Mendoza v.

Republic
G.R. No. 157649 November 12, 2012 BERSAMIN, J.:

Facts:
Petitioner Arabelle Mendoza and her husband Dominic Mendoza met sometime in 1989. They had been
neighbours since then. After a month of courtship, they had been intimately together that petitioner became
pregnant with their daughter. They got married in a civil rites sometime June 1991, while petitioner was on
her eighth month of pregnancy. Thereafter, their relationship went south. Petitioner filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of her husband, as exemplified by
his emotional immaturity, sexual infidelity, deceitfulness, and irresponsibility and failure to give support to her
and her child. Her husband is also alleged to have misdealings with other people at work and with other
people as shown by several cases filed against her husband.

Issue:
Whether or not emotional immaturity, sexual infidelity and irresponsibility amounts to psychological
incapacity to warrant the nullity of their marriage

Held:
No. The medical report failed to show that his actions indicated a psychological affliction of such a grave or
serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted. His alleged immaturity, sexual infidelity, deceitfulness
and lack of remorse for his dishonesty and lack of affection did not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity. His inability to share or to take responsibility or to feel remorse over his misbehavior or to share his
earnings with family members, albeit indicative of immaturity, was not necessarily a medically rooted
psychological affliction that was incurable.

Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility did not equate with psychological incapacity.

Sexual infidelity, if true, is but a ground only for legal separation.


The wife refuted all these allegations saying that she played mahjhong only 3 times a week and always with
the husbands consent, that she was never caught in plain view half naked in a hotel room with another man,
and that she took care of all her children. After battling it out in the lower court and Court of Appeals, the
parties presented their case to the Supreme Court which upheld the validity of the marriage. It viewed the
acrimony and infidelity of the spouses as circumstances which may have prevented them from keeping their
marriage possible grounds for legal separation, but not necessarily constitutive of psychological incapacity to
nullify the marriage. (The case of Valerio Kalaw vs. Ma. Elena Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, Sept. 19. 2011)


AURELIO V. AURELIO
G.R. No. 175367, [June 06, 2011]
DOCTRINE:
The following are the guidelines to aid the courts in the disposition of cases involving psychological incapacity:
(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage; (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable; (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; (6) The essential marital obligations
must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision; (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts; (8) The trial court
must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition.

FACTS:
Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988. They have two
sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.
On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically
incapacitated of performing and complying with their respective essential marital obligations. In addition, respondent
alleged that such state of psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time of the marriage
ceremony. Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the FamilyCode. It
alleged among others that said psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the husband;
his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousy and
distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to assist in the
maintenance of the family.
On the side of the wife on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely. Her feelings change
very quickly from joy tofury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for boredom
was very low. She was emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to
gratify her needs. She gets upset when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely. Their
hostility towards each other distorted their relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the essential obligations of
marital life led to the breakdown of their marriage.
On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition. Petitioner principally argued that the petition
failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court for the interpretation and
implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
RTC denied the petition. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage shall be declared null and void?
HELD:
Petition denied. Marriage is null and void.
RATIO:
First, contrary to petitioners assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated and
alleged in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent that the familybackgrounds of both petitioner
and respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a
competent and expert psychologist clinically identified the same as the root causes.
Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a
disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent suffers
from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from
Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital obligations
was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.
Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged in the
petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondents allegations fall under Article 68 of the
Family Code which states that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.


REPUBLIC V. GALANG
G.R. No. 168335, [June 6, 2011]
DOCTRINE:
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.
The defect should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage.
FACTS:
In March 1994, Nestor and Juvy contracted marriage in Pampanga and thereafter they resided in the house of
the Nestors father. Nestor worked as an artist-illustrator while Juvy stayed at home. They had one child,
Christopher.
In August 1999, Nestor filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy,
under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. He alleged that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to
exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as she was a kleptomaniac and a swindler; that Juvy suffers
from mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love
andaffection *towards him and their+ child. He posited that Juvys incapacity was extremely serious and
appears to be incurable.
Having found no collusion between the parties, the case was set for trial. In his testimony, Nestor alleged that
he was the one who prepared their breakfast because Juvy did not want to wake up early; Juvy often left their
child to their neighbors care; and Christopher almost got lost in the market when Juvy brought him there. He
added that Juvy stole his ATM card and falsified his signature to encash the check representing Nestors
fathers pension. He, likewise, stated that he caught Juvy playing mahjong and kuwaho three (3) times.
Finally, he testified that Juvy borrowed money from their relatives on the pretense that their son was confined
in a hospital.
Nestor presented Anna Liza Guiang, a psychologist, who testified that she conducted a psychological test on
Nestor. In her Psychological Report, the psychologist made the following findings:
Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor Galang resembles an emotionally-matured individual. He is well-
adjusted to the problem he meets, and enable to throw-off major irritations but manifest[s] a very low
frustration tolerance which means he has a little ability to endure anxiety and the client manifests suppressed
feelings and emotions which resulted to unbearable emotional pain, depression and lack of self-esteem and
gained emotional tensions caused by his wifes behavior.
The incapacity of the defendant is manifested [in] such a manner that the defendant-wife: (1) being very
irresponsible and very lazy and doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility; (2) her involvement in
gamblingactivities such as mahjong and kuwaho; (3) being an estafador which exhibits her behavioral and
personality disorders; (4) her neglect and show no care attitude towards her husband and child; (5) her
immature and rigid behavior; (6) her lack of initiative to change and above all, the fact that she is unable to
perform her marital obligations as a loving, responsible and caring wife to her family. There are just few
reasons to believe that the defendant is suffering from incapacitated mind and such incapacity appears to be
incorrigible.
The RTC nullified the parties marriage in its decision of January 22, 2001. The RTC Judge, relying on the Santos
Case, stated in the decision that the psychological incapacity of respondent to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage can be characterized by (a) gravity because the subject cannot carry out the
normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing under ordinary
circumstances of life
and work; (b) antecedence, because the root cause of the trouble can be traced to the history of the subject
before marriage although its overt manifestations appear over after the wedding; and (c) incurability, if
treatments required exceed the ordinary means or subject, or involve time and expense beyond the reach of
the subject are all obtaining in this case.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether there is basis to nullify the respondents marriage to Juvy on the ground that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological incapacity that prevented her from complying
with her essential marital obligations.
HELD:
None. The Supreme Court held that the totality of Nestors evidence his testimonies and the psychologist,
and the psychological report andevaluation insufficient to prove Juvys psychological incapacity pursuant
to Article 36 of the Family Code.
RATIO:
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must be confined to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. [Louel Santos vs. CA]
It is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if
the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability can be duly established. [Brenda Marcos vs. Marcos]
Instead of serving as a guideline, Molina Doctrine unintentionally became a straightjacket; it forced all cases
involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it. [Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te] In Ting vs. Velez-Ting, far
from abandoning Molina, the Ngo Te case simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements; the
Ngo Te case merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriages based on psychological incapacity.
In the present case, the psychologist did not even identify the types of psychological tests which she
administered on Nestor and the root cause of Juvys psychological condition. There was no showing that any
mental disorder existed at the inception of the marriage. The report failed to prove the gravity or severity of
Juvys alleged condition, specifically, why and to what extent the disorder is serious, and how it incapacitated
her to comply with her marital duties; the report did not even categorically state the particular type of
personality disorder found. The report failed to establish the incurability of Juvys condition. The reports
pronouncements that Juvy lacks the initiative to change and that her mental incapacity appears
incorrigible are insufficient to prove that her mental condition could not be treated, or if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond her means to undertake.
Petition was granted. Galangs petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Juvy Salazar
under Article 36 of the Family Code was dismissed.
OCHOSA v. ALANO G.R. NO. 167459, JANUARY 26, 2011
Soldier love story
FACTS: It appears that Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a young lieutenant in the AFP while the
latter was a seventeen-year-old first year college drop-out. They had a whirlwind romance that culminated
into sexual intimacy and eventual marriage on 27 October 1973 before the Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe
in Basilan. The couple did not acquire any property. Neither did they incur any debts. Their union produced no
offspring. In 1976, however, they found an abandoned and neglected one-year-old baby girl whom they later
registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste AlanoOchosa.
During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the Philippine archipelago as an officer in
the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to stay in her hometown of Basilan. Neither did
Bona visit him in his areas of assignment, except in one (1) occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4)
days.
Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of the Security Escort Group. He and
Bona, along with Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City where they resided with
their military aides.
In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in the failed coup detat. He was
incarcerated in Camp Crame.
It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset of their marriage when Jose was assigned in
various parts of the country, she had illicit relations with other men. Bona apparently did not change her ways
when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio; she entertained male visitors in her bedroom whenever Jose was
out of their living quarters. On one occasion, Bona was caught by Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having
sex with Joses driver, Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of Bonas sexual infidelity circulated in the military
community. When Jose could no longer bear these rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden and
confronted Bona.
During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin who also made a similar
admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away from their living quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to
Basilan.
In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is currently supporting the needs of
Ramona.
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-2903 with the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 140, seeking to nullify his marriage to Bona on the ground of the latters psychological
incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage. One of the evidence presented is the testimony of
psychiatrist, who reached the conclusion that respondent (Bona)was suffering from histrionic personality
disorder. The RTC granted the nullity of marriage, but the CA reversed the decision of RTC. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations.

HELD: NO.
After a careful perusal of the evidence presented in this case, that Bona had been, on several occasions with
several other men, sexually disloyal to her spouse, Jose. Likewise, Bona had indeed abandoned Jose.
However, we cannot apply the same conviction to Joses thesis that the totality of Bonas acts constituted
psychological incapacity as determined by Article 36 of the Family Code. There is inadequate credible
evidence that her defects were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage. In other
words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of juridical
antecedence.
Also, the psychiatric report of Dr. RondainregardingBonas psychological condition was gathered solely from
Jose and his witnesses.
Contrary to Joses assertion, Bona had no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the beginning of their marriage
and was, in fact, living with him for the most part of their relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose
drove her away from their conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary, the record shows that it was Jose who
was constantly away from Bona by reason of his military duties and his later incarceration. A reasonable
explanation for Bonas refusal to accompany Jose in his military assignments in other parts of Mindanao may
be simply that those locations were known conflict areas in the seventies. Any doubt as to Bonas desire to live
with Jose would later be erased by the fact that Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in Fort Bonifacio
during the following decade.
In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bonas alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and
abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose and not to the
inception of the said marriage.
We have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and
so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of
the Family Code.


YAMBAO V. REPUBLIC AND YAMBAO
GR. No. 184063 [January 24, 2011]
FACTS:
Petitioner Cynthia Yambao (hereinafter petitioner wife) filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
her marriage with respondent Patricio Yambao (hereinafter respondent husband) after 35 years of marriage.
She invoked the ground of psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner wife alleged that since the beginning, her marriage with the respondent husband had been marred
by bickering, quarrels, and recrimination due to the latters inability to comply with the essential obligations to
married life. She elaborated by saying that through all the years of their married life, she was the only
one who earned a living and took care of the children and that respondent husband just ate and slept all day
and would spend time with friends. In addition, she claimed that respondent husband would venture into
several businesses but all of these failed. Respondent husband was also a gambler. Petitioner wife also
claimed that, when their children were babies, respondent did not even help to change their diapers or feed
them, even while petitioner was recovering from her caesarean operation, proffering the excuse that he knew
nothing about children. Later, respondent husband became insecure and jealous and would get mad every
time he would see petitioner talking to other people, even to her relatives. When respondent husband started
threatening to kill petitioner, she decided to leave the conjugal abode and live separately from him. She then
consulted a psychiatrist who concluded that respondent was indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations.
Respondent husband denied that he has refused to work. He claimed that he had been trying to find a decent
job, but was always unable to because of his old age and lack of qualifications. He also claimed that he did not
stay long in the jobs he had because the same could not support the needs of his family, and yielded benefits
that were not commensurate to the efforts he exerted. He had ventured into small businesses but they failed
due to various economic crises. Respondent further claimed that he was not, in fact, contented with living
with petitioners relatives since his every move was being watched with eagle eyes. He also denied that he
gambled. He alleged that even without a steady source of income, he stillshared in the payment of the
amortization of their house in BF Homes, Paraaque City. He also denied that he threatened to kill petitioner,
considering that there was never any evidence that he had ever harmed or inflicted physical injury on
petitioner to justify the latter having a nervous breakdown. He further alleged that he never consulted any
psychiatrist, and denied that he was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage.
RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit holding that petitioner wifes evidence failed to support her
argument that respondent husband was indeed psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations.
Thus:
The court said that, even as petitioner claimed to be unhappy in the marriage, it is incontrovertible that the
union lasted for over thirty years and the parties were able to raise three children into adulthood without
suffering any major parenting problems.
o The court also noted that respondent was faithful to petitioner and never physically abused her.
o Likewise, when the parties lived with petitioners parents, respondent got along well enough with her
family.
The court recognized that respondent did indeed have many faults, such as his indolence and utter
irresponsibility. However, the RTC said, respondents failure to find decent work was due to his not having
obtained a college degree and his lack of other qualifications. Likewise, respondents failure in business could
not be entirely attributed to him, since petitioner was a business partner in some of these ventures.
RTC also rejected the supposed negative effect of respondents Dependent Personality Disorder. The RTC
said that, although the evidence tended to show that respondent would unduly rely upon petitioner to earn a
living for the family, there was no evidence to show that the latter resented such imposition or suffered with
the additional financial burdens passed to her by her husband.
The RTC concluded that while respondent might have been deficient in providing financial support, his
presence, companionship, and love allowed petitioner to accomplish many things. Thus, respondent could be
relied on for love, fidelity, and moral support, which are obligations expected of a spouse under Article 68
of the Family Code.
Lastly, the RTC rejected petitioners claim that she suffered through respondents overbearing jealousy. It
found that respondent only became jealous when he thought that petitioner was cheating on him. The RTC
determined that jealousy was not a character trait that contributed to respondents psychological dysfunction;
much less did it amount to psychological or mental torture on petitioner.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It held that:
o Petitioner failed to show that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage
o Petitioner exerted efforts to find a source of income to support his family. However, his failure to find a
suitable job and the failure of hisbusiness ventures were not mental but physical defects and, hence,
could not be considered psychological incapacity as contemplated under the law.
o The fact that the parties lived together for 35 years and raised three children well, and the fact that
respondent never physically abused petitioner belied the formers psychological incapacity.
o The respondents refusal to care for the children was not psychological incapacity but merely
constituted refusal to perform the task, which is not equivalent to an incapacity or inability.
It rejected petitioners allegation of respondents unbearable jealousy. It said that the same must be shown
as a manifestation of a disordered personality which would make respondent completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of the marital state. The CA averred that a jealous attitude simply evinced
respondents love for his wife, whom he could not bear to lose to another man.
o The the purported threats to kill petitioner is an emotional immaturity and not
psychological incapacity.
o Lastly, the CA found the report of expert witness Dr. Edgardo Juan Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino) to be
unsupported by sufficient evidence since the findings therein were not corroborated by any other
witness. Moreover, the CA said, neither the report nor petitioners testimony established that
respondents psychological condition was grave enough to bring about the inability of the latter to
assume the essential obligations of marriage, so that the same was medically permanent or incurable.
ISSUE:
WON the totality of petitioner wifes evidence establish respondents psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage?
HELD:
No.
RATIONALE:
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that psychologicalincapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. These guidelines do not require that a physician examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be medically or clinically
identified. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys
psychological condition.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Thus, for a marriage to be annulled under Article 36 of the Family Code, the
psychologically incapacitated spouse must be shown to suffer no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacitythat causes him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. It is a malady
so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
In this case, there is no showing that respondent was suffering from a psychological condition so severe that
he was unaware of his obligations to his wife and family. On the contrary, respondents efforts, though few
and far between they may be, showed an understanding of his duty to provide for his family, albeit he did not
meet with much success. Whether his failure was brought about by his own indolence or irresponsibility, or by
some other external factors, is not relevant. What is clear is that respondent, in showing an awareness to
provide for his family, even with his many failings, does not suffer from psychological incapacity.
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations
and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity
consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to
commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and
love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be
tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so
due to some psychological illness.
That respondent, according to petitioner, lack*ed+ effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility
does not mean he is incapable to meet his marital obligations. His refusal to help care for the children, his
neglect for his business ventures, and his alleged unbearable jealousy may indicate some emotional turmoil or
mental difficulty, but none have been shown to amount to a psychological abnormality. Moreover, even
assuming that respondents faults amount to psychological incapacity, it has not been established that the
same existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Furthermore, as found by both RTC and CA, respondent never committed infidelity or physically abused
petitioner or their children. In fact, considering that the children lived with both parents, it is safe to assume
that both made an impact in the childrens upbringing. Still, the parties were able to raise three children into
adulthood without any major parenting problems, and such fact could hardly support a proposition that the
parties marriage is a nullity.

MARABLE V. MARABLE
G.R. No. 178741, [January 17, 2011]
FACTS:
On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before
Mayor Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December 30, 1970 and their marriage was blessed with 5
children.
Their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels became common occurrences. Petitioner developed
a relationship with another woman. Respondent learned about the affair, and petitioner promptly terminated
it. But despite the end of the affair, their quarrels aggravated. Petitioner felt that he was unloved, unwanted
and unappreciated and this made him indifferent towards respondent. Petitioner left the family home and
stayed with his sister in Antipolo City. He gave up all the properties which he and respondent had accumulated
during their marriage in favor of respondent and their children. Later, he converted to Islam after dating
several women.
On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds and filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of his marriage to respondent on the ground of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential
responsibilities of marital life.
Petitioner averred that he came from a poor family and was already exposed to the hardships of farm life at
an early age. His father left their family to live with another woman with whom he had seven other children.
This caused petitioners mother and siblings to suffer immensely. He further alleged that he supported himself
through college and worked hard for the company he joined. But despite his success at work, he alleged that
his misery and loneliness as a child lingered as he experienced a void in his relationship with his own family.
Petitioner presented the Psychological Report of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist from the National
Center for Mental Health. Dr. Tayags report stated that petitioner is suffering from AntisocialPersonality
Disorder, characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-
centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of remorse. The report also revealed that petitionerspersonality
disorder is rooted in deep feelings of rejection starting fromthe family to peers, and that his experiences have
made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. It was Dr. Tayags conclusion that petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to perform his maritalobligations.
The RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioners marriage to respondent on the ground of petitioners
psychological incapacity. Upon appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the CA reversed the RTC
decision. CA denied MR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is psychologically incapacitated.
HELD:
NO! CAs decision was upheld.
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential maritalobligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacitybecomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The term psychological incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. These are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give
meaning and significance to the marriage he or she has contracted. Psychological incapacity must refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
In Republic v. CA, the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36. The
Court held, (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. (3)
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. (4)
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. (5) Such illness must
be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (6)
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. (7)
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the FamilyCode, as amended, the psychological
illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the inception of the marriage. The evaluation of Dr.
Tayag merely made a general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder.
As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo, the presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties
by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short of the required proof which the Court can rely
on as basis to declare as void petitioners marriage to respondent. It is indispensable that the evidence must
show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself.
Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer for a father, was one of the
reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs during his marriage. However, it appears more likely that he
became unfaithful as a result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder
rooted in his personal history. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the intention of the law is to confine the meaning
of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Enrique Agraviador v. Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador
G.R. No. 170729, December 8, 2010

Facts:
PETITIONER (Enrique) met RESPONDENT (Erlinda) in 1971 at a beerhouse where RESPONDENT worked.
PETITIONER, at that time, was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of Customs, while
RESPONDENT was a 17-year old waitress. PETITIONER and RESPONDENT eventually became
sweethearts. They soon entered into a common-law relationship.
In 1973, PETITIONER and RESPONDENT married in a ceremony officiated by Reverend Reyes at a
church in Tondo. PETITIONERs family was apprehensive because of the nature of RESPONDENTs work
and because she comes from a broken family.
Out of their union, they begot four children: Erisque, Emmanuel, Evelyn, and Eymarey.
In 2001, PETITIONER filed with RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code. PETITIONER alleged that RESPONDENT was psychologically incapacitated to
exercise the essential obligations of marriage as she was carefree and irresponsible, and refused to do
household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their house for long periods of time;
had an affair with a lesbian; didnt take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to
bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities.
PETITIONER further claimed RESPONDENT refused to have sex with him since 1993 because she
became very close to a male tenant in their house (Enrique also discovered their love notes to each
other, and caught them inside his room several times).
RESPONDENT moved to dismiss petition on the ground that the root cause of her psychological
incapacity was not medically identified. RTC denied motion.
In her answer, RESPONDENT denied engaging in extramarital affairs and maintained that PETITIONER
refused to have sex with her. PETITIONER allegedly wanted to have their marriage annulled because he
wanted to marry their former household helper, Gilda Camarin. Lastly, PETITIONER maintained she
took care of her sick son (who eventually died).
RTC ordered city prosecutor and Solgen to investigate if collusion existed between the parties.
Aside from his testimony, PETITIONER presented Certificate of True Copy of their Marriage Contract
and the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac. Dr. Patac: (1) PETITIONER
psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage; (2) RESPONDENT failed to fulfill
the essential obligations of marriage, manifesting inflexible maladaptive behavior even at the time
before their marriage; and (3) RESPONDENT suffers from a Personality Disorder.

Issue: Whether there is basis to nullify the petitioners marriage to the respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations?

Held: No. Petition denied.

1. TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE presented failed to establish RESPONDENTs psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity under Art. 36 is not vitiation of consent; it does not affect the consent to the
marriage.

2. Summary of Jurisprudential Guidelines:

a. Santos v. Court of Appeals: psychological incapacity is a mental incapacity (not physical capacity)
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Thus, it is must be confined to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is characterized by:
i. Gravity;
ii. Juridical antecedence; and
iii. Incurability.

b. Molina Doctrine (Republic v. Court of Appeals): Guidelines in interpreting Art. 36 of the Family
Code:
i. Burden of Proof belongs to the Plaintiff. Doubt should be resolved in favor of existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
ii. Root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified; (b)
alleged in the complaint; (c) sufficiently proven by the experts; and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.
iii. Incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage
(exchanged I dos).
iv. Incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Incurability may
be absolute or relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolute against
everyone of the same sex.
v. Illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of the marriage; it should not be merely a refusal, neglect, difficulty, or ill will. Ergo,
the natal/supervening disability effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to the marriage.
vi. Essential marital obligations = Arts. 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife & Arts. 220, 221, and 225 of the Family Code w/ respect to the children
vii. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of
the Philippines, while not controlling, should be given great respect by the courts.
viii. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the SolGen to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the SolGen issues a certification
stating his reasons for agreeing or opposing the petition. SolGen shall discharge the equivalent
function of defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

c. Marcos v. Marcos: clarified that there is no requirement that defendant/respondent should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration
of marriage based on psychologically incapacity. Introduction of expert opinion in a petition under
Art. 36 of the Family Code no longer necessary if the totality of evidence shows psychological
incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.

d. Ngo Te v. Yu-Te: rigid rules are in appropriate in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity (PI)
such as those set out it Molina. This case put into question the applicability of time-tested
guidelines set forth in Manila.

e. Ting v. Velez-Ting & Suazo v. Suazo: clarified that Ngo Te did not abandon Molina, it simply
suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. Ngo Te merely stands for a more flexible
approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on PI.

3. Summary of Evidence
a. Petitioners testimony: Petitioners theory that the respondents psychological incapacity is
premised on her refusal or unwillingness to perform certain marital obligations, and a number of
unpleasant personality traits such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness. These acts, in
our view, do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires, and should be
distinguished from the difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect, in the performance of
some marital obligations that characterize some marriages.

Petitioners testimony failed to establish that the respondents condition is a manifestation of a
disordered personality rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that
makes her completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations. If at all, the petitioner
merely showed that the respondent had some personality defects that showed their
manifestation during the marriage; his testimony sorely lacked details necessary to establish that
the respondents defects existed at the inception of the marriage. In addition, the petitioner failed
to discuss the gravity of the respondents condition; neither did he mention that the respondents
malady was incurable, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the respondents means
to undertake. The petitioners declarations that the respondent does not accept her fault, does
not want to change, and refused to reform are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental
defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code.

b. Psychiatric Evaluation Report: fell short in proving that the respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. Dr. Patac did not personally evaluate and
examine the respondent; he, in fact, recommended at the end of his Report for the respondent to
undergo the same examination *that the petitioner+ underwent.

We do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated is mandatory. If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no
reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit. No such
independent evidence appears on record, however, to have been gathered in this case.

In his Report, Dr. Patac attempted to establish the juridical antecedence of the respondents
condition by stating that the respondent manifested inflexible maladaptive behavior before
marriage, pointing out how the respondent behaved before the marriage the respondent defied
her parents and lived alone; rented a room for herself; and allowed the petitioner to sleep with
her. These perceived behavioral flaws, to our mind, are insufficient to establish that the incapacity
was rooted in the history of the respondent antedating the marriage. This is an area where
independent evidence, such as information from a person intimately related to the respondent,
could prove useful. In the absence of such evidence, it is not surprising why the Psychiatric Report
Evaluation failed to explain how and why the respondents so-called inflexible maladaptive
behavior was already present at the time of the marriage.

Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of the
respondents condition. He simply made an enumeration of the respondents purported behavioral
defects (as related to him by third persons), and on this basis characterized the respondent to be
suffering from mixed personality disorder. At best, the personality flaws mentioned in the Report,
even if true, could only amount to insensitivity, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity, and
irresponsibility, which do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to adequately explain how Dr. Patac came to the
conclusion that the respondents personality disorder had no definite treatment. It did not
discuss the concept of mixed personality disorder and failed to show how and to what extent the
respondent exhibited this disorder in order to create a necessary inference that the respondents
condition had no definite treatment or is incurable. A glaring deficiency, to our mind, is the
Psychiatric Evaluation Reports failure to support its findings and conclusions with any factual basis.

The standards used in Court to assess the sufficiency of psychological reports may be deemed very
strict, but these are proper, in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the validity of the marriage.
Noel Baccay v. Maribel Baccay

Topic under Psychological Incapacity/ Doctrine: Unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage per se,
must clearly establish true incapability to perform basic marital covenants.

Facts: Noel and Maribel were college sweethearts. Then, sometime in November 1998, Maribel informed Noel
that she was pregnant with his child. They immediately wed days after before RTC QC. After the marriage
ceremony, both agreed to live with Noel's family in their house. During all the time she lived with Noel's
family, Maribel remained aloof and did not go out of her way to endear herself to them. She would just come
and go from the house as she pleased, She never contributed to the family's coffer leaving Noel to shoulder all
expenses for their support, she refused to have any sexual contact with Noel. Surprisingly, despite Maribel's
claim of being pregnant, Noel never observed any symptoms of pregnancy in her!
Trouble ensued and so Noel filed for declaration of nullity of the marriage, to which the Court granted, stating
that Maribel failed to perform the essential marital obligations of marriage, and such failure was due to a
personality disorder called Narcissistic Personality Disorder characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability as determined by a clinical psychologist. CA reversed, hence this petition.
Issue: Marriage null and void under Article 36? Psychological incapacity? (in short, will the personality disorder
and no sexy-time merit the nullity of marriage?)
Held: Petition denied! Totality of evidence by Noel fails to prove P.I.
Ratio: First, Santos v. Court of Appeals

that the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend
all possible cases of psychoses. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
Second, Republic v. CA laid down the guidelines to determine P.I.
a) Burden of Proof on petitioner/ Resolved in favor of validity and continuity of marriage
b) Must be alleged in complaint that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
c) Medically proven to be permanently incurable in terms of marital obligations (INCURABILITY)
d) Grave enough illness to not assume the essential obligations of marriage (GRAVITY)
e) the obligations are those expressly enumerated by law/ Interpretation of NAMT Church should be given
great respect/ TC must order fiscal and Sol-Gen to appear as counsel for the State

Lastly, he failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the requirements
of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. As correctly observed by the CA, the report of the
psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable to her
experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from
validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage.
Republic vs. CA
GR No. 159614, December 9, 2005

FACTS:


Alan Alegro, the petitioner, was married with Lea in January 1995. Lea arrived home late in February 1995 and
Alan told her that if she enjoys life of a single person, it will be better for her to go back to her parents. Lea left
after that fight. Allan checked if she went to her parents house but was not there and even inquired to her
friends. He went back to the parents-in-laws house and learned that Lea had been to their house but left
without notice. He then sought help from the Barangay Captain. For sometime, Alan decided to work as part-
time taxi driver and during his free time he would look for Lea in the malls. In June 2001, Alan reported Leas
disappearance to the local police station and an alarm notice was issued. He also reported the disappearance
in NBI on July 2001. Alan filed a petition in March 2001 for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife.


ISSUE: Whether Alan has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.


HELD:


The court ruled that Alan failed to prove that he has a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition with
RTC, that his spouse was dead. He failed to present a witness other than the Barangay Captain. He even failed
to present those friends of Lea which he inquired to corroborate his testimony. He also failed to make
inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Leas whereabouts before filing his petition in the RTC. It could
have enhanced his credibility had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea's whereabouts
considering that Lea's father was the owner of Radio DYMS. He did report and seek help of the local police
authorities and NBI to locate Lea but he did so only after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in RTC.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 163604. May 6, 2005]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Twentieth Division), HON.
PRESIDING JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, RTC-BR. 35 and APOLINARIA MALINAO JOMOC,
respondents.
Facts:
The Republic (petitioner) insists that the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code is not a special proceeding involving multiple or separate appeals where a record on appeal shall
be filed and served in like manner. Petitioner cites Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court which enumerates
the cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is required for an appeal to be
perfected. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse not being included in
the enumeration, petitioner contends that a mere notice of appeal suffices.
Issue: The principal issue in this case is whether a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a
person is in the nature of a special proceeding.
Ruling:
The instant petition is in the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. The
petition merely seeks for a declaration by the trial court of the presumptive death of absentee spouse
Clemente Jomoc. It does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress
of a wrong. Neither does it involve a demand of right or a cause of action that can be enforced against
any person.

Republic of the Philippines VS. Bermudez Lorino
G.R. No. 160258. January 19, 2005

FACTS: Gloria Bermudez and Francisco Lorino were married in June 1987. The wife was unaware that her
husband was a habitual drinker with violent attitude and character and had the propensity to go out with his
friends to the point of being unable to work. In 1991 she left him and returned to her parents together with
her three children. She went abroad to work for her support her children. From the time she left him, she had
no communication with him or his relatives.
In 2000, nine years after leaving her husband, Gloria filed a verified petition with the RTC under the rules on
Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law. The lower court issued an order for the publication of the
petition in a newspaper of general circulation.
In November 7, 2001, the RTC granted the summary petition. Although the judgment was final and executors
under the provisions of Act. 247 of the Family Code, the OSG for the Republic of the Philippines filed a notice
of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the factual and legal bases for a judicial declaration of presumptive death under Art 41
of the Family Code were duly established.
HELD: Art. 238 of the Family Code under Title XI Summary Judicial Proceeding in the Family Law, sets the tenor
for cases scoured by these rules, to wit:
Art238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided
for in this Code requiring summary court proceeding. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditions manner
with out regards technical rules.
The judge of the RTC fully complied with the above-cited provision by expeditiously rending judgment within
ninety (90) days after the formal offer of evidence by the petitioner.
REPUBLIC V. GRANADA
G.R. No. 187512, [June 13, 2012]
DOCTRINE:
Even if the RTC erred in ruling that therespondent was able to prove her well-founded belief that her absent
spouse was already dead, such order already final and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed,
*n+othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes
immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.
FACTS:
Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida Electric Company, got married in 1993.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to
seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she did not receive any communication from her
husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus
regarding the latters whereabouts, to no avail.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead with the
RTC Lipa City. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate
Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. The motion was denied. The
OSG then elevated the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the
judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.
The appellate court granted Yolandas Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic
v. Bermudez-Lorino, the CA ruled that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the
Family Code is a summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is immediately final and executory upon notice
to the parties.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is
immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal.
2. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the petition for declaration of presumptive death
based on evidence that respondent had presented.
HELD:
Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is finaland immediately executory. Even if the RTC erred in granting
the petition, such order can no longer be assailed.
RATIO:
1. A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a
subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding as provided for under the
Family Code. Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for
declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be
immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and
executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial courts judgment in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to
question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of
Appeals in accordance with theDoctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Courts original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases,
such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of
the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the
exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment
thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the
decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2. Petitioner also assails the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent
spouse of respondent on the ground that she had not adduced the evidence required to establish a well-
founded belief that her absent spouse was already dead, as expressly required by Article 41 of the Family
Code.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse isalready dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent
marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-groundedbelief is a state of the mind or condition
prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which
may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in
truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and
objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it
tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence evidence
on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to
ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded beliefof death of the absent spouse depends
upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance
of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of theinquiries made by present spouse. (Footnotes omitted,
underscoring supplied.)
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not
initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having
inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latters relatives, these relatives were not presented to
corroborate Diosdados testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her
husband. Petitioner argues
that if she were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from
other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end,
but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
The Republics arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her well-founded belief that her
absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already
final and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, *n+othing is more settled in law than that when a
judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law.
Valdez vs. Republic
GR No. 180863, September 8, 2009

FACTS:

Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named Nancy. They
argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, the
latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited until in May 1972, they decided to go back to her parents
home. 3 years have passed without any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and they
agreed to separate and executed a document to that effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had
never heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June
1985. Virgilios application for naturalization in US was denied because petitioners marriage with Sofio was
subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of
Sofio.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive
death of Sofio.

HELD:

The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofios death is necessary because Civil Code governs
during 1971 and not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence is only needed. Thus,
petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their marriage is legal and valid.
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2316 : October 9, 2012
(Formerly A.M. No. 09-7-280-RTC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. HON. LIBERTY 0. CASTANEDA, Presiding Judge,
ATTY. PAULINO I. SAGUYOD, Clerk of Court, LOURDES E. COLLADO, Sheriff, MARYLINDA C, DOCTOR, EVELYN
B. ANTONIO, ROSALIE P. SARSAGAT and CHERYL B. ESTEBAN, Court Stenographers, GEORGE P. CLEMENTE,
Clerk, MARITONI FLORIAN C. CERVANTES, Court Interpreter, and RUBEN A. GIGANTE, Utility Worker, all of
the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 67, PANIQUI, TARLAC, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
This administrative matter is a consequence of the judicial audit and physical inventory of cases conducted
from September 29, 2008 to October 8, 2008 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67,
presided over by Judge Liberty O. Castada (Judge Castada). A follow-up audit was subsequently conducted on
February 1 to 4, 2011.
The Facts
The team from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) reported
1
rll that as of audit date, Branch 67
had a caseload of 1,123, consisting of 406 criminal cases and 717 civil cases. Of the 70 cases submitted for
decision, 18 have not been decided notwithstanding the lapse of the 90-day period within which to resolve
them. Likewise, of the seven (7) criminal and three (3) civil cases with pending incidents submitted for
resolution, seven (7) have been awaiting resolution beyond the reglementary period.
However, notwithstanding her failure to decide the 18 cases and resolve the incidents in the seven (7) cases
mentioned above, Judge Castada certified in her Certificates of Service from January to December 2008 that
she has decided and resolved all cases and incidents within three (3) months from the date of submission.
The audit team also reported that 164 cases have not been acted upon for a considerable length of time; there
are 14 cases with pending incidents; and no initial action has been taken in 27 cases. Apart from these figures,
the audit team likewise noted that Branch 67 had a poor case and records management, particularly citing the
absence of minutes of the court proceedings, lack of stamp receipts on the pleadings filed before it, official
receipts reflecting that filing fees were paid days after the cases had been
filed, registry receipts containing no registry numbers, and lack of proofs of receipts of court processes or
issuances. Case records were not even properly stitched together.
The audit also revealed that there were criminal cases that were ordered archived even before the expiration
of the 6-month period reckoned from the delivery of the warrant of arrest to the police authorities, in
violation of OCA Circular No. 89-2004
2
rll dated August 12, 2004. In one case, Judge Castada arbitrarily
reduced the bail bond of an accused from P120,000.00 to P10,000.00, and released another on recognizance
on charges of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165.
3
rll Similarly, another
accused, who was charged with violation of R.A. 7610,
4
rll was released on recognizance despite the fact
that the penalty therefor is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
It was also found that Atty. Paulino I. Saguyod (Atty. Saguyod), the Branch Clerk of Court, issued commitment
orders in two (2) criminal cases without written authority from Judge Castada, and that no certificates of
arraignment were issued in some cases.
Prompted by reports that Branch 67 is fast becoming a haven for couples who want their marriages to be
judicially declared null and void or annulled, or those who merely want to be legally separated, the audit team
gave special attention to cases for declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of marriage and legal
separation, and found that of the 717 civil cases, 522 or 72.80% involved nullity of marriage, annulment and
legal separation.
Further investigation of these cases revealed various irregularities in the proceedings, consisting of blatant
violations of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
5
rll or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as well as A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC,
6
rll or the Rule on Legal Separation.
First. Judge Castada allowed the petitions for nullity of marriage or annulment to prosper despite the
impropriety of venue. The audit showed that most of the parties in these petitions are not actual residents of
the places under the territorial jurisdiction of Branch 67, i.e., Paniqui, Anao, Moncada and San Miguel, all in
Tarlac. A number of the addresses reflected on the pleadings are incomplete or vague, some are handwritten,
typewritten or super-imposed on blanks, or even left completely blank. Many of the respondents raised the
issue of improper venue, which Judge Castada ignored. One of the respondents, Lea Benaid, the respondent in
Civil Case No. 254-P07 (Dodgie Benaid v. Lea Borreo-Benaid) claimed, in a letter
7
rll dated October 8, 2008
addressed to the Chief Justice, that she and her petitioner-husband are not residents of Tarlac but of Infanta,
Quezon, and that she never received any summons nor has she been notified of a collusion investigation by
the public prosecutor. She also averred that she never met the clinical psychologist, whose report reflected
that she was purportedly suffering from psychological incapacity. Neither was she subjected to any
psychological test.
Second. In some cases, there are no proofs of payment of docket fees, while in others, summons and other
initial court processes were issued even before the docket fees were fully paid.
Third. There are cases where the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the Office of the Public Prosecutor
(OPP) were not furnished copies of the petition, which under the rules must be done within five (5) days from
the date of its filing, and proof of such service must be submitted to the court within the same period,
otherwise, the petition may be outrightly dismissed. However, in those cases where it has been established
that the OSG and OPP were not served copies of the petition, Judge Castada did not order the petitioners to
comply.
Fourth. In several cases, the process server or sheriff merely resorted to substituted service of summons,
without strict compliance with the rule
8
rll thereon as well as the Court's ruling in Manotoc v. Court of
Appeals
9
rll elucidating on the requirements for effecting a valid substituted service. Nonetheless, Judge
Castada acted on these petitions.
Fifth. Judge Castada likewise granted motions for depositions and allowed the advance taking of testimonies
even without the respondent or public prosecutor being furnished copies of the motion. In several cases, she
granted the motion on the very same day, or merely a day after it was filed.
Sixth. After having been served with summons, respondents were usually no longer notified of subsequent
court orders or processes.
Seventh. In other cases, Judge Castada permitted the public prosecutor to conduct a collusion investigation
even before the respondent has filed an answer, or the lapse of the prescribed period of 15 days. She would
proceed with the pre-trial even without proof that respondent had been duly notified, or terminate the pre-
trial for failure of respondent to file an answer and even without the prosecutor's collusion report.
Worse,eight (8) petitions were granted despite the absence of an investigation report from the public
prosecutor.
Eighth. Judge Castada allowed the pre-trial to proceed in several cases, notwithstanding the absence of the
petitioner, or the fact that the latter failed to authorize his/her counsel, through a duly-executed special
power of attorney (SPA), to represent him/her thereat. She also condoned the late filing of pre-trial briefs, as
in fact, there were instances when the petitioner's pre-trial brief was filed on the day of the pre-trial
conference itself.
Ninth. There are cases where the documentary evidence had been allegedly marked and formally offered, and
which Judge Castada admitted, but which cannot be found in the records. In several cases, the petitioner
would be allegedly cross-examined by the public prosecutor, but records are bereft of showing to establish
such proceeding.
Tenth. Most of the pyschologists' reports are pro forma and mere photocopies, and the psychologists did not
even testify in court. On the other hand, the respondent's failure to appear in court for purposes of presenting
his/her evidence is considered a waiver thereof, despite lack of due notice.
Eleventh. At the time of the audit, Judge Castada had granted 175 cases involving nullity or annulment of
marriage and legal separation. More particularly, the audit team observed the extraordinary speed and
overzealousness with which Judge Castada acted in granting some 11 cases, which were decided between a
period of a mere 16 days to four (4) months from the date of their filing.
Finally, Judge Castada issued certificates of finality of decisions notwithstanding the lack of proof that the
parties, counsels, the OSG and the OPP had been duly furnished with copies of the decisions.
Acting upon the report of the audit team, the Court, in its Resolution
10
rll dated November 23, 2009,
resolved, inter alia, to:
(a) preventively suspend Judge Castada from office immediately upon receipt of notice, and direct her to
explain, within 60 days from notice, why she should not be administratively dealt with for her numerous
infractions above-enumerated, and to comment on the letter of Lea Benaid dated October 8, 2008, the
respondent in Civil Case No. 254-P07 (Dodgie Benaid v. Lea Benaid);
(b) direct Atty. Saguyod, the Clerk of Court of Branch 67, to:
(1) explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for issuing commitment orders without Judge
Castada's written authority in two (2) criminal cases; failing to issue certificates of arraignment in several
cases; failing to furnish respondents copies of notice of pre-trial in some cases; allowing the issuance of notice
of pre-trial in two (2) civil cases only two (2) days prior to the pre-trial conference; allowing the delay in the
issuance of notice of pre-trial in Civil Case No. 228-07, which respondent received 16 days after the scheduled
pre-trial; failing to furnish the respondent the court's order setting the presentation of respondent's evidence
in several cases; and issuing the certificates of finality in many cases without the OSG having been furnished
with copies of the court's decisions;
(2) explain why no initial action has been taken on several cases, to take appropriate action and to submit a
report to the Court, through the OCA, on the status of these cases;
(c) direct Process Server Angel C. Vingua (Process Server Vingua) and Sheriff Lourdes E. Collado (Sheriff
Collado), both of Branch 67, to explain within 15 days from notice why they failed to comply with the rules on
personal service of summons and the requirements to effect a valid substituted service, in several cases;
(d) order Court Stenographers Marylinda C. Doctor (Doctor), Evelyn B. Antonio (Antonio), Rosalie P. Sarsagat
(Sarsagat) and Cheryl B. Esteban (Esteban) to attach their stenographic notes and transcripts thereof to the
case records;
(e) advise Clerk George P. Clemente (Clerk Clemente) and Court Interpreter Maritoni Florian C. Cervantes
(Court Interpreter Cervantes), personnel in charge of the criminal and civil dockets, to attach the registry
receipts and registry returns to the case records, arrange the pleadings and court orders chronologically
according to the dates of receipt or issue, cause the pagination of records and update their respective dockets;
and
(f) order Utility Worker Ruben A. Gigante (Utility Worker Gigante) to stitch all court records.
In her defense, Judge Castada claimed
11
rll that when she assumed her judicial functions on March 16,
2007, the court was actually housed in a dilapidated old school building, with leaky ceilings and faulty wiring,
and that the records were in bundles and complete disarray. When her predecessor retired, she inherited
quite a number of cases, and she was taken to task with rickety typewriters, limited office supplies, and lack of
personnel. In July 2008, when the construction of a new judiciary building commenced, the court was
transferred to a 6x10 square-meter session hall in the barangay. Judge Castada declared that this was the
situation in which the OCA team found Branch 67 when they conducted the audit.
More specifically, Judge Castada asseverated that her preventive suspension was a violation of her human
rights, as well as her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. She maintained that the
undecided and unresolved cases which Judge Alipio C. Yumul, who took over her duties during her preventive
suspension, was directed to decide included 2008 cases, which were either newly-filed, pending trial, or
submitted for decision. Defending Atty. Saguyod's issuance of commitment orders, she insisted that it was
sanctioned by the 2002 Manual for Clerks of Court, especially when the judge's signature could not be
secured.
Judge Castada cited inadvertence with respect to the archiving of cases without the warrants of arrest having
been returned, and claimed that the two (2) accused who allegedly have not yet been arraigned had, in fact,
already been arraigned when she was appointed as judge. She averred that she reduced the bail bond of an
accused charged with violation of RA No. 9165 from P120,000.00 to P10,000.00 because it was recommended
by Provincial Prosecutor Aladin Bermudez, and that she released on recognizance two (2) other accused
charged with violation of RA No. 7610 because they were minors, both of whom she referred to the
Department of Social Welfare and Development.
With regard to her alleged failure to decide cases within the reglementary period, Judge Castada insisted that
she had already resolved them, thereby prompting her to declare such fact, in good faith, in her Certificates of
Service.
Finally, Judge Castada denied that she failed to observe the provisions of A.M. Nos. 02-11-10-SC and 02-11-11-
SC. Instead, she asseverated that, since the petitions filed before her were all verified, it was no longer
incumbent upon her to confirm the veracity of the contents thereof, including the parties' addresses. She
contended that she merely allowed the issuance of summons even before the filing fees had been paid when
no receipts were readily available to be issued. She likewise explained that it was not the duty of the court to
order the petitioner to furnish the OSG or the OPP with copies of the petition, and that it was only upon the
petitioner's failure to do so that the court arrogates unto itself the duty to furnish the OSG a copy of the
petition.
With respect to the granting of motions to take depositions without the respondent and the OPP being
furnished copies thereof, she asserted that only the OSG is required to be given a copy, not the respondent,
who only learns of the case when summons is served upon him/her. On the other hand, she adopted the
explanation offered by Sheriff Collado on the matter of resorting to substituted service and the failure to
strictly observe the requirements on validly effecting it, as mandated by the rules.
Meanwhile, Judge Castada blamed the clerk in-charge for allegedly forgetting to attach the court orders
requiring the public prosecutor to conduct a collusion investigation in declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage, and legal separation cases. She defended her stance to proceed with pre-trial conferences
notwithstanding the absence of the public prosecutor's investigation report, maintaining that resetting the
pre-trial for this reason alone would unduly delay the proceedings. She also proceeded with pre-trial despite
lack of showing that respondent was duly notified thereof as the court merely presumes that he/she received
it via registered mail within a period of 30 days. With regard to the absence of the petitioners themselves
during pre-trial, or an SPA authorizing their counsels to act on their behalf, Judge Castada averred that the
parties may have simply forgotten to sign the minutes, or the staff failed to make them sign for some reason.
As for those cases where there were no SPAs presented, or where the petitioner has yet to submit a pre-trial
brief, she imputed the blame upon the clerk in charge, who she claimed had forgotten to attach them to the
records or who may have even misplaced or misfiled them.
Judge Castada likewise avowed that she always checks all documents when she renders her decisions. Thus,
even if there has been no proof that respondent was furnished with a copy of the notice of hearing for the
presentation of respondent's evidence, she nonetheless issues Orders submitting them for decision, as to wait
for the returns would unnecessarily delay case disposition. She also insisted that the public prosecutor's
investigation reports were always in the case records, and if they were not, they might have been misplaced
or accidentally removed. She also postulated that the OSG is always furnished with copies of the decisions in
all cases.
With respect to the letter
12
rll sent by Lea Benaid, Judge Castada reiterated her earlier ratiocination that
the petition filed by Lea's petitionerhusband was verified, thus, the court had no duty to investigate on the
veracity of its contents. Judge Castada likewise pointed out that, despite having received summons, Lea did
not file any responsive pleading, nor did her counsel appear before the court to participate in the proceedings.
For his part, Atty. Saguyod explained
13
rll that he issued the commitment orders without Judge Castada's
written authority as he was empowered, under the 2002 Manual of Clerks of Court to issue
a mittimus whenever the signature of the judge could not be secured, and there was an immediate necessity
to detain an accused. He charged to mere inadvertence or oversight instances when the branch staff failed to
have the accused or counsel affix their signatures on the certificates of arraignment. With regard to his alleged
failure to furnish respondents copies of notice of pre-trial, Atty. Saguyod explained that these notices were
actually sent on time but the proofs of mailing were not immediately attached to the records, and
unfortunately, these proofs were misplaced.
Further, Atty. Saguyod averred that there was a mere typographical error on the date of one notice of pre-
trial, supposedly issued two (2) days before the pre-trial conference, which should have reflected February
8, 2008 and not February 18, 2008. In a civil case where the respondent received the notice of pre-
trial only on February 22, 2008, 16 days after the scheduled pre-trial, Atty. Saguyod claimed that the notice of
pre-trial was promptly mailed to respondent on February 1, 2008. Similarly, the order setting the hearing for
the presentation of respondent's evidence was actually mailed, only that the proof of mailing was not
attached to the case records.
Finally, Atty. Saguyod echoed the defense of Judge Castada that the OSG had always been furnished with
copies of the court's decisions before the corresponding certificates of finality were issued.
In compliance with the Court's directive, Atty. Saguyod submitted a report
14
of the initial action taken on the
cases mentioned in the Court's November 23, 2009 Resolution.
For her part, Sheriff Collado claimed
15
rll that she served summons only in 10 cases enumerated in the
Court's November 23, 2009 Resolution, but admitted that she failed to observe the requirements to validly
effect substituted service of summons set forth in Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,
16
rll as she was allegedly
not aware thereof and because she was used to a pro forma return of service. However, she posited that it
was an honest mistake and made assurances to strictly observe the rules in future services of summons.
On the other hand, records show that Process Server Vingua died on January 1, 2009.
17
rll
On March 12, 2010, Judge Castada manifested
18
rll that she will resume her duties as Presiding Judge of
Branch 67 on March 22, 2010, asseverating that since she had already acted upon the cases cited in the
Court's November 23, 2009 Resolution, and that any lapses thereon were not attributable to her but to her
staff, she has the right to be reinstated to her position. Thus, Judge Castada reported back to her court on
March 22, 2010 notwithstanding the lack of any action from the Court regarding her manifestation.
On February 1 to 4, 2011, a second audit was conducted in Branch 67, the results of which essentially mirrored
those of the first audit.
19
rll
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA
In its Memorandum
20
rll dated March 22, 2011, the OCA recommended the following, inter alia:
(a) that Judge Castada be dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government,
including government-owned or -controlled corporations, for dishonesty, gross ignorance of the law and
procedure, gross misconduct and incompetency;
(b) that Atty. Saguyod be suspended for six (6) months and one (1) day, without salaries and other benefits,
with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely, for inefficiency and
incompetency;
(c) that Sheriff Collado, Court Stenographers Doctor, Antonio, Sarsagat and Esteban, Clerk Clemente, Court
Interpreter Cervantes, and Utility Worker Gigante be fined in the amount of P5,000.00 each, for simple neglect
of duties, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely; and,
(d) that Atty. Saguyod and Clerk Clemente be ordered to explain, within fifteen (15) days from notice, why
they failed to present to the audit team, in the conduct of the second audit, the records of 241 nullity of
marriage cases decided in 2010, and why 30 decided cases involving nullity of marriage were not reported in
2010.
In arriving at its recommendation insofar as Judge Castada is concerned, the OCA found that she failed to
decide cases within the reglementary period, and that her inaction or procrastination was inexcusable. The
OCA touted Judge Castada's explanation as unsatisfactory, especially since she attempted to use her staff as
scapegoats to evade administrative liability.
Because she failed to conduct a semi-annual inventory of her case docket, Judge Castada failed to see that
there were two (2) accused who were yet to be arraigned. With respect to the accused charged with an
offense involving drugs whose bailbonds she drastically reduced from P120,000.00 to P10,000.00 purportedly
upon the recommendation of the public prosecutor, records are bereft of such recommendation.
Moreover, the OCA also considered the irregularities and procedural lapses in the manner in which Judge
Castada handled cases for nullity, annulment of marriage and legal separation, as she completely disregarded
the basic provisions of A.M. Nos. 02-11-10-SC and 02-11-11-SC. For these infractions, the OCA found her guilty
of gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and held her unjustifiable zeal and readiness in granting petitions
for nullity, annulment and legal separation to be so gross, patent and deliberate that it reeks of utter bad
faith. In fact, the OCA aptly took note of Judge Castada's alarming and indiscriminate granting of petitions for
nullity and annulment of marriage, as evidenced by the fact that these cases would be usually submitted for
decision within a month from the filing of the petition and decided in a mere 2 months' time. In 2010 alone,
Judge Castada granted the extremely high total of 410 petitions of this nature. From this observation, the OCA
explained that Judge Castada demonstrated an utter lack of competence and integrity in performing her
duties as a judge, which amounted to grave abuse of authority.
Finally, by submitting her Certificates of Service for February and March 2010 and falsely asserting therein that
she rendered work for that period when, in fact, she served her preventive suspension from January 13, 2010
to March 21, 2010, Judge Castada deliberately committed acts of dishonesty.
In fine, Judge Castada violated the Code of Judicial Conduct, which enjoins judges to uphold the integrity of
the judiciary, avoid impropriety or the appearance of impropriety in all activities and to perform their duties
honestly and diligently. Thus, considering the number and severity of Judge Castada's infractions, the OCA
indicated that the extreme penalty of dismissal may be imposed upon her.
On the other hand, the OCA found Atty. Saguyod administratively liable for inefficiency and incompetence in
the performance of his duties, which is classified as a grave offense under the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service. The judicial audits showed that Atty. Saguyod went beyond the ministerial duties of
a branch clerk of court and arrogated unto himself functions that belong to a judge by issuing commitment
orders in two criminal cases. On the other hand, he was remiss in his mandated duties as a branch clerk of
court when he accepted nonverified petitions for nullity, annulment and legal separation as well as petitions
which were not within the territorial jurisdiction of Branch 67. He demonstrated inefficiency when he failed
to: (1) issue certificates of arraignment in several criminal cases; (2) furnish respondents copies of notice of
pre-trial; and (3) furnish the respondent the Order setting the case for presentation of the latter's evidence, as
well as when he issued certificates of finality without furnishing the respondent and/or the public prosecutor
with copies of the decision.
Moreover, Atty. Saguyod miserably failed in performing his mandated duty under the Rules of Court to
oversee and exercise control and supervision over the orderly keeping of court records, papers and files.
Worse, he passed the blame to his subordinates and attributed the miserable state of their records to the
condition of their office during the first audit.
However, when the second audit was eventually conducted, the team observed no substantial improvement
in case and records management despite the fact that Branch 67 had already transferred to a new building.
As for Sheriff Collado, the OCA held that she should endeavor to learn the rules on service of summons, and
her claim that their office uses a pro forma return of service is no excuse to absolve her from liability. On the
other hand, despite having been ordered in the Court's November 23, 2009 Resolution to attach the
stenographic notes and transcripts of stenographic notes to the case records, Court Stenographers Doctor,
Antonio, Sarsagat and Esteban still failed to do so. Similarly, Clerk Clemente failed to attach the registry
receipts and registry returns to the case records, arrange the pleadings and court issuances chronologically,
cause the pagination of records and update the court docket book. For her part, former Clerk and currently
Court Interpreter Cervantes was found to have failed to prepare the minutes of the court proceedings and
mark exhibits properly. Finally, Utility Worker Gigante still failed to stitch all court records accordingly.
For their respective infractions, the OCA found Sheriff Collado, Court Stenographers Doctor, Antonio, Sarsagat
and Esteban, Clerk Clemente, Court Interpreter Cervantes, and Utility Worker Gigante liable for simple neglect
of duties, which is classified as a less grave offense under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, punishable by suspension for 1 month and 1 day to 6 months for the first offense. Instead of
suspending them, however, the OCA recommended that a fine of P5,000.00 each be imposed upon them. The
OCA refused to give credence to their defense that they cannot cope with their work because of the court's
heavy caseload.
The Issue Before The Court
The sole issue before the Court is whether Judge Castada, Atty. Saguyod, Sheriff Collado, Court Stenographers
Doctor, Antonio, Sarsagat and Esteban, Clerk Clemente, Court Interpreter Cervantes, and Utility Worker
Gigante should be imposed the penalties as recommended by the OCA, for their various and respective
infractions in the performance of their official duties.
The Court's Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court wholly concurs with the findings and recommendations of
the OCA as enumerated above.
Judge Liberty O. Castada, Presiding Judge
A. On the Delay in the Disposition of Cases
"Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides that judges shall
perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable
promptness."
21
rll Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution mandates trial court judges to decide a case
within the reglementary period of 90 days, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within
twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme
Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts. (Emphasis
supplied)
Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 dictates:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Rule 3.05 A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
Thus, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent
needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases, making the 90-day period within which to
decide cases mandatory."
22
rll Corollarily, judges have always been exhorted to observe strict adherence to
the rule on speedy disposition of cases.
23
rll Delay in the disposition of cases is a major culprit in the erosion
of public faith and confidence in the judicial system, as judges have the sworn duty to administer justice
without undue delay, for justice delayed is justice denied.
24
rll
In Judge Castada's case, both judicial audits conducted in the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67 revealed that
there were many cases that were undecided notwithstanding the lapse of the 90-day reglementary period
within which they should be disposed, apart from those that have remained dormant or unacted upon for a
considerable amount of time. Judge Castada failed to decide, within the prescribed period, 40
25
rll cases
from the first audit and 22 cases from the second audit, or a total of 62 cases. In the absence of an extension
of time within which to decide these cases, which Judge Castada could have sought from the Court, her failure
to assiduously perform her judicial duties is simply inexcusable. An inexcusable failure to decide a case within
the prescribed 90-day period constitutes gross inefficiency
26
rll warranting a disciplinary sanction.
27
rll
B. On the Falsification of the Certificates of Service
A certificate of service is an instrument essential to the fulfillment by the judges of their duty to dispose of
their cases speedily as mandated by the Constitution.
28
rll A judge who fails to decide cases within the
reglementary period but continues to collect his salaries upon his certification that he has no pending matters
to resolve transgresses the constitutional right of the people to the speedy disposition of their cases.
29
rll
Notwithstanding her failure to dispose of cases within the prescribed period, Judge Castada made it appear in
her monthly Certificates of Service that she had decided or resolved cases within 90 days from their
submission. When she was preventively suspended in the Court's November 23, 2009 Resolution, which
suspension she served from January 13, 2010 to March 21, 2010, she nonetheless misrepresented on her
Certificates of Service in February and March 2010 that she rendered work for those months. Because of such
dishonest conduct, she was able to receive her salaries for the months when she was supposedly under
preventive suspension. A judge who falsifies her Certificate of Service is administratively liable for serious
misconduct and inefficiency.
30
rll
C. On Disregarding the Provisions of A.M. Nos. 02-11-10-SC and 02-11-11-SC
"A judge should observe the usual and traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he should hear both
sides with patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision at a
minimum."
31
rll Thus, he must neither sacrifice for expediencys sake the fundamental requirements of
due process nor forget that he must conscientiously endeavor each time to seek the truth, to know and aptly
apply the law, and to dispose of the controversy objectively and impartially."
32
rll
The serious infractions committed by Judge Castada were in cases involving petitions for nullity and
annulment of marriage and legal separation, the most disturbing and scandalous of which was the haste with
which she disposed of such cases. For the year 2010 alone, Judge Castada granted a total of 410 petitions of
this nature. The audits likewise showed that she acted on these petitions despite the fact that it was not
verified; that the OSG or the OPP were not furnished a copy of the petition within 5 days from its filing; that
the petition did not recite the true residence of the parties, which should be within the territorial jurisdiction
of Branch 67 for at least 6 months prior to the filing of the petition; or that the docket fees have not been fully
paid and jurisdiction over the person of the respondents have not been acquired.
The Court takes special exception to Civil Case No. 254-P07 (Dodgie Benaid v. Lea Benaid), which Judge
Castada granted notwithstanding the following irregularities: (1) petitioner-husband Dodgie Benaid appeared
to be a resident of Infanta, Quezon, contrary to the information reflected on the petition that he was a
resident of Apulid, Paniqui, Tarlac; (2) respondent-wife Lea Benaid is not a resident, either, of Goldenland
Subdivision, Mabalacat, Pampanga, but of Infanta, Quezon; and (3) Lea was neither interviewed nor
investigated by the public prosecutor in arriving at the conclusion that no collusion exists between her and her
husband. In fact, records show that Dodgie Benaid, the Chief of Police of Real, Quezon, was eventually found
guilty of misconduct and dishonesty for falsely claiming in his petition for nullity of marriage that he was a
resident of Apulid, Tarlac and that his wife, Lea, was a resident of Mabalacat, Pampanga.
The OCA has extensively elucidated on the transgressions committed by Judge Castada, which the Court
adopts in its entirety. For her blatant disregard of the provisions of A.M. Nos. 02-11-10-SC and 02-11-11-SC,
Judge Castada is thus found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure. Thus, in Pesayco v.
Layague, the Court held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
No less than the Code of Judicial conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the laws and maintain
professional competence. Indeed, competence is a mark of a good judge. A judge must be acquainted with
legal norms and precepts as well as with procedural rules. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity
with the rules, he erodes the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of
the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the court the duty to be
proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. Basic rules of procedure
must be at the palm of a judges hands.
33
rll Moreover, the reprehensible haste with which she granted
petitions for nullity and annulment of marriage and legal separation, despite noncompliance with the
appropriate rules and evident irregularities in the proceedings, displayed her utter lack of competence and
probity, and can only be considered as grave abuse of authority.
Atty. Paulino I. Saguyod, Branch Clerk of Court
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Trocino, the Court explained the functions and responsibilities of a
clerk of court, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Clerks of court perform vital functions in the prompt and sound administration of justice. Their office is the
hub of adjudicative and administrative orders, processes, and concerns. Clerks of court are charged not only
with the efficient recording, filing, and management of court records but also with administrative supervision
over court personnel. A clerk of court is the personnel officer of the court who exercises general supervision
over all court personnel, enforces regulations, initiates investigations of erring employees, and recommends
appropriate action to the judge. They play a vital role in the complement of the court.
34
rll
In the extensive results of the judicial audits conducted by the OCA, Atty. Saguyod miserably failed to meet the
standards required of an effective and competent clerk of court. He arrogated unto himself functions which
were not his, and at the same time, failed to perform duties which were incumbent upon him to do.
Records further show that Branch 67 has been remiss in the submission of the reportorial requirements, as
evidenced by the fact that as of March 21, 2011, the latest Docket Inventory of Cases submitted by Branch 67
is for January to June 2010, and the latest Monthly Report of Cases is for November 2010.
35
rll Clearly, Atty.
Saguyod violated Administrative Circular No. 4-2004 dated February 4, 2004, which requires the Monthly
Report of Cases to be filed with the Court on or before the 10
th
day of the succeeding month, as well as
Administrative Circular No. 76-2007 dated August 31, 2007 which in turn requires all trial judges and their
clerks of court to submit the docket inventory of cases not later than the first week of February and the first
week of August each year.
As aptly pointed out by the OCA, when he assumed the position of Clerk of Court of Branch 67, Atty. Saguyod
is presumed to be ready, willing, and able to perform his tasks with utmost devotion and efficiency, failing
which, he becomes administratively liable. Thus, Atty. Saguyod is administratively liable for inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties.
Sheriff Lourdes E. Collado
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, the Court expounded on the duty of the sheriff with respect to effecting a
valid service of summons, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due care, utmost diligence, and
reasonable promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice. Thus, they
are enjoined to try their best efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant. On the other hand, since
the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful,
persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the defendant. For substituted service of summons
to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a
reasonable period [of one month] which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service.
"Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the
sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be
confirmed or accepted.
36
rll (Emphasis supplied)
With Sheriff Collado's admission that she indeed failed to observe the requirements to effect a valid
substituted service of summons set forth in Manotoc v. Court of Appeals
37
rll in the 10 cases assigned to
her, and upon her assurances to strictly observe these rules in the future, the Court therefore reminds Sheriff
Collado to endeavor to commit to memory the rules on proper service of summons.
Court Stenographers Marylinda C. Doctor, Evelyn B. Antonio, Rosalie P. Sarsagat and Cheryl B. Esteban; Clerk
George P. Clemente; Court Interpreter Maritoni Florian C. Cervantes; Utility Worker Ruben A. Gigante
Section 17 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court provides for the functions and duties of a court stenographer,
which states in part:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 17. Stenographer. It shall be the duty of the stenographer who has attended a session of a court either in
the morning or in the afternoon, to deliver to the clerk of court, immediately at the close of such morning or
afternoon session, all the notes he has taken, to be attached to the record of the case; and it shall likewise be
the duty of the clerk to demand that the stenographer comply with said duty. The clerk of court shall stamp
the date on which such notes are received by him. When such notes are transcribed, the transcript shall be
delivered to the clerk, duly initialed on each page thereof, to be attached to the record of the case.
Further, Administrative Circular No. 24-90
38
rll requires all stenographers to transcribe all stenographic
notes and to attach the transcripts to the records of the case not later than 20 days from the time the notes
were taken. Stenographers are also required to accomplish a verified monthly certification to monitor their
compliance with this directive. In the absence of such certification or for failure or refusal to submit the
certification, the stenographers salary shall be withheld.
In the Court's November 23, 2009 Resolution, issued pursuant to the results of the first audit conducted by the
OCA, Stenographers Doctor, Antonio, Sarsagat and Esteban were already directed by the Court to attach their
stenographic notes and transcripts of stenographic notes to the case records. Likewise, Clerk Clemente, who
was in charge of civil cases, was advised to attach registry receipts and registry returns to their respective
records, arrange papers chronologically, complete records pagination and update his docket book. Similarly,
Court Interpreter Cervantes was ordered to prepare the Minutes of proceedings and mark exhibits properly,
and Utility Worker Gigante was tasked to stitch all court records properly.
Unfortunately, by the time the second audit had been concluded on February 4, 2011, all of them miserably
failed to complete the respective tasks assigned to them, for which they must be held administratively liable.
On this note, the Court takes the opportunity to remind judges, clerks of court, and other court employees
that all of them share in the same duty and obligation to ascertain that justice is dispensed promptly. In order
to realize this end, they must be able to work together and mutually assist one another. However, it bears to
stress that it is the judge who has, at the end of the day, the ultimate responsibility to ensure that the
professional competence of her staff is constantly displayed, and to take the necessary steps when she feels
that the same is not observed or begins to take a downward path. Thus, judges should supervise their court
personnel to guarantee the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance
of high standards of public service and fidelity.
39
rll
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds:
(a) JUDGE LIBERTY. 0. CASTANEDA guilty of dishonesty, gross ignorance of the law and procedure, gross
misconduct and incompetency and hereby DISMISSES her from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or -controlled corporations;
(b) ATTY. PAULINO I. SAGUYOD guilty of inefficiency and incompetency and hereby SUSPENDS him for six (6)
months and one (1) day, without salaries and other benefits, with warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely;
(c) SHERIFF LOURDES E. COLLADO; COURT STENOGRAPHERS MARYLINDA C. DOCTOR, EVELYN B. ANTONIO,
ROSALIE P. SARSAGAT AND CHERYL B. ESTEBAN; CLERK GEORGE P. CLEMENTE; COURT INTERPRETER
MARITONI FLORIAN C. CERVANTES and UTILITY WORKER RUBEN A. GIGANTE guilty .of simple neglect of duties
and hereby imposes upon them a FINE in the amount of P5,000.00 each, with wan1ing that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the records of Judge Castaneda, Atty. Saguyod, Sheriff Collado,
Stenographers Doctor, Antonio, Sarsagat and Esteban, Clerk Clemente, Court Interpreter Cervantes and Utility
Worker Gigante on file with the Court.rll
EN BANC

[A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232 : April 10, 2012]

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE CADER P. INDAR, PRESIDING JUDGE
AND ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 14, COTABATO CITY AND BRANCH
15, SHARIFF AGUAK, MAGUINDANAO, RESPECTIVELY, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative complaint for gross misconduct and dishonesty against respondent Judge Cader P.
Indar, Al Haj (Judge Indar), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14, Cotabato City and
Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao.cralaw

This case originated from reports by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City to the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) that they have received an alarming number of decisions, resolutions, and orders
on annulment of marriage cases allegedly issued by Judge Indar.

To verify the allegations against Judge Indar, the OCA conducted a judicial audit in RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch
15, where the Audit Team found that the list of cases submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and
Quezon City do not appear in the records of cases received, pending or disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch
15. Likewise, the annulment decisions did not exist in the records of RTC-Cotabato, Branch 14. The Audit Team
further observed that the case numbers in the list submitted by the Local Civil Registrars are not within the
series of case numbers recorded in the docket books of either RTC-Shariff Aguak or RTC-Cotabato.

At the same time, the Audit Team followed-up Judge Indars compliance with Deputy Court Administrator
(DCA) Jesus Edwin A. Villasors 1st Indorsement, dated 15 February 2010, relative to the letter
[1]
of Ms. Miren
Galloway, Manager-Permanent Entry Unit, Australian Embassy, Manila (Australian Embassy letter), asking
confirmation on the authenticity of Judge Indars decision, dated 23 May 2007, in Spec. Proc. No. 06-581,
entitled Chona Chanco Aguiling v. Alan V. Aguiling, for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. As regards this
case, the Audit Team found that Spec. Proc. No. 06-584 does not exist in the records of cases filed, pending or
disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak.

Subsequently, the Audit Team made the following conclusions:
1. The list in Annexes A; A-1; A-2 and A-3 are not found in the list of cases filed, pending or decided in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak [Maguindanao] which is based in Cotabato City, nor in the
records of the Office of the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City;

2. There are apparently decisions of cases which are spurious, as these did not pass through the regular
process such as filing, payment of docket fees, trial, etc. which are now circulating and being registered in
Local Civil Registrars throughout the country, the extent of which is any bodys guess;

3. The authenticity of the signatures appearing thereon could only be validated by handwriting experts of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI);

4. The participation of any lower court officials and/or employees could not be ascertained except probably
through a more thorough discreet investigation and or entrapment; [and]

5. There is a possibility that more of this (sic) spurious documents may appear and cause damage to the
Courts Integrity.
[2]


Meanwhile, in compliance with DCA Villasors Indorsement and in response to the Australian Embassy letter,
Judge Indar explained, in a Letter dated 10 March 2010, that this court is a Court of General Jurisdiction and
can therefore act even on cases involving Family Relations. Hence, the subject decision rendered by this Court
annulling the marriage of your client is VALID and she is free to marry.
[3]


In a Memorandum dated 26 April 2010, the OCA recommended that (1) the matter be docketed as a regular
administrative matter; (2) the matter be assigned to a Court of Appeals Justice for Investigation, Report, and
Recommendation; and (3) Judge Indar be preventively suspended, pending investigation.

In a Resolution dated 4 May 2010, the Court En Banc (1) docketed this administrative matter as A.M. No. RTJ-
10-2232,
[4]
and (2) preventively suspended Judge Indar pending investigation of this case.

The case was initially raffled to Justice Rodil V. Zalameda of the Court of Appeals, Manila for investigation. The
case was re-raffled to Justice Angelita A. Gacutan (Justice Gacutan) of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro
due to its proximity to the Regional Trial Courts involved.

Justice Gacutan set the case for hearing on several dates and sent the corresponding notices of hearing to
Judge Indar at his known addresses, namely, his official stations in RTC-Cotabato and RTC-Shariff Aguak and
residence address.

The first notice of hearing dated 21 June 2010, which was sent via registered mail and private courier LBC,
scheduled the hearings on 14, 15, and 16 July 2010 and directed Judge Indar to submit in affidavit form his
explanation. The LBC records show that this notice, which was delivered to Judge Indars official stations, was
received by one Mustapha Randang on 28 June 2010.

The scheduled hearing was postponed and reset to 20, 21 and 22 July 2010. The notice of postponement was
sent to Judge Indar via registered mail on 6 July 2010 to his official stations and was received again by
Mustapha Randang on 8 July 2010.

Judge Indar failed to attend the hearing as rescheduled and to submit the affidavit as required. Thus, in an
Order of 23 July 2010, Justice Gacutan directed Judge Indar to explain his non-appearance, and reset the
hearing to 10 and 11 August 2010. The Order was sent to his residence address in M. Tan Subdivision, Gonzalo
Javier St., Rosary Heights, Cotabato City. The LBC report indicated that the Order was received by a certain
Mrs. Asok.

Justice Gacutan also sent a letter dated 23 July 2010 addressed to Atty. Umaima L. Silongan (Atty. Silongan),
Acting Clerk of Court of RTC-Cotabato, directing her to serve the notice of hearing scheduled on 10 and 11
August 2010 to Judge Indar and to report the steps taken to effect service of the same. Atty. Silongan
submitted a Return of Service, informing that the notices sent to Judge Indar had remained unserved, as the
latter left Cotabato City in April 2010 and his location since then was unknown.

In a Resolution of 28 September 2010, this Court directed Justice Gacutan to conduct further investigation to
determine the authenticity of the questioned decisions allegedly rendered by Judge Indar annulling certain
marriages. The Court required Justice Gacutan to ascertain whether the cases were properly filed in court, and
who are the parties responsible for the issuance of the questioned decisions, and to submit a report thereon
within 60 days from receipt of the Resolution.

In compliance with the Courts Resolution, Justice Gacutan directed the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and
Quezon City and Atty. Silongan to submit certified true copies of the questioned decisions and to testify
thereon.

Only the Civil Registrars were present during the hearings on 4 and 5 November 2010. Their testimonies are
summarized as follows:
Testimonies of Ma. Josefina Encarnacion A. Ocampo, City Civil Registrar of Manila

TSN, November 4, 2010

As City Civil Registrar, she is mandated to receive all registered documents that will affect the status of the
person like the birth, death and marriage contract, court decrees regarding annulment, adoption,
legitimization, the affidavit using the surname of the father, naturalization, the selection of citizenship, etc.
The documents are forwarded to their office after they are being registered by the concerned parties.

In the case of annulment of marriage, a copy of the decision is submitted to the Civil Registrar by the one who
had his marriage annulled. Per administrative order, it is the duty of the Clerk of Court to furnish them a copy
of the Decision. After the copies of decisions are submitted to them, they are mandated to verify the
authenticity of the decision by writing a verification letter to the Clerk of Court before making the annotation
or changing the parties status.

She identified the list of cases of annulment of marriages and petitions changing status of persons (annexes
A-1 and A-2) which all came from a court in Cotabato. All the cases listed in A-2 have already been
confirmed or annotated in the records of the Manila Civil Registry. She affirmed that the said cases in the list
were certified true by the clerk of court. As their duty to annotate the said decrees to their records are merely
ministerial, they do not question the decrees however peculiar they may seem.

The cases listed in the document marked as Annex A-2 were also cases that came from Cotabato City for their
annotation. Although these cases have been certified true by the Clerk of Court, their annotation and
confirmation were held in abeyance due to the on-going investigation of Judge Indar.

Testimony of Salvador Cario,
Chief of Records Division, City Civil Registrar of Quezon City
TSN, November 4, 2010

He generally supervises the retrieval of all the records or documents in their office. He also signs certified true
copies of birth, marriage contract, death certificate and certified true copies of Courts decisions furnished to
them by different courts.

With regards the decisions issued by the Court in provinces, once the Judge issued the decision regarding the
annulment, the parties concern should first register the decision to the Local Civil Registrar where the court is
situated. After they receive the decision from the Administrative Division, they would call or write the
concerned Local Civil Registrar to authenticate or verify the records. He identified the cases coming from a
Cotabato court that were submitted to them for annotation.

The subject decisions listed in the annexes which were decided by a court in Cotabato City were already
annotated and verified. However he could not ascertain who from the court verified the authenticity or
existence of such decisions as he was not the one who personally called to verify and authenticate them from
the court where the listed Decisions/Orders originate.
[5]


The Civil Registrar of Manila submitted copies of Decisions, Orders and Resolutions, all signed by Judge Indar,
in forty three (43) cases for annulment of marriage, correction of entry and other similar cases from RTC-
Cotabato City, Branch 15. All the decisions were accompanied by the corresponding Letter of Atty. Silongan,
affirming each of the decisions as true and authentic based on the records, while thirty six (36) of such
decisions are accompanied by Atty. Silongans certification affirming the genuineness of Judge Indars
signature affixed on the Decisions.
[6]


On the other hand, the Civil Registrar of Quezon City submitted twenty five (25) Decisions, Orders, and
Resolutions issued by RTC-Cotabato City, Branch 15, which were transmitted to the Registrars office for
annotation and recording. All the Decisions were signed by Judge Indar, and accompanied by Certificates of
Finality affirming the genuineness of Judge Indars signature appearing above the name of Judge Cader P.
Indar. The Certificates of Finality were issued by Atty. Silongan and in one case, by Abie Amilil, the OIC-Branch
Clerk of Court.
[7]


Meanwhile, Atty. Silongan, despite notice, failed to attend the hearing. She explained in a Manifestation of 8
November 2010 that she received the Notice only on 8 November 2010 because she was on leave from 1
October 1 to 30 November 2010. Thus, the hearing was reset to 11 and 12 January 2011. However, on the
scheduled hearing, Atty. Silongan still failed to appear.

Justice Gacutan sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to locate the whereabouts
of Judge Indar, as well as of Atty. Silongan. After several exchanges of correspondence, the NBI, in a Letter
dated 22 March 2011, provided the residence addresses of both Judge Indar and Atty. Silongan.

Meanwhile, Judge George C. Jabido (Judge Jabido), Acting Presiding Judge of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15,
was directed to verify the authenticity of the records of the subject Decisions and to appear at the hearing on
29 March 2011. The hearing was canceled due to the judicial reorganization in the Court of Appeals.

This administrative matter was re-raffled to Justice Abraham B. Borreta (Justice Borreta) since Justice Gacutan
was reassigned to Manila effective 11 April 2011. Justice Borreta set the hearing on 27 to 29 June 2011.
Notices of hearing were sent to Judge Indar and Atty. Silongan at the addresses provided by the NBI and at
their previous mailing addresses. The registered mails addressed to Judge Indar were returned for the
following reasons: (1) addressee out of town, move to another place and (2) addressee unknown. The
Notice sent to Atty. Silongan was also returned and per LBC report, the consignee has moved to an unknown
address.

Judge Jabido, who was notified of the hearing, testified that:
In compliance with the directive of the Investigating Justice to verify the authenticity of the records of the
listed decisions, judgments and orders, he issued memos to the officers of the Court, the Branch Clerk of
Court, the docket clerk, directing them to produce and secure copies of the minutes and other documents
related therein. He personally checked the records of the RTC. The Records of the RTC are bereft of evidence
to show that regular and true proceedings were had on these cases. There is no showing that a docket fee has
been paid for each corresponding cases. There is also no showing that the parties were notified of a scheduled
hearing as calendared. There is also no record that a hearing was conducted. No stenographic notes of the
actual proceedings were also made. He could not also determine when the said cases were submitted for
decision as it was not calendared for that purpose.
[8]


Judge Jabido also submitted a report, portions of which read:
The undersigned took extra efforts to locate any record of the cases involving the parties as enumerated in the
list. The undersigned even issued Memorandum to the Branch Clerk of Court, the docket clerk and other
responsible officers of the Court to produce and secure copies of any pleading/documents related to these
cases enumerated in the list but his efforts proved futile, hence:

a) to this Court, there is no record on file of all the enumerated cases contained in the list.

b) to this Court, it is bereft of any evidence on whether the Hon. Judge Indar conducted a hearing in these
cases.

x x x x

There is absence of any record showing compliance of the same. It is hereby submitted that the manner upon
which the questioned annulment and correction cases, as contained herein in the attached list, allegedly
decided by the Hon. Judge Indar were commenced are clearly doubtful.

Firstly, there is no showing of compliance on the rules prescribed.

x x x x

There is no showing that a verified Petition was officially filed in writing and giving (sic) an opportunity for the
Respondents to be heard by himself or by counsel. x x x
[9]


To support his findings, Judge Jabido submitted: (1) copies of the Letters and Memoranda mentioned in the
report; (2) the Calendar of Cases in RTC-Cotabato, Branch 15, on various dates from the period starting April
2007 to 20 October 2009; and (3) the Docket Inventory in Civil Cases, Criminal Cases and Other Cases for the
period of January to December 2009 in RTC-Cotabato, Branch 15.

Subpoenas were sent to some of the parties in the questioned decisions, namely: Grace Elizarde Reyes (Special
Case No. 1049), Buenaventura Mojica (Apl. Proc. No. 08-1931), Marie Christine N. Florendo (Civil Case No.
519), Jesse Yamson Faune, Jr. (Special Civil Case 08-2366), Rosemarie Tongson Ramos (Special Case No. 08-
1871) and Melissa Sangan-Demafelis (Spl. Proc. 07-2262) to determine whether they filed the petitions for
annulment of marriage and whether proceedings were actually had before Judge Indars sala in relation to
their cases. All the subpoenas were returned to the Court of Appeals.

In his Report dated 2 September 2011, Justice Borreta first determined whether the requirements of due
process had been complied with since there was no proof that Judge Indar personally and actually received
any of the notices sent to him in the course of the investigation.

Justice Borreta differentiated administrative due process with judicial due process. He stated that while a day
in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest
upon different principles.

Justice Borreta noted that all possible means to locate Judge Indar and to personally serve the court notices to
him were resorted to. The notices of hearing were sent to Judge Indars known addresses, namely, his sala in
RTC-Cotabato Branch 14 and RTC-Shariff Aguak Branch 15, and at his residence address. However, none of the
notices appeared to have been personally received by Judge Indar.

Notwithstanding, Justice Borreta concluded that the requirements of due process have been complied with.
Justice Borreta stated that Judge Indar was aware of a pending administrative case against him. The notice of
this Courts Resolution of 4 May 2010, preventively suspending Judge Indar, was mailed and sent to him at his
sala in RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15.

Justice Borreta proceeded to determine Judge Indars administrative liability, and found the latter guilty of
serious misconduct and dishonesty.

According to Justice Borreta, Judge Indars act of issuing decisions on annulment of marriage cases without
complying with the stringent procedural and substantive requirements of the Rules of Court for such cases
clearly violates the Code of Judicial Conduct. Judge Indar made it appear that the annulment cases underwent
trial, when the records show no judicial proceedings occurred.

Moreover, Judge Indars act of affirming in writing before the Australian Embassy the validity of a decision he
allegedly rendered, when in fact that case does not appear in the courts records, constitutes dishonesty.

Justice Borreta recommended the dismissal of Judge Indar from service, and the investigation of Atty.
Silongan, who is not included as respondent in this case, on her participation in the certification of the
authenticity of the spurious Decisions.

The sole issue in this case is whether Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty.

We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice.

The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which govern the conduct of disciplinary and
non-disciplinary proceedings in administrative cases, clearly provide that technical rules of procedure and
evidence do not strictly apply to administrative proceedings. Section 3, Rule I of the Uniform Rules states:
Section 3. Technical Rules in Administrative Investigations. Administrative investigations shall be conducted
without necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial
proceedings.

In Cornejo v. Gabriel,
[10]
the Court held that notice and hearing are not indispensable in administrative
investigations, thus:
The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an administrative proceeding and not with a
judicial proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on constitutional Law, has well said, due
process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by means of which the Government is
carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is as much due
process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in
administrative proceedings it is otherwise since they rest upon different principles. In certain proceedings,
therefore, of an administrative character, it may be stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a
notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law. x x x
[11]
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

It is settled that technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative
proceedings. Thus, administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense.
[12]
It is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is
decided.
[13]
Otherwise stated, in the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be
safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.
[14]


The Court emphasized in Cornejo
[15]
the Constitutional precept that public office is a public trust,
[16]
which is
the underlying principle for the relaxation of the requirements of due process of law in administrative
proceedings, thus:
Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an
office as property. It is, however, well settled in the United States, that a public office is not property within
the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust or agency.
[17]
(Emphasis
supplied)

In this case, Judge Indar was given ample opportunity to controvert the charges against him. While there is no
proof that Judge Indar personally received the notices of hearing issued by the Investigating Justices, the first
two notices of hearing were received by one Mustapha Randang of the Clerk of Court, RTC-Cotabato, while
one of the notices was received by a certain Mrs. Asok, who were presumably authorized and capable to
receive notices on behalf of Judge Indar.

Further, Judge Indar cannot feign ignorance of the administrative investigation against him because aside from
the fact that the Courts Resolution suspending him was mailed to him, his preventive suspension was
reported in major national newspapers.
[18]
Moreover, Judge Indar was repeatedly sent notices of hearings to
his known addresses. Thus, there was due notice on Judge Indar of the charges against him. However, Judge
Indar still failed to file his explanation and appear at the scheduled hearings. Consequently, the investigation
proceeded ex parte in accordance with Section 4, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
[19]


Public office is a public trust.
[20]
This constitutional principle requires a judge, like any other public servant and
more so because of his exalted position in the Judiciary, to exhibit at all times the highest degree of honesty
and integrity.
[21]
As the visible representation of the law tasked with dispensing justice, a judge should conduct
himself at all times in a manner that would merit the respect and confidence of the people.
[22]


Judge Indar miserably failed to live up to these exacting standards.

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez,
[23]
the Court explained the difference between simple misconduct
and grave misconduct, thus:
The Court defines misconduct as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves
any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules,
which must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a
charge of grave misconduct.

In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases which do not exist in the
records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
Cotabato City. There is nothing to show that (1) proceedings were had on the questioned cases; (2) docket
fees had been paid; (3) the parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared; (4) hearings had been
conducted; or (5) the cases were submitted for decision. As found by the Audit Team, the list of case titles
submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City are not found in the list of cases filed,
pending or decided in RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, nor in the records of the Office of the Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. In other words, Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the
law, issued decisions on the questioned annulment of marriage cases, without any showing that such cases
underwent trial and complied with the statutory and jurisprudential requisites for voiding marriages. Such act
undoubtedly constitutes gross misconduct.

The Court condemns Judge Indars reprehensible act of issuing Decisions that voided marital unions, without
conducting any judicial proceedings. Such malfeasance not only makes a mockery of marriage and its life-
changing consequences but likewise grossly violates the basic norms of truth, justice, and due process. Not
only that, Judge Indars gross misconduct greatly undermines the peoples faith in the judiciary and betrays
public trust and confidence in the courts. Judge Indars utter lack of moral fitness has no place in the Judiciary.
Judge Indar deserves nothing less than dismissal from the service.

The Court defines dishonesty as:
x x x a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty,
probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or
betray.
[24]


In this case, Judge Indar issued Decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases when in fact he did not
conduct any judicial proceedings on the cases. Not even the filing of the petitions occurred. Judge Indar made
it appear in his Decisions that the annulment cases complied with the stringent requirements of the Rules of
Court and the strict statutory and jurisprudential conditions for voiding marriages, when quite the contrary is
true, violating Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a judge perform official duties
honestly.

As found by the Audit Team, the list of cases submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City
do not appear in the records of cases received, pending, or disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, which
Judge Indar presided. The cases do not likewise exist in the docket books of the Office of the Clerk of Court,
RTC-Cotabato. The Audit Team also noted that the case numbers in the list are not within the series of case
numbers recorded in the docket books of either RTC-Shariff Aguak or RTC-Cotabato.

Moreover, Judge Jabido, Acting Presiding Judge of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, verified the records of the
trial court and found nothing to show that proceedings were had on the questioned annulment cases. There
was nothing in the records to show that (1) petitions were filed; (2) docket fees were paid; (3) the parties were
notified of hearings; (4) hearings were calendared and actually held; (5) stenographic notes of the proceedings
were taken; and (6) the cases were submitted for decision.

Among the questioned annulment decrees is Judge Indars Decision dated 23 May 2007, in Spec. Proc. No. 06-
581, entitled Chona Chanco Aguiling v. Alan V. Aguiling. Despite the fact that no proceedings were
conducted in the case, Judge Indar declared categorically, in response to the Australian Embassy letter, that
the Decision annulling the marriage is valid and that petitioner is free to marry. In effect, Judge Indar confirms
the truthfulness of the contents of the annulment decree, highlighting Judge Indars appalling dishonesty.

The Court notes that this is not Judge Indars first offense. In A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953,
[25]
the Court imposed on
him a fine of P10,000 for violating Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, when he issued a preliminary
injunction without any hearing and prior notice to the parties. In another case,A.M. No. RTJ-07-2069,
[26]
the
Court found him guilty of gross misconduct for committing violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and
accordingly fined him P25,000.

Since this is Judge Indars third offense, showing the depravity of his character and aggravating
[27]
the serious
offenses of gross misconduct and dishonesty,
[28]
the Court imposes on Judge Indar the ultimate penalty of
dismissal from the service, with its accessory penalties, pursuant to Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court.
[29]


This administrative case against Judge Indar shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him
as a member of the Bar, in accordance with AM. No. 02-9-02-SC.
[30]
This Resolution entitled Re: Automatic
Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan;
Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar, provides:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular
and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds
for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyers Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have
been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against
the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may
forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended,
disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar.Judgment in both respects may be
incorporated in one decision or resolution. (Emphasis supplied)

Indisputably, Judge Indars gross misconduct and dishonesty likewise constitute a breach of the following
Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful act.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION.

In addition, Judge Indars dishonest act of issuing decisions making it appear that the annulment cases
underwent trial and complied with the Rules of Court, laws, and established jurisprudence violates the
lawyers oath to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. Such violation is also a ground for
disbarment. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphasis supplied)

In Samson v. Caballero,
[31]
where the Court automatically disbarred the respondent judge, pursuant to the
provisions of AM. No. 02-9-02-SC, the Court held:
Under the same rule, a respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause
why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as member of the Bar.
The rule does not make it mandatory, before respondent may be held liable as a member of the bar, that
respondent be required to comment on and show cause why he should not be disciplinary sanctioned as a
lawyer separately from the order for him to comment on why he should not be held administratively liable as
a member of the bench. In other words, an order to comment on the complaint is an order to give an
explanation on why he should not be held administratively liable not only as a member of the bench but also
as a member of the bar. This is the fair and reasonable meaning of automatic conversion of administrative
cases against justices and judges to disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers. This will also serve the
purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the duplication or unnecessary replication of actions by treating an
administrative complaint filed against a member of the bench also as a disciplinary proceeding against him as
a lawyer by mere operation of the rule. Thus, a disciplinary proceeding as a member of the bar is impliedly
instituted with the filing of an administrative case against a justice of the Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals and
Court of Tax Appeals or a judge of a first- or second-level court.

It cannot be denied that respondents dishonesty did not only affect the image of the judiciary, it also put his
moral character in serious doubt and rendered him unfit to continue in the practice of law. Possession of good
moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the
practice of law. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those
counted within its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also accord continuing
fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general
public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. (Emphasis supplied)

Considering that Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty, constituting violations of the
Lawyers Oath, and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Judge Indar
deserves disbarment.

In so far as Atty. Silongan, is concerned, we adopt Justice Borretas recommendation to conduct an
investigation on her alleged participation in the authentication of the questioned Decisions.cralaw

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Cader P. Indar, Al Haj, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 14,
Cotabato City and Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao, guilty of Gross
Misconduct and Dishonesty for which he is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits due him,
except accrued leave benefits, if any, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.

Judge Indar is likewise DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and his name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into Judge Indars record as a member of the bar and notice of the same
be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts in the country.

The Office of the Court Administrator is ORDERED to investigate Atty. Umaima L. Silongan, Acting Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City, on her alleged participation in the authentication of the
questioned Decisions on the annulment of marriage cases issued by Judge Indar.

Let copies of this Decision be forwarded to the Local Civil Registrars of the City of Manila and Quezon City, the
same to form part of the records of Decisions of Judge Indar on the annulment of marriages filed with their
offices.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
INSTANCE SHOWING SIMPLE MISCONDUCT OF A JUDGE (Judicial Ethics)
Aida R. Campos, Alistair R. Campos, and Charmaine R. Campos v. Judge Eliseo M. Campos
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761, February 8, 2012
Carpio, J.

FACTS:
This is a complaint for serious misconduct, immorality and dishonesty filed by complainants against
respondent, former Presiding Judge of the MTC of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur.

Complainant Aida and respondent were married in 1981 and had two children, complainants Alistair and
Charmaine. In 2008, respondent filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, alleging that he and
Aida were both psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. For his part,
respondent is a homosexual who could not be intimate with his wife unless he imagined he was with another
man, while his wife had affairs with other men as a result of his homosexuality. To her defense, Aida denied
the allegations and filed for legal separation. According to her, respondent wanted their marriage annulled so
that he could marry another woman with whom he was having a relationship.

In the meantime, a separate case was pending against the respondent, to which a certain parcel of registered
land might be taken from the their property in the event of loss. Facts show that the title to such land was
kept by respondent in his drawer. When respondent could not find the title in his usual place for safekeeping,
he sought the advice of the Register of Deeds who told him to execute the affidavit of loss, to which he did.
Respondent then registered the title but in the name of Alistair, a minor at that time.


ISSUE:
Is respondent guilty of immorality, dishonesty, and serious misconduct?

HELD:
NO, respondent is not guilty of immorality, dishonesty and serious misconduct but only simple misconduct.

First, the complainants failed to present any proof of respondents alleged relationship with another woman,
so as to justify a charge for immorality. There was no evidence presented that respondent engaged in
scandalous conduct that would warrant the imposition of disciplinary action against him. However, the Court
reminded respondent of the judge's duty to conduct himself in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office. As such, he must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or
otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity
and justice.

Second, respondent was not guilty of dishonesty as regards the declaration of loss of title because respondent
did not appear to have acted in bad faith or committed dishonesty in executing the affidavit of loss of the title
to the property. As shown by the facts, he merely took the advice of the Register of Deeds in the execution of
the document.

Third, while respondent has not committed any serious misconduct, it is clear that respondent is guilty of
simple misconduct. In this case, respondent knew at that time of the registration of the property that he had a
pending case and that he could possibly lose the case. In order to manipulate the situation and taking
advantage of his knowledge of the law, respondent caused the registration of the property in Alistairs name
with the intention of defrauding a possible judgment-obligee. Clearly, it was an improper behavior that
warrants a disciplinary sanction by the Court.

Isidro Ablaza vs. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 158298
August 11, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner filed in the RTC of Masbate a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage contracted
between his late brother Cresenciano and his wife Leonila. The petitioner alleged that the marriage had been
celebrated in December 1949 without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only in January
1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He
insisted that Cresenciano died without any issue thereby he being the surviving brother is entitled to one half
of the real properties acquired by his brother, before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest;
and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of marriage of the spouses at any time, even
after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio. The RTC dismissed the petition stating
that the petitioner is not the proper party to file the action, not being a party to the marriage contracted
between the spouses and that his contention that he is considered a real party in interest, as he stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, is simply misplaced. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the
marriage of his deceased brother.

HELD:

The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. The validity of a marriage is tested according to the law
in force at the time the marriage is contracted. As a general rule, the nature of a marriage already celebrated
cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law. The applicable law was the old Civil
Code, the law in effect at the time of celebration of the marriage in 1949. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of
parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of the nullity of the marriage
had absolutely no application to the petitioner.

The old and new Civil Code contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision cannot be construed as giving a license to just any
person to bring an action. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a
material interest in the estate of his brother that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. It is
relevant to observe, moreover, that not all marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required a marriage
license for their validity.

The Supreme Court ruled that both the RTC and CA erroneously resolved the issue presented in this case. The
decision of the CA was reversed and set aside. The records of the case were returned to the RTC for further
proceedings.
G.R. No. 172198 June 16, 2009
MA. LOURDES C. DE CASTRO, Petitioner,
vs.
CRISPINO DE CASTRO, JR., OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR FOR MANILA, and THE OFFICE OF THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81856,
dated April 4, 2006, which found no grave abuse of discretion in the Orders dated August 20, 2003 and
December 12, 2003, issued by Acting Judge Marvic Balisi-Umali of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in
Civil Case No. 96-79135 for the declaration of nullity of marriage.
First, the facts:
Petitioner Ma. Lourdes C. De Castro and private respondent Crispino De Castro, Jr. were married on January 1,
1971. In 1996, private respondent filed a petition
2
for the declaration of nullity of their marriage before the
RTC of Manila.
In his petition, private respondent alleged that he was impulsive and reckless in his youth; that while still in
school, he impregnated petitioner, and they got married so as not to expose both their families to further
embarrassment; that their quarrels intensified during the marriage; that due to immaturity and inability to
cope with their problems, he abandoned his family many times and became involved in affairs with different
women. He further alleged that they tried to save their marriage through counseling, but to no avail. In 1992,
he left the family home for good, and lived with another woman with whom he had three illegitimate children.
For failure of petitioner to file her Answer to the petition and upon motion of private respondent, the case
was set for hearing and private respondent testified. Further, he presented psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Albaran, as
an expert witness. He then rested his case, with no opposition from the public prosecutor.
On June 22, 1998, the RTC annulled the marriage between petitioner and private respondent, viz.:
After a thorough review of the evidence adduced and the testimonies of petitioner [herein private
respondent] and Dra. Cecilia Albaran, the Court finds and so holds that both parties are psychologically
incapacitated to enter into marriage. The Court, therefore, is convinced that from the evidence presented,
there appears sufficient basis to declare that herein parties are psychologically incapacitated to enter into
marriage, which, under the provisions of the Family Code, is a valid ground for the annulment of marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Decision is hereby rendered declaring the marriage entered into by the
parties herein on January 1, 1971 at Santuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City null and void and of
no legal effect.
The Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City is hereby directed to cancel from the Registry of Marriages the
marriage contract entered into by the parties herein on January 1, 1971 at Mandaluyong City.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City for proper annotation
and recording, as required by law; the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the National Census and Statistics
Office for record purposes.
SO ORDERED.
3

On August 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave
4
to file an Omnibus Motion
5
seeking a new trial or
reconsideration of the June 22, 1998 Decision. She alleged that she was misled and prevented from
participating in the annulment case by private respondent, because of his promise of continuous adequate
support for the children, and the transfer of title to their three children of their family home, including its lot,
located in Blue Ridge Subdivision, Libis, Quezon City and another piece of real property in Tagaytay.
The trial court granted the omnibus motion in an Order dated December 11, 1998. In the Order, petitioner
was required to submit a question-and-answer form affidavit which would constitute her direct testimony.
Further, the cross-examination of petitioner and her witnesses was scheduled on February 4, 1999.
On December 27, 1999, petitioner filed her Answer. She controverted the allegations of private respondent.
She alleged that they were both psychologically and emotionally prepared for marriage; that, except for a few
slightly turbulent months in 1981, their life as a married couple was smooth and blissful and remained so for
twenty years, or until 1990; that they were well adapted to each other, and their quarrels were few and far
between; that the communication lines between them were always open and they were able to settle their
differences through discussion; that private respondent was a devoted and faithful husband, and did not
abandon them repeatedly; and that petitioner knew of only one extramarital affair of private respondent.
The trial court conducted hearings on petitioner's (1) application for support pendente lite and (2) urgent
motion for judicial deposit of petitioner's [herein private respondent's] separation benefits,
6
in light of his
retirement/separation from employment at Petron Corporation, effective August 31, 2000; and private
respondent's (3) motion for judicial approval of the alleged voluntary agreement on the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains and partition of the conjugal properties.
7
The first has been resolved,
8
but the
second and third remain pending.
On July 17, 2002, petitioner was to present her first witness. The trial court reset the hearing to August 21,
2002 as there was no return of the notice sent to private respondent and his counsel.
9

On August 21, 2002, petitioner started her direct testimony. However, considering the length of her
testimony, the continuance of her direct examination was set on October 2, 2002.
On September 30, 2002, private respondent moved to reset the October 2, 2002 hearing to November 13,
2002, due to his trip to Europe.
10

On November 8, 2002, private respondent again moved to reset the November 13, 2002 hearing to December
11, 2002 or at the earliest possible date as the calendar of the trial court would allow, for the reason that his
counsel was "out of the country for important personal reasons and cannot attend the hearing."
11

During the hearing on December 11, 2002, petitioner's counsel moved for its cancellation because of the
absence of petitioner who was at that time attending a very urgent business meeting in connection with her
volunteer work for Bantay Bata. The hearing was reset to February 6, 2003.
12
However, the records reveal that
no hearing was conducted on said date.
On the next hearing of February 20, 2003, petitioner's counsel again moved for the resetting of the hearing to
March 27, 2003.
13

On March 27, 2003, the hearing was reset to April 10, 2003 because the Presiding Judge was on official
leave.
14

On April 10, 2003, the hearing was again reset to May 8, 2003, by agreement of the parties.
15

On May 8, 2003, the hearing was likewise reset to July 25, 2003 because of the absence of counsel of both
petitioner and private respondent.
16

During the hearing on July 25, 2003, petitioner's counsel moved to reset the hearing because of the absence of
petitioner who was then in the U.S. helping her daughter in taking care of her newborn baby. The trial court
then ordered the resetting of the hearing to August 20, 2003 for the last time, viz.:
As prayed for by respondent's counsel for the cancellation of today's hearing as according to her the
respondent is out of the country, over the vehement objection of petitioner's counsel, the hearing today is
cancelled and reset for the last time to August 20, 2003 at 9:30 o'clock (sic) in the morning.
In the event the respondent cannot present any evidence on the next scheduled hearing, on proper motion
the case shall be submitted for decision.
It appears that the presentation of respondent's evidence had been reset twice at the instance of defendant's
counsel, the respondent is hereby directed to pay a postponement fee of Php100.00 and to show proof of
compliance.
Both counsels are notified in open Court.
SO ORDERED.
Given in open Court this 25th day of July 2003 in the City of Manila, Philippines.
17

In the hearing on August 20, 2003, counsel for petitioner again requested that it be cancelled and reset due to
the unavailability of witnesses. Petitioner was still in the U.S. taking care of her newborn grandchild, while Dr.
Maria Cynthia Ramos-Leynes, who conducted a psychiatric evaluation on petitioner, was likewise out of the
country, attending a convention. The motion was denied by the trial court, viz.:
In its Order of July 25, 2003, respondent was given today her last chance to present her evidence, with the
warning that if no evidence is presented today, then the case shall be submitted for decision.
In today's hearing, respondent failed to present any evidence. As ordered and on motion of petitioner's
counsel, the Court deems the respondent to have waived her right to present further evidence. In view
thereof, she is hereby given fifteen (15) days from today within which to make an offer of her exhibits, copy of
which she shall furnish the petitioner's counsel, who is hereby given the same period of time from receipt
thereof within which to make his comments thereon. Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the Court's
resolution on respondent's offer of exhibits, parties are directed to file their respective Memorandum of
Authorities.
Thereafter, this case which is of 1996 vintage shall be submitted for the decision once again.
SO ORDERED.
Given in open Court, this 20th day of August, 2003 in Manila.
18

Petitioner moved to reconsider the August 20, 2003 Order. She claimed that her reasons for her absence
during the hearings were justifiable and she had no intention to delay the proceedings of this case. Further,
she argued that there were pending incidents yet to be resolved by the trial court, referring to her motion for
judicial deposit of private respondent's separation benefits and private respondents motion for judicial
approval of the alleged voluntary agreement on the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains and
partition of the conjugal properties.
19

This motion was denied in an Order dated December 12, 2003, which states:
This resolves respondents Motion for Reconsideration on the August 20, 2003 Order directing her to submit
her formal offer of exhibits after the Court deemed her to have waived her right to present further evidence
for her failure to appear on the hearing which was previously set on said date by her counsel.
The record of the case reveals that respondent commenced the presentation of her evidence on August 21,
2002. The subsequent settings were all cancelled on motion of respondents counsel for one reason or
another.
On July 25, 2003, the hearing was again cancelled on motion of respondents counsel and was reset for the
last time to August 20, 2003 with the warning that if the respondent still fails to present evidence, the case
shall be submitted for decision. On August 20, 2003, respondent failed to adduce her evidence.
The respondents Motion for Reconsideration deserves a DENIAL.
It is more than apparent that the respondent was given all opportunity to adduce her evidence but she failed
to do so. The Court had stretched its leniency to the limit but it is apparent the respondent is merely trifling
with the Courts precious time.
Wherefore, respondents Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. Respondent is given ten (10) days
from notice to file her offer of exhibits.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, December 12, 2003.
20

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals,
seeking to annul the Orders dated August 20, 2003 and December 12, 2003, for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion. Upon motion of petitioner, the trial court held in abeyance its Order to file the formal
offer of exhibits, pending resolution by the Court of Appeals of the petition for certiorari.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It ruled:
. . . A reading of the assailed Orders reveals that public respondents denial of petitioners motion for
cancellation and resetting of the hearing for continuance of her testimony was for cause. We take notice of
the several postponements of the hearings on the continuation of petitioners testimony, mostly on account
of petitioners own urgings. Particularly, we find remarkably militating against petitioners cause the Order
dated 25 July 2003 where public respondent, maybe exasperated at petitioners seemingly shallow interest to
proceed with the case as manifested in the prior motions to cancel the hearing, dutifully warned that another
postponement of the scheduled presentation of testimony would compel the court to consider the case
submitted for decision. We see this as a reasonable exercise of discretion on the part of public respondent.
Petitioner was properly apprised and warned of the consequence of another non-appearance in the hearing.
Petitioner insists that her inability to be present on the scheduled hearing on August 20, 2003 was due to
physical impossibility to appear as she was out of the country on that day. We find the excuse flimsy. Aware in
advance that she could not make it on the 20 August 2003 hearing, the least that she could have done was to
instruct her counsel to make a timely representation with the court by filing an early motion-manifestation for
the resetting of the hearing. Between July 25, 2003 and August 20, 2003 she had sufficient time to file one.
Had the counsel not waited for the August 20, 2003 hearing to make the motion, petitioner may have elicited
a kinder action from public respondent.
x x x
The Orders being assailed are interlocutory that will lead to a rendering of a judgment in the case by public
respondent. Should such judgment be adverse to petitioner as she assumes it would be, she is not completely
rendered helpless and without remedy as there will always be the remedy of appeal where facts and issues
raised in the instant petition such as errors of law and errors of facts will still be ventilated and passed upon.
Certiorari is not available as a remedy against an interlocutory order except when such interlocutory order is
patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford an adequate and expeditious relief. We do not
find the assailed Orders patently erroneous and in case of an eventual unfavorable judgment, the remedy of
appeal is an adequate relief always available to petitioner. Hence, certiorari, in the case at bar, will not lie.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
21

Hence, this petition where petitioner invokes the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT JUDGE UMALI DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ISSUING HIS ORDERS DATED 20 AUGUST 2003 AND 12 DECEMBER 2003.
22

Petitioner argues that the lower courts erred in ruling that she waived her right to present further evidence
when she failed to appear at the August 20, 2003 hearing. She contends that in effect, she was declared in
default, which is violative of the state policy on marriage as a social institution and the due process clause of
the Constitution.
We disagree.
The instant case was set for hearing twelve times, or on the following dates:
1. July 17, 2002
2. August 21, 2002
3. October 2, 2002
4. November 13, 2002
5. December 11, 2002
6. February 6, 2003
7. February 20, 2003
8. March 27, 2003
9. April 10, 2003
10. May 8, 2003
11. July 25, 2003
12. August 20, 2003
The hearing of March 27, 2003 was cancelled because the presiding judge was on official leave, while the April
10, 2003 hearing was reset by agreement of the parties. Likewise, the hearing of May 8, 2003 was reset
because the counsels of both parties were absent.
On the other hand, the following postponements were made at the instance of private respondent: (1)
October 2, 2002 hearing, where private respondent, on September 30, 2002, moved to reset the hearing
because of his trip to Europe; and (2) November 13, 2002 hearing, where private respondent, on November 8,
2002, moved to reset the hearing because his counsel was out of the country for important personal reasons.
In contrast, the following postponements were made at the instance of petitioner: (1) December 11, 2002
hearing, where petitioner's counsel, on the day itself, moved for the cancellation of the hearing because of the
absence of his client who was at that time attending a very urgent business meeting in connection with her
volunteer work for Bantay Bata; (2) February 20, 2003 hearing, where petitioner's counsel, on the day itself,
moved for the resetting of the hearing; (3) July 25, 2003 hearing, where petitioner's counsel, on the day itself,
moved to reset the hearing because his client was in the U.S. taking care of her newborn grandchild; and (4)
August 20, 2003 hearing, where petitioner's counsel, again only on the day itself, moved to cancel the hearing
because his client was still in the U.S. Further, Dr. Ramos-Leynes, petitioner's witness who conducted a
psychiatric evaluation on her, was likewise out of the country.
We take note of the fact that all motions for postponement by petitioner were made on the scheduled hearing
dates themselves. On the August 20, 2003 hearing, despite previous warning that no further postponement
would be allowed, petitioner still failed to appear. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it pointed out
that petitioner obviously knew in advance that she could not make it to the August 20, 2003 hearing. As of the
last scheduled hearing of July 25, 2003, she was still out of the country. The least that petitioner could have
done was to instruct her counsel to make a timely representation with the trial court by filing an early motion-
manifestation for the resetting of the hearing. Between July 25, 2003 and August 20, 2003 she had sufficient
time to file one. Obviously, the warning by the court of the consequence of another non-appearance in the
hearing fell on deaf ears. After having been granted numerous motions for postponement, petitioner cannot
now claim that she was denied due process. In Ortigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa German Airlines,
23
we ruled that:
Where a party seeks postponement of the hearing of this case for reasons caused by his own inofficiousness,
lack of resourcefulness and diligence if not total indifference to his own interests or to the interests of those
he represents, thereby resulting in his failure to present his own evidence, the court would not extend to him
its mantle of protection. If it was he who created the situation that brought about the resulting adverse
consequences, he cannot plead for his day in court nor claim that he was so denied of it.
Further in Hap Hong Hardware Co. v. Philippine Company,
24
we sustained the trial court's denial of a motion
for postponement on the ground that the defendant's witnesses, officers of the company, could not come
because it was the beginning of the milling season in the municipality of San Jose, Mindoro Occidental and
their presence in the Central was necessary. We held that the reason adduced was "not unavoidable and one
that could not have been foreseen." We ratiocinated:
The reason adduced in support of the motion for postponement is not unavoidable and one that could not
have been foreseen. Defendant ought to have known long before the date of trial that the milling season
would start when the trial of the case would be held. The motion should have been presented long in advance
of the hearing, so that the court could have taken steps to postpone the trial without inconvenience to the
adverse party. As it is, however, the motion was presented on the day of the trial. Knowing as it should have
known that postponements lie in the court's discretion and there being no apparent reason why the
defendant could not have presented the motion earlier, thus avoiding inconvenience to the adverse party, the
appellant can not claim that the trial court erred in denying postponement. Under all the circumstances we
hold that the court was perfectly justified in denying the motion for postponement.
In the case at bar, petitioner's excuse that she was still in the U.S. taking care of her newborn grandchild,
while her witness, Dr. Maria Cynthia Ramos-Leynes, who conducted a psychiatric evaluation on her, was
likewise out of the country, attending a convention was unjustified. These reasons were "not unavoidable
and one that could not have been foreseen." The date of the trial was set one month prior, and as of July 25,
2003, petitioner was in the U.S. Certainly, petitioner would know in advance if she could make it to the August
20, 2003 hearing. Likewise, attending a convention is a scheduled event, also something known in advance. It
is the basic duty of a litigant to move for postponement before the day of the hearing, so that the court could
order its resetting and timely inform the adverse party of the new date. This was not the case at bar for the
subject motion was presented only on the day of the trial without any justification. We thus hold that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for postponement.
Consequently, we cannot strike down the trial courts following orders: (1) dated August 20, 2003, which
denied petitioners motion for postponement, and, instead, directed petitioner to submit her formal offer of
exhibits after the trial court considered her to have waived her right to present further evidence; and (2) dated
December 12, 2003, which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. These orders are not violative of
the state policy on marriage as a social institution, for the trial judge has the duty to resolve judicial disputes
without unreasonable delay.
Petitioner contends that because her direct examination has not been completed and as she has not been
cross-examined, her testimony has become useless. Apparently, petitioner is alluding to the rule that oral
testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-
examined by the adverse party; until such cross-examination has been finished, the testimony of the witness
cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form part of the evidence to be
considered by the court in deciding the case.
25
The rule will not apply to the instant case.
Private respondent, who was present in court during the August 20, 2003 hearing and did not register any
objection to the trial court's order nor move to strike out petitioner's testimony from the records, is deemed
to have waived his right to cross-examine petitioner. Thus, petitioner's testimony is not rendered worthless.
The waiver will not expunge the testimony of petitioner off the records. The trial court will still weigh the
evidence presented by petitioner vis--vis that of private respondent's. The situation is not akin to default at
all, where, for failure of defendant to file his responsive pleading and after evidence for the plaintiff has been
received ex parte, the court renders a judgment by default on the basis of such evidence.1avvphi1
Lastly, the appellate court correctly pointed out that the assailed Orders are interlocutory and there is yet no
judgment in the case by the court a quo. If the trial court renders a judgment that is adverse to petitioner, she
can always avail of the remedy of appeal to protect her legal rights.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81856,
dated April 4, 2006, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Pacete vs Carriaga
231 SCRA 321

FACTS:

Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her
erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her
and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to
Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second
marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August
1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living
with Clarita.

The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an answer,
which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the
defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to
declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs evidence
during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in
favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners motion for extension of
time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980
which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and void the marriage of Pacete to
Clarita.

HELD:

The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or
by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting
attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested
proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that
marriage is more than a mere contract.

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal
separation must in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,
obviously in order to provide the parties a cooling-off period. In this interim, the court should take steps
toward getting the parties to reconcile.

The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a
provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of
marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for
legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a
collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it
that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012
WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner,
vs.
AVELINA AMORES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
1
under Rule 45 of the Rules of CoLlli assailing the
October 8, 2009 Decision
2
and January 24, 2011 Resolution
3
of the court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
01940, which affirmed the February 28, 2007 Decision
4
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental,
Branch 34 in Civil Case No. I 2884. The foregoing rulings dissolved the conjugal partnership of gains of Willem
Beumer (petitioner) and Avelina Amores (respondent) and distributed the properties forming part of the said
property regime.
The Factual Antecedents
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29, 1980. After several years, the
RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 32, declared the nullity of their marriage in the Decision
5
dated November 10,
2000 on the basis of the former?s psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code.
Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership
6
dated December 14, 2000
praying for the distribution of the following described properties claimed to have been acquired during the
subsistence of their marriage, to wit:
By Purchase:
a. Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 22846, containing an area of 252 square meters (sq.m.),
including a residential house constructed thereon.
b. Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21974, containing an area of 806 sq.m.,
including a residential house constructed thereon.
c. Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21306, containing an area of 756 sq.m.
d. Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered
by TCT No. 21307, containing an area of 45 sq.m.
By way of inheritance:
e. 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 23567, containing an area of
2,635 sq.m. (the area that appertains to the conjugal partnership is 376.45 sq.m.).
f. 1/15 of Lot 2055-I of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 23575, containing an area of 360
sq.m. (the area that appertains to the conjugal partnership is 24 sq.m.).
7

In defense,
8
respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1 and
2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth being that
she used her own personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds and Lots
2055-A and 2055-I by way of inheritance.
9
She submitted a joint affidavit executed by her and petitioner
attesting to the fact that she purchased Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon using her own
money.
10
Accordingly, respondent sought the dismissal of the petition for dissolution as well as payment for
attorney?s fees and litigation expenses.
11

During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of
respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as his
disability benefit
12
since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. He also
claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was contrary to
Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid.
13

For her part, respondent maintained that the money used for the purchase of the lots came exclusively from
her personal funds, in particular, her earnings from selling jewelry as well as products from Avon, Triumph and
Tupperware.
14
She further asserted that after she filed for annulment of their marriage in 1996, petitioner
transferred to their second house and brought along with him certain personal properties, consisting of drills,
a welding machine, grinders, clamps, etc. She alleged that these tools and equipment have a total cost of
P500,000.00.
15

The RTC Ruling
On February 28, 2007, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 34 rendered its Decision, dissolving the parties?
conjugal partnership, awarding all the parcels of land to respondent as her paraphernal properties; the tools
and equipment in favor of petitioner as his exclusive properties; the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and
2142 as co-owned by the parties, the dispositive of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
between petitioner Willem Beumer and respondent Avelina Amores considering the fact that their marriage
was previously annulled by Branch 32 of this Court. The parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Titles
Nos. 22846, 21974, 21306, 21307, 23567 and 23575 are hereby declared paraphernal properties of
respondent Avelina Amores due to the fact that while these real properties were acquired by onerous title
during their marital union, Willem Beumer, being a foreigner, is not allowed by law to acquire any private land
in the Philippines, except through inheritance.
The personal properties, i.e., tools and equipment mentioned in the complaint which were brought out by
Willem from the conjugal dwelling are hereby declared to be exclusively owned by the petitioner.
The two houses standing on the lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 21974 and 22846 are hereby
declared to be co-owned by the petitioner and the respondent since these were acquired during their marital
union and since there is no prohibition on foreigners from owning buildings and residential units. Petitioner
and respondent are, thereby, directed to subject this court for approval their project of partition on the two
houses aforementioned.
The Court finds no sufficient justification to award the counterclaim of respondent for attorney?s fees
considering the well settled doctrine that there should be no premium on the right to litigate. The prayer for
moral damages are likewise denied for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
16

It ruled that, regardless of the source of funds for the acquisition of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4, petitioner could
not have acquired any right whatsoever over these properties as petitioner still attempted to acquire them
notwithstanding his knowledge of the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of private
lands.
17
This was made evident by the sworn statements petitioner executed purporting to show that the
subject parcels of land were purchased from the exclusive funds of his wife, the herein
respondent.
18
Petitioner?s plea for reimbursement for the amount he had paid to purchase the foregoing
properties on the basis of equity was likewise denied for not having come to court with clean hands.
The CA Ruling
Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA, contesting only the RTC?s award of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 in favor
of respondent. He insisted that the money used to purchase the foregoing properties came from his own
capital funds and that they were registered in the name of his former wife only because of the constitutional
prohibition against foreign ownership. Thus, he prayed for reimbursement of one-half (1/2) of the value of
what he had paid in the purchase of the said properties, waiving the other half in favor of his estranged ex-
wife.
19

On October 8, 2009, the CA promulgated a Decision
20
affirming in toto the judgment rendered by the RTC of
Negros Oriental, Branch 34. The CA stressed the fact that petitioner was "well-aware of the constitutional
prohibition for aliens to acquire lands in the Philippines."
21
Hence, he cannot invoke equity to support his
claim for reimbursement.
Consequently, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA Decision due to the
following error:
UNDER THE FACTS ESTABLISHED, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE PETITIONER?S ATTEMPT AT
SUBSEQUENTLY ASSERTING OR CLAIMING A RIGHT OF HALF OR WHOLE OF THE PURCHASE PRICE USED IN THE
PURCHASE OF THE REAL PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.
22
(Emphasis supplied)
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena
Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller
23
the Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the value
of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former Filipina
spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of
equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against
foreign ownership of Philippine land
24
enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution which reads:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited constitutional
prohibition"
25
and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the
subject properties in the latter?s name.
26
Clearly, petitioner?s actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt
the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no reason why it should not
apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioner?s claim for reimbursement.
As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he
who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not be
accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has
been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.
27

In this case, petitioner?s statements regarding the real source of the funds used to purchase the subject
parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting to have previously executed a joint affidavit
that respondent?s personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1,
28
he likewise claimed that his personal
disability funds were used to acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies show his untruthfulness. Thus,
as petitioner has come before the Court with unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any equitable
refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that
he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is
well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which,
because of public policy, cannot be done directly.
29
Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the
law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all.
30
Corollary
thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code,
31
petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or
allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to an
illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.
32
Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights
from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.
Neither can the Court grant petitioner?s claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment.
33
As held
in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent on
purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by
the Constitution, to wit:
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes
into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him.1?wphi1
The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person
should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid
without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this
case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be
unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from
recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of
Holman v. Johnson: "The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the
defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the
objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the
advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff."
34
(Citations omitted)
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship.
35
Precisely, it is the
Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be
sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the
improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly
declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition
is to conserve the national patrimony
36
and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed October 8, 2009 Decision and January 24, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01940 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CATALAN V. CATALAN G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012
Merope Enriquez Vda. De Catalan, Petitioner
Louella A. Catalan-Lee, Respondent.
Ponente: Sereno J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision and Resolution regarding the
issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
This petition for review assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69875 dated August 6,
2004, which reverse the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Civil Case No.
D-10636, declaring the marriage between respondents Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on
the ground of bigamy, as well as the Resolution dated January 27, 2005, which denied the motion for
reconsideration.
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan.
Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof.
After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988. Two months after the divorce, or on
June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondentMeropein Calasiao, Pangasinan.Contending that said marriage was
bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with EusebioBristol, petitioner filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was allegedly not
a real party-in-interest, but it was denied. Trial on the merits ensued. On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered
judgment in favor of the petitioner. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent before appellate
court and ruled in favor of her reversing the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was dismissed by the appellate court.Petitioner contends that the bigamous
marriage of the respondents, which brought embarrassment to her and her children, confers upon her an
interest to seek judicial remedy to address her grievances and to protect her family from further
embarrassment and humiliation. She claims that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not
declaring the marriage void despite overwhelming evidence and the state policy discouraging illegal and
immoral marriages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of the
respondents on the ground of bigamy.
HELD:
Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of whether
petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. After all, she may have
the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or amensa et thoro;or
the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute.In such case, the RTC
would be correct to declare the marriage of the respondents void for being bigamous, there being already in
evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini,
Pangasinan dated December 21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope,and the other, in
Calasiao, Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents.However, if there was indeed a divorce
decree obtained and which, following the national law of Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the Court of
Appeals would be correct in ruling that petitioner has no legal personality to file a petition to declare the
nullity of marriage, thus:
Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any interest nor should each
have the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other might subsequentlycontract. x x x Viewed
from another perspective, Felicitas has no existing interest in Orlandos subsequent marriage since the
validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage will not affect the divorced status of
Orlando and Felicitas.In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage
cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a
remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether
respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same
allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not
allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents marriage as
bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and
exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce
decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant case.
G.R. No. 180572 June 18, 2012
SPOUSES ATTY. ERLANDO A. ABRENICA and JOENA B. ABRENICA Petitioners,
vs.
LAW FIRM OF ABRENICA, TUNGOL and TIBAYAN, ATTYS. ABELARDO M. TIBAYAN and DANILO N.
TUNGOL,Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, J.:
The present case is a continuation of G.R. No. 169420
1
decided by this Court on 22 September 2006. For
brevity, we quote the relevant facts narrated in that case:
Petitioner Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica was a partner of individual respondents, Attys. Danilo N. Tungol and
Abelardo M. Tibayan, in the Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayan ("the firm").
In 1998, respondents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) two cases against petitioner.
The first was SEC Case No. 05-98-5959, for Accounting and Return and Transfer of Partnership Funds With
Damages and Application for Issuance of Preliminary Attachment, where they alleged that petitioner refused
to return partnership funds representing profits from the sale of a parcel of land in Lemery, Batangas. The
second was SEC Case No. 10-98-6123, also for Accounting and Return and Transfer of Partnership Funds where
respondents sought to recover from petitioner retainer fees that he received from two clients of the firm and
the balance of the cash advance that he obtained in 1997.
The SEC initially heard the cases but they were later transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799, which transferred jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies from the
SEC to the courts. In a Consolidated Decision dated November 23, 2004, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 226, held that:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
CIVIL CASE NO. Q01-42948
1. Ordering the respondent Atty. Erlando Abrenica to render full accounting of the amounts he
received as profits from the sale and resale of the Lemery property in the amount of P 4,524,000.00;
2. Ordering the respondent Atty. Erlando Abrenica to remit to the law firm the said amount
of P4,524,000.00 plus interest of 12% per annum from the time he received the same and converted
the same to his own personal use or from September 1997 until fully paid; and
3. To pay the costs of suit.
CIVIL CASE NO. Q01-42959
1. Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to render a full accounting of the amounts he received under the
retainer agreement between the law firm and Atlanta Industries Inc. and Atlanta Land Corporation in
the amount of P320,000.00.
2. Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to remit to the law firm the amount received by him under the
Retainer Agreement with Atlanta Industries, Inc. and Atlanta Land Corporation in the amount
of P 320,000.00 plus interests of 12% per annum from June 1998 until fully paid;
3. Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to pay the law firm his balance on his cash advance in the amount
of P25,000.00 with interest of 12% per annum from the date this decision becomes final; and
4. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner received a copy of the decision on December 17, 2004. On December 21, 2004, he filed a notice of
appeal under Rule 41 and paid the required appeal fees.
Two days later, respondents filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution pursuant to A.M. 01-2-04-SC,
which provides that decisions in intra-corporate disputes are immediately executory and not subject to appeal
unless stayed by an appellate court.
On January 7, 2005, respondents filed an Opposition (To Defendant's Notice of Appeal) on the ground that it
violated A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC
2
prescribing appeal by certiorari under Rule 43 as the correct mode of appeal
from the trial courts decisions on intra-corporate disputes.
Petitioner thereafter filed a Reply with Manifestation (To the Opposition to Defendant's Notice of Appeal) and
an Opposition to respondents motion for execution.
On May 11, 2005, the trial court issued an Order requiring petitioner to show cause why it should take
cognizance of the notice of appeal in view of A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC. Petitioner did not comply with the said
Order. Instead, on June 10, 2005, he filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave of Court to Admit
Attached Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondents opposed the motion.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion in its assailed Resolution dated June 29, 2005 x x x.
x x x x x x x x x
The Court of Appeals also denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in its August 23, 2005 Resolution.
Given the foregoing facts, we dismissed the Petition in G.R. No. 169420 on the ground that the appeal filed by
petitioner was the wrong remedy. For that reason, we held as follows:
3

Time and again, this Court has upheld dismissals of incorrect appeals, even if these were timely filed. In
Lanzaderas v. Amethyst Security and General Services, Inc., this Court affirmed the dismissal by the Court of
Appeals of a petition for review under Rule 43 to question a decision because the proper mode of appeal
should have been a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. x x x.
x x x x x x x x x
Indeed, litigations should, and do, come to an end. "Public interest demands an end to every litigation and a
belated effort to reopen a case that has already attained finality will serve no purpose other than to delay the
administration of justice." In the instant case, the trial court's decision became final and executory on January
3, 2005. Respondents had already acquired a vested right in the effects of the finality of the decision, which
should not be disturbed any longer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated June 29, 2005 and August 23,
2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 90076 denying admission of petitioners Petition for Review are AFFIRMED.
Thus, respondents sought the execution of the judgment. On 11 April 2007, G.R. No. 169420 became final and
executory.
4

Apparently not wanting to be bound by this Courts Decision in G.R. No. 169420, petitioners Erlando and Joena
subsequently filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
98679. The Petition for Annulment of Judgment assailed the merits of the RTCs Decision in Civil Case Nos. Q-
01-42948 and Q-01-42959, subject of G.R. No. 169420. In that Petition for Annulment, Petitioners raised the
following grounds:
I. The lower court erred in concluding that both petitioners and respondents did not present direct
documentary evidence to substantiate [their] respective claims.
II. The lower court erred in concluding that both petitioners and respondents relied mainly on
testimonial evidence to prove their respective position[s].
III. The lower court erred in not ruling that the real estate transaction entered into by said petitioners
and spouses Roman and Amalia Aguzar was a personal transaction and not a law partnership
transaction.
IV. The lower court erred in ruling that the testimonies of the respondents are credible.
V. The lower court erred in ruling that the purchase price for the lot involved was P 3 million and
not P 8 million.
VI. The lower court erred in ruling that petitioners retainer agreement with Atlanta Industries, Inc. was
a law partnership transaction.
VII. The lower court erred when it failed to rule on said petitioners permissive counterclaim relative to
the various personal loans secured by respondents.
VIII. The lower court not only erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction but more importantly it acted
without jurisdiction or with lack of jurisdiction.
5

We note that petitioners were married on 28 May 1998. The cases filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on 6 May 1998 and 15 October 1998 were filed against petitioner Erlando only. It was with
the filing of CA-G.R. SP No. 98679 on 24 April 2007 that Joena joined Erlando as a co-petitioner.
On 26 April 2007, the CA issued a Resolution
6
dismissing the Petition. First, it reasoned that the remedy of
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is available only when the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of
petitioners.
7
Considering that the dismissal of the appeal was directly attributable to them, the remedy under
Rule 47 was no longer available.
Second, the CA stated that the grounds alleged in the Petition delved on the merits of the case and the
appreciation by the trial court of the evidence presented to the latter. Under Rule 47, the grounds for
annulment are limited only to extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Lastly, the CA held that the fact that the trial court was not designated as a special commercial court did not
mean that the latter had no jurisdiction over the case. The appellate court stated that, in any event,
petitioners could have raised this matter on appeal or through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, but they
did not do so.
Petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Annulment of Judgment dated 2 May 2007, but the CA had by then
already issued the 26 April 2007 Resolution dismissing the Petition.
On 24 May 2007, the 26 April 2007 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 98679 became final and executory.
8

Petitioners did not give up. They once again filed a 105-page Petition for Annulment of Judgment with the CA
dated 25 May 2007
9
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 99719. This time, they injected the ground of extrinsic fraud
into what appeared to be substantially the same issues raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 98679. The following were the
grounds raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719:
A. Extrinsic fraud and/or collusion attended the rendition of the Consolidated Decision x x x based on the
following badges of fraud and/or glaring errors deliberately committed, to wit:
I. The lower court deliberately erred in concluding that both petitioners and respondents did not
present direct documentary evidence to substantiate their respective claims, as it relied purely on the
gist of what its personnel did as regards the transcript of stenographic notes the latter [sic] in collusion
with the respondents.
II. The lower court deliberately erred in concluding that both petitioners and respondents relied mainly
on testimonial evidence to prove their respective positions by relying totally on what was presented to
it by its personnel who drafted the Consolidated Decision in collusion with the respondents.
III. The lower court deliberately erred in not ruling that the real estate transaction entered into by said
petitioners and spouses Roman and Amalia Aguzar was a personal transaction and not a law
partnership transaction for the same reasons as stated in Nos. 1 and II above.
IV. The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that the testimonies of the respondents are credible as
against the petitioner Erlando Abrenica and his witnesses for the same reasons as stated in Nos. I and II
above.
V. The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that the purchase price for the lot involved was P 3
million and not P 8 million for the same reasons as stated in Nos. 1 and II above.
VI. The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that petitioners retainer agreement with Atlanta
Industries, Inc. was a law partnership transaction for the same reasons as stated in Nos. 1 and II above.
VII. The lower court deliberately erred when it failed to rule on said petitioners permissive
counterclaim relative to the various personal loans secured by respondents also for the same reasons
as the above.
B. As an incident of the extrinsic fraud[,] the lower court[,] despite full knowledge of its incapacity[,]
rendered/promulgated the assailed Consolidated Decision x x x without jurisdiction or with lack of
jurisdiction.
10
(Underscoring in the original.)
On 2 August 2007, the CA issued the first assailed Resolution
11
dismissing the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719,
which held the Petition to be insufficient in form and substance. It noted the following:
x x x. Readily noticeable is that CA-G.R. SP No. 90076 practically contained the prayer for the annulment of the
subject consolidated Decision premised on the very same allegations, grounds or issues as the present
annulment of judgment case.
x x x x x x x x x
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there
is no available or other adequate remedy (Espinosa vs. Court of Appeals, 430 SCRA 96[2004]). Under Section 2
of Rule 47 of the Revised Rules of Court, the only grounds for an annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction (Cerezo vs. Tuazon, 426 SCRA 167 [2004]). Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if
it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
x x x x x x x x x
x x x. In the case at bar, not only has the court a quo jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the persons
of the parties, what petitioner is truly complaining [of] here is only a possible error in the exercise of
jurisdiction, not on the issue of jurisdiction itself. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject
matter (as in this case), the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the
jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of
judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal (Republic vs. "G" Holdings, supra, citing Tolentino vs.
Leviste, supra). (Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, petitioners filed a Humble Motion for Reconsideration
12
on 28 August 2007.
While the 28 August 2007 motion was pending, on 13 September 2007, petitioner Erlando filed an Urgent
Omnibus Motion
13
with Branch 226, alleging that the sheriff had levied on properties belonging to his children
and petitioner Joena. In addition, Erlando alleged that the trial court still had to determine the manner of
distribution of the firms assets and the value of the levied properties. Lastly, he insisted that the RTC still had
to determine the issue of whether the Rule 41 appeal was the correct remedy.
On the same day, Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim
14
also with Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon
City, alleging that she
15
and her stepchildren
16
owned a number of the personal properties sought to be levied.
She also insisted that she owned half of the two (2) motor vehicles as well as the house and lot covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 216818, which formed part of the absolute community of property. She
likewise alleged that the real property, being a family home, and the furniture and the utensils necessary for
housekeeping having a depreciated combined value of one hundred thousand pesos (P 100,000) were exempt
from execution pursuant to Rule 39, Section 13 of the Rules of Court. Thus, she sought their discharge and
release and likewise the immediate remittance to her of half of the proceeds, if any.
Accordingly, the RTC scheduled
17
a hearing on the motion. On 17 October 2007, however, petitioner Erlando
moved to withdraw his motion on account of ongoing negotiations with respondents.
18

Thereafter, petitioner Erlando and respondent Abelardo Tibayan, witnessed by Sheriff Nardo de Guzman, Jr. of
Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City, executed an agreement to postpone the auction sale of the property
covered by TCT No. 216818 in anticipation of an amicable settlement of the money judgment.
19

Finally, on 30 October 2007, the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719 issued the second assailed Resolution
20
denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for having been filed out of time, as the last day for filing was on 27
August 2007. Moreover, the CA found that the grounds stated in the motion were merely recycled and
rehashed propositions, which had already been dispensed with.
Petitioners are now assailing the CA Resolutions dated 2 August 2007 and 30 October 2007, respectively, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 99719. They insist that there is still a pending issue that has not been resolved by the RTC. That
issue arose from the Order
21
given by the trial court to petitioner Erlando to explain why it should take
cognizance of the Notice of Appeal when the proper remedy was a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court.
Further, petitioners blame the trial and the appellate courts for the dismissal of their appeal despite this
Courts explanation in G.R. No. 169420 that the appeal was the wrong remedy and was thus correctly
dismissed by the CA. Instead of complying with the show-cause Order issued by the RTC, petitioners went
directly to the CA and insisted that the remedy they had undertaken was correct.
Petitioners also contend that there was extrinsic fraud in the appreciation of the merits of the case. They raise
in the present Petition the grounds they cited in the three (3) Petitions for Annulment of Judgment (including
the Amended Petition) quoted above.
Next, they assert that petitioner Joenas right to due process was also violated when she was not made a
party-in-interest to the proceedings in the lower courts, even if her half of the absolute community of
property was included in the execution of the judgment rendered by Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City.
Finally, they insist that their Humble Motion for Reconsideration was filed on time, since 27 August 2007 was a
holiday. Therefore, they had until 28 August 2007 to file their motion.
Since then, it appears that a Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was issued on 3 January 2008 in favor of the law firm
for the sum of P 5 million for the property covered by TCT No. 216818.
On 18 March 2009, while the case was pending with this Court, petitioners filed a Complaint
22
with a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Marikina City against herein respondents
and Sheriff Nardo I. de Guzman, Jr. of Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 09-1323-MK and was raffled to Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina City.
23
Petitioners sought the
nullification of the sheriffs sale on execution of the Decision in the consolidated cases rendered by Branch
226, as well as the payment of damages. They alleged that the process of the execution sale was conducted
irregularly, unlawfully, and in violation of their right to due process.
On 2 July 2009, Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina City issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining
respondents and/or their agents, and the Register of Deeds of Marikina City from consolidating TCT No.
216818.
24

The filing of the Complaint with the RTC of Marikina City prompted respondents to file a Motion
25
before us to
cite for contempt petitioner spouses and their counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista. This Motion was on the
ground that petitioners committed forum shopping when they filed the Complaint pending with Branch 273 of
the RTC of Marikina City, while the present case was also still pending.
Meanwhile, on 22 September 2009, respondents filed before Branch 226 an Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Possession.
26
That Motion was granted by Branch 226 through a Resolution
27
issued on 10 November
2011. This Resolution then became the subject of a Petition for Certiorari
28
under Rule 65 filed by petitioners
before the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 123164.
Soon after, on 6 March 2012, petitioners filed with the CA an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order (T.R.O.)
29
after Sheriff De Guzman, Jr. served on them a Notice to Vacate within five days
from receipt or until 11 March 2012. As of the writing of this Decision, the CA has not resolved the issue raised
in the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 123164.
Our Ruling
Petitioners elevated this case to this Court, because they were allegedly denied due process when the CA
rejected their second attempt at the annulment of the Decision of the RTC and their Humble Motion for
Reconsideration.
We DENY petitioners claims.
The rules of procedure were formulated to achieve the ends of justice, not to thwart them. Petitioners may
not defy the pronouncement of this Court in G.R. No. 169420 by pursuing remedies that are no longer
available to them. Twice, the CA correctly ruled that the remedy of annulment of judgment was no longer
available to them, because they had already filed an appeal under Rule 41. Due to their own actions, that
appeal was dismissed.
It must be emphasized that the RTC Decision became final and executory through the fault of petitioners
themselves when petitioner Erlando (1) filed an appeal under Rule 41 instead of Rule 43; and (2) filed a
Petition for Review directly with the CA, without waiting for the resolution by the RTC of the issues still
pending before the trial court.
In Enriquez v. Court of Appeals,
30
we said:
It is true that the Rules should be interpreted so as to give litigants ample opportunity to prove their
respective claims and that a possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities should be avoided.
But it is equally true that an appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with
the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. In other words, he who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must
play by the rules. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
With regard to the allegation of petitioner Joena that her right to due process was violated, it must be recalled
that after she filed her Affidavit of Third Party Claim on 13 September 2007 and petitioner Erlando filed his
Urgent Omnibus Motion raising the same issues contained in that third-party claim, he subsequently filed two
Motions withdrawing his Urgent Omnibus Motion. Petitioner Joena, meanwhile, no longer pursued her third-
party claim or any other remedy available to her. Her failure to act gives this Court the impression that she
was no longer interested in her case. Thus, it was through her own fault that she was not able to ventilate her
claim.
Furthermore, it appears from the records that petitioner Erlando was first married to a certain Ma. Aline
Lovejoy Padua on 13 October 1983. They had three children: Patrik Erlando (born on 14 April 1985), Maria
Monica Erline (born on 9 September 1986), and Patrik Randel (born on 12 April 1990).
After the dissolution of the first marriage of Erlando, he and Joena got married on 28 May 1998.
31
In her
Affidavit, Joena alleged that she represented her stepchildren; that the levied personal properties in
particular, a piano with a chair, computer equipment and a computer table were owned by the latter. We
note that two of these stepchildren were already of legal age when Joena filed her Affidavit. As to Patrik
Randel, parental authority over him belongs to his parents. Absent any special power of attorney authorizing
Joena to represent Erlandos children, her claim cannot be sustained.
Petitioner Joena also asserted that the two (2) motor vehicles purchased in 1992 and 1997, as well as the
house and lot covered by TCT No. 216818 formed part of the absolute community regime.1wphi1 However,
Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the community property the property acquired before the
marriage of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits and the income, if
any, of that property. Neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second marriage.
We now proceed to discuss the Motion for contempt filed by respondents.
Respondents claim that petitioners and their present counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista, were guilty of forum
shopping when the latter filed Civil Case No. 09-1323-MK with the RTC of Marikina City while the case was still
pending before us. In Executive Secretary v. Gordon,
32
we explained forum shopping in this wise:
Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. Thus, it has been held that
there is forum-shopping
(1) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other
than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or
(2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a party files another before the Court of
Appeals since in such case he deliberately splits appeals "in the hope that even as one case in which a
particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open,"
or
(3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after failing to obtain the
same from the original court.
Civil Case No. 09-1323-MK was filed to question the proceedings undertaken by the sheriff in executing the
judgment in Civil Case Nos. Q01-42948 and Q01-42959. On the other hand, the present case questions the
merits of the Decision itself in Civil Case Nos. Q01-42948 and Q01-42959. These cases have different causes of
action. Thus, it cannot be said that petitioners were clearly guilty of forum shopping when they filed the
Complaint before the RTC of Marikina City.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions dated 2 August 2007
and 30 October 2007 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Pana v Heirs of Jose Juanite, Sr. and Jose Juanite, Jr.
December 10, 2012

FACTS:

The prosecution accused Efren Pana, his wife Melencia, and others of murder before the
Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, and eventually a decision was rendered acquitting Efren of the
charge for insufficiency of evidence but finding Melencia and another person guilty as charged and
was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed RTCs decision but modified the penalty to
Reclusion Perpetua. As for the monetary awards, the court affirmed the award of civil indemnity and
moral damages but deleted the award for actual damages for lack of evidentiary basis. In its place the
court made an award of php15, 000 each by way of temperate damages. In addition, the court
awarded Php50, 000.00 exemplary damages per victim to be paid solidarily by them. The decision
became executory of October 1, 2001.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the
writ resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melencia.
Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued. On April 3, 2002, Efren
and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution claiming that the properties levied
were conjugal assets and not paraphernal of Melecia. On September 16, 2002, the RTC denied the
motion. The spouses moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same. In this case, it is
submitted that Efren and Melencia were married when the Civil Code was still in effect. They did not
execute a pre-nuptial agreement, hence CPG governed their property relations. However, both RTC
and CA held that property regime changed into ACP when family code took effect it reason out that
Art. 256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive effect in so far as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Both the RTC and the Court of the Appeals are in error on this point. While it is true that the
personal stakes of each spouses in their conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation
of the conjugal partnership of hains and, therefore none of them can be said to have acquired vested
rights in specific assets , it is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to reac back
and automatically convert into absolute community of property relations all conjugal partnership of
gains that existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melencia can be levied and executed
upon for the satisfaction of Melencias civil liability in the aforesaid murder case.


SUPREME COURT:
YES, provided that the conditions under Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.
First of all, the Supreme Court explained that it is clear from the facts that Efren and Melencia were
married when the Civil code was still the operative law on marriages. The presumption, absent any evidence
to the contrary, is that they were married under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
Furthermore, Article 119 of the Civil Code provides that the future spouses main in marriage
settlements agree upon absolute or relative community or conjugal partnership of gains or upon a complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. The family code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage
settlements cannot be modified except prior to marriage, and clearly, under this situation, the spouses cannot
modify their regime. Post marriage modification of settlements can take place only where (a) the absolute
community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation; (b) the
spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive their former property regime; (c)judicial
separation of property had been had on the ground that a spouse abandons the other without just cause or
fails to comply with his obligations to the family; (d) there was judicial separation of property under article
135; (e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or
conjugal partnership of gains. None of these circumstances exists in this case.
Furthermore, Article 119 provides as well, that in the absence of marriage settlements, or when the
same is void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains established under the civil
code shall govern the property regime of the spouses. the family code contains terms governing the conjugal
partnership of gains that supersede the terms of the conjugal partnership of gains under the civil code. Article
105 of the family code states that the provisions of such chapter on the conjugal partnership of gains shall also
apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the affectivity of this
code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the civil or other laws as
provided in Article 256.
QUIAO V. QUIAO
G.R. No 176556, [July 04, 2012]
FACTS:
Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC
rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in
favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses subject to the
respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.
Brigidos share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children because Brigido is the offending spouse.
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or after more
than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for
Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term Net Profits Earned.
RTC held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties after
deducting the separateproperties of each [of the] spouse and the debts. It further held that after determining
the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending
spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43,
No. (2) of the Family Code.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of
Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the
Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal partnership of
gains is applicable in this case. Art 129 will govern.
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights overof theproperties in the conjugal partnership
NO.
3. Is the computation of net profits earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the
computation of net profits earned in the absolute community? NO.
RATIO:
1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family code, the default rule
is that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community
or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses marriage the operative law is already the Family
Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of
the Family Code.
2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of
Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of
the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides:
All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife.
While one may not be deprived of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due process and such
deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process.First, he was well-aware that the
respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his
Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the
respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the
community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation was promulgated, the
petitioner never questioned the trial courts ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as net profits,
pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right
to due process.
3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint owners
of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those
acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common
mass of the couples properties. And when the couples marriage or community is dissolved, that common
mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have
established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the spouses have
no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the net profits. And since
the legal separationshare decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to the
children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.
On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article142
of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and
income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage. From
the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend
to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a
complete separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no
separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part
of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listedproperties should be divided
equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner
the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common
children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute
community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because
there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty partys favor.
G.R. No. 179010 April 11, 2011
ELENITA M. DEWARA, epresented by her Attorney-in-Fact, FERDINAND MAGALLANES, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES RONNIE AND GINA LAMELA and STENILE ALVERO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision
1
dated November 6, 2006 and the Resolution
2
dated July 10, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 64936, which reversed and set aside the Decision
3
dated September 2, 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 54, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 93-7942.
The Facts
Eduardo Dewara (Eduardo) and petitioner Elenita Magallanes Dewara (Elenita) were married before the
enactment of the Family Code. Thus, the Civil Code governed their marital relations. Husband and wife were
separated-in-fact because Elenita went to work in California, United States of America, while Eduardo stayed
in Bacolod City.
On January 20, 1985, Eduardo, while driving a private jeep registered in the name of Elenita,
4
hit respondent
Ronnie Lamela (Ronnie). Ronnie filed a criminal case for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence
5
against Eduardo before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch IV, Bacolod City. The
MTCC found Eduardo guilty of the charge and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2)
months and one (1) day to (3) months, and to pay civil indemnity of Sixty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-
Eight Pesos and Seventy Centavos (P62,598.70) as actual damages and Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as
moral damages. On appeal, the RTC
6
affirmed the decision of the MTCC
7
and it became final and executory.
8

The writ of execution on the civil liability was served on Eduardo, but it was returned unsatisfied because he
had no property in his name. Ronnie requested the City Sheriff, respondent Stenile Alvero, to levy on Lot No.
234-C, Psd. 26667 of the Bacolod Cadastre, with an area of One Thousand Four Hundred Forty (1,440) square
meters (sq m), under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-80054, in the name of "ELENITA M. DEWARA, of
legal age, Filipino, married to Eduardo Dewara, and resident of Bacolod City," to satisfy the judgment on the
civil liability of Eduardo. The City Sheriff served a notice of embargo on the title of the lot and subsequently
sold the lot in a public auction. In the execution sale, there were no interested buyers other than Ronnie. The
City Sheriff issued a certificate of sale to spouses Ronnie and Gina Lamela to satisfy the civil liability in the
decision against Eduardo.
9
Ronnie then caused the consolidation of title in a Cadastral Proceeding before the
RTC, which ordered the cancellation of TCT No. T-80054 in the name of Elenita and the issuance of a new
certificate of title in the name of respondent spouses.
10

The levy on execution, public auction, issuance of certificate of sale, and cancellation of title of the lot in the
name of Elenita were done while Elenita was working in California.
11
Thus, Elenita, represented by her
attorney-in-fact, Ferdinand Magallanes, filed a case for annulment of sale and for damages against respondent
spouses and ex-officio sheriff Stenile Alvero before the RTC of Bacolod City. Petitioner claimed that the levy on
execution of Lot No. 234-C was illegal because the said property was her paraphernal or exclusive property
and could not be made to answer for the personal liability of her husband. Furthermore, as the registered
owner of the property, she received no notice of the execution sale. She sought the annulment of the sale and
the annulment of the issuance of the new TCT in the name of respondent spouses.
12

On the other hand, respondent spouses averred that the subject lot was the conjugal property of petitioner
Elenita and Eduardo. They asserted that the property was acquired by Elenita during her marriage to Eduardo;
that the property was acquired with the money of Eduardo because, at the time of the acquisition of the
property, Elenita was a plain housewife; that the jeep involved in the accident was registered in the name of
petitioner; and that Elenita did not interpose any objection pending the levy on execution of the property.
13

On September 2, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [petitioner] and against the [respondents]:
1. The levy on execution on Lot No. 234-C of the Bacolod Cadastre covered by TCT No. 80054 in the
name of [petitioner] Elenita M. Dewara, the public auction of the property, and the consolidation of
the title and issuance of new TCT No. 167403 in the name of [respondent] Ronnie Lamela, are hereby
declared null and void;
2. The Register of Deeds of Bacolod City is ordered to cancel TCT No. 167403 in the name of
[respondent] Ronnie Lamela and TCT No. 80054 be reinstated or a new one issued in the name of
[petitioner] Elenita M. Dewara;
3. There is no pronouncement on damages with cost de officio.
SO ORDERED.
14

The RTC declared that said property was paraphernal in nature. It arrived at this conclusion by tracing how
Elenita acquired the subject property. Based on the documentary evidence submitted, Elenitas grandfather,
Exequiel Magallanes, originally owned Lot No. 234-C. Upon his demise, his children, Jesus (Elenitas father),
Salud, and Concepcion, inherited the property, each entitled to a share equal to one-third (1/3) of the total
area of the land. They were issued a new title (TCT No. T-17541) for the property. On July 6, 1966, petitioners
aunt, Salud, executed a waiver of rights duly registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds under Entry
No. 76392, thereby waiving her rights and participation over her 1/3 share of the property in favor of her
siblings, Jesus and Concepcion. The two siblings then became the owners of the property, each owning one-
half (1/2) of the property. Jesus subsequently sold his share to his daughter, Elenita, for the sum of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), based on the deed of sale dated March 26, 1975. The deed of sale was duly
registered with the Register of Deeds under Entry No. 76393. Concepcion also sold her share to her niece,
Elenita, for the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), based on the deed of sale dated April 29, 1975,
which was duly registered with the Register of Deeds under Entry No. 76394. By virtue of the sale transactions,
TCT No. T-17541 was cancelled and a new title, TCT No. T-80054, was issued in the name of Elenita.
15

The RTC gave credence to the testimony of Elenita on the circumstances surrounding the sale of the property.
First, it was sold to her by her father and her aunt so that the family would remain on the lot. Second, the
minimal and inadequate consideration for the 1,440 sq m property was for the purpose of helping her expand
her capital in her business at the time. Thus, the sale was essentially a donation and was therefore gratuitous
in character.
16

Having declared that the property was the paraphernal property of Elenita, the RTC ruled that the civil liability
of Eduardo, which was personal to him, could not be charged to the exclusive property of his wife.
17

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 54, dated September 2, 1999, in Civil Case No. 93-7942 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and a new Decision is entered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City, Negros Occidental [which] is
hereby ordered to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-80054 or any transfer certificate of title covering
Lot No. 234-C issued in the name of Elenita M. Dewara, and reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title No. 167403
or issue a new transfer certificate of title covering Lot No. 234-C in the name of Ronnie Lamela. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
18

In reversing the decision of the RTC, the CA elucidated that the gross inadequacy of the price alone does not
affect a contract of sale, except that it may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended
a donation or some other act or contract. Except for the assertions of Elenita, there was nothing in the records
that would indicate a defect in Jesus and Concepcion Magallanes consent to the sale.
19
The CA ruled that
Elenita and Eduardo acquired the property by onerous title during their marriage through their common fund.
Thus, it belonged to the conjugal partnership of gains and might be levied upon to answer for civil liabilities
adjudged against Eduardo.
20

Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The sole issue for resolution is whether the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita
or the conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo.
The answer to this question will define whether the property may be subject to levy and execution sale to
answer for the civil liability adjudged against Eduardo in the criminal case for serious physical injuries, which
judgment had already attained finality.
The Ruling of the Court
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
21
Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone
does not destroy this presumption.
22
The separation-in-fact between the husband and the wife without
judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature.
23
Moreover, the
presumption of conjugal ownership applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does
not appear. The use of the conjugal funds is not an essential requirement for the presumption to arise.
24

There is no dispute that the subject property was acquired by spouses Elenita and Eduardo during their
marriage. It is also undisputed that their marital relations are governed by the conjugal partnership of gains,
since they were married before the enactment of the Family Code and they did not execute any prenuptial
agreement as to their property relations. Thus, the legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the property
applies to the lot in question. The presumption that the property is conjugal property may be rebutted only by
strong, clear, categorical, and convincing evidencethere must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of
one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.
25

Aside from the assertions of Elenita that the sale of the property by her father and her aunt was in the nature
of a donation because of the alleged gross disparity between the actual value of the property and the
monetary consideration for the sale, there is no other evidence that would convince this Court of the
paraphernal character of the property. Elenita proffered no evidence of the market value or assessed value of
the subject property in 1975. Thus, we agree with the CA that Elenita has not sufficiently proven that the
prices involved in the sales in question were so inadequate for the Court to reach a conclusion that the
transfers were in the nature of a donation rather than a sale.
Furthermore, gross inadequacy of the price does not affect a contract of sale, except as it may indicate a
defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract.
26
The
records are bereft of proof that the consent of petitioners father and her aunt were vitiated or that, in reality,
they intended the sale to be a donation or some other contract. Inadequacy of the price per se will not rule
out the transaction as one of sale; the price must be grossly inadequate or shocking to the conscience, such
that the mind would revolt at it and such that a reasonable man would neither directly nor indirectly consent
to it.
27

However, even after having declared that Lot No. 234-C is the conjugal property of spouses Elenita and
Eduardo, it does not necessarily follow that it may automatically be levied upon in an execution to answer for
debts, obligations, fines, or indemnities of one of the spouses. Before debts and obligations may be charged
against the conjugal partnership, it must be shown that the same were contracted for, or the debts and
obligations should have redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Fines and pecuniary
indemnities imposed upon the husband or the wife, as a rule, may not be charged to the partnership.
However, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if the property should be
insufficient, the fines and indemnities may be enforced upon the partnership assets only after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 of the Civil Code have been covered.
In this case, it is just and proper that Ronnie be compensated for the serious physical injuries he suffered. It
should be remembered that even though the vehicle that hit Ronnie was registered in the name of Elenita, she
was not made a party in the said criminal case. Thus, she may not be compelled to answer for Eduardos
liability. Nevertheless, their conjugal partnership property may be held accountable for it since Eduardo has no
property in his name. The payment of indemnity adjudged by the RTC of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No.
7155 in favor of Ronnie may be enforced against the partnership assets of spouses Elenita and Eduardo after
the responsibilities enumerated under Article 161 of the Civil Code have been covered. This remedy is
provided for under Article 163 of the Civil Code, viz.:
Art. 163. The payment of debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership.1wphi1
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage, and that of fines
and indemnities imposed upon them, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 161 have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property
or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership such spouse shall be charged
for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned.
28

Article 161 of the Civil Code enumerates the obligations which the conjugal partnership may be held
answerable, viz.:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and
those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the
partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which constitute a charge upon
property of either spouse or of the partnership;
(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of
either the husband or the wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the partnership;
(4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of both the husband and wife, and
of legitimate children of one of the spouses;
(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or other course.
The enumeration above-listed should first be complied with before the conjugal partnership may be held to
answer for the liability adjudged against Eduardo.
Finally, the indemnity imposed against Eduardo shall earn an interest at the rate of twelve percent per annum,
in accordance with our ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.
29

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated November 6, 2006 and the Resolution dated July 10,
2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64936 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The decision
dated September 2, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City in Civil Case No. 93-7942 is hereby
REINSTATED WITH MODIFICATION that the conjugal properties of spouses Elenita Dewara and Eduardo
Dewara shall be held to answer for the judgment of Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Eight Pesos
and Seventy Centavos (P72,598.70), plus an interest rate of twelve (12) percent per annum from the date of
finality of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 7155, after complying
with the provisions of Article 161 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010
Post under case digests, Civil Law at Friday, December 16, 2011 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
HAD8J5EKCNKC
Facts: A became a Canadian citizen through naturalization. a later married B a Filipino. A worked abroad and
when he came back to see B, B was having an affair. A filed a petition for Divorce in Canada which was
granted.

A fell in love with C. A went to the Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree Despite
the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed him that
the marriage between him and B still subsists. To be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to a NSO Circular.

RTC- A was NOT THE PROPER PARTY to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce
decree as he is a NATURALIZED CANADIAN CITIZEN. It ruled that ONLY THE FILIPINO spouse can avail of the
remedy, under Art. 26, 2 of the Family Code.1

Issue: WON Art. 26, 2 extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a
foreign divorce decree.

Held: NO. The alien spouse can claim no right under Art. 26, 2 of the Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the FILIPINO SPOUSE.

Art. 26, 2 was included in the law to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative
intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts
created by thedivorce decree. Essentially, Art. 26, 2 provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have
his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without
Art. 26, 2, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the
Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond.

An action based on Art. 26, 2 is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds
that the decree capacitatedthe alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. However, no Philippine court can make a similar
declaration for the alien spouse, whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.
Bayot case: separate pdf