VILLANUEVA V. CASTAEDA, JR.

FACTS
Petitioners are owners of stalls in a talipapa located in a land owned by the municipal government. They were ed to lease the said land
through a municipal council resolution in 1961.

The municipal government demolished the the stalls and subsequently issued a new resolution revoking the right previously granted to
the vendor. Said resolution indicated that the said area will be a parking space for the town plaza.
Petitioners brought an action against the municipal government alleging that they have the right to use the said lang because the
resolution allowing them to use the area constitutes a contract between them (vendors) and the municipal government.
CFI dismissed the petition and ordered the petitioners to be evicted from the area. But such eviction was not enforced and the number
of stall owners even grew.
After a few years, the municipal again resolved to demolish the stalls

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the resolution in 1961 conferred contractual rights to the stall owners making them lawful lessees of the land

2. Whether or not the said area are dedicated for public use
HELD:
1. There was no dispute that the land occupied by the petitioners was previously used as a town plaza and being such it is considered
as beyond the commerce of man and cannot be the subject of lease or any contractual undertaking. The petitioners had no right in the
first place to occupy the disputed premises.

2. The proliferation of the stalls caused several repercussions to the area such as
> the makeshift and flammable materials has made the area susceptible of fire endangering public safety
> said stalls have obstructed the way going to the real public market
> the filthy conditions of the stalls has aggravated health and sanitation problems
> the area has contributed to the obstruction of the flow of traffic

3. Assuming that there was a valid contract (and that the land is not for public use), the petitioners must yield to the police power
exercised by the municipal government. It is a well settled rule that any valid contract may be cancelled if it causes danger to the public.

Villanueva vs
There is in the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, along Mercado Street, a strip of land measuring 12 by 77
meters on which stands a conglomeration of vendors stalls together forming what is commonly known as a talipapa. This is the subject
of the herein petition. The petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous
authorization granted to them by the municipal government. The respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stal ls as illegal
constructions on public property. At the petitioners behest, we have issued a temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo
between the parties pending our decision.
This dispute goes back to November 7, 1961, when the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No. 218 authorizing
some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stalls and sell in the above-
mentioned place. The action was protested on November 10, 1961, in Civil Case No. 2040, where the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Branch 2, issued a writ of preliminary injunction that prevented the defendants from constructing the said stalls until final
resolution of the controversy. On January 18, 1964, while this case was pending, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted
Resolution No. 29, which declared the subject area as the parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality, thereby impliedly
revoking Resolution No. 218, series of 1961. Four years later, on November 2, 1968, Judge Andres C. Aguilar decided the aforesaid
case and held that the land occupied by the petitioners, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could
not be the subject of private occupancy. The writ of preliminary injunction was made permanent.
HELD
Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled
that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. In fact, every contract affecting the
public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing
legal order. This power can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the
promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and
limited by the paramount police power.
We hold that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for prohibition. On the contrary, he
acted correctly in sustaining the right and responsibility of the mayor to evict the petitioners from the disputed area and clear it of all the
structures illegally constructed therein.

Maneclang v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Facts:
Adriano Maneclang in this case filed a complaint for
quieting of titleover a certain fishpond located within the 4 parcels of land belonging to them
situated in Pangasinan but the trial courtdismissed it by saying that the body of water is a
creek constitutinga tributary to Agno River
therefore public in nature and notsubject to private appropriation.
oThey appealed it to the IAC which affirmed theaforementioned decision. Hence, this review on certiorari.

e case
(thecomplainant and the awardee in the public bidding Maza) decided toamicably settle the case saying that judgment be rendered and
that thecourt
recognize the ownership of the petitioners over the landthe body of water found within their titled properties.

oThey say that there would be no benefit since the NIA already constructed a dike and no water now gets in and out of theland
HELD
A CREEK is a recess/arm extending from a river and participating in the eb and flow of the sea. It is a property belonging to the
public domain. It is not susceptible to appropriation & acquisitive prescription because such is
As a public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual.
Its nature as property of the public domain cannot be modified by the construction of irrigatoon dikes by the National Irrigation Authority,
or by its conversion into a fishpond.
Hence, a compromise agreement adjudicating the ownership of such property in favor of an individual is null and void.
The compromise agreement has no legal effect since it is contrary to law and public policy.
Laurel v. Garcia
SALVADOR H. LAUREL vs. RAMON GARCIA, G. R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990
FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and agents from proceeding with the
bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi; 5-chome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21,
1990.
The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations
Agreement entered into with Japan on 9 May 1956. The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese
government for national development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property
and their suffering during World War II.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Roppongi property and others of its kind can be alienated by the Philippine government. 2. Whether or
not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents have the authority, and jurisdiction to sell the Roppongi property.
RULING: The Court ruled in the negative. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. It is
dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippi ne
government and the Japanese government. There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion and is outside the commerce of man.
And the property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal
declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio vs. Director of Lands, 108 Phil 335). It is not for the
President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyances must be authorized
and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. Petition is granted.