People v Maceren

79 SCRA 450

Facts:

Defendants Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and
Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta.
Cruz, Laguna with the complaint that the five accused resorted to electro fishing in the waters of
Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by using their own motor banca, equipped with electrocuting
device that catches fish thru electric current. which destroy any aquatic animals. Upon motion of
the Maceren and others, the municipal court quashed the complaint -- that electro fishing cannot
be penalize because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated
in section I of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy
conducted or transmitted by substance. The prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of
Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal. The case is now before this Court on appeal by the
prosecution under Republic Act No. 5440.

Issue: Whether or not the 1987 regulation penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries,
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Commissioner of
Fisheries under the old fisheries law is valid.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court held that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Commissioner of Fisheries went beyond the scope of their power. The fisheries law does not
expressly prohibit or penalize.

Had the law making body intended to punish electrofishing, a penal provision to that effect could
have been embodied in the old Fisheries Law.

Therefore the court dismissed the lower courts decision for the lack of appellate jurisdiction and
the order of dismissal rendered by the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Criminal Case No.
5429 is affirmed.












PACIFIC STEAM LAUNDRY, INC. (PSL), Petitioner, VS LAGUNA LAKE
DEVELOPMENTAUTHORITY (LLDA), Respondents
608 SCRA 442

Facts:

Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc., petitioner is a company engaged in the business of
laundry services. On 5 September 2001, the Environmental Quality Management
Division of Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) conducted wastewater
sampling of petitioners effluent which showed non-compliance. After a series of
subsequent water sampling, PSL still failed to conform to the regulatory standards.
Another wastewater sampling which was conducted on 5 June 2002, in response to
the 17 May 2002 request for re-sampling received by LLDA, finally showed
compliance with the effluent standard in all parameters. On 16 September 2002,
LLDA issued an Order to Pay indicating therein that the penalty should be imposed
from the date of initial sampling to the date there quest for re-sampling was
received by the Authority Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the
LLDA denied.

Issue: Whether or not the grant of implied power to LLDA to impose penalties violate the rule on
non-delegation of legislative powers

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court disagreed on the contention of the petitioner. LLDA is a special agency
created to manage and develop the Laguna Lake region. The office is also granted additional
powers and functions to effectively perform its role and to enlarge its prerogatives of monitoring,
licensing and enforcement. In this case, LLDA investigated the pollution complaint against
petitioner and conducted wastewater sampling of petitioners effluent. It was only after the
investigation result showing petitioners failure to meet the established water and effluent quality
standards that LLDA imposed a fine against petitioner. LLDA then imposed upon petitioner a
penalty of P1,000 per day of discharging pollutive wastewater.
There are adequate statutory limitations on LLDAs power to impose fines which obviates
unbridled discretion in the exercise of such power.












Aldaba v. Comelec
GR No. 188078

FACTS:

The case is a Motion for Reconsideration. Republic Act No. 9591 was enacted, creating a
legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Accordingly, RA 9591 violates the
minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district; therefore, it is
unconstitutional for it violates Section 5 paragraph 3 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
In 2007, before the passage of the Act through House Bill 3693, Malolos City had a
population of 223,069. House Bill 3693 issued request to the NSO to submit a projected
population for the Malolos City, upon request, The NSOs projection of the Malolos Citys
population by the year 2010 is 254,030. Petitioners contended that RA 9591 is
unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city
to merit representative in Congress.

Issue:
Whether or not R.A. 9591, n act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos,
Bulacan is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos has at least
250,000 actual or projected.


Ruling:
It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for being
violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987
Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000 population.

It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded,
the Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of
August 1, 2010.

It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of
legislative reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among districts.












Domino v. COMELEC
GR 134015

Facts:
Juan Domino, plaintiff, filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of
the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani indicating in item nine (9) of his
certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1)
year and two (2) months immediately preceding the election. On 30 March 1998, private
respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr., Eddy B. Java, Juan P. Bayonito, Jr., Rosario Samson and
Dionisio P. Lim, Sr., filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy, assigned to the Second Division of the COMELEC. Private
respondents alleged that Domino, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy,
is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks
election.
Domino was then disqualified as candidate for representative of the Lone Legislative
District of the Province of Sarangani in the May 1998 elections. COMELEC en banc denied
Dominos motion for reconsideration on May 1998.

Issue: Whether or not Domino should be disqualified as a candidate under Section 6,
Article VI of the Constitution.

Ruling:

The petition of Domino was dismissed. It is doctrinally settled that the term residence, as
used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the
same thing as domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business,
pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.

Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime
in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at Old Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his
certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the 3rd District of Quezon City
in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his
residence in Quezon City and has established a new domicile of choice at the Province of
Sarangani.

It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical presence in Alabel, Sarangani since
December 1996 was sufficiently established by the lease of a house and lot located therein
in January 1997 and by the affidavits and certifications under oath of the residents of that
place that they have seen petitioner and his family residing in their locality.

While this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself sufficient to show that from said
date he had transferred his residence in that place. To establish a new domicile of choice,
personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention.

People v. Jalosjos
324 SCRA 689

Facts:

Romeo G. Jalosjos, appellant, was a member of Congress who was confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of
lasciviousness on six counts was pending appeal. Jalosjos filed this motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of
a non-bailable offense.

Issue: Whether or not the membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and
rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in accordance to Sec. 11, Art. 6 of the
constitution

Ruling:

NO. The history of the provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a
restraining sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be
extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.

The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department:

Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases
except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; xxx.

Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied
only to civil arrests.

Members of the Congress are not exempt from detention for crime. They may be arrested,
even when the house is in session, for crimes punishable by penalty of more than six
months. This is the case of Jalosjos. There is no basis to treat him differently from any other
convicts.










Arroyo v. De Venecia
277 SCRA 268

Facts:
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against
respondents House Speaker Jose de Venecia, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, and others
charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally
mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved
on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the
Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on November 17,
1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.

Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report
on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null
and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these rules
embody the constitutional mandate in Art. VI, 16(3) that each House may determine the
rules of its proceedings and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation
of the Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the
law was properly passed is false and spurious.

Issue: Whether or not that the committee embodied the constitutional mandate in Art. VI,
Section 16(3) in passing H. No 7198

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petitioners motion. It is clear from the foregoing facts that
what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal
rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment
of a law.
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional
provision that each House may determine the rules of its proceedings and that for this
reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with, this contention stands the principle
on its head. In the decided cases, the constitutional provision that each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings was invoked by parties, although not successfully,
precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business
free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite
purpose of invoking judicial review.








Angara v Electoral Commission
63 Phil 134


Facts:
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were
candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district
of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the
NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935,
the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec
8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against the
election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, par. 6 of
which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous
confirmation made by the National Assembly. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that
by virtue of the National Assembly proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua
argued back by claiming that Electoral Commission proclamation governs and that the
Electoral Commission can take cognizance of the election protest and that the Electoral
Commission cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of the election protest.

Ruling:

Supreme Court ruled in favor of Angara. The Court emphasized that in cases of conflict
between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the
SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the
conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

The judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases
and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

The Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers
and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative
than to any of the other two departments of the government. The Electoral Commission is
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly.






Aggabao v COMELEC
GR No. 163756

Facts:

Georgidi B. Aggabao and Anthony Miranda were rival congressional candidates for the 4th
District of Isabela during the May 10, 2004 elections. During the canvassing of the
certificates of canvass of votes (COCV) for the municipalities of Cordon and San Agustin,
Miranda moved for the exclusion of the 1st copy of the COCV on grounds that it was (1)
tampered with (2) prepared under duress (3)differed from other authentic copies and (4)
contained manifest errors.
Aggabao objected arguing that the grounds raised by Miranda are proper only for a pre-
proclamation controversy which is not allowed in elections for Members of the House of
Representatives.
On appeal with the COMELEC, Aggabao asserted that the PBC acted without jurisdiction
when it heard Mirandas Petition for Exclusion. Even assuming that the PBC had
jurisdiction over the petition, it still erred in excluding the contested COCVs as they
appeared regular and properly authenticated

Issue: Whether or not WON Aggabao resort to certiorari lies

Ruling:
The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction overall contests relative to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives.
Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as
a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunals own jurisdiction begins.

It is undisputed that Miranda has already been proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed
office on June 14, 2004

As such, Aggabaos recourse would have been to file an electoral protest before the HRET.
His remedy is not this petition for certiorari.
The allegation that Mirandas proclamation is null and void ab initio does not divest the
HRET of its jurisdiction.










Neri v Senate
564 SCRA 152

FACTS:
On April 21, 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $
329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the
Peoples Republic of China.
September 2007 hearing, Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials
and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by
the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue
Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC
tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further
narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo
and petitioners discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
invoking "executive privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,4 (b) whether or not she
directed him to prioritize it,5 and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it

ISSUE:
Whether or not the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by
executive privilege valid

HELD:

The communications are covered by executive privilege

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry
relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the
area of military and foreign relations.
In the case at bar, Ex. Sec. Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground
that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials necessary in her executive and
policy decision-making process and, that the information sought to be disclosed might
impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by
the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of
Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law.
Philconsa v. Enriquez
235 SCRA 506

Facts:

House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 , was passed and approved by
both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and
limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted
by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects
in the pork barrels allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.

Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the
Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and
approval.

On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to
have become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO
DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES (GAA of 1994).

Issue:
Whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and
the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional.

Ruling:

The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D.
No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment
policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a
separate law, not in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the
President vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other
government agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their income and
maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying
such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions
to the one-fund policy.









Tobias v Abalos
239 SCRA 106
Facts:

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as
"An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Mandaluyong. Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the
municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district.

Issue:

WON RA 7675 is in violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding one subject one bill
rule

Ruling:

No. The court ruled that RA No. 7675 dismissed the argument of unconstitutionality. The
ruling indicates that it followed Article VI Section 26(1) saying "should be given a practical
rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such
requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to
that general subject."


As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of
Congress to reapportion legislative districts, it was the Congress itself which drafted,
deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress
cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.

Hence, the court dismissed the petition due to lack of merit.

















Lladoc v. CIR
14 SCRA 292

Facts:
Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated 10,000.00 pesos in cash to Fr.
Crispin Ruiz, the parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr.
Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic church in the locality. The donated amount
was spent for such purpose.

On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor's gift tax return. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue issued an assessment for the donee's gift tax against the Catholic Parish
of Victorias of which petitioner was the parish priest.


Issue:
Whether or not the imposition of gift tax was binding as the constitutional exemption for
religious purpose is valid.


Held: Yes, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under Section 22(3) Article VI of the
Constitution contemplates exemption exempts from taxation cemeteries, churches and
parsonages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements
used exclusively for religious purposes. The imposition of the gift tax on the property used
for religious purpose is not a violation of the Constitution. A gift tax is not a property by
way of gift inter vivos.

The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real party in interest in the
imposition of the donee's tax on the property donated to the church for religious purpose.


















Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank
158 SCRA 626

Facts:
Petitioners are sugar producers and planters and millers filed a MANDAMUS to implement
the privatization of Republic Planters Bank, and for the transfer of the shares in the
government bank to sugar producers and planters. (because they are allegedly the true
beneficial owners of the bank since they pay P1.00 per picul of sugar from the proceeds of
sugar producers as STABILIZATION FEES)

The shares are currently held by Philippine Sugar Commission /Sugar Regulatory Admin.

The Solicitor General countered that the stabilization fees are considered government
funds and that the transfer of shares to from Philsucom to the sugar producers would be
irregular.

Issue:
Whether or not the nature of the P1.00 stabilization fees collected from sugar producers
are entitled to public funds

Ruling:

The money is entitled to public funds. While it is true that the collected fees were used to
buy shares in RPB, it did not collect said fees for the account of sugar producers. The
stabilization fees were charged on sugar produced and milled which accrued to PhilSuCom,
under PD 338.

The fees collected are in the nature of a tax, which is within the power of the state to
impose for the promotion of the sugar industry. The collections accrue to a special funds. It
is levied not purely for taxation, but for regulation, to provide means to stabilize the sugar
industry. The levy is primarily an exercise of police powers.

The fact that the State has taken money pursuant to law is sufficient to constitute them as
state funds, even though held for a special purpose. Having been levied for a special
purpose, the revenues are treated as a special fund, administered in trust for the purpose
intended. Once the purpose has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance will be transferred
to the general funds of govt.

It is a special fund since the funds are deposited in PNB, not in the National Treasury.