PHIL DOWE

A DEFENSE OF BACKWARDS IN TIME CAUSATION MODELS IN

QUANTUM MECHANICS

ABSTRACT. This paper offers a defense of backwards in time causation models in quantum
mechanics. Particular attention is given to Cramers transactional account, which is shown
to have the threefold virtue of solving the Bell problem, explaining the complex conjugate
aspect of the quantum mechanical formalism, and explaining various quantum mysteries
such as Schrodingers cat. The question is therefore asked, why has this model not received
more attention from physicists and philosophers? One objection given by physicists in
assessing Cramers theory was that it is not testable. This paper seeks to answer this
concern by utilizing an argument that backwards causation models entail a fork theory of
causal direction. From the backwards causation model together with the fork theory one
can deduce empirical predictions. Finally, the objection that this strategy is questionable
because of its appeal to philosophy is deflected.

1. INTRODUCTION
The concept of backwards in time causation has actually had quite a high
profile in twentieth century physics. One has only to think of the interest
aroused in tachyons, particles which travel faster than the speed of light, the
Feynman electron, Feynmans bold conjecture that positrons are really
electrons travelling backwards in time, or the recent surge of interest in
time travel (see Earman 1995, 268). It is quite surprising, therefore, that
the backwards in time model of Bell phenomena, although it has a long
tradition,1 has received so little attention from theoretical physicists or
from any of the numerous popularisers of the wonders of modern physics.2
And this is all the more surprising when one considers the promise of this
model to solve all the deep mysteries of quantum mechanics (see Cramer
1988, section IV).
In this paper I want firstly (Section 2) to consider the backwards in
time causation model of Bell phenomena, and in particular to sketch the
transactional account due to Cramer, in order to highlight just why, from
the point of view of physics, the theory deserves more attention than it
has received. In particular I will highlight three putative achievements of
the transactional account: its solution to the Bell problem, its explanation

Synthese 112: 233246, 1997.

c 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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PHIL DOWE

Figure 1.

of the complex conjugate utilized in the central quantum mechanical formalism, and its solution to the various quantum mysteries, in particular,
Schrodingers cat.
Secondly, I want to utilise a recent argument (Dowe 1996) which
shows that the only theory of causal direction compatible with the backwards causation model is the so-called fork theory to answer a key
objection given by physicists responding to the transactional account.
Finally (Section 3), I wish to anticipate and answer a possible objection to
this ploy.

2. BACKWARDS CAUSATION IN QUANTUM MECHANICS

In its most abstract form, the backwards in time model (hereafter Bit model) provides a simple explanation of non-locality3 in quantum mechanics.
Suppose a system is separated from a source S into two parts and spatially
separated, and measurements M1 , M2 are performed on each part such
that no speed-of-light contact between the measurements is possible. The
nonlocality proofs in quantum mechanics seem to show that a choice of
measurement at M1 can affect the result of the measurement at M2 . Bit
models propose that the choice of measurement at M1 influences the earlier
state of the system S at the source, which in turn influences the result of
the measurement at M2 .
For example, consider the FreedmanClauser experiment (Freedman
and Clauser 1972) where two correlated photons are emitted in an atomic cascade of Calcium atoms. The linear polarization of the photons is
measured in various directions by means of rotatable polarizers P1 , P2
together with single photon detectors (see Figure 1). Local hidden variable
theories predict correlations which conflict with the predictions of quantum mechanics for certain angles ,  . In the first successful experimental
test of Bell inequalities, Freedman and Clauser found that the results of
experiments match the quantum mechanical predictions rather than the
local hidden variable predictions. Something about the local hidden variable theories must be wrong, and one candidate is locality. If this is this
case, then we have a situation where the choice of measurement at M1

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235

influences the results of the measurement at M2 , and vice versa. The Bit
model proposes a scenario by which such non-local influence operates.
John Cramers transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics
(Cramer 1980; Cramer 1986; Cramer 1988) postulates a well defined mechanism for such backwards in time influence. Cramers model makes use
of a generalised form of the WheelerFeynman absorber theory of electrodynamics (Cramer 1980) which allows advanced-wave solutions of the
electromagnetic wave equation in addition to the normal retarded wave
solutions. Advanced waves are interpreted as propagating in the negative
time direction. In Cramers words,
When we stand in the dark and look at a star 100 light years away, not only have the retarded
light waves from the star been travelling for 100 years to reach our eyes, but the advanced
waves generated by the absorption process within our eyes have reached 100 years into the
past, completing the transaction that permitted the star to shine in our direction. (Cramer
1988, 229.)

Quantum events, then, are understood as transactions involving an

exchange of advanced and retarded waves. Suppose we have an emitter
E at (r1, t1) and an absorber A at (r2, t2). A transaction between the
emitter and absorber involves a number of components. The emitter sends
out a retarded offer wave F1 (r, t) for t  t1 . The absorber receives the
attenuated wave front F1 (r2 , t2 ) causing the production of an advanced
confirmation wave G2 (r, t) such that

G2(r; t) / F1 (r2 ; t2)g2 (r; t)

where g2 is the unit advance wave, the complex conjugate of the retarded
wave:

g2 (r; t t2) = [F1 (r; t t1)]

The confirmation wave G2(r, t) propagates from the absorber to the emitter,
viz from (r2 , t2 ) to (r1 , t1 ). The wavefront G2 (r1 , t1 ) is proportional to
the initial amplitude of G2 (r, t), and thus to F1 (r2 , t2 ), and also to the
amplitude of the time reversal of the retarded wave F1 (r2 , t2 ), since it
travels through exactly the same attenuating media. Thus

G2(r1 ; t1) / jF1 (r2 ; t2)j2

The arrival of the confirmation wave causes the emitter to send another
offer wave with initial amplitude proportional to G2 (r1 , t1 ), and the cycle
continues until the quantum boundary conditions are satisfied.

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PHIL DOWE

In quantum mechanics the state function is said to contain all the

information there is about the system, but to calculate the probability of
any of the various possible outcomes of a measurement one must multiply
the function by its complex conjugate  . Thus Cramer finds that the features of the transactional interpretation are written into the very formalism
of quantum mechanics (Cramer 1986, 666), for the operation of complex conjugation is essentially a time-reversal operation which transforms
retarded waves into advanced waves. This raises questions about why such
an interpretation of  has not been thought of before (see Cramer 1986,
666). As Cramer himself says,

What else, one might legitimately ask, could the ubiquitous  notations of the quantum
wave mechanics formalism possibly denote except that the time-reversed (or advanced)
counterparts of normal (or retarded) wave functions are playing an important role in
a quantum event? What could an overlap integral combining with  represent other
than the probability of a transaction through an exchange of advanced and retarded waves?
(Cramer 1988, 229)

As Garrett puts it, Cramers idea improves the correspondence between

the physics and the mathematics (Garrett 1990, 1505).
We turn then to the explanation of Bell phenomena. The explanation of
the FreedmanClauser experiment is quite straightforward for the transactional account. The source generates two offer waves F x, t and Gx, t
constrained by conservation laws to be in the same state of polarisation. F
propagates to polarizer P1 , which filters out all but F the component of
F in the  direction. F propagates to the detector where it is absorbed,
causing a confirmation wave F x, T ) to transmit unmodified back in time
to the source. A similar sequence occurs at the other arm, sending back a
confirmation wave G x, t.
However, in general the summation of this total process will not satisfy
the boundary condition that the two photons are in the same state of
polarization (required by the law of conservation of momentum), since in
general the angles of polarization will not match. Further cycles will not
change this, so only the matching components of the confirmation waves
can be projected as a transaction. Thus the nature of the transaction
(which is the sum of the various offer and confirmation waves), which
determines the results of the measurements, is in part determined by the
choice of angle of measurements. This mechanism will produce nonlocal
correlations under the right conditions.
Finally, Cramer finds that the transactional account explains the various
mysteries of quantum physics, such as the EPR paradox, Schrodingers
cat, Wigners friend, Wheelers delayed choice, etc. Here we will focus on
Schrodingers cat. In this famous example a closed system, wherein a cats

A DEFENSE OF BACKWARDS IN TIME CAUSATION MODELS

237

life is dependent on the 50-50 chance of an atom decaying, is undisturbed

by measurement until one hour has passed. Schrodinger comments:

The -function of the total system would yield an expression for all this in which, in equal
measure, the living and the dead cat are (pardon the expression) blended or smeared out.
(translation from Fine 1986, 65)

According to the standard view, the statefunction of the total system is

a superposition of two states: F1 , where no decay occurs over the hour the
cat remains alive, and F2 , where a decay occurs and the cat dies:

= 1=

2 F1 + 1= 2 F2

The statefunction collapses when the measurement takes place, after

which it is definitely in on state or the other. But according to the transactional account it is not true to say the statefunction collapses at the
time of measurement. What actually happens is that during the hour the
source sends out a continuous weak retarded offer wave. This is indeed a
superposition of both possible states. But the offer wave may or may not
be confirmed by an advanced confirmation wave from the counter to the
source. If it is, then the quantum transaction, involving the decay of the
atom, will go ahead and the system will be found in state F2 , with the cat
dead. If there is no confirmation wave then the system will be found in
state F1 , with the cat alive. Thus the system itself is at no time in a mixed
state, and there is no time at which the statefunction collapses, yet the later
event is in part responsible for the definite state in which the system is
found; via backwards in time causation.
Thus we can see that the transactional account purports to provide
not only an explanation of Bell phenomena and non-locality, but also the
various quantum mysteries, as well as puzzling features of the quantum
mechanical formalism itself. Given that this is so, one would expect the
theory to attract considerable interest. Yet this has not yet been the case.
Why? In the next section we shall examine one of the key responses of
those physicists who have responded.
3. TESTABILITY THE PHYSICISTS OBJECTION
Of those physicists who do discuss the Bit model, many explicitly reject
it for well-known and essentially philosophical reasons (see the excellent
discussion in Price 1994). With Price, I do not think those reasons are very
convincing, but here I want to focus on a different objection.
Shortly after the publication of Cramers (1986) paper, the Loyola
Conference determined to address the transactional account, and a number

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of the papers from that conference were published in the International

Journal of Theoretical Physics in 1988. A major focus of the criticism
raised there concerned the testability of Cramers proposal. Cramer himself
had said that the testable consequences of the transactional account do not
in any way differ from the experimental predictions of standard quantum
mechanics (Cramer 1986, 649, 663) although he appears to have changed
his mind by the Loyola Conference (Cramer 1988, section 7).
The feeling at the Loyola Conference appears to have been that since
there are no testable consequences of the transactional account perhaps
it therefore does not deserve too much attention. A particularly strong
version of this sentiment was expressed by Gornitz and von Weizsacker:
Since [the Copenhagen and transactional interpretations] refer to the same mathematical
structure with the same empirical use, [they] are no more than two different linguistic
expressions of one identical theory : : : . As long as the two interpretations do not predict
different experimental results, there is no way of empirically deciding between them and
hence no way of empirically giving their difference another meaning than just as the use of
different languages for the same thing. (Gornitz and von Weizsacker 1988, 2489)

Without pausing to analyze exactly what kind of positivism these authors

are appealing to here, it is clear that the view is at least that since the
transactional account is not testable vis a vis the Copenhagen account,
it probably should be passed over. This same attitude is articulated by
Groenewold:
In principle one could see as its base just the minimal skeptical [i.e. Copenhagen] interpretation : : : . In the transactional interpretation this hard core is displayed in soft conceptual
wrappings, which can neither be proved (defended) nor disproved (attacked) : : : . [T]his representation might give soft interpreters a sense of deep comprehension. Hard no-nonsense
physicists, who do not enjoy that satisfaction and think they cannot even learn from it,
might just forget it and be content with the poor skeptical interpretation. (Groenewold
1987, 5920)

In this paper I want to argue that this conclusion is too hasty. It is true
that the transactional account duplicates all the predictions of the quantum
mechanical formalism, e.g. those associated with the Bell inequalities.
But that does not mean that there is not a more subtle way of testing the
theory. Indeed such possibilities have since come to light. In his Loyola
paper (Cramer 1988, 2356) Cramer says that although there is no direct
test, there may be ways to test the transactional account indirectly, and he
refers to work by Bennett as having promise in this regard (Bennett 1987a;
Bennett 1987b). A more recent attempt to provide indirect evidence is due
to Wolf (Wolf 1989a). In this paper I wish to present, in abstract form,
another avenue for indirect empirical testing. In the next section I will
summarize an argument given elsewhere (Dowe 1996) for a certain theory

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239

of the direction of causation, which, together with the Bit model, entails
the possibility of a general strategy for uncovering empirical predictions.
(Note that even if that derivation were not sound, it would still serve to
show that the above position on the transactional account is much too
hasty.)
4. HOW PHILOSOPHY CAN HELP SCIENCE
In this section I will summarize an argument presented in a recent paper
in Mind (Dowe 1996) which derives a theory of the direction of causation,
the fork asymmetry theory, from the supposition of backwards in time
causation. This, in turn, leads to a strategy for testing the Bit model. I will
also attempt to analyse the argument into its scientific and philosophical
parts.
The argument takes as a premise the Bit model as the correct interpretation of the Bell phenomena. So we suppose this model is true. Then, if
we think in terms of causal processes (see Salmon 1984; Salmon 1994 and
Dowe 1992b; Dowe 1995a) we can think of Bell experiments as involving,
amongst other things, a causal process going from the choice of measurement on one arm, backwards in time to the source. It is essential that this
process has a direction opposite with respect to time to that of certain other
relevant processes. So it is necessary that there is an answer to the question,
what is it that constitutes the direction of a causal process? So, we need to
consider what answers there might be to this question.
The most common theory amongst philosophers of the direction of
causation is what I call the temporal theory (Dowe 1992a). The temporal
theory asserts that causes by definition, or by necessity, precede their
effects. That is, the direction of causation must be from the past to the
future. It is clear that if, as we are supposing, the Bit model is true, then
the temporal theory cannot be true. The Bit model clearly violates what
physicists call causality, the principle that causes precede their effects (at
least, it violates the microscopic version).
A second theory of the direction of causal processes which is quite
common amongst physicists is the subjective theory. According to this
theory the direction of causation is simply a product of the way we humans
see the world, it is not a feature of the objective world of physics (for
example, see Price 1992). But this is also ruled out by the Bit model,
since what is required here is an objective sense to the direction of causal
processes.4 Backwards causation is claimed to be an objective feature of
the world which appears in the physical theory and, in the transactional
account, is represented by the complex conjugate of the wave function.5

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It follows, then, that we need a physical account of the direction of

causal processes. A physical account will detail what it is, in the physical
world, that constitutes the direction of causation. Such an account will
concern things which in principle fall under the area of concern of physics.
There are many rival physical theories. Some, such as the transmission
account of Aronson (1971) and the transference account of Salmon (1994)
simply fail in the end to offer anything distinguishable from the temporal
theory (for the proof of this see (Dowe 1995b, section 2.1) and (Dowe
1995a, 3256) respectively). Other accounts, such as the Kaon Theory
once offered by the author (Dowe 1992a) fail for other reasons (see Dowe
1996, section 7).
However, there is one promising physical account, and thats the fork
asymmetry theory. Causal forks are normally explicated in terms of statistical correlations. In the language of Reichenbach, statistical correlations
are often screened off by earlier common causes, but are never screened
off by later common effects (see Salmon 1984, chapter 6 and Dowe 1996,
section 5). According to the fork asymmetry theory the direction of a causal
process is due to the direction of the causal fork in which it is involved.
Two versions need to be distinguished. The first, that defended by
contemporary philosophers such as Hausman and Papineau (Hausman
1984; Papineau 1993) says that the direction of a causal process is given
by the direction of the causal fork which it part constitutes. A second, due
to Reichenbach (1956), says that the direction of a causal process is given
by the direction of the net in which it is located, where the net is the web of
interconnected causal processes (see Dowe 1992a) and the direction of the
net is the direction of statistical forks within the net, which as it happens
in our universe, all point the same way. This second version must be ruled
out in the present context, because what is required in the Bit model is
that processes which are part of the same net, e.g. two processes which in
part make up the two arms of a Bell arrangement, have different directions
(Dowe 1996, section 7).
However, the first version, which from hereon I will call the fork
theory, does not suffer this defect, and so emerges as the appropriate theory
of the direction of causation.6 If this is so, then we can deduce a surprising
consequence. Since the process linking the choice of measurement and
the source in the case of the transactional account, the advanced wave
from the absorber to the transmitter is a causal process whose direction
is backwards in time, then that process must in part constitute a causal fork
whose common cause occurs after its effects. That is, if the process really is
backwards in time, then the fork of which it is a part must also be backwards
in time. This follows from the fork theory. Then the absorber will be the

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common cause and the transmitter will be one of the common effects.
However, we notice now that there must be another event correlated with
the action of the transmitter which forms the third event in the causal fork.
But theres no reason why this correlation should have been noticed before,
and it may well be something previously thought to be quite irrelevant.
So we have a general formula for testing the Bit model: find these events
which are predicted to be correlated with the decay of the source in Bell
experiments. To be more precise: it tests the conjunction of the Bit model
and the fork theory.
Obviously such a test has two possible outcomes: a positive or a negative
result, depending on whether the prediction turns out to be true. In the case
of a positive result we say the test confirms (by the standard Bayesian
understanding of confirmation) the conjunction of the fork theory and the
Bit model. In the case of a negative result we say that this shows that one
or other of the fork theory and the Bit model is false.
The above derivation can be divided into its philosophical and scientific
parts, although at this stage I dont wish to be committed to any particular
account of the natures of and differences between science and philosophy.
For it is clear that the Bit model is a scientific theory: it least in the
transactional account proposes a physical model of the mathematical
formalism of quantum mechanics. It is also clear that the fork theory of
the direction of causal processes is a philosophical theory. It provides an
analysis, in quite general terms, of the direction of causation. Further, the
proof of that theory is a philosophical proof. Finally, it is clear that the
prediction that there should be some event correlated in a certain way
with the decay of the source in Bell experiments - is an empirical matter,
capable of being made more precise and being tested. A successful test
would constitute a scientific proof; or rather, strong scientific evidence.
Since it is the philosophical part of this argument which people are
likely to find most problematic, it is that feature to which we turn in the
final section.
5. AN OBJECTION ANTICIPATED
The above argument is an attempt to convince physicists and philosophers
alike to give Bit models the attention they deserve. It attempts to do this by
opening up a possible strategy for empirical testing. One objection might
be that the suggestion is just too abstract and it needs to be filled out before
the viability of such an empirical test can be established. This point is
granted; what I want to say is even before that is done, the above argument
should alert us to this kind of possibility. Indeed, perhaps such an abstract

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outline is necessary before work can be done on the details of the physics.
Specific proposals first require an abstract vision. In any case, theres no
reason to doubt that this objection can be answered by further work.
But thats not the objection I want to focus on. The anticipated objection
to my argument to be addressed here concerns the philosophical nature of
the argument. (Perhaps its an objection that would be levelled by Groenewolds hard no-nonsense physicists.) There are two parts to this objection. Firstly, it may be objected that the argument involves a philosophical
theory, the fork theory, which, being philosophical, cannot be proved. Further, since philosophical theories have no empirical content, they cannot
lead to empirical predictions. Secondly, the argument for the fork theory is
a philosophical argument, which therefore is not incontrovertible. Therefore the theory is not to be relied upon. (Why test for something which we
have no reason to expect will be there?)
In the remainder of this section I attempt to answer both parts of this
objection. Behind the first objection lies a familiar view of philosophy
as conceptual analysis. Many philosophers of the twentieth century have
taken the task of philosophy to be just conceptual analysis. For example,
Peter Strawson writes,
the philosopher labours to produce a systematic account of the general conceptual structure
of which our daily practice shows us to have a tacit and unconscious mastery. (Strawson
1992, 7)

Associated with this view of philosophy is the belief that it is not the role of
philosophy to deal in synthetic a posteriori matters, which is the exclusive
task of science. Ducasse, for example, held this view: No discovery in any
of the sciences has or ever can have any logical bearing upon the problems
of philosophy (Ducasse 1969, 120).
However, in offering the fork theory, I did not have that project in mind.
There was no claim that the analysis captures any concept of everyday
use. Rather, what was in mind was something I call empirical analysis,
which is concerned with (in this case) causation as it is in the world rather
than with the concept that we have. This program has variously been
called empirical metaphysics (Armstrong), ontological metaphysics
(Aronson 1982), speculative cosmology (Jackson 1994), physicalist
analysis (Fair 1979, 233) and factual analysis (Mackie 1985, 178).
I do not deny that there is a place in philosophy for conceptual analysis,7
but what is offered above seems to fall pretty squarely under the description of empirical analysis. The proof of this seems to be evident in the
very argument itself: the fork theory is utilized in deriving an empirical
prediction and the theory is essential to the derivation (both the Bit model
and the fork theory are essential for the derivation) so the conceptual

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analysis view of philosophy cannot apply to the argument and theory in

question here.
To make the point more explicit, I appeal to the notion of theoretical
definition as articulated by Ruth Millikan:
It is traditional to contrast three kinds of definition: stipulative, descriptive, and theoretical. Descriptive definitions are thought to describe marks that people actually attend to
when applying terms. Conceptual analysts take themselves to be attempting descriptive
definitions. Theoretical definitions do something else, exactly what is controversial, but the
phenomena itself the existence of this kind of definition is evident enough. A theoretical
definition is the sort the scientist gives you in saying that water is HOH, that gold is the
element with atomic number 79 or that consumption was, in reality, several varieties of
respiratory bacterium bacillus tuberculosis. (Millikan 1989, 2901)

Millikan herself defends a historical definition of proper function, an

exercise which she takes to be an attempt at a theoretical definition rather
than conceptual analysis.
It is uncontroversial that theoretical definitions (in this sense) can and
do play a part in the derivation of empirical predictions from physical theories. For example, its agreed that Einsteins theoretical definition equating
gravitational and inertial mass plays an important role in deriving empirically testable predictions (such as the bending of light around the sun)
from general relativity.
This brings me to the answer to part two of the objection. The fork
theory is argued for by philosophical reasoning which takes the Bit model
as a premise. It is granted that philosophical reasoning is rarely if ever
incontrovertible. But that an argument is offered cannot count against the
theory. The fact is that very often in science theoretical definitions are
introduced without any argument; or with the justification that it is fruitful since it leads to novel predictions. So, if someone has no patience
for the philosophical proof of the fork theory simply because it is a philosophical proof, let her take the fork theory to be a theoretical definition of
an important aspect of the Bit model, and take the above derivation of an
empirical test as an indication of its potential fruitfulness.
In the light of these possibilities, it seems that the objection to my
argument concerning its philosophical nature is unfounded, and therefore
it ought not be a stumbling block to accepting the above argument as a way
to meet the argument that Bit models are untestable and therefore do not
warrant further attention.
NOTES
 Note that the use of the term causation is not intended to imply that the model is

deterministic (see Cramer 1986, 648, n. 3), nor that it violates the causality condition that

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PHIL DOWE

rules out spacelike connections.

1
For example, (Costa de Beauregard 1977; Davidon 1976; Stapp 1975; Sutherland 1983;
Sutherland 1985) and (Cramer 1980; Cramer 1986; Cramer 1988).
2
The only exception to this latter dearth that I am aware of is (Wolf 1989b).
3
For the purposes of this paper I will follow Cramers definition of locality: that the
separated parts of the system described are assumed to remain correlated only so long as
they retain the possibility of speed-of-light contact and that when isolated from such contact
the separated parts can retain correlations only through memory of previous contact
(Cramer 1988, 648).
4
For a detailed argument for this claim see (Dowe 1996), which deals with arguments put
by Price (1992; 1993; 1994).
5
Thus the subjectivist turn taken by Costa de Beauregard in recent years (e.g. Costa de
Beauregard 1992) seems quite unnecessary and if not ironic (since originally Costa de
Beauregard was developing the line pioneered by de Broglie, who was driven by strongly
realist intuitions). See (Dowe 1993a) and the reply in (Costa de Beauregard 1993).
6
In the Mind paper (Dowe 1996, section 6) I consider a different flaw in this version, and
in response to that I propose a third version, a hybrid of the two versions mentioned above.
However, the differences between the first version given above and that third version are
not significant for the purposes of this paper. Note also that the fork theory here is a theory
of the direction of causation, not of causation itself. For my reasons for rejecting the latter
see (Dowe 1993b).
7
Thus, although I approve of Millikans articulation of a philosophical task of giving a
theoretical definition, (see below) I do not agree with her dismissal of conceptual analysis
(Millikan 1989, 290). In this my views accord more closely with those expressed by Karen
Neander (1991).

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Department of Philosophy
University of Tasmania
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