Review of International Studies (2006), 32, 189216 Copyright

British International Studies Association

doi:10.1017/S026021050600698X
Causes of a divided discipline: rethinking the
concept of causein I nternational Relations
theory
MI LJ A K URK I *
Abstract. During the last decades causation has been a deeply divisive concept in I nter-
national Relations (I R) theory. While the positivist mainstream has extolled the virtues of
causal analysis, many post-positivist theorists have rejected the aims and methods of causal
explanation in favour of constitutive theorising. I t is argued here that the debates on
causation in I R havebeen misleadingin that they havebeen premised on, and havehelped to
reify, arather narrowempiricist understandingof causal analysis. I t issuggested that in order
to move I R theorising forward we need to deepen and broaden our understandings of the
concept of cause. Thereby, wecanradicallyreinterpret thecausal-constitutivetheorydividein
I R, as well as redirect thestudy of world politics towards moreconstructivemulti-causal and
complexity-sensitiveanalyses.
Introduction
I n Explaining and Understanding International Relations Martin Hollis and Steve
Smith famously argued that there are always two sorts of stories to tell
1
in the
discipline of I nternational Relations (I R): one can explain international politics
throughcausal analysisof international processesor seek to understand international
politics through inquiringinto themeanings of, and thereasons for, theactions of
world political actors.
2
Theassumption elicited by Hollis and Smith that thereis a
fundamental dichotomy between causal and non-causal approaches to the social
world, has cometo permeatethedisciplineof I R in thelast decadeor so. Whilethe
so-called scientic theorists have advocated systematic causal analysis in I R
3
, the
so-called reectivist constitutive theorists have maintained that causal analysis is
neither a necessary, nor a desirable aim in understanding world politics.
4
As a
* Theauthor would liketo thank Alexander Wendt, Colin Wight, J onathan J oseph, Hidemi
Suganami and an anonymous reviewer for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1
Martin Hollis and SteveSmith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 1.
2
Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding, pp. 17.
3
G. King, R. O. Keohaneand S. Verba, Designing Social Inquiry; Scientic Inference in Qualitative
Research (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1994).
4
David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and Politics of Identity (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1998), p. 4.
189
consequenceof their disagreements thetheorists in thedierent camps havetended
to eschew talking to each other at least constructively in providing accounts of
world political processes.
5
Curiously, despite the fact that the contentions between these camps have
centred around theconcept of cause, therehas been no real engagement in I R with
the source from which this dichotomisation of causal and non-causal forms of
theorising arises. This article argues that an uncritical acceptance of a so-called
Humean conception of causation is at theroot of thedisciplinary divisions in I R. A
Humean discourseof causation a set of assumptions deeply embedded in modern
philosophy has, it is argued, deeply informed most I R theorists engagements with
causation. Theimplicit inuenceof Humean assumptions has brought with it many
prejudiceswithregardtothewayinwhichcausesarediscussedinI R. Thus, it isoften
assumed that causes or causal analyses imply determinism, laws and objectivism. I t
is also assumed that causes refer to pushing and pulling forces.
I t issuggestedherethat weneednot conceptualisecausationaccordingtoHumean
assumptions: we can, in fact, think of causation as a common-sensical intuitive
notion with a multiplicity of dierent meanings, none of which entail laws or
determinism. Wecanalso understandsocial scienticcausal analysisasepistemically
reective, methodologically pluralist and complexity-sensitive. I t is seen that if we
drawon philosophies of causation with much richer and broader understandings of
the notion of cause we can start doing away with the prejudices that the Humean
discourseof causation has promulgated in I R. I f theconcept of causeis reconcep-
tualised on thelines suggested here, it emerges that, not only is theempiricist form
of causal analysisthat dominatesinI R problematicasamodel of causal analysis, but
alsothat causal analysisinthewider reconceptualisedsenseis, infact, somethingthat
all I R theorists, includingconstitutivetheorists, engagein. I t isargued, then, that the
deeper and broader conception of causal analysis advanced here can, not only
improve causal analysis in I R, but also help forge constructive links between
theoretical camps in thedivided discipline of I R.
Thereconceptualisationof causationisadvancedinvesections. To contextualise
thediscussion, therst section will tracehowtheHumean philosophy of causation
hascometo inuencethemodernphilosophyof scienceandsocial science. Thefocus
will then shift to the examination of Humean assumptions in I R debates on
causation. Then, the concept of cause will be reconceptualised in two interrelated
sections. First, it is argued that we need to challenge the inuence of Humeanism
through adoptinga philosophically realist deeper conception of cause. Thesection
that followsarguesthat thismoveneedsto beextended through thedevelopment of
abroader meaningfor theconcept of cause. I t issuggestedthat I R theorisingreturns
to theinsights of theAristotelian conception of causation. Therecongured deeper
and broader model of causal analysis has many metatheoretical, theoretical and
methodological implications for I R theorising and the disciplinary debates. These
will bereected on in thenal section.
5
Therehas been a tendency to seetheseapproaches as mutually exclusive, incommensurableaccounts
as Hollis and Smith portrayed them. Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding, pp. 196216.
190 Milja Kurki
Thedominanceof Humeanismandthedeclineof causation
The concept of cause has been one of the central but also one of the most
controversial conceptsinthehistoryof philosophyandscience. However, duringthe
last threehundred years a particular set of assumptions, arisingfromtheempiricist
philosophy of David Hume, have come to dominate the way in which causes and
causal analysishavebeenunderstood. I norder to gainadeeper understandingof I R
debates on causation, it is important to grasp thenatureof theHumean legacy in
modern philosophy and science.
The rise of Humeanism: the narrowing down and emptying out of the notion of cause
I nancient Greek philosophy, whichrst formulatedtheconcept of cause, thenotion
referred to that which brought somethingabout or contributed in any way to the
existenceof objects, or to changein or between them. I t was accepted that nothing
in theworld comes fromnothing and that thenotion of aition (cause) provided an
openmetaphor that referredtothoseforcesthat werebehind other things. Thereare
two aspects that areworth highlightingwith regard to theseearly understandings of
causation.
First, for classical ancient thinkers, notably Aristotle, causes wereunderstood as
ontologicallyreal. Althoughtheconcept of causewasseenasaman-made concept
designed to help us to understand why the world works as it does, this concept
was conceived to havean ontological referencepoint in thereal causal powers of
nature.
6
Second, theconception of causein ancient philosophy wasplural. Aristotle,
withhisfour causes account, recognisedfour maintypesof causes: material, formal,
nal and ecient causes.
7
Material and formal causes referred to theroleof matter
and ideas in shaping reality, ecient causes to pushing and pulling moving
causes, andnal causesto endsor purposesascauses. Crucially, thesedierent types
of causes which wewill examinein moredetail in thefourth section wereseen as
interlinked: anycausal analysiswouldhaveto understand, not onlydierent typesof
causes on their own, but also their complex interplay in concretesituations.
I nterestingly, in modern philosophy theAristotelian ontologically grounded and
broad conception of cause has been sidelined in favour of a very dierent under-
standing of causation. During the sixteenth century important shifts took place in
theorisingcausation.
8
Descartesinitiatedanarrowingdown of theconcept of cause
by concentrating on the mechanical meaning of the term cause: the notion of
ecient cause.
9
Descartes rejected as vagueand unsubstantiated thewider material,
formal andnal causemeaningsof thenotionof causeandcametoseecausesstrictly
6
For descriptions of early accounts of cause, seefor exampleR. J . Hankinson, Cause and
Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); J onathan Lear, Aristotle;
the Desire to Understand (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1988).
7
Aristotle, Metaphysics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1998), p. 115.
8
For an account of thehistorical changes in theconcept of causein themodern period seeW.A.
Wallace, Causality and Scientic Explanation, vol. I (Ann Arbor, MI : University of Michigan, 1972),
and K. Clatterbaugh, Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy 16371739 (NewYork, London:
Routledge, 1999).
9
ReneDescartes, Key Philosophical Writings (Ware: Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, 1997).
The concept of cause in IR theory 191
as pushing and pulling, so-called ecient, forces. He argued that, rather than
attributing objects unobservable occult qualities (material, formal or nal causal
powers), themost useful waytothink of causeswastotracethepushingandpulling
relations between things.
10
Having concurred with the Cartesian narrowing down of the meaning of
the concept of cause, David Humes eighteenth century philosophy initiated the
emptying out of the notion. Hume advanced a radical empiricist critique of
metaphysics according to which, in the search for reliable knowledge, human
perceptionsshouldtakeprecedenceover anyspeculationabout thenatureof reality.
Throughfocusingtheacquisitionof knowledgeontheobservable, Humesempiricism
sought to challenge the ontological reality of causes. Hume had a profound
disagreement with all the philosophers before him who tried to dene causes as
(ontologically) naturally necessary. He rejected all eorts to dene causes on the
basisof ecacy, agency, power, force, energy, necessity, connexion, and productive
quality.
11
Humecontendedthat all wecansayabout causationmust bebasedonour
experiencesof theempirical world. ThisledHumeto theconclusionthat, sincethere
is nothing that can be observed directly about causal connections, we cannot
attributecausal relations any reality beyond our observations.
The notion of cause, for Hume, arose simply from human observations of
constant conjunctions of events. Heargued that when regular successions of types
of events havebeen observed, themind through custom comes to associatethese
eventsinsuchawayasto createtheillusionarybelief inacausal connection. When
wehaveobserved that billiard ball B has regularly moved after ball A has hit it, we
can say that A is the cause of Bs movement. There is nothing more to the causal
connection between theseobjects, however, or wecannot say whether thereis, since
wehaveno observational evidenceof deeper causal connections. I t followsthat for
Hume[causal] necessity is something that exists in themind, not in objects. . . or
necessity is nothing but that determination of the thought to pass fromcauses to
eects and fromeects to causes, according to their experiencd union.
12
Humes inuential solution to theproblemof causation entails certain important
assumptionsthat needtobedrawnout. TheHumeanphilosophyof causation, which
has been deeply entwined with the empiricist tradition in modern philosophy, has
entailed thefollowing assumptions.
1. Causal relationsaretied to regularities and causal analysisto ndingassociations
between patterns of regularities.
2. Causal relationsareregularity relationsof patternsof observables. Asempiricism
dictatesthat onlyobservableevents/thingscanbethebasisof knowledge, causality
has been reduced to a relation of observables.
3. Causal relations are seen as regularity-deterministic.
13
Most Humeans have
assumed that, given certain regularities have been observed in the past, we can
makewhen A, then B statements about therelations of certain types of events
(given regularities wecan assumetheexistenceof closed systems).
10
E. Chavez-Arvizo, I ntroduction, in Descartes, Key Philosophical Writings, p. ix.
11
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 157.
12
Hume, Treatise, pp. 1656.
13
Thetermregularity-determinismwas coined by Roy Bhaskar. Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of
Science (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1978), p. 69.
192 Milja Kurki
4. Beyondthesestrictlyempiricist assumptions, it hasalso beenassumedthat causes
refer to moving causes that push and pull, that is, so-called ecient causes.
Theseassumptions arereferred to hereas Humean assumptions. I t will beseen that
they underlie many contemporary engagements with causation in philosophy of
science, social scienceand I R, even if often unsystematically or inadvertently.
Humes legacy in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of social science
The most inuential advocates of Humeanism in twentieth century philosophy of
science can be found within the so-called positivist tradition. I ndeed, at the
beginning of the twentieth century the so-called logical positivists transformed the
Humeanpremisesintoaphilosophyof sciencegearedaroundthenotionof laws. By
basing scienceon theanalysis of laws (based on observed event regularities), it was
believed that sciencecould get rid of all metaphysical speculation.
14
Poppers and
Hempels later deductive-nomological (DN-) model explanation followed the same
Humean lineof thought: although falsication and deductivemethods werepriori-
tised over verication and inductive methods, the basis of scientic theories was
conceived to lie in generalised patterns of observables. Without generalisations to
back it upacausal account wasseenasunscienticandasmerespeculation.
15
I ndeed,
in the course of the twentieth century causal explanation has become closely tied
up with analysis of general laws: science has come to be understood to be about
nding falsiable, predictive, observation-based regularities, or generalisations.
I nterestingly, Humean assumptions havebecomeso widely accepted that they have
been increasingly taken for granted in most philosophy of sciencedebates.
16
I t isimportant to notethat Humeanassumptionshavebeendominant, not just in
thenatural sciences, but also in thesocial sciences. TheHumean assumptions were
givenrst trulysystematic guisebythebehaviourist social scientists: causal analysis
inthesocial sciencesbecameequatedwithlookingfor associationsamongst patterns
of observed behaviour.
17
Since the 1960s many social scientists have criticised the
strict regularity assumptions and quantitative methods of the 1960s behaviourists.
Yet, arguably the key assumptions of Humeanism still hold sway in many social
sciences through the inuence of so-called post-behaviourist positivism. Social
14
Humean assumptions wereaccepted, however, with a distinct anti-causal twist. Logical positivists
argued that sincewecan only legitimately talk of regularities of events, weshould refrain from
using causal terminology. I nstead, they talked of functionally determinate relations between laws.
See, for example, A. J . Ayer, Logical Positivism (Glencoe, I L: TheFreePress, 1959), R. Carnap,
Logical Foundations of Probability (London: Routledge& Kegan Paul, 1950).
15
K.R. Popper, The Logic of Scientic Discovery (London: Hutchinson of London, 1959), C. G.
Hempel (ed.), Aspects of Scientic Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (New
York: FreePress, 1965).
16
Theinuential growth of knowledge debates on philosophy of sciencewere, for example, implicitly
underpinned by Humean assumptions. Although thelogical positivist and Popperian models of
scientic progress havecomeunder criticismfromphilosophers such as Thomas Kuhn, I mre
Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend, theseattacks havenot challenged theHumean notion of cause
embedded in theseaccounts of scientic progress.
17
For a classical logical positivist/behaviourist viewof social sciences seeMarieNeurath and Robert
S. Cohen (eds.), Otto Neurath: Empiricism and Sociology (Dordrecht, TheNetherlands: D. Reidel
Publishing, 1973).
The concept of cause in IR theory 193
scientistsnowaccept thelegitimacy of qualitativemethodsand data, yet most social
scientists are still adamant that only careful observation of regularities (even if of
localised regularities) can giveus an adequateunderstandingof human action and
society.
18
Of course, the hermeneutic tradition in the social sciences disagrees with both
behaviourist and post-behaviourist forms of positivism and argues that mere
descriptionof patternsof behaviour explainsnothingabout whypeopledowhat they
do: what weshould do isanalysemorecarefully howpeoplecometo understand the
meaning of social situations. Causal descriptions of the social world have been
rejected by thehermeneutictheoristsasinvalid in theinterpretiveunderstanding of
subjects. Social science, as Peter Winch famously argued, is about studying the
reasons, not causes, of actions.
19
Theinternal relations between meanings, rules,
reasonsand actions, it isargued, cannot betreated in thesameway astheexternal
relations of events. I t follows that social relations do not lend themselves to
generalisation and prediction in the same way as the relations that the natural
sciences study.
20
Assessing human behaviour from the point of view of general
patterns of behaviour misses out the crucial role that rules and reasons play in
constituting themeaningful context of social action.
Thedisagreements over thelegitimacy of thenotion of causehavegiven riseto a
sharp dichotomisation of reasons and causes, understandingand explaining, as well
as causal and constitutive forms of inquiry in the social sciences. However, it is
crucial to noticethat thehermeneuticrule-followingaccountsof thesocial worldare
also basedonaHumeanunderstandingof causation. Rejectingacausal approachto
the social world has been relatively easy for these theorists because they have
uncritically accepted the positivist Humean understanding of causation as charac-
teristicof causal analysis. Winch, for example, rejectscausesbecauseassumptionsof
lawfulness andwhenA, thenB (regularity-determinism, ecient causation) donot
seemtoapplyinthesocial world.
21
I ndeed, oneof thekeyproblemsinthephilosophy
of social sciencesisthat, becauseof the(ofteninadvertent) acceptanceof theHumean
assumptions as thebaselinefor evaluatingcausal approaches, therehas been little
engagement with alternative ways of thinking about causation. As we will see, the
disciplineof I R has reproduced theseproblems by drawing on theterms of debate
between positivist and interpretive approaches to justify the present divided
disciplinary self-image.
HumeanisminInternational Relationstheory
Thegoal of thissectionis, rst, toidentifytheHumeanassumptionsoperatingwithin
contemporaryI R theory. Humeanassumptions, it isseen, characterisemost contem-
porary I R theorists understandingsof causation. However, it isalso recognisedthat
18
C. Frankfort-Nachmias and D. Nachmias, Research Methods in the Social Sciences (London:
Edward Arnold, 1992); King, Keohaneand Verba, Designing Social Inquiry.
19
Peter Winch, The Idea of Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1990).
20
Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1985),
p. 56.
21
Winch, Idea of Social Science, p. xii.
194 Milja Kurki
evenwhenHumeanassumptionsareaccepted, morecommon-sensical non-Humean
causal terminology can bedetected in I R theorising. Thelatter sections will seek to
clarify themeaningof theimplicit non-Humean causal languagethrough opening
up thenotion of cause.
Humeanism and scientic causal analysis in IR
Arguably, a particular kind of orthodoxy has dominated the way in which causal
analysis has been thought about in contemporary I R theory: orthodoxy dened by
the advocates of a positivist, or as some term it, an empiricist, model of social
science.
22
I t is argued herethat thepositivist/empiricist mainstreamin I R is deeply
informed by Humean assumptions, even though it does not necessarily advocate
Humeanismin thehard form(exemplied by themorebehaviourist approaches).
23
I t is seen that the acceptance of Humeanismcreates some problems and inconsist-
encies in themainstreamapproaches to causal analysis in I R.
To understand howHumeanism functionsin I R at present, King, Keohaneand
Verbas methodological thesis Designing Social Inquiry will beexamined here. This
book has not only outlined the premises of social scientic causal analysis in an
admirably systematicmanner, but hasalso becomevery inuential asaguidinglight
of causal analysis in political science and I R. I ndeed, most I R theorists and
researchers in theAmerican mainstreamseek to followprecepts for causal analysis
that areinlinewithKing, KeohaneandVerba: not simplytherationalist neorealist
and neoliberal theorists that haveused an empiricist framework for sometime, but
also researchers driven by morehistorical interests.
24
King, Keohane and Verba attempted to bring cohesion and order into social
scienticinquirybyoutlininghowweshouldconduct validcausal analysis. Causality
for King, Keohaneand Verba is measured in terms of thecausal eect exerted by
an explanatory variableon a dependent variable. They proposethat wemeasure
causal eect as thedierencebetween thesystematic component of observations
madewhenanexplanatoryvariabletakesonevalueandthesystematiccomponent of
22
Positivismis understood hereto refer to thoseapproaches that (1) believein a scientic method
that is applicableacross sciences and hence(2) assumenaturalism, (3) empiricism, (4) believein
value-neutrality of scientic method and (5) emphasisetheimportanceof instrumental (predictive)
knowledge. Gerard Delanty, Social Science: Beyond Constructivism and Realism, Concepts in Social
Sciences (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997), p. 12. Empiricismis morenarrowly an
epistemological approach to theconstruction of knowledge(through empirical observation).
However, empiricist epistemology is understood to bea crucial ingredient of a positivist approach to
science.
23
Examples of theharder Humean approach can beseen advocated explicitly in American journals,
such as theJournal of Conict Resolution. Many democratic peacetheorists can beseen as examples
of hard Humeanismbecauseof their statistical approach. See, for example, Z. Maoz and B. Russett,
Normativeand Structural Causes of Democratic Peace19461986, American Political Science
Review, 87:3 (1993), pp. 62438; R. I . Rummel, Democracies AreLess WarlikeThan Other
Regimes, European Journal of International Relations, 1:4 (1995), pp. 45779; Russett, Grasping the
Democratic Peace; Principles of Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press,
1993).
24
Theneo-neo contenders sharea common, arguably, empiricist conception of scienceas highlighted
by Baldwin. D. A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 9. This conception is arguably largely compatiblewith
King, Keohaneand Verbas precepts. For an application of King, Keohaneand Verba in a more
historical inquiry see, for example, Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitlers
Strategy of World Conquest (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1998).
The concept of cause in IR theory 195
comparableobservationswhentheexplanatoryvariabletakesonanother value.
25
I n
other words, whenweassesscausal relationswemeasuretheaverageeect that the
changing value of an explanatory variable has for the dependent variable. King,
Keohane and Verba acknowledge that we can never completely securely rerun
explanatory variables against dependent variables (as if in controlled experiments)
but argue that through a careful observation of some central rules of causal
inference falsiability, consistency, careful selection of dependent variables, max-
imisation of concreteness and of encompassing qualities of theories
26
we can
minimise disturbances in causal explanations of the social world. I mportantly,
King, KeohaneandVerbaarguethat therulesandlogicof causal inferencethat they
advanceapply equally to quantitativeand qualitativeinferences.
King, Keohane and Verbas model of causal analysis is steeped in Humean
assumptions, althoughthismight not beimmediatelyobvious. First, causal relations
are seen as relations between observables or patterns of observables. I mportantly,
King, KeohaneandVerbawarnagainst utilisingconceptsthat cannot beempirically
operationalised in testingof theories. This raises thequestion; what is thenatureof
thecausal relation for King, Keohaneand Verba? Theseauthors do not talk about
real (ontological) relationsbetween things: causality for themisan epistemological
concept, and relations between observables (events, things) logically, rather than
naturally, necessitating relations.
As for the key Humean assumption of regularity, although strict behaviourist
requirements of quantiability have been left behind, King, Keohane and Verbas
account still works on thebasis of theexpectation that thequalitativevariables will
beexpressedinquantiableterms. Also, it isarguedthat thelarger thesamples, even
in qualitative inquiries, the better the reliability of the inquiry.
27
Further, generali-
sation isprioritised over theparticular: too much concentration on thecomplex and
theunique, it is argued, dampens theeciency of theexplanation, and accounting
for too many contributory factors lowers the mean causal eect of the key
variable.
28
I mportantly, while King, Keohane and Verba acknowledge that social
scientists can, and sometimes do, concentrate their study on the so-called causal
mechanisms of social life, it is argued that accounts of causal mechanisms must
always bepremised on theidentication of appropriateempirical variables.
29
The wide acceptance of King, Keohane and Verbas understanding of causal
analysis in themainstreamof I R, and hencethereproduction of Humean assump-
tionsinthediscipline, hasthreeimportant implicationsthat must bedrawnout. First,
the acceptance of Humean causal analysis has led to an empiricist formof causal
analysis being advocated as thenorm. Methodologically, this has entailed a certain
degreeof rigidity: King, KeohaneandVerbasconceptionof causal analysisdoesnot
allowfor amultiplicityof dierent typesof evidencetobeappreciated. Qualitativeor
historical data, for example, arenot evaluated on their own terms but aremadeto
conform to the regularity criteria. On the other hand, methods such as discourse
analysis aresidelined as they cannot bebent to t in with theempiricist regularity-
drivenassumptions. Besidesgeneratingarather methodologicallyrigidconceptionof
25
King, Keohaneand Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, pp. 812.
26
I bid., pp. 99114.
27
I bid., pp. 20830.
28
I bid., pp. 104, 1823.
29
I bid., p. 86.
196 Milja Kurki
causal analysis, theempiricist criteria for scientic causal analysis put forward by
King, Keohaneand Verbaalso imply theepistemological superiority of thisformof
gaining knowledge, an assumption that has been strongly criticised by many
post-positivists and onethat is, indeed, far fromstraightforward.
Moreover, Humeanism has also entailed adoption of particular ontological
assumptions. The mainstream empiricists have often not been able to focus on
explaining why event-regularities come about. Crucially, because explanation is
conceived to take place through the analysis of the logical relations of observable
variables, thesetheoristshavenot been very interested in formingunderstandingsof
thedeepontological structures, processesandconditions(theunderlyingunobserv-
able causal powers), which would provide so-called depth explanations of the
patterns of observables identied. Thus, empiricist explanations of, for example,
democratic peace have mostly been focused on the analysis of the observable
independent variables and their logical relations (given patterns in quantitativeor
qualitative data), rather than on conceptualising the complex deep ontological
social relations that underlietheempirically observed sets of variables.
30
Also, as a
result of prioritisingobservability, theempiricists social ontologieshavetendedtobe
atomistic, that is geared around methodological individualism.
31
Third, it isalso important to notethat thereissomethingof aparadox within the
empiricist approaches. Whiletheempiricistsclaimthat causation can only betalked
of when strict epistemological and methodological rules of the positivist model of
scienceareemployed, causal languagein a much more(for want of a better word)
common-sensical manner can also bedetected in most mainstreamcausal analyses.
I ndeed, if we start paying attention to causal terminology in a wider everyday
sense to words such as because, leads to, produces, makes, enables and
constrains we can see that a great deal of broader (but only implicitly causal)
terminologyisat work inempiricist I R theorising. Althoughvalid causal theorising
is seen as that backed up by observed regularities, I R theorists also make more
common-sensical assumptions about theproductiveconnections between things.
I t is seen in the latter part of this article that these common-sensical causal
statements demonstrate that causal analysis in a deeper non-Humean sense is
possibleand inltrates even theHumean frameworks. I n this sense, themainstream
scientic accounts of causal relations are not necessarily the nal word on
causation, nor necessarily as internally consistent as is often thought.
Constitutive theorists: another case of Humeanism
The constitutive, sometimes also called reectivist, theorists in I R are, as opposed
to mainstream scientic causal analysts, wary of causal terminology. Causal
30
Especially evident in Maoz and Russett, Normativeand Structural Causes, pp. 62438.
31
Waltzs work, for example, is geared around methodologically individualismand, also, closed
system regularity-deterministic logic. Regularity of war is logically deduced fromassumptions about
structure premised on an individualistic understanding of states as actors. Kenneth Waltz, Theory
of International Politics (London: McGraw-Hill, 1979). For an excellent critiqueof Waltzs
individualismseeAlexander Wendt, Agent-StructureProblemin I nternational Relations Theory,
International Organization, 41:3, (1987), pp. 33570, Alexander Wendt, Anarchy I s What States
Makeof I t, International Organization, 46:2 (1992), pp. 391425.
The concept of cause in IR theory 197
descriptionsareseenasproblematicbythesetheoristsbecausecauses, for them, tend
to imply deterministicand materialisticexplanations. Thesetheoristsliketo conduct
constitutive theorisingand research instead. Thetermconstitutive has a rangeof
meanings. I t is argued, for example, that ideas constitute themeaning of material
forces. Others seerules, norms and discourses as sets of constitutive forces in that
they providetheconstitutive framework within which human actorsthink and act.
Beyond this, it is also accepted by many constitutive theorists that our theories
about theworld do not simply reect theworld but arealso constitutive of social
reality. Byopeningupthisnewwayof talkingabout thesocial worldtheconstitutive
theorists have opened up new important avenues of inquiry in I R. However, it is
important to note that causation is rejected by these theorists on curious grounds.
Reectivists tend to favour constitutive descriptions over causal ones becausethey
tend to associatecausal analysis with theempiricist Humean viewof social inquiry.
When critical theorists, for example, refer to causes they do so only when
criticising positivist causal analysis. Robert Cox, for example, argues that the
concept of cause is applicable strictly to the positivist framework and that his
historical explanation cannot be equated with causal explanation since causal
explanation cannot capturethecomplexityof thesocial worldasthehistorical mode
of analysis can.
32
Causal analysis is associated with the ahistorical neorealist
frameworks and the scientic claims of objectivity of the mainstream. Causal
analysis, then, is understood in accordance with Humean assumptions and, as a
result, rejected altogether.
However, aswewill see, weshouldresist thesimpleconclusionthat Coxsaccount
is void of causal concerns. I t should be kept in mind that Coxs account of world
politics seems to bebased on careful outlining of forces material, ideational and
institutional that produce and shape theworld order and agents actions within
it. However, Cox describes the layered and interacting structural forces, not as
causes, but aspressuresandconstraints.
33
I t couldbearguedthat to theextent that
thisterminologyimpliesaproductive meaning, andisdrawnuponto explainwhy
thingshappenincertainwaysrather thanothers, Coxismakingcommon-sensically
or implicitly causal claims. However, becauseCox associates causation with positiv-
ism, he does not recognise his own implicit interest in causal forces that shape the
world.
Poststructuralists also harbour a deep dislike of causation. On the basis of the
poststructuralist critiqueof knowledge, J enny Edkins, for example, argues that the
notions of causeand eect areuntenable.
34
Moreover, sheargues that lookingfor
causes hasresulted in inadequateresponsesin thedealingwith particular problems
inworldpoliticsand, hence, talk of causesshouldbeavoidedfor practical reasonsas
well as philosophical ones.
Processes of technologization and depoliticization can beseen in international politics itself,
as well as in thedisciplinethat studies it. Oneexampleof this is found in responses to
famines, humanitarian crises, or complex political emergencies. Agencies and governments
outsidethecrisis area do not takeaccount of thepolitical processes that areunder way, of
32
Robert Cox, Realism, Positivismand Historicism, in Robert Cox and Timothy Sinclair (eds.),
Approaches to World Order (NewYork: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1995), p. 51.
33
Cox, Social forces, states, and world orders, in Cox and Sinclair (eds.), Approaches, p. 98.
34
J enny Edkins, Poststructuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In (London:
LynneRienner, 1999), p. 15.
198 Milja Kurki
which thecrisis is a symptom. I nstead, they rely on interventions derived fromabstract,
technical analysis of thesituation, onethat looks for causes, not political reasons or
motivations.
35
While Edkins voices a fair criticism of some political science approaches to
humanitarian emergencies, her statement gives an unfair portrayal of thenotion of
cause. Causal analyses can, of course, have adverse consequences for the way in
which concrete problems are dealt with. However, it must be noted that Edkinss
assessment itself depends on an implicitly causal understanding of the situation:
presumably the political processes of which the crisis is a symptom, and the
contextual political reasons or motivations, areinfact the(real) causesthat should
beaddressed in order to deal with thesituation. Becauseof her seemingly positivist
understanding of causation, Edkins rejects the concept too swiftly and, thereby,
ignores her own implicit causal claims.
The same paradox characterises David Campbells work. I n Writing Security
Campbell declaresthat theinterpretivepositionheassociateshimself withisopposed
to cataloging, calculating and specifying the real causes ;
36
instead, Campbell
maintains that his poststructuralist theory aims to inquire into the political
consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another.
37
While
appearing anti-causal, his statement evidences an implicit causal commitment:
representations matter precisely because they produce certain consequences. This
understandingof representationsand discoursescan beseen ascausal, even if not in
a when A, then B manner.
38
Because Campbell, as other reectivists, associates
causationwiththemainstream HumeanisminI R, hedoesnot recognisetheimplicit
causal claims in his own work.
Constructivist oscillation
Constructivists have not rejected the notion of cause as readily as many critical
theoristsandpoststructuralists. Thereisatendencyinconstructivist work tooscillate
between reasons and causes accounts, and between causal and constitutive
theorising. However, the terms causal and constitutive seem to lack coherent
meaning for many constructivists.
Nicholas Onuf provides a good example. Onuf thinks there is something to the
notion of cause, but he also wants to resist accounting for social action in merely
causal terms. Onuf wants to givea special meaning to theintentionality, rules and
constitution of the social world that cannot, for him, be understood through a
causal approach.
39
However, neither the concept of causation, nor the notion of
35
Edkins, Poststructuralism, p. 910.
36
Campbell, Writing Security, p. 4.
37
I bid., p. 4.
38
I n National Deconstruction, for example, Campbell argues that theontopology of binding together
of territoriality, statismand mono-culturalismin Western liberal discourses has had somecrucial
implications on howtheWest viewed and dealt with thesituation in Bosnia. David Campbell,
National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia (London: University of Minnesota
Press, 1998).
39
Seehis discussion of Bhaskars reasons as causes account. Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making:
Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia, CA: University of Southern
California Press, 1989), p. 49.
The concept of cause in IR theory 199
constitution, areclearly dened and causal concerns, in theend, largely drop o the
agendaasthenotionof constitutiverulesisgivenpriorityinanalysinghowrulesand
norms work.
Similar trends can be detected in the work of other constructivists such as
Friedrich Kratochwil. Kratochwil attacks the mono-causal neorealist theorising
and its inappropriate concept of causality.
40
However, despite his rejection of
outright Humeanism, what alternativeassumptions about causation entail remains
unclear and, as a result, causation, again, disappears fromthe theoretical agenda.
Norms, for example, arenot seenascausal but rather asconstitutive.
41
Ruggie, too,
despiterecognising ideational causation, continually contrasts causal explanations
with the so-called constitutive non-causal explanations.
42
Yet, it remains unclear
what hends causal about causal explanations and non-causal about constitutive
explanations.
While they do not reject the concept of cause outright, these constructivists
arguably continue to attach certain deterministic and materialistic connotations to
the notion of cause and, as a result, remain unclear about its role in their own
explanations. Oneof theonly openly constructivist theorists to takesteps towards a
clearer understandingof causationhasbeenAlexander Wendt, whoseeortstobuild
a deeper account of causewill bediscussed in thenext section.
The failure of many I R theorists empiricist, reectivist and constructivist to
giveadequateemphasisto theconceptualisationof thenotionof causehashadsome
crucial eects on thedisciplineof I R. Crucially, theHumean discourseof causation
has had an overwhelmingly inuential rolein directingtheassumptions attached to
thenotion of cause. Thewideacceptanceof Humean assumptions on causation has
ledto theempiricist formof causal analysisbeingtreatedastheonlyacceptableform
of causal inquiry in thediscipline. This, in turn, has resulted in thedichotomisation
of scientic causal and reectivist constitutive(non-causal) approaches in I R. As
theempiricist scientists haveinsisted on theneed for systematic causal analysisas
dened by them(on Humean terms), thepost-positivist constitutivetheorists have
rejected thevalidity of causal analysis altogether in an eort to avoid being forced
into astraightjacket conceptionof howto analysesocial aairs. Also, asaresult of
the acceptance of Humeanism, theorists have not given adequate attention to the
manycommon-sensical assumptionsat work intheir theorising. I t isarguedherethat
thesecommon-sensical assumptionsreveal that causation can, and in fact should, be
thought of inamuchdeeper andbroader waythanisrecognisedbythecontemporary
causal or non-causal theorists.
I n order to solve the tensions and confusions that contemporary I R, with its
Humeanframingof causation, isweddedtowemust rethink andopenuptheconcept
of causealtogether. Thenext section arguesthat weshould accept thedeeper notion
40
R. Koslowski and F. Kratochwil, Understanding Changein I nternational Politics: TheSoviet
Empires Demiseand theI nternational System, in T. Risse-Kappen et al. (eds.), International
Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1995),
p. 136. Seealso F. Kratochwil, Constructing a NewOrthodoxy? Wendts Social Theory of
I nternational Politics and theConstructivist Challenge, Millennium, 29 (2000), pp. 73101.
41
Koslowski and Kratochwil, Understanding Change, p. 137.
42
J . G. Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Organization (London:
Routledge, 1998), p. 34. Seealso J . G. Ruggie, What Makes theWorld Hang Together? The
Neo-Utilitarianismand theSocial Constructivist Challenge, in Krasner et al. (eds.), Exploration and
Contestation in the Study of World Politics (Cambridge, MA: MI T Press, 1999), p. 229.
200 Milja Kurki
of causeadvocated by thephilosophical realists. I t is then argued that wemust also
broaden the notion of cause away from the pushing and pulling ecient cause
conception of causation. By taking these two steps we can comprehensively avoid
Humean assumptions and radically recongurecausal analysis in I R.
Philosophical realismandadeeper conceptionof cause
This section argues that to escape from the problem-eld that has plagued I R
theoristson all sideswith regard to causal analysis, weneed to rst adopt adeeper
ontologically grounded conception of causation advanced in the philosophy of
science, and in I R, by theso-called philosophical realists. Philosophical realists aim
to put forward a new ontological framework for thinking about the objects of
science, which in turn necessitates a reconguration of the epistemological and
methodological parameters of scientic causal analysis. Thephilosophically realist
literaturehas already been drawn on in I R by certain key gures such as Alexander
Wendt, David Dessler, Heikki Patomaki and Colin Wight. This section seeks to
explicate why the philosophically realist turn is important in redirecting causal
analysis, whilealso pointing out why weneed to go beyond thedeepening of the
meaning of causation.
Towards a deeper conception of cause
Theturn towards philosophical realismhas been an important development in the
recent philosophy of science. I t has had wide ranging implications within the
philosophy of science, social science and I R. This is because philosophical realism
aims to, and by and large succeeds, in solving a number of seemingly intractable
problems and debates in modern philosophy and social science.
What does philosophical realismas a general philosophy of sciencecontributeto
our understanding of causation? First, philosophical realismhas been important in
that it hasallowedustoreclaimanontological conceptionof causationthat hasbeen
lost for threehundred years or so. Realist philosophies of scienceand social science
havehad as their aimtherefocusing of debates in thecontemporary philosophy of
scienceand social scienceon ontological questions.
43
As a result, thephilosophical
realists, importantly, advancearadically anti-Humean ontological understandingof
causation: causes, therealists argue, can be, or indeed, must beassumed to exist as
real ontological entities, that is, they arenot merecreations of our imagination, but
have real existence in the world outside our thought and observations.
44
Causal
analysis, then, is about analysing causes out there (outside what we think or
observe), an assumption rejected by both Humean empiricists and many reectivist
sceptics.
43
Notethat philosophical realismshould not beequated with theI R tradition of realism, which being
based on empiricist assumptions in many cases is, in fact, largely anti-realist.
44
RomHarreand Edward H. Madden, Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1975).
The concept of cause in IR theory 201
Second, in reclaiming the ontological meaning of the concept of cause, the
philosophically realist conception of cause allows us to transcend the regularity-
dependence of Humeanism. For philosophical realists, regularities, although
accepted as possibly indicative of underlying causal structures, are deemed neither
necessary nor sucient for establishing a causal explanation.
45
To grasp the real
underlyingcauses(why somethinghappens), realistsargue, weneedknowledgebased
on various types of evidenceand, importantly, a conceptual framework that allows
usto conceptualisethereal (ontological) unobservablecausal powersthat arebehind
observableevents(or regularitiesof events). Thus, whileobservedregularitiesarenot
thrown away altogether, they aregiven aradically dierent rolein thisnon-Humean
approach to causal analysis: they areonly oneformof data amongst many and in
themselves cannot providescientically objective causal analysis.
Third, philosophical realists also challenge the regularity-determinism of the
Humean empiricist model of causation. The realists emphasise that causes exist
outsideclosed systems and that theworld, in fact, consists of open systems, where
multiple causes interact and counteract each other in complex and, importantly,
unpredictableways. Thus, thecentral focus of causal analysis is not theanalysis of
isolated independent variables (through statistical methods), but rather understand-
ingthecomplex interaction of a variety of dierent kinds of causal factors (through
thebuilding of conceptual frameworks).
Furthermore, causation is dened much moreopenly, or common-sensically, by
thephilosophical realists. Causes aredened rather loosely as all thosethings that
bringabout, produce, direct or contributeto statesof aairsor changesintheworld.
This allows us to reclaimthediversepragmatic causal languagein common useand
reectstheubiquity of causal analysisin our everyday lives. Causal analysis, then, is
not something that is uniquely abstract and scientic: rather scientic causal
analysis is arenement and extension of what wedo in thepractical functioningof
everyday life.
46
These philosophically realist arguments have important implications for the
analysisof thesocial world. Philosophical realistswho concentrateon social inquiry
(often called critical realists)
47
reject theterms of debatein much of thephilosophy
of social science by arguing that the philosophy of social science has been deeply
informed by a misleading positivist stanceon science.
Thecritical realists, in linewith thegeneral philosophically realist critiques, reject
the applicability of empiricist observation based scientic inquiry and the closed
system model of explanation. As a result, they aim to recongure radically
philosophy of social sciencedebatesaway fromthepositivist vs. hermeneutic theory
dichotomy. Notably, the reasons vs. causes debate is recongured by the critical
realists. Thecritical realistsarguethat, whenwedisentanglethenotionof causefrom
theHumean regularity-deterministic model of causation, wecan accept that reasons
are, in fact, a type of cause. Critical realists argue that just because humans are
intentional, meaningful and human action reasoned this does not mean that our
45
Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1978), p. 12.
46
J . Lopez and G. Potter, After Postmodernism: TheMillennium, in J . Lopez and G. Potter (eds.),
After Postmodernism: an Introduction to Critical Realism (London: AthlorePress, 2001), p. 9.
47
Short for realist critical naturalism Roy Bhaskar, Possibility of Naturalism: A Critique of the
Contemporary Human Sciences, 3rd edn. (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 28.
202 Milja Kurki
actions, and the rules and reasons that inform our actions are non-causal (or
uncaused) .
48
Onthecontraryideas, meaningsandreasonsareimportant inthesocial
world precisely becausethey arecausal.
49
I t follows that interpretivemethods, far frombeing anti-causal or non-scientic,
areseenasnecessaryinorder toconduct social scienticcausal analysis: hermeneutic,
historical and qualitative methods are seen as fundamentally important in getting
to grips with the complex nature of social relations. Critical realists advance a
methodologically pluralist approach to social scienceaccepting thevalidity of both
extensive statistical methodsand intensive qualitativeand interpretivemethods.
50
Critical realists also avoid the epistemologically objectivist tendencies of the
empiricists. Although realists accept that theworld is characterised by ontologically
real things and processes, they accept that in coming to knowthoseforces, wewill
always be inevitably informed by the social and political context that we inhabit.
I ndeed, all knowledge about the world is deeply constrained and enabled by the
linguistic conventions, conceptual systems and thesocial-political backgrounds that
weknow within. Thismeansthat scienceisnever purelyobjective. However, science
is not relativistic either becauseour knowledgeis always of something, that is, our
accounts of theworld arenot merely imagined but makeprojections about really
existing ontological objects, relations and processes.
51
Philosophical and critical realismallowus to deeply challengethedominanceof
thetraditional positivist model of science, and thetaken-for-granted natureof the
Humean model of causal analysis attached to it. They introducea new ontological
approach to causal analysis and, in so doing, transcend the epistemological and
methodological deadlocks betweenthetraditional contendersinthesocial sciences.
Theadvancement of realist ideas in I R has been very important in redirectingI R
theory. Theworks of Wendt, Dessler, Patomaki and Wight haveopened important
new theoretical and empirical avenues in I R.
52
Wendt has demonstrated that the
philosophically realist logic can be used to bridge the gap between rationalist and
reectivist theorising in I R, while Dessler has demonstrated that philosophical
realism directs us towards more integrative analysis of world political processes.
Patomaki andWight, on theother hand, havedemonstratedthedeepembeddedness
of I R theoretical approaches in an anti-realist problem-eld that has weakened
I R theorising ontologically, epistemologically and methodologically. Notably, all
these theorists have challenged the taken-for-granted conception of science in I R
and, hence, have directed I R theorisations towards more ontologically and
epistemologically reectiveand methodologically pluralist frameworks.
Thesetheorists havealso madeimportant contributions in rethinking causation:
Wendt and Dessler have emphasised the analysis of causal mechanisms over
48
Paul Lewis, Agency, Structureand Causality in Political Science: A Comment on Sibeon, Politics,
22:1 (2002), pp. 1723.
49
AndrewSayer, Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 111.
50
See, for example, Sayer, Method in Social Science.
51
Heikki Patomki, After International Relations; Critical Realism and the (Re)Construction of World
Politics (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 79.
52
See, for example, Heikki Patomki and Colin Wight, After Post-Positivism? ThePromises of
Critical Realism, International Studies Quarterly, 44 (2000), pp. 21337; Patomki, After
International Relations; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (NewYork:
CambridgeUniversity Press, 1999); David Dessler, Beyond Correlations: Towards a Causal Theory
of War, International Studies Quarterly, 35:3 (1991), pp. 33755.
The concept of cause in IR theory 203
regularitiesinanalysingworldpolitics, andhaveraisedconcernsabout therigidityof
thecausal-constitutivetheory dividein I R. Patomaki and Wight, on theother hand,
havearguedfor moremulti-causal inquiriesthroughadvancingthenotionof causal
complex. However, more could be done to develop the philosophically realist
conception of causation. I ndeed, the next section will point out that we should go
beyondadvocatingdeeper analysisof causationby coherently broadening out the
meaning of causation. This provides the philosophically realist approaches with a
sharper focus in analysing themultiplicity of social causes.
Beyond the deeper conception of cause?
Whileprovidingauseful correctiveto thedominant positivist model of scienceinI R,
and, hence, enablingtheopeningupof newconceptual andmethodological avenues,
the philosophically realist critiques have not gone far enough in challenging the
Humean discourse of causation in philosophy of science, social science and in I R.
Thisisbecausethephilosophical realistsseemto havebeen unnecessarily wedded to
theecient causeunderstandingof causation. Aswill beseen, morecanandshould
be done to open up systematically the meaning of the notion of cause beyond the
pushing and pulling ecient causemetaphor.
When we examine the philosophically realist accounts more closely, we can see
that many of them retain a belief in a pushing and pulling understanding of
causation, the so-called ecient cause understanding of causation. For example,
Harreand Madden, thetheorists behind theturn towards thestudy of ontological
causal powers, denecausation and causal powers squarely through themetaphor
of ecient cause. Causation, for them, always involves a material particular which
producesor generatessomething, that is, [powerful] particularsareto beconceived
ascausal agents.
53
Thisfollowscloselythepost-Cartesianassumptionthat, whenwe
talk about causes, we only talk about pushing and pulling causes: causation is
dened by the ability of objects to bring about change through agential action.
I mportantly, because they accept this assumption of causal powers as agential
movers, HarreandMaddenhaveacceptedthat inthesocial worldtheonlyimportant
causal forceis theactive human action by individuals.
54
Somecritical realists in Roy Bhaskars tradition havechallenged this reduction of
social causalityto activehumanaction becausethisisperceivedto leadto methodo-
logical individualism. As a result, some Bhaskarian critical realists have started to
open up themeaningof thenotion of causeaway fromtheecient causeconnota-
tions. First, theseBhaskarian critical realists haveargued for a wider conception of
ecient cause, onethat encapsulatesnot onlyhumanaction, but also ideas, rulesand
reasons: thesetoo cause statesof aairs, althoughnot necessarilyinawhenA, then
B manner.
55
Second, however, thecritical realists havealso cometo arguethat the
onlywayinwhichwecangraspthecausal natureof factorssuchassocial structures
is by accepting that social structures do not necessarily push and pull, rather they
53
Harreand Madden, Causal Powers, p. 5.
54
Paul Lewis, Realism, Causality and theProblemof Social Structure, Journal for the Theory of
Social Behaviour, 30: 3 (2000), pp 2557.
55
Bhaskar, Possibility of Naturalism, p. 89, Sayer, Method in Social Science, p. 111.
204 Milja Kurki
constrainandenable. Toconceptualisethesenon-pushingandpullingtypesof causes
the Bhaskarian critical realists have utilised the Aristotelian metaphor of material
cause. As Paul Lewis explains:
J ust as a sculptor fashions a product out of therawmaterials and tools availableto him, so
social actors producetheir actions out of pre-existing social structure. Likethemediumin
which thesculptor works, pre-existing social structurelacks thecapacity to initiateactivity
and makethings of its own accord social actors aretheonly ecient causes or prime
movers in society but it does aect thecourseof events in thesocial world by inuencing
theactions that peoplechooseto undertake . . And by inuencing thebehaviour of social
actors, pre-existing social structuremakes a dierenceto and henceexerts a (material)
causal inuenceover social life.
56
The opening up of the possibility that there might be other types of causes than
ecient causes in social life is important and promising. However, the broader
conception of causation has not been developed fully by thephilosophical realists.
The use of the Aristotelian material cause analogy, for example, is not adequately
developed as many would question thesimilarity of material and social structural
causes. Also, thereis no explicit acceptanceamong thephilosophical realists of the
general principle that when we talk about causation we are actually talking about
many dierent types of causes, nor real willingness to develop broader categorisa-
tions of dierent types of causes. Thus, thedierent ways in which ideas, discourses
and reasons, for example, cause are not examined but subsumed under the now
rather broad ecient causeheading. I f therearedierent types of causes at work in
social life, why should wethink only in terms of material and ecient causes? I t is
argued in thefollowing section that it is, indeed, useful to drawon theAristotelian
account to develop a more pluralistic understanding of causation, but that this
broadening out should bedonemoreconsistently and holistically.
Furthermore, theimplicationsof awider conceptionof causeshouldbedeveloped
in more detail in the I R theoretical context. While the followers of philosophical
realismin I R haverethought causation on deeper lines, and havebeen sceptical of
mono-causal explanations, thesetheoristshavenot sofar focusedondrawingout the
implications of broadening out thenotion of causein I R context.
AninterestingexceptioninthisregardisAlexander Wendt who inhisrecent work
hasshowninterest inexploringthebroader conceptionsof cause. I mportantly, inhis
article Why the World State is I nevitable, Alexander Wendt turned to the
Aristotelian notion of cause in order to elucidate a teleological logic for the
development of theworld state.
57
WhileWendt focused on developingthenotion of
nal cause, he also pointed out that parallels can be drawn between constitutive
analyses in I R and theAristotelian causal categories.
58
Thus, Wendt has opened up
the possibility of broadening out the notion of cause for the purposes of I R
theorising. The following section seeks to take further Wendts reections by
systematically exploring theimport of theAristotelian philosophy of causation for
thepurposes of I R theorising.
56
Lewis, Agency, pp. 2021.
57
Alexander Wendt, Why a World Stateis I nevitable, European Journal of International Relations,
9:4 (2003), pp. 491542.
58
Wendt, Why A World State?, p. 495.
The concept of cause in IR theory 205
Aristotlerevisited: broadeningtheconcept of cause
Whilebeingtheoldest andmost famousaccount of causation, Aristotlesphilosophy
of causationhasbeenlargelyforgottenduringthelast centuries. Thissectionseeksto
showthat if werevisit thebroader Aristotelian logic of causal explanation wegain a
radically recongured understandingof causal analysis philosophically and for the
purposes of I R theorising. I t is accepted here that, contrary to what Hume, the
empiricists and even many philosophical realists assume, causation is not a single,
monolithicconcept
59
and, hence, causal analysisinvolvesthecareful identicationof
various dierent types of causes and understanding their complex interactions.
Aristotles four causes account
As was seen in therst section, theoriginal meaning of theword cause, theGreek
wordaition, didnot haveaprecisemeaninginthesensethat modernphilosophyhas
tried to establish. An aition was anything that contributed in any way to the
producingor maintainingof acertainreality, or whatever onecouldciteasananswer
to a why-question.
60
Crucially, for Aristotle, dierent causes material, formal,
ecient and nal cause in dierent ways. Aristotlesawecient causes (by which
something is made) and nal causes (for the sake of which something is made) as
active or extrinsic causes that cause by lending an inuence or activity to the
producingof something. Ontheother hand, anintrinsiccause, for Aristotle, wasthat
which causes through constituting an object or thing.
61
Within his framework of
four causes (constitutivecauses of reality) could bethought to consist of material
causes (material out of which something is made) and formal causes (ideas or
relations accordingto which somethingis made). Aristotlesawtheworld as shaped
through the complex interaction of all these dierent types of causal forces. To
explainwhyanychangeor thinghascomeabout onewouldneedto refer to all these
dierent categories of causeand therelations between them.
TheAristoteliancategoriesof thinkingabout themeaningof causationallowusto
open up themeaningof thenotion of causeand to exploretheplurality of meanings
of the concept, something that has been pushed aside since Descartes narrowing
down of the concept of cause. What do the categories mean and how can we use
themto understand thesocial world in better ways?
Material causes, for Aristotle, werea fundamental part of any explanation in the
sensethat all accountsof theworld would haveto refer to thematter out of which
things come to be. Material causes simply referred to the passive potentiality of
matter as a type of cause that enables and delimits possible ways of being or
changing. I mportantly, in the Aristotelian framework the notion of material cause
has dierent meanings in dierent explanatory contexts: thus, whilethings such as
a table or a gun, can be treated as material causes in one instance, these things
59
Nancy Cartwright, Causation: OneWord, Many Things, Philosophy of Science, 71 (2004), p. 805.
60
Lear, Aristotle, p. 6.
61
S. Waterlow, Nature, Change and Agency in Aristotles Physics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982),
p. 11.
206 Milja Kurki
can also be understood to have material causes themselves in the constitution of
substances (wood, metal).
62
What does this notion of material cause contribute to our understanding of
causation?Therst contributionof theAristotelianunderstandingof material causes
is that it points us to recognise that material causes are fundamental in any
explanation. I t directsusto accept that without accountingfor material potentiality,
and thevarious forms that matter takes, any account of theworld is limited. At the
sametime, theAristotelian notion of material causealso allows us to usematerial
causesasaexiblecategorythat refersto awiderangeof material substances, things
andresourcesandallowsustoconceptualisethesematerial resourcesasconstraining
andenabling causes, not asmechanical pushingandpulling causesoftenimpliedin
modernmaterialist accounts. Thisframingisuseful inthesocial sciencesasit getsus
away fromcompleterejection of material factors (exemplied by idealist strands of
thinking) as well as the deterministic overtones often attached to more materially
based explanationsof thesocial world. To givean examplefromI R context, wecan
recognise that the availability of guns in a crisis situation is an important causal
factor that conditionstheconict, whilerealisingthat thismaterial causeinitself does
not determine outcomes, nor does it provide an adequate explanation in and of
itself. I ndeed, in order to understand thenatureand roleof material causes weneed
to consider threeother types of cause.
Formal causes, for Aristotle, referred to that which shapes or denes matter. For
Aristotle, aformal causeisthat which makesor denesagiven thing, itsstructure,
its qualities and its properties. I n modern discourse formal causes are often
understoodideationally (inthePlatonicsense), that is, aformistakentorefer tothe
idea of athing. Whilethisis, indeed, avalidinterpretation, it isuseful to remember
that Aristotelian formal causes werenot dened by ideationality alone, but rather
by relationality (which ideas can reect): formal causes describe and dene
the structure or internal relations that give meaning and being to things. I f the
material cause of a table is the wood it is made of, the formal cause of it is the
structure (embodied in the idea of a table) that denes the relationship between
pieces of wood to makeit into a table.
Why are formal causes useful for our understanding of causal relations? First
and foremost, because it seems that in the social world, ideas, rules, norms and
discourses often interpreted as non-causal constitutive forces can usefully be
understood through the notion of formal cause. Rules, norms and discourses, are
causes, then: asformal causes, they deneand structuresocial relations, that is, they
relateagentstoeachother, their social rolesandthemeaningsof their practices. They
describe the rules and relations that dene social positions and relationships, and
hence can be seen as that according to which social reality works. Crucially, the
Aristotelian conception of formal cause allows us to understand rules, norms and
discoursesasconstrainingandenabling causes, andgetsusawayfromthepushing
and pulling model of framingthecausal roleof ideas, rules, normsand discourses
themodel that thereectivist constitutivetheoristsinI R havealwaysbeenwaryof.
Crucially, both material and formal causes break the mould of modern causal
analysis in thesensethat they do not conformto thecommonly elicited assumption
62
F. A. Lewis, Aristotleon theRelation between a Thing and its Matter, in M. L. Gill (ed.), Unity,
Identity and Explanation in Aristotles Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), p. 248.
The concept of cause in IR theory 207
that causes should temporally precede and beindependent of eects. I t could be
argued that these two criteria often advanced by Humeans, as well as by some
philosophical realists,
63
confuse more than they clarify in the light of the analysis
advanced here. This is because these criteria, which arguably have their origins in
Humeanqualicationsfor howto distinguishbetweencausesandeects,
64
restrict us
from accepting as causal certain important conditioning or constitutive causal
powers. The key contribution of the Aristotelian notion of constitutive causes,
exemplied by material and formal causes, is that it directs us to accept the
constraining and enabling conditions of social life as real and as causal, thus
exposing a deeper level of causality in the social world than is often recognised,
especially by thosefocused on analysing merely observablepatterns of behaviour.
However, there is also place for the traditional active causes within this
framework. The active causes, as opposed to conditioning causes, for Aristotle,
were ecient and nal causes, as these causes, through their activity, go towards
producingchange. Aristoteliannotionof ecient cause refersto aso-calledprimary
mover, or a sourceof change, for example, a carpenter as themaker of a table.
I mportantly, Aristotelian ecient causality does not have modern mechanistic
overtonesasecient causes, for Aristotle, werefundamentallyembeddedwithin, and
in relation to, other types of causes and could not in and of themselves explain
anything.
Conceiving of the causal actions and causal conditions of agency in the
Aristotelian manner is useful in that the Aristotelian conceptualisation of ecient
causesgetsusaway fromthemechanisticwaysof thinkingof agency aswell asfrom
theindividualist tendencies to isolateagents as theonly typeof causein thesocial
world (agency is conceived as embedded in a complex causal social environment,
material and formal). Also, it is useful because it allows us to link ecient causes
closely with so-called nal causes.
Final causes, for Aristotle, referred to the ends and purposes that go towards
makingthingshappen, tothat for thesakeof which somethinghappensor isdone.
Final form of causality was, for Aristotle, an irreducible form of causality in the
social aswell asthenatural world.
65
Manywoulddoubt theapplicabilityof teleology
in natural sciences. One might also doubt the kind of teleological explanations of
social processesasoutlined, for example, byWendt.
66
However, whether oneaccepts
these forms of nal causality or not, in one simple sense nal causes seemlike an
inherently important type of cause in the social world. Social action, even when
unplanned and spontaneous, is inevitably premised on the intentionality of human
agency, which in turn can beseen asaformof nal causality.
67
When wetalk of the
intentions, motivationsor, incertaincontextsreasons, that direct actors, weareinfact
referring to thenal causes becauseof which certain (ecient) actions aretaken.
63
Wendt, Social Theory, pp. 7788.
64
For Hume, causes had to beobserved independently fromeects, and causes wereidentied as
dening themas thoseobservables that wereobserved beforetheeects.
65
E. Gilson, From Aristotle to Darwin and Back Again: A Journey in Final Causality, Species and
Evolution (I ndiana, I N: NotreDamePress, 1984), p. 5.
66
Wendt, Why theWorld Stateis I nevitable.
67
D. V. Porpora, On thePost-Wittgenstein Critiqueof theConcept of Action in Sociology, Journal
for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 13 (1983), pp. 12946. For a similar account of reasons as nal
causes seeRuth Gro, Critical Realism, Postpositivism and the Possibility of Knowledge (London:
Routledge, 2004).
208 Milja Kurki
Crucially, acceptance of the Aristotelian conception of nal causality does not
necessitateamechanistic or deterministicunderstandingof causality. I ntentionsand
reasons should not be conceived to push and pull in the same sense as ecient
causes: instead, they are causal in the sense that they signify a contributory cause,
that for thesakeof which something is done. I t must also benoted that, against
commonmisconceptions, acceptingthenotionof nal causalityinthissensedoesnot
downgradeother typesof causality. Final causalitypresupposesmaterial causalityof
themind as well as a material world to act upon. I t presupposes a formal relational
social context (rules, norms, discourses) that constrainsand enables theformingof
intentions. An(ecient) agent andactionsarealso requiredto actualise intentions/
purposes/goals.
Towards causal holism and explanatory pragmatism
The Aristotelian categories, arguably, provide us with interesting new ways to
describe and analyse causes. I mportantly, the rethought conception of cause
advancedhereallowsustoget awayfromHumeanandpushingandpulling modern
conceptions of causation by outliningdierent ways of causing(constitutiveas well
as active). They also allow us to position and assess causes as complex and
interacting. I ndeed, Aristotleimportantly stresses that in inquiring into any change
or thing, wemust alwaysask manydierent kindsof why-questions: inquiringmerely
into singular causes tells us littlein most cases, sincecauses never exist in isolation
fromeach other. I t follows that thebroadening of our understanding of causation
allowsusto advancean ontologically holistic framework for causation. By allowing
usto look into avarietyof dierent kindsof causal factorsthisrethought framework
of causal analysis allows us to ask much moreopen and plural questions about the
social worldandabout theinteractionof dierent kindsof actors, objects, discourses
and structures.
The Aristotelian system also allows us to advocate explanatory pragmatism.
Social life, aswell asnatural life, can, rst, beconceivedasworkingthroughmultiple
cycles of causes. Second, the Aristotelian system recognises that the multiple
cyclesof causescan betreated fromdierent anglesdependingon onesexplanatory
interests: what we assign as causes, and which types of causes, can be seen as a
questiontiedtoour pragmaticexplanatoryinterests. Thus, onemight beinterestedin
explainingtheformationof anorm, whichwouldentail inquiryinto thespeechacts
of actorsin aparticular social (material andformal) context, but thesamenormcan
in a dierent context betreated as theformal cause(of an action, for example).
68
I t canalsobeacceptedthat eventhoughcausesarereal andubiquitous, our causal
accounts do not need to be treated as objective or xed. This ts in with the
requirements of philosophical realism according to which we must accept that all
68
However, importantly, simply becauseweassign certain things as causes for our explanatory interest
does not makefactors outsideour accounts non-causal. Wemerely designatethemas unimportant
background causes for our explanatory interests. This is similar to what themanipulability
theorists argue. SeeR. G. Collingwood, Essay in Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940). For
an interesting manipulability account of causation in I R, seeSuganami, On the Causes of War
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
The concept of cause in IR theory 209
knowledge claims are socially embedded and dependent on the conceptual and
linguistic categoriesweinherit. I t can, then, beaccepted that claimsto epistemologi-
cal objectivity aremisleading. However, if weaccept philosophical realism, weneed
not accept relativist conclusions: we do not have to accept that all accounts are
equally valid since we have to, and do, make evaluations between dierent
conceptual/theoretical systems on the basis of their ability to account for evidence
and to put forward plausibleontological projections.
Also, theaccount advanced hereis commensuratewith methodological pluralism
as emphasised by philosophical realists. The methodological tools used in social
science should remain non-specied: we need many dierent ways of studying the
ontologically complex social world. I t is accepted that quantitative methods can
point to someinterestingpatternsof observabledata. However, in order to explain
thesepatternsof data, qualitativeanalysisisnecessaryasthisdataallowsustoaccess
theactual causal processes that takeplacein morenuanced ways.
Theemphasis of therethought deeper and broader account of causeis on asking
many typesof causal questionsand refusingto delimit methodsand epistemological
approaches a priori. This points causal theorising in I R towards a new direc-
tion which, in turn, has important implications for the disciplinary self-images
reproduced in I R.
Implicationsfor IR: beyondHumeanism, beyondthecausal-constitutivedivide
The simultaneous deepening and broadening of the notion of cause has important
implications for thedisciplineof I R. First, it allows us to rethink theway in which
wethink about, andconduct, causal analysisinI R. I t alsodeeplychallengesthelogic
of thecausal-constitutivetheory dividein I R. Furthermore, in so doing, rethinking
causation can help direct I R theorisations away from theoretical reductionism
towards more constructive holistic understandings of concrete world political
processes.
Beyond Humean causal analysis in IR
First of all, therethinkingof causation advanced hereremindsusthat theempiricist
modeof causal analysis is not theonly way to framecausal analysis and, in fact, is
methodologically, epistemologically and ontologically problematic in important
ways.
Theapproach defended heremaintains that theessenceof causal explanation is
not thegatheringof regularities, but conceptual explanation of thevariety of forces
that bring about regularities of observables. I t follows that analysis of data is
methodologicallypluralist, not gearedaroundspecicobservation-basedmethods, or
identication of regularities. Emphasis is on combining empirical data sets of
various kinds and, through them, thedevelopment of reectivecomplexity-sensitive
conceptual (ontological) frameworks. I t also follows that more holistic integrative
causal explanationscan beprovided. Whereasvariableswereisolated and compared
210 Milja Kurki
against eachother intheempiricist Humeanmodelsof causal analysis, nowtheycan
bebrought together into integrativeexplanatory frameworks.
I n many ways themodel of causal analysis advanced hereis commensuratewith
the more common-sensical causal explanations and descriptions we give. Since
causal analysis is not dened by certain types of systematic observation and
generalisationbut rather throughreexiveuseof avarietyof data, it isacceptedthat
words such as produce, enable, constrain, bring about, push and direct
usefully describethemany dierent kindsof causal connectionsthat therearein the
world. Hence, to reducecausal explanation to mechanisticmetaphorsor relationsof
independent and dependent variables is to overly restrict our understandingof the
complex social reality around us.
I t also follows that causal explanations in I R cannot simply rely on an empiricist
conception of scientic methods to deliver an objectivescientic truth on causal
relations. Wehaveto besceptical of theepistemological condenceof theempiricist
causal theorists in the superior objectivity of observational methods and, indeed,
recognise that the positivist model of social science is in itself limited in its
ontological, epistemological and methodological scope. Crucially, the approach to
causal analysisadvancedhereallowsustoaccept that all causal accountsof theworld
are, asCoxandthepost-positivistswouldhaveit, alwaysfor someoneandfor some
purpose.
69
Also, the approach advanced here is important because it challenges the tradi-
tional ontological framings of world political processes. Against the mainstream
followersof King, Keohaneand Verba, observability isnot theonly, nor necessarily
a useful, benchmark for what matters in causal analysis in I R: as the reectivists
havepointed out, only so much can beexplained through thestudy of measurable
variables. On thebasis of thediscussion hereit can beaccepted that unobservable
objects are real and causal and can be got at through careful conceptualisation.
Reasons and motivations as well as rules, norms and discourses can beconceptual-
ised as real and as causal within this framework and, hence, can beaccepted as
legitimateobjectsof social scienceinquiry, evenif theyarenot directlyobservableor
stable in termsof empirical outcomes. Theapproach here, then, challengesnot just
the empiricist approach but also reectivism. I t emphasises that when Humean
criteriafor causal explanationarerejected, wecanseethat thereectivistsare, infact,
involved in making a number of causal claims.
Beyond the causal-constitutive theory divide
I t can beargued on thebasis of thereconceptualised conception of causeadvanced
herethat thecausal-constitutivetheorydichotomythat manyI R theoristshavecome
to accept is misleading and could, in fact, be radically reinterpreted. Constitutive
theorising can, in the light of the present analysis, be interpreted as a form of
causal theorising. I t follows that it is not useful for I R theorists to reify the
traditional causal vs. constitutivetheory logic in understandingdierent approaches
to I R theory.
69
Robert Cox, Social Forces, in Cox and Sinclair (eds.), Approaches, p. 87.
The concept of cause in IR theory 211
I f weaccept that causes, not onlypushandpull, but condition or constrainand
enable, we need to start recognising that there are some serious problems in the
causal vs. constitutive theory self-image in I R. This is because we have to start
recognisingthat constitutiveanalysisis, moreoftenthannot, engagedinthestudyof
the(formal) conditioning causes of social life. When, for example, theconstructiv-
ists talk of theconstitutive norms and rules because of which shifts takeplacein
worldpolitics, theyareengagingincausal analysisinthat theyarecontextualisingthe
agents actions within a formal causal context which shapes theagents perceptions
and thinking processes.
70
Equally, when poststructuralists highlight the role of
discourseor theories in constituting social life, they do so becausethesediscourses
or theories, through constituting agents perceptions and reasoning, have conse-
quences for how agents perceive the world, themselves, others and, hence, their
actions. When Campbell, for example, studies the Bosnian war, the constitutive
discourses referredto (for exampleterritorial discourse) do not merely matter inthe
senseof deningmeanings but inthesensethat theyconstrainandenable courses
of action
71
constitutivediscoursesare, in fact, causal. AsCampbell himself admits,
discursivesystems havepolitical consequences.
72
I n the view of the model of causal analysis advanced here, causal relations and
causal analysis should not, in fact, be separated from constitutive relations or
constitutiveanalysisat all. I t followsfromour reconceptualisation of causation that
wewould bebetter placed to deal with thesocial world and its complex causes and
causal conditioningif wesawconstitutivetheorisingasan inseparable part of causal
theorising.
Reectivist criticsmayndthisargument disturbing. After all, for them, inquiring
into constitutive relations is very dierent fromcausal analysis becauseit inquires
into relations of meaning not relations of change. On one level this criticism is
correct. Of coursewecan say that when concepts deneeach others meaning they
are non-causally related. Also, we can, of course, ask non-causal questions of
meaning (such as what does X mean?). However, in the view of the approach
accepted here, weneed to recognisethat thestudy of thesenon-causal conceptual
relations is never really an end in itself:
73
conceptual relations that makeup rules,
discourses and norms matter ultimately precisely because they are causal, that is
becausetheyproduce, contributeto, direct or constrainandenableontological social
realities. I n thenal analysisit seemsthat theconstitutiverelations matter because
conceptual relations causally condition thoughts, actions and relations. I t follows
that we must recognise that our inquiries are never limited to mere non-causal
understandingof meanings: most theorists, includingthepoststructuralists, want to,
andinevitablydo, account for howthosemeaningsweremade, reproducedor reied
and how they shape, inuence and condition other meanings/discourses/ideas and
social lifemorewidely.
The unique contribution of the Aristotelian framework is that it allows us to
accept that constitutive claims areessentially inseparablefromcausal claims. This
also means that the causal-constitutive theory divide in I R no longer stands as a
fundamental divide as both sides of the divide can, in the light of this analysis, be
70
Koslowski and Kratochwil, Understanding Change, p. 127.
71
D. Campbell, National Deconstruction, p. 84.
72
Campbell, Writing Security, p. 4.
73
Wendt, Social Theory, p. 86.
212 Milja Kurki
interpreted asbeingengaged in causal analysis even if causal analysisconceived of
in a very dierent sense. The traditional causal theorists must be recognised to be
engagedwithinaparticular, insomewayslimited, formof empiricist causal analysis
(focused on patterns of observables), whereas the constitutive theorists can be
understoodtobeengagedindeeper andbroader realist causal analysis(oftenfocused
on theanalysis of discursive/ideational causes).
The Aristotelian account builds bridges in another sense too. I t is important to
notethat constitutive conditioningcausesconcern, not onlyconstitutivetheorists,
but also those explicitly interested in the role of material conditions. I n I R realist
theorists have traditionally explained world politics through resort to material
factors. However, often thewrongkind of causal logic has been applied to material
forces, just as to ideational forces. I nstead of framing material forces as akin to
ecient pushing and pulling causes, as has arguably been thecasein many realist
explanations,
74
it is implied herethat they should beseen as forms of conditioning
causes in social life, whoseroleneeds to beunderstood in relation to other types of
causes in any given context. Of coursematerial resources matter, for they condition
much of international politics, but material resources must be recognised to be
constitutedthroughsocial processesinvolvingsocial actorsandsocialisingprinciples
(formal causes) and, indeed, to lend their inuence dierently in dierent causal
contexts. Manyrealistshavebeenunwillingto examinetheroleof material resources
as causally complex. As a result, they have failed to account for how the material
causesaredeterminingof outcomes(howtheyinuenceideas, rulesandnorms). The
Aristotelian framework that sees material resources as important and as causal, but
as causally conditioning (constitutive) and as intertwined with other causal
factors, canbeusedtoovercomesomeof thereductionist materialist tendenciesinI R
theorising.
Towards new kinds of causal explanations of world politics?
The conceptualisation of causation advanced here radically opens up how we
should think about causal analysis and the role of constitutive factors in our
analysis. This insight poses a deep challenge to the divisive causal vs. constitutive
theoryself-image perpetuatedbymanyempiricists, reectivistsandconstructivist in
I R, aswell astheontologically, epistemologically and methodologically reductionist
tendencieswithinthesetheoretical approaches. Theimpact of thereconceptualisation
of causation is not merely metatheoretical, however. This is because meta-
theoretical framings of explanatory frameworks have direct eects on the kinds of
explanations we advance for concrete world political processes: indeed, theoretical
and conceptual lenses constrain and enable (causally direct) the kinds of
explanations wecan construct. Theconceptual lenses advanced herearemoreopen
andholisticthanmanyof thoseadvancedbyI R theoretical camps. I t followsthat the
approachheredirectsI R theorisationstowardsnewmoreopenandholisticavenues.
First, it directs empiricist researchers in I R away from mere statistical and
observational analysis towards the construction of integrative and holistic
74
As is implied in Waltzs regularity-deterministic account for example. Seefn. 31.
The concept of cause in IR theory 213
explanatory systems. Thus, it emerges that the study of democratic peace, for
example, should not beconducted merely on thebasis of traditional taxonomical
(procedural) understandingsof democraciesand through measuringtherelevanceof
observed variables (democracy, wealth, alliances, culture) against each other.
Rather, the focus becomes the construction of holistic and integrative frameworks
where many types of conditioning causes, from material constraints of capitalist
social relations to the ideological congruence of Western cultures, can be brought
together to provide explanations of social and historical dynamics. Because the
questions asked aremoreholistic and themethods used morepluralist, wecan, not
only devisemoreholistic explanations, but also uncover newlevels/areas of relevant
social realities. For example, proxy wars or patriarchal power relations within
states cannot simply be dened away as irrelevant variables, but can be seen to
providean important part of aholistic structural understandingof democraciesand
their embeddedness in thewider world system.
75
Also theI R theoretical camps exclusionary approachto social explanationscan
be countered. Too often I R theorists have avoided engaging with each others
theoretical frameworksinexplainingconcreteworldpolitical processes. Think of the
explanations of theend of theCold War, for example. This complex world political
process has been explained in rather reductionist and theoretically incommensura-
ble terms by the realists and the constructivists, one emphasising material and
structural determinants, the other normative ones.
76
The key to providing better
explanations of theend of theCold War, and to initiatingmoreconstructivedebate
between theoretical schools, lies with the abandonment of the beliefs that single
ontological factors(ideas, material concerns, agents, structures) explainanevent, and
that causal factors are independent.
77
The approach to causal analysis advanced
hereenablesmuch moreopen and multi-causal questionsto beasked, which in turn
necessitates a turn away fromtheoretically reductionist explanations. Theorists and
researchers are, instead, directed towards providing accounts where the complex
interaction of norms and material constraints are analysed in a holistic and
historically attuned manner.
Themodel of causal analysis advocated here, by advancingcausal pluralismand
by rejecting themetatheoretical persuasiveness of thecausal vs. constitutivetheory
divide, holdsopenthepossibilityfor newkindsof integrativeandholistictheoretical
engagements with world political processes. Although the deeper and broader
conceptualisation of causation does not in itself solve any of the concrete causal
puzzles in I R, it opens up newlines of inquiry and newways of dealing with them.
As well as justifying theuseof a variety of methodological tools and accepting the
epistemological reectivity of scientic causal analysis, it also forces I R theorists to
ask morepluralistic questions about dierent types of causal forces and about their
75
For an appreciation of theimportanceof thesewider analyses see, for example, Tarak Barkawi and
Mark Laey (eds.), Democracy, Liberalism and War: Rethinking the Democratic Peace Debate
(London: LynneRienner, 2001).
76
Compare, for example, Koslowski and Kratochwil, Understanding Change and R. D. English,
Power, I deas, and theNewEvidenceon theCold Wars End, International Security, 26: 4 (2002),
pp. 7092, to S. G. Brooks and W. C. Wohlforth, Power, Globalization and theEnd of theCold
War; Reevaluating a Landmark Casefor I deas, International Security, 25:3 (2000), pp. 553.
77
A point also madeby Gaddis. J . L. Gaddis, On Starting All Over Again: A NaveApproach to the
Study of Cold War, in O. A. Westad (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretation,
Theory (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 28.
214 Milja Kurki
interaction. Thus, philosophical rethinking of causation is not just a fanciful
meta-theoretical exercise but has the potential to redirect the concrete study of
world political processes in signicant ways.
Conclusion
I n 1998 David Campbell famously attacked theparochial and hegemonic main-
stream I R and its eorts to suppress critical work, either by denouncing it as
anti-scientic or by coopting identity issues within themainstreamcausal analysis
that reduces identity issues to study of independent variables.
78
Campbell argued
that it was thescientic conception of causal analysis and theeorts to extend this
formof inquiry to all questions that is at the core of the problems of the divided
discipline.
Thisassessment isuncannilycorrect: not onlywasCampbell correct topoint tothe
deep and politicised nature of the disciplinary divisions in I R, but he also rightly
identied the conception of causal analysis as a problem in the division of the
discipline. Yet, Campbell himself didnot seek awayout of thispredicament. I nstead,
being caught up in the Humean discourse himself, Campbell through his critique
perpetuated thedichotomies in thediscipline. Thedisciplinary politics of I R can be
criticised but not through criticisingthemainstreamapproach to causal analysisin
isolation, or supercially, by rejecting causation. A morecomprehensivecritiqueis
attained through addressing thewider metatheoretical groundings of I R
79
in which
theHumean conception of causeplays a crucial role.
The reconceptualisation of causation advanced here takes steps towards doing
away with someof themisleadingand unhelpful ways of theorisingthesocial world
that havebecomeuncriticallyacceptedincontemporaryI R and, thereby, holdsopen
thepossibilitythat I R theoristscanstart talkingto, rather thanpast, eachother. The
belief that causal and constitutive approaches are fundamentally dierent is an
illusion created by theacceptanceof a Humean empiricist concept of cause. I n the
light of theconceptionof causeadvancedhere, theempiricist conceptionof causation
is ontologically, epistemologically and methodologically overly restrictive. I t is also
seen to beconstrained within straightjacket of theecient cause metaphor.
The reectivists and constructivists, on the other hand, have been equally
constrained by Humean and ecient cause assumptions, in that they reject causal
analysis on thesegrounds. However, when interpreted through a wider lens wecan
see that, rather than being a-causal, they are, in fact, deeply engaged in causal
analysis: although causal analysis concentrated on examining theconstraining and
enabling inuence of norms, rules and discourses. The metaphor of constitution
has been applied in such a way in I R as to hide the causal nature of ideas, rules,
norms and discourses. I t has been argued here that, whether we consider ideas
constitutiveof our identities, theory as constitutiveof practice, rules as constitutive
of action or structures constitutive of things, constitutive relations are intimately
tied up to causal relations.
78
Campbell, Writing Security, pp. 20727.
79
SeePatomaki and Wight, After Post-Positivism?, pp. 21337.
The concept of cause in IR theory 215
I nadisciplineconstructedonthebasisof themetatheoretical groundingadvanced
here, political and theoretical dierences will no doubt remain, but theoretical
insulation between causal and constitutive approaches, and between dierent
theoretical campsfocused on dierent kind of causal factors, becomesmoredicult
to justify. I f weseecausal analysis as pluralistic, complexity-sensitive, epistemologi-
cally reective and methodologically open, the constraints and prejudices that the
Humeandiscourseof causation, alongwiththepositivist model of science, hasplaced
uponI R theorisingcanbelifted. Onthebasisof areconceptualisedconcept of cause
wecan, arguably, openuppathstowardsmoreconstructiveconsistent andpragmatic
debates on causation and, indeed, on world politics.
216 Milja Kurki