President (Sec. 23 (2) of
Art. VI
3. people (Sec. 32 of Art. VI; Sec. 10 of Art. X, Sec. 2
of Art. XVII; RA 6735)
4. local governments (Art X)
5. administrative bodies (power of subordinate
legislation)

Tests of valid delegation:
1. completeness test * Gerochi vs. DOE, July 17, 2007
2. sufficient standard *Santiago vs. COMELEC,
3/19/97; Abakada Guro
Party List vs. Exec. Sec.


- Incorporation Clause -By the doctrine of incorporation, the
country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered to be automatically part
of our own laws.[Tanada vs. Angara, May 2, 1997]

- Incorporated: 1. Treaties duly ratified (Pimentel vs. Ermita,
462 SCRA 622, July 6, 2005)
2. norms of general or customary laws example.
Immunity of our heads of state under the principle of exterritoriality and
extraterritoriality, Pacta Sunt Servanda, (Mijares vs. Javier)
3. treaties which have become part of customary
Law (Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons; Kuroda
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vs. Jalandoni (Kellog-Bryan Pact, Statute of
Rome)

Transformation- process of adopting the above principles (genrally
adopted.etc.)

- Mijares, et al. vs. Javier, et al., April 12, 2005- There is no
obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires
the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a
procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally
accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of
the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The
classical formulation in international law sees those customary
rules accepted as binding result from the combination two
elements: the established, widespread, and consistent
practice on the part of States; and a psychological element
known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law
or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the
practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a
rule of law requiring it.

- Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the
Philippines, vs. Duque, et al., GR No. 1703034, October 9,
2007- Customary international law is deemed incorporated into
our domestic system. A mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
(Breast milk is still the best milk in the world)

- Lim vs. Exec. Sec., April 11, 2002 generally accepted
principles of International Law, the provisions of a treaty are
always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent
law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State. Because
Police power cannot be subject of a treaty)

- The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal
tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which
there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law
and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give
effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was
enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles
of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in
the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine
Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where
the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and municipal law,
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jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld
by the municipal courts (I chong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
[1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re:
Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are
organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land does
not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over
national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine
of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules
of international law are given equal standing with, but are
not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly,
the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty
may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In
states where the constitution is the highest law of the land,
such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the
constitution [Sec. of Justice vs. Lantion]

- Civilian Supremacy (IBP vs. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81(2000)-
The calling of the marines constitutes permissible use of military
assets for civilian enforcement. Notwithstanding the conduct of
joint visibility patrols by the members of PNP and the Philippine
marines, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader and
it is the local police forces who are in charge at all times.

- Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- The vitality of the tenet
that the President is the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces
is most crucial to the democratic way of life, to civilian
supremacy over the military, and to the general stability of our
representative system of government. The Constitution reposes
final authority, control and supervision of the AFP to the
President, a civilian who is not a member of the armed forces,
and whose duties as commander-in-chief represent only a part of
the organic duties imposed upon the office, the other functions
being clearly civil in nature. Civilian supremacy over the military
also countermands the notion that the military may bypass
civilian authorities, such as civil courts, on matters such as
conducting warrantless searches and seizure. The ability of the
President to prevent military officers from testifying before
Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the
Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the
actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The
Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not
hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
The President could, as a general rule, require military officers to
seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is
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based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly
diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-
chief. (Under the Chain of Command)

What is the role of the AFP?- protector of the people from
external threats of our sovereignty

- Gonzales, et al vs. Gen. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, August 10,
2006- Courts-martial are instrumentalities of the Executive to
enable the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to effectively
command, control, and discipline the armed forces (see Ruffy
v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrops Military
Law and Precedents, 2
nd
edition, p. 49). In short, courts-martial
form part of the disciplinary system that ensures the
Presidents control, and thus civilian supremacy, over the
military. At the apex of this disciplinary system is the President
who exercises review powers over decisions of courts-martial
(citing Article 50 of the Articles of War; quoted provisions
omitted

- Maintenance of Peace & Order and the protection of the people
against violence are constitutionsl duties of the State and to bear
arms is to be construed in connection and in harmony with
these constitutional duties (Chavez s. Romulo, G. R. No.
157036, June 9, 2004).

- Separation of the Church and State- Estrada vs. Escritor,
June 22, 2006- It is indubitable that benevolent neutrality-
accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the
spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine
Constitution. Benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does
not offend compelling state interest.

- Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines vs. Office of the
Executive Secretary, July 9, 2003. Only the prevention of an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of
the community can justify the infringement of religious
freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally
unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like
ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of
its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable
freedom of personal and religious activity.

- Balanced & Healthful Ecology- The right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is a fundamental legal right that carries with it
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the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
This right implies, among other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the countrys resources, which
duty is reposed in the DENR. ( Prov. of Rizal vs. Exec. Sec.,
December 13, 2005)

- Local Autonomy ( Basco vs. Pagcor)- the power of local
government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to
limitations which Congress may provide by law. The principle of
local autonomy under the 1987 constitution simply means
decentralization. It does not make local governments
sovereign within the state of an imperium in imperio
(unlike in a Federal System). The matter of regulating, taxing or
otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it
is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to
local governments.

- Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel, (GR No.
183591, Oct. 14, 2008)- The Constitution does not contemplate
any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State much
less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare
any part of the Philippine territory for independence.

- Equal access to opportunity for public service Pamatong
vs. COMELEC, April 13, 2004- the provision does not
bestow a right to seek the presidency; it does not contain a
judicial enforceable constitutional right and merely specifies a
guideline for legislative action. It is not intended to compel the
State to enact positive measures that would accomodate as many
as possible into public office.


ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP

- Valles vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543- Having a Filipino
father at the time of birth makes one a Filipino. Having an
Australian passport and an alien certificate of registration does
not constitute an effective renunciation of citizenship and does
not militate against the claim of Filipino citizenship.

- Co vs. HRET, 199 SCRA 692- An attack on a persons
citizenship may be done through a direct action for its nullity.

- Re: Vicente Ching, 316 SCRA 1- There are two conditions in
order that the election of Philippine citizenship is effective:
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1. the mother of the person making the
election must be citizen of the
Philippines; and
2. said election must be made upon
reaching the age of majority.
- Ma v. Fernandez, July 26, 2010, GR No. 183133 - the
evolvement from election of Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority under the 1935 Philippine Constitution to
dispensing with the election requirement under the 1973 Philippine
Constitution to express classification of these children as natural-
born citizens under the 1987 Constitution towards the conclusion
that the omission of the 1941 statutory requirement of registration
of the documents of election should not result in the obliteration of
the right to Philippine citizenship.
- The Court concluded that, having a Filipino mother is permanent.
It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine
citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and
substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry
should not defeat the election and negate the permanent fact that
they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be
complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate
administrative penalties, if any.
- Bengson vs. HRET, May 7, 2001- Repatriation may be had
under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
1) desertion of the AFP; 2) served in the armed forces of the allied
forces in WWII; 3) service in the AF of the US at any other time; 4)
marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; 5) political and economic
necessity.

- R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is
an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and
(b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. To
claim the benefit of RA 8171, the children must be of minor
age at the time of the petititon for repatriation was filed by
the parent [Angat vs. RP, September 14, 1999; Tabasa vs.
CA, GR. No. 125793, August 29, 2006- no showing that
Tabasas parents lost their Philippine citizenship on account of
political or economic necessity].

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- Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance
to the RP and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of
the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

- Altarejos vs. COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655- In addition to the
taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper
civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite
in effecting the repatriation of a citizen.

- Repatriation retroacts to the date of the filing of ones
application for repatriation. Supra.

- Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. If he was originally a natural born citizen before he
lost his citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as
natural born Filipino.

- NATURAL BORN- Read Sections 2 and 4 of RA 9225,
amending CA 63, otherwise known as Citizenship Retention
and Reacquisition Act (August 29, 2003)- including citizens
repatriated and unmarried children, whether legitimate or
illegitimate or adopted, below 18 years of age of those
repatriated.


- DUAL CITIZENSHIP- Read: Mercado vs. Manzano, 307
SCRA 630- The phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance (especially for
naturalized citizens). In filing a certificate of candidacy, the
person with dual citizenship effectively renounces his foreign
citizenship. The oath of allegiance contained in the certificate of
candidacy constitutes sufficient renunciation of his foreign
citizenship.

- Corodora v. COMELEC, GR No. 176947, February 19,
2009- The Supreme Court recently ruled that a natural-born
Filipino, who also possesses American citizenship having been
born of an American father and a Filipino mother, is exempt
from the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance
and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship under the
Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act (RA 9225) before
running for public office. The Supreme Court En Banc held that
that it has applied the twin requirements to cases which involve
natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of
another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the
Philippines. In the present case, [private respondent Gustavo S.]
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Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently
become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin
requirements in RA No. 9225 do not apply to him.

- LOPEZ VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008
Valles and Mercado Doctrines do not apply is one reacquires his
citizenship under RA 9225 and runs for public office. To comply
with the provisions of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225, it is necessary
that the candidate for public office must state in clear and
unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship.

- Jacot vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008
Mercado case was decided under Section 40 of LGC re dual
allegiance, and that time RA 9225 was not yet enacted.

- Manuel B. Japzon vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180088, January
19, 2009- It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225
governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may
reacquire or retain his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a
foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities
under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would
reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of
the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions.
Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it
mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned
natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats
citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and
consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual
citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same
time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish
residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of
which he is also a citizen. Residency in the Philippines only
becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual
citizenship decides to run for public office. Under Republic Act
No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.

- Roseller de Guzman vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180048, June
19, 2009- R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and
retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-
born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the
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law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that
they are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.
However, it must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an
additional requirement on those who wish to seek elective
public office, as follows: Section 5. Civil and Political Rights
and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:

- x x x x (2)Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath. The filing
of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a
renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. The
rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable
because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements.


- BM No. 1678, Petition for Leave to Resume the Practice of
Law, Benjamin M. Dacanay, December 17, 2007- Dual
citizens may practice law in the Philippines by leave of the
Supreme Court and upon compliance with the requirements,
which will restore their good standing as members of the
Philippine Bar.


- Effective nationality principle (Nottebohm case)- The
Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international
law principle of effective nationality which is clearly not
applicable to the case at bar. This principle is expressed in
Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of
Nationality Laws as follows: Art. 5. Within a third State a
person having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he
had only one. Without prejudice to the application of its law in
matters of personal status and of any convention in force, a third
State shall, of the nationalities which any such person possesses,
recognize exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the
country in which he is habitually and principally resident or the
nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he
appears to be in fact most closely connected. Nottebohm was a
German by birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when
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he applied for and acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one
month before the outbreak of World War II. Many members of
his family and his business interests were in Germany. In 1943,
Guatemala, which had declared war on Germany, arrested
Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on the ground that
he was a German national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on
his behalf, as its citizen, against Guatemala. The International
Court of Justice held Nottebohm to be still a national of
Germany, with which he was more closely connected than with
Liechtenstein.

*Read: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, GR No. 87193, June 23, 1989
- AASJS, Calilung vs. Datumanong, GR No. 160869, May 11, 2007-
It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No.
9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63
which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos
who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act
No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino
citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not
recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of
the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship.
Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the
problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the
issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned
foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made
a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. xxx To begin with, Section 5,
Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not
a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law
on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the
framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the
status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was
given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters
of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it
would be premature for the judicial department, including the
Supreme Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

- Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 148; Velez vs. Poe and
Fornier vs. COMELEC, March 3, 2004- Under the Philippine
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Bill of 1902, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an
inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11
th

day of April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1)
a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native
of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained
Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. Whether or not
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended
on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would
have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative,
whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents
him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo
Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died
in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime
in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule,
and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his
death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have
well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo
Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that
the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan
F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during
which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

- As Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not
distinguish between legitimate child and illegitimate child of
a Filipino father, we should not make a distinction. The civil
status of legitimacy or illegitimacy, by itself, is not
determinative of the Philippine citizenship.

- Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner Immigration, 41 SCRA
292- When citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or
administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is
generally not considered as res judicata in any subsequent
proceeding challenging the same.

- Burca vs. Republic, 51 SCRA 248- EXCEPTIONS (to res
judicata principle) 1.) a persons citizenship be raised as a
material issue in a controversy where the person is a party; 2.) the
Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part
in the resolution thereof; and 3.) the finding on citizenship is
affirmed by the Supreme Court.

6

- Administrative Naturalization (R.A. No. 9139) grants
Philippine citizenship by administrative proceedings to aliens
born and residing in the Philippines. They have the choice to
apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the
prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.


- Kilosbayan vs. Ermita, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 . The
alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by
the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the
final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong
and his mother were naturalized along with his father.

- JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG VS. COMELEC, G.R. No.
179120, April 1, 2009- Clearly, under the law and
jurisprudence, it is the - State, through its representatives
designated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly
procured certificate of naturalization proceedings. It is not a
matter that maybe raised by private persons in an election case
involving the naturalized citizens descendant.

- Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231- A Filipino
citizens acquisition of permanent resident status abroad
constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines. The green card status in the USA is a renunciation
on ones status as a resident of the Philippines.




ARTICLE V
(SUFFRAGE)

- READ: RA 9225 and RA 9189 (Absentee Voting)

- AKBAYAN-Youth vs. COMELEC, March 26, 2001- where it
is both impractical and illegal to conduct a two-day special
registration for new voters, the COMELEC cannot be compelled
to do so.

- The right of suffrage is not absolute. The exercise of the right
is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements
embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other
repositories of law.

6

- The right of citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon
certain procedural requirements he must undergo, among others
the process of registration under RA 8189 (Voters Registration
Act of 1996).

- Makalintal vs. COMELEC, July 10, 2003- The interpretation
of residence is synonymous to domicile. An absentee remains
attached to his residence in the Philippines, as residence is
considered synonymous with domicile. Domicile means an
individuals permanent home or a place to which, whenever
absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they
disclose intent.

- Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC- Three basic rules on domicile:
1) a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2)
domicile, once established, remains until a new one is validly
acquired; (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at
any given time.

- Absentee voting under Section 2 of RA 9189 is an exception
to the six-month/one-year residency requirement.

- Lewis vs. COMELEC, August 4, 2006- There is no provision
in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to
actually establish residence and physically stay in the
Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On
the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals
are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the
same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter
under R.A. 9189 (election for president, v-pres., senators). It
cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to
enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who,
save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary
voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.


ARTICLE VI
(LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)

- Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 178413, March 13,
2008- in elections for President, V-President, Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives, the general rule still
is that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of
election returns or certificates of canvass are prohibited. As with
6

other general rules, there are recognized exceptions to he
prohibition namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2)
questions affecting the composition of proceeding of the board
of canvassers; and (3) determination of the authenticity and the
due execution of certificates of canvass as provided in Section
30 of RA 7166, as amended by RA No. 9369.

- Non delegation of legislative power

- Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17, 2007 - Under the
first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions
when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The
second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the
law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. The Court finds that the
EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34
thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and
that it contains sufficient standards. xxx In the past, accepted as
sufficient standards the following: "interest of law and order;"
"adequate and efficient instruction;" "public interest;" "justice
and equity;" "public convenience and welfare;" "simplicity,
economy and efficiency;" "standardization and regulation of
medical education;" and "fair and equitable employment
practices." Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, to
ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality,
reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric
power and watershed rehabilitation and management meet the
requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations
on the ERCs power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient
standards.
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice- Being a mere constituent
unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections
could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the
imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of
Justice as the rule making authority under RA No. 8177.

- EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA, 166 SCRA 533-
Power of Subordinate Legislation with this power,
administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid
down in a statute by filling the details which Congress may not
have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected
by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary
regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by DOLE on
6

the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect
of law.

- ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, September 1, 2005- No undue delegation of
legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of
facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase
rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the
operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent
upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation
or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of
the control of the executive.

- Congress did not delegate the power to tax to the President.-
The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from
Congress and the task of the President is simply to execute the
legislative policy.

- Abakada Guro vs. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251- The requirement
that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by
Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal
constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule of
presentment. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the
act of both chambers. It can be exercised neither solely by one of
the two chambers nor by a committee of either or both chambers.

- The Presidents Ordinance Power is the Executives rule-
making authority in implementing and executing constitutional
or statutory powers. Indisputably, there are constitutional powers
vested in the Executive that are self-executory.

- Secretary of Finance, et al. vs. La Suerte Cigar, GR No.
166498, June 11, 2009- Unless expressly granted to the BIR, the
power to reclassify cigarette brands remains a prerogative of the
Legislature which cannot be usurped by the former.

- Review Center Assos. of the Philippines vs. Ermita, GR No.
180046, April 2, 2009- The President has no inherent or
delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED
under RA 7722.

- SEMA VS. COMELEC, G. R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008-
Congress cannot validly delegate to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create legislative districts. The power to
increase the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives and to reapportion legislative districts is
vested exclusively in Congress.

6

- PARTY-LIST SYSTEM- BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, GR No.
1777271, May 4, 2007- No national security or like concerns is
involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-
list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the
petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of
their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies. xxx The last
sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: [T]he names of the
party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list is
certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested
disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said
Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends
only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be
posted in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage
of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something that
is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No.
7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing
through mediums other than the Certified List the names of the
party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-
disclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public
disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus
given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension
on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941. xxx Comelec has
a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the
nominees of the party-list groups.
- Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244,
October 6, 2000; Partido Ng Manggagawa vs. COMELEC,
March 15, 2006 Section VI 5(2) of Article of the Constitution is not
mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the
House of Representatives. The Supreme Court ruled that the
Constitution and RA 7941 mandate at least 4 inviolable parameters:
(1) the 20% allocation: the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of the
House of Representatives; (2) the 2% threshold: only those parties
garnering a minimum of 2% of the total votes cast for the party list
system are qualified to a have a seat in the House; (3) the three seat
limit: each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats, i.e., one
qualifying and two additional; and (4) proportional representation: the
additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
6

- BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009- 2%
threshold in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found in
the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is declared
unconstitutional. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.
- In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives
under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be
observed:
- (1) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections. (2)The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. (3)
Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking
in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
(4) Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more
than three (3) seats.
- In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no
longer be included because they have already been allocated, at
one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum
seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A.
No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
- In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not
limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-
percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list
candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered
by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for
party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of
seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining
available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55
maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17
guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the
product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats
corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats.
Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in
rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We
distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat
6

allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the
number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:
Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Rank Party
Votes
Garnered
Votes
Garnered
over
Total Votes
for Party
List, in %



(A)
Guaranteed
Seat





(First Round)

(B)
Additional
Seats





(Second
Round)

(C)
(B) plus
(C), in
whole
integers






(D)
Applying
the three
seat cap






(E)
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.
2 BAYAN
MUNA
979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.
9
[31]
COOP-
NATCCO
409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.
21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.
6

22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.
23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
26 SENIOR
CITIZENS
213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.
27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.
28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.
29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.
30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A.
31 ANG
KASANGGA
170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.
32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.
33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.
34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.
35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.
36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A.
Total

17

55



- Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3
above, there are 55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning
party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled.
The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of
votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for
each party, are shown in column (D).

- Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections:
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that
allowed all political parties to participate in the party-list
elections.

- Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political
parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary,
the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections through their
sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional
Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in
the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral
6

groups. In defining a party that participates in party-list elections as
either a political party or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also
clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the
party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list
elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the
Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot
engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the
exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in
patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

- Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are
allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral
organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not
be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the
party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas
(KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political
parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or
sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish
a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this
fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng
Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.

- Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-
up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found
in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of
Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the
House of Representatives to Congress: The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x. The 20%
allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-
list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of
the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the
continued existence of a provision in the law which will
systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation
to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may
occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from
dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list
representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the
procedure used in Table 3 above.

- However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in
Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

- Aquino vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189793, April 7, 2010- There is no
6

specific provision in the Constitution that fixes 250,000 minimum
population that must compose legislative district. For while a
province is entitled to at least a representative with nothing mentioned
about a population, a city must first meet a population minimum of
250,000 in order to be similarly situated.

- Aldaba, et al. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188078, January 25, 2010-
In this case, there is no official record that the population of the City
of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected prior to the
May 2010 elections. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have
a legislation district of its own under Section 5(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution.

- Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR No. 190582, April 8,
2010 - that Ang Ladlad, an organization composed of men and
women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-
gendered individuals (LGBTs), has satisfied the exacting standards
that the marginalized and underrepresented sector must demonstrate
(1) past subordination or discrimination suffered by the group; (2) an
immutable or distinguishing characteristic, attribute, or experience
that define them as a discrete group; and (3) present political and/or
economic powerlessness.

- The Court said that Ang Ladlad has shown that the LGBT sector has
been historically disadvantaged and discriminated against because of
negative public perception, and has even alleged acts of violence
perpetrated against members of the LGBT community by reason of
their sexual orientation and gender identity. It added that the
magnitude of opposition against petitioners participation in the party
list system is, by itself, demonstrative of the sectors lack of political
power; so, too, is the fact that proposed legislations seeking to
prohibit discriminatory treatment against LGBTs have been
languishing in Congress.

- LEGISLATIVE PERKS (PP vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689)
The history of the provision granting Senators and Congressmen
immunity from arrest and detention shows that the privilege
has always been granted in a restrictive sense.

- Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, June 27, 2008- presumption of
innocence does not necessarily carry with it the full enjoyment
of civil and politicsl rights.

6

- Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete
freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in
criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum
outside of the Congressional Hall. However, it does not protect
him from responsibility before the legislative body itself
whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter
disorderly or unbecoming of a member thereof (Osmea vs.
Pendatun).

- Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009- Richard
Gordon did not relinquish his Senatorial post despite his election
to and acceptance of the post Chairman of the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. PNRC is a
private organization merely performing public functions, and
that the PNRC Chairman is not a government official or
employee. Not being a government office, the PNRC
Chairmanship may be held by any individual, including a
Senator or Member of the House of Congress. NRC is
autonomous, neutral and independent of the Philippine
Government. It is a voluntary organization that does not have
government assets and does not receive any appropriation from
the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is not a part of any of the
government branches. PNRC Chairmanship is not a government
office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in
the 1987 Constitution. Senator Gordon can validly serve as the
Chairman of the PNRC without giving up his senatorial
position.


Avelino vs. Cruz- When the constitution declares that a majority
of each House shall constitute a quorum, it does not mean all the
members. The base in computing majority is normally the total
membership of the body, within the coercive power of the
House.

Santiago vs. Guingona (298 SCRA 756)- The term majority
simply means the greater number or more than half. Who
shall sit as officers is the sole prerogative of the Senate. (Note:
splitting of term between Senate President Drilon and another
Senator). When the Constitution provides that the Senate
President shall be elected by the majority it does not
delineate who comprises the majority or the minority. The
defeated senator (s) in the election for the Senate presidency are
not necessarily the minority.
6


- RULES OF PROCEEDINGS- Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 277
SCRA 268- Courts cannot inquire into the allegations that in
enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its
own rules in the absence of showing that there was violation of a
constitutional provision or private rights. Parliamentary rules are
mere procedures which may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body.

- DISCIPLINING MEMBERS- Osmea vs Pendatun, The
House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes
disorderly behavior. The courts will not assume jurisdiction in
any case which will amount to an interference by the judicial
department with the legislature.

- People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689- His election as
congressman did not thereby amount to a condonation of his
offense; neither does it entitle him, pending appeal of his case, to
be free from confinement and to be allowed to attend sessions of
congress, for the people elected him with full awareness of the
limitations on his freedom of action and movement.

- It was never the intention of the framers of the constitution to
shield a member of congress from the consequences of his
wrongdoings. A member of Congress could only invoke the
immunity from arrests for relatively minor offenses, punishable
at most by correctional penalties.

Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan- suspension imposed by Congress
to a colleague is distinct from suspension spoken in Section 13
of RA 3019 which is not a penalty but a preliminary preventive
measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed for misbehavior as a member of Congress.

- ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS- Vera vs. Avelino- The members
of the Senate validly suspended the oath-taking of the 3 senators
elect. This does not fall within the powers of the electoral
tribunal. The latter has jurisdiction only over electoral contests
in which contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but
also have himself inducted into office.

- LIMKAICHONG vs. COMELEC; Biraogo vs. Nograles;
Paras vs. Nograles & Villando vs. COMELEC, April 1, 2009-
once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives,
COMELECs jurisdiction over the election contests relating to
his election, returns and qualifications, ends and the HRETs
6

own jurisdiction begins. The proclamation of a winning
candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over
matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation.

- Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidates in
the congressional elections, the remedy of those who may assail
ones eligibility or ineligibility, qualification or disqualification
is to file before the HRET a petition for an election protest, or
a petition for quo warranto, within the period provided by the
HRET Rules.

- Codilla vs. De Venecia, GR No. 150605, December 10, 2002-
Since petitioner (Codilla) seasonably filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending
the proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc
was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the
said Order of the 2
nd
Division. The said Order was yet
unenforceable as it has not attained finality, the timely filing of
the motion for reconsideration suspends the execution. It cannot,
thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the
respondent (Locsin) as the duly elected representative of the 4
th

District of Leyte.

- At the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the
validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC 2
nd
Division was
seasonably challenged by the petitioner (Codilla) in his motion
for reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the
HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.

- Barbers vs. COMELEC, June 22, 2005- The phrase election,
returns and qualifications should be interpreted in its totality as
referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestees
title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that election
referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of
voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and
counting of the votes; returns to the canvass of the returns and
the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning
the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity
of the election returns; and qualifications to matters that could
be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed
winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy
of his certificate of candidacy.

6

- Chavez vs. COMELEC- While the COMELEC has exclusive
jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local
elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code),
nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in
elections for President, V-President, Senator and Members of
the House of Representatives.

What is allowed is the correction of manifest errors in the
certificate of canvass or election returns. To be manifest, the
errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or
election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto
must have been made before the board of canvassers and
specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.

Where the petition calls for the correction of manifest
errors in the certificates of canvass, COMELEC has
jurisdiction. If it calls for the re-opening and appreciation of
ballots, the Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction.

- This Supreme Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and
resolutions of HRET operates only upon a showing of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Tribunal tantamount to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of discretion implies
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power
because of passion or personal hostility (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission; Pena vs. HRET).

- Bondoc vs. Pineda- Members of the HRET as sole judge of
congressional election contests are entitled to security of tenure
just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under
our Constitution.

- Robles vs. HRET- Jurisdiction of HRET once acquired is not
lost upon the instance of the parties bu| continues until the
case is terminated.

- Abubakar vs. HRET, March 7, 2007- The Supreme Courts
jurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions of HRET
operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Such grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or
arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or
personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so
6

patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law. It is absent in this case.

- Abayon vs. HRET; Palparan vs. HRET, GR 189466 &
189506, respectively, February 11, 2010- Since party-list
nominees are considered as elected members of the House, the
HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications.

- Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, Zubiri, March 13, 2008 - It is
the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint
of Pimentel involving, as it does, a contest relating to the
election of Zubiri, now a member of the Senate.

- DAZA V. SINGSON, 180 SCRA 496- The House of
Representatives is authorized to change its representation in the
Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the
changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership. The changes must be PERMANENT and do not
include temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving
severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and
permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to
another.

- The provision on Section 18 on proportional representation is
mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the
majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard. A political
party must have at least two senators to be able to have a
representative in the Commission on Appointments, so that any
number less than 2 will not entitle such party a membership in
the CA. (Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789).

- Pimentel, Jr. vs. House of Representatives, 11/19/02- Even
assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient
number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the
HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the
House of Representatives and not with this Court. Under
Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list
representatives must first show to the House that they possess
the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the
HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the
directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of
political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list
representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power of
judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior
recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring
the instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioners direct
recourse to this Court is premature. The discretion of the House
6

to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute,
being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on
proportional representation.


- APPROPRIATION- Gonzales vs. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733, -
The Presidents creation of the Preparatory Commission on
Constitutional Reform through an executive Order involves no
exercise by Congress of its taxing power or spending power.

- The appropriation for the PCCR was authorized by the
President, not by Congress. In a strict sense, appropriation has
been defined as nothing more than the legislative
authorization prescribed by the Constitution that the money
may be paid out of the treasury, while appropriation made
by law refers to the act of the legislature setting apart or
assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the
payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors.

- IMPORTANT: LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY- Bengzon vs.
Senate Blue Ribbon (203 SRCA 76)- An investigation that
seeks the determination whether a law has been violated is not in
aid of legislation but in aid of prosecution, and therefore,
violative of separation of powers. To allow the Committee to
investigate the matter would create the possibility of conflicting
judgments; and that the inquiry into the same justiceable
controversy would be an encroachment on the exclusive domain
of judicial jurisdiction that had set in much earlier (investigation
was not in aid of legislation).

- Subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to
judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing
the court, or obstructing the administration of justice (Romero II
vs. Estrada, GR No. 174105, April 2, 2009).

- Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks,
GR No. 167173, December 27, 2007- the mere filing of a
criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or quasi-
judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of
legislative inquiry, otherwise, it would be extremely easy to
subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the
convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative
complaint.

- The exercise by Congress or by any of its Committee of the
power to punish contempt is based on the principle of self-
preservation as the branch of government vested with the
6

legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, it can
assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it.
Except only when the Congress and/or its Committee exercise
the power of contempt, it cannot penalize violators even if there
is overwhelming evidence of criminal culpability. It can only
recommend measures to address or remedy whatever
irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation,
although it may include in its Report a recommendation for the
criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable.

- EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE- is the implied constitutional
power of the President to withhold information requested by
other branches of the government. The Constitution does not
expressly grant this power to the President but courts have long
recognized implied Presidential powers if necessary and
proper in carrying out powers and functions expressly
granted to the Executive under the Constitution. xxx In this
jurisdiction, several decisions have recognized executive
privilege starting with the 1995 case of Almonte v. Vasquez, and
the most recent being the 2002 case of Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority and the 2006 case of Senate v. Ermita.
As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and as Chief
Executive, the President is ultimately responsible for military
and national security matters affecting the nation. In the
discharge of this responsibility, the President may find it
necessary to withhold sensitive military and national security
secrets from the Legislature or the public.
As the official in control of the nations foreign service by
virtue of the Presidents control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices, the President is the chief implementer of the
foreign policy relations of the State. The Presidents role as
chief implementer of the States foreign policy is reinforced by
the Presidents constitutional power to negotiate and enter into
treaties and international agreements. In the discharge of this
responsibility, the President may find it necessary to refuse
disclosure of sensitive diplomatic secrets to the Legislature or
the public. Traditionally, states have conducted diplomacy with
considerable secrecy. There is every expectation that a state will
not imprudently reveal secrets that its allies have shared with it.
6

There is also the need to protect the confidentiality of the
internal deliberations of the President with his Cabinet and
advisers. To encourage candid discussions and thorough
exchange of views, the Presidents communications with his
Cabinet and advisers need to be shielded from the glare of
publicity. Otherwise, the Cabinet and other presidential advisers
may be reluctant to discuss freely with the President policy
issues and executive matters knowing that their discussions will
be publicly disclosed, thus depriving the President of candid
advice.
Executive privilege, however, is not absolute. The
interest of protecting military, national security and
diplomatic secrets, as well as Presidential communications,
must be weighed against other constitutionally recognized
interests. There is the declared state policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest, the
right of the people to information on matters of public
concern, the accountability of public officers, the power of
legislative inquiry, and the judicial power to secure
testimonial and documentary evidence in deciding cases.
The balancing of interests between executive privilege
on one hand and the other competing constitutionally
recognized interests on the other hand - is a function of the
courts. The courts will have to decide the issue based on the
factual circumstances of each case. This is how conflicts on
executive privilege between the Executive and the Legislature,
and between the Executive and the Judiciary, have been decided
by the courts.
Akbayan vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008 -
Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is
clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept
perpetually confidential since there should be ample
opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved the
offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue
to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is
reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives
submitted their offers with the understanding that historic
6

confidentiality would govern the same. Disclosing these offers
could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with
Japan but with other foreign governments in future
negotiations. xxx Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are
recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA
negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis,
however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate
v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged
does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all
instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the
claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest
that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong
enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.

- Operational Proximity Test (Neri vs. Senate Committee,
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)- The communications
elicited by the three (3) questions [a) Whether the President
followed up the (NBN) project? b) Were you dictated to
prioritize the ZTE? c) Whether the President said to go ahead
and approve the project after being told about the alleged bribe?]
are covered by the presidential communications privilege.
First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-
delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized
in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are
received by a close advisor of the President. Under the
operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close
advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And
third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.

- Conduct of legislative inquiries must be in accordance with
publish rules.

6

- In the matter of the petition for issuance of writ of habeas
corpus of Camilo Sabio- GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006-
The Congress power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses
everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as
well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends to
government agencies created by Congress and officers whose
positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or
even abolish. PCGG belongs to this class. xxx So long as the
constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners, will be respected by respondent Senate
Committees, it is their duty to cooperate with them in their
efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action.
The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to
subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its
Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within
the realm of proper investigation

- Miguel vs. Gordon, GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006- a
mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad
power of Congress in the absence of constitutional basis.

- Senate vs. Ermita (E.O. 464), April 20, 2006- Ultimately, the
power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive
officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22
find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While
the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it
cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to
comply with its demands for information.

- Varieties of Executive Privilege
1. state secrets invoked by Presidents, if disclosed would
subvert crucial military or diplomatic objective.
2. informers privilege- not to disclose the identity of persons
who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged
with the enforcement of that law.
3. generic privilege for internal deliberations- attach to
intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process
by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.

- Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the
executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If
the executive branch withholds such information on the
ground that it is executive privileged, it must so assert it and
state the reason therefore and why it must be respected.
6



- When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way
for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a
valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere
fact that they are department heads. Only one executive
official may be exempted from this power the President on
whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of
Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based
on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the
due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which
is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.

- The absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation,
must be construed as limited in its appearance of department
heads in the question hour contemplated in Section 22 of
Article VI, the objective of which is to obtain information in
pursuit of Congress oversight function.

- The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by
Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the
implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight
concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress (a)
to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives; (b)
to determine whether agencies are properly administered; (c) to
eliminate executive waste and dishonesty; (d) to prevent
executive usurpation of legislative authority; and (e) to assess
executive conformity with the congressional perception of public
interest.

- The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its
oversight powers may be divided into three categories, namely:
scrutiny; investigation and supervision.


- ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE Abakada Guro Party List,
et al. vs. Ermita, ed al., October 18, 2005 the signing of a bill
by the Speaker of the Housa and the Senate Presi`ent and the
certification od the Secretaraes of both houses of Congress that it
was passed are conclusive of its due enactment.

- A bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive
changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of
the whole, a distinct bill may be produced. The power of the
Senate to propose amendments, it cal propose its own version
6

even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution
to originate in the House.

- BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE- The Supreme
Court recognizes the long standing legislative practice of giving
said conference ample latitude for compromising differences
between the Senate and the House. It can propose amendment
in the nature of a substitute, so long as the amendment is
germane to the subject of the bills before the committee.
After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both
houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative
department.

- Lung Center vs. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29,
2004 Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and RA 7160 in
order to be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is burdened
to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a
charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are actually,
directly, and exclusively used for charitable purposes.
Exclusive is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion
of others; debarred from participation or enjoyment, and
exclusively is defined, in a manner to exclude; as enjoying a
privilege exclusively. The words dominant use or principal
use cannot be substituted for the words used exclusively
without doing violence to the Constitution and the law. Solely is
synonymous with exclusively.

- Suplico, et al. vs. Romulo Neri, et al, GR No. 178830, July
14, 2008- Any government expenditure without the
corresponding appropriation from Congress is unconstitutional.
There can be no dispute that the proceeds of foreign loans,
whether concluded or not, cannot be obligated in a procurement
contract without a prior appropriation from Congress. When the
executive branch secures a loan to fund a procurement of goods
or services, the loan proceeds enter the National Treasury as part
of the general funds of the government. Congress must
appropriate by law the loan proceeds to fund the procurement of
goods or services, otherwise the loan proceeds cannot be spent
by the executive branch. When the loan falls due, Congress must
make another appropriation law authorizing the repayment of the
loan out of the general funds in the National Treasury. This
appropriation for the repayment of the loan is what is covered by
the automatic appropriation

-
6

ARTICLE VII
(PRESIDENT)

- PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY- The immunity enjoyed by a
sitting president evolved through case law.

Soliven vs. Makasiar- The privilege pertains to the President by
virtue of the office. There is nothing in our laws that would
prevent the President from waiving the privilege. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
Presidents prerogative.

Estrada vs. Desierto- There is no basis in the contention that
the immunity of the President extends to the end of the term to
which he was elected notwithstanding his resignation. It is clear
that the immunity of the President from suit is concurrent
only with his tenure (representing the period during which the
incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (the time
during which the officer may claim to hold office as a matter of
right).

Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371- Executive
immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President.

David, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006 It is not proper
to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the
doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and
there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.

- SUPREME COURT AS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL- Lopez vs. Roxas, 17 SCRA 755- When the law
grants the Supreme Court the power to resolve an election
contest between or among presidential candidates, no new or
separate court is created. The law merely conferred upon the
Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

- The power of Congress to declare who, among the candidates for
President and/or Vice-President has obtained the largest number
of votes, is entirely different in nature from and not inconsistent
with the jurisdiction vested in the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
by RA 1793. Congress merely acts as national board of
canvassers, charged with the ministerial and executive duty
to make said declaration, on the basis of the election returns
duly certified by provincial and city boards of canvassers.
Upon the other hand, the Presidential Electoral tribunal has
the judicial power to determine whether or not said duly
6

certified election returns have been irregularly made or
tampered with or reflect the true results of the elections in
the areas covered by each and, if not, to recount the ballots
cast, and incidentally thereto, pass upon the validity of each
ballot or determine whether the same shall be counted, and,
in the affirmative, in whose favor, which Congress has no
power to do.

- In assuming the Office of Senator protestant Santiago has
effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest to the election
protestee Ramos as President. (Santiago v. Ramos, 253 SCRA
559).

- Citing Defensor Santiago v. Ramos, the PET stressed that
Legarda effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest when
she ran in the Senate, which term coincides with the term of the
Vice-Presidency 2004-2010. (Min. Res., PET Case No. 003,
Legarda v. De Castro, February 12, 2008)

- The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential election
protest is Rule 14 of the PET Rules. It provides,

Rule 14. Election Protest.Only the registered candidate for
President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the
second or third highest number of votes may contest the election
of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing
a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the
winner.

- Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2
nd
and 3
rd
placers,
may contest the election. By this express enumeration, the rule
makers have in effect determined the real parties in interest
concerning an on-going election contest. It envisioned a scenario
where, if the declared winner had not been truly voted upon by
the electorate, the candidate who received that 2
nd
or the 3
rd

highest number of votes would be the legitimate beneficiary in a
successful election contest.
- The Supreme Court ruled that it does not have any rule on
substitution nor intervention but it does allow for the analogous
and suppletory application of the Rules of Court, decisions of the
Supreme Court, and the decisions of the electoral tribunals. Rule
3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court.
This rule allows substitution by a legal representative. It can be
6

gleaned from the citation of this rule that movant/intervenor
seeks to appear before the Presidential Tribunal as the legal
representative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by said
Section 16. However, in the Supreme Courts application of this
rule to an election contest, it has every time ruled that a public
office is personal to the public officer and not a property
transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, the Supreme Court
consistently rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in
election contests where the protestant dies during the pendency
of the protest.
- This is not to say that death of the protestant necessarily abates
the pending action. In Vda. de De Mesa (1966) the Supreme
Court held that while the right to a public office is personal and
exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely
personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such
that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to
continue the protest proceedings. Hence, the Supreme Court has
allowed substitution and intervention but only by a real party in
interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is
entitled to the avails of the suit. Herein movant/intervenor,
Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of
President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we can
conclude that protestants widow is not a real party in interest to
this election protest (Ronald Allan Poe vs. GMA, PET case No.
002, March 29, 2005).
- Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 277- The actions
contemplated in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution are
post election remedies, namely, regular election contests and quo
warranto. The word contest means that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court only be invoked after the election and
proclamation of the President or Vice-President there can be
no contest before a winner is proclaimed.
- TERM OF OFFICE- Pormento vs. Estrada (GR No. 191988,
August 31, 2010)- Estrada was not elected President the second
time he ran. Since the issue will be premised on the second
election as President, there is no case or controversy to be
resolved in this case.

6

- VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT-
Estrada vs. Desierto, March 2, 2001- Also Read:
TEMPORARY DISABILITY OF PRESIDENT- The question
whether the claimed temporary inability of Estrada is a political
question beyond the Supreme Courts power of review. The
decision that President Arroyo is the dejure President made
by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by
the Supreme Court.

POLITICAL QUALIFIED AGENCY (ALTER-EGO
DOCTRINE) Constantino vs. Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064,
October 13, 2005- Nevertheless, there are powers vested in the
President by the Constitution which may not be delegated to or
exercised by an agent or alter ego of the President. Justice
Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear: Withal, at
first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible
under the circumstances, it should be observed that there are
certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by
subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are
certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief
Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in
person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the
exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for
instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and
proclaim martial law (PAR. 3, SEC. 11, Art. VII) and the
exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec.
11, idem]. These distinctions hold true to this day. There are
certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional
circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of
fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of
executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal
branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the
pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of
guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that
demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the
constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive,
but there must be a showing that the executive power in question
is of similar gravitas and exceptional import. We cannot
conclude that the power of the President to contract or guarantee
foreign debts falls within the same exceptional class.
Indubitably, the decision to contract or guarantee foreign debts
is of vital public interest, but only akin to any contractual
obligation undertaken by the sovereign, which arises not from
6

any extraordinary incident, but from the established functions of
governance.

- APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT- Sarmiento
vs. Mison; Bautista vs. Salonga; Bermudez vs. Torres; Calderon
vs. Carale- Congress cannot expand the constitution by
increasing those officers who need prior confirmation by the
CA.

- Election Ban (Midnight Appointments) GR No. 191002, De
Castro v. JBC; GR No. 191032, Soriano v. JBC; GR No.
191057, PHILCONSA v. JBC; AM No. 10-2-5-SC, In Re
Applicability of Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution to
Appointments to the Judiciary; GR No. 191149, Peralta v.
JBC; GR No. 191342, Tolentino, Jr. v. JBC; GR No. 191420,
Philippine Bar Association, Inc. v. JBC; March 17, 2010,
April 20, 2010)- the prohibition under Article VII, Section 15 of
the Constitution against presidential appointments immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
term of the outgoing President does not apply to vacancies in the
High Tribunal. Although Valenzuela came to hold that the
prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be
disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the
confirmation made to the JBC by then Senior Associate Justice
Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a former member of the
Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being
intended to apply to the appointments to the Judiciary, which
confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should
prevail. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so.

- Binamira vs. Garucho; Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2, 2002-
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment
because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once an appointee has qualified into
office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the CA does
not alter its permanent character. It is effective until
disapproved by the CA or until the next adjournment of
Congress. It is extended only during a recess of Congress. If
disapproved by CA, appointee can no longer be extended a
new appointment. If by-passed, the President is free to renew
the ad-interim appointment.

6

- Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 462 SCRA
622, July 6, 2005- The law allows the President to make such
acting appointment. The President may even appoint in acting
capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as
the President deems that person competent.

- Acting appointment- It is temporary in nature. It is a stop-gap
measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the
appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of
vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of her choice as
acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice
could assume office. It may be extended any time there is
vacancy, given while Congress is in session.

- Rufino vs. Endriga, G. R. No. 139554, July 21 2006- Under
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President
appoints three groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads
of the Executive departments," ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those
whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third
group refers to all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under the same
Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose
appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. xxx The President
appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the second
and third groups of officers without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. The President appoints the third group of officers
if the law is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law
authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or
board to appoint is declared unconstitutional.
- Agyao vs. CSC, GR No. 182591, January 8, 2011- The position of
department manager such as Director Manager II of PEZA is not a
third level position and does not require presidential appointment.
- CABINET SECRETARIES, UNDERSECRETARIES AND
THEIR ASSISTANT SECRETARIES are prohibited from
holding multiple positions and receiving compensation
therefrom- BITONIO VS. COA, 425 SCRA 437, March 12,
2004.
6


- CONTROL OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS- Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora, July 10, 2001- The general rule
has always been that the power to abolish a public office is
lodged with the legislature. The exception, however, is that as
far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department
are concerned, the Presidents power of control may justify him
to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws
may grant him broad authority to carry out reorganization
measures. The chief executive, under our laws, has the
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of
the Office of the President.

- Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission, GR No. 192935,
December 7, 2010- The creation of the Philippine Truth
Commission finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure
that the laws are faithfully executed. The President's power to
conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
execution of laws - in this case, fundamental laws on public
accountability and transparency - is inherent in the President's
powers as the Chief Executive. Suffice it to say that there will be
no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing
funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation
on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds.

- Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the
Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) vs. Romulo, GR No. 160093, July
31, 2007 The President has the authority to carry out a
reorganization of the Department of Health under the
Constitution and statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct of
his power of control under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the
1987 Constitution. The Presidents power to reorganize the
executive branch is also an exercise of his residual powers under
Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which grants the
President broad organization powers to implement
reorganization measures. Be that as it may, the President must
exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any
branch or agency of the executive department. Reorganization is
effected in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to
make bureaucracy more efficient.

- Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential
Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the
President of the Philippines the continuing authority to
reorganize the national government, which includes the
6

power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish
offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions,
services and activities and to standardize salaries and
materials. The validity of these two decrees
[is]"unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that
all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with
this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed
or revoked.

- Domingo vs. Zamora, GR No. 142283, February 6, 2003
The Presidents power (EO 292) to reorganize offices outside
of the Office of the President Proper is limited merely
transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the
President to Departments or Agencies and vice-versa. The
DECS is indisputably a Department of the Executive Branch.
Even if the DECS is not part of the Office of the President,
Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 clearly authorizes the President
to transfer any function or agency of the DECS to the Office of
the President. Under its charter, the Philippine Sports
Commission (PSC), is attached to the Office of the President.
Therefore, the President has the authority to transfer the
functions, programs and activities of DECS related to sports
development to the PSC, making EO 81 a valid presidential
issuance.

- Rufino vs. Endriga, GR No. 113956, July 21, 2006- The
presidential power of control over the Executive branch of
government extends to all executive employees from the Department
Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This constitutional power of the
President is self-executing and does not require any implementing
law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the Presidents power of control
over the Executive branch. xxx In mandating that the President shall
have control of all executive x x x offices, Section 17, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office one
performing executive functions outside of the independent
constitutional bodies from the Presidents power of control. xxx
The Presidents power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all
officers in the Executive branch. This is true whether such officers are
appointed by the President or by heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. The power of control means the power to
6

revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer
involving the exercise of discretion.

- COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AFP (Lacson vs.
Perez, May 10, 2001)- The declaration by the President of state
of rebellion during or in the aftermath of the May 1, 2001 seige
of Malacanang is not violative of the separation of powers
doctrine. The President, as Commander in chief of Armed Forces
of the Philippines, may call upon such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

- Sanlakas vs. Executive Committee, 421 SCRA 656, February
3, 2004- The Presidents authority to declare a state of rebellion
springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at
the same time draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief
powers pursuant to her calling out power.

- Gudani vs. Senga, Augsut 15, 2006- It is on the President that
the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the
prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again,
the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command
mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual
members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect.
Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President
and obeying the Senate, the Supreme Court will without
hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President.
After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and
not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces. if the President or the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a
member of the AFP to appear before Congress, the legislative
body seeking such testimony may seek judicial relief to compel
the attendance.

- Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora The President
has full discretion to call the military when in his judgment it is
necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. There is no equivalent provision
dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to
call out the armed forces.

- David, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, May 3, 2006- PP
1017 constitutes the call by the President for the AFP to prevent
or suppress lawless violence. However, PP 1017s extraneous
6

provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to
issue decrees; (2) to direct AFP to enforce obedience to all laws
even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees
promulgated by the president; and (3) to impose standards on
media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires
and unconstitutional. In the absence of legislation, the President
cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private
business affected with public interest.

- The President can validly declare the existence of a state of
national emergency even in the absence of congressional
enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers requires a
delegation from Congress.

- EMERGENCY POWER GRANT TO PRESIDENT-
Requisites: 1) there must be a war or other emergency; 2) the
delegation must be for a limited period only; 3) the delegation
must be subject to such restrictions as Congress may prescribe
and 4) the emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a
national policy declared by Congress.

- David, et al. vs. Ermita- It may be pointed out that the second
paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also
to other national emergency. If the intention of the Framers of
our Constitution was to withhold from the President the
authority to declare a state of national emergency pursuant to
Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to
Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war),
then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not
intend that Congress should first authorize the President before
he can declare a state of national emergency. The logical
conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare
the existence of a state of national emergency even in the
absence of a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of
emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest, is
different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.

- PARDONING POWER- Drilon vs. CA, 202 SCRA 370- The
pardoning power of the President is final and unappealable.

- AMNESTY- Kapunan, Jr. vs. CA, 51 SCRA 42, March 13,
2009.- The text of Proclamation No. 347 then issued by
President Fidel V. Ramos covered the members of the AFP- it
extends to all persons who committed the particular acts
described in the provision, and not just rebels or insurgents.
6


- TREATY MAKING POWER- Bayan vs. Zamora, 342
SCRA 449-It is inconsequential whether the United States treats
the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a
treaty. (Also read USAFFE Veterans Ass. v. Treasurer 105 Phil.
1030) In the field of negotiation, the Senate cannot intrude, and
Congress itself is powerless to invade it.
Akbayan vs. Aquino - The doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus
that the treaty-making power is exclusive to the President, being
the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, was echoed
in BAYAN v. Executive Secretary where the Court held:
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office,
the President, as head of State, is the sole organ and authority in the
external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the chief
architect of the nation's foreign policy; his "dominance in the field of
foreign relations is (then) conceded." Wielding vast powers and
influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as Jefferson
describes, is executive altogether.

As regards the power to enter into treaties or international
agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the President, subject
only to the concurrence of at least two thirds vote of all the members of
the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent
ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the
President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic
powers granted him no less than by the fundamental law itself. I nto the
field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is
powerless to invade it. x x x (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The same doctrine was reiterated even more recently in Pimentel
v. Executive Secretary where the Court ruled:
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state,
is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is
the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief
architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece
with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with
the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or
withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties,
and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of
treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with
other states.

6

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to
negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation
to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of
the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It has long been recognized that the power to enter into
treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the President,
subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this
light, the authority of the President to enter into trade
agreements with foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464
may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power
already inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis to
hold the President or its representatives accountable to
Congress for the conduct of treaty negotiations.
This is not to say, of course, that the Presidents power to
enter into treaties is unlimited but for the requirement of Senate
concurrence, since the President must still ensure that all treaties
will substantively conform to all the relevant provisions of the
Constitution. It follows from the above discussion that
Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may not
interfere in the field of treaty negotiations. While Article
VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, such
pertains only to the validity of the treaty under
consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to
its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole
that has been given the authority to concur as a means of
checking the treaty-making power of the President, but only the
Senate.

- Pimentel, Jr. vs. Executive Secretary, July 6, 2005-Under our
Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President,
subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the
Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its
consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within
the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the
Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to
ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty
which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that
should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the
competence of the President alone, which cannot be
6

encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. The Supreme
Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the
President in the performance of his official duties. The Court,
therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the
petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive
branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome
Statute to the Senate.

- POWER TO CLASSIFY PUBLIC LANDS and TO SELL
THE SAME- The power to classify lands as alienable belongs
to the President. Only lands, which have been classified as
alienable, may be sold. There must be a law authorizing its sale
or alienation by the President or by another officer before
conveyance can be executed on behalf of the government
(Section 48, Book I of the 1987 Administrative Code). Laurel
vs. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797- The President may not convey
valuable real property of the government on her sole will.
Conveyance must be authorized by a law enacted by Congress.

- POWER OF SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS- to ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law. xxx Insofar as existing legislation authorizes
the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to
proceed against local officials administratively.


ARTICLE VIII
(JUDICIAL)

- JUDICIAL REVIEW- Joya vs. PCGG; Kilosbayan vs.
Guingona; Oposa vs. Factoran (petitioners-children); Kilosbayan
vs. Morato; IBP vs. Zamora (IBP not proper party); Gonzales vs.
Narvasa (private citizen not proper party).

- Garcia v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 157584, April 2,
2009- The immediate implementation of full deregulation of the
local downstream oil industry is a policy determination by
Congress which this Court cannot overturn without offending the
Constitution and the principle of separation of powers. That the
law failed in its objectives because its adoption spawned the
evils petitioner Garcia alludes to does not warrant its
nullification. In the words of Mr. Justice Leonardo A.
Quisumbing in the 1999 Garcia case, [a] calculus of fear and
pessimism xxx does not justify the remedy petitioner seeks: that
we overturn a law enacted by Congress and approved by the
Chief Executive.

6

- The Secretary of Justice vs. Koruga, GR No. 166199, April
24, 2009- Although the courts are without power to directly
decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government and are not empowered to execute absolutely their
own judgment from that of Congress or of the President, the
Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or not
such judgment has been made with grave abuse of discretion,
when the act of the legislative or executive department is
contrary to the constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when
executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice,
ill will or personal bias.

- Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- Courts are empowered,
under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate
disputes between the legislative and executive branches of
government on the proper constitutional parameters of power.

- PROPER PARTY- In this jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
adopts the DIRECT INJURY test. In People vs. Vera, it held
that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.

- However, being a mere procedural technicality, the
requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Supreme
Court in the exercise of its discretion. Even when the
petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been
allowed to sue under the principle of transcendental
importance. DAVID, ET AL VS. ARROYO; CHAVEZ VS.
PEA, 384 SCRA 152; BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN VS. ZAMORA, 342 SCRA 449; LIM VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 380 SCRA 739.

- Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators may be
accorded standing to sue, provided that the following
requirements are met:
1. the cases involved constitutional issues;
2. for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional; anomalous contrary to laws<
miapplication
3. for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest
in the validity of the election law in question;
4. for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that
the issues are of transcendental importance which must
be settled early; and
6

5. for legislators, there must be a claim that the official
action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives
as legislators.(Impairs the prerogatives of congress)

- AIWA vs. Romulo, GR No. 157509, January 18, 2005- For a
citizen to have standing, he must establish that he has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by
a favorable action.

- TELEBAP VS.C OMELEC- proper party
1. registered voter must show that the action concerns his
right of suffrage
2. taxpayer he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation.
3. corporate entity- the party suing has substantial relation to the
third party; the third party cannot assert his constitutional
right; the right of the third party will be diluted unless the
party in court is allowed to espouse the third partys
constitutional claim.

- As the case involves constitutional questions, the Supreme Court
is not concerned with whether the petitioners are real parties in
interest, but whether they have legal standing. LA BUGAL-
BLAAN TRIBAL ASS., INC., VS RAMOS, 421 SCRA 148.

- EVEN WHEN THE ISSUES ARE MOOT AND
ACADEMIC, the Court still entertains to adjudicate the
substantive matter if there is a grave violation of the constitution;
to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and
public and capable of repetition, yet evading review
PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. ROMULO, 429 SCRA
736, May 27, 2004.

- The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula
that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:
first, there is grave violation of the constitution, second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved, third, when constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
bar and the public, and fourth, the case is capable of repetition
yet evading review. DAVID, ET AL. VS. ARROYO, ET AL.;
SANLAKAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 421 SCRA 656; ACOP VS.
GUINGONA, JR., 383 SCRA 577; ALBA-A VS.
COMELEC, 435 SCRA 98.
6



- POLITICAL QUESTIONS- are concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.
QUESTIONS REGARDING ADMINISTRATIVE
ISSUANCES will not preclude the SUPREME COURT from
exercising its power of judicial review to determine whether or
not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of issuing authority under its
EXPANDED JURISDICTION- BRILLANTES VS.
COMELEC, 432 SCRA 269, June 15 2004.

- KILOSBAYAN VS. ERMITA, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 -
Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as peoples
organizations and taxpayers since the matter involves an issue of
utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance, namely, the
qualification nay, the citizenship of a person to be appointed
a member of this Court. xxxx This case is a matter of primordial
importance involving compliance with a Constitutional
mandate. As the body tasked with the determination of the
merits of conflicting claims under the Constitution, the
Supreme Court is the proper forum for resolving the issue,
even as the JBC has the initial competence to do so. xxx It is
clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent
Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent
recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of
Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of
the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother
were naturalized along with his father.

- FISCAL AUTONOMY- Bengzon vs. Drilon- The Chief
Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment
appropriations where augmentation is needed.

- PP VS. DY, 395 SCRA 256- Under Article VIII, Section 4(1)
of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may sit en banc or, in its
discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven members.

- IBP vs. Zamora, deployment of marines is justiciable- the
problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom.

- FARIAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 417 SCRA 503- Policy matters
are not the concern of the Supreme Court- government policy is
within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the
government.
6


- CHANGE OF VENUE-Larranaga vs. CA, 287 SCRA 581, A
motion to change the venue of (and authority to conduct)
preliminary investigation cannot be taken cognizance by the
courts for lack of jurisdiction. The holding of a preliminary
investigation is a function of the Executive department and not
of the judiciary.

- PP vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 (1981)- In case of doubt, it should
be resolved in favor of change of venue.

- PP VS. TUBONGBANUA, GR No. 171271- August 31, 2006-
In view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty on June 24, 2006,
the penalty that should be meted is reclusion perpetua, thus:

- SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby
prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One
Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act
Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic
Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659),
otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and all other laws,
executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty
are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

- SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:


(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated
makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does
not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.


- PROMULGATE RULES concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all court, the admission to the practice of law,
the IBP, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
NOTE: Limitations: simplified and inexpensive procedure;
uniform; not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

WRIT OF AMPARO The right to enforce and protect a
persons rights guaranteed and recognized by the bill of rights. It
is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty,
and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
6

of a private individual or entity. The writ covers extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final
judgment, the court, justice or judge may grant any of the
following reliefs:
(a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge,
upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or
the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be
protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or
private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If
the petitioner is an organization, association or institution
referred to in Section 3(c) of the Rule, the protection may be
extended to the officers involved. The Supreme Court shall
accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend
temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and
any member of the immediate family, in accordance with
guidelines which it shall issue. The accredited persons and
private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions
that may be imposed by the court, justice or judge.
(b) I nspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified
motion and after due hearing, may order any person in
possession or control of a designated land or other property, to
permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying,
or photographing the property or any relevant object or operation
thereon. The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be
inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of
witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced
disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party. If the
motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the
privileged nature of the information, the court, justice or judge
may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the
opposition. The movant must show that the inspection order is
necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to
be threatened or violated. The inspection order shall specify the
person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the date,
time, place and manner of making the inspection and may
prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of
all parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after the date of
its issuance, unless extended for justifiable reasons.
(c) Production Order. The court, justice or judge, upon
verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in
possession, custody or control of any designated documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible
things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which
6

constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the
return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or
photographing by or on behalf of the movant. The motion may
be opposed on the ground of national security or of the
privileged nature of the information, in which case the court,
justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine
the merit of the opposition. The court, justice or judge shall
prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of
all the parties.
(d) Witness Protection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon
motion or motu proprio, may refer the witnesses to the
Department of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection,
Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act No.
6981. The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to
other government agencies, or to accredited persons or private
institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety.
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA- It is a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged
in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.
- Masangkay vs. del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17,
2008- To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was
originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in
the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the
perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address
these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address
violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security,
as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those
available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to
protect concerns that are purely property or commercial.
Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds. Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing
civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and
the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point
in separately and directly intervening through a writ of
amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing
that the right to life, liberty or security the personal
concern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately
in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is
6

continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application
for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a
pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy
the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately
filed criminal case.

- Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires
the following material allegations of ultimate facts in a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
- (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the
respondent;

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or
threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or
security of the aggrieved party;
- (c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to
secure the data or information;

- (d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the
government office, and the person in charge, in
possession or in control of the data or information, if
known;


- (e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files kept by the respondent.
Aruelo vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 475- The COMELEC
cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in
the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning
pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the
Supreme Court.

Republic vs. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 16429, December 19, 2005-
Congress has the plenary legislative power. The silence of the
Constitution on the subject can only be interpreted as meaning
there is no intention to diminish that plenary power. RA 8974
which requires full payment before the State may exercise
proprietary rights, contrary to Rule 67 which requires only a
deposit was recognized by the Supreme Court.

PEOPLE VS. MATEO, July 7, 2004 While the fundamental
law requires mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases
where the penalty is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or
death, nowhere however, has it proscribed an intermediate
6

review. The Supreme Court deems it wise and compelling to
provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before
the case is elevated to the Supreme Court.

Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely
within the rule making prerogative of the Supreme Court
than the law making power of Congress. The rule allowing an
intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate
appellate court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court
for automatic review, is such a procedural matter.

- MINUTE RESOLUTION- Komatsu vs. CA, 289 SCRA 604-
does not violate Section 14. Resolutions are not decisions within
the constitutional requirement; they merely hold that the petition
for review should not be entertained and the petition to review
decision of the CA is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion, hence, there is no need to fully explain the Courts
denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already
mentioned in the CA decision.

- German Machineries Corporation vs. Endaya, 444 SCRA
329- The mandate under Section 14, Article VIII of the
constitution is applicable only in cases submitted for decision,
i.e, given due course and after the filing of the briefs or
memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where a resolution is
issued denying due course to a petition and stating the legal basis
thereof.

- Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Laserna, 550 SCRA 613- The
constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is bases, does not preclude the validity
of memorandum decisions, which adopt by reference the
finding of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions
of inferior tribunals.

- Joaquin-Agregado v. Yama, March 20, 2009, GR No.
181107- The Supreme Court stressed that it has the discretion to
decide whether a minute resolution should be used in lieu of a
full-blown decision in any particular case. Further, the Supreme
Court explained that the grant of due course to a petition for
review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion.
When it fails to find any reversible error committed by the CA,
there is no need to fully explain the Courts denial as it means
that the Supreme Court agrees with or adopts the findings and
6

conclusions of the CA. There is no point in reproducing or
restating in the resolution of denial the conclusions of the
appellate court affirmed.The constitutional requirement of
sec. 14, Art. VIII of a clear presentation of facts and laws
applies to decisions, where the petition is given due course,
but not where the petition is denied due course, with the
resolution stating the legal basis for the dismissal.


- Oil & National Gas Com. vs. CA, 293 SCRA 26- Section 14
does not preclude the validity of Memorandum Decision
which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of
law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. It is intended
to avoid cumbersome reproduction of the decision (or portions
thereof) of the lower court.


ARTICLE IX
(CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS)

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION


- GSIS VS. CSC, 202 SCRA 799- The grant to the Civil Service
Commission of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and
adjudge cases, necessarily includes the power to enforce or order
execution of its decisions, resolutions, or orders. The authority to
decide cases would be inutile unless accompanied by the
authority to see that what has been decided is carried out.

- Pangasinan State University vs. CA, 526 SRCA 92- The CSC
is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.

- Office of the Ombudsman vs. CSC, 528 SCRA 535- since the
responsibility of the establishment, administration and
maintenance of qualification standards lies with the concerned
department or agency, the role of the CSC is limited to assisting
the department agency with respect to these qualification
standards and approving them.

- CSC vs. Sojor, GR No. 168766, May 22, 2008- The
Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire
civil service. As defined, the civil service embraces every
branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the
government, including every government-owned or controlled
corporation. It is further classified into career and non-career
6

service positions. Career service positions are those where: (1)
entrance is based on merit and fitness or highly technical
qualifications; (2) there is opportunity for advancement to higher
career positions; and (3) there is security of tenure. A state
university president with a fixed term of office appointed by
the governing board of trustees of the university, is a non-
career civil service officer. He was appointed by the
chairman and members of the governing board of CVPC.
By clear provision of law, respondent is a non-career civil
servant who is under the jurisdiction of the CSC.

- CSC v. Alfonso, GR No. 179452, June 11, 2009,- Even though the
CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases decided by
government departments, agencies, and instrumentalities, a complaint
may be filed directly with the CSC, and the CSC has the authority to
hear and decide the case, although it may in its discretion opt to
deputize a department or an agency to conduct the investigation, as
provided for in the Civil Service Law of 1975. The Supreme Court
also ruled that since the complaints were filed directly with the CSC
and the CSC had opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the
CSCs exercise of jurisdiction shall be to the exclusion of other
tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction.

- CSC vs. DBM, GR No. 158791, July 22, 2005- The no report,
no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices
vested with fiscal autonomy. Being automatic connotes
something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. It means
that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed.

- Naseco vs. NLRC, 68 SCRA 122- Employees of GOCCs, as a
general rule, are governed by the Civil Service Law. But a
distinction of the manner the GOCC was created must be made.
If the GOCC was established through an original charter (or
special law), then it falls under the civil service, e.g., GSIS and
SSS. However, corporations which are subsidiaries of these
chartered agencies, e.g., Manila Hotel, is excluded from the
coverage of the civil service.


- Leveriza vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 282- An agency of government
refers to any of the various units of the government, including a
department, bureau, office, instrumentality or government-
owned or controlled corporation or a local government or a
distinct unit therein. Instrumentality refers to any agency of the
national government, not integrated within the department
6

framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies,
institutes and government-owned or controlled corporations,

- MWSS vs. Hernandez, 143 SCRA 602- If one is employed in
a GOCC, whether regular or not, the civil service law applies. It
is not true either that with respect to money claims, the Labor
Code applies. Regardless of the nature of employment or claim,
an employee in a GOCC with original charter is covered by the
Civil Service Law.

- Dimayuga vs. Benedicto II, 373 SCRA 652 (2002) the
appointment to the positions in the Career Executive Service
may be considered permanent in which the appointee enjoys
security of tenure.

- Achacoso vs. Macaraig, 195 SCRA 235- permanent
appointment can be issued only to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed,
including the appropriate eligibility prescribed. The mere fact
that a position belongs to the Career Service does not
automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he
does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have
to depend on the nature of appointment, which in turn depends
on his eligibility or lack of it.

- Fernandez vs. Dela Paz, 160 SCRA 751- Unconsented transfer
of the officer, resulting in demotion in rank or salary is a
violation of the security of tenure clause in the Constitution.

- Rosales, Jr. vs. Mijares, 442 SCRA 532- A transfer that aims
by indirect method to terminate services or to force resignation
constitutes removal.

- Estrada vs. Escritor, June 22, 2006 In the area of religious
exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state
interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its
violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also
protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing such state
interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.

- Mateo vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 284- The party
aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of
6

the government involving termination of services may appeal to
the CSC within 15 days. Thereafter, he could go on certiorari to
the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he still
feels aggrieved by the ruling of the CSC.

- PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL- Montecillo vs. CSC, June
28, 2001- The CSC is expressly empowered by the
Administrative Code of 1987 to declare positions in the Civil
Service primarily confidential. (Read: Salazar vs. Mathay, 73
SCRA 285, on two instances when a position may be considered
primarily confidential: (1) President declares the position to be
primarily confidential upon recommendation of of the CSC; (2)
when by the nature of the functions, there exists close intimacy
between the appointee and appointing authority which ensures
freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from
misgiving or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of
state.

HILARIO VS. CSC, 243 SCRA 206, City Legal Officer is
primarily confidential.

PAGCOR VS. RILLORAZA, June 25, 2001, The position of
Casino Operations Manager is not primarily confidential

- RESIGNATION- Estrada vs. Desierto, March 2, 2001, There
must intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by
any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be
written. It can be express. It can implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
- To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public
office, there must be: (1) an intention to relinquish a part of the
term; (2) an act of relinquishment; and (3) an acceptance by the
proper authority. The last one is required by reason of Article
238 of the Revised Penal Code. (Sangguniang Bayan of San
Andres, Catanduanes vs. CA, 284 SCRA 276, 1997).

- Santos vs. CA, 345 SCRA 553, (2000) rule on double
compensation not applicable to pension. A retiree receiving
pension or gratuity after retirement can continue to receive such
pension or gratuity if he accepts another government position to
which another compensation is attached.

- PILC vs. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, March 5, 2007 PCCG
Chair Magdangal Elma is prohibited under the Constitution from
simultaneously serving as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel. The
position of PCCG Chair and CPLC are incompatible offices
since the CPLC reviews actions of the PCGG Chair. It pointed
6

out that the general rule to hold more than one office is allowed
by law or by the primary functions of his position/

- Del Castillo vs. Civil Service Commission, August 21, 1997-
When an employee is illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement
is later ordered by the Court, for all legal intents and purposes he
is considered as not having left his office, and notwithstanding
the silence of the decision, he is entitled to payment of back
salaries.

- DOTC vs. Cruz, GR No. 178256, July 23, 2008 The Supreme
Court follows as a precedent, the DOTC did not effect Cruz's
termination with bad faith and, consequently, no backwages can
be awarded in his favor.

- David vs. Gania GR No. 156030, August 14, 2003- A civil
service officer or employee, who has been found illegally
dismissed or suspended, is entitled to be reinstated and to
back wages and other monetary benefits from the time of his
illegal dismissal or suspension up to his reinstatement, and if
at the time the decision of exoneration is promulgated, he is
already of retirement age, he shall be entitled not only to back
wages but also to full retirement benefits.

- CSC vs. Dacoycoy, April 29, 1999 The CSC as an aggrieved
party, may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court. Appeal now lies from a decision exonerating a
civil service employee of administrative charges.

- CSC vs. Albao, October 13, 2005- The present case partakes of
an act by petitioner CSC to protect the integrity of the civil
service system, and does not fall under the provision on
disciplinary actions under Sec. 47. It falls under the provisions
of Sec. 12, par. 11, on administrative cases instituted by it
directly. This is an integral part of its duty, authority and power
to administer the civil service system and protect its integrity, as
provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, by
removing from its list of eligibles those who falsified their
qualifications. This is to be distinguished from ordinary
proceedings intended to discipline a bona fide member of the
system, for acts or omissions that constitute violations of the law
or the rules of the service.

- SSS Employees Ass. vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686- While the
Constitution and the Labor Code are silent as to whether
6

government employees may strike, they are prohibited from
striking by express provision of Memorandum Circular No.
6, series of 1997 of the CSC and as implied in E.O. 180.


COMELEC

- REAPPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONERS- Matibag vs.
Benipayo, April 2, 2002- The phrase without reappointment
applies only to one who has been appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or not
such person completes his term of office which could be seven,
five or three years. There must be a confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of the previous appointment
before the prohibition on reappointment can apply.


- ISSUANCE of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.- Relampagos vs. Cumba,
243 SCRA 690.

- Bedol vs. COMELEC, GR No. 179830, December 3, 2009-
The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations
as an adjunct to its constitutional duty to enforce and administer
all election laws, by virtue of the explicit provisions of paragraph
6, Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx
- (6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

- The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it
by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may
be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-
judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces
the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement
of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation
controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to
the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election
laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly
be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers
to the enforcement and administration of election laws. In the
exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-
A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the
COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to implement the
6

provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election
Code.
7


- The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the
power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with
the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The Court, in Dole Philippines Inc.
v. Esteva, described quasi-judicial power in the following
manner, viz:

- Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other
hand is the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the
rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law
itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it
performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an
executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in
such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to
it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the
administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts
or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh
evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their
official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.
Since rights of specific persons are affected, it is elementary that
in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must
be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.

- Task Force Maguindanaos fact-finding investigation to probe
into the veracity of the alleged fraud that marred the elections in
said province; and consequently, to determine whether the
certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious, and whether an
election offense had possibly been committed could by no
means be classified as a purely ministerial or administrative
function.

- The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was
exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind
the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in
Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force
conducted hearings and required the attendance of the parties
concerned and their counsels to give them the opportunity to
argue and support their respective positions.

6

- The effectiveness of the quasijudicial power vested by law on a
government institution hinges on its authority to compel
attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses at the hearings or
proceedings.

- In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power to
punish individuals who refuse to appear during a fact-finding
investigation, despite a previous notice and order to attend,
would render nugatory the COMELECs investigative power,
which is an essential incident to its constitutional mandate to
secure the conduct of honest and credible elections. In this case,
the purpose of the investigation was however derailed when
petitioner obstinately refused to appear during said hearings and
to answer questions regarding the various election documents
which, he claimed, were stolen while they were in his possession
and custody. Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish
petitioner for such contumacious refusal to attend the Task Force
hearings.

- Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a
board of canvassers at that time it required petitioner to appear
before it, the Court had the occasion to rule that the powers of
the board of canvassers are not purely ministerial. The board
exercises quasi-judicial functions, such as the function and duty
to determine whether the papers transmitted to them are genuine
election returns signed by the proper officers.
10
When the results
of the elections in the province of Maguindanao were being
canvassed, counsels for various candidates posited numerous
questions on the certificates of canvass brought before the
COMELEC. The COMELEC asked petitioner to appear before it
in order to shed light on the issue of whether the election
documents coming from Maguindanao were spurious or not.
When petitioner unjustifiably refused to appear, COMELEC
undeniably acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction when it
issued the assailed resolutions.

- Sema vs. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700- The COMELEC does
not have the requisite power to call elections, as the same is part
of the plenary legislative power.


- LDP vs. COMELEC, GR No. 151265, February 24, 2004 -
The COMELEC correctly stated that the ascertainment of the
identity of [a] political party and its legitimate officers is a
matter that is well within its authority. The source of this
authority is no other than the fundamental law itself, which vests
upon the COMELEC the power and function to enforce and
6

administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election. In the exercise of such power and in the discharge of
such function, the Commission is endowed with ample
wherewithal and considerable latitude in adopting means and
methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the great
objectives for which it was created to promote free, orderly and
honest elections.

- LP vs. ATIENZA, ET AL., GR No. 174992- April 17, 2007
COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide questions of leadership
within a party and to ascertain its legitimate officers and leaders.
xxx The COMELEC is endowed with ample wherewithal and
considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will
ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it
was created to promote free and orderly honest elections.

- Atienza vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188920, February 16, 2010-
While the question of party leadership has implications on the
COMELECs performance of its functions under Section 2 of
Art. IX-C of the constitution, the same cannot be said of the
issue pertaining to Ateinza, et al.s expulsion from the LP. Such
expulsion is for the moment an issue of party membership and
discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot interfere, given the
limited scope of its power over political parties.

- Galang vs. Geronimo and Ramos, (GR No. 192793, February
22, 2011)- In election cases involving an act or omission of a
municipal or regional trial court, petition for certiorari shall be
filed exclusively with the COMELEC, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.

- Balajonda vs. COMELEC, GR No. 166032, February 28,
2005- Despite the silence of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
as to the procedure of the issuance of a writ of execution pending
appeal, there is no reason to dispute the COMELECs authority
to do so, considering that the suppletory application of the Rules
of Court is expressly authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that absent any
applicable provisions therein the pertinent provisions of the
Rules of Court shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory
character and effect.

- Codilla vs. De Venecia, et al., December 10, 2002- Section 3,
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC
6

en banc to review, on motion for reconsideration, decisions or
resolutions decided by a division. Since the petitioner
seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
of the Second Division suspending his proclamation and
disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested
of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of
the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division
was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely
filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution.
It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office
of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4
th

legislative district of Leyte.
- Sarmiento vs. COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307- The COMELEC
en banc does not have the authority to hear and decide cases at
the first instance. Under the COMELEC Rules, pre-proclamation
cases are classified as Special Cases and in compliance with the
provision of the Constitution, the two divisions of the
COMELEC are vested with the authority to hear and decide
these special cases.

- Santiago vs. COMELEC, March 19, 1997 - COMELEC
cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative.
It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on
the COMELECs power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of
the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations
referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC
under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a
law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which
satisfies the completeness and the sufficient standard tests.

- The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for
initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory
pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the
COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the
COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are
(1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue through its
Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total
number of registered voters in each legislative district; (3) to
assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of
signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its election
registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters,
6

voters affidavits, and voters identification cards used in the
immediately preceding election.

- Cayetano vs. COMELEC, January 23, 2006- The conduct of
plebiscite and determination of its result have always been the
business of the COMELEC and not the regular courts. Such a
case involves the appreciation of ballots which is best left to the
COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body exclusively
charged with the power of enforcement and administration of
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the COMELEC
has the indisputable expertise in the field of election and
related laws. Its acts, therefore, enjoy the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties.

- Alunan III vs. Mirasol, GR No. 108399, July 31, 1997
Contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall within
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.


- Loong vs. COMELEC, 305 SCRA 832- The COMELEC may
validly order a manual count notwithstanding the required
automated counting of ballots in R. A. 8436, the law authorizing
the commission to use an automated election system, if that is
the only way to count votes. It ought to be self-evident that the
Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the
result of an election.

- Limkaichong vs. COMELEC- Resolution No. 8062 is a valid
exercise of the COMELECs constitutionally mandated power to
promulgate its own rules of procedure relative to the conduct of
the elections. In adopting such policy-guidelines for the May
14, 2007 National and Local Elections, the COMELEC had in
mind the objective of upholding the sovereign will of the people
and in the interest of justice and fair play. Accordingly, those
candidates whose disqualification cases are still pending at the
time of the elections, should they obtain the highest number of
votes from the electorate, shall be proclaimed but that their
proclamation shall be without prejudice to the continuation of
the hearing and resolution of the involved cases.

- Fernandez vs. COMELEC, 556 SCRA 765- The 1987
constitution vests COMELEC appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving barangay officials decided by the trial courts
of limited jurisdiction.

6

- Cayetano vs. COMELEC, GR 193846, April 12, 2011- Final
orders of a COMELEC Division denying the affirmative
defenses of petitioner cannot be questioned before the Supreme
Court even via a petition for certiorari.


COMMISSION ON AUDIT

- COAS AUDITING POWER- Blue Bar Coconut Phils. vs.
Tantuico- Corporations covered by the COAs auditing powers
are not limited to GOCCs. Where a private corporation or entity
handles public funds, it falls under COA jurisdiction. Under Sec.
2(1), item, (d), non-governmental entities receiving subsidies or
equity directly or indirectly from or through the government are
required to submit to post audit.

- DBP vs. COA, January 16, 2002 -The mere fact that private
auditors may audit government agencies does not divest the
COA of its power to examine and audit the same government
agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even
with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual
examination and audit, and its findings and conclusions will still
bind government agencies and their officials. A concurrent
private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or
assets escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit. Manifestly,
the express language of the Constitution, and the clear intent of
its framers, point to only one indubitable conclusion - the COA
does not have the exclusive power to examine and audit
government agencies. The framers of the Constitution were
fully aware of the need to allow independent private audit of
certain government agencies in addition to the COA audit, as
when there is a private investment in a government-controlled
corporation, or when a government corporation is privatized or
publicly listed, or as in the case at bar when the government
borrows money from abroad.

- BSP vs. COA, January 22, 2006 - Retirement benefits accruing
to a public officer may not, without his consent, be withheld and
applied to his indebtedness to the government.

- MISON vs. COA, 187 SCRA 445, The chairman of COA,
acting by himself, has no authority to render or promulgate a
decision for the commission. The power to decide on issues
relating to audit and accounting is lodged in the COA acting as a
6

collegial body which has the jurisdiction to decide any case
brought before it.

- PHIL. OPERATIONS, INC. vs Auditor General, 94 Phil 868,
COAs power over the settlement of accounts is different
from power over unliquidated claims, the latter of which is
within the ambit of judicial power.

- Santiago vs. COA, 537 SCRA 740- The COA can direct the
proper officer to withhold a municipal treasurers salary and
other emoluments up to the amount of her alleged shortage but
no to apply the withheld amount to the alleged shortage for
which her liability is still being litigated.

- NHA vs. COA, 226 SCRA 55, COA can validly disallow the
approval of excess or unnecessary expenditures.


ARTICLE X
(LOCAL GOVERNMENTS)

- TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS-
Socrates vs. COMELEC, November 12, 2002, What the
Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth
term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution,
however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth
term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of
the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the
term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent
election but not an immediate re-election after the third
term.

- Aldovino, Jr. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 184836, December 23,
2009- The preventive suspension of public officials does not
interrupt their term for purposes the three-term limit rule under
the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Preventive
suspension, by its nature does not involve an effective
interruption of service within a term and should therefore not be
a reason to avoid the three-term limitation.

- The interruption of a term exempting an elective official from
the three-term limit is one that involves no less than involuntary
loss of the title to office. In all cases of preventive suspension,
the suspended official is barred from performing the functions of
his office and does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of
office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual
finding of guilt or liability.
6


- Bolos, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 581 SCRA 786, March 18, 2009-
Bolos was serving his third term as punong barangay when he
ran for Sangguniang Bayan member and upon winning, assumed
the position of SB member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his
office as punong barangay which the court deems as voluntary
renunciation of said office.


- Adormeo vs. COMELEC, February 4, 2002- The winner in
the recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full
term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness
of an elective officials terms in office. Thus, in a situation where
a candidate loses in an election to gain a third consecutive term
but later wins in the recall election, the recall term cannot be
stitched with his previous two consecutive terms. The period of
time prior to the recall term, when another elective official holds
office, constitutes an interruption in the continuity of service.

- Lonzanida vs COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602- Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three-term limit. Conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full
term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the
next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by
the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from
office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the
petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

- Borja vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157- For the three term-limit
rule to apply, the local official concerned must serve three
consecutive terms as a result of election. The term served must
be one for which he was elected. Thus, if he assumes a position
by virtue of succession, the official cannot be considered to have
fully served the term.

- Ong vs. Alegre, et al., June 23, 2006- assumption of office
constitutes, for Francis Ong, service for the full term, and
should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the
three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory
provisions, barring local elective officials from being elected and
serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same
position. His continuous exercise of the functions thereof from
start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service
6

for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule,
notwithstanding the subsequent nullification of his proclamation.
There was actually no interruption or break in the continuity of
Francis Ongs service respecting the 1998-2001 term.

- Navarro vs. Ermita, GR No. 180050, April 12, 2011 - The
land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared
VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating
the Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and
CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of
Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are
declared VALID.

- League of the Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC, GR
No. 176951, April 12, 2011- All the 16 cityhood laws, enacted
after the effectivity of RA 9009 increasing the income
requirement for cityhood from P20 million to P100 million in
sec. 450 of the , explicitly exempt the respondent municipalities
from the said increased income requirement. The respondent
LGUS had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009
and that the year before the amendatory RA 9009, respondent
LGUs had already met the income criterion exacted for cityhood
under the LGC of 1991.

- METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORTY- Its function is limited to the delivery of basic
services. RA 7924 does not grant the MMDA police power,
let alone legislative power. The MMDA is a development
authority. It is not a political unit of government. There is no
grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for
the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. It is
the local government units, acting through their respective
legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police
power. (MMDA vs. BelAir Village Association, 328 SCRA
836).

- Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is
understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the
MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers
licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, such is
an unauthorized exercise of police power. The MMDA was
intended to coordinate services with metro-wide impact that
transcend local political boundaries or would entail huge
expenditures if provided by the individual LGUs, especially with
regard to transport and traffic management, and we are aware of
6

the valiant efforts of the petitioner to untangle the increasingly
traffic-snarled roads of Metro Manila. But these laudable
intentions are limited by the MMDAs enabling law, which we
can but interpret, and petitioner must be reminded that its efforts
in this respect must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance,
or regulation arising from a legitimate source (MMDA vs.
Danilo Garin, April 15, 2005).

- MMDA vs. Trackworks, GR No. 179554, December 16, 2009-
MMDA has no authority to dismantle billboards and other forms
of advertisements posted on the structures of the Metro Rail
Transit 3 (MRT 3), the latter being a private property. MMDAs
powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting
of policies, installing a system and administration, and therefore,
it had no power to dismantle the billboards under the guise of
police and legislative power.

- MMDA vs. MenCorp Transport System, G.R. No. 170657,
August 15, 2007- In light of the administrative nature of its
powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to
implement the Project (Greater Manila Transport System) as
envisioned by E.O 179; hence, it could not have been validly
designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows
that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of
respondents terminals. Even the MMDAs claimed authority
under the police power must necessarily fail in consonance with
the above-quoted ruling in MMDA v. Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc. and this Courts subsequent ruling in
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin that the
MMDA is not vested with police power.


INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENT- IRAs- are items of
income because they form part of the gross accretion of the
funds of the local government unit Alvarez vs. Guingona, 252
SCRA 695).

- LGUS SHARE IN THE IRA SHALL BE
AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED WITHOUT ANY
CONDITION OF APPROVAL FROM ANY
GOVERNMENTAL BODY-Section 6, Art. X of the
1987constitution provides that LGUs shall have a just share, as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them. When passed, it would be readily
6

see that such provision mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a
just share in the national taxes; and (2) just share shall be
determined by law; (3) that just share shall be automatically
released to the LGUs. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS.
ROMULO, 429 SCRA 736, May 27, 2004.

- The legislative is barred from withholding the release of the
IRA. (ACORD vs. Zamora, June 8, 2005)

- AO No. 372 of President Ramos, Section 4 which provides that
pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development
Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation,
the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment
to local government units shall be withheld is declared in
contravention of Section 286 of the LG Code and Section 6 of
Art X of the constitution (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, July 19, 2000).

- LOCAL TAXATION Constitution itself promotes the
principles of local autonomy as embodied in the Local
Government Code. The State is mandated to ensure the
autonomy of local governments, and local governments are
empowered to levy taxes, fees and charges that accrue
exclusively to them, subject to congressional guidelines and
limitations. The principle of local autonomy is no mere passing
dalliance but a constitutionally enshrined precept that deserves
respect and appropriate enforcement by this Court. The GSISs
tax-exempt status, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the Local
Government Code but restored by the Government Service
Insurance System Act of 1997, the operative provision of
which is Section 39. The subject real property taxes for the years
1992 to 1994 were assessed against GSIS while the Local
Government Code provisions prevailed and, thus, may be
collected by the City of Davao. (City of Davao vs. RTC, Br. 12,
August 18, 2005).

- G.R. No. 165827, National Power Corporation vs. Province of
Isabela, represented by Hon. Benjamin G. Dy, Provincial
Governor, June 16, 2006)- the NAPOCOR is not exempt from
paying franchise tax. Though its charter exempted it from the
tax, the enactment of the Local Government Code (LGC) has
withdraw such exemption, the Court said, citing its previous
ruling in National Power Corporation vs. City of Cabanatuan.

- MCCIA vs. Marcos, September 11, 1996- The power to tax is
primarily vested in the Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it
6

may be exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer merely
by virtue of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct
authority conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution.
An agency of the Government refers to any of the various
units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office,
instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation,
or a local government or a distinct unit therein;

while an
instrumentality refers to any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed
with some if not all corporate powers, administering special
funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions and government-owned and controlled
corporations. It had already become, even if it be conceded to
be an agency or instrumentality of the Government, a taxable
person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last
paragraph of Section 234 of exemptions from the payment of
real property taxes, which, as earlier adverted to, applies to
MCIAA.

- PPA vs. Iloilo City, November 11, 2004- The bare fact that the
port and its facilities and appurtenances are accessible to the
general public does not exempt it from the payment of real
property taxes. It must be stressed that the said port facilities and
appurtenances are the petitioners corporate patrimonial
properties, not for public use, and that the operation of the port
and its facilities and the administration of its buildings are in the
nature of ordinary business.

- MIAA vs. CA, et al., July 20, 2006- MIAAs Airport Lands and
Buildings are exempt from real estate tax imposed by local
governments. MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government
and thus exempt from local taxation. Second, the real properties
of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and
thus exempt from real estate tax. The Airport Lands and
Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and
therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the
Philippines. The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to
public use because they are used by the public for
international and domestic travel and transportation. The
Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are devoted to public use
6

and thus are properties of public dominion. As properties of
public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are
outside the commerce of man. Real Property Owned by the
Republic is Not Taxable.

- When local governments invoke the power to tax on national
government instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly
against local governments. The rule is that a tax is never
presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing
the tax. Any doubt whether a person, article or activity is
taxable is resolved against taxation. This rule applies with
greater force when local governments seek to tax national
government instrumentalities.

- Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed against
the taxpayer claiming the exemption. However, when
Congress grants an exemption to a national government
instrumentality from local taxation, such exemption is
construed liberally in favor of the national government
instrumentality.

- PRESIDENTS SUPERVISION- National Liga vs. Paredes,
September 27, 2004- Like the local government units, the Liga
ng mga Barangay is not subject to control by the Chief
Executive or his alter ego.

- The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a
local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted
contrary to law. This is the scope of the Presidents supervisory
powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any
of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as
the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters
of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the
President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the
wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local
government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the
principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the
executive and legislative departments in governing municipal
corporations. (Dadole vs. COA, December 3, 2002).

- Leynes vs. COA, 418 SCRA 180- By upholding the power of
LGUs to grant allowances to judges and leaving to their
discretion the amount of allowances they may want to grant,
6

depending on the availability of local funds, the genuine and
meaningful local autonomy is ensured.

- Batangas CATV Inc. vs. CA, 439 SCRA 326- In the absence of
constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities have no
power to grant franchises.






ARTICLE XI
(ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS)


- IMPEACHMENT- Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001Section
3(7) of Article XI provides for the limit and the consequence of
an impeachment judgment. Conviction in the impeachment
proceeding is not required before the public officer subject
of impeachment may be prosecuted, tried and punished for
criminal offenses committed.

- READ: Francisco, et al. vs. House of Representatives,
November 10, 2003- definition of TO INITIATE
IMPEACHMENT- proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on
Justice.

- Gutierrez vs. The House of Representatives Committee on
Justice, GR No. 193459, February 15, 2011- The proceeding is
initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and
referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the
initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.

- A vote of 1/3 of all the members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles
of Impeachment of the Committee or override its contrary
resolution, De Castro vs. Committee on Justice, Batasan
Pambansa, September 3, 1995.

- Resignation by an impeachable official does not place him
beyond the reach of impeachment proceedings; he can still be
impeached.

- Salumbides vs. Ombudsman, GR No. 180917, April 23, 2010-
The doctrine of condonation cannot be extended to reappointed
6

coterminous employees like petitioners as in their case, there is
neither subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement
of the electorate. The unwarranted expansion of the Pascual
doctrine would set a dangerous precedent as it would, as
respondents posit, provide civil servants, particularly local
government, with blanket immunity from administrative liability
that would spawn and breed abuse of bureaucracy.

- The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the
opinions of constitutional law experts all indicate that the
Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. (Office
of the Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals and former Deputy
Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica, March 4, 2005).

- Marquez vs. Desierto, June 27, 2001- there must be a pending
case before a court of competent jurisdiction before inspection of
bank accounts by Ombudsman may be allowed.

- OMBS POWER TO PROSECUTE, Uy vs. Sandiganbayan,
March 20, 2001- The power to prosecute granted by law to the
Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. The law does not make
a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
and those cognizable by regular courts.

- Ombudsman vs. Valera, September 30, 2005- The Court has
consistently held that the Office of the Special Prosecutor is
merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may
only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of
the Ombudsman. xxx However, with respect to the grant of the
power to preventively suspend, Section 24 of R.A. No 6770
makes no mention of the Special Prosecutor. The obvious
import of this exclusion is to withhold from the Special
Prosecutor the power to preventively suspend.

- Honasan II vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ,
April 13, 2004- The power of the Ombudsman to investigate
offenses involving public officers or employees is not
exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized
agencies of the government such as the provincial, city and
state prosecutors. DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting
any investigation of cases against public officers involving
violations of penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman
may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any
stage.

6

- Ledesma vs. CA, July 29, 2005 - Ombudsman has the
authority to determine the administrative liability of a public
official or employee at fault, and direct and compel the head
of the office or agency concerned to implement the penalty
imposed. In other words, it merely concerns the procedural
aspect of the Ombudsmans functions and not its jurisdiction.

- Office of the Ombudsman vs. CA, et al.,GR No. 160675, June
16, 2006- the Court similarly upholds the Office of the
Ombudsmans power to impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public
officer or employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its
administrative disciplinary authority. The exercise of such
power is well founded in the Constitution and Republic Act No.
6770. xxx The legislative history of Republic Act No. 6770 thus
bears out the conclusion that the Office of the Ombudsman was
intended to possess full administrative disciplinary authority,
including the power to impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a
public officer or employee found to be at fault. The
lawmakers envisioned the Office of the Ombudsman to be an
activist watchman, not merely a passive one.

- Facura vs. CA, et al., GR No. 166495, February 16, 2011-
Appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases do not stay the execution of the penalty imposed.

- Ombudsman vs. CA, et al., GR No. 1772224, January 26,
2011- The decision of the Ombudsman in administrative cases
may be executed pending appeal. This is pursuant to the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman which explicitly
states that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being
executory. Also, the power of the Ombudsman to implement
the penalty is not merely recommendatory but mandatory.

- Masing, et al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No.
165584, January 22, 2008 Supreme Court reiterated this
ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, where we
emphasized that the Ombudsmans order to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not
merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually
mandatory. Implementation of the order imposing the penalty
is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.
6


- Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administrative
investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall
be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with
due process. It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to
contend that R.A. No. 4670 confers an exclusive disciplinary
authority on the DECS over public school teachers and
prescribes an exclusive procedure in administrative
investigations involving them. R.A. No. 4670 was approved on
June 18, 1966. On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution was
ratified by the people in a plebiscite in 1987 while R.A. No.
6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989. It is basic that the
1987 Constitution should not be restricted in its meaning by a
law of earlier enactment. The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No.
6770 were quite explicit in conferring authority on the
Ombudsman to act on complaints against all public officials and
employees, with the exception of officials who may be removed
only by impeachment or over members of Congress and the
Judiciary.


- QUIMPO vs. TANODBAYAN- It is not material that a
GOCC is originally created by charter or not. What is
decisive is that it has been acquired by the government to
perform functions related to government programs and
policies.

- JURISDICTION OVER GOCC- Macalino vs.
Sandiganbayan, 376 SCRA 452- Section 13, Article XI of the
Constitution and Section 15 of RA 6770 granted the
Ombudsman the power to direct any officer or employee of
government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters to perform any act or duty required by law or to stop
any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.

- PRESCRIPTION- Presidential Ad-hoc Fact-finding
Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto , 317 SCRA 272-
Section 15 of Article XI applies only to civil actions for recovery
of ill-gotten wealth and not to criminal cases.


ARTICLE XII
(NATIONAL ECONOMY & PATRIMONY)
1.
- ANCESTRAL DOMAIN- Alcantara vs. DENR, GR No.
161881, July 31, 2008- It must be emphasized that FLGLA
No. 542 is a mere license or privilege granted by the State to
6

petitioner for the use or exploitation of natural resources and
public lands over which the State has sovereign ownership under
the Regalian Doctrine. Like timber or mining licenses, a forest
land grazing lease agreement is a mere permit which, by
executive action, can be revoked, rescinded, cancelled, amended
or modified, whenever public welfare or public interest so
requires. The determination of what is in the public interest is
necessarily vested in the State as owner of the country's natural
resources. Thus, a privilege or license is not in the nature of a
contract that enjoys protection under the due process and non-
impairment clauses of the Constitution. In cases in which the
license or privilege is in conflict with the people's welfare, the
license or privilege must yield to the supremacy of the latter, as
well as to the police power of the State. Such a privilege or
license is not even a property or property right, nor does it
create a vested right; as such, no irrevocable rights are
created in its issuance. xxx

- The Supreme Court recognized the inherent right of ICCs/IPs
to recover their ancestral land from outsiders and usurpers.
Seen by many as a victory attained by the private respondents
only after a long and costly effort, the Court, as a guardian and
instrument of social justice, abhors a further delay in the
resolution of this controversy and brings it to its fitting
conclusion by denying the petition.

- CRUZ VS. SEC. OF DENR, 347 SCRA 128- RA 8371
categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by
native title as never to have been public land. Domains and lands
under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have
never been public lands and are private. The right of
ownership granted to indigenous peoples over their ancestral
domains does not cover the natural resources. The right granted
to IP to negotiate the terms and conditions over the natural
resources covers only their exploration to ensure ecological and
environmental protection.

- Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 US 449 recognized the
existence of a native title to land by Filipinos by virtue of
possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial as
an exception to the theory of jus regalia.

- Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002- Foreshore
and submerged areas form part of the public domain and are
inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged
6

areas are also form part of the public domain and are also
inalienable, unless converted into alienable or disposable lands
of the public domain.

- The prevailing rule is that reclaimed disposable lands of the
public domain may only be leased and not sold to private
parties. These lands remained sui generis, as the only
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain which the
government could not sell to private parties except if the
legislature passes a law authorizing such sale. Reclaimed
lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or
public service. xxx The ownership of lands reclaimed from
foreshore areas is rooted in the Regalian Doctrine, which
declares that all lands and waters of the public domain belong to
the State

- But notwithstanding the conversion of reclaimed lands to
alienable lands of the public domain, they may not be sold to
private corporations which can only lease the same. The State
may only sell alienable public land to Filipino citizens.

- Chavez vs. PEA & Amari, May 6, 2003- Decision does not bar
private corporations from participating in reclamation projects
and being paid for their services in reclaiming lands. What the
Decision prohibits, following the explicit constitutional mandate,
is for private corporations to acquire reclaimed lands of the
public domain. There is no prohibition on the directors,
officers and stockholders of private corporations, if they are
Filipino citizens, from acquiring at public auction reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain. They can acquire not
more than 12 hectares per individual, and the land thus acquired
becomes private land.

- Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the public domain.
Government owned lands, as long they are patrimonial property,
can be sold to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or
qualified private corporations. Thus, the so-called Friar Lands
acquired by the government under Act No. 1120 are patrimonial
property which even private corporations can acquire by
purchase. Likewise, reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain if sold or transferred to a public or municipal corporation
for a monetary consideration become patrimonial property in the
hands of the public or municipal corporation. Once converted to
patrimonial property, the land may be sold by the public or
municipal corporation to private parties, whether Filipino
citizens or qualified private corporations.
6


- Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philipipnes,
GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009)- public domain lands become
patrimonial property or private property of the government only
upon a declaration that these are alienable or disposable lands,
together with an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public
service or the development of national wealth. Only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for
the acquisition of property of the public domain begin to run.

- in connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration
Decree, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes that
those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12,
1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title, to such
lands based on the length and quality of their possession. The
Court clarified that the Public Land Act merely requires
possession since June 12, 1945 and does not require that the
lands should have been alienable and disposable during the
entire period of possession. The possessor is thus entitled to
secure judicial confirmation of title as soon as the land it covers
is declared alienable and disposable. This is, however, subject to
the December 31, 2020 deadline imposed by the Public Land
Act, as amended by R.A. 9176.

- DENR vs. Yap, GR No. 167707, Sacay vs. DENR, GR No.
17775, October 8, 2008- Boracay Island is owned by the State
except for the lot areas with existing titles. The continued
possession and considerable investment of private claimants do
not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do
these give them a right to apply a title to the land they are
presently occupying. The present land law traces its roots to the
Regalian Doctrine.

- Except for lands already covered by existing titles, the Supreme
Court said that Boracay was unclassified land of the public
domain prior to Proc. 1064 (which classified Boracay as 400
hecs of reserved forest land and 628.96 hecs. of agricultural
land). Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under
PD No. 705. Forest lands do not necessarily refer to large tracts
of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees
and underbrushes.

6

- Laureano V. Hermoso, et al. vs. Francia, et al., GR No.
16678, April 24, 2009 The classification of lands of the public
domain is of two types, i.e., primary classification and secondary
classification. The primary classification comprises agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. The
agricultural lands of the public domain may further be classified
by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. This
further classification of agricultural lands is referred to as
secondary classification. Congress, under existing laws, granted
authority to a number of government agencies to effect the
secondary classification of agricultural lands to residential,
commercial or industrial or other urban uses.


- Borromeo v. Descallar, GR No. 159310, February 24, 2009-
While the acquisition and the purchase of real properties in the
country by a foreigner is void ab initio for being contrary to the
Constitution, the subsequent acquisition of the said properties
from the foreigner by a Filipino citizen has cured the flaw in the
original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.

- Chavez vs. NHA, et al., August 15, 2007- To lands reclaimed
by PEA or through a contract with a private person or entity,
such reclaimed lands still remain alienable lands of public
domain which can be transferred only to Filipino citizens but not
to a private corporation. This is because PEA under PD 1084
and EO 525 is tasked to hold and dispose of alienable lands of
public domain and it is only when it is transferred to Filipino
citizens that it becomes patrimonial property. On the other hand,
the NHA is a government agency not tasked to dispose of
public lands under its charterThe Revised Administrative
Code of 1987. The NHA is an end-user agency authorized
by law to administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. The
moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the special
patents are transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds,
they are automatically converted to patrimonial properties
of the State which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private
corporations, 60% of which are owned by Filipinos. The
reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted to
patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then it would be
useless to transfer it to the NHA since it cannot legally transfer
or alienate lands of public domain. More importantly, it cannot
attain its avowed purposes and goals since it can only transfer
patrimonial lands to qualified beneficiaries and prospective
6

buyers to raise funds for the SMDRP. From the foregoing
considerations, we find that the 79-hectare reclaimed land has
been declared alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; and in the hands of NHA, it has been reclassified as
patrimonial property.

- Republic vs. Tri-plus Corp., September 26, 2006- Section 6 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides that the
classification and reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the
prerogative of the Executive Department. Under the Regalian
doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any
asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing
to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated
to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable
public domain.

- JG Summit Holdings Inc. vs. CA, January 31, 2005- the
prohibition in the Constitution applies only to ownership of
land. It does not extend to immovable or real property as
defined under Article 415 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, we
would have a strange situation where the ownership of
immovable property such as trees, plants and growing fruit
attached to the land would be limited to Filipinos and Filipino
corporations only.

- Ramos-Bulalio vs. Ramos, January 23, 2006- Under the
Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State and those lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Lands of the
public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks. Alienable lands of the
public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. A
homestead patent, such as the subject of the instant case, is one
of the modes to acquire title to public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes.

- La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Ass., Inc. vs. Ramos, December 1,
2004 Foreign corporations are confined to technical and
financial assistance. The State itself may explore, develop or
utilize the countrys natural resources by entering into the
necessary agreements with individuals or entities in the pursuit
6

of visible operations. Service contracts with foreign corporations
as contractors who invest in and operate and manage extractive
enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the
State. Control by the state must be on the macro level,
through the establishment of policies, guidelines, regulations,
industry standards and similar measures that would enable
the government to control the conduct of the affairs in
various enterprises and restrain activities deemed not
desirable or beneficial.

- GR No. 157882, Didipio Earth-Savers Multi-Purpose
Association, Incorporated, et al. v. DENR Sec. Gozun, et al.,
March 30, 2006- the Constitution expressly allows service
contracts in the large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and mineral oils via
agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance as provided by law. The Court
said that these agreements with foreign corporations are not
limited to mere financial or technical assistance. The 1987
Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts
with foreign corporations as contractors who would invest in
and operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to
the full control and supervision of the State.

- GR Nos. 152613 & 152628, Apex Mining Co., Inc. v.
Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al.; GR No.
152619-20, Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative v.
Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al.; and GR No.
152870-71, The Mines Adjudication Board and its Members,
et al. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al., J une
23, 2006- Mining operations in the Diwalwal Mineral
Reservation Area lies within the full control of the executive
branch of the state. xxx Mining operations in the Diwalwal
Mineral Reservation are now, therefore, within the full control of
the State through the executive branch. Pursuant to sec. 5 of RA
7942, the State can either directly undertake the exploration,
development, and utilization of the area or it can enter into
agreement with qualified entities.

- Republic vs. Rosemoor Mining & Development Corp., 426
SCRA 517 Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 constitution does
not apply retroactively to a license, concession or lease
granted by the government under the 1973 constitution or
before the effectivity of the 1987 constitution.

6

- Zarate vs. Director of Lands, 434 SCRA 322- It is the rule of
law that possession, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership.

- PUBLIC UTILITIES- Republic vs. EXTELCOM, 373 SCRA
316 The operation of public utility shall not be exclusive.

- Ridjo Doctrine- (MERALCO vs. Wilcon Builders Supply
Inc., 556 SCRA 742)- doctrine states that the public utility has
the imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection
of its apparatus and equipment to ensure they do not
malfunction.

- FRANCHISE - PLDT vs. Bacolod City, July 15, 2005 - In
sum, it does not appear that, in approving 23 of R.A. No. 7925,
Congress intended it to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all
telecommunications entities. Applying the rule of strict
construction of laws granting tax exemptions and the rule that
doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal corporations in
interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, we
hold that 23 of R.A. No. 7925 cannot be considered as having
amended petitioner's franchise so as to entitle it to exemption
from the imposition of local franchise taxes.

- Divinagracia v. CBS, GR No. 162272, April &, 2009-The
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) is not
authorized to cancel the certificates of public convenience
(CPCs) and other licenses it had issued to the holders of duly
issued legislative franchises on the ground that the latter had
violated the terms of their franchise. As legislative franchises are
extended through statutes, they should receive recognition as the
ultimate expression of State policy.

- City Government of San Pablo vs. Reyes, 305 SCRA 353-
Under the Constitution, no franchise shall be granted under the
condition that it shall be subject to amendment or repeal when
the public interest so requires. Franchises are also subject to
alteration by the power to tax, which cannot be contracted
away.

- Pilipino Telephone Corp. vs. NTC, 410 SCRA 82 The
constitution is emphatic that the operation of public utility shall
not be exclusive.

- Eastern Assurance & Surety Corp. vs. LTFRB, October 7,
2003 - The constitution does not totally prohibit monopolies. It
6

mandates the State to regulate them when public interest so
requires.


ARTICLE XIII
(SOCIAL JUSTICE & HUMAN RIGHTS)


- SOCIAL JUSTICE- while the pursuit of social justice can have
revolutionary effect, it cannot justify breaking the law.
(Astudillo v. Board of Directors, PHHC, 73 SCRA 15).

- HUMAN RIGHTS- read EPZA VS, HR, 208 SCRA; Simon vs.
Com. on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 1170- limited to violations
of civil and political rights only either by government official
or private individual.

- Human Security Act- granting adjudicatory and prosecutorial
powers to the CHR re violations of human rights.- refer to
Section 5- perform such other functions and duties as may be
provided by law.

- CHREA vs. CHR, November 25, 2004- The CHR, although
admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included
in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by
constitutional or legislative fiat.

- People vs. Leachon, 1998- The constitutional requirement that
the eviction and demolition be in accordance with law and
conducted in a just and humane manner does not mean validity
or legality of the demolition or eviction is hinged on the
existence of resettlement area designated or earmarked by the
government.

ARTICLE XIV
(ESTACS)

- Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita, GR
No. 180046, April 2, 2009- A review center is not an institution
of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722[i]t does not
offer a degree-granting program that would put it under the
jurisdiction of the CHED. Moreover, [a] review course is only
intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies
and skills of reviewees, and it does not require enrollment,
attendance, a grade or submission of a thesis in order to
6

complete the review center course requirements or take the
licensure examination.

- ACADEMIC FREEDOM- from standpoint of the educational
institution and the members of the academe. The Supreme Court
sustained the primacy of academic freedom over Civil service
rules on AWOL, stressing when UP opted to retain private
petitioner and even promoted him despite his absence, the
University was exercising its freedom to choose who may teach
or who may continue to teach its faculty (UP, et al. vs. CSC,
April 3, 2001).

- Letter of the UP LAW: AM 10-10-4 SC; March 8, 2011- The
Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondnets
academic freedom as it does not dictat upon the law professors
the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their
instruction. They are free to determine what they will teach their
students and how they will teach. Moreover, it is not inconsistent
with the principle of academic freedom for the Supreme Court to
subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for
contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue
intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without
observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their
capacity as teachers. The right to freedom expression of
members of the BAR may be circumscribed by their ethical
duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold
the publics faith in the legal profession and the justice system.


- Morales vs. UP Board of Regents, December 13, 2004- As
enunciated by this Court in the case of University of San Carlos
v. Court of Appeals, the discretion of schools of learning to
formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for
purposes of graduation forms part of academic freedom. And
such discretion may not be disturbed much less controlled by the
courts, unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise.
Therefore, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, the
courts may not disturb the Universitys decision not to confer
honors to petitioner.

- Lacuesta vs. Ateneo, December 9, 2005- Consistent with
academic freedom and constitutional autonomy, an institution of
higher learning has the prerogative to provide standards for its
teachers and determine whether these standards have been met.
At the end of the probation period, the decision to re-hire an
6

employee on probation, belongs to the university as the
employer alone.

- UP vs. CSC, April 3, 2001- the University has the academic
freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may
be admitted to study. Clearly, this freedom encompasses the
autonomy to choose who should teach and, concomitant
therewith, who should be retained in its rolls of professors and
other academic personnel. This Court declared in Ateneo de
Manila University v. Capulong: As corporate entities,
educational institutions of higher learning are inherently
endowed with the right to establish their policies, academic and
otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure.

- De LaSalle University vs. CA, December 19, 2007- Section
5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of
higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic
freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for
itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free
from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the
overriding public interest calls for some restraint. According to
present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the
independence of an academic institution to determine for
itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it
shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.

- It cannot be gainsaid that the school has an interest in teaching
the student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in
any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches
discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student
likewise finds basis in the freedom what to teach. Indeed,
while it is categorically stated under the Education Act of
1982 that students have a right to freely choose their field of
study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their
course therein up to graduation, such right is subject to the
established academic and disciplinary standards laid down
by the academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can
very well exercise its academic freedom, which includes its free
choice of students for admission to its school.


6

ARTICLE XVI
(GENERAL PROVISIONS)


- IMMUNITY OF THE STATE FROM SUIT (Read general
principles; Phil Agila Satellite, Inc. vs. Lichauco, May 3,
2006)- The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the
performance of official functions against an officer of the
government by a private citizen which would result in a charge
against or financial liability to the government must be regarded
as a suit against the State itself, although it has not been formally
impleaded. However, government immunity from suit will not
shield the public official being sued if the government no longer
has an interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the
liability of the officer is personal because it arises from a tortious
act in the performance of his/her duties.

- COA vs. Link Worth Intl. Inc., GR No. 182559, March 13,
2009- The COA is an unincorporated government agency which
does not enjoy a separate juridical personality of its own, Hence,
even in the exercise of proprietary functions incidental to its
primarily governmental functions, COA cannot be sued without
its consent.

- Professional Video, Inc., vs. TESDA, GR No. 155504, June
26, 2009- Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary
contract with PROVI and thereby gave its implied consent to be
sued, TESDAs funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot
be the valid subject of a writ of garnishment or attachment.

- GTZ v. CA, GR No. 152318, April 16, 2009- German Agency
for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), which implements a joint
health insurance project of the German and Philippine
governments, is not entitled to immunity from suit in the
Philippines as GTZ, being the equivalent of a government-
owned-and-controlled corporation, has the power and capacity to
sue and be sued under the Corporation Code. GTZ is akin to a
governmental owned or controlled corporation without original
charter which, by virtue of the Corporation Code, has expressly
consented to be sued,

- PCCG vs. Sandiganbayan, March 6, 2006- When the
government itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No. 0034.
Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the
main case, immunity from suit cannot be effectively invoked.
6

For, as jurisprudence teaches, when the State, through its duly
authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a
private party, it thereby descends to the level of a private
individual and thus opens itself to whatever counterclaims or
defenses the latter may have against it. Petitioner Republics act
of filing its complaint in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a
waiver of its immunity from suit. Being itself the plaintiff in
that case, petitioner Republic cannot set up its immunity against
private respondent Benedictos prayers in the same case.

- NATIONAL POLICE FORCE- Under the DILG (Carpio vs.
Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290). Alunan vs. Asuncion,
January 28, 2000, the new PNP absorbed the members of the
former NAPOLCOM, PC and INP, all three of which
accordingly abolished.

- Note: Professionalism of the AFP- cannot engage, directly or
indirectly, in any partisan political activity, except to vote. They
cannot be appointed to a civilian position in the government,
including GOCCs or their subsidiaries.

- IBP vs. Zamora- Since none of the marines were incorporated or
enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to
a civilian position to speak of.

- OPERATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES- 60% Filipino
ownership.

- MASS MEDIA- 100% Filipino ownership

- ADVERSTISING INDUSTRY 70%

- EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION- 60 % EXCEPT: Schools
established by religious groups and mission boards.


ARTICLE XVII
(AMENDMENTS)


- The Province of North Cotabato v. Republic, GR Nos.
183591, 183572, 183893, and 183951, October 14, 2008- The
Court noted that inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD
establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the
Central Government is itself a violation of the Memorandum of
6

Instructions from the President dated March 1, 2001, addressed
to the government peace panel. Moreover, it virtually
guarantees that the necessary amendments to the
Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place.
Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is
authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act
would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent
powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional
Convention, or the people themselves through the process of
initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the
outcome of the amendment process is through an undue
influence or interference with that process.

- IMBONG VS. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28- Congress when
acting as a Constituent Assembly has full and plenary powers to
propose amendments or to call a convention. The grant to
Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority
includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication, all
powers necessary to the effective exercise of principal power
granted, such as the power to fix qualifications, apportionment,
etc..

- SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106- RA 6735 is
insufficient in providing for mechanism to govern initiatives for
constitutional amendments. While the Constitution recognizes
the right of citizens to propose amendments, the people cannot
exercise such until Congress provides for its implementation.

- LAMBINO VS., ET AL. VS. COMELEC, October 25, 2006 -
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the draft
of the proposed constitutional amendment should be ready
and shown to the people before they sign such proposal. The
framers plainly stated that before they sign there is already a
draft shown to them. The framers also envisioned that the
people should sign on the proposal itself because the
proponents must prepare that proposal and pass it around
for signature. The essence of amendments directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This
means two essential elements must be present. First, the people
must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative
upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
6


- DOCTRINE OF PROPER SUBMISSION- GONZALES VS.
COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774- The power to amend the
Constitution or to propose amendments is not included in the
general grant of legislative power to Congress. It is part of the
inherent powers of the people as the repository of sovereignty in
a republican state. Congress may propose amendments to the
Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such
power. Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators
and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as
members of Congress, but as component elements of a
Constituent Assembly.

- When Congress, acting as Constituent Assembly, makes
proposals for amendments, it does not have the final say on
whether or not its acts are within constitutional limits- an issue
which is clearly subject to judicial review.

- There is nothing to indicate that a special election is all times
necessary in the ratification of amendments. A plebiscite may be
validly held together with general elections.

- TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702- There can be
no piece meal ratification.

- Presidential proclamation is not required for effectivity of
amendment/revisions. UNLESS, the proposed
amendments/revisions so provide.


ARTICLE XVIII
(TRANSITORY PROVISIONS)


- LIM VS. EXEC SEC., April11, 2002- Section 25 of the
Transitory Provisions show a marked antipathy towards foreign
military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in
general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the
Philippines only be way of direct exception.

- Under the Constitution, the US forces are prohibited from
engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory. The
Supreme Court, however, cannot accept the bare allegations that
the Arroyo administration is engaged in double speak in trying to
pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive effort by foreign
troops on native soil.

6

- Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA
449-the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has
been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and
certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States
government. The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and
consent of the United States Senate does not detract from its status as
a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said
State. For this is a matter of internal United States law. Notice can be
taken of the internationally known practice by the United States of
submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements that are
policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry out or further
implement these policymaking agreements are merely submitted to
Congress, under the provisions of the so-called CaseZablocki Act,
within sixty days from ratification. The second reason has to do with
the relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty
of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly
ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the
United States Senate.

- AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN), et al.,
Petitioners - versus - THOMAS G. AQUINO, et al., No. 170516,
July 16, 2008- While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate
concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under
consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its
conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole that has
been given the authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-
making power of the President, but only the Senate.

- Nicolas vs. Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 175888; Salonga vs. Smith, et
al. G.R. No. 176051; and Makabayan vs. Arroyo, et al., G.R.
No. 176222- February 11, 2009
-
The Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States,
entered into on February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as constitutional,
but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006
are DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA, and respondent
Secretary of Foreign Affairs is hereby ordered to forthwith negotiate
with the United States representatives for the appropriate agreement
on detention facilities under Philippine authorities as provided in Art.
V, Sec. 10 of the VFA, pending which the status quo shall be
maintained until further orders by this Court.

ARTICLE III
(BILL OF RIGHTS)

Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., GR No. 156052, February 13,
2008- Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property.
They allege that they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced [to] relocate.
6

However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the
right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is
obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or [local
government unit] LGUs exercise of police power clashes with a few
individuals right to property, the former should prevail,.

- Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. DSWD,et al., GR No. 166494, June
29, 2007 (Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003)- When conditions
so demand, as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow
to the primacy of police power because property rights, though
sheltered by due process clause, must yield to the general welfare.

- Yrasuegi vs. PAL, Inc., 565 SCRA 467- In the absence of
governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the constitution
cannot be invoked. The Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked
against acts of private individuals.

- Procedural Due Process- Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca
Serano vs NLRC, 323 SCRA 445- Due process clause of the
constitution is a limitation on government powers. It does not apply
to the exercise of private power, such as the termination of
employment under the Labor Code.

- Chavez vs. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534- The license to carry firearm is
neither a property nor a property right. Neither does it create a vested
right. A permit to carry a firearm outside of ones residence maybe
revoked at anytime.

- MMDA vs. Garin, GR No. 130230, April 15, 2005- A license to
operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted
by the State, which may be suspended or revoked by the State in the
exercise of police power.

- Mercury Drug Corp. vs. Serrano, March 10, 2006- In dismissing
an employee, the employer must serve the employee two notices: (1)
the first to inform the employee of the particular acts or omissions for
which the employer seeks his dismissal, and (2) the second to inform
the employee of his employers decision to terminate him. The first
notice must state that the employer seeks dismissal for the act or
omission charged against the employee, otherwise, the notice does not
comply with the rules.

- Macias vs. Macias, September 3, 2003- Denial of due process
suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of the
government the impress of nullity.

6

- Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001- Alleged violations of the right
to impartiality due to adverse publicity must be substantiated by proof
of actual prejudice.

- Alauya vs. COMELEC, 395 SCRA 742- due process is satisfied
even if there was no oral argument if a party was able to file
pleadings.

- INSTANCES WHEN HEARINGS ARE NOT NECESSARY:

1. When administrative agencies are exercising their quasi-
legislative functions;
2. Abatement of nuisance per se;
3. Granting by courts of provisional remedies;
4. Preventive suspension; (Co. Vs. Barbers)
5. Removal of temporary employees in the government service;
6. Issuance of warrants of distraint and/or levy by the BIR
Commissioner;
7. Cancellation of passport of a person charged with a crime;
8. Issuance of sequestration orders
9. Judicial order which prevents an accused from traveling
abroad
10. Suspension of banks operations by the Monetary Board upon
a prima facie finding of liquidity problems in such bank.
11. Extradition proceedings ([evaluation stage]- Sec of Justice vs.
Lantion; Cuevas vs. Munoz, 2000)
12. Reinvestigation (criminal cases)

Ang Tibay vs. CIR, Administrative Due Process

Equal Protection of the Law


- Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008
Election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal
law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement.

- People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Election to the position of a
Congressman is not reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement.


6

- USA vs. Puruganan, September 3, 2002- The position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same
class.

- Farias vs. Executive Secretary, 417 SCRA 503, December 10,
2003, Substantive distinctions exist between elective officials
and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue
of the mandate of the people while the latter hold their office by
virtue of their designation by an appointing authority.

- PAGCOR vs. BIR, GR No. 172087, March 15, 2011-
PAGCOR cannot find support in the equal protection clause of
the constitution. It was granted a franchise , subject to
amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress.


Section 2- Unreasonable searches & seizures

- The right to security of a person- (Secretary of National
Defense vs. Manalo, GR No. 180908, October 7, 2008)-is a
gurarantee of protection of ones rights by the government. In the
context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the
guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Art. III, Sec. 1 of
the 1987 constitution and the right to security of person (as
freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity) under Art. III, Sec. 2.


- PROBABLE CAUSE- Read: Stone Hill vs. Diokno; Lim vs.
Felix; Webb vs. de Leon; Roan vs. Gonzales; Papa vs. Mago;
Aniag vs. COMELEC.

- Del Rosario vs. People, May 31, 2001- Seizure of evidence in
plain view is justified only when:
1. there is prior valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless
arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties;
2. the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who
had the right to be there where they are;
3. the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
4. plain view justified the seizure without further search
conducted.
6


- Manalili vs. CA, 280 SCRA 400- The following are valid
warrantless searches and seizures:

1. Search incidental to lawful arrest (PP vs. Tiu Won Chua, 405
SCRA 280; PP vs. Estella, 395 SCRA 553);
2. search of a moving vehicle (PP vs. Tampis, 407 SCRA 582);
3. seizure in plain view (PP vs. Go, 411 SCRA 81, The
counterfeit nature of the seals and stamps was not apparent
and established until after they have been turned over to the
Chinese embassy and the Bureau of Immigration for
verification. Hence, not considered as evidence in plain view);
4. customs search (Salvador vs. PP, July 15, 2005);
5. waiver by the accused( 1. right to be waived exists; 2. person
waiving has knowledge of such right, actually or
constructively; and 3. he/she has actual intention to relinquish
the right.) Silahis Intl Hotel vs. Soluta, Feb. 20, 2006;
Valdez vs. People, 538 SCRA 611)- It is the State which has
the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that
the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and
voluntarily given.
6. stop & frisk (limited protective search); Terry Search
(Terry vs, Ohio, 1968; Malacat vs CA, Dec. 1, 1997) it is a
stop of a person by law enforcement officer based upon
reasonable suspicion that a person may have been engaged
in criminal activity, whereas an arrest requires probable
cause that a suspect committed a criminal offense.
7. Armed conflict (war time)
8. Check points (limited to visual search; PP vs. Escao, GR No.
129756-58, January 28, 2000);
9. Exigent and emergency circumstances (PP vs. De Gracia,
233 SCRA 716), where a warrantless search was allowed
where there was a prevailing general chaos and disorder
because of an ongoing coup;
10. Conduct of Area Target Zone and Saturation Drives in the
exercise of military powers of the President (Guanzon vs.
Villa, 181 SCRA 623);
11. Routine Airport Security Procedure (PP vs. Suzuki, October
23, 2003; PP vs. Johnson, GR No. 138881, December 18,
2000).

WARRANTLESS ARREST

HOT PURSUIT- Requisites:

6

1.The pursuit of the offender by the arresting officer must be
continuous from the time of the commission of the offense
to the time of the arrest.
2.There must be no supervening event which breaks the
continuity of the chase.

- Ladlad/Beltran, et al. vs. Gonzales/Velasco, June 1, 2007-
Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been
lawfully arrested without warrant.

- PP vs. dela Cruz, 571 SCRA 469- arrest in flagrante delicto
to be availed, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing or is attempting to
commit a crime. (2) such commission of a crime must be done in
the presence and within the view of the arresting officer.

- PP vs. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740, There must be a large
measure of immediacy between the time of the offense was
committed and the time of the warrantless arrest. If there was an
appreaciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission
of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.

- Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402, When the law speaks of a crime
committed in the presence of an arresting officer, it is not limited
to actually seeing the commission of the crime. The
requirement of the law is complied where the arresting
officer was within an earshot from the scene although he did
not personally witness the commission of the crime.

- PP vs. Martin, 193 SCRA 57, The Bill of Rights is protection
against the State. The protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed
by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. Right applies only
against the government and agencies tasked with the enforcement
of the law.

- Only a judge may validly issue a warrant- EXCEPT: By
administrative authorities (CID; BOC) only for the purpose of
carrying out a final finding of violation of law.

- Jackson vs. Macalino, November 24, 2003- the Commissioner
of the Immigration can issue a warrant of arrest against a
foreigner who has been ordered to be deported.

- SCATTER SHOT WARRANT- is a warrant having been
issued to more than one offense.

6

- PRECISE AND MINUTE DETAIL AS TO THE PLACE TO
BE SEARCHED AND THINGS OR PERSONS TO BE
SEIZED NOT REQUIRED- the constitution does not require
that the things to be seized must be described in precise and
minute detail as to no room for doubt on the part of the searching
authorities; TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION IS NOT
REQUIRED- It is only necessary that there be reasonable
certainty or particularity as to the identity of the property to be
searched for and seized so that the warrant shall not be a mere
roving commission. THE TEST as would be as to what is to be
taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the
warrant. VALLEJO VS. CA, 427 SCRA 658, April 14, 2004.

- Administrative arrest-Causes:
i. If you breach peace or if you are
planning to do so, you can be arrested
but only if it is absolutely necessary to
do so. You will be freed as soon as you
no longer represent a threat to public
security.
ii. If you disrupt a court hearing;
iii. If you are in a drunken state on the
public highway;
iv. In case of brawling;
v. If you block traffic without
authorization;
vi. If you refuse to give your ID documents
or if these are questionable;
vii. If you are in the country illegally.


Section 3- Privacy of communication & correspondence-

- In the matter of petition for habeas corpus of Capt. G.
Alejano, et al. vs. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005-
The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities
were not confidential letters between the detainees and their
lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees
Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees
personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the
letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not
confidential communication between the detainees and their
lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read
the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication
between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials
should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for
inspection in the presence of the detainees. That a law is
6

required before an executive officer could intrude on a
citizens privacy rights is a guarantee that is available only to
the public at large but not to persons who are detained or
imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to
Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in
lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their
detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a
diminished expectation of privacy rights.

- Roxas vs. Zuzuarregei, June 12, 2007- To prevent liability
from attaching on account of his letter, he invokes his rights to
free speech and privacy of communication. The invocation of
these rights will not, however, free him from liability. As
already stated, his letter contained defamatory statements that
impaired public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. The
making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is
not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right.
Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be
disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be
used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or
public respect therefor and confidence therein. Free expression
must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones irrational obsession
to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its
magistrates.

- Right to Privacy Re Iggy Arroyos right to privacy ( the
right to be let alone) Read: PP vs. Molina, et al., - right to
privacy may be waived by the defendant).

Basis: It is expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of
Rights:Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in
various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz: Sections1; 2; 6; 8;
and 17. Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected
in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "[e]very person shall
respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts
several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy
of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any
private individual liable for damages for any violation of the
rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy
of letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal
Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the
revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to
6

dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like
the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposit Act and
the Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged
communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain
information. (Ople vs. Torres, July 23, 1998.

- In the matter of petition for habeas corpus of Camilo Sabio,
October 17, 2006- In evaluating a claim for violation of the
right to privacy, a court must determine whether a person
has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so,
whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable
government intrusion.

- SJS vs. Dangerous Drugs Board and PDEA, GR No. 157870,
November 3, 2008- Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional
the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office and persons accused of crimes.
However, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
said RA insofar as random drug testing for secondary and tertiary
school students, as well as for officials and employees of public
and private offices is concerned. The need for drug testing to at
least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override
the individuals privacy interest under the premises.

- Read: Ayer Productions vs. Capulong- The right of privacy or
the right to be let alone is not an absolute right where the person
is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from
him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public
character.

-Zulueta vs. CA, 253 SCRA 699- The only exception to the
prohibition in the constitution is if there is a lawful order from
a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.

-Relate to emails and other ways of communication.

-RA 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Act)-A violation of the Anti Wire
Tapping Law (R.A. 4200) which prohibits not only the
unauthorized taping of private conversations, but also: (a) the
possession of such tapes with the knowledge of their nature as
illegal wiretaps; (b) the replaying of the tapes to any person; and
(c) to communicate the contents thereof either verbally or in
writing, such as the provision of transcripts. The potential jail
term, if convicted, ranges from six months to six years.

- Arts. 290, 291, 292 and 299 of the Revised Penal Code
6


- RA No. 9372 (Human Security Act)- The provisions of RA
4200 to the contrary notwithstanding, a police or law
enforcement official and members of his team may, upon a
written order of the Court of Appeals, listen to intercept, and
record, with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of
electronic or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and
tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable ways and
means for that purpose, any communication, message,
conversation, discussion or spoken or written words between
members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization, association, or group of persons or any person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism. Provided, that surveillance,
interception and recording of communications between
lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and
their sources and confidential business correspondence shall
not be authorized.

Section 4- Freedom of expression-


- Bayan vs Ermita, April 25, 2006 - The provisions of B.P. No.
880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes:
6

Reyes v. Bagatsing
(G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, 1983,
125 SCRA 553, 569)
8. By way of a summary. The applicants
for a permit to hold an assembly should inform
the licensing authority of the date, the public
place where and the time when it will take
place. If it were a private place, only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled to its
legal possession is required. Such application
should be filed well ahead in time to enable the
public official concerned to appraise whether
there may be valid objections to the grant of the
permit or to its grant but at another public
place. It is an indispensable condition to such
refusal or modification that the clear and
present danger test be the standard for the
decision reached. If he is of the view that there
is such an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, the applicants must be heard
on the matter. Thereafter, his decision,
whether favorable or adverse, must be
transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity.
Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to
the proper judicial authority.







B.P. No. 880



SEC. 4. Permit when required and when
not required.-- A written permit shall be
required for any person or persons to
organize and hold a public assembly in a
public place. However, no permit shall be
required if the public assembly shall be
done or made in a freedom park duly
established by law or ordinance or in
private property, in which case only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled to
its legal possession is required, or in the
campus of a government-owned and
operated educational institution which shall
be subject to the rules and regulations of
said educational institution. Political
meetings or rallies held during any election
campaign period as provided for by law are
not covered by this Act.

SEC. 5. Application requirements.-- All
applications for a permit shall comply with
the following guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in writing
and shall include the names of the leaders
or organizers; the purpose of such public
assembly; the date, time and duration
thereof, and place or streets to be used for
the intended activity; and the probable
number of persons participating, the
transport and the public address systems to
be used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the
duty and responsibility of applicant under
Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with the
office of the mayor of the city or
municipality in whose jurisdiction the
intended activity is to be held, at least five
(5) working days before the scheduled
public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application,
which must be duly acknowledged in
6

-
- It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of
public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time,
place and manner of the assemblies.
- In sum, the Supreme Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the
fundamental rights of our people, especially freedom of expression
and freedom of assembly. In several policy addresses, Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to uphold the liberty of
our people and to nurture their prosperity. He said that in cases
involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against
the government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the
marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak. Indeed, laws and
actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a
heavy presumption against their validity. These laws and actions are
subjected to heightened scrutiny.
- For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy
has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a
darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is
used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P.
No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not
curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of
public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far
from being insidious, maximum tolerance is for the benefit of
rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the
power to issue rally permits is valid because it is subject to the
constitutionally-sound clear and present danger standard.
- IBP v. Atienza, GR No. 175241, February 24, 2010- Atienza
gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the
IBP which should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the
changing of the venue under BP 880, the Public Assembly Act. It
found that Atienza failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying
the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present
danger test which is an indispensable condition to such modification.
Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil, which blank denial or modification
6

would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it,
render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereto,
- A heckler's veto occurs when an acting party's right to freedom of
speech is curtailed or restricted by the government in order to prevent
a reacting party's behavior. The common example is that of
demonstrators (reacting party) causing a speech (given by the acting
party) to be terminated in order to preserve the peace.
- Social Weather Stations vs. COMELEC, May 5, 2001- Election
surveys are covered by the protection to freedom of expression as
they refer to the measurement of opinions and perception of voters as
regards to a candidates popularity, qualifications, platforms or a
matter of public discussion in relation to the election, including the
voters preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues during
the campaign period.
- The prohibition imposed by Section 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair Election
Act) is invalid because: 1) it imposes prior restraint on the freedom
of expression; 2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period;
and 3) the government interest sought to be promoted can be achieved
by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression.
1. TESTS of Valid Government Interference:
1. Clear & Present Danger
2. Balancing of Interests
3. Dangerous Tendency Rule

- Content based and content neutral regulations- Regulations
of speech may either be content-based (the subject of the speech
or utterance is sought to be regulated) and content-neutral (it
regulates only the conduct associated with speech, such as the
time, place and manner). To pass constitutional muster, any
content-based regulation must show that the government has a
compeling or overiding interest in the subject regulation. A
content neutral restriction, on the other hand, need only show an
important government interest, as long as it leaves open
alternative channels of communication.

- Chavez vs. Secretary Gonzales, GR No. 168338, February 15,
2008- The acts of the Secretary of Justice and the NTC in
warning television stations against playing the Garci tapes
under pain of revocation of their licenses, were content-based
restrictions and should be subjected to the clear and present and
danger test.
6


- Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc., et al. vs. Dy, et al.,
GR No. 170270/GR No. 179411, April 2, 2009- The immediate
implication of the application of the strict scrutiny test is that
the burden falls upon respondents as agents of the government to
prove that their actions do not infringe upon petitioners
constitutional rights. As content regulation cannot be done in the
absence of compelling reason to infringe the right to free
expression.

- The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special
application only to free-speech cases, and are not appropriate for
testing the validity of penal statutes. The doctrines of strict
scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech
cases or, as they are called in American law,

- A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to
avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of
the Government muscle.[57] The overbreadth doctrine,
meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.

- As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth
doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute
prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even
though some of it is protected.

- A facial challenge is likewise different from an as-applied
challenge.

- Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers
only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is
an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and
defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the
parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities.[60]

6

- The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a
facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant
cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a
criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.

- The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is
justified by the aim to avert the chilling effect on protected
speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be
abridged.[62] As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to
plain penal statutes that generally bear an in terrorem effect in
deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may
even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and
lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the
exercise of constitutionally protected rights.

- The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free
speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be
facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes
be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a
facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of
crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A
strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case
of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go
against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and
concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately
exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best,
amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court
to consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in
my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack
penal statutes, such a test will impair the States ability to deal
with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder
an accused from defeating the States power to prosecute on a
mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is
vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as
applied to him.[65] (Emphasis and underscoring

- It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the
overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and,
owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable
only to free speech cases.

- By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a
facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected
speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the
court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially
overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be
6

properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court
confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.

- In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the
Court, in at least two cases,[67] observed that the US Supreme
Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the
limited context of the First Amendment,[68] and that claims of
facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken
words.[69] In Virginia v. Hicks,[70] it was held that rarely, if
ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or
regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-
related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by
the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression.

- American jurisprudence[74] instructs that vagueness challenges
that do not involve the First Amendment must be examined in
light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard
to the statute's facial validity.

- In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted
under the due process clause has been utilized in examining the
constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three cases,[76]
the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an
ordinance penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on
fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable under
Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision
under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the
petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the two
Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the
therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the present case.

- From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited
Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may be culled: (1)
the offender commits an act punishable under any of the cited
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the
enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the
predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the
offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand.

- Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there
must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the
operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of
the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to
6

an unlawful demand. Given the presence of the first element,
any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative
component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the
unprotected conduct into a protected speech.

- ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC, 323 SCRA 811 (2000)- The
prohibition of publication of exit poll or electoral survey would
be unreasonably restrictive because it effectively prevents the
use of exit poll data not only for election day projections, but
also for long term research.

- MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN, et al., January 17, 2005- P.D. No.
1986 gives petitioner the power to screen, review and examine
all television programs, emphasizing the phrase all television
programs. Thus, when the law says all television
programs, the word all covers all television programs,
whether religious, public affairs, news documentary, etc.
The principle assumes that the legislative body made no
qualification in the use of general word or expression. It
then follows that since The Inside Story is a television
program, it is within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB over
which it has power of review.

- Soriano v. Laguardia, GR No. 164785; Soriano v. MTRCB
GR No. 165636, April 29, 2009-The Supreme Court said that
Sorianos statement can be treated as obscene, at least with
respect to the average child, and thus his utterances cannot be
considered as protected speech. Ang Dating Daan has earlier
been given a G rating for general viewership. The Supreme
Court said the MTRCB suspension was limited only to the
show Ang Dating Daan, not Soriano, as the MTRCB may
not suspend television personalities, for such would be
beyond its jurisdiction.

- Borjal vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1, In order to maintain a libel suit, it
is essential that the victim is identifiable although it is not
necessary that he be named. It must also be shown that a third
party could identify him as the object of the libelous article.
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even
if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for
making it is shown, except in the following:

6

1. private communication made by any person
to another in the performance of any legal,
moral or social duty;

2. a fair and true report, made in good faith,
without remarks, of any judicial, legislative or
other official proceeding which are not
confidential in nature including any statement
made therein or act performed by public
officer.

- A privileged communication may either be absolutely privileged
(those which are not actionable or even if author acted in bad
faith, e.g. speech by member of Congress therein or any
committee thereof) or qualified privileged (those containing
defamatory imputations which are not actionable unless found to
have been made without good intention or justifiable motive,
e.g., private communications and fair and true reports without
any comments/remarks).

- Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel
or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in
general every discreditable imputation publicly made is
deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until
his guilt is judicially proved.

Section 5- Freedom of Religion-

- Ebralinag vs. Div. Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219
SCRA 256 - members of Jehovahs witnesses may validly refuse
participating in flag ceremonies (singing the national anthem,
saluting the flag, etc.) on account of their religious beliefs.

- Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, 259 SCRA 529- The exercise of
religious freedom can be regulated when it will bring about clear
and present danger of a substantive evil which the State has a
duty to prevent. However, criticism on certain catholic tenets and
dogmas does not constitute clear and present danger.

- Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 Freedom of
religion does not prohibit imposition of a generally applicable
sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials by a religious
organization. For the purpose of defraying cost of registration.

- Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines vs. Executive
Secretary, 405 SCRA 497- Classifying a food product as halal
6

is a religious function because the standards are drawn from the
Quran and Islamic beliefs. By giving the Office of the Muslim
Affairs exclusive power to classify food products as halal, E. O.
No. 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim
organization to interpret what food products are fit for Muslim
consumption. The State has in effect forced Muslim to accept its
own interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah on halal food.

- Citing Art. III, sec. 5 of the Constitution, the Court stressed that
[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Thus, it found a grave
violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to
utilize the Bible and Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad. The Court held that moral disapproval is not a
sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party list system.
Upholding equal protection, the Court ruled that from the
standpoint of the political process, LGBTs have the same interest
in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as
other political parties similarly situated. As such, laws of
general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and
they deserve to participate in the party list system on the same
basis as other marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The
Court also found that there was a transgression of Ang Ladlads
fundamental right of freedom of expression since, by reason of
the COMELEC action, the former was precluded from publicly
expressing its views as a political party and participating on an
equal basis in the political process with other party-list
candidates. (GR No. 190582, Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v.
COMELEC, April 8, 2010)


- Taruc vs. Bishop dela Cruz, et al., GR No. 144801, March 10,
2005- The expulsion/excommunication of members of a
religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the
discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization.

Section 6- Liberty of abode & Right to travel-

- Read: Villavicencio vs. Lukban; Manotoc vs. CA; Silverio vs
CA- Relate to suspension of deployment of OFWs to SARs
infected countries. In relation to bail (Manotoc vs. CA; Santiago
vs. Vasquez)- valid restriction on his right to travel.

6

- Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 115132, August 9, 1995-
The persons right to travel is subject to the usual constraints
imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of
justice. Whether the accused should be permitted to leave the
country for humanitarian reasons is a matter addressed to the
courts discretion. (Yap vs. CA, GR No. 141529, June 6, 2001).

- Art. 13 (2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights- provides
that everyone has the right to leave any country, including his
own, and to return to his country.

- Art. 12 (4), Covenant on Civil and Political Rights- provides
that noone shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his
own country.


Section 7- Right to Information

- Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002- The
constitutional right to information includes official information
on on-going negotiations before a final contract is consummated.
The information, however, must constitute definite propositions
by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions
liked privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and
similar matters affecting national security and public order.

1. Legazpi vs. CSC; Valmonte vs. Belmonte; BARA vs.
2. COMELEC

- Berdin vs. Mascarinas, 526 SCTA 592- While access to
official records may not be prohibited, it certainly may be
regulated.


Section 8- Right to form Unions of public sector

- United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union vs. Laguesma, 288 SCRA
15- Congress, via Art. 125 of the Labor Code, validly prohibited
supervisors from forming labor unions. the right to strike does
form an integral part of the Right to Association.

Section 9- Expropriation


- Republic vs. Gingoyon, December 19, 2005- Rule 67 outlines the
procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the
Government. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary
guideline through which the State may expropriate private property.
6

For example, Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to
the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent
domain through an enabling ordinance. And then there is Rep. Act
No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings intended for
national government infrastructure projects.

- Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more
favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in
instances when the national government expropriates property for
national government infrastructure projects.

- Republic vs. Holy Trinity Realty Development Corp., 551 SCRA
303- There are at least two crucial differences between the respective
procedure under RA No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the
government is required to make immediate payment to the property
owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of
possession, whereas Rule 67, the government is required only to make
an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary, and Rule
67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed
value of the property for purpose of taxation, unlike RA 8974 which
provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market
value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the current
relevant zonal value of the BIR, whichever is higher, and the value of
the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost
method.

- ATO vs. Tongoy, 551 SCRA 320- the right of the previous owners
who were able to prove the commitment of the government to allow
them to repurchase their land.

- Asias Emerging Dragon Corp. vs. DOTC, 552 SCRA 59- The
State, through expropriation proceedings may take private property
even if, admittedly, it will transfer this property again to another
private party as long as there is public purpose to the taking.

- Tiongson vs. NHA, 558 SCRA 56- Where the initial taking of a
property subject to expropriation was by virtue of a law which was
subsequently declared unconstitutional, just compensation is to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint, and not the
earlier taking.

- MCWD vs. J. King and Sons Co., Inc., GR No. 175983, April 16,
2009 - For MCWD to exercise its power of eminent domain, two
requirements should be met, namely: first, its board of directors
passed a resolution authorizing the expropriation, and second, the
exercise of the power of eminent domain was subjected to review by
the LWUA.
6


- Republic vs. Lim, June 29, 2005- Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting
function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights
against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the detriment
of the individuals rights. Given this function, the provision should
therefore be strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the
government, and liberally in favor of the property owner.

- While the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just
compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover
possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the
government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years
from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation
proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover
possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle
that the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the
judgment. To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage
the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in
keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the
government, whenever it takes property from private persons against
their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation.

- Local government units possessed the delegated power of eminent
domain, subject to judicial review (City of Manila vs. Chinese
Community).

- Any property owned by a municipal corporation in its private
capacity (patrimonial), in any expropriation proceeding, must be
paid just compensation. If the property owned is public or otherwise
held in trust then no compensation need be paid (City of Baguio vs.
NAWASA).

- To set just compensation is a judicial prerogative (EPZA vs. Dulay).


- GR No. 177056, Office of the Solicitor General v. Ayala Land
Incorporated, September 18, 2009- The Court said that the total
prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees from
persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the
National Building Code or its implementing rules and regulations. It
added that the State also cannot impose the same prohibition by
generally invoking police power, since said prohibition amounts
6

to a taking of respondents property without payment of just
compensation.

- Cmsr. of IR vs. Central Luzon Drug Corp., GR No. 148512, June
26, 2006, Cmsr. of IR vs. Bicolandia Drug Corp., GR No. 148083,
July 21, 2006 The tax credit given to commercial establishments for
the discount enjoyed by senior citizens pursuant to RA 7432 is a form
of just compensation for private property taken by the State for public
use, since the privilege enjoyed by senior citizens does not come
directly from the State, but from private establishments concerned.

- Public use does not mean use by the public. As long as the purpose of
the taking is public, then power of eminent domain comes into play. It
is inconsequential that private entities may benefit as long as in the
end, public interest is served (Ardona vs. Reyes).

- Reyes v. National Housing Authority, 395 SCRA 494, Taking of
property for socialized housing is for public use.

- Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired n the following
order: 1) government lands; 2) alienable lands of the public domain;
3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; 4) lands within the
declared areas for priority development, zonal improvement program
sites, slum improvement and resettlement sites which have not yet
been acquired; 5) BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and
6) privately-owned lands (City of Mandaluyong vs. Aguilar,
350SCRA 487 2001).

Section 10- Non-impairment clause

- There is no impairment in the imposition of the VAT against real
estate transactions entered or perfected even prior to its imposition.
The contract clause is not a limitation on the exercise of the States
power of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted
for a valid consideration. (Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance)

- The non-impairment clause includes prohibition on judicial acts that
impair contract. (Ganzon vs. Inserto, 123 SCRA 135)

Sections 11 & 12 Custodial Investigation Rights

- Read: Miranda vs. Arizona, Gamboa vs. Cruz, Escobedo vs. Illinois.

- Applies to preliminary investigation, PP vs. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624

- PP vs. Vallejo, May 9, 2002- To be an effective counsel, a lawyer
need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client.
6

The presence of counsel to preclude the slightest coercion as would
lead the accused to admit something false. Indeed counsel should not
prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.

- PP vs. Domantay, 307 SCRA 1- RA 7438 has extended the
constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has not
been formally arrested but has merely been invited for questioning.

- PP vs. Garcia, 400 SCRA 229, A confession made to a private person
is admission in evidence.

- PP vs. Lozada, 406 SCRA 494, An unwritten confession is
inadmissible.

- A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel (Ampong vs. CSC, 563 SCRA 293).

- Van Luspo vs. People, GR No. 188487, February 14, 2011- The
court sustained the admissibility of the sworn statements of the other
accused, explaining that the investigations performed by the PNP
were administrative and not custodial in nature.

- Perez vs. People, 544 SCRA 532- While investigations by an
administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, a
party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of respondents
capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to
furnish the person being investigated with counsel.

Section 13- Bail

- Where the accused was originally charged with a capital offense but
later convicted of non-capital and which he appeals, bail cannot be
granted as a matter right (Obosa vs. CA, 266 SCRA 281).

- The constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal
proceedings. The right is not available in extradition proceedings
that are not criminal in nature. In the absence of any provision in the
constitution, the law or the treaty, adopting the practice of not
granting bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring
fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their
prosecutors.

- Notwithstanding the rule that bail is not a matter of right in
extradition cases, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception,
only upon a clear and convincing showing: 1) that, once granted bail,
the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community;
6

and 2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling reasons
(Govt. of USA vs. Purganan, September 24, 2002).

- Government of Hongkong Special Administrator Region vs.
Judge Olalia, Jr., April 19, 2007 Potential extraditee may be
granted bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that the
person is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and
processes of the extradition court.

Section 14- Rights of accused

1. Presumption of innocence- as against presumption of law.

2. The right to be heard

- The vagueness doctrine merely requires reasonable degree of
certainty for the law to be upheld- not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude ( Estrada vs
- . Desierto, November 19, 2001).

- Despite the allegation of minority of the victim, an accused
appellant may not be sentenced to death under RA 7659 due to
the failure of the information to allege relationship to the victim.
It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of
the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due
process (PP vs. Sandoval, 348 SCRA 476).

- A person subject of an extradition request from another
sovereign State is bereft of the right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. An
extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not criminal
proceeding which will call into operations all the rights of an
accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The extraditees
right to notice and hearing is present only when the petition
for extradition is filed in court- it is only then when he has the
opportunity to meet the evidence against him (Secretary of
Justice vs. Lantion, 343 SCRA 377, 2000).

3. Right to public trial

- A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only
implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to
come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with
decorum and observe trial (Sec of Justice vs. Estrada, June 29,
2001).

6

- RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE
OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST
MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET
AL., [A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC ]- The impossibility of holding such
judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all
the interested parties, whether private complainants or accused,
is unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commands
that a reasonable number of the general public be allowed to
witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the courtroom.
Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the
inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of
a transparent, open and public trial. Thus, the Supreme Court
PARTIALLY GRANTS PRO HAC VI CE the request for live
broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings of
the Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to the guidelines
outlined therein.

4. Right to face to face confrontation

- The absence of cross-examination by the defense due to the
supervening death of plaintiff/witness does not necessarily
render the deceaseds testimony inadmissible. Where no fault can
be attributed to plaintiff/witness, it would be a harsh measure to
strike out all that has been obtained in the direct examination (PP
vs. Narca, 275 SCRA 696).

Section 16- Speedy disposition

- Where the case for violation of the Anti-Graft Law was pending
for preliminary investigation with the Office of the Tanodbayan
for 3 years and it is indicated that the case is of simple nature
and was prosecuted for political reasons, it is held that there was
violation of the accuseds right to speedy disposition of case.
Right to speedy disposition extends to preliminary
investigations. (Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70).


Section 17- Against Self-incrimination

- The right against self-incrimination is available in
administrative hearings when the nature of the penalty is penal
in nature (like forfeiture of property or dismissal from
employment) and the hearing partakes the nature of criminal
proceeding (Cabal vs. Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1059).

6

- Applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss
of the privilege to practice medical profession (Pascual vs.
Board of Medical Examiners, ).

- Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks,
541 SCRA 456- The right against self incrimination is extended
in an administrative investigations that partake of the nature of
or are analogous to criminal proceedings. The privilege has
consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by
law; and all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited
upon a witness, whether a party of not.

- The right against self-incrimination is defeated by the public
nature of documents sought to be accessed (Almonte vs.
Vasquez).

- In the recent case of PEOPLE vs. YATAR, G.R. No. 150224,
May 19, 2004, the Supreme Court affirmed the admissibility and
probative value of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). Citing the first
ever Supreme Court decision on the admissibility of DNA
evidence, i.e., People v. Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002,
382 SCRA 192, 209, the Court, in Yatar, held that in assessing
the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider,
inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

- In Yatar, in an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the
appellant contended that the blood sample taken from him as
well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to
remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under
Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.

- The Court rejected the argument. It held that the kernel of the
right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion, citing Alih v. Castro, G.R. No. 69401, 23 June
1987, 151 SCRA 279. It held that the right against self-
incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting
from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt and that it
does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not
an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
6


- Citing People v. Rondero, G.R. No. 125687, 9 December 1999,
320 SCRA 383, the Court held that although accused-appellant
insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and
submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic
examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence
against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial
compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired
from the accused under duress.

- Hence, according to the Court, a person may be compelled to
submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and
DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. It cited
People v. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, 27 February 2000, 325
SCRA 835, where immediately after the incident, the police
authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of
counsel. In that case, the Court ruled that there was no
violation of the right against self-incrimination. It further stated
that the accused may be compelled to submit to a physical
examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which
he is accused.

Section 18 Involuntary servitude: (Article 272 of the Revised
Penal Code)
Exceptions:1. Punishment for a crime;
2.service in defense of the state
3.naval enlistment
4. posse comitatus
5.return to work order
6. patria potestas

Section 19- Death penalty

- The death penalty is not a cruel punishment. There was no total
abolition of the death penalty. The ConCom had deemed it
proper for Congress to determine its reimposition because of
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. (PP v, Echegaray,
267 SCRA 682).

Section 20- Non-imprisonment for Debt

6

- The civil liability from a crime is not debt within the purview
of the constitutional provision against imprisonment for non
payment of debt.

- Vergara vs. Gedorio, 402 SCRA 520- Debt, as used in the
Constitution, refers to a civil debt or one not arising from a
criminal offense. Clearly, the non payment of rentals is
covered by the constitutional guarantee against
imprisonment.

Section 21- Double Jeopardy

- As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered
because it places the accused under double jeopardy (Re MR in
Lejano vs. People, GR No. 176389, January 18, 2011).

- The impeachment proceedings against petitioner Estrada was not
concluded as a series of events prompted the Senate to declare
the impeachment functus officio- thus, he was neither acquitted
nor was the impeachment proceeding dismissed without his
express consent. Neither was there conviction/ It follows then
that the claim of double jeopardy must fail. (Estrada vs. Desierto,
April 3, 2001).

- Under Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, a provisional
dismissal of a case becomes permanent after the lapse of one
year for offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding
six years or a lapse of two years for offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years.

- For this rule to bar the subsequent filing of a similar case against
the accused, the following must be established: 1) the
provisional dismissal had express consent of the accused; 2) the
provisional dismissal was ordered by the court after notice to the
offended party; 3) the 1 yr. or 2-yr. period to revive had lapsed;
4) there is no justification to file a subsequent case beyond the
period of one or two years. (PP vs. Lacson, May 28, 2002).

- The order approving the plea of guilty to homicide was not a
judgment of conviction. It merely approved the agreement
between the parties on the plea to a lesser offense by the accused
and the condition attached to it. (PP vs. Romero, 399 SCRA 386)


Section 22- Ex post facto law/bill of attainder

- RA 8249, an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, is not penal law but a substantive law on
6

jurisdiction whose retroactive application is constitutional
(Lacson vs. Exec. Secretary, 301 SCRA 298).

- Nasi-Villar vs. People, 571 SCRA 202- A law can never be
considered ex-post facto law as long as it operates prospectively
since its stricture would cover only offenses committed after and
not before its enactment.


- The prohibition of ex post facto laws and bill of attainder
applies to court doctrines pursuant to the maxim legis
interpretatio legis vim obtinet- the interpretation placed upon
the written law by a competent court has the force of law ( PP
vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 602).

- The law making the use of an unlicensed firearm a qualifying
circumstance in murder cannot apply retroactively. (PP vs.
Patoc, 398 SCRA 62).

- Re DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against accused
being unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto was
tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto law- Describing
the argument as specious, the Supreme Court held no ex-post
facto law was involved in the case at bar. It added that the
science of DNA typing involved the admissibility, relevance and
reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court.
Whereas, an ex-post facto law referred primarily to a question
of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the
probative weight of the evidence presented. (PP vs. Yatar, May
19, 2004)