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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 127240 March 27, 2000
ONG CHIA, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
MENDOZA, J .:
This is a petition for review of the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato
2
admitting petitioner Ong Chia to
Philippine citizenship.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived
at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines
where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom
he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a
Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as
amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as required in 2, and lack of the disqualifications
enumerated in 3 of the law, stated
17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of
Instruction No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor
General, Manila, docketed as SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon
owing to the fact that the said Special Committee on Naturalization was not reconstituted
after the February, 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for naturalization by
administrative process was suspended;
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to
corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony
of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the State intended to present any witness
present any witness against him, he remarked:
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in
the sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the
Philippines, so, on our part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really
deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to
present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner,
as well as the petitioner himself.
3

Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to
Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed all
the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former placer of residence in
violation of C.A. No. 473, 7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of 2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or
occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of
2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence.
4

Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by
petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767,
5
in which
petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since
childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his 1989
petition for naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail.
6
The state also annexed
income tax returns
7
allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could
hardly support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper
and irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that, although
petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a judge in
1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of
marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was alleged that petitioner failed to present
his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The State also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977
marriage contract
8
and a Joint-Affidavit
9
executed by petitioner and his wife. These documents show
that when petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been
required in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had
been living together as husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This, according
to the State, belies his claim that when he started living with his wife in 1953, they had already been
married.
The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence,
10
petitioner
resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in the petition.
On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted,
reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the
importance naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in
the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal.
11
The appellate court held:
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to
state in this present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG," which
name appeared in his previous application under Letter of Instruction No. 270. Names and
pseudonyms must be stated in the petition for naturalization and failure to include the same
militates against a decision in his favor. . . This is a mandatory requirement to allow those
persons who know (petitioner) by those other names to come forward and inform the
authorities of any legal objection which might adversely affect his application for citizenship.
Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that he formerly
resided in "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised
Naturalization Law requires the applicant to state in his petition "his present and former
places of residence." This requirement is mandatory and failure of the petitioner to comply
with it is fatal to the petition. As explained by the Court, the reason for the provision is to give
the public, as well as the investigating agencies of the government, upon the publication of
the petition, an opportunity to be informed thereof and voice their objections against the
petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision, the petitioner is depriving the public
and said agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the law. . .
Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner when he
lived-in with his wife for several years, and sired four children out of wedlock. It has been the
consistent ruling that the "applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without the
benefit of clergy and begetting by her three children out of wedlock is a conduct far
from being proper and irreproachable as required by the Revised Naturalization Law",
and therefore disqualifies him from becoming a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization . . .
Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of
bonuses, commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income. His failure to file an income
tax return "because he is not liable for income tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . . "It
is not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in
life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an
appreciable margin of his income over expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate
support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one's
becoming the object of charity or public charge." . . . Now that they are in their old age,
petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are living on the allowance given to them by their children.
The monthly pension given by the elder children of the applicant cannot be added to his
income to make it lucrative because like bonuses, commissions and allowances, said
pensions are contingent, speculative and precarious. . .
Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN
NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN APPLICATION FOR
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE
THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.
II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN
KNOWN BY SOME OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PETITIONER
STATED IN HIS PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES
OF RESIDENCE.
IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO
CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which
had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the
reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence,
they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value,"
12
so it was argued, because
under Rule 132, 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered.
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143
13
of the Rules of Court which
provides that
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization
and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in
a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added).
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked
by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The
only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is
"practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents
presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and
convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered
by the rule on res judicata.
14
Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State
from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same
documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its
documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their
authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process.
15
We are
not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not
been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility.
16

Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the
documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as
he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. thus:
The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which was
supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the case
number of the alleged petition for naturalization. . . is 031767 while the case number of the
petition actually filed by the appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable and
should not be considered by the Honorable Court in resolving the instant appeal.
17

Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted
for as a typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of
which was annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet
18
of the Special Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767."
Other than this, petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the documents
presented by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents namely, the petition in SCN Case No.
031767, petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and
petitioner's income tax returns are all public documents. As such, they have been executed under
oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or
irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the
appellate court did not err in relying upon them.
One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but to settle
all the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include the address
"J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with 7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on
petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records as
Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said
address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had
been fully published,
19
with the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes
substantial compliance with 7.
20
This is allegedly because the publication effectively satisfied the
objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of the
government the opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and prevent suppression of
information regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have
lived at one time or another.
21
It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly
enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.
22
As
noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, 7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set
forth in the petition his present and former places of residence.
23
This provision and the rule of
strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial
compliance" with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the
instant petition ought to be denied.1wphi1. nt
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.




















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 100901 July 16, 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAILON KULAIS, CARLOS FALCASANTOS @ "Commander Falcasantos," AWALON KAMLON
HASSAN @ "Commander Kamlon," MAJID SAMSON @ "Commander Bungi," JUMATIYA
AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS, NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y
MENDOZA, HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH, JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM TARUK ALAH y
SALIH, JALINA HASSAN DE KAMMING, FREDDIE MANUEL @ "Ajid" and several JOHN and
JANE DOES, accused, JAILON KULAIS, appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J .:
The trial court's erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness' testimony in another case, also
pending before it, does not affect the conviction of the appellant, whose guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and overwhelming evidence, both testimonial and
documentary. The Court takes this occasion also to remind the bench and the bar that reclusion
perpetua is not synonymous with life imprisonment.
The Case
On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom (Crim. Case Nos. 10060, 10061,
10062, 10063 and 10064) and three Informations for kidnapping (Crim Case Nos. 10065, 10066 and
10067), all dated August 14, 1990, were filed
1
before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City
against Carlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Jalina Hassan
de Kamming,
2
Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan, Imam
3
Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel
alias "Ajid," and several John and Jane Does. The Informations for kidnapping for ransom, which set forth
identical allegations save for the names of the victims, read as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being all private individuals, conspiring and confederating
together, mutually aiding and assisting one another, with threats to kill the
person of FELIX ROSARIO [in Criminal Case No. 10060]
4
and for the
purpose of extorting ransom from the said Felix Rosario or his families or
employer, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, KIDNAP the
person of said Felix Rosario,
5
a male public officer of the City Government of
Zamboanga, who was then aboard a Cimarron vehicle with plate No. SBZ-976
which was being ambushed by the herein accused at the highway of Sitio Tigbao
Lisomo, Zamboanga City, and brought said Felix Rosario
6
to different
mountainous places of Zamboanga City and Zamboanga del Sur, where he was
detained, held hostage and deprived of his liberty until February 2, 1989, the day
when he was released only after payment of the ransom was made to herein
accused, to the damage and prejudice of said victim; there being present an
aggravating circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with the
aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
The three Informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, likewise
alleged identical facts and circumstances, except the names of the victims:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being all private individuals, conspiring and confederating together,
mutually aiding and assisting one another, by means of threats and
intimidation of person, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
KIDNAP, take and drag away and detain the person of MONICO SAAVEDRA
Y LIMEN [Criminal Case No. 10065]
7
a male public officer of the City
Government of Zamboanga, against his will, there being present an aggravating
circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with the aid of armed
men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended, namely, Jailon Julais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma
Sahiddan de Kulais, Salvador Mamaril Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah, Jalina
Hassan and Freddie Manuel.
8

On their arraignment on September 13, 1990, all the accused pleaded not guilty. Joint trial on the
merits ensued. On April 8, 1991, Judge Pelagio S. Mandi rendered the assailed 36-page Decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, above premises and discussion taken into consideration, this
Court renders its judgment, ordering and finding:
1. FREDDIE MANUEL, alias "AJID" and IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH [n]ot
[g]uilty of the eight charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping,
their guilt not having been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Their immediate release from the City Jail, Zamboanga City is ordered,
unless detained for some other offense besides these 8 cases (Crim. Cases
Nos. 10060-10067).
2. JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, JAILON KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL
y MENDOZA and HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH [g]uilty as principals by
conspiracy in all these 8 cases for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for
[k]idnapping (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10067).
Their guilt is aggravated in that they committed the 8 offenses with the aid of
armed men who insured impunity. Therefore, the penalties imposed on them
shall be at their maximum period.
WHEREFORE, for the five charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom, and
pursuant to Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, five life imprisonments are
imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y
Mendoza and Kadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).
For kidnapping Mrs. Virginia San Agustin-Gara, a female and public officer
and pursuant to Art. 267, Revised Penal Code (par. 4.), another life
imprisonment is imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais,
Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Case No.
10066)
For kidnapping Monico Saavedra y Limen, and Calixto Francisco y Gaspar,
and their kidnapping not having lasted more than five days, pursuant to Art.
268, Revised Penal Code, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same
four accused Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril
y Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih are sentenced to serve two (2) jail
terms ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to eighteen
(18) years of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065 and
10067).
3. JAMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges
of [k]idnapping and she is acquitted of these charges. (Crim. Cases Nos.
10065, 10066 and 10067).
But Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is [g]uilty as accomplice in the five
charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom.
WHEREFORE, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is sentenced to serve five
(5) imprisonments, ranging from TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as
minimum to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum
(Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-1 0064).
4. NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, 18 years old, and JALIHA HUSSIN
(charged as Jalina Hassan de Kamming), 15 years old, [n]ot [g]uilty in the
three charges for [k]idnapping and are, therefore, ACQUITTED of these three
charges. (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 & 10067).
But Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are found [g]uilty as
accomplices in the five charges for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom. Being miners,
they are entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which
lowers the penalty imposable on them by one degree.
WHEREFORE, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are sentenced
to serve five imprisonments ranging from SIX (6) YEARS of prision
correccional as minimum to TEN YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY OF prision
mayor as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).
Due to the removal of the suspension of sentences of youthful offenders
"convicted of an offense punishable by death or life" by Presidential Decree
No. 1179 and Presidential Decree No. 1210 (of which [k]idnapping for
[r]ansom is such an offense) the sentences on Norma Sahiddan de Kulais
and Jaliha Hussin de Kamming are NOT suspended but must be served by
them.
Januddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin are
sentenced further to return the following personal effects taken on December
12, 1988, the day of the kidnapping, or their value in money, their liability
being solidary.
To Jessica Calunod:

One (1) Seiko wrist watchP P 250.00
One Bracelet P 2,400.00
One Shoulder Bag P 200.00
Cash P 200.00
To Armado C. Bacarro:

One (1) wrist watch P 800.00
One Necklace P 300.00
One Calculator P 295.00
Eyeglasses P 500.00
One Steel Tape P 250.00
To Edilberto S. Perez:

One (1) Rayban P 1,000.00
One Wrist WatchP P 1,800.00
Cash P 300.00
To Virginia San Agustin-
Gara:

One (1)Wrist Watch P 850.00
The benefit of Art. 29, Revised Penal Code, on preventive suspension, shall
be extended to those sentenced.
The cases against Majid Samson, alias "Commander Bungi" Awalon Kamlon
a.k.a. "Commander Kamlon" Carlos Falcasantos and several "John Does"
and Jane "Does" are ARCHIVED until their arrest.
Costs against the accused convicted.
SO ORDERED.
9

On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and
Jaliha Hussin filed their joint Notice of Appeal.
10
In a letter dated February 6, 1997, the same
appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appeal because of their application for "amnesty." In our
March 19, 1997 Resolution, we granted their motion. Hence, only the appeal of Kulais remains for the
consideration of this Court.
11

The Facts
The Version of the Prosecution
The solicitor general summarized, in this wise, the facts as viewed by the People:
On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various government
agencies, organized themselves as a monitoring team to inspect government
projects in Zamboanga City. The group was composed of Virginia Gara, as
the head of the team; Armando Bacarro, representing the Commission on
Audit; Felix del Rosario, representing the non-government: Edilberto Perez,
representing the City Assessor's Office; Jessica Calunod and Allan Basa of
the City Budget Office and Monico Saavedra, the driver from the City
Engineer's Office. (p. 3, TSN, October 22, 1990.)
On that particular day, the group headed to the Lincomo Elementary School
to check on two of its classrooms. After inspecting the same, they proceeded
to the Talaga Footbridge. The group was not able to reach the place because
on their way, they were stopped by nine (9) armed men who pointed their
guns at them (p. 4, TSN, ibid.).
The group alighted from their Cimarron jeep where they were divested of
their personal belongings. They were then ordered to walk to the mountain by
the leader of the armed men who introduced himself as Commander
Falcasantos (p. 5, TSN, ibid.).
While the group was walking in the mountain, they encountered government
troops which caused their group to be divided. Finally, they were able to
regroup themselves. Commander Kamlon with his men joined the others.
(pp. 7-8, TSN, ibid.).
The kidnappers held their captives for fifty-four (54) days in the forest. During
their captivity, the victims were able to recognize their captors who were at all
times armed with guns. The wives of the kidnappers performed the basic
chores like cooking. (pp. 9-10. TSN, ibid.)
Commander Falcasantos also ordered their victims to sign the ransom notes
which demanded a ransom of P100,000.00 and P14,000.00 in exchange for
twenty (20) sets of uniform. (p. 15, TSN, ibid.)
On February 3, 1989, at around 12:00 o'clock noontime, the victims were
informed that they would be released. They started walking until around 7:00
o'clock in the evening of that day. At around 12:00 o'clock midnight, the
victims were released after Commander Falcasantos and Kamlon received
the ransom money. (p. 19, TSN, ibid.) The total amount paid was
P122,000.00. The same was reached after several negotiations between
Mayor Vitaliano Agan of Zamboanga City and the representatives of the
kidnappers. (pp. 2, 6, TSN, Nov. 11, 1990)
. . .
12

The prosecution presented fifteen witnesses, including some of the kidnap victims themselves:
Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro, Edilberto Perez, Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Calixto Francisco,
and Monico Saavedra.
The Version of the Defense
The facts of the case, according to the defense, are as follows:
13

On May 28, 1990, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, while weeding their
farm in Sinaburan, Zamboanga del Sur, accused-appellant Jumatiya Amlani
was picked up by soldiers and brought to a place where one army battalion
was stationed. Thereat, her five (5) co-accused, namely Salvador Mamaril,
Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassin, Imam Taruk Alah and Freddie Manuel
were already detained. In the afternoon of the same day, appellants spouses
Jailon Kulais and Norma Sahiddan were brought to the battalion station and
likewise detained thereat. On May 30, 1990, the eight (8) accused were
transported to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City. Here on the same date, they
were joined by accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin.
At the time Amlani was picked up by the military, she had just escaped from
the captivity of Carlos Falcasantos and company who in 1988 kidnapped and
brought her to the mountains. Against their will, she stayed with Falcasantos
and his two wives for two months, during which she slept with Falcasantos as
aide of the wives and was made to cook food, wash clothes, fetch water and
run other errands for everybody. An armed guard was assigned to watch her,
so that, for sometime, she had to bear the ill-treatment of Falcasantos' other
wives one of whom was armed. After about two months, while she was
cooking and Falcasantos and his two wives were bathing in the river, and
while her guard was not looking, she took her chance and made a successful
dash for freedom. (TSN, January 29, 1992, pp. 2-15)
Likewise a kidnap victim herself is accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin, who was
thirteen years old at the time (she was fifteen years old when the trial of the
instant cases commenced). She was kidnapped by Daing Kamming and
brought to the mountains where he slept with her. She stayed with him for
less than a month sleeping on forest ground and otherwise performing
housekeeping errands for Kamming and his men. She made good her
escape during an encounter between the group of Kamming and military
troops. She hid in the bushes and came out at Ligui-an where she took a
"bachelor" bus in going back to her mother's house at Pudos, Guiligan,
Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. One day, at around 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, while she was harvesting palay at the neighboring village of
Tigbalangao, military men picked her up to Ticbanuang where there was an
army battalion detachment. From Ticbawuang, she was brought to Vitali,
then to Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City, where on her arrival, she met all the
other accused for the first time except Freddie Manuel. (Ibid., pp. 16-21)
Another female accused is appellant Norma Sahiddan, a native of Sinaburan,
Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of a
day in May, while she and her husband were in their farm, soldiers arrested
them. The soldiers did not tell them why they were being arrested, neither
were they shown any papers. The two of them were just made to board a six
by six truck. There were no other civilians in the truck. The truck brought the
spouses to the army battalion and placed them inside the building where
there were civilians and soldiers. Among the civilians present were her six
co-accused Hadjirul Plasin, Salvador Mamaril, Jaimuddin Hassan, Ima[m]
Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel and Jumatiya Amlani. That night, the eight of
them were brought to Tictapul, Zamboanga City; then to Vitali; and, finally, to
the Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City where they stayed for six days and six
nights. On the seventh day, the accused were brought to the City Jail,
Zamboanga City. (TSN, January 30, 1991, pp. 6-11)
The husband of Norma Sahiddan is Jailon Kulais who, as heretofore
narrated, was arrested with his wife the day the soldiers came to their farm
on May 28, 1990. He has shared with his wife the ordeals that followed in the
wake of their arrest and in the duration of their confinement up to the present.
(TSN, January 22, 1991 pp. 2-4).
The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for ransom and one count of
kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which offenses it imposed upon him six terms of "life
imprisonment." It also found him guilty of two counts of slight illegal detention for the kidnapping of
Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. The trial court ratiocinated as follows:
Principally, the issue here is one of credibility both of the witnesses and
their version of what had happened on December 12, 1988, to February 3,
1989. On this pivotal issue, the Court gives credence to [p]rosecution
witnesses and their testimonies. Prosecution evidence is positive, clear and
convincing. No taint of evil or dishonest motive was imputed or imputable to
[p]rosecution witnesses. To this Court, who saw all the witnesses testify,
[p]rosecution witnesses testified only because they were impelled by [a]
sense of justice, of duty and of truth.
Contrarily, [d]efense evidence is weak, uncorroborated and consisted only of
alibis. The individual testimonies of the nine accused dwel[t] principally on
what happened to each of them on May 27, 28 and 29, 1990. None of the
accused explained where he or she was on and from December 12, 1988, to
February 3, 1989, when [p]rosecution evidence show[ed] positively seven of
the nine accused were keeping the five or six hostages named by
[p]rosecution evidence.
The seven accused positively identified to have been present during the
course of the captivity of the five kidnap-victims-complainants are: (1)
Jumatiya Amlani; (2) Jaliha Hussin; (3) Norma Sahiddan; (4) Jailon Kulais;
(5) Hadjirul Plasin; (6) Salvador Mamaril and (7) Jainuddin Hassan.
The two accused not positively identified are: Freddie Manuel alias "Ajid",
and Imam Taruk Alah. These two must, therefore, be declared acquitted
based on reasonable doubt.
The next important issue to be examined is: Are these seven accused guilty
as conspirators as charged in the eight Informations; or only as accomplices?
Prosecution evidence shows that the kidnapping group to which the seven
accused belonged had formed themselves into an armed band for the
purpose of kidnapping for ransom. This armed band had cut themselves off
from established communities, lived in the mountains and forests, moved
from place to place in order to hide their hostages. The wives of these armed
band moved along with their husbands, attending to their needs, giving them
material and moral support. These wives also attended to the needs of the
kidnap victims, sleeping with them or comforting them.
xxx xxx xxx
II The guilt of Jainuddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul
Plasin. The Court holds these four men guilty as conspirators in the 8 cases
of kidnapping. Unlike the three women-accused, these male accused were
armed. They actively participated in keeping their hostages by fighting off the
military and CAFGUS, in transferring their hostages from place to place, and
in guarding the kidnap hostages. Salvador Mamaril and Jailon Kulais were
positively identified as among the nine armed men who had kidnapped the
eight kidnap victims on December 12, 1988.
The higher degree of participation found by the Court of the four accused is
supported by the rulings of our Supreme Court quoted below.
(1) The time-honored jurisprudence is that direct proof is not essential to
prove conspiracy. It may be shown by a number of infinite acts, conditions
and circumstances which may vary according to the purposes to be
accomplished and from which may logically be inferred that there was a
common design, understanding or agreement among the conspirators to
commit the offense charged. (People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil 64; People vs.
Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.)
(2) The crime must, therefore, in view of the solidarity of the act and intent
which existed between the sixteen accused, be regarded as the act of the
band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible for the
murder in question. (U.S. vs. Bundal, et. al. 3 Phil 89, 98.)
(3) When two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether
through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or
collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contribute to the
wrongdoing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though
performed by himself alone. (People vs. Peralta, et. al. 25 SCRA 759, 772
(1968).)
14

The Assigned Errors
The trial court is faulted with the following errors, viz:
I
The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a material testimony given in
another case by Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who allegedly was the team leader
of the government troops which allegedly captured the accused-appellants in
an encounter; thereby, depriving the accused-appellants their right to cross-
examine him.
II
On the assumption that Lt. Feliciano's testimony could be validly taken
judicial notice of, the trial court, nevertheless, erred in not disregarding the
same for being highly improbable and contradictory.
III
The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants Jumatiya Amlani,
Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan provided Carlos Falcasantos, et. al., with
material and moral comfort, hence, are guilty as accomplices in all the
kidnapping for ransom cases.
IV
The trial court erred in denying to accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin and
Norma Sahiddan the benefits of suspension of sentence given to youth
offenders considering that they were minors at the time of the commission of
the offense.
15

As earlier noted, Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan had withdrawn their appeal,
and as such, the third and fourth assigned errors, which pertain to them only, will no longer be dealt
with. Only the following issues pertaining to Appellant Jailon Kulais will be discussed: (1) judicial
notice of other pending cases, (2) sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, and (3) denial as a
defense. In addition, the Court will pass upon the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
First Issue:
Judicial Notice and Denial of Due Process
Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took judicial notice of
the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who was the team leader of the
government troops that captured him and his purported cohorts.
16
Because he was allegedly deprived
of his right to cross-examine a material witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he contends that
the latter's testimony should not be used against him.
17

True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other
proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard
and are actually pending before the same judge.
18
This is especially true in criminal cases, where the
accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the
testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against the
appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction was based mainly on
the positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims, namely, Jessica Calunod, Armando
Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross-examinations
conducted by appellant's counsel. At best, then, the trial court's mention of Lieutenant Feliciano's
testimony is a decisional surplusage which neither affected the outcome of the case nor substantially
prejudiced Appellant Kulais.
Second Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Appellant was positively identified by Calunod, as shown by the latter's testimony:
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q And how long were you in the custody of these persons?
A We stayed with them for fifty-four days.
Q And during those days did you come to know any of the
persons who were with the group?
A We came to know almost all of them considering we stayed
there for fifty-four days.
Q And can you please name to us some of them or how you
know them?
A For example, aside from Commander Falcasantos and
Commander Kamlon we came to know first our foster
parents, those who were assigned to give us some food.
Q You mean to say that the captors assigned you some men
who will take care of you?
A Yes.
Q And to whom were you assigned?
A To Ila Abdurasa.
Q And other than your foster [parents] or the parents whom
you are assigned to, who else did you come to know?
A Pagal and his wife; Tangkong and his wife Nana; the two
(2) wives of Commander Falcasantos Mating and Janira
another brother in-law of Commander Kamlon, Usman, the
wife of Kamlon, Tira.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, you said that you were with these men for fifty-four
days and you really came to know them. Will you still be able
to recognize these persons if you will see the[m] again?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Now will you look around this Honorable Court and see if
any of those you mentioned are here?
A Yes, they are here.
Q Some of them are here?
A Some of them are here.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Where is Tangkong? What is he wearing?
A White t-shirt with orange collar. (witness pointing.) He was
one of those nine armed men who took us from the highway.
RTC INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to a man sitting in court and when asked of
his name, he gave his name as JAILON KULAIS.
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q Aside from being with the armed men who stopped the
vehicle and made you alight, what else was he doing while
you were in their captivity?
A He was the foster parent of Armando Bacarro and the
husband of Nana.
COURT:
Q Who?
A Tangkong.
xxx xxx xxx
19

Likewise clear and straightforward was Bacarro's testimony pointing to appellant as one of the
culprits:
FISCAL CAJAYON:
xxx xxx xxx
Q And what happened then?
A Some of the armed men assigned who will be the host or
who will be the one [to] g[i]ve food to us.
Q [To] whom were you assigned?
A I was assigned to a certain Tangkong and [his] wife Nana.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, you said you were assigned to Tangkong and his
wife. [D]o you remember how he looks like?
A Yes.
Q Now, will you please look around this Court and tell us if
that said Tangkong and his wife are here?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Could you please point this Tangkong to us?
A Witness pointed to a person in Court. [W]hen asked his
name he identified [himself] as Jailon Kulais.
Q Why did you say his name is Tangkong? Where did you get
that name?
A Well, that is the name [by which he is] usually called in the
camp.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FABIAN (counsel for accused Kulais)
Q When did you first meet Tangkong?
A That was on December 11, because I remember he was
the one who took us.
Q When you were questioned by the fiscal a while ago, you
stated that Mr. Mamaril was one of those who stopped the
bus and took you to the hill and you did not mention
Tangkong?
A I did not mention but I can remember his face.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And because Tangkong was always with you as your host
even if he did not tell you that he [was] one of those who
stopped you, you would not recognize him?
A No, I can recognize him because he was the one who took
my shoes.
COURT:
Q Who?
A Tangkong, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
20

Also straightforward was Ernesto Perez' candid narration:
FISCAL CAJAYON:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Who else?
A The last man.
Q Did you come to know his name?
A Only his nickname, Tangkong. (Witness pointed to a man in
Court who identified himself as Jailon Kulais.)
Q And what was Tangkong doing in the mountain?
A The same, guarding us.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. SAHAK.
Q Engr. Perez, you stated that you were ambushed by nine
armed men on your way from [the] Licomo to [the] Talaga
Foot Bridge. [W]hat do you mean by ambushed?
A I mean that they blocked our way and stopped.
Q They did not fire any shots?
A But they were pointing their guns at us.
Q And among the 9 armed men who held you on your way to
[the] Talaga Footbridge, you stated [that] one of them [was]
Commander Falcasantos?
A Yes.
Q Could you also recognize anyone of the accused in that
group?
A Yes.
Q Will you please identify?
A That one, Tangkong. (The witness pointed to a man sitting
in court who identified himself as Jailon Kulais.)
xxx xxx xxx
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. FABIAN.
Q You said Jailon Kulais was among those who guarded the
camp?
FISCAL CAJAYON:
Your Honor, please, he does not know the name of Julais, he
used the word Tangkong.
ATTY. FABIAN
Q You said Tangkong guarded you[. W]hat do you mean?
A He guarded us like prisoners[. A]fter guarding us they have
their time two hours another will be on duty guarding us.
Q Where did you meet Tangkong?
A He was one of the armed men who kidnapped us.
xxx xxx xxx
21

It is evident from the foregoing testimonies of Calunod, Bacarro and Perez that kidnapping or
detention did take place: the five victims were held, against their will, for fifty-three days from
December 12, 1988 to February 2, 1989. It is also evident that Appellant Kulais was a member of the
group of armed men who staged the kidnapping, and that he was one of those who guarded the
victims during the entire period of their captivity. His participation gives credence to the conclusion of
the trial court that he was a conspirator.
Kidnapping
for Ransom
That the kidnapping of the five was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom is also apparent
from the testimony of Calunod, who was quite emphatic in identifying the accused and narrating the
circumstances surrounding the writing of the ransom letters.
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q Now, you were in their captivity for 54 days and you said
there were these meetings for possible negotiation with the
City Government. What do you mean by this? What were you
supposed to negotiate?
A Because they told us that they will be releasing us only
after the terms.
22

Q And what were the terms? Did you come to know the
terms?
A I came to know the terms because I was the one ordered
by Commander Falcasantos to write the letter, the ransom
letter.
Q At this point of time, you remember how many letters were
you asked to write for your ransom?
A I could not remember as to how many, but I can identify
them.
Q Why will you able to identify the same?
A Because I was the one who wrote it.
Q And you are familiar, of course, with your penmanship?
A Yes.
Q Now we have here some letters which were turned over to
us by the Honorable City Mayor Vitaliano Agan. 1,2,3,4,5
there are five letters all handwritten.
COURT:
Original?
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Original, your Honor.
Q And we would like you to go over these and say, tell us if
any of these were the ones you were asked to write.
A (Witness going over [letters])
This one 2 pages. This one 2 pages. No more.
Q Aside from the fact that you identified your penmanship in
these letters, what else will make you remember that these
are really the ones you wrote while there?
A The signature is there.
Q There is a printed name here[,] Jessica Calunod.
A And over it is a signature.
Q That is your signature?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q How about in the other letter, did you sign it also?
A Yes, there is the other signature.
Q There are names other names here Eddie Perez,
Allan Basa, Armando Bacarro, Felix Rosario, Jojie Ortuoste
and there are signatures above the same. Did you come up to
know who signed this one?
A Those whose signatures there were signed by the persons.
[sic].
Q And we have here at the bottom, Commander Kamlon
Hassan, and there is the signature above the same. Did you
come to know who signed it?
A [It was] Commander Kamlon Hassan who signed that.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Jessica, I am going over this letter . . . Could you please
read to us the portion here which says the terms? . . .
A (Witness reading) "Mao ilang gusto nga andamun na ninyo
ang kantidad nga P100,000 ug P14,000 baylo sa 20 sets nga
uniforms sa Biyernes (Pebrero 3, 1989).
23

xxx xxx xxx
INTERPRETER (Translation):
This is what they like you to prepare[:] the amount of
P100,000.00 and P14,000.00 in exchange [for] 20 sets of
uniform on Friday, February 3, 1989.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now you also earlier identified this other letter and this is
dated January 21, 1988.
24
Now, could you please explain to us
why it is dated January 21, 1988 and the other one Enero 31,
1989 or January 31, 1989?
A I did not realize that I placed 1989, 1988, but it was 1989.
Q January 21, 1989?
A Yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, in this letter, were the terms also mentioned?
Please go over this.
A (Going over the letter)
Yes, ma'am.
Q Could you please read it aloud to us?
A (Witness reading)
Gusto nila and P100,000.00 ng kapinan nu ug 20 sets nga
completong uniformer (7 colors marine type wala nay labot
ang sapatos), tunga medium ug tunga large size.
25

xxx xxx xxx
INTERPRETER:
They like the P100,000.00 and an addition of 20 sets of
complete uniform (7 colors, marine-type not including the
shoes), one half medium, one half large.
xxx xxx xxx
Q After having written these letters, did you come to know
after [they were] signed by your companions and all of you,
do you know if these letters were sent? If you know only.
A I would like to make it clear. The first letter was ordered to
me by Falcasantos to inform the City Mayor that initial as
P500,000.00, and when we were already I was asked
again to write, we were ordered to affix our signature to serve
as proof that all of us are alive.
26
[sic]
Calunod's testimony was substantially corroborated by both Armando Bacarro
27
and Edilberto Perez.
28
The receipt of the ransom letters, the efforts made to raise and deliver the ransom, and the release of
the hostages upon payment of the money were testified to by Zamboanga City Mayor Vitaliano Agan
29

and Teddy Mejia.
30

The elements of kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
31

having been sufficiently proven, and the appellant, a private individual, having been clearly identified by
the kidnap victims, this Court thus affirms the trial court's finding of appellant's guilt on five counts of
kidnapping for ransom.
Kidnapping of
Public Officers
Victims Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco were members of the
government monitoring team abducted by appellant's group. The three testified to the fact of
kidnapping; however, they were not able to identify the appellant. Even so, appellant's identity as
one of the kidnappers was sufficiently established by Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, who were with
Gara, Saavedra and Francisco when the abduction occurred.
That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were detained for only three hours
32
does nor matter. In People
vs. Domasian,
33
the victim was similarly held for three hours, and was released even before his parents
received the ransom note. The accused therein argued that they could not be held guilty of kidnapping as
no enclosure was involved, and that only grave coercion was committed, if at all.
34
Convicting appellants
of kidnapping or serious illegal detention under Art. 267 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court found
that the victim, an eight-year-old boy, was deprived of his liberty when he was restrained from going
home. The Court justified the conviction by holding that the offense consisted not only in placing a person
in an enclosure, but also in detaining or depriving him, in any manner, of his liberty.
35
Likewise, in People
vs. Santos,
36
the Court held that since the appellant was charged and convicted under Article 267,
paragraph 4, it was not the duration of the deprivation of liberty which was important, but the fact that the
victim, a minor, was locked up.
Thus, in the present case, the detention of Gara, Saavedra and Francisco for only a few hours is
immaterial. The clear fact is that the victims were public officers
37
Gara was a fiscal analyst for the
City of Zamboanga, Saavedra worked at the City Engineer's Office, and Francisco was a barangay
councilman at the time the kidnapping occurred. Appellant Kulais should be punished, therefore, under
Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and not Art, 268, as the trial court held.
The present case is different from People vs. Astorga,
38
which held that the crime committed was not
kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4, but only grave coercion. The appellant in that case had tricked
his seven-year-old victim into going with him to a place he alone knew. His plans, however, were foiled
when a group of people became suspicious and rescued the girl from him. The Court noted that the
victim's testimony and the other pieces of evidence did not indicate that the appellant wanted to detain
her, or that he actually detained her.
In the present case, the evidence presented by the prosecution indubitably established that the
victims were detained, albeit for a few hours. There is proof beyond reasonable doubt that
kidnapping took place, and that appellant was a member of the armed group which abducted the
victims.
Third Issue:
Denial and Alibi
The appellant's bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of the
prosecution witnesses' positive identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the
positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to the negative testimonies of the defense.
39

Between positive and categorical testimony which has a ring of truth to it on the one hand, and a bare
denial on the other, the former generally prevails.
40
Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto
Perez testified in a clear, straightforward and frank manner; and their testimonies were compatible on
material points. Moreover, no ill motive was attributed to the kidnap victims and none was found by this
Court.
We agree with the trial court's observation that the appellant did not meet the charges against him
head on. His testimony dwelt on what happened to him on the day he was arrested and on
subsequent days thereafter. Appellant did not explain where he was during the questioned dates
(December 12, 1988 to February 3, 1989); neither did he rebut Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, when
they identified him as one of their kidnappers.
Reclusion Perpetua, Not Life Imprisonment
The trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant to six terms of life imprisonment. The penalty
for kidnapping with ransom, under the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the
crimes happened in 1988, when the capital penalty was proscribed by the Constitution, the
maximum penalty that could have been imposed was reclusion perpetua. Life imprisonment is not
synonymous with reclusion perpetua. Unlike life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua carries with it
accessory penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code and has a definite extent or duration. Life
imprisonment is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion
perpetua is prescribed in accordance with the Revised Penal Code.
41

WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Jailon Kulais as principal in five counts of kidnapping for
ransom and in three counts of kidnapping is AFFIRMED, but the penalty imposed is hereby
MODIFIED as follows: Appellant is sentenced to five terms of reclusion perpetua, one for each of his
five convictions for kidnapping for ransom; and to three terms of reclusion perpetua, one each for the
kidnapping of Public Officers Virginia Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. Like the other
accused who withdrew their appeals, he is REQUIRED to return the personal effects, or their
monetary value, taken from the kidnap victims. Additionally, he is ORDERED to pay the amount of
P122,000 representing the ransom money paid to the kidnappers. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.







Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 174472 June 19, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff- Appellee,
vs.
BENIGNO FETALINO y GABALDON, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
For Review is the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 31 May 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 02162 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Benigno Fetalino y Gabaldon," affirming, with
modification, the Judgment
2
dated 29 July 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 213, in Criminal Cases No. MC-99-1445, MC- 99-1446, MC-99-1447-H, MC 99-1448-H, and
MC-99-1449-H.
Appellant stood charged with two counts of acts of lasciviousness and three counts of rape allegedly
committed against the person of his own daughter, AAA.
3
The Informations, all signed by Assistant
City Prosecutor Carlos A. Valenzuela, state:
In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1445
That on or about the 21st day of March 1999, in the City of XXX, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by force and
intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness
upon the person of [his] daughter AAA, a girl sixteen (16) years of age, and subjected to sexual
abuse, by inserting his finger into her vagina against her will and consent.
4

In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1446
That on or about the 22nd day of March 1999, in the City of XXX, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by force and
intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness
upon the person of [his] daughter, AAA, a girl sixteen (16) years of age, and subjected to sexual
abuse, by inserting his finger into her vagina against her will and consent.
5

In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1447-H
That on or about the 23rd day of March 1999, in the City of XXX, Philippines, a place [within] the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force
and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
[his] daughter AAA, a girl sixteen years of age, and subjected to sexual abuse, all against her will
and consent.
6

In Criminal Case No. MC 99-1448-H
That on or about the 24th day of March 1999, in the City of XXX, Philippines, a place [within] the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force
and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
[his] daughter AAA, a girl sixteen years of age, and subjected to sexual abuse, all against her will
and consent.
7

In Criminal Case No. MC 99-1449-H
That on or about the 25th day of March 1999, in the City of XXX, Philippines, a place [within] the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force
and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
[his] daughter AAA, a girl sixteen years of age and subjected to sexual abuse, all against her will and
consent.
8

On 20 April 1999, the arraignment for Criminal Cases No. MC-99-1445 and MC-99 99-1446 was
held at which time appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges of acts of lasciviousness.
9
On 10
February 2000, he entered a similar plea to the three counts of rape in Criminal Cases No. MC-99-
1447-H, MC-99-1448-H, and MC-99-1449-H.
10
Joint trial of the five cases thereafter ensued with the
prosecution presenting five witnesses, namely: AAA, the private complainant; BBB, AAAs mother
and appellants live-in partner; Dr. Winston S. Tan (Dr. Tan), Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City; SPO4 Julieta Espiritu (SPO4
Espiritu), Chief of the Womens Desk of the PNP, XXX City; and POS Rolando Tejada (POS
Tejada).
AAA was called to the witness stand as a hostile witness by the prosecution. The reason behind this
unusual move was explained by the prosecutor during the offer of AAAs testimony:
Before we proceed your honor, may we manifest that we are presenting this witness as our hostile
witness in view of her declaration before this representation that she is no longer interested in
prosecuting this case against the accused your honor, and in view likewise, of the manifestation
given before this honorable court by the counsel for the accused that the victim and the mother of
the victim came to see him to ask her (sic) to desist.
11

AAA testified that appellant raped her on three separate instances in March 1999. She recalled that
the events transpired in their house which was then undergoing renovation.
12
Appellant allegedly
undressed her and inserted his private organ into her vagina for which she felt pain and cried. She
claimed that she tried to resist appellants bestial attack and that she struggled with him by trying to
remove his hands. She could not shout for help as appellant threatened her with harm. After
satisfying his lust, appellant told her not to report the incident to anybody or else he would kill her
and her mother. She, however, finally revealed her sad experiences to her mother sometime in
1999. Thereafter, she was brought to the crime laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City for a
medical examination. The physical examination was conducted by Dr. Tan whose test confirmed that
AAA was already in a non-virgin state physically. The pertinent portion of Dr. Tans medico-legal
report states:
GENITAL:
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with the pinkish brown
labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same disclosed an elastic, fleshy-type hymen
with deep healed lacerations at 7 and 9 oclock and shallow healed laceration at 6 oclock positions.
External vaginal orifice offers strong resistance to the introduction of the examining index finger.
Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent rugorsities. Cervix is firm and closed.
13

Dr. Tan confirmed having performed the medical examination on the person of AAA. According to
him, their office received a request from the XXX Police Station for the conduct of a "medico-
legal/physical examination" on AAA who was a victim of an "alleged sexual abuse/molestation
perpetrated by her biological father."
14
AAA and BBB were then subjected to a brief interview after
which they both signed the consent form for the said examination.
15
Dr. Tan likewise explained that
the most common cause of a hymenal laceration is the insertion into the vagina of an erect male
genitalia or any other object of the same consistency.
16

BBB, AAAs mother, stated that she and appellant were engaged in a common law relationship and
together they begot five children
17
including AAA. On the evening of 25 March 1999, BBB came
home from Divisoria where she earned a living as a vendor. When she reached their house, a
certain Paul Quiambao, a carpenter she hired to do some minor repairs in their abode, came to see
her and informed her that he saw appellant on top of AAA. In the vernacular, Paul allegedly told BBB
that AAA was "ginagalaw" by appellant. Immediately after Paul left, BBB talked to AAA to confirm the
harrowing news that she had just received. AAA finally had the courage to reveal to her mother that
her predicament in the hands of her own father started on 22 March 1999 and it occurred everyday
thereafter until 25 March 1999. She and AAA then proceeded to the barangay hall to report the
misdeeds of appellant. After this, their barangay captain and members of the police came to their
house to look for appellant who allegedly tried to flee after seeing the authorities. He was eventually
arrested and taken to the police station. The barangay officials then instructed her and AAA to go to
the police station in order for them to file a complaint against appellant.
In the police station, she and AAA gave their respective sworn statements to the investigating
officer.
18

SPO4 Espiritu testified that she was the investigator assigned to the case. During her investigation,
AAA complained that in the afternoon of 21 March 1999, when the latter arrived home from school,
appellant entered her room and, at knife point, embraced and kissed her. Unsatisfied with these
initial condemnable acts, appellant thereafter inserted his finger into AAAs vagina. This incident
would be repeated the following day, 22 March 1999.
Unfortunately for AAA, her ordeal would even take a turn for the worse for on 23 March 1999,
appellant apparently became more emboldened and could no longer contain his bestial desires;
thus, he proceeded to have carnal knowledge of AAA. AAA had to suffer such abuse on two more
separate instances which occurred on 24 and 25 March 1999.
The prosecution presented, as its last witness, POS Tejada, who was a member of the team which
responded to the complaint of AAA and BBB on 26 March 1999. His turn at the witness stand was
brief, as appellants counsel admitted the substance of POS Tejadas would-be testimony which
pertained mainly to the circumstances surrounding the arrest of appellant.
For his part, appellant offered the hackneyed defense of denial to refute the charges brought against
him. Appellant narrated that he and BBB had been live-in lovers for almost 25 years. He admitted
that AAA was indeed one of their children.
19
In 1977, he was imprisoned for murder and was ordered
released from detention on 23 February 1996. From the time he regained freedom, he allegedly
stayed in the house of one of his legitimate children located somewhere in Paco, Manila. During the
time material to the case, however, he was at the house he used to share with BBB and their
children located at No. XXX St., XXX Drive, XXX City. Said house was undergoing renovation at that
time.
Appellant claimed that the present criminal charges were brought against him in retaliation for the
physical injuries he inflicted upon BBB during one of their heated arguments which became frequent
as he wanted BBB and her new live-in partner to move out of their house in XXX St. In fact,
according to appellant, BBB even charged him with physical injuries which was raffled off to a
different branch of the court.
To bolster appellants claim of innocence, the defense presented CCC, another one of his children
with BBB. In CCCs recollection, at the time the criminal acts complained of took place, she was in
their house together with AAA, their brother DDD, and appellant. She, however, insisted that nothing
unusual happened during those dates. She remembered that although appellant was in their house,
he spent most of his time inside his room fixing his belongings.
As for its last witness, the defense recalled BBB to the witness stand in order to prove that the only
reason she executed her sworn statement before the police was because she was angry with
appellant for having stabbed her during one of their fights.
After trial, the court a quo found appellant guilty as charged in all the cases filed against him. The
dispositive portion of the trial courts judgment states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case Nos. MC-99-1445
and MC-99-1446, finding the accused BENIGNO FETALINO Y GABALDON, GUILTY, beyond
reasonable doubt of Acts of Lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article III, Section 5[b] of
Republic Act 7610, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer for each of the two (2) charges, the penalty
of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as minimum and
maximum, respectively.
Decision is also hereby rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. MC-99-1447-H, MC-99-1448-H and MC-
99-1449-H finding the accused, BENIGNO FETALINO Y GABALDON, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of RAPE defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by the Republic Act 7659 and R.A. 8353. Finding the victim to be under eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, and that the offender is the father, this court
imposes upon same BENIGNO FETALINO Y GABALDON, for EACH charge, the supreme penalty
of DEATH through lethal injection, as provided for in R.A. 8177, amending Section 24, of R.A. 7659
in the manner and procedure therein provided.
Moreover, pursuant to [A]rticle 100 in relation to Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, governing
civil indemnity, accused is furthermore ordered to indemnify the minor victim, AAA, the amount of
Php50,000.00, by way of moral damages in line with the reward made under the case of People vs.
Bonday (222 SCRA 216) and another Php25,000.00 for exemplary damages to deter other sexual
perverts or two legged-beast from sexually assaulting or molesting hapless and innocent girls.
As the penalty imposed is [TRIPLE] DEATH, the City Jail Warden is directed to immediately commit
the person of BENIGNO FETALINO Y GABALDON to the National Prisons at Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila.
20

In view of the death penalty imposed by the trial court, the cases were automatically elevated to this
Court for review. However, in our Resolution dated 13 December 2005,
21
we ordered the remand of
these cases to the Court of Appeals pursuant to our holding in People v. Mateo.
22

In its assailed Decision, the appellate court modified the decision of the trial court by acquitting
appellant of the two charges of rape and by downgrading the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No.
MC-99-1447-H from death to reclusion perpetua
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 213 of Mandaluyong City
convicting accused-appellant Benigno Fetalino of the crime of two (2) counts of acts of
lasciviousness in Criminal Case Nos. MC-99-1445 and MC-99-1446 and for rape in Criminal Case
No. MC-99-1447-H is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of death imposed by the
trial court for the crime of rape should be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is
ordered to pay complainant AAA the following amounts:
1. the total amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages;
2. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and
3. P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
As regards Criminal Case Nos. MC-99-1448-H and MC-99-1449-H, accused is hereby ACQUITTED
for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
23

Once again, appellants case is before us for our consideration raising the following errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR THE [CRIMES] CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH AS THE AGE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAS NOT
BEEN SUFFICIENTYLY PROVED.
24

The appeal is partly meritorious.
At the outset, we would like to impart our observation as regards the proper charge that should have
been filed against appellant for the incidents that transpired on 21 and 22 March 1999, during which
he inserted his finger into the vagina of AAA. For these acts, which spawned Criminal Cases No.
MC-99-1445 and MC-99-1446, appellant was indicted merely for two counts of acts of
lasciviousness when the appropriate charges should have been two separate counts of rape under
Article 266-A(2) of the Revised Penal Code. It must be remembered that Articles 266-A and 266-B
are the amendments introduced to the Revised Penal Code by Republic Act No. 8353 or the "The
Anti-Rape Law of 1997," which took effect on 22 October 1997. With these amendments, rape was
reclassified as a crime against person and not merely a crime against chastity. Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed:
1) By a man who [shall] have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
The first paragraph of Article 266-A refers to the traditional concept of rape; that is, having sexual
intercourse with a woman against her will. The second paragraph, on the other hand, is
categorized as rape by sexual assault.
25

In the case of People v. Soriano,
26
appellant therein was charged with 13 counts of rape by sexual
assault for having inserted his finger inside the private organ of his minor daughter. After reviewing
the records of said case, we adjudged appellant therein guilty of 12 counts rape by sexual assault,
bearing in mind the expanded definition of rape under Republic Act No. 8353.
Subsequently, in People v. Palma,
27
appellant therein was charged with six counts of qualified rape
committed between the second week of October 1997 and the first week of November 1997. This
case was brought before us on automatic appeal in view of the death sentence imposed by the trial
court. It must be noted that two of the charges arose from appellants acts of inserting his finger into
the vagina of his victim. The first of such incidents happened during the second week of October
1997 when appellant inserted his thumb into the victims vaginal orifice. Then, sometime during the
first week of November 1997, appellant inserted his middle finger into the vagina of the private
complainant. In disposing said case, we declared
x x x In Criminal Case No. 8177, the first incident of insertion of appellants finger into the victims
vagina during the second week of October 1997 could only render appellant guilty of an act of
lasciviousness. The second incident of the insertion of appellants middle finger, however, during the
first week of November 1997, constituted consummated rape through sexual assault under Republic
Act No. 8353 or the "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997," which took effect on 22 October 1997 x x x."
28

With these precedents, it is clear that the insertion of ones finger into the genital or anal
orifice of another person constitutes rape by sexual assault and not merely an act of
lasciviousness like what was erroneously charged in this case. Much as we want to punish appellant
for his appalling acts toward AAA in Criminal Cases Nos. MC-99-1445 and MC-99-1446, we are
enjoined by our primordial duty to observe appellants constitutionally guaranteed right to be
informed of the charges against him. Certainly, we cannot allow ourselves to be the ones to
perpetrate the denial of appellants right to due process. He cannot be punished for an offense
graver than that with which he was charged.
29

In his Brief, appellant invokes the settled rule that under our jurisdiction, an accused is presumed
innocent until proven guilty and to overcome this presumption, the prosecution must establish
the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. He contends that in this case, the fact that the
prosecution presented AAA as a hostile witness casts doubt as to the culpability of appellant. He
also insists that the testimony of AAA was unconvincing and vague and points to the following
portions of her statement in the witness stand:
Q. Who was raped by Benigno Fetalino?
A. Me, maam.
Q. When was (sic) you raped by Benigno Fetalino?
A. I cannot recall anymore, maam.
Q. Could it be in the year 1999?
A. Yes, maam.
Q. Could it be in the month of March?
A. Yes, maam.
Q. Where did the alleged raping incident took place?
A. In our house.
Q. Where is your house located?
A. XXX Street, XXX City.
Q. How many times were you raped in March 1999?
A. Three (3) times.
Q. Is it on the same date or on different dates of March 1999?
A. Same dates, maam.
Q. Are you sure of that?
A. Yes, maam.
PROS. SILAO:
I would like to remind you again Madam Witness that you are under oath and you can be held liable
for telling a lie.
Q. What time was the first rape committed?
A. It was then in the afternoon after my mother arrived.
Q. What time did your mother arrived on that afternoon?
A. 5:00 p.m.
Q. What about the second rape, what time was it?
A. I cannot recall the time anymore.
Q. What about the third rape?
A. I cannot recall anymore, maam.
Q. But all in the year 1999 of March?
A. Yes, maam.
30

The seeming reluctance of AAA, as punctuated by appellant, is precisely one of the principal
motivations which propelled our legislature to reclassify the crime of rape as a crime against person.
As explained by Congresswoman Luz Reyes Bakunawa during her sponsorship speech of the
House Bill No. 6265 which eventually became Republic Act No. 8353
This reclassification is necessary because under the existing law, only the victim can file a
complaint, if she wishes, or her parents, or grandparents in that order, which is very restrictive. The
bill now prescribes that any citizen can file a complaint, even if the complainant may not be the
victim, or close relative of the victim. This is the significance of the change that intends to bring the
criminal to the bar of justice even if the victim may not decide to complain due to fear, shame, or for
other reasons.
31

Thus, despite the claimed disinterest of AAA in pursuing the charges against appellant, the choice
of whether the cases would prosper was no longer hers alone. Besides, at the time AAA was
presented as a witness, almost three years had already lapsed. Events must have taken place or
influence might have been exerted upon her that could have weakened her resolve to seek justice
for what was done to her. However, the fact remains that AAA never categorically denied in open
court the charges she hurled at appellant. On the contrary, when AAA was subjected to cross-
examination, she affirmed that appellant had indeed raped her, thus:
COURT:
Q. Do you know why you were (sic) here, Madam Witness?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why?
A. Because we have a hearing.
Q. Do you know for a fact that you filed a rape case against the accused in this case?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Tell us the reason why you filed this case?
A. Because he raped me.
Q. Did anyone forced (sic) you to file a case against the accused herein?
A. None, sir.
Q. In what part of your house were you raped?
A. Inside my fathers bedroom.
Q. How many bedrooms do you have in your house?
A. Two only, sir.
Q. So, at the time you were rape you were inside your fathers bedroom?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You will agree with me that the door of the room has a lock, Madam Witness?
A. None sir, it was open because our house was under renovation then.
Q. When the accused inserted his penis into your vagina, you did not resisted (sic)?
A. I resisted.
Q. How did you resisted (sic), Madam Witness?
A. I struggled.
Q. In what way?
A. I remove (sic) his hands.
Q. Did the accused likewise, undress himself?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. He was totally naked then?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you have a neighbor, Madam Witness?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. It happened at about 1:00 to 2:00 in the afternoon, Madam Witness?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You did not shout for help, Madam Witness?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why?
A. I was afraid because he threatened me.
Q. How did he threaten you?
A. He told me not to report the matter to anybody.
Q. When did you finally decide to disclose what happened to you to anyone, Madam Witness?
A. It was on (sic) 1999, to my mother, but I cannot recall the date.
Q. Why did you disclose the same to your mother?
A. I was afraid of my father.
Q. When you stated in your statement that a certain Paul witnessed the incident, when was that?
A. March 1999.
Q. While your father was raping you?
A. He saw the incident because he was then working at our house.
Q. You stated in your affidavit that your father was on top of you when Paul see (sic) you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But at the time when Paul saw your father on top of you, his penis was not yet inserted in to your
vagina?
A. Not yet, sir.
32

Complementary to AAAs oral testimony, she confirmed the sworn statement which she executed
before SPO4 Espiritu on 26 March 1999 upon redirect examination by the prosecutor. As we had
elucidated in the case of People v. Servano,
33
the evidence which should be considered by the
court in criminal cases need not be limited to the statements made in open court; rather, it
should include all documents, affidavits or sworn statements of the witnesses, and other
supporting evidence. We explained
x x x [W]hen a sworn statement has been formally offered as evidence, it forms an integral part of
the prosecution evidence which should not be ignored for it complements and completes the
testimony on the witness stand. A sworn statement is a written declaration of facts to which the
declarant has sworn before an officer authorized to administer oaths. This oath vests
credibility and trustworthiness on the document. The fact that a witness fails to reiterate, during
trial, the contents of his sworn statement should not affect his credibility and render the sworn
statement useless and insignificant, as long as it is presented as evidence in open court. This is not
to say, however, that the sworn statement should be given more probative value than the
actual testimony. Rather, the sworn statement and the open court declarations must be evaluated
and examined together in toto so that a full and thorough determination of the merits of the case may
be achieved. Giving weight to a witness oral testimony during the trial should not mean being
oblivious to the other pieces of available evidence such as the sworn statement. In like manner, the
court cannot give probative value to the sworn statement to the exclusion of the oral
testimony. In every case, the court should review, assess and weigh the totality of the evidence
presented by the parties. x x x.
34

In this case, AAAs sworn statement which forms part of the records of this case supplied the details
of the incidents she experienced during those fateful days in March 1999, thus:
T : Ano ang dahilan at narito ka ngayon sa aming tanggapan at nagbibigay ng isang malayang
salaysay?
S : Para po isumbong at ipakulong ang tatay ko na tatlong beses akong ni-rape at dalawang beses
na ipinasok and daliri niya sa ari ko.
T : Sino ba ang tatay mo na sinasabi mo na nag-rape sa iyo ng tatlong beses?
S : Siya po si Benigno Fetalino y Gabaldon, 62 taong gulang, walang trabaho at nakatira din po sa
XXX St., XXX City.
T : Kailan, saan at anong oras nangyari ang sinasabi mong pangre-rape na ginawa sa iyo ng tatay
mo?
S : Noon pong March 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 1999, lahat po ay mga ala-una hanggang alas dos ng
hapon, sa mismo pong bahay namin sa XXX St., XXX City.
T : Tunay mo bang ama ang sinasasabi mong tatay mo na nag-rape sa iyo ng maraming beses?
S : Opo.
T : Maari mo bang ituro sa akin ang sinasabi mong tatay mo na nag-rape sa iyo?
S : Siya po. (Affiant pointing to ne Benigno Fetalino y Gabaldon, 62 years old, jobless of XXX St.,
XXX City.)
T : Maari mo bang isalaysay ang buong pangyayari?
S : Noon nga pong March 21, 1999, pagdating ko po galing sa eskwela at nasa loob ako ng kwarto
at gumagawa po ako ng assignment ng bigla pong pumasok ang tatay ko at agad akong tinutukan
ng balisong at sinabing huwag akong maingay, niyakap po ako at hinalikan, tapos po ay ipinasok
ang kamay niya sa loob ng short ko at ipinasok ang daliri niya sa ari ko, umiiyak po ako at
nakikiusap ng huwag niyang gawin, pero ang sabi lang po niya "HUWAG KANG MAINGAY,
PAPATAYIN KITA" at pagkatapos po ay sinabihan din niya ako ng "HUWAG KANG
MAGSUSUMBONG, PAPATAYIN KITA, PATI NA ANG NANAY MO." Noon pong March 22, 1999,
pagdating ko po uli galing eskwela, ay ganon po ulit ang ginawa niya, ipinasok po uli ang daliri niya
sa ari ko, natatakot po ako kaya hindi po ako sumisigaw at hindi rin po ako nagsusumbong, kasi
baka nga patayin niya kaming lahat. Ng pangatlong araw po, March 23, 1999 ay ganon po uli ang
ginawa niya, pinasok po niya ako sa kwarto at tinutukan ng balisong, pero hinubad na po niya ang
short ko at inihiga ako sa papag at naghubad din po siya at pumatong sa akin at ipinasok ang ari
niya sa ari ko, hindi po ako pumapalag dahil natatakot po ako dahil may hawak siyang balisong
habang gumagalaw siya sa ibabaw ko. Wala po akong nagawa kundi ang umiyak, hindi po ako
makapagsumbong dahil sa pananakot niya na papatayin kami. Tapos po ng March 24, 1999 uli ng
hapon ay pinasok ulit niya ako at ganon po ulit, inalis niya ang short ko at pumatong sa akin, ng
nakapatong po siya ay biglang pumasok si Kuya Pol, iyon po yong karpintero na gumagawa ng
bahay naming at nakita kami, kaya po biglang tumigil ang tatay ko, at lumabas na siya pero
sinabihan ako ulit na huwag magsusumbong dahil papatayin kami. Hindi pa rin po ako nagsumbong,
kaya kahapon po, March 25, 1999 ay inulit na naman niya ang ginagawa niyang pangre-rape sa
akin. Tapos kagabi nga po ng wala ang tatay ko ay nagpunta sa amin si Kuya Pol at kinausap ang
nanay ko at narinig ko ng sabihin niya sa nanay ko na nakita niya ang tatay ko na nakapatong sa
akin sa kwarto. Pag-alis po ni Kuya Pol ay agad akong kinausap ng nanay ko at tinanong, kaya po
sinabi ko na sa kanya, pero ang sinabi ko po ay daliri lang ang ginagamit ng tatay ko, natatakot po
kasi ako na baka patayin kami ng tatay ko. Agad pong pumunta ang nanay ko sa Barangay at
nagsumbong, kaya po hinuli siya ng Barangay at dinala kami dito sa pulis.
35

Against the categorical statements of AAA, appellant could only offer the defense of denial and point
to BBB as the brains behind the institution of these criminal charges against him. Such bare-faced
defense is obviously insufficient to overcome AAAs categorical claim of being raped and
sexually molested by appellant. The rule is settled that against the positive identification by
the private complainant, the mere denials of an accused cannot prevail to overcome
conviction by the trial court.
36

Indeed, appellant could not offer any plausible reason which could have impelled AAA to bring these
serious charges against him. All he could muster was to claim in the trial court that BBB was furious
at him and that the two of them engaged in frequent fights. To our mind, such contention is
unavailing. Although BBB admitted that she was mad at appellant for the physical injuries he inflicted
upon her, still, she stated that what drove her to issue her sworn statement on 26 March 1999 was
appellants rape of AAA. Furthermore, a mother like BBB certainly would not expose her own
daughter to the ignominy of a rape trial simply to retaliate against her husband for the
transgressions, knowing fully well the life-long stigma and scars that such a public trial could
bring.
37
Such selfish motive on the part of a mother runs counter to her natural instinct to protect her
offspring from all kinds of harm and to safeguard the latters well-being.
We, however, sustain the appellate courts acquittal of appellant in Criminal Cases No. MC-99-1448-
H and MC-99-1449-H. It must be remembered that each and every charge of rape is a separate and
distinct crime so that each of the other rape charges should be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
38

Thus, it is incumbent on the prosecution to present the quantum of proof necessary for the
conviction of an accused.
In this case, we have gone over the testimony of AAA and her sworn statement and cannot agree in
the trial courts conclusion that appellants guilt had been sufficiently established. AAAs testimony
pertaining to the second and third incidents of rape merely consists of the following:
Q. What about the second rape, what did he do to you?
A. The same.
Q. Meaning he undressed you and he inserted his private organ to your private organ?
A. Yes, maam.
Q. What about the third rape, how did he did (sic) it to you?
A. The same procedure, maam.
39

Such laconic responses on the part of AAA to the prosecutors queries are grossly inadequate to
sustain appellants conviction. Her answers during the prosecutors examination are utterly lacking in
material details that would warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
40
As we have held in
the case of People v. Marahay
When prodded to specify the acts done to her, she stated that her father "used her." No other detail
was evoked from her to show the attendant elements that constitute rape, the crime charged. Such
bare statements cannot suffice to establish accused-appellants guilt with the required quantum of
evidence.
41

In this regard, we cannot overemphasize the need for the prosecution to ask the necessary probing
questions in order to elicit from a witness crucial details to establish the elements of the crime
charged.
Likewise, AAAs sworn statement cannot be the basis for appellants conviction for the second and
third incidents of rape. To recall, AAA declared in said statement that the rape which allegedly
occurred on 24 March 1999 was the one witnessed by their carpenter Quiambao. However, on the
witness stand, she declared that when Quiambao saw appellant on top of her, appellant had not yet
inserted his penis into her vagina. In fact, her testimony does not even state whether appellants
penis even touched her vagina at all. In the absence of a statement that appellants penis touched
even just her labia majora, we have to acquit him for the 24 March 1999 incident.
As regards the rape purportedly committed on 25 March 1999, AAAs sworn statement, like her
testimony, contained a mere conclusion that she was raped by appellant on that day which we find
insufficient to support a finding of appellants guilt.
We now turn to the appropriate penalties that should be imposed upon appellant for the two counts
of acts of lasciviousness and one count of rape. Appellant contends, and the Court of Appeals and
the Office of the Solicitor General agree with him, that the trial court erred in appreciating AAAs
minority in determining the imposable penalties on him. We find merit in this contention.
While it is alleged in the Informations that AAA was only 16 years old at the time the crimes charged
were committed, nevertheless, the prosecution failed to substantiate said allegation. In establishing
the minority of the alleged victim, the courts are to be guided by our pronouncement in the case of
People v. Pruna,
42
to wit:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the
family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree
such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the
Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victims
mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice provided that
it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the
accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
43

In the case at bar, we cannot simply rely on BBBs unsubstantiated claim with regard to AAAs age,
particularly since the loss of her birth certificate was not sufficiently established. We cannot
overemphasize the importance of fixing with exactitude AAAs age, for under Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code, rape by sexual intercourse is punishable by the supreme penalty of
death in case "the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim." The severity, permanence and irreversible
nature of the penalty prescribed by law makes the decision-making process in capital offenses, such
as qualified rape, subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence.
44

On the other hand, the alternative circumstance of relationship under Article 15 of the Revised Penal
Code should be considered against appellant since in crimes against chastity, like acts of
lasciviousness, relationship is considered aggravating.
45
In this case, as it was clearly
mentioned in the Informations and admitted by appellant that AAA is his daughter, their
relationship aggravated the two charges of acts of lasciviousness.
Acts of lasciviousness is punished under the Revised Penal Code by prision correccional. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and taking into consideration the aggravating circumstance of
relationship, appellant should be made to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition,
appellant is to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages for each count of acts of
lasciviousness.
46

With respect to Criminal Case No. M-99-1447-H, because of the prosecutions failure to establish
with certainty that AAA was still a minor at the time the incestuous rape was committed by appellant,
the appropriate penalty should only be reclusion perpetua in accordance with the first sentence of
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code which states that rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A,
or rape by sexual intercourse, shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. In addition to this, and
consistent with the prevailing jurisprudence,
47
appellant is also held liable to AAA in the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 31 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:
A. Appellant Benigno Fetalino y Gabaldon is hereby found GUILTY:
1. In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1445, of acts of lasciviousness and he is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate prison term of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision
correccional, as maximum and to pay AAA the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos as
moral damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1446, of acts of lasciviousness and he is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate prison term of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to six (6) years of
prision correccional, as maximum and to pay AAA the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00)
pesos as moral damages;
3. In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1447-H, of rape through sexual intercourse, and he is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amount of fifty thousand (P50,000.00)
pesos as civil indemnity, fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as moral damages, and twenty-five
thousand (P25,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
B. Appellant is ACQUITTED of the charges in MC-99-1448-H and MC-99-1449-H on grounds of
reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice






















SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.]
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J .:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to
return documents and papers taken by her from private respondents clinic without the
latters knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March
26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of
private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards,
cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs. The documents and
papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her
husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and
for damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr.
Alfredo Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in
paragraph 3 of plaintiffs Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return
and Suppress and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to
immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal
damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorneys fees; and to pay the costs of
the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner
Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from using or
submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this
petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein
petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared
the documents and papers to be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to
return them to private respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In
appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial courts decision,
petitioners only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,
1
this Court ruled
that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-i to J-7 of respondents
comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by
petitioners attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute malpractice or gross
misconduct. For this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondents complaint.
Petitioners contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for
disbarment. Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant
in that case, charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed
malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In
dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following
defense of Atty. Felix, Jr. which it found to be impressed with merit:
2

On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.],
he maintains that:
xxx xxx xxx
4. When respondent refiled Cecilias case for legal separation before the Pasig
Regional Trial Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court
prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents Annex A-I to J-7. On September 6,
1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court on a petition for certiorari,
this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set
aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Courts order,
respondents request for petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the
subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin
finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes. At that point in
time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use petitioners admission as
evidence against him in the legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court
of Makati? Respondent submits it is- not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioners admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin
himself under oath. Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore,
receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For
Cecilia to avail herself of her husbands admission and use the same in her action for
legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more





than a declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing
Dr. Martins admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a
violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that
case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of
violating the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because,
at the time he used the documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial
court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was
eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial courts
order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the
documents and papers became effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence
[to be] inviolable
3
is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if
there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise,
as prescribed by law.
4
Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
5

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking
the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence
of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or
his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to
him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.
6
Neither may be
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in









confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.
7

But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one
to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of
fidelity that each owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch
25, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime of Rape with
Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, civil indemnity in the
amount of P75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00, exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,000.00, actual damages in the amount of P186,410.00, or total damages amounting
to P511,410.00, and costs of litigation.
1

Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the following Information:
That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, in order to have carnal knowledge of a
certain KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with
use of a bladed weapon stab the latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in the death
of the victim, and on the occasion or by reason thereof, accused, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and by means of force and violence had carnal knowledge of said Kathlyn D.
Uba against her will.



CONTRARY TO LAW.
2

The facts are:
On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old
Kathylyn Uba, were on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in
Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar,
to her husband, appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyns friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn
handed the letter to appellant earlier that morning.
3

At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for their
farm in Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband departed, Kathylyn
told Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to leave,
she would just stay home and wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt, Anita Wania.
Kathylyn was left alone in the house.
4

Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of
Isabel. They saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside the house through the back
door of the kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was doing there, and he
replied that he was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother.
5

At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the
ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the house.
6

She later noticed appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back
and forth at the back of the house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his wife used to
live in the house of Isabel Dawang.
7

At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time, he was
wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting
the lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellants eyes were
"reddish and sharp." Appellant asked her where her husband was as he had something important to
tell him. Judilyns husband then arrived and appellant immediately left and went towards the back of
the house of Isabel.
8

In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house
were off. She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was
open. She noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still
empty. She went up the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She
found that the door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the
dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid.
9

Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked body of her
granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was given a
flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her
intestines protruding out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer assistance. A
daughter of Isabel, Cion, called the police.
10

At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was found in
Isabel Dawangs house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house and found
the naked body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds.
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down the ladder
of the house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.
The police discovered the victims panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her
naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood
within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.
When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylynss death,
11

however, he was placed under police custody.
On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer Cesar
Abagan accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police station.
They suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (Hes running away!). Police
Officer Orlando Manuel exited through the gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running
away. Appellant was approximately 70 meters away from the station when Police Officer Abagan
recaptured him.
12
He was charged with Rape with Homicide. When he was arraigned on July 21,
1998, appellant pleaded "not guilty."
After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and penalized under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-
Rape Law of 1997, and was accordingly, sentenced to Death.
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In his
Brief, appellant assigns the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellants contentions are unmeritorious.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against
appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility
of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence
which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.
13
Well-entrenched
is the rule that the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on
appeal unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of
the same; the reason being that the former is in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the
witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude.
14
Absent any showing that the trial
judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would
affect the result of the case, the trial judges assessment of credibility deserves the appellate courts
highest respect.
15
Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were
actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.
16

The weight of the prosecutions evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule which
provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient
circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused
committed the crime.
17

Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and five (5)
incised, were found on the victims abdomen and back, causing a portion of her small intestines to
spill out of her body.
18
Rigor mortis of the vicitms body was complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the
victim at 9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998. According to him, the time of death may be approximated from
between nine (9) to twelve (12) hours prior to the completion of rigor mortis.
19
In other words, the
estimated time of death was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was
within the timeframe within which the lone presence of appellant lurking in the house of Isabel
Dawang was testified to by witnesses.
It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician, Dr. Pej
Evan C. Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were noted on the
victim,
20
Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal canal of the victim. During his
testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that the introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could only be done
through sexual intercourse with the victim.
21
In addition, it is apparent from the pictures submitted by
the prosecution that the sexual violation of the victim was manifested by a bruise and some swelling
in her right forearm indicating resistance to the appellants assault on her virtue.
22

Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm
specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellants gene type.
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms.
23
A persons DNA is
the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a persons lifetime; the DNA in a persons
blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax,
mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells.
24
Most importantly, because of polymorphisms
in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of
identical twins.
25

DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a
suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been
left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory
and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the crime
committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent,
and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from
suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used.
26
Incidents involving sexual assault would
leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the
victims body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could
also be transferred to the victims body during the assault.
27
Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in
proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from
the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to place the
suspect at the scene of the crime.
28

The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this case,
used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR)
analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially
within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it became
possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following
factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of
the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted
the tests.
29

In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as
an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques.
30
Based on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it
was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts
subject of examination.
31
The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the
following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical
with semen taken from the victims vaginal canal.
32
Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen
found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of
the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the
Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted
waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed
in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,
33
it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid
principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were
allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of
new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief
in its existence or non-existence.
34
Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence
obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a
quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human
genetics and molecular biology.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellants semen found in the victims vaginal canal, the
trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang
together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellants wife left the house because of
their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his
estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania
and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang,
acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going
down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30
p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a
was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the
ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The door leading to the
second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay
naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from her body on the second floor of the
house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the
periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victims vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J");
(11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive with blood;
(12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical;
and (13) Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended,
such flight being indicative of guilt.
35

Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain which
leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the
perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three
requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences
are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
36

In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from
him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his
right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against
testimonial compulsion.
37
The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of
extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence
sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
We ruled in People v. Rondero
38
that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were
forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic
examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the
use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused
under duress.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and
DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde,
39
where immediately
after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel,
we ruled that there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused may be
compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which
he is accused.
It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was
conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.
Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are
unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto
law.
This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA
typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of
Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a
factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.
Appellants twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA evidence and
bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence at Isabel Dawangs house
during the time when the crime was committed, undeniably link him to the June 30, 1998 incident.
Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two
places at the same time, especially in this case where the two places are located in the same
barangay.
40
He lives within a one hundred (100) meter radius from the scene of the crime, and
requires a mere five minute walk to reach one house from the other. This fact severely weakens his
alibi.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court a quo committed reversible
error in convicting him of the crime charged. He alleges that he should be acquitted on reasonable
doubt.
Appellants assertion cannot be sustained.
Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere
conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes "something more than a
minimum of probative value," suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a "plus
value."
41
This may be necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight
value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without "plus
value" may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial
court to balance the probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that would result from
its admission.
The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which the
court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is
that degree of certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and
judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable
doubt.
42
This requires that the circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no one else,
committed the offense charged.
43
In view of the totality of evidence appreciated thus far, we rule that
the present case passes the test of moral certainty.
However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of the
culprit.
44

Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that she last saw
the victim alive in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel Dawang.
45
She witnessed the
appellant running down the stairs of Isabels house and proceeding to the back of the same house.
46

She also testified that a few days before the victim was raped and killed, the latter revealed to her
that "Joel Yatar attempted to rape her after she came from the school."
47
The victim told Judilyn
about the incident or attempt of the appellant to rape her five days before her naked and violated
body was found dead in her grandmothers house on June 25, 1998.
48
In addition, Judilyn also
testified that when her auntie Luz Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant, separated from her husband,
"this Joel Yatar threatened to kill our family."
49
According to Judilyn, who was personally present
during an argument between her aunt and the appellant, the exact words uttered by appellant to his
wife in the Ilocano dialect was, "If you leave me, I will kill all your family and your relatives x x x."
50

These statements were not contradicted by appellant.
Thus, appellants motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant case. It is a
rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses
on the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense,
deeds or words that may express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be
inferred.
51

Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of rape with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or
on the occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed the victims lips by
stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely demise.
The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal
knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or
intimidation; and (3) by reason or on the occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force,
threat or intimidation, appellant killed the woman.
52
However, in rape committed by close kin, such as
the victims father, step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary
that actual force or intimidation be employed.
53
Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of
violence and intimidation.
54
The fact that the victims hymen is intact does not negate a finding that
rape was committed as mere entry by the penis into the lips of the female genital organ, even
without rupture or laceration of the hymen, suffices for conviction of rape.
55
The strength and
dilatability of the hymen are invariable; it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during
intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations does not disprove sexual abuse especially when the
victim is of tender age.
56

In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victims aunt. He is seven years older than the
victim Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife separated, appellant lived in the house of his mother-in-
law, together with the victim and his wife. After the separation, appellant moved to the house of his
parents, approximately one hundred (100) meters from his mother-in-laws house. Being a relative
by affinity within the third civil degree, he is deemed in legal contemplation to have moral
ascendancy over the victim.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is imposed when by reason or
on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed. Although three (3) Justices of this Court
maintain their position that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty,
they nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is not unconstitutional, and that the
death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of P100,000.00,
57
actual damages incurred by the family of
the victim that have been proved at the trial amounting to P93,190.00,
58
and moral damages of
P75,000.00
59
should be awarded in the light of prevailing law and jurisprudence. Exemplary
damages cannot be awarded as part of the civil liability since the crime was not committed with one
or more aggravating circumstances.
60

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch
25 in Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special
complex crime of Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he be ORDERED
to pay the family of the victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P100,000.00,
P93,190.00 in actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The award of exemplary
damages is DELETED.
Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance with Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Sec. 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
President of the Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.
*
, Puno
*
, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.









Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 97525. April 7, 1993.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOEL SARTAGODA y BOCANEGRA, JIMMY BASCUA y LAZARTE, VICENTE STA. ANA y
GUTIERREZ and JOHN DOE, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ernesto M. Maiquez for accused-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINGERPRINTS; ABSENCE THEREOF DOES NOT ELIMINATE
POSSIBILITY THAT ACCUSED COULD HAVE BEEN AT SCENE OF THE CRIME. Although We
agree with their opinion that a positive finding of matching fingerprints has great significance, We
cannot sustain their theory that from the negative findings in the fingerprint examination conducted in
the course of the investigation in the instant case, it must be concluded that they could not have
been at the scene of the crime. Negative findings do not at all times lead to a valid conclusion for
there may be logical explanations for the absence of identifiable latent prints other than their not
being present at the scene of the crime. Only latent fingerprints found on smooth surface are useful
for purposes of comparison in a crime laboratory because prints left on rough surfaces result in
dotted lines or broken lines instead of complete and continuous lines. Such kind of specimen cannot
be relied upon in a fingerprint examination. The latent fingerprints are actually oily substance
adhering to the surfaces of objects that come in contact with the fingers. By their very nature, oily
substances easily spread such that when the fingers slide against the surface they touch, no
identifiable latent print is left, only smudges instead. Not all police investigators are aware of the
nature of latent fingerprints so as to be guided accordingly in deciding which objects to submit for
fingerprint lifting and examination. Noting the interplay of many circumstances involved in the
successful lifting and identification of proper latent fingerprints in a particular crime scene, the
absence of one does not immediately eliminate the possibility that the accused-appellants could
have been at the scene of the crime. They may be there yet they had not left any identifiable latent
fingerprint. Besides, in the case at bar, only ten latent fingerprints are involved. The findings in this
particular fingerprint examination are not sufficient to case even just a reasonable doubt in their
finding of guilt for the crime charged.
2. ID.; ID.; IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED; POLICE LINE-UP NOT REQUIRED BY LAW
FOR PROPER IDENTIFICATION; FACE AND BODY MOVEMENT OF ASSAILANT CREATE
LASTING IMPRESSION ON VICTIM. Whether or not there was a previous police line-up, the fact
is that they were positively identified at the trial. There is no law requiring a police line-up as
essential to a proper identification. The complainant's recognition of the accused-appellants as her
attackers cannot be doubted for she had during the carnal acts ample opportunity to see the faces of
the men who ravaged her. It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to
see the looks and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was
committed. Most often the face of the assailant and body movement thereof, create a lasting
impression which cannot easily be erased from their memory.
3. ID.; ID.; NON-FLIGHT NOT PROOF OF INNOCENCE; CASE AT BAR. They claim that the fact
that Vicente Sta. Ana and Jimmy Bascua did not flee, even when they had all the opportunities to
do so, prove their innocence. When they were allowed to go home after Vilma failed to identify them
during the first confrontation at the police station, they stayed home and did not flee until they were
again required to appear at the police station for the second time. The accused-appellants in effect
posit that if flight is an indication of guilt, non-flight or the decision not to flee, having the opportunity
to do so, is a sign of innocence. We do not agree. Although it is settled that unexplained flight
indicates guilt, it does not necessarily follow that absence thereof proves innocence, specially so
when there is overwhelming evidence to establish their guilt.
4. ID.; APPEAL; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF TRIAL JUDGE ENTITLED TO HIGHEST RESPECT;
EXCEPTION. this Court finds no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in
convicting the three accused-appellants for the crime of robbery with multiple rape under Article 294
par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. We affirm its findings of fact which are firmly grounded on the
evidence presented at the trial. We reiterate our ruling thus: "There is need to stress anew that this
Court has long been committed to the principle that the determination by a trial judge who could
weigh and appraise the testimony as to the facts fully proved is entitled to the highest respect,
unless it could be shown that he ignored or disregarded circumstances of weight or influence
sufficient to call for a different finding."
5. CRIMINAL LAW; CIVIL LIABILITY OF PERSONS GUILTY OF CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY;
INDEMNITY TO VICTIM FOR MULTIPLE RAPE ATTENDED BY CONSPIRACY; ACCUSED
SOLIDARILY LIABLE THEREFOR. With regard to the indemnity to Vilma de Belen for multiple
rape, there having been evidence of conspiracy, the act of one being the act of all, each must be
liable for all the three rapes committed, they must be held solidarily liable for said indemnity which
the trial court fixed at P30,000.00 for each offender or a total of P90,000.00.
6. ID.; ID.; IN MULTIPLE RAPE ACCUSED NOT REQUIRED TO RECOGNIZE OFFSPRING.
This Court cannot uphold the trial court's ruling ordering each of the accused to "recognize the
offspring if there by any." In multiple rape, not one maybe required to recognized the offspring of the
offended woman. In a case where three persons, one after another, raped a woman, neither of the
accuse was ordered to recognize the offspring simply because it was impossible to determine the
paternity thereof.
D E C I S I O N
CAMPOS, JR., J p:
The Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 36, Calamba, Laguna convicted all three
accused-appellants in its decision ** dated November 7, 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the accused Joel Sartagoda y Bocanegra, Jimmy Bascoa
(sic) y Lazarte and Vicente Sta. Ana y Gutierrez all guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals
of the crime of Robbery With Rape, defined and penalized in Article 294, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code; there being two aggravating circumstances without any mitigating circumstance to
offset the same, hereby sentences each of the said accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua with the accessories provided for by the law.
Each of the three accused is ordered to indemnify the offended party Vilma de Belen the sum of
P30,000.00, and each of them shall recognize the offspring if there be any.
The said accused are likewise ordered to return the personal properties stolen or pay its equivalent
amount of P17,490.00 to Rogelio de Belen, the lawful owner thereof.
SO ORDERED." 1
The facts of the case may be summarized as follows:
It was the evening of July 2, 1988 while Rogelio de Belen, his two daughters and his sister Vilma de
Belen were sleeping in their house at Calamba, Laguna, when appellant broke in and woke him up,
poking a knife at him. They tied up his hands and made him lie flat on his stomach and asked for the
key to his cabinet. Fearing for his life and that of his companions, he reluctantly told them where the
key was kept.
Just on the other room was Vilma, who heard whispers (kaluskos) but simply played possum. When
the three saw her on the bed, they approached her. One covered her mouth as another poked a
knife at her neck. They threatened to kill her if she should make an outcry.
They raised her blouse and removed her underwear. They tied both her hands so that she could
offer no resistance. She was at such a pitiful state when the accused Jimmy Bascua went on top of
her, kissing her on different parts of her body, while Vicente Sta. Ana held her legs apart. Jimmy
finally inserted his sex organ inside her and satisfied his bestial desire. After Jimmy was over,
Vicente took his turn and then Joel. After the three of them had successfully deflowered Vilma, they
left, carrying with them the money and other personal belongings of the de Belen family.
After the three men left, Rogelio, with his hands and feet still tied up, tried to get up from the bed and
switched the lights on and called to his neighbors for help. Vilma, meanwhile, had lost
consciousness due to shock.
Meanwhile, Petra Lamire, his sister-in-law who lives right next to his house responded to his cry for
help. She went to their house and untied Rogelio. She saw Vilma with her upper body naked and
sobbing so she covered Vilma with a blanket. Soon after, his other sister-in-law also arrived. They
reported the incident to the Barangay Captain.
They had Vilma examined by Dr. Danilo A. Ramirez at Dr. Jose Rizal Memorial Hospital at about
10:00 that same morning. He conducted external and internal examinations. His external
examination showed no physical injuries except that he noted several abrasions at the genital area.
His internal examination showed fresh lacerations of the hymen at 9:00 and 4:00 positions. The
vagina admitted two fingers with ease.
In the present appeal the lone assigned error is:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING (THAT) THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION UTTERLY FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT HENCE, THEIR ACQUITTAL IS INEVITABLE.
This appeal has no merit.
The accused-appellants fault the trial court of ignoring the fingerprint examination report submitted
by the Crime Laboratory of the PC/INP Camp Crame which stated that none of the specimen latent
fingerprints were found to be positive. It is their contention that since their fingerprints were not found
in the objects found in the scene of the crime they cannot be held guilty of the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt.
Although We agree with their opinion that a positive finding of matching fingerprints has great
significance, We cannot sustain their theory that from the negative findings in the fingerprint
examination conducted in the course of the investigation in the instant case, it must be concluded
that they could not have been at the scene of the crime. Negative findings do not at all times lead to
a valid conclusion for there may be logical explanations for the absence of identifiable latent prints
other than their not being present at the scene of the crime.
Only latent fingerprints found on smooth surface are useful for purposes of comparison in a crime
laboratory because prints left on rough surfaces result in dotted lines or broken lines instead of
complete and continuous lines. Such kind of specimen cannot be relied upon in a fingerprint
examination. The latent fingerprints are actually oily substances adhering to the surfaces of objects
that come in contact with the fingers. By their very nature, oily substances easily spread such that
when the fingers slide against the surface they touch, no identifiable latent print is left, only smudges
instead. Not all police investigators are aware of the nature of latent fingerprints so as to be guided
accordingly in deciding which objects to submit for fingerprint lifting and examination. Noting the
interplay of many circumstances involved in the successful lifting and identification of proper latent
fingerprints in a particular crime scene, the absence of one does not immediately eliminate the
possibility that the accused-appellants could have been at the scene of the crime. They may be
there yet they had not left any identifiable latent fingerprint. Besides, in the case at bar, only ten
latent fingerprints are involved. The findings in this particular fingerprint examination are not
sufficient to cast even just a reasonable doubt in their finding of guilt for the crime charged.
The accused-appellants likewise contend that the police line-up had been irregularly conducted
revealing suggestibility to their prejudice. They accused Pat. Reyes of coaching complainant Vilma
de Belen when she identified her three assailants. They claim that it was Pat. Reyes' fault that "they
were not allowed to select their positions at the line-up; that they were not placed in line under a
numeral against a wall marked to indicate their respective height in feet and inches; that there was
no record made of their descriptions and physical characteristics; that the witness/victim was not out
of view of the three (3) accused lined-up for identification purposes." 2
We find these claims of irregularities of little if not, of no significance at all when considered in the
light of the natural desire in the victim to seek retribution not simply from anybody who may be put
before her but from the very same offenders who actually did violence against her. It would be most
illogical for an outraged victim to direct her anger against anyone other than her three offenders. We
cannot accept the accused-appellants' claim that it was on Pat. Reyes' suggestion that the victim
pointed to the accused-appellants as her assailants. No amount of coaching will be sufficient to
counter the natural outrage of a rape victim against her abuser when said abuser is presented
before her in a police line-up. The outrage displayed by the rape victim was a spontaneous reaction.
She identified her assailants because of no other reason except to let people know who hurt her.
Whether or not there was a previous police line-up, the fact is that they were positively identified at
the trial. There is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification. 3 The
complainant's recognition of the accused-appellants as her attackers cannot be doubted for she had
during the carnal acts ample opportunity to see the faces of the men who ravaged her. It is the most
natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants
and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the face of the assailant and
body movements thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot easily be erased from their
memory. 4
The accused-appellants further claim that "the Medical Findings of Dr. Danilo Ramirez concludes
that the alleged victim of rape, Vilma de Belen must have had sexual experienced (sic) five (5) to six
(6) days before the alleged incident happened on July 2, 1988 at about 3 to 4 o'clock in the
morning". 5 There is no truth to this claim. In fact, there was no categorical or positive assertion on
the part of Dr. Ramirez that the sexual intercourse with Vilma was committed on the very date when
the alleged "robbery with rape" took place on July 2, 1988.
This is a clear distortion of the testimony of Dr. Ramirez who on cross-examination testified as
follows:
"ATTY. MAIQUEZ:
Q You cannot also determine when was the first and when was the last intercourse as per your
examination?
FISCAL
Objection, witness is incompetent.
COURT
Witness may answer.
A The findings suggest that because of hymenal laceration the injuries was (sic) recent not more
than one week, sir.
Q When you say it is not more than one week, could it be 6 or 5 days?
A Possible, sir.
Q When you say it is possible that the victim could have experienced sexual intercourse 6 to 5 days
that was indicated in your examination marked as Exh. A, can you determine as per your finding?
A Well, yes, sir, I placed fresh hymenal laceration because laceration will determine whether it is
fresh or old because of the characteristice (sic) of the laceration, sir.
Q At the time you examined the patient in your medical opinion it could have been 5 or 6 days had
elapsed?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. MAIQUEZ:
That will be all." 6
The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion to seek clarification in witness' testimony proceeded
as follows:
"COURT:
Q Doctor, in your findings you noted that there was an abrasion?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Is that more than one abrasion?
A I found 3 mm., your Honor.
WITNESS (continuing):
and on the lower opening of the vagina on the right side, that is the only place, sir.
COURT:
Q Aside from that injury or rater (sic) that portion there is no other injury which you found?
A None, your Honor.
Q Because laceration stated in your medicolegal certificate that there was fresh hymenal laceration
noted at 9 and 4 o'clock on the face of the clock?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Do we gather it right when you stated in your medicolegal certificate fresh it is not yet healed?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q From that finding of yours regarding the existence of fresh hymenal laceration you said that it least
one or 2 days had elapsed before you have conducted the physical examination?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q In other words from one to 5 days?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Q But it is possible that it could be more than one or two days?.
WITNESS:
A Yes, your Honor." 7
It is evident that Dr. Ramirez never categorically concluded that the sexual intercourse causing the
fresh hymenal lacerations took place five to six days before the date of her examination. The
accused-appellants' claim that the sexual intercourse took place on June 26 or 27, 1988 is
conjectural and without factual basis.
The claim of the accused-appellants that the prosecution failed to present rebuttal evidence to refute
the averments of Joel Sartagoda that they tried in vain to persuade him to admit the charge against
him and to implicate his two (2) co-accused did not deserve the attention of the trial court nor does it
deserve Ours, being per se unacceptable and unbelievable in the light of human experience.
Finally, they claim that the fact that Vicente Sta. Ana and Jimmy Bascua did not flee, even when
they had all the opportunities to do so, prove their innocence. When they were allowed to go home
after Vilma failed to identify them during the first confrontation at the police station, they stayed home
and did not flee until they were again required to appear at the police station for the second time.
The accused-appellants in effect posit that if flight is an indication of guilt, non-flight or the decision
not to flee, having the opportunity to do so, is a sign of innocence.
We do not agree. Although it is settled that unexplained flight indicates guilt, it does, not necessarily
follow that absence thereof proves innocence, specially so when there is overwhelming evidence to
establish their guilt.
This Court finds no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in convicting the three
accused-appellants for the crime of robbery with multiple rape under Article 294 par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code. We affirm its findings of fact which are firmly grounded on the evidence
presented at the trial. We reiterate our ruling thus:
"There is need to stress anew that this Court has long been committed to the principle that the
determination by a trial judge who could weigh and appraise the testimony as to the facts duly
proved is entitled to the highest respect, unless it could be shown that he ignored or disregarded
circumstances of weight or influence sufficient to call for a different finding." 8
We are for the affirmance of the conviction of the three accused-appellants. With regard to the
indemnity to Vilma de Belen for multiple rape, there having been evidence of conspiracy, the act of
one being the act of all, each must be liable for all the three rapes committed, they must be held
solidarily liable 9 for said indemnity which the trial court fixed at P30,000.00 for each offender or a
total of P90,000.00. 10
However, this Court cannot uphold the trial court's ruling ordering each of the accused to "recognize
the offspring if there be any". In multiple rape, not one maybe required to recognized the offspring of
the offended woman. In a case 11 where three persons, one after another, raped a woman, neither
of the accused was ordered to recognize the offspring simply because it was impossible to
determine the paternity thereof.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the accused-appellants are held jointly and severally liable to indemnify Vilma de Belen for
multiple rape in the amount of P90,000.00, and that none of the accused is required to recognize the
offspring.
SO ORDERED.



FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 119288. August 18, 1997]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFA
GACOT, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
VITUG, J .:
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, prays in the
instant petition for review on certiorari for the annulment of the decision, dated 22
February 1995, of the Court of Appeals affirming the 12th August 1993 judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Palawan (Branch 50-Puerto Princesa) which has adjudicated Lot
No. 5367 in Cadastral Case No. 13, GLRO Cadastral Record No. 1133, to herein
private respondent, now deceased Josefa Gacot, the claimant in the cadastral case.
The antecedents are amply summarized in the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals, viz:
"The entire lot 5367 is being claimed by Josefa Gacot as per answer she filed on
June 7, 1971. It appears from the record that the lot is located in Barangay Los
Angeles, Magsaysay, Palawan but the area was not indicated. It also appeared that
Ceferino Sabenacio is her co-owner.
This case was set for hearing on August 9, 1990 and the petitioner was
represented by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Reynaldo Guayco and Rogelio
Paglinawan, Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of
Puerto Princesa City while the claimant appeared without counsel. In view thereof, the
hearing was reset to August 13, 1990. Before the scheduled hearing on August 13,
1990, the Court received a report from the Land Registration Authority calling the
Court's attention of the decision rendered by Judge Lorenzo Garlitos on October 20,
1950 declaring this lot as property of the Republic of the Philippines. Despite this
declaration however, the petitioner nor the government did not bar the claimant from
filing her answer, possessing and occupying the lot and in fact accepted her tax
payments and issuing her tax declaration on the same.
The claimant presented herself as witness as well as her son, Vicente Dantic, Jr.
The witnesses testified that Josefa Gacot was married to Vicente Dantic, Sr. in 1940
and were in actual possession of the property for more than 30 years, having bought
the same from Cipriana Dantic-Llanera as per deed of sale dated April 22, 1955 in
Cuyono dialect (Exhibit `1 and 1-A). Since she acquired the property from Cipriana
Llanera, she continued her occupation and introduced improvements thereon as well
as declared Lot 5367 for taxation purposes in her name (Exhibit 2) and paid the
corresponding taxes thereon up to the present time (Exhibit 3). That claimant is now a
widow and has 5 children namely, Hernando Dantic, Antero Dantic, Felipe Dantic, Fe
Dantic and Vicente Dantic, Jr.
Cipriano Sabenacio, the alleged co-owner of claimant Josefa Gacot appeared in
Court and manifested that he is waiving his claim over Lot 5367 in favor of Josefa
Gacot who is in actual possession of the property as he is only a boundary owner.
After the presentation of claimant and her son, they offered their exhibits and
rested their case. Thereafter, the petitioner thru counsel manifested that it is not
presenting controverting evidence and is submitting the case for resolution.
i[1]

On 05 September 1990, the trial court rendered judgment adjudicating Lot No. 5367
to Josefa Gacot, thus -
"WHEREFORE, this Court finds the claim of Josefa Gacot Dantic to be in order.
Accordingly, Lot 5367 is hereby adjudicated to Josefa Gacot-Dantic, widow and a
resident of Barangay Los Angeles, Magsaysay, Palawan with all the improvements
thereon, subject to the estate tax as provided by law."
"SO ORDERED."
ii[2]

The Republic, through the Solicitor General, elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals.
During the pendency of the appeal, the Office of the Solicitor General was able to
verify that Lot 5367 was earlier declared to be the property of the Republic in a decision
rendered by Judge Lorenzo Garlitos on 20 October 1950 following an order of general
default. The Solicitor General thus filed a motion with the appellate court to have the
case reopened and remanded to the court a quo to allow the Republic of the Philippines
to present the decision of Judge Garlitos. In its resolution, dated 26 December 1991, the
Court of Appeals granted the motion.
What transpired thereafter was narrated by the trial court in its 12th August 1993
decision; viz:
This case was set for hearing several times for the government to present its
evidence and for the parties to submit their respective memorandum in support of their
respective stand on the matter. The claimant submitted her memorandum while the
government represented by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor assigned to this sala
has not presented any witness to support the governments claim, neither has he
submitted any memorandum to support the governments stand on this matter.
With the foregoing development, the Court is of the opinion that the subsequent
application or claim of Josefa Gacot-Dantic on Lot 5367 which became part of the
public domain where her occupation thereto having been open to the whole world,
public and notorious in the concept of an owner since 38 years ago was well taken and
therefore entitled to the lawful adjudication of Lot 5367 in her name. Besides, the
government represented by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) for Puerto Princesa City and
Cuyo, Palawan have not made any protest nor interposed any objection on the claim of
Josefa Gacot during the hearings. Neither was there a manifestation of protest or claim
of government use coming from the municipal officials of Magsaysay, Palawan despite
notice sent to them of the cadastral hearing. And the sad part was that the government
had accepted without any protest all the taxes due the property paid by the claimant
religiously. This is not to say that this order has been considered in the previous
decision of this Court which is hereunder quoted as follows:
x x x x x x x x x
With this finding of the Court, it is its considered opinion and so holds, that there is
no reason to disturb its previous decision aforequoted."
iii[3]

An appeal was taken by the Republic from the decision of the trial court. In its now
assailed decision of 22 February 1995, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
judgment of the trial court. The appellate court ratiocinated:
In its brief, the Office of the Solicitor General claims that `records of the re-hearing
show that on October 20, 1950, an order was, indeed, issued by Judge Lorenzo C.
Garlitos of the Court of First Instance of Palawan, 7th Judicial District, declaring that
Lot No. 5367 was among lots declared as property of the Republic of the Philippines.
(p. 3, Appellants Brief; p. 19, Rec.) It now invokes Republic Act No. 931, approved on
June 30, 1953 and Republic Act No. 2061, which took effect on June 30, 1958, both
laws setting the time limits for the filing of applications, among other things, for the
reopening of judicial proceedings on certain lands which were declared public land.
Under R.A. 2061, the time for filing an application shall not extend beyond December
31, 1968. Thus, petitioner-appellant argues that since claimant-appellee Josefa Gacot
filed her answer only on 07 June 1971, the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over
the instant claim since she did not file her answer within the period fixed by R.A. No.
2061.
This would be true, if the Order dated 20 October 1950 of Judge Lorenzo Garlitos
declaring Lot No. 5367 as property of the Republic of the Philippines, was presented as
evidence in the rehearing of this case. Unfortunately, the Republic of the Philippines
failed to offer as its exhibit the said order. There is no basis for the appellant, therefore,
to invoke R.A. 2061, to support its claim that claimant-appellee Josefa Gacot filed her
answer beyond the period fixed by said law and therefore the court a quo did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Precisely, the purpose of the rehearing was to enable the Republic of the
Philippines, thru the Office of the Solicitor General, to present in evidence the said
order. The Solicitor General, in its Motion dated 21 May 1991, prayed that with regards
to Lot No. 5367 `the proceedings therein be ordered reopened and the same be
remanded to the court a quo to enable the Republic of the Philippines to present the
judgment dated October 20, 1950 of Judge Lorenzo Garlitos declaring Lot No. 5367 as
government property. (pp. 30-31, Rollo) [Underlines Ours]
This Court granted the motion and ordered the records of the case remanded to
the court a quo for further proceedings to enable the government to present in
evidence the judgment dated October 20, 1950, declaring Lot No. 5367 as government
property x x x. (p. 42, Rollo) [Underlines Ours]
During the rehearing, however, the Government failed to present the said order of
Judge Garlitos in evidence. Thus, the court a quo said in its appealed decision:
This case was set for hearing several times for the government to present its
evidence and for the parties to submit their respective memoranda in support
of their respective stand on the matter. The claimant submitted her
memorandum while the government represented by the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor has not presented any witness to present the governments claim
neither has he submitted any memorandum to support the governments
stand on this matter. (see p. 92, Rollo) [Underlines Ours]
It is the rule that `The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. (Rule 132, Sec. 34) It is true that the Order of 20 October 1950 has
been appended to the records of this case (see p. 19, Rec.). But it is misleading on the
part of the Solicitor General to state that `Records of the rehearing show that on
October 20, 1950, an order was, indeed, issued by Judge Lorenzo C. Garlitos x x x.
For, during the rehearing, as reflected in the appealed decision, the government did not
present any evidence nor any memorandum despite having been ordered by the court
a quo.
Neither can We take judicial notice of the Order of Judge Garlitos. As a general
rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial knowledge of the contents of the record
of other cases, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, even though the trial
judge in fact knows or remembers the contents thereof, or even when said other cases
have been heard or are pending in the same court and notwithstanding the fact that
both cases may have been heard or are really pending before the same judge.
(Municipal Council vs. Colegio de San Jose, et al., G.R. No. L-45460; 31 C.J.S. 623-
624; cited in p. 25, Evidence, Second Ed.; R.J. Francisco) Indeed, the Government
missed its opportunity to have the claim of Josefa Gacot, the herein appellee, declared
as a nullity, considering that no evidence was presented by it in opposition thereto.
iv[4]

In the instant petition, the Republic, assigning a sole error, contends that -
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (HAS) ERRED IN RULING THAT
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR PETITIONER TO INVOKE R.A. No. 2061 TO SUPPORT
ITS CLAIM THAT JOSEFA GACOT FILED HER ANSWER BEYOND THE PERIOD
FIXED BY THE SAID LAW AND THEREFORE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, SINCE IT (HAS) FAILED TO OFFER
AS ITS EXHIBIT THE ORDER, DATED OCTOBER 20, 1950 OF JUDGE LORENZO
GARLITOS.
v[5]

The Solicitor General explains that the records of the reopened case would show
that a certified copy of the decision, dated 20 October 1950, of Judge Garlitos has been
appended to page 19 thereof. It is not evident, however, why the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor and the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer ("CENRO")
for Puerto Princesa, representing the government during the rehearing, did not present
it. The Solicitor General, nevertheless, invokes the rule that the Republic is not
estopped by the mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.
In the meantime, Josefa Gacot passed away. The Solicitor General thereupon
moved that the heirs of Josefa Gacot be impleaded party respondents in substitution for
the deceased. The motion was granted, and the heirs were directed to comment on the
governments petition.
To this day, private respondents have not submitted their comment. The Court,
however, cannot allow the case to remain pending and unresolved indefinitely. It must
now dispense, as it hereby dispenses, with such comment in order not to unduly delay
the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Let it initially be said that, indeed, the Court realizes the points observed by the
appellate court over which there should be no quarrel. Firstly, that the rules of
procedure
vi[6]
and jurisprudence,
vii[7]
do not sanction the grant of evidentiary value,
viii[8]
in
ordinary trials,
ix[9]
of evidence which is not formally offered, and secondly, that adjective
law is not to be taken lightly for, without it, the enforcement of substantive law may not
remain assured. The Court must add, nevertheless, that technical rules of procedure
are not ends in themselves but primarily devised and designed to help in the proper and
expedient dispensation of justice. In appropriate cases, therefore, the rules may have to
be so construed
x[10]
liberally as to meet and advance the cause of substantial justice.
Furthermore, Section 1, Rule 129, of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states,
their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive
and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time,
and the geographical divisions.
Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras
xi[11]
opined:
A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of
facts established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own
records of another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the
same court, and of public records on file in the same court. In addition judicial notice
will be taken of the record, pleadings or judgment of a case in another court between
the same parties or involving one of the same parties, as well as of the record of
another case between different parties in the same court. Judicial notice will also be
taken of court personnel.
xii[12]

The remand of the case would likewise seem to be unavoidable. The area of Lot
No. 5367 claimed and awarded to the late Josefa Gacot had not been specified in the
records. Indeed, on the basis of the Certification of the Forest Management Services of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Lot No. 5367, per Land
Classification (LC) No. 1246 of 15 January 1936, would appear to contain an area of
394,043 square meters, 300,000 square meters of which were classified as Alienable
and Disposable land and 94,043 square meters as Timberland, which under
Proclamation No. 2152, dated 29 December 1981, had been included to form part of the
Mangrove Swamp Forest Reserve, closed for entry, exploitation and settlement.
xiii[13]

It behooves all concerned that the above matters be carefully looked into, albeit with
reasonable dispatch, for the final resolution of this case.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings for
it to ascertain and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties conformably with the
foregoing opinion of the Court. No costs.
SO ORDERED.







Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 143276 July 20, 2004
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J .:
Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of 19.3422 hectares
of agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-6296. A portion of the land consisting of 6.2330 hectares (5.4730 of which is planted to
coconut and 0.7600 planted to palay) was compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,
1
as amended, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
In accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992,
2
as
amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994,
3
the Land Bank of the Philippines
4

(Landbank), petitioner, made the following valuation of the property:
Acquired
property
Area in hectares Value
Coconut land 5.4730 P148,675.19
Riceland 0.7600 25,243.36

P173,918.55
Respondents rejected the above valuation. Thus, pursuant to Section 16(d) of R.A. 6657, as
amended, a summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the land. Eventually, the PARAD
rendered its Decision affirming the Landbank's valuation.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, designated as a Special Agrarian Court, a petition for
determination of just compensation, docketed as Civil Case No. 6806. Impleaded as respondents
were the DAR and the Landbank. Petitioners therein prayed for a compensation of P100,000.00 per
hectare for both coconut land and riceland, or an aggregate amount of P623,000.00.
During the pre-trial on September 23, 1998, the parties submitted to the RTC the following
admissions of facts: (1) the subject property is governed by the provisions of R.A. 6657, as
amended; (2) it was distributed to the farmers-beneficiaries; and (3) the Landbank deposited the
provisional compensation based on the valuation made by the DAR.
5

On the same day after the pre-trial, the court issued an Order dispensing with the hearing and
directing the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
6

In its Decision dated February 5, 1999, the trial court computed the just compensation for the
coconut land at P657,137.00 and for the riceland at P46,000.00, or a total of P703,137.00, which is
beyond respondents' valuation of P623,000.00. The court further awarded compounded interest at
P79,732.00 in cash. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners, the spouses Dr. Vicente
Banal and Leonidas Arenas-Banal, for the 5.4730 hectares of coconut land the sum
of SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN
PESOS (P657,137.00) in cash and in bonds in the proportion provided by law;
2. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners for the .7600 hectares of
riceland the sum of FORTY-SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P46,000.00) in cash and in
bonds in the proportion provided by law; and
3. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners the sum of SEVENTY-NINE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS (P79,732.00) as the
compounded interest in cash.
IT IS SO ORDERED."
7

In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the facts established in
another case pending before it (Civil Case No. 6679, "Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al."), using the
following formula:
For the coconut land
1. Average Gross Production (AGP) x .70 x 9.70 (price per kilo of coconut) =
Net Income (NI)
2. NI / 6% = Price Per Hectare (PPH) (applying the capitalization formula
under Republic Act No. 3844
8
)
For the riceland
1. 2.5 x AGP x Government Support Price (GSP) = Land Value (LV) or PPH
(using the formula under Executive Order No. 228
9
)
2. AGP x 6% compounded annually for 26 years x GSP = Interest (pursuant
to DAR AO No. 13, Series of 1994)
Forthwith, the Landbank filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 52163.
On March 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision
10
affirming in toto the judgment of the
trial court. The Landbank's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
11

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial
court's valuation of the land. As earlier mentioned, there was no trial on the merits.
To begin with, under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 405 (1990), the Landbank is charged
"primarily" with "the determination of the land valuation and compensation for all private lands
suitable for agriculture under the Voluntary Offer to Sell or Compulsory Acquisition arrangement"
For its part, the DAR relies on the determination of the land valuation and compensation by the
Landbank.
12

Based on the Landbank's valuation of the land, the DAR makes an offer to the landowner.
13
If the
landowner accepts the offer, the Landbank shall pay him the purchase price of the land after he
executes and delivers a deed of transfer and surrenders the certificate of title in favor of the
government.
14
In case the landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR adjudicator
15

conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by
requiring the landowner, the Landbank and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just
compensation for the land.
16
These functions by the DAR are in accordance with its quasi-judicial
powers under Section 50 of R.A. 6657, as amended, which provides:
"SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
x x x."
A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC
designated as a Special Agrarian Court
17
"for final determination of just compensation."
18

In the proceedings before the RTC, it is mandated to apply the Rules of Court
19
and, on its own
initiative or at the instance of any of the parties, "appoint one or more commissioners to examine,
investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute, including the valuation of properties, and to
file a written report thereof x x x."
20
In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider
several factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended, thus:
"Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation,
the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature,
actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and
the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
Government to the property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said land, shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation."
These factors have been translated into a basic formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series
of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, issued pursuant to the
DAR's rule-making power to carry out the object and purposes of R.A. 6657, as amended.
21

The formula stated in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended, is as follows:
"LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and applicable.
A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula
shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula
shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.3 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the
formula shall be:
LV = MV x 2"
Here, the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and the fundamental requirements in
determining just compensation for the property. Firstly, it dispensed with the hearing and merely
ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Such action is grossly erroneous since
the determination of just compensation involves the examination of the following factors specified in
Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended:
1. the cost of the acquisition of the land;
2. the current value of like properties;
3. its nature, actual use and income;
4. the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations;
5. the assessment made by government assessors;
6. the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers
and by the government to the property; and
7. the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing
institution on the said land, if any.
Obviously, these factors involve factual matters which can be established only during a hearing
wherein the contending parties present their respective evidence. In fact, to underscore the intricate
nature of determining the valuation of the land, Section 58 of the same law even authorizes the
Special Agrarian Courts to appoint commissioners for such purpose.
Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents' property is P703,137.00, merely
took judicial notice of the average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending before it and
applied the same to this case without conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or
consent of the parties, thus:
"x x x. In the case x x x of the coconut portion of the land 5.4730 hectares,
defendants determined the average gross production per year at 506.95 kilos only,
but in the very recent case of Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al., filed and decided
by this court in Civil Case No. 6679 also for just compensation for coconut lands
and Riceland situated at Basud, Camarines Norte wherein also the lands in the
above-entitled case are situated, the value fixed therein was 1,061.52 kilos per
annum per hectare for coconut land and the price per kilo is P8.82, but in the
instant case the price per kilo is P9.70. In the present case, we consider 506.95
kilos average gross production per year per hectare to be very low considering that
farm practice for coconut lands is harvest every forty-five days. We cannot also
comprehended why in the Rodriguez case and in this case there is a great variance
in average production per year when in the two cases the lands are both coconut
lands and in the same place of Basud, Camarines Norte. We believe that it is more
fair to adapt the 1,061.52 kilos per hectare per year as average gross production. In
the Rodriguez case, the defendants fixed the average gross production of palay at
3,000 kilos or 60 cavans per year. The court is also constrained to apply this
yearly palay production in the Rodriguez case to the case at bar.
x x x x x x x x x
"As shown in the Memorandum of Landbank in this case, the area of the coconut
land taken under CARP is 5.4730 hectares. But as already noted, the average
gross production a year of 506.96 kilos per hectare fixed by Landbank is too
low as compared to the Rodriguez case which was 1,061 kilos when the
coconut land in both cases are in the same town of Basud, Camarines Norte,
compelling this court then to adapt 1,061 kilos as the average gross
production a year of the coconut land in this case. We have to apply also the
price of P9.70 per kilo as this is the value that Landbank fixed for this case.
"The net income of the coconut land is equal to 70% of the gross income. So, the net
income of the coconut land is 1,061 x .70 x 9.70 equals P7,204.19 per hectare.
Applying the capitalization formula of R.A. 3844 to the net income of P7,204.19
divided by 6%, the legal rate of interest, equals P120,069.00 per hectare. Therefore,
the just compensation for the 5.4730 hectares is P657,137.00.
"The Riceland taken under Presidential Decree No. 27 as of October 21, 1972 has
an area of .7600 hectare. If in the Rodriguez case the Landbank fixed the average
gross production of 3000 kilos or 60 cavans of palay per year, then the .7600 hectare
in this case would be 46 cavans. The value of the riceland therefore in this case is 46
cavans x 2.5 x P400.00 equals P46,000.00.
22

"PARC Resolution 94-24-1 of 25 October 1994, implemented by DAR AO 13,
granted interest on the compensation at 6% compounded annually. The
compounded interest on the 46 cavans for 26 years is 199.33 cavans. At P400.00
per cavan, the value of the compounded interest is P79,732.00."
23
(emphasis added)
Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or
before the same judge.
24
They may only do so "in the absence of objection" and "with the knowledge
of the opposing party,"
25
which are not obtaining here.
Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special
Agrarian Courts. In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on
the necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:
"SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the court, on its
own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial
notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
"After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own
initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow
the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the
case." (emphasis added)
The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.
Lastly, the RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed under Executive Order (EO) No. 228
26
and
R.A. No. 3844,
27
as amended, in determining the valuation of the property; and in granting
compounded interest pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994.
28
It must be
stressed that EO No. 228 covers private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn,
while R.A. 3844 governs agricultural leasehold relation between "the person who furnishes the
landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who
personally cultivates the same."
29
Here, the land is planted to coconut and rice and does not involve
agricultural leasehold relation. What the trial court should have applied is the formula in DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11 discussed earlier.
As regards the award of compounded interest, suffice it to state that DAR Administrative Order No.
13, Series of 1994 does not apply to the subject land but to those lands taken under Presidential
Decree No. 27
30
and Executive Order No. 228 whose owners have not been compensated. In this
case, the property is covered by R.A. 6657, as amended, and respondents have been paid the
provisional compensation thereof, as stipulated during the pre-trial.
While the determination of just compensation involves the exercise of judicial discretion, however,
such discretion must be discharged within the bounds of the law. Here, the RTC wantonly
disregarded R.A. 6657, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations. (DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No.11).
In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals and the RTC erred in determining the valuation of the
subject land. Thus, we deem it proper to remand this case to the RTC for trial on the merits wherein
the parties may present their respective evidence. In determining the valuation of the subject
property, the trial court shall consider the factors provided under Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as
amended, mentioned earlier. The formula prescribed by the DAR in Administrative Order No. 6,
Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, shall be used in
the valuation of the land. Furthermore, upon its own initiative, or at the instance of any of the parties,
the trial court may appoint one or more commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain facts
relevant to the dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
March 20, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 52163 is REVERSED. Civil Case No. 6806 is REMANDED to the
RTC, Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, for trial on the merits with dispatch. The trial judge is
directed to observe strictly the procedures specified above in determining the proper valuation of the
subject property.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.

Footnotes
1
Effective June 15, 1988.
2
Rules and Regulations Amending the Valuation of Lands Voluntarily Offered and
Compulsorily Acquired As Provided For Under Administrative Order No. 17, Series of
1989, As Amended, Issued Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657.
3
Revising the Rules and Regulations Covering the Valuation of Lands Voluntarily
Offered or Compulsorily Acquired as Embodied in Administrative Order No. 6, Series
of 1992.
4
Executive Order No. 405, dated June 14, 1990, vests the Land Bank of the
Philippines the primary responsibility to determine the land valuation and
compensation for all private lands covered by R.A. 6657, as amended. See
Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132767, January 18, 2000,
322 SCRA 139, 145.
5
Pre-trial Order, Rollo at 76-77.
6
Rollo at 25, 82.
7
RTC Decision at 7, id. at 68.
8
Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines.
9
Entitled "Declaring Full Land Ownership to Qualified Farmer Beneficiaries Covered
by Presidential Decree No. 27, Determining the Value of Remaining Unvalued Rice
and Corn Lands Subject of P.D. No. 27, and Providing for the Manner of Payment by
the Farmer Beneficiary and Mode of Compensation to the Landowner," dated July
17, 1987.
10
Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico and concurred by Associate
Justices Ramon Mabutas, Jr. and Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis.
11
Resolution dated May 16, 2000, Rollo at 60.
12
Sec. 1, Executive Order No. 405 (1990); Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
122256, October 30, 1996, 263 SCRA 758 and Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Court of
Appeals, supra.
13
Sec. 16(a) of R.A. 6657, as amended.
14
Sec. 16(c), id.
15
The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) and the Regional Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (RARAD), depending on the value of the land within their
respective territorial jurisdiction (Rule II, Sec. 2, DARAB Rules of Procedure).
16
Sec. 16(d) of R.A. 6657, as amended; Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Court of
Appeals, supra.
17
Sec. 56, id.
18
Sec. 16(f), in relation to Sec. 57, id.
19
Sec. 57, id.
20
Sec. 58, id.
21
"Sec. 49. Rules and Regulations. The PARC and the DAR shall have the power
to issue rules and regulations, whether substantive or procedural, to carry out the
object and purposes of this Act. Said rules shall take effect ten (10) days after
publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation."
22
The formula used by the trial court in its valuation of the Riceland is taken from
Executive Order No. 228. Section 2 of the said EO states that "(t)he average gross
production per hectare shall be multiplied by two and half (2.5), the product of which
shall be multiplied by Thirty-Five Pesos (P35.00), the government support price for
one cavan of 50 kilos of corn on October 21, 1972, and the amount arrived at shall
be the value of the rice and corn land, as the case may be, for the purpose of
determining its cost to the farmer and compensation to the landowner." However,
instead of using the government support price of P35.00, the trial court used
P400.00, the then current price per cavan of palay (RTC Decision, p. 3, Rollo, p. 64).
23
Rollo at 67.
24
BPI-Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122480, April 12,
2000, 330 SCRA 507, 517; People vs. Kulais, G.R. Nos. 100901-08, July 16, 1998,
292 SCRA 551, 565; Occidental Land Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 96721, March 19, 1993, 220 SCRA 167, 175.
25
People vs. Hernandez, 328 Phil. 1123, 1146 (1996), citing Tabuena vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 85423, May 6, 1991, 196 SCRA 650 and U.S. vs. Claveria, 29
Phil. 527 (1969).
26
Supra.
27
Supra.
28
Rules and Regulations Governing the Grant of Increment of Six Percent (6%)
Yearly Interest Compounded Annually on Lands Covered by Presidential Decree No.
27 and Executive Order No. 228.
29
Sec. 6, RA 3844, as amended.
30
Entitled "Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil
Transferring To Them The Ownership of the Land They Till and Providing the
Instruments and Mechanism Therefor," dated October 21, 1972.












FIRST DIVISION


REPUBLIC GLASS CORPORATION G.R. No. 144413
and GERVEL, INC.,
Petitioners, Present:
Davide, Jr., C.J., Chairman,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, -
versus - Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.


Promulgated:
LAWRENCE C. QUA,
Respondent. July 30, 2004
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x


DECISION


CARPI O, J .:


The Case



Before the Court is a petition for review
1[1]
assailing the 6 March 2000
Decision
2[2]
and the 26 July 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 54737. The Court of Appeals set aside the Order
3[3]
of 3 May 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 63 (RTC-Branch 63), in Civil Case No.
88-2643 and reinstated the Decision
4[4]
of 12 January 1996 in respondents favor.


The Facts

Petitioners Republic Glass Corporation (RGC) and Gervel, Inc. (Gervel)
together with respondent Lawrence C. Qua (Qua) were stockholders of Ladtek,
Inc. (Ladtek). Ladtek obtained loans from Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company (Metrobank)
5[5]
and Private Development Corporation of the
Philippines
6[6]
(PDCP) with RGC, Gervel and Qua as sureties. Among

1[1]
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo LL. Salas with Associate Justices Salome A. Montoya and Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr. concurring.
3[3]
Penned by Judge Amado A. Amador, Jr.
4[4]
Penned by Judge Ruben A. Mendiola.
5[5]
In its Decision dated 21 November 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, found that Ladteks
loan from Metrobank amounted to P44,552,738.34 as of 31 October 1987.
6[6]
PDCP granted Ladtek a foreign currency loan in the amount of US$110,000.00 on 20 January 1982.
themselves, RGC, Gervel and Qua executed Agreements for Contribution,
Indemnity and Pledge of Shares of Stocks (Agreements).
7[7]


The Agreements all state that in case of default in the payment of Ladteks
loans, the parties would reimburse each other the proportionate share of any sum
that any might pay to the creditors.
8[8]
Thus, a common provision appears in the
Agreements:

RGC, GERVEL and QUA each covenant that each will respectively
reimburse the party made to pay the Lenders to the extent and subject to the
limitations set forth herein, all sums of money which the party made to pay the
Lenders shall pay or become liable to pay by reason of any of the foregoing, and
will make such payments within five (5) days from the date that the party made to
pay the Lenders gives written notice to the parties hereto that it shall have become
liable therefor and has advised the Lenders of its willingness to pay whether or
not it shall have already paid out such sum or any part thereof to the Lenders or
to the persons entitled thereto. (Emphasis supplied)


7[7]
The Agreements were executed on 9 December 1981, November 1982 and 19 September 1983.


8[8]
The Agreements provide the following:
1. 1. Contribution
Should the Company be in default under the Credit Agreements, and one party to the Suretyship
Agreements is required to pay to the Lenders under the Suretyship Agreements, the other parties shall
contribute an amount equivalent to the percentage set forth after their respective names below of each amount
of principal, interest and all other sums, liability, loss and expense, including attorneys fees, that the party
made to pay the Lenders may incur by reason of its executing the Suretyship Agreements, or in defending or
prosecuting any suit, action or other proceeding brought in connection therewith, or in obtaining or attempting
to obtain a release from any liability in respect thereof:
RGC - 35.557%
Gervel - 22.223%
Qua - 42.220%
It is the intention that as between the parties hereto, each party would be liable for any default by the
Company under the Credit Agreements only to the extent of the percentage that the stockholdings of
each in the Company bears to the aggregate stockholdings in the Company of all the parties hereto.
(Emphasis supplied)





Under the same Agreements, Qua pledged 1,892,360 common shares of
stock of General Milling Corporation (GMC) in favor of RGC and Gervel. The
pledged shares of stock served as security for the payment of any sum which RGC
and Gervel may be held liable under the Agreements.

Ladtek defaulted on its loan obligations to Metrobank and PDCP. Hence,
Metrobank filed a collection case against Ladtek, RGC, Gervel and Qua docketed
as Civil Case No. 8364 (Collection Case No. 8364) which was raffled to the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149 (RTC-Branch 149). During the
pendency of Collection Case No. 8364, RGC and Gervel paid Metrobank P7
million. Later, Metrobank executed a waiver and quitclaim dated 7 September
1988 in favor of RGC and Gervel. Based on this waiver and quitclaim,
9[9]

Metrobank, RGC and Gervel filed on 16 September 1988 a joint motion to dismiss
Collection Case No. 8364 against RGC and Gervel. Accordingly, RTC-Branch 149
dismissed the case against RGC and Gervel, leaving Ladtek and Qua as
defendants.
10[10]


In a letter dated 7 November 1988, RGC and Gervels counsel, Atty.
Antonio C. Pastelero, demanded that Qua pay P3,860,646, or 42.22% of

9[9]
Exhibit D, Records, p. 316.
10[10]
Exhibit F, Records, p. 319.
P8,730,543.55,
11[11]
as reimbursement of the total amount RGC and Gervel paid to
Metrobank and PDCP. Qua refused to reimburse the amount to RGC and Gervel.
Subsequently, RGC and Gervel furnished Qua with notices of foreclosure of Quas
pledged shares.

Qua filed a complaint for injunction and damages with application for a
temporary restraining order, docketed as Civil Case No. 88-2643 (Foreclosure
Case No. 88-2643), with RTC-Branch 63 to prevent RGC and Gervel from
foreclosing the pledged shares. Although it issued a temporary restraining order on
9 December 1988, RTC-Branch 63 denied on 2 January 1989 Quas Urgent
Petition to Suspend Foreclosure Sale. RGC and Gervel eventually foreclosed all
the pledged shares of stock at public auction. Thus, Quas application for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction became moot.
12[12]


Trial in Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643 ensued. RGC and Gervel offered
Quas Motion to Dismiss
13[13]
in Collection Case No. 8364 as basis for the
foreclosure of Quas pledged shares. Quas Motion to Dismiss states:

8. 8. The foregoing facts show that the payment of defendants Republic
Glass Corporation and Gervel, Inc. was for the entire obligation
covered by the Continuing Surety Agreements which were Annexes B
and C of the Complaint, and that the same naturally redound[ed] to the

11[11]
RGC and Gervel paid Metrobank P7 million and PDCP P1,730,543.55.
12[12]
Records, p. 50.
13[13]
Exhibit 6 to 6-D, Records, pp. 392-396.

benefit of defendant Qua herein, as provided for by law, specifically
Article 1217 of the Civil Code, which states that:

xxx

10. It is very clear that the payment of defendants Republic Glass Corporation
and Gervel, Inc. was much more than the amount stipulated in the
Continuing Surety Agreement which is the basis for the action against
them and defendant Qua, which was just SIX MILLION TWO
HUNDRED [THOUSAND] PESOS (P6,200,000.00), hence, logically the
said alleged obligation must now be considered as fully paid and
extinguished.

RGC and Gervel likewise offered as evidence in Foreclosure Case No. 88-
2643 the Order dismissing Collection Case No. 8364,
14[14]
which RTC-Branch 149
subsequently reversed on Metrobanks motion for reconsideration. Thus, RTC-
Branch 149 reinstated Collection Case No. 8364 against Qua.

On 12 January 1996, RTC-Branch 63 rendered a Decision in Foreclosure
Case No. 88-2643 (12 January 1996 Decision) ordering RGC and Gervel to
return the foreclosed shares of stock to Qua. The dispositive portion of the 12
January 1996 Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment
ordering defendants jointly and severally liable to return to plaintiff the 1,892,360
shares of common stock of General Milling Corporation which they foreclosed on
December 9, 1988, or should the return of these shares be no longer possible then
to pay to plaintiff the amount of P3,860,646.00 with interest at 6% per annum
from December 9, 1988 until fully paid and to pay plaintiff P100,000.00 as and
for attorneys fees. The costs will be for defendants account.

SO ORDERED.
15[15]


14[14]
Exhibit 7 to 7-C-1, Records, pp. 397-400.
15[15]
Rollo, p. 69.



However, on RGC and Gervels Motion for Reconsideration, RTC-Branch
63 issued its Order of 3 May 1996 (3 May 1996 Order) reconsidering and setting
aside the 12 January 1996 Decision. The 3 May 1996 Order states:

After a thorough review of the records of the case, and an evaluation of
the evidence adduced by the parties as well as their contentions, the issues to be
resolved boil down to the following:

1. Whether or not the parties obligation to reimburse, under the
Indemnity Agreements was premised on the payment by any of them of
the entire obligation;

2. Whether or not there is basis to plaintiffs apprehension that he
would be made to pay twice for the single obligation; and

3. Whether or not plaintiff was benefited by the payments made by
defendants.

Regarding the first issue, a closer scrutiny of the pertinent provisions of
the Indemnity Agreements executed by the parties would not reveal any
significant indication that the parties liabilities are indeed premised on the
payment by any of them of the entire obligation. These agreements clearly
provide that the parties obligation to reimburse accrues upon mere advice that
one of them has paid or will so pay the obligation. It is not specified whether the
payment is for the entire obligation or not.

Accordingly, the Court stands corrected in this regard. The obvious
conclusion that can be seen now is that payment of the entire obligation is not
a condition sine qua non for the paying party to demand reimbursement. The
parties have expressly contracted that each will reimburse whoever is made to pay
the obligation whether entirely or just a portion thereof.

On the second issue, plaintiffs apprehension that he would be made to
pay twice for the single obligation is unfounded. Under the above-mentioned
Indemnity Agreements, in the event that the creditors are able to collect from him,
he has the right to ask defendants to pay their proportionate share, in the same
way defendants had collected from the plaintiff, by foreclosing his pledged shares
of stock, his proportionate share, after they had made payments. From all


indications, the provisions of the Indemnity Agreements have remained binding
between the parties.

On the third issue, there is merit to defendants assertion that plaintiff has
benefited from the payments made by defendants. As alleged by defendants, and
this has not been denied by plaintiff, in Civil Case No. 8364 filed before
Branch 149 of this Court, where the creditors were enforcing the parties
liabilities as sureties, plaintiff succeeded in having the case dismissed by
arguing that defendants payments [were] for the entire obligation, hence,
the obligation should be considered fully paid and extinguished. With the
dismissal of the case, the indications are that the creditors are no longer running
after plaintiff to enforce his liabilities as surety of Ladtek.

Whether or not the surety agreements signed by the parties and the
creditors were novated is not material in this controversy. The fact is that there
was payment of the obligation. Hence, the Indemnity Agreements govern.

In the final analysis, defendants payments gave rise to plaintiffs
obligation to reimburse the former. Having failed to do so, upon demand,
defendants were justified in foreclosing the pledged shares of stocks.

xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated January 12, 1996
is reconsidered and set aside. The above-entitled complaint against defendants is
DISMISSED.

Likewise, defendants counterclaim is also dismissed.

SO ORDERED.
16[16]
(Emphasis supplied)



Qua filed a motion for reconsideration of the 3 May 1996 Order which RTC-
Branch 63 denied.

Aggrieved, Qua appealed to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of
the appeal, Qua filed a Manifestation
17[17]
with the Court of Appeals attaching the

16[16]
Rollo, pp. 71-73.
17[17]
Ibid., pp. 126-128.
Decision
18[18]
of 21 November 1996 rendered in Collection Case No. 8364. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering defendants Ladtek, Inc. and Lawrence C. Qua:

1. 1. To pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff the amount of
P44,552,738.34 as of October 31, 1987 plus the stipulated interest of 30.73% per
annum and penalty charges of 12% per annum from November 1, 1987 until the
whole amount is fully paid, less P7,000,000.00 paid by defendants Republic Glass
Corporation and Gervel, Inc., but the liability of defendant Lawrence C. Qua
should be limited only to P5,000,000.00 and P1,200,000.00, the amount stated
in the Continuing Suretyship dated June 15, 1983, Exh. D and Continuing
Suretyship dated December 14, 1981, Exh. D-1, respectively, plus the
stipulated interest and expenses incurred by the plaintiff.

2. 2. To pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff an amount equivalent
to ten (10%) percent of the total amount due as and by way of attorneys fees;

3. 3. To pay the cost of suit.

The Counterclaims of the defendants Ladtek, Inc. and Lawrence C. Qua
against the plaintiff are hereby dismissed.

Likewise, the cross-claims of the defendants are dismissed.

SO ORDERED.
19[19]
(Emphasis supplied)


On 6 March 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered the questioned Decision
setting aside the 3 May 1996 Order of RTC-Branch 63 and reinstating the 12
January 1996 Decision ordering RGC and Gervel to return the foreclosed shares of
stock to Qua.
20[20]


Hence, this petition.

18[18]
Penned by Judge Roberto C. Diokno.
19[19]
Rollo, pp. 129-151.
20[20]
Ibid., p. 56.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals



In reversing the 3 May 1996 Order and reinstating the 12 January 1996
Decision, the appellate court quoted the RTC-Branch 63s 12 January 1996
Decision:

The liability of each party under the indemnity agreements therefore is
premised on the payment by any of them of the entire obligation. Without such
payment, there would be no corresponding share to reimburse. Payment of the
entire obligation naturally redounds to the benefit of the other solidary debtors
who must then reimburse the paying co-debtors to the extent of his corresponding
share.

In the case at bar, Republic Glass and Gervel made partial payments only,
and so they did not extinguish the entire obligation. But Republic Glass and
Gervel nevertheless obtained quitclaims in their favor and so they ceased to be
solidarily liable with plaintiff for the balance of the debt (Exhs. D, E, and
I). Plaintiff thus became solely liable for the unpaid portion of the debt even as
he is being held liable for reimbursement on the said portion.

What happened therefore, was that Metrobank and PDCP in effect
enforced the Suretyship Agreements jointly as against plaintiff and defendants.
Consequently, the solidary obligation under the Suretyship Agreements was
novated by the substantial modification of its principal conditions. xxx The
resulting change was from one with three solidary debtors to one in which
Lawrence Qua became the sole solidary co-debtor of Ladtek.

Defendants cannot simply pay off a portion of the debt and then absolve
themselves from any further liability when the obligation has not been totally
extinguished.

xxx

In the final reckoning, this Court finds that the foreclosure and sale of the
shares pledged by plaintiff was totally unjustified and without basis because the
obligation secured by the underlying pledge had been extinguished by novation.
xxx
21[21]




The Court of Appeals further held that there was an implied novation or
substantial incompatibility in the suretys mode or manner of payment from one
for the entire obligation to one merely of proportionate share. The appellate court
ruled that RGC and Gervels payment to the creditors only amounted to their
proportionate shares of the obligation, considering the following evidence:
The letter of the Republic to the appellant, Exhibit G, dated June 25,
1987, which mentioned the letter from PDCP confirming its willingness to release
the joint and solidary obligation of the Republic and Gervel subject to some terms
and conditions, one of which is the appellants acceptable repayment plan of his
pro-rata share; and the letter of PDCP to the Republic, Exhibit H, mentioning
full payment of the pro rata share of the Republic and Gervel, and the need of
the appellant to submit an acceptable repayment plan covering his pro-rata
share, the release from solidary liability by PDCP, Exhibit J, mentioning full
payment by the Republic and Gervel of their pro rata share in the loan, as
solidary obligors, subject however to the terms and conditions of the hold out
agreement; and the non-payment in full of the loan, subject of the May 10, 1984
Promissory Note, except the 7 million payment by both Republic and Gervel, as
mentioned in the Decision (Case No. 8364, Metrobank vs. Ladtek, et al).
Precisely, Ladtek and the appellant, in said Decision were directed to pay
Metrobank the balance of P9,560,798, supposedly due and unpaid.

Thus, the payment did not extinguish the entire obligation and did not benefit Qua.
Accordingly, RGC and Gervel cannot demand reimbursement. The Court of
Appeals also held that Qua even became solely answerable for the unpaid balance
of the obligations by virtue of the quitclaims executed by Metrobank and PDCP in

21[21]
Ibid., pp. 53-56.

favor of RGC and Gervel. RGC and Gervel ceased to be solidarily liable for
Ladteks loan obligations.
22[22]




The Issues



RGC and Gervel raise the following issues for resolution:


I.
WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL APPLIES TO QUAS JUDICIAL
STATEMENTS THAT RGC AND GERVEL PAID THE ENTIRE
OBLIGATION.

II.
WHETHER PAYMENT OF THE ENTIRE OBLIGATION IS A CONDITION
SINE QUA NON FOR RGC AND GERVEL TO DEMAND REIMBURSEMENT
FROM QUA UNDER THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS EXECUTED BY
THEM AFTER RGC AND GERVEL PAID METROBANK UNDER THE
SURETY AGREEMENT.

III.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE WAS NOVATION OF THE
SURETY AGREEMENTS SIGNED BY THE PARTIES AND THE
CREDITORS, WHETHER THE NOVATION IS MATERIAL IN THIS
CASE.
23[23]




The Courts Ruling



We deny the petition.



22[22]
Ibid., pp. 51-52.
23[23]
Ibid., p. 287.
Whether Qua was in estoppel


RGC and Gervel contend that Qua is in estoppel for making conflicting
statements in two different and separate cases. Qua cannot now claim that the
payment made to Metrobank was not for the entire obligation because of his
Motion to Dismiss Collection Case No. 8364 where he stated that RGC and
Gervels payment was for the entire obligation.

The essential elements of estoppel in pais are considered in relation to the
party to be estopped, and to the party invoking the estoppel in his favor. On the
party to be estopped, such party (1) commits conduct amounting to false
representation or concealment of material facts or at least calculated to convey the
impression that the facts are inconsistent with those which the party subsequently
attempts to assert; (2) has the intent, or at least expectation that his conduct shall at
least influence the other party; and (3) has knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
real facts. On the party claiming the estoppel, such party (1) has lack of
knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth on the facts in question; (2)
has relied, in good faith, on the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped;
(3) has acted or refrained from acting based on such conduct or statements as to
change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury,
detriment or prejudice.
24[24]


In this case, the essential elements of estoppel are inexistent.

While Quas statements in Collection Case No. 8364 conflict with his
statements in Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643, RGC and Gervel miserably failed to
show that Qua, in making those statements, intended to falsely represent or conceal
the material facts. Both parties undeniably know the real facts.

Nothing in the records shows that RGC and Gervel relied on Quas
statements in Collection Case No. 8364 such that they changed their position or
status, to their injury, detriment or prejudice. RGC and Gervel repeatedly point out
that it was the presiding judge
25[25]
in Collection Case No. 8364 who relied on
Quas statements in Collection Case No. 8364. RGC and Gervel claim that Qua
deliberately led the Presiding Judge to believe that their payment to Metrobank

24[24]
Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121739, 14 June 1999, 308 SCRA 229; Kalalo
v. Luz, No. L-27782, 31 July 1970, 34 SCRA 337. See also Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 109803, 20 April 1998, 289 SCRA 178.


25[25]
Now Associate Justice of this Court, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago.
was for the entire obligation. As a result, the presiding judge ordered the dismissal
of Collection Case No. 8364 against Qua.
26[26]


RGC and Gervel further invoke Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
to support their stance:

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a
party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof.
The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings filed by the parties, (b)
during the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in
other stages of the judicial proceeding.
27[27]


The elements of judicial admissions are absent in this case. Qua made
conflicting statements in Collection Case No. 8364 and in Foreclosure Case No.
88-2643, and not in the same case as required in Section 4 of Rule 129. To
constitute judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case in
which it is offered. If made in another case or in another court, the fact of such

26[26]
As earlier stated, Case No. 8364 was reinstated against Qua upon Metrobanks motion for reconsideration of
the dismissal of the case.
27[27]
FLORENZ D. REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, VOLUME TWO, SEVENTH REVISED
EDITION, 650.

admission must be proved as in the case of any other fact, although if made in a
judicial proceeding it is entitled to greater weight.
28[28]


RGC and Gervel introduced Quas Motion to Dismiss and the Order
dismissing Collection Case No. 8364 to prove Quas claim that the payment was
for the entire obligation. Qua does not deny making such statement but explained
that he honestly believed and pleaded in the lower court and in CA-G.R. CV No.
58550 that the entire debt was fully extinguished when the petitioners paid P7
million to Metrobank.
29[29]


We find Quas explanation substantiated by the evidence on record. As
stated in the Agreements, Ladteks original loan from Metrobank was only P6.2
million. Therefore, Qua reasonably believed that RGC and Gervels P7 million
payment to Metrobank pertained to the entire obligation. However, subsequent
facts indisputably show that RGC and Gervels payment was not for the entire
obligation. RTC-Branch 149 reinstated Collection Case No. 8364 against Qua and
ruled in Metrobanks favor, ordering Qua to pay P6.2 million.



Whether payment of the entire obligation is an

28[28]
Ibid.
29[29]
Rollo, p. 239.

essential condition for reimbursement


RGC and Gervel assail the Court of Appeals ruling that the parties
liabilities under the Agreements depend on the full payment of the obligation.
RGC and Gervel insist that it is not an essential condition that the entire obligation
must first be paid before they can seek reimbursement from Qua. RGC and Gervel
contend that Qua should pay 42.22% of any amount which they paid or would pay
Metrobank and PDCP.

RGC and Gervels contention is partly meritorious.

Payment of the entire obligation by one or some of the solidary debtors
results in a corresponding obligation of the other debtors to reimburse the paying
debtor.
30[30]
However, we agree with RGC and Gervels contention that in this case
payment of the entire obligation is not an essential condition before they can seek
reimbursement from Qua. The words of the Agreements are clear.


30[30]
This is in accordance with Art. 1217 of the Civil Code which expressly provides:
Payment made by one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the obligation. If two or more solidary debtors
offer to pay, the creditor may choose which offer to accept.

He who made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the share which corresponds to each, with
interest for the payment already made. If the payment is made before the debt is due, no interest for the
intervening period may be demanded.

xxx

See also Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, No. L-36413, 26 September 1988, 165 SCRA 536;
Camus v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 107 Phil. 4 (1960).

RGC, GERVEL and QUA each covenant that each will respectively
reimburse the party made to pay the Lenders to the extent and subject to the
limitations set forth herein, all sums of money which the party made to pay the
Lenders shall pay or become liable to pay by reason of any of the foregoing,
and will make such payments within five (5) days from the date that the party
made to pay the Lenders gives written notice to the parties hereto that it shall have
become liable therefor and has advised the Lenders of its willingness to pay
whether or not it shall have already paid out such sum or any part thereof to the
Lenders or to the persons entitled thereto. (Emphasis supplied)


The Agreements are contracts of indemnity not only against actual loss but
against liability as well. In Associated I nsurance & Surety Co., I nc. v. Chua,
31[31]

we distinguished between a contract of indemnity against loss and a contract of
indemnity against liability, thus:
32[32]


The agreement here sued upon is not only one of indemnity against loss
but of indemnity against liability. While the first does not render the indemnitor
liable until the person to be indemnified makes payment or sustains loss, the
second becomes operative as soon as the liability of the person indemnified
arises irrespective of whether or not he has suffered actual loss. (Emphasis
supplied)


Therefore, whether the solidary debtor has paid the creditor, the other solidary
debtors should indemnify the former once his liability becomes absolute. However,
in this case, the liability of RGC, Gervel and Qua became absolute simultaneously

31[31]
L-15656, 31 January 1963, 7 SCRA 52. In Associated I nsurance, the insurance company put up a bail bond for
the provisional liberty of the accused. An indemnity agreement in favor of the insurance company was in turn
signed by appellant, solidarily with accused. Accused failed to appear in court for trial, thus, the bail bond was
ordered confiscated. After judgment on the bond was rendered, the insurance company filed an action against
appellant on the indemnity agreement. The Court ruled that the stipulation in the indemnity agreement allowing
the insurance company to proceed against appellant for indemnification even prior to actual satisfaction of the
judgment on the bond is valid and not contrary to public policy.
32[32]
Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, No. L-22366, 30 October 1969, 29 SCRA 791.

when Ladtek defaulted in its loan payment. As a result, RGC, Gervel and Qua all
became directly liable at the same time to Metrobank and PDCP. Thus, RGC and
Gervel cannot automatically claim for indemnity from Qua because Qua himself is
liable directly to Metrobank and PDCP.

If we allow RGC and Gervel to collect from Qua his proportionate share,
then Qua would pay much more than his stipulated liability under the Agreements.
In addition to the P3,860,646 claimed by RGC and Gervel, Qua would have to pay
his liability of P6.2 million to Metrobank and more than P1 million to PDCP. Since
Qua would surely exceed his proportionate share, he would then recover from
RGC and Gervel the excess payment. This situation is absurd and circuitous.

Contrary to RGC and Gervels claim, payment of any amount will not
automatically result in reimbursement. If a solidary debtor pays the obligation in
part, he can recover reimbursement from the co-debtors only in so far as his
payment exceeded his share in the obligation.
33[33]
This is precisely because if a
solidary debtor pays an amount equal to his proportionate share in the obligation,
then he in effect pays only what is due from him. If the debtor pays less than his
share in the obligation, he cannot demand reimbursement because his payment is
less than his actual debt.

33[33]
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, VOLUME IV, 1997, 244.

To determine whether RGC and Gervel have a right to reimbursement, it is
indispensable to ascertain the total obligation of the parties. At this point, it
becomes necessary to consider the decision in Collection Case No. 8364 on the
parties obligation to Metrobank. To repeat, Metrobank filed Collection Case No.
8364 against Ladtek, RGC, Gervel and Qua to collect Ladteks unpaid loan.

RGC and Gervel assail the Court of Appeals consideration of the decision
in Collection Case No. 8364
34[34]
because Qua did not offer the decision in
evidence during the trial in Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643 subject of this petition.
RTC-Branch 62
35[35]
rendered the decision in Collection Case No. 8364 on 21
November 1996 while Qua filed his Notice of Appeal of the 3 May 1996 Order on
19 June 1996. Qua could not have possibly offered in evidence the decision in
Collection Case No. 8364 because RTC-Branch 62 rendered the decision only after
Qua elevated the present case to the Court of Appeals. Hence, Qua submitted the
decision in Collection Case No. 8364 during the pendency of the appeal of
Foreclosure Case No. 88-2643 in the Court of Appeals.


34[34]
The decision in Case No. 8364 became final on 15 March 2004. The Court denied Quas petition for review
and the motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62.
35[35]
Case No. 8364 was later assigned to RTC-Branch 62.
As found by RTC-Branch 62, RGC, Gervel and Quas total obligation was
P14,200,854.37 as of 31 October 1987.
36[36]
During the pendency of Collection
Case No. 8364, RGC and Gervel paid Metrobank P7 million. Because of the
payment, Metrobank executed a quitclaim
37[37]
in favor of RGC and Gervel. By
virtue of Metrobanks quitclaim, RTC-Branch 62 dismissed Collection Case No.
8364 against RGC and Gervel, leaving Ladtek and Qua as defendants. Considering
that RGC and Gervel paid only P7 million out of the total obligation of
P14,200,854.37, which payment was less than RGC and Gervels combined shares
in the obligation,
38[38]
it was clearly partial payment. Moreover, if it were full
payment, then the obligation would have been extinguished. Metrobank would
have also released Qua from his obligation.

RGC and Gervel also made partial payment to PDCP. Proof of this is the
Release from Solidary Liability that PDCP executed in RGC and Gervels favor

36[36]
As stated in the decision in Case No. 8364, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
37[37]
The quitclaim provides:
xxx in consideration of the payment of SEVEN MILLION PESOS (P7,000,000.00) Philippine Currency,
made by Republic Glass Corporation and Gervel, Inc., receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, does hereby
WAIVE, QUITCLAIM, TERMINATE AND RELINQUISH any and all rights, claims or causes of action
that Metrobank may have against Republic Glass Corp. and Gervel, Inc. xxx, in Civil Case No. 8364, xxx,
thereby releasing and discharging forever said Republic Glass Corp. and Gervel, Inc., as well as its officers and
directors, from any and all liabilities of whatsoever kind or nature related to the above case, or related to any
account of Ladtek, Inc. and/or Lawrence C. Qua.
38[38]
RGCs share is 35.557% while Gervels share is 22.223% of the obligation.
RGC - 35.557%
+ Gervel - 22.223%
---------------------------------
Total - 57.780%
57.780% of P14,200,854.37 (total obligation) is equal to P8,205,253.655.
which stated that their payment of P1,730,543.55 served as full payment of their
corresponding proportionate share in Ladteks foreign currency loan.
39[39]

Moreover, PDCP filed a collection case against Qua alone, docketed as Civil Case
No. 2259, in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 150.
40[40]


Since they only made partial payments, RGC and Gervel should clearly and
convincingly show that their payments to Metrobank and PDCP exceeded their
proportionate shares in the obligations before they can seek reimbursement from
Qua. This RGC and Gervel failed to do. RGC and Gervel, in fact, never claimed
that their payments exceeded their shares in the obligations. Consequently, RGC
and Gervel cannot validly seek reimbursement from Qua.


Whether there was novation of the Agreements


RGC and Gervel contend that there was no novation of the Agreements.
RGC and Gervel further contend that any novation of the Agreements is
immaterial to this case. RGC and Gervel disagreed with the Court of Appeals on
the effect of the implied novation which supposedly transpired in this case. The

39[39]
The release provides:
WHEREAS, RGC and GERVEL, in consideration of their full payment of their corresponding
proportionate share in the Loan of the BORROWER, have requested to be released from their obligation as
solidary obligor under and by virtue of the abovementioned Assumption of Solidary Liability and the LENDER
have consented and agreed to release the said solidary obligors, subject to the terms and conditions of that
Holdout Agreement, dated December 17, 1987, between the LENDER, RGC and GERVEL; xxx (Emphasis
supplied)
40[40]
Records, pp. 192-199.
Court of Appeals found that there was an implied novation or substantial
incompatibility in the mode or manner of payment by the surety from the entire
obligation, to one merely of proportionate share. RGC and Gervel claim that if it
is true that an implied novation occurred, then the effect would be to release
respondent (Qua) as the entire obligation is considered extinguished by operation
of law. Thus, Qua should now reimburse RGC and Gervel his proportionate share
under the surety agreements.

Novation extinguishes an obligation by (1) changing its object or principal
conditions; (2) substituting the person of the debtor; and (3) subrogating a third
person in the rights of the creditor. Article 1292 of the Civil Code clearly provides
that in order that an obligation may be extinguished by another which substitutes
the same, it should be declared in unequivocal terms, or that the old and new
obligations be on every point incompatible with each other.
41[41]
Novation may
either be extinctive or modificatory. Novation is extinctive when an old obligation
is terminated by the creation of a new obligation that takes the place of the former.
Novation is merely modificatory when the old obligation subsists to the extent it
remains compatible with the amendatory agreement.
42[42]



41[41]
Tropical Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111858, 14 May 1997, 272 SCRA 428.
42[42]
Quinto v. People, G.R. No. 126712, 14 April 1999, 305 SCRA 708. See also Bautista v. Pilar Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 135046, 17 August 1999, 312 SCRA 611.
We find that there was no novation of the Agreements. The parties did not
constitute a new obligation to substitute the Agreements. The terms and conditions
of the Agreements remain the same. There was also no showing of complete
incompatibility in the manner of payment of the parties obligations. Contrary to
the Court of Appeals ruling, the mode or manner of payment by the parties did not
change from one for the entire obligation to one merely of proportionate share. The
creditors, namely Metrobank and PDCP, merely proceeded against RGC and
Gervel for their proportionate shares only.
43[43]
This preference is within the
creditors discretion which did not necessarily affect the nature of the obligations
as well as the terms and conditions of the Agreements. A creditor may choose to
proceed only against some and not all of the solidary debtors. The creditor may
also choose to collect part of the debt from some of the solidary debtors, and the
remaining debt from the other solidary debtors.

In sum, RGC and Gervel have no legal basis to seek reimbursement from
Qua. Consequently, RGC and Gervel cannot validly foreclose the pledge of Quas

43[43]
Art. 1216 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1216. The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to those which may subsequently
be directed against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully collected.

See also Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, No. L-22366, 30 October 1969, 29 SCRA 791.

GMC shares of stock which secured his obligation to reimburse.
44[44]
Therefore, the
foreclosure of the pledged shares of stock has no leg to stand on.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision dated 6 March 2000
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54737 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.


ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:



HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
Chairman




LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice




44[44]
Art. 2087 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2087. It is also the essence of these contracts (pledge, mortgage and antichresis) that when the
principal obligation becomes due, the things in which the pledge or mortgage consists may be alienated for the
payment to the creditor.




ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice



CERTIFICATION


Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.


HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice












THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 155110. March 31, 2005]
HABAGAT GRILL Through LOUIE BIRAOGO, Proprietor/Manager,
petitioner, vs. DMC-URBAN PROPERTY DEVELOPER, INC.,
respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
Entitlement to physical or material possession of the premises is the issue in an
ejectment suit. The two forms of ejectment suits -- forcible entry and unlawful detainer --
may be distinguished from each other mainly by the fact that in forcible entry, the
plaintiffs must prove that they were in prior possession of the premises until they were
deprived thereof by the defendants; in unlawful detainer, the plaintiffs need not have
been in prior physical possession.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review
[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging
the April 12, 2002 Decision
[2]
and the August 19, 2002 Resolution
[3]
of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 53524. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the petition, the Court REVERSES the appealed
Decision and renders judgment:
1. Commanding [Petitioner] Louie Biraogo and all persons acting for and in his
behalf or by his authority to remove the Habagat Grill and all improvements he has
introduced into the lot in question and to vacate said lot; and
2. Ordering said [petitioner] to pay the [respondent] P10,000.00 monthly
compensation for the occupation of the land in question until the possession from
December 1, 1993 of said property shall have been completely restored to the
[respondent]; and
3. Ordering [petitioner] to pay [respondent] P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.
[4]

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The antecedents were ably summarized by the CA as follows:
On June 11, 1981, David M. Consunji, Inc. acquired and became the owner of a
residential lot situated in Matina, Davao City and covered by TCT No. T-82338. This lot
shall henceforth be called the lot in question. On June 13, 1981, David M. Consunji,
Inc. transferred said lot to its sister company, the DMC Urban Property Developers,
Inc. (DMC) in whose favor TCT No. T-279042 was issued. Alleging that Louie Biraogo
forcibly entered said lot and built thereon the Habagat Grill in December, 1993, DMC
filed on March 28, 1994 a Complaint for Forcible Entry against Habagat Grill and/or
Louie Biraogo. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 1233-D-94 in the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, in Davao City. The Complaint alleged that as
owner DMC possessed the lot in question from June 11, 1981 until December 1, 1993;
that on that day, December 1, 1993, Louie Biraogo, by means of strategy and stealth,
unlawfully entered into the lot in question and constructed the Habagat Grill thereon,
thus illegally depriving DMC of the possession of said lot since then up to the present;
that the reasonable rental value of said lot is P10,000.00 a month.
Louie Biraogo in his Answer denied illegally entering the lot in question. He
averred that Habagat Grill was built in 1992 inside Municipal Reservation No. 1050
(Presidential Proclamation No. 20) and so DMC has no cause of action against him.
Since one of the vital issues in the case was the location of Habagat Grill, the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities constituted a team composed of three members, one a
Geodetic Engineer representing the DMC, another Geodetic Engineer representing
Biraogo and the third from the DENR which was tasked with the duty of determining
where precisely was Habagat Grill located, on the lot in question or on Municipal
Reservation No. 1050. Biraogo was directed by the court to furnish the team with a
copy of Municipal Reservation No. 20. Biraogo never complied. Worse, his designated
Geodetic Engineer Panfilo Jayme never took oath as such and did not participate in the
Relocation survey. The ones who conducted the survey were Engr. Edmindo Dida of
the DENR and Engr. Jose Cordero, DMCs representative. After conducting the
relocation survey on March 30, 1998, engineers Dida and Cordero submitted their
report to the Court specifically stating that the Habagat Grill Restaurant was occupying
934 square meters of the lot in question.
After necessary proceedings, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities rendered a
Decision on August 6, 1998 dismissing the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
and lack of cause of action. DMC appealed from said Decision to the Regional Trial
Court and the same was docketed in Branch 12, in Davao City as Civil Case No. x x x
26,860.98. On February 16, 1999, said court rendered judgment affirming the appealed
Decision. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but was denied in the courts Order
dated April 21, 1999.
[5]

Consequently, respondent interposed an appeal to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Granting respondents appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the court of origin had
jurisdiction over the Complaint for Forcible Entry.
[6]
The CA gave greater weight to the
testimony of respondents real property manager, Bienamer Garcia, that Habagat Grill
had been built on December 1, 1993.
[7]
The appellate court opined that his testimony
was credible, because he had personal knowledge of the facts he had testified to -- it
was his task to know such matters. On the other hand, it was not clear in what capacity
petitioners witness, Samuel Ruiz, came to know of the facts he had testified to.
[8]
The
CA further held that the minutes of the Urban Planning and Economic Development
hearings -- submitted by petitioner to prove the construction of Habagat Grill in 1992 --
were immaterial, as these referred to another establishment.
[9]

The CA faulted petitioner for not presenting any other documentary evidence to
establish the date of Habagat Grills construction.
[10]
It added that the court of origin had
improperly adjudged the subject property as part of the public domain. The appellate
court explained that the lower court could take cognizance of Presidential Proclamation
No. 20, but not of the situational relation between the property covered by the
Proclamation and the land in question. The CA further criticized petitioner for not
presenting any evidence to show the basis of the latters alleged authority to build
Habagat Grill on the property.
[11]

Hence, this Petition.
[12]

The Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
1. That, with due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the
Honorable Court of First Level has no jurisdiction over this case as petitioners
possession and occupation of the lot where Habagat Grill was constructed on the
subject premises was yet in 1992 or for more than one (1) year prior to the filing of this
case on April 7, 1994 and that respondents predecessor (David M. Consunji, Inc.) had
not been in prior and physical possession of the subject premises, as a matter of fact, it
failed to allege the same in its Complaint in this case; and
2. That, with due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the
Complaint of respondents predecessor (David M. Consunji, Inc.) in this case failed to
state a valid cause of action as the lot referred to therein is not particularly described
and is different from the lot on which the Habagat Grill was constructed.
[13]

Simplified, the issues are (1) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the case, and
(2) whether respondent alleged a sufficient cause of action in its Complaint.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
J urisdiction
Petitioner argues that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case,
because mere allegation of ownership did not, by itself, show that respondent had prior
possession of the property.
[14]

We disagree. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations
pleaded in the complaint.
[15]
As long as these allegations demonstrate a cause of action
either for forcible entry or for unlawful detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction over the
subject matter. This principle holds, even if the facts proved during the trial do not
support the cause of action thus alleged, in which instance the court -- after acquiring
jurisdiction -- may resolve to dismiss the action for insufficiency of evidence.
The necessary allegations in a Complaint for ejectment are set forth in Section 1 of
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which reads thus:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the
provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any
land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by
virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any
such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after
such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving
of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs.
In the present case, the Complaint filed before the trial court on March 28, 1994,
stated:
2. That [respondent] had been in lawful and peaceful possession of a
residential lot at Tulip Drive, Ecoland and Subdivision covered by TCT T-82338 of
the Registry of Deeds of Davao City being owner thereof, since June 11, 1981, until
the day and incident in the following paragraph hereof.
3. That on or about December 1, 1993, [petitioner] by means of strategy and
stealth, unlawfully entered and occupied a portion of said residential lot and
constructed what is now known as the Habagat Grill, thereby illegally depriving
[respondent] of the possession of the premises.
[16]

Notably, petitioner alleged (1) prior possession, (2) deprivation thereof by strategy
and stealth, and (3) the date such unlawful deprivation started, which was less than one
year from the filing of the Complaint. Considering the presence in the Complaint of all
the necessary allegations,
[17]
the trial court evidently acquired jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case.
Date of Entry
Petitioner further contends that, as determined by the court of origin and the
regional trial court, respondent has not adduced preponderance of evidence to prove
that this case was filed within the one-year prescriptive period.
[18]
Petitioner presented
the testimony of a certain Samuel Ruiz and offered the minutes of the hearings
conducted by the Urban Planning and Economic Development (UPED) to prove that the
construction of the Habagat Grill began in 1992.
[19]

Respondent counters that the CA properly relied on the testimony of the formers
real property manager, Bienamer Garcia, as he had personal knowledge of the facts.
[20]

On the other hand, the two trial courts allegedly relied on the hearings conducted by the
UPED in resolving that petitioner had been in possession of the property since 1992.
Respondent avers that those hearings referred to a restaurant located 330 meters
away, not to Habagat Grill.
[21]

The determination of the date of entry into the subject lot is a question of fact. This
Court has held in a long line of cases that the review of cases brought before it via Rule
45 of the Rules of Court is limited to errors of law. Findings of fact by the CA are
conclusive except in a number of instances, one of which is when its factual findings are
contrary to those of the courts below, as in the present case.
[22]

The appellate court held that the minutes of the UPED hearing pertained to matters
relating to a different establishment, the Kawayan Restaurant.
[23]
Thus, the UPED
minutes did not have any material bearing on the resolution of the present case.
Consequently, the determination of the date of entry into the subject lot boils down to
the appreciation of the testimonies of Garcia and Ruiz.
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a
whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other.
[24]
Where the evidence
presented by one side is insufficient to ascertain the claim, there is no preponderance of
evidence.
[25]
In criminal cases in which the quantum of evidence required is greater than
in civil cases, the testimony of only one witness -- if credible, straightforward, and
worthy of belief -- is sufficient to convict.
[26]
With more reason then, Garcias testimony,
if clear and positive, may be sufficient to establish respondents claim.
Under Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, among the facts and
circumstances to be considered by the court in determining which of the presented
evidence has superior weight is the witnesses means and opportunity to know the facts
to which they testify.
[27]

The extent of such means and opportunity are determined by the following
considerations:
First, the Actor Rule. This rule maintains that a persons recollection of his own
acts and of the attendant circumstances is more definite and trustworthy than another
persons recollection of it, especially if it was an act done in the performance of a duty,
or if the other persons testimony is little more than an expression of opinion or
judgment. Apart from comparative tenacity of memory, the actor usually knows better
than any one else what he did or did not do, and his testimony is generally, but not
always, entitled to superior weight on that account. Thus, the execution and attestation
of a will or other legal document may be so far regarded as the act of the lawyer who
superintends the transactions and knows the formalities required by law, and his
testimony to the circumstances will generally outweigh that of a non-professional
witness.
The Actor Rule has been applied in a multitude of admiralty cases and any other
cases where a persons testimony concerning his own conduct conflicts with the
testimony of a non-participating observer or with inconclusive inferences from facts
proved, especially where the actor witness testifies to an act which the duties of his
employment required him to perform. But it said that the testimony of one who
evidently speaks rather to his custom than to his acts on the particular occasion will
hardly suffice to put him in the category of those who are specially favored by the Actor
Rule.
Second, the witness who had the greater interest in noticing and remembering the
facts is to be believed in preference to the one that had a slighter interest to observe or
was wholly indifferent. Interest has effect on the power of observation of witness. Thus,
it has been held that it was not remarkable that witnesses would not have observed
traces of blood along the route through which the deceased was taken because said
witnesses had no reason to suspect that the crime was not committed in the place
where the dead body was found. Similarly, the failure of witnesses to notice whether or
not there were houses at the place where they say the accused maltreat the offended
party was attributed as due to the fact that their attention was concentrated to what
they say, and they had no interest in knowing whether or not there were houses in or
around the place.
Third, the witness who gives reasons for the accuracy of his observations is
preferred to him who merely states the fact to be so, without adverting to any
circumstances showing that his attention was particularly called to it. Thus, the
testimony of the crew of a vessel that their light on the night of a collision was red, and
nothing more, was easily overcome by testimony of witnesses on the other vessel that
the light was white, not red, and that fact was a matter of remark among them when the
light was observed.
Fourth, the witness in a state of excitement, fear, or terror is generally incapable
of observing accurately. This is so because, if men perceive the most insignificant facts
in the most diverse ways, even when it is impossible that these facts should produce
on the observer any emotion preventing him from observing with absolute calm, even
much more will their impressions be diversified under circumstances calculated to
produce in the onlookers excitement, fear or terror.
Fifth, intoxication tends to impair accuracy both of observation and memory of a
witness.
[28]
(Citations omitted)
Based on the foregoing criteria, the testimony of Garcia must be given greater
weight, considering that it was his task -- as the real property manager of respondent --
to know about matters involving the latters properties. In contrast, it was not explained
how Ruiz could be deemed competent and credible in his testimony as to those matters.
The lower courts dismissed the testimony of Garcia -- regardless of how clear,
positive and straightforward it was -- solely on the ground that he was not a
disinterested witness. True, he was an employee of respondent; relationship, however,
will not by itself determine the true worth of ones testimony.
[29]
The essential test is
whether such testimony is disencumbered, credible, and in accord with human
experience.
[30]
It cannot easily be dismissed by the mere invocation of the witness
relationship with respondent. In sum, we have no reason to disagree with the CAs
evaluation that, being credible, Garcias direct testimony was sufficient to establish
respondents claim that petitioner had entered the premises on December 1, 1993.
Second Issue:
Cause of Action
Petitioner avers that no cause of action was alleged by respondent, as shown by
the following circumstances: (1) the latters property was not encroached upon by
Habagat Grill, which had allegedly been constructed on a portion of land owned by the
City Government of Davao;
[31]
and (2) respondent failed to prove that its predecessor-in-
interest had prior possession of the property.
[32]

On the other hand, respondent argues that the trial court indiscriminately ignored
the Report of the survey team that had been constituted to determine the exact location
of Habagat Grill. Respondent further contends that the trial court erred in taking judicial
notice of the metes and bounds of the property covered by Presidential Proclamation
No. 20.
[33]
Although the lower court may take judicial notice of PD No. 20, it may not do
so in regard to the metes and bounds of Times Beach. Neither, may it claim knowledge
of the situational relation between the land in question and Times Beach.
Location of the Property
We agree with respondent. Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which
judges may properly take and act on without proof because they already know them.
[34]

Its object is to save time, labor and expense in securing and introducing evidence on
matters that are not ordinarily capable of dispute or actually bona fide disputed, and the
tenor of which can safely be assumed from the tribunals general knowledge or from a
slight search on its part.
Indeed, municipal courts may take judicial notice of the municipal ordinances in
force in the municipality in which they sit.
[35]
Such notice, however, is limited to what the
law is and what it states.
[36]
As can be gleaned from its discussions, the trial court took
judicial notice of the existence of Presidential Proclamation No. 20, which declared
Times Beach a recreation center. The MTC also took judicial notice of the location of
the beach, which was from the shoreline to the road towards the shoreline. On the
basis of these premises, the trial court resolved that the lot on which petitioners
restaurant was located should necessarily be inside Times Beach, which was owned by
the City of Davao. Hence, it was the City -- not respondent -- that had a cause of action
against petitioner. To arrive at this conclusion, the MTC made its own estimate of the
location of the metes and bounds of the property mentioned by the law.
[37]

The location of Habagat Grill cannot be resolved by merely taking judicial notice of
Presidential Proclamation No. 20; such location is precisely at the core of the dispute in
this case. Moreover, considering respondents allegation that the supposed lot covered
by the Ordinance has been lost due to inundation by the sea, we cannot fathom how the
trial court could have known of the actual location of the metes and bounds of the
subject lot.
Neither may the MTC take discretionary judicial notice under Section 2 of Rule 129
of the Rules of Court, because the exact boundaries of the lot covered by that law are
not a matter of public knowledge capable of unquestionable demonstration. Neither may
these be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
Hence, the CA was correct in disregarding the findings of the trial courts, because
they had erred in taking judicial notice of the exact metes and bounds of the property.
The appellate court aptly relied on the Report submitted by the survey team that had
been constituted by the trial court, precisely for the purpose of determining the location
of Habagat Grill in relation to respondents lot.
Prior Possession
Finally, petitioner avers that respondent failed to prove that the latters predecessor-
in-interest had prior possession of the property.
[38]
Conversely, respondent alleges that
its predecessor was in prior physical possession of the property as the registered owner
thereof since June 11, 1981.
[39]
Again, we rule for respondent.
There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is entitled to physical or
material possession of the premises; that is, to possession de facto, not possession de
jure? Issues as to the right of possession or ownership are not involved in the action;
evidence thereon is not admissible, except only for the purpose of determining the issue
of possession.
[40]

The two forms of ejectment suits -- forcible entry or unlawful detainer -- may be
distinguished from each other mainly by the fact that in forcible entry, the plaintiffs must
prove that they were in prior possession of the premises until they were deprived
thereof by the defendant; in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior
physical possession.
[41]

Spouses Benitez v. CA
[42]
has held that possession can be acquired not only by
material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of ones will
or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.
Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives
the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, x x x
execution and registration of public instruments, and the inscription of possessory
information titles.
[43]
For one to be considered in possession, one need not have actual
or physical occupation
[44]
of every square inch of the property at all times. In the present
case, prior possession of the lot by respondents predecessor was sufficiently proven by
evidence of the execution and registration of public instruments and by the fact that the
lot was subject to its will from then until December 1, 1993, when petitioner unlawfully
entered the premises and deprived the former of possession thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the challenged Decision and Resolution
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.






EN BANC
[G.R. No. 131516. March 5, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RONNIE
RULLEPA y GUINTO, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO-MORALES, J .:
On complaint of Cyra May Francisco Buenafe, accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y
Guinto was charged with Rape before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 17
th
day of November, 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused, by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously removing her panty, kissing her lips and vagina and
thereafter rubbing his penis and inserting the same to the inner portion of the vagina of
the undersigned complainant, 3 years of age, a minor, against her will and without her
consent.
45[1]

Arraigned on January 15, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.
46[2]

From the testimonies of its witnesses, namely Cyra May,
47[3]
her mother Gloria
Francisco Buenafe, Dr. Cristina V. Preyra, and SPO4 Catherine Borda, the prosecution
established the following facts:
On November 20, 1995, as Gloria was about to set the table for dinner at her house
in Quezon City, Cyra May, then only three and a half years old, told her, Mama, si kuya
Ronnie lagay niya titi niya at sinaksak sa puwit at sa bibig ko.
Kuya Ronnie is accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa, the Buenafes house boy, who
was sometimes left with Cyra May at home.
Gloria asked Cyra May how many times accused-appellant did those things to her,
to which she answered many times. Pursuing, Gloria asked Cyra May what else he did
to her, and Cyra May indicated the room where accused-appellant slept and pointed at
his pillow.
As on the night of November 20, 1995 accused-appellant was out with Glorias
husband Col. Buenafe,
48[4]
she waited until their arrival at past 11:00 p.m. Gloria then









sent accused-appellant out on an errand and informed her husband about their
daughters plaint. Buenafe thereupon talked to Cyra May who repeated what she had
earlier told her mother Gloria.
When accused-appellant returned, Buenafe and Gloria verified from him whether
what Cyra May had told them was true. Ronnie readily admitted doing those things but
only once, at 4:00 p.m. of November 17, 1995 or three days earlier. Unable to contain
her anger, Gloria slapped accused-appellant several times.
Since it was already midnight, the spouses waited until the following morning to
bring accused-appellant to Camp Karingal where he admitted the imputations against
him, on account of which he was detained. Glorias sworn statement
49[5]
was then
taken.
50[6]

Recalling what accused-appellant did to her, Cyra May declared at the witness
stand: Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa bunganga, thus causing her
pain and drawing her to cry. She added that accused-appellant did these to her twice in
his bedroom.
Dr. Ma. Cristina V. Preyra, the Medico-Legal Officer and Chief of the Biological
Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory who examined Crya
May, came up with her report dated November 21, 1995,
51[7]
containing the following
findings and conclusions:
FINDINGS:
GENERAL AND EXTRA GENITAL:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female child subject. Breasts are
undeveloped. Abdomen is flat and soft.
GENITAL:
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with
congested and abraded labia minora presenting in between. On separating the
same is disclosed an abraded posterior fourchette and an elastic, fleshy type intact
hymen. External vaginal orifice does not admit the tip of the examining index finger.
x x x
CONCLUSION:







Subject is in virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at the time
of examination. (Emphasis supplied.)
By Dr. Preyras explanation, the abrasions on the labia minora could have been
caused by friction with an object, perhaps an erect penis. She doubted if riding on a
bicycle had caused the injuries.
52[8]

The defenses sole witness was accused-appellant, who was 28 and single at the
time he took the witness stand on June 9, 1997. He denied having anything to do with
the abrasions found in Cyra Mays genitalia, and claimed that prior to the alleged
incident, he used to be ordered to buy medicine for Cyra May who had difficulty
urinating. He further alleged that after he refused to answer Glorias queries if her
husband Buenafe, whom he usually accompanied whenever he went out of the house,
was womanizing, Gloria would always find fault in him. He suggested that Gloria was
behind the filing of the complaint. Thus:
q- According to them you caused the abrasions found in her genital?
a- That is not true, sir.
q- If that is not true, what is the truth?
a- As I have mentioned earlier that before I started working with the family I was sent
to Crame to buy medicine for the daughter because she had difficulty in urinating.
q- Did you know why the child has difficulty in urinating?
a- No, I do not know, sir.
q- And how about the present complaint filed against you, the complaint filed by the
mother of the victim?
a- I did not do it, sir.
q- What is the truth, what can you say about this present complaint filed against you?
a- As I said Mrs. Buenafe got mad at me because after I explained to her that I was
going with her gusband (sic) to the children of the husband with a former
marriage.
53[9]

Finding for the prosecution, Branch 96 of the Quezon City RTC rendered judgment,
the dispositive portion of which reads:





WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused RONNIE RULLEPA
y GUINTO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, and he is accordingly sentenced to
death.
The accused is ordered to pay CYRA MAE BUENAFE the amount of P40,000.00
as civil indemnity.
Costs to be paid by the accused.
54[10]
(Italics in the original.)
Hence, this automatic review, accused-appellant assigning the following errors to
the trial court:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ADMISSION.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED ON (sic) RULING THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS SILENCE DURING TRIAL AMOUNTED TO AN IMPLIED ADMISSION
OF GUILT.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
IV
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME
PENALTY OF DEATH UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
55[11]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Accused-appellant assails the crediting by the trial court, as the following portion of
its decision shows, of his admission to Gloria of having sexually assaulted Cyra May:
In addition, the mother asserted that Rullepa had admitted Cyra Ma[y]s complaint
during the confrontation in the house. Indeed, according to the mother, the admission
was even expressly qualified by Rullepas insistence that he had committed the sexual
assault only once, specifying the time thereof as 4:00 pm of November 17, 1995. That
qualification proved that the admission was voluntary and true. An uncoerced and
truthful admission like this should be absolutely admissible and competent.
x x x





Remarkably, the admission was not denied by the accused during trial despite his
freedom to deny it if untrue. Hence, the admission became conclusive upon him.
56[12]

(Emphasis supplied.)
To accused-appellant, the statements attributed to him are inadmissible since they
were made out of fear, having been elicited only after Cyra Mays parents bullied and
questioned him. He thus submits that it was error for the trial court to take his failure to
deny the statements during the trial as an admission of guilt.
Accused-appellants submission does not persuade. The trial court considered his
admission merely as an additional ground to convince itself of his culpability. Even if
such admission, as well as the implication of his failure to deny the same, were
disregarded, the evidence suffices to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The plain, matter-of-fact manner by which Cyra May described her abuse in the
hands of her Kuya Ronnie is an eloquent testament to the truth of her accusations. Thus
she testified on direct examination:
q- Do you recall if Ronnie Rullepa did anything to you?
a- Yes, sir.
q- What did he do to you?
a- Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa bunganga
q- How many times did he do that to you?
a- Twice, sir.
x x x
q- Do you remember when he did these things to you?
a- Opo.
q- When was that?
a- When my mother was asleep, he put he removed my panty and inserted his
penis inside my vagina, my anus and my mouth, sir.
x x x
q- After your Kuya Ronnie did those things to you what did you feel?
a- Sabi nya ganito (Witness putting her finger in her lips) Nasaktan po ako at umiyak
po ako.
q- Did you cry because of hurt?
a- Yes.
q- What part of your body hurt?



a- Pepe ko po. When I went to the bathroom to urinate, I felt pain in my organ,
sir.
57[13]

Cyra May reiterated her testimony during cross-examination, providing more
revolting details of her ordeal:
q- So, you said that Kuya Ronnie did something to you what did he do to you on
November 17, 1995?
a- Sinaksak nga yong titi nya. He inserted his penis to my organ and to my mouth,
sir.
x x x
q- When you said that your kuya Ronnie inserted his penis into your organ, into your
mouth, and into your anus, would you describe what his penis?
a- It is a round object, sir.
C o u r t:
Is this titi of your kuya Ronnie a part of his body?
a- Opo.
q- Was that in the head of kuya Ronnie?
a- No, sir.
q- Which part of his body that titi located?
(Witness pointing to her groin area)
C o u r t:
Continue
x x x
q- Why were you in that room?
a- Gusto nya po matulog ako sa kuwarto niya.
q- When you were in that room, what did Kuya Ronnie do to you?
a- Hinubo po niya ang panty ko.
q- And after he remove your panty, what did Kuya Ronnie do, what did he do to you?
a- He inserted his penis to my organ, sir.
q- Why did kuya Ronnie, was kuya Ronnie already naked or he was already wearing
any clothing?
a- Still had his clothing on, sir.



q- So, where did his penis, saan lumabas ang penis ni Kuya Ronnie?
a- Dito po, (Witness referring or pointing to her groin area)
x x x
q- So, thats the and at the time, you did not cry and you did not shout for help?
a- Sabi nya po, not to make any noise because my mother might be roused from
sleep.
q- How long was kuya Ronnie did that to you?
a- Matagal po.
q- After kuya Ronnie scrub his penis to your vagina, what other things did he do?
a- After that he inserted his penis to my mouth, and to my anus, sir.
q- You did not complain and you did not shout?
a- I cried, sir.
58[14]

Accused-appellant draws attention to the statement of Cyra May that he was not in
the house on November 17 (1995), as reflected in the following transcript of her
testimony:
q- Is it not a fact that you said a while ago that when your father leaves the house, he
[was] usually accompanied by your kuya Ronnie?
a- Opo.
q- Why is it that Kuya Ronnie was in the house when you father left the house at that
time, on November 17?
a- He was with Kuya Ronnie, sir.
q- So, it is not correct that kuya Ronnie did something to you because your kuya
Ronnie [was] always with your Papa?
a- Yes, sir.
59[15]

The above-quoted testimony of Cyra May does not indicate the time when her
father Col. Buenafe left their house on November 17, 1995 with accused-appellant and,
thus, does not preclude accused-appellants commission of rape on the same date. In
any event, a young child is vulnerable to suggestion, hence, her affirmative response to
the defense counsels above-quoted leading questions.
As for the variance in the claim regarding when Gloria was informed of the rape,





Gloria having testified that she learned of it on November 20, 1995
60[16]
while Cyra May
said that immediately after the incident, she awakened her mother who was in the
adjacent room and reported it:
61[17]
This is a minor matter that does not detract from
Cyra Mays categorical, material testimony that accused-appellant inserted his penis
into her vagina.
Accused-appellant goes on to contend that Cyra May was coached, citing the
following portion of her testimony:
q- Yong sinabi mong sinira nya ang buhay mo, where did you get that phrase?
a- It was the word of my Mama, sir.
62[18]

On the contrary, the foregoing testimony indicates that Cyra May was really narrating
the truth, that of hearing her mother utter sinira niya ang buhay mo.
Accused-appellants suggestion that Cyra May merely imagined the things of which
he is accused, perhaps getting the idea from television programs, is preposterous. It is
true that the ordinary child is a great weaver of romances, and her imagination may
induce (her) to relate something she has heard or read in a story as personal
experience.
63[19]
But Cyra Mays account is hardly the stuff of romance or fairy tales.
Neither is it normal TV fare, if at all.
This Court cannot believe that a victim of Cyra Mays age could concoct a tale of
defloration, allow the examination of her private parts, and undergo the expense,
trouble, inconvenience, not to mention the trauma of public trial.
64[20]

Besides, her testimony is corroborated by the findings of Dr. Preyra that there were
abrasions in her labia minora, which she opined, could have been caused by friction
with an erect penis.











This Court thus accords great weight to the following assessment of the trial court
regarding the competency and credibility of Cyra May as a witness:
Her very tender age notwithstanding, Cyra Ma(y) nonetheless appeared to
possess the necessary intelligence and perceptiveness sufficient to invest her with the
competence to testify about her experience. She might have been an impressionable
child as all others of her age are but her narration of Kuya Ronnies placing his titi
in her pepe was certainly one which could not be considered as a common childs
tale. Her responses during the examination of counsel and of the Court established her
consciousness of the distinction between good and bad, which rendered inconceivable
for her to describe a bad act of the accused unless it really happened to her.
Needless to state, she described the act of the accused as bad. Her demeanor as a
witness manifested during trial by her unhesitant, spontaneous, and plain responses
to questions further enhanced her claim to credit and trustworthiness.
65[21]
(Italics in
the original.)
In a futile attempt at exculpation, accused-appellant claims that even before the
alleged incident Cyra May was already suffering from pain in urinating. He surmises that
she could have scratched herself which caused the abrasions. Dr. Preyra, however,
was quick to rule out this possibility. She stated categorically that that part of the female
organ is very sensitive and rubbing or scratching it is painful.
66[22]
The abrasions could
not, therefore, have been self-inflicted.
That the Medical-Legal Officer found no external signs of recent application of any
form of trauma at the time of the examination does not preclude accused-appellants
conviction since the infliction of force is immaterial in statutory rape.
67[23]

More. That Cyra May suffered pain in her vagina but not in her anus despite her
testimony that accused-appellant inserted his penis in both orifices does not diminish
her credibility. It is possible that accused-appellants penis failed to penetrate her anus
as deeply as it did her vagina, the former being more resistant to extreme forces than
the latter.
Accused-appellants imputation of ill motive on the part of Gloria is puerile. No
mother in her right mind would subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace and trauma
attendant to a prosecution for rape if she were not motivated solely by the desire to
incarcerate the person responsible for the childs defilement.
68[24]
Courts are seldom, if








at all, convinced that a mother would stoop so low as to subject her daughter to physical
hardship and shame concomitant to a rape prosecution just to assuage her own hurt
feelings.
69[25]

Alternatively, accused-appellant prays that he be held liable for acts of
lasciviousness instead of rape, apparently on the basis of the following testimony of
Cyra May, quoted verbatim, that he merely scrubbed his penis against her vagina:
q- Is it not a fact that kuya Ronnie just made some scrubbed his penis into your
vagina?
a- Yes, sir.
q- And when he did not actually penetrated your vagina?
a- Yes, sir.
70[26]

Dr. Preya, however, found abrasions in the labia minora, which is directly beneath the
labia majora,
71[27]
proving that there was indeed penetration of the vagina, not just a
mere rubbing or scrubbing of the penis against its surface.
In fine, the crime committed by accused-appellant is not merely acts of
lasciviousness but statutory rape.
The two elements of statutory rape are (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge
of a woman, and (2) that the woman is below twelve years of age.
72[28]
As shown in the
previous discussion, the first element, carnal knowledge, had been established beyond
reasonable doubt. The same is true with respect to the second element.
The victims age is relevant in rape cases since it may constitute an element of the
offense. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659,
73[29]
provides:











Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
x x x.
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age x x x.
x x x.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
x x x.
Furthermore, the victims age may constitute a qualifying circumstance, warranting
the imposition of the death sentence. The same Article states:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity with the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
x x x.
4. when the victim is x x x a child below seven (7) years old.
x x x.
Because of the seemingly conflicting decisions regarding the sufficiency of evidence
of the victims age in rape cases, this Court, in the recently decided case of People v.
Pruna,
74[30]
established a set of guidelines in appreciating age as an element of the crime
or as a qualifying circumstance, to wit:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim
would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to
be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;




b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to
be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought
to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony
of the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended
party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age
shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the
victim.
Applying the foregoing guidelines, this Court in the Pruna case held that the therein
accused-appellant could only be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
since:
x x x no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as a baptismal
certificate of LIZETTE, was presented to prove her age. x x x.
x x x.
However, the Medico-Legal Report relied upon by the trial court does not in any
way prove the age of LIZETTE, for there is nothing therein which even mentions her
age. Only testimonial evidence was presented to establish LIZETTEs age. Her mother,
Jacqueline, testified (that the victim was three years old at the time of the commission
of the crime).
x x x
Likewise, LIZETTE testified on 20 November 1996, or almost two years after the
incident, that she was 5 years old. However, when the defense counsel asked her how
old she was on 3 January 1995, or at the time of the rape, she replied that she was 5
years old. Upon further question as to the date she was born, she could not answer.
For PRUNA to be convicted of rape in its qualified form and meted the supreme
penalty of death, it must be established with certainty that LIZETTE was below 7 years
old at the time of the commission of the crime. It must be stressed that the severity of
the death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once carried out, makes
the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules
of procedure and evidence.
In view of the uncertainty of LIZETTEs exact age, corroborative evidence such as
her birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other authentic document should be
introduced in evidence in order that the qualifying circumstance of below seven (7)
years old is appreciated against the appellant. The lack of objection on the part of the
defense as to her age did not excuse the prosecution from discharging its burden. That
the defense invoked LIZETTEs tender age for purposes of questioning her
competency to testify is not necessarily an admission that she was below 7 years of
age when PRUNA raped her on 3 January 1995. Such being the case, PRUNA cannot
be convicted of qualified rape, and hence the death penalty cannot be imposed on him.
However, conformably with no. 3 (b) of the foregoing guidelines, the testimony of
LIZETTEs mother that she was 3 years old at the time of the commission of the crime
is sufficient for purposes of holding PRUNA liable for statutory rape, or rape of a girl
below 12 years of age. Under the second paragraph of Article 335, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659, in relation to no. 3 of the first paragraph thereof, having carnal
knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
Thus, the penalty to be imposed on PRUNA should be reclusion perpetua, and not
death penalty. (Italics in the original.)
Several cases
75[31]
suggest that courts may take judicial notice of the appearance
of the victim in determining her age. For example, the Court, in People v. Tipay,
76[32]

qualified the ruling in People v. Javier,
77[33]
which required the presentation of the birth
certificate to prove the rape victims age, with the following pronouncement:
This does not mean, however, that the presentation of the certificate of birth is at
all times necessary to prove minority. The minority of a victim of tender age who may
be below the age of ten is quite manifest and the court can take judicial notice thereof.
The crucial years pertain to the ages of fifteen to seventeen where minority may seem
to be dubitable due to ones physical appearance. In this situation, the prosecution has
the burden of proving with certainty the fact that the victim was under 18 years of age
when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty
under the above-cited provision. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, a handful of cases
78[34]
holds that courts, without the requisite
hearing prescribed by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,
79[35]
cannot take judicial
notice of the victims age.
Judicial notice signifies that there are certain facta probanda, or propositions in a
partys case, as to which he will not be required to offer evidence; these will be taken for











true by the tribunal without the need of evidence.
80[36]
Judicial notice, however, is a
phrase sometimes used in a loose way to cover some other judicial action. Certain rules
of Evidence, usually known under other names, are frequently referred to in terms of
judicial notice.
81[37]

The process by which the trier of facts judges a persons age from his or her
appearance cannot be categorized as judicial notice. Judicial notice is based upon
convenience and expediency for it would certainly be superfluous, inconvenient, and
expensive both to parties and the court to require proof, in the ordinary way, of facts
which are already known to courts.
82[38]
As Tundag puts it, it is the cognizance of
certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because they
already know them. Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, where the provisions governing
judicial notice are found, is entitled What Need Not Be Proved. When the trier of facts
observes the appearance of a person to ascertain his or her age, he is not taking
judicial notice of such fact; rather, he is conducting an examination of the evidence,
the evidence being the appearance of the person. Such a process militates against the
very concept of judicial notice, the object of which is to do away with the presentation of
evidence.
This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court; on the
contrary, it does. A persons appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object
evidence, the same being addressed to the senses of the court. Section 1, Rule 130
provides:
SECTION 1. Object as evidence. Objects as evidence are those addressed to
the senses of the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be
exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court.
To be sure, one author writes, this practice of inspection by the court of objects,
things or persons relevant to the fact in dispute, has its roots in ancient judicial
procedure.
83[39]
The author proceeds to quote from another authority:
Nothing is older or commoner in the administration of law in all countries than the
submission to the senses of the tribunal itself, whether judge or jury, of objects which









furnish evidence. The view of the land by the jury, in real actions, of a wound by the
judge where mayhem was alleged, and of the person of one alleged to be an infant,
in order to fix his age, the inspection and comparison of seals, the examination of
writings, to determine whether they are ()blemished,() the implements with which a
crime was committed or of a person alleged, in a bastardy proceeding, to be the child
of another, are few illustrations of what may be found abundantly in our own legal
records and textbooks for seven centuries past.
84[40]
(Emphasis supplied.)
A persons appearance, as evidence of age (for example, of infancy, or of being
under the age of consent to intercourse), is usually regarded as relevant; and, if so,
the tribunal may properly observe the person brought before it.
85[41]
Experience teaches
that corporal appearances are approximately an index of the age of their bearer,
particularly for the marked extremes of old age and youth. In every case such evidence
should be accepted and weighed for what it may be in each case worth. In particular,
the outward physical appearance of an alleged minor may be considered in judging his
age; a contrary rule would for such an inference be pedantically over-cautious.
86[42]

Consequently, the jury or the court trying an issue of fact may be allowed to judge the
age of persons in court by observation of such persons.
87[43]
The formal offer of the
person as evidence is not necessary. The examination and cross-examination of a party
before the jury are equivalent to exhibiting him before the jury and an offer of such
person as an exhibit is properly refused.
88[44]

This Court itself has sanctioned the determination of an aliens age from his
appearance. In Braca v. Collector of Customs,
89[45]
this Court ruled that:













The customs authorities may also determine from the personal appearance of the
immigrant what his age is. The person of a Chinese alien seeking admission into the
Philippine Islands is evidence in an investigation by the board of special inquiry to
determine his right to enter; and such body may take into consideration his appearance
to determine or assist in determining his age and a finding that the applicant is not a
minor based upon such appearance is not without evidence to support it.
This Court has also implicitly recognized the same process in a criminal case. Thus,
in United States v. Agadas,
90[46]
this Court held:
Rosario Sabacahan testified that he was 17 years of age; that he had never
purchased a cedula; and that he was going to purchase a cedula the following january.
Thereupon the court asked this defendant these questions: You are a pretty big boy
for seventeen. Answer: I cannot tell exactly because I do not remember when I was
born, but 17 years is my guess. Court: If you are going to take advantage of that
excuse, you had better get some positive evidence to that effect. Answer: I do not
remember, as I already stated on what date and in what year I was born. The court, in
determining the question of the age of the defendant, Rosario Sabacahan, said:
The defendant, Rosario Sabacahan, testified that he thought that he was
about 17 years of age, but judging by his appearance he is a youth 18 or 19
years old. He has shown that he has no positive information on the subject
and no effort was made by the defense to prove the fact that he is entitled to
the mitigating circumstance of article 9, paragraph 2, of the Penal code, which
fact it is held to be incumbent upon the defense to establish by satisfactory
evidence in order to enable the court to give an accused person the benefit of
the mitigating circumstance.
In United States vs. Estavillo and Perez (10 Off. Gaz., 1984) Estavillo testified,
when the case was tried in the court below, that he then was only 16 years of age.
There was no other testimony in the record with reference to his age. But the trial judge
said: The accused Estavillo, notwithstanding his testimony giving his age as 16 years,
is, as a matter of fact, not less than 20. This court, in passing upon the age of
Estavillo, held:
We presume that the trial court reached this conclusion with reference to
the age of Estavillo from the latters personal appearance. There is no proof in
the record, as we have said, which even tends to establish the assertion that
this appellant understated his age. * * * It is true that the trial court had an
opportunity to note the personal appearance of Estavillo for the purpose of
determining his age, and by so doing reached the conclusion that he was at
least 20, just two years over 18. This appellant testified that he was only 16,
and this testimony stands uncontradicted. Taking into consideration the
marked difference in the penalties to be imposed upon that age, we must,
therefore, conclude (resolving all doubts in favor of the appellants) that the
appellants ages were 16 and 14 respectively.



While it is true that in the instant case Rosario testified that he was 17 years of
age, yet the trial court reached the conclusion, judging from the personal appearance
of Rosario, that he is a youth 18 or 19 years old. Applying the rule enunciated in the
case just cited, we must conclude that there exists a reasonable doubt, at least, with
reference to the question whether Rosario was, in fact 18 years of age at the time the
robbery was committed. This doubt must be resolved in favor of the defendant, and he
is, therefore, sentenced to six months of arresto mayor in lieu of six years ten months
and one day of presidio mayor. x x x.
There can be no question, therefore, as to the admissibility of a persons
appearance in determining his or her age. As to the weight to accord such appearance,
especially in rape cases, Pruna laid down guideline no. 3, which is again reproduced
hereunder:
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to
be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to
be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought
to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
Under the above guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the
victim is sufficient to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a), (b) and (c)
above. In such cases, the disparity between the allegation and the proof of age is so
great that the court can easily determine from the appearance of the victim the veracity
of the testimony. The appearance corroborates the relatives testimony.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the persons
appearance, as object evidence of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true
age becomes greater and, following Agadas, supra, such doubt must be resolved in
favor of the accused.
This is because in the era of modernism and rapid growth, the victims mere
physical appearance is not enough to gauge her exact age. For the extreme penalty of
death to be upheld, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime must be substantiated. Verily, the minority of the victim should
be not only alleged but likewise proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime
itself. Be it remembered that the proof of the victims age in the present case spells the
difference between life and death.
91[47]




In the present case, the prosecution did not offer the victims certificate of live birth
or similar authentic documents in evidence. The victim and her mother, however,
testified that she was only three years old at the time of the rape. Cyra Mays testimony
goes:
q- Your name is Cyra Mae is that correct?
a- Yes, sir.
q- And you are 3 years old?
a- Yes, sir.
92[48]

That of her mother goes:
Q How old was your daughter when there things happened?
A 3 and years old.
Q When was she born?
A In Manila, May 10, 1992.
93[49]

Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age
sought to be proved (below twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty
ascertaining the victims age from her appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore,
exists that the second element of statutory rape, i.e., that the victim was below twelve
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, is present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here,
reasonable doubt exists. A mature three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for
an underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the victim, as object evidence,
cannot be accorded much weight and, following Pruna, the testimony of the mother is,
by itself, insufficient.
As it has not been established with moral certainty that Cyra May was below seven
years old at the time of the commission of the offense, accused-appellant cannot be
sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be
imposed upon him.
In line with settled jurisprudence, the civil indemnity awarded by the trial court is
increased to P50,000.00. In addition, Cyra May is entitled to an award of moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
94[50]







WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto is
found GUILTY of Statutory Rape, defined and punished by Article 335 (3) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. He is ordered to pay private complainant, Cyra May Buenafe y Francisco, the
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, and Corona, JJ., on leave.













FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121979. March 2, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SAMUEL


ULZORON, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J .:
SAMUEL ULZORON was charged with rape with the use of a deadly weapon.
Complaining witness was Emily Gabo. On 8 March 1995 the trial court adjudged him
guilty as charged and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
xiv[1]
No indemnity was
awarded to Emily for the sexual assault.
On 31 March 1987, at around 10:00 oclock in the morning, Emily was watering her
plants near a well in Brgy. Tumarbong, Roxas, Palawan, when Samuel suddenly
appeared. He was armed with a 2-foot long bolo hanging in its scabbard around his
waist with a long-sleeved work shirt slung over his shoulder. He asked Emily where her
husband was. She replied that Roberto was already in the kaingin so she advised him
to follow her husband there. But Samuel opted to remain and rest on an anthill some
two and a half (2 ) meters from the well.
xv[2]

After Emily finished watering her plants and before she could start washing clothes,
Samuel grabbed her wrists and locked them with one hand behind her back with the
other drawing his bolo and pointing it at her neck. She struggled to free herself from his
hold but was so intimidated with the bolo that she could not shout for help; she lost her
strength eventually. After she weakened, he dragged her some forty (40) meters away
to the bushes and tall grasses. He forced her to lie down; then he mounted her. He laid
his bolo beside him, pinned her arms with one hand, and with the other, loosened the
buttons of her dress. Emily could only struggle in vain until he ripped off her dress and
panties. He opened the zipper of his pants and then inserted his penis to her vagina. He
copulated with her for about fifteen (15) minutes. She did everything to disengage
herself from the sexual imbroglio but her efforts proved no match to his strength.
xvi[3]

At this moment, Emily heard her husbands voice calling for her. Roberto was now
somewhere within the vicino. He saw Emilys slippers near the well so he frantically
hollered, Baby! She answered back. When Robertos voice was heard by Samuel, he
dashed off and fled to the thickets.
xvii[4]

Roberto followed the direction of Emilys voice until he saw her emerge from the
thick bushes. She was in a state of shock. He asked her what happened and she told
him that she was sexually abused by Samuel Ulzoron. Emily pointed Roberto to the
place where she was dragged and raped. Together when they went there and found
Ulzorons bolo and work shirt and took them home.
xviii[5]

The following afternoon, Emily went to Dr. Feliciano M. Velasco Jr. for physical
examination. The doctor noted the discharge mixed with semen in her private part. He
opined that it could have been caused by sexual intercourse within twenty-four (24)
hours prior to his examination. He found her cervix to be parous with superficial
erosions. Her hymen was obliterated with caruncles.
6
The next day Emily lodged a
complaint for rape against Samuel Ulzoron as she turned over his belongings to the
police authorities as her evidence in support thereof.
7

Ulzoron had his own story to tell. He said that on the day of the incident he saw
Emily at the well. She told him that work in the kaingin would be in the afternoon yet so
she advised him to come back. Since he was returning in the afternoon, he decided to
leave his bolo and work shirt near the well. However, at around 10:00 oclock that
morning, as he was about to retrieve his bolo and shirt, he saw the Gabo spouses
having sexual intercourse in a hut with a wall only on one side. As he was ashamed to
be seen by them he proceeded instead to the house of a relative.
8

On the strength of the testimony of Emily Gabo, the trial court convicted the
accused. It found her testimony straightforward and credible. It rationalized that she
would not have filed her complaint for rape if her accusations were not true, for to do so
would only expose herself to public shame or ridicule. No improper motive on her part to
file the case had been shown. The findings of the examining physician also lent
credence to her claim. On the other hand, the trial court found the defense of the
accused too weak, anemic, for if Ulzoron really felt embarrassed to be seen by the
Gabo spouses, he could have taken a detour or passed another way to get back his
bolo and work shirt. Besides, it was never established that the Gabos had so much
yearning for each other that they had to indulge in sexual congress in a hut that was
open to public view and at such an unlikely hour.
9

Appellant concedes, even as he assails his conviction, that his defense is inherently
weak. Nevertheless, he faults the trial court for convicting him on the basis of his
defense. He argues that the undisputed facts and circumstances made it more likely
that Emily was involved in an adulterous relationship with him.
10
He claims, for instance,
that there was absolutely nothing to support the victims claim of struggle, and that while
he allegedly dragged her forty (40) meters away before assaulting her sexually, the
examining physician could not conclude that physical force was actually inflicted since
she did not sustain any physical injuries.
11
Another point raised by the defense in her
testimony that while he was on top of her his bolo was beside him. The plain import of
such testimony, according to the accused, is that the bolo was not a necessary
instrument in the commission of the crime.
12
He also invites attention to the
circumstance that the judge who wrote the decision did not personally try the case and
therefore lacked the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the parties and their
witnesses.
13

The arguments of appellants are unpersuasive ; they fail to convince us. Contrary to
his claim that he was convicted because of his weak defense, his conviction was
actually founded on the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution. With regard to his
claim that he had an adulterous relationship with the victim, the Office of the Solicitor
General observed that such claim was a radical departure from the defense of denial he
raised at the trial. The OSG observed further that the sweetheart defense was being
raised for the first time in this appeal hence should be disallowed conformably with
established jurisprudence.
14
Here, the Court does not necessarily agree. Appellant could
only be emphasizing the point that the facts and circumstances established could lead
to a conclusion of the existence of adulterous relationship between him and Emily and
not of rape. In other words, appellant could be utilizing the sweetheart theory not
necessarily as a defense but as a focal point in disputing the appreciation by the trial
court of the evidence for the prosecution. Thus, this course taken by the defense may
not be totally disregarded.
The term dragged should not indeed be taken in the meaning understood by
appellant as dragged along on the ground. When asked on cross-examination by the
defense counsel to describe how she and appellant travelled at (sic) forty (40) meters
distance,
15
she said, He was holding my hands and at the same time he is (sic)
pushing me forward.
16
This testimony adequately explains the absence of injuries in her
body. At any rate, it is not necessary for the commission of rape that there be marks of
physical violence on the victims body.
17
While Emily repeatedly mentioned her struggles
to be released from his grasp, such efforts need not always result in physical injuries.
18

Besides, they did not refer to the circumstances when she was being dragged by the
accused, but to the circumstances when he initially grabbed her hands,
19
when he was
on top of her,
20
when he was undressing her,
21
and when she was exerting efforts to
disengage herself from the sexual anchorage.
22

Intimidation may be of the moral kind, e.g., the fear caused by threatening a woman
with a knife.
23
There was sufficient intimidation when appellant pointed his 2-foot long
bolo at Emilys neck while they were near the well until they reached the spot where she
was finally abused. This intimidation continued even after he positioned himself on top
of her and placed the bolo beside him since he was at liberty to point it anew at her
neck or any part of her body. Anyway, the significant consideration is that, as
aforementioned, the intimidation was continuous as to sufficiently engender fear in her
mind.
24

The circumstance that the judge who wrote the decision had not heard the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses does not taint or disturb his decision. After all,
he had the records of the case before him including the transcript of stenographic notes.
The validity of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer only took
over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial unless there is a clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the facts,
25
and none exists
in the present case. The records amply support the factual findings of the trial court and
its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses.
The circumstances of force and intimidation attending the instant case were
manifested clearly not only in the victims testimony but also in the physical evidence
presented during the trial consisting of her torn dress and underwear as well as the
medico-legal report. Such pieces of evidence indeed are more eloquent than a hundred
witnesses.
26
The fact of carnal knowledge is not disputed. It was positively established
through the offended partys own testimony and corroborated by that of her examining
physician.
Moreover, the conduct of the complaining witness immediately following the assault
clearly established the truth of her charge that she was raped by accused-appellant.
27

Consequently, we agree with the observation of the OSG that Emilys actuations
following her misfortune, namely, her revelation to her husband of her violation by the
accused and subjecting her private parts immediately to medical examination, as well
as the filing of her complaint for rape immediately thereafter are consistent with her
straightforward, logical, truthful and credible testimony thus rebutting any insinuation of
voluntariness on her part to the sexual confrontation; rather, they only display a moral
certainty of his culpability for the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from finding accused-appellant SAMUEL
ULZORON guilty of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED. In
addition, he is ordered to indemnify his victim Emily Gabo the amount of P50,000.00,
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 83377 February 9, 1993
BASILIO DE VERA, LUIS DE VERA, FELIPE DE VERA, HEIRS OF EUSTAQUIA DE VERA-PAPA
represented by GLICERIA PAPA-FRANCISCO, et al., petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES MARIANO AGUILAR and LEONA V. AGUILAR, respondents.
Pablo M. Gancayaco for petitioners.
De Mesa, Villarica & Associates for respondents.
CAMPOS, JR., J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated November
27, 1987 in CA-GR CV No. 07448 entitled, "Basilio de Vera, Luis de Vera, Felipe de Vera, Heirs of
Eustaquia de Vera-Papa, represented by Gliceria Papa-Francisco, and Heirs of Maria de Vera-
Torres, represented by Luis V. Torres, plaintiffs-appellees versus Spouses Mariano Aguilar and
Leona V. Aguilar, defendants-appellants", which reversed the decision ** of the Regional Trial Court
of Bulacan, Third Judicial Region, Branch 14, for failure of petitioners to prove the loss or destruction
of the original deed of sale and of all its duplicate original copies.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Petitioners Basilio, Luis, Felipe, Eustaquia and Maria, all surnamed de Vera and respondent Leona,
married to respondent Mariano Aguilar, are the children and heirs of the late Marcosa Bernabe who
died on May 10, 1960. In her lifetime, Marcosa Bernabe owned the disputed parcel of land situated
in Camalig, Meycauayan, Bulacan, with an area of 4,195 square meters, designated as Cadastral
Lot No. 3621, Cad. 337, Case No. 4, Meycauayan Cadastre.
The disputed property was mortgaged by petitioners Basilio and Felipe de Vera to a certain Atty.
Leonardo Bordador. When the mortgage had matured, the respondents redeemed the property from
Atty. Leonardo Bordador and in turn Marcosa Bernabe sold the same to them as evidenced by a
deed of absolute sale dated February 11, 1956.
On February 13, 1956, the respondents registered the deed with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan
resulting in the cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of Marcosa Bernabe and the issuance
of another in the name of the Aguilars. Since then and up to the present, the Aguilars have been
paying taxes on the land.
On July 20, 1977, respondent Mariano Aguilar was issued a free patent to the land on the basis of
which Original Certificate of Title No. P-1356(M) was issued in his name.
On September 1, 1980, the petitioners wrote to the respondents claiming that as children of Marcosa
Bernabe, they were co-owners of the property and demanded partition thereof on threats that the
respondents would be charged with perjury and/or falsification. The petitioners also claimed that the
respondents had resold the property to Marcosa Bernabe on April 28, 1959.
On September 27, 1980, the respondents wrote in reply to the petitioners that they were the sole
owners of the disputed parcel of land and denied that the land was resold to Marcosa Bernabe.
True to petitioners' threat, they filed a falsification case against the respondents. However, on March
31, 1981, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Arsenio N. Mercado of Bulacan recommended dismissal of the
charge of falsification of public document against the respondents for lack of a prima facie case.
On March 26, 1981, petitioners filed a suit for reconveyance of the lot covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. P-1356(M).
On July 31, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision *** the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants:
1. To reconvey the property in question to the plaintiffs;
2. To pay plaintiffs P10,000.00 as litigation expenses;
3. To pay plaintiffs P5,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. To pay P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
1

In ruling in favor of the petitioners, the trial court admitted, over the objection of the respondents,
Exhibit A purporting to be a xeroxed copy of an alleged deed of sale executed on April 28, 1959 by
the respondents selling, transferring and conveying unto Marcosa Bernabe the disputed parcel of
land for and in consideration of P1,500.00.
Not contented with the decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that they
never sold back to Marcosa Bernabe the disputed parcel of land. Furthermore, respondents
contended that since the petitioners have failed to produce the original of the alleged deed of sale
dated April 28, 1959, the same was not the best evidence of the alleged sale hence it should have
been excluded and should not have been accorded any evidentiary value. On the other hand, the
petitioners claimed that the existence of the document of sale dated April 28, 1959 had been duly
established by the testimony of the notary public before whom it was acknowledged and by Luis de
Vera who was present during its execution and that the loss of the original document had been
proven by the testimony of the representatives of the offices of the National Archives and the
Provincial Assessor of Bulacan.
On November 29, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing the trial court's
decision. It found that the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale has not been duly proven by
the petitioners. Hence, secondary evidence, i.e., presentation of the xeroxed copy of the alleged
deed of sale is inadmissible.
Hence this petition.
The crux of this case is whether or not the petitioners have satisfactorily proven the loss of the
original deed of sale so as to allow the presentation of the xeroxed copy of the same.
We rule in the negative.
Section 4 of Rule 130 (now Section 5, Rule 130) of the Rules of Court on Secondary Evidence
states:
Sec. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. When the original
writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its
execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection
of witnesses.
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But
prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former
existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss;
contents although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. The
sufficiency of proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an alleged lost deed lies within the
judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case.
2

A reading of the decision of the trial court shows that it merely ruled on the existence and due
execution of the alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959. It failed to look into the facts and
circumstances surrounding the loss or destruction of the original copies of the alleged deed of sale.
In the case at bar, the existence of an alleged sale of a parcel of land was proved by the
presentation of a xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of absolute sale.
In establishing the execution of a document the same may be established by the person or persons
who executed it, by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or by any person who
was present and saw it executed or who, after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures; or
by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof.
3

We agree with the trial court's findings that petitioners have sufficiently established the due
execution of the alleged deed of sale through the testimony of the notary public to wit:
Preponderance of evidence clearly disclosed the facts that Atty. Ismael Estela
prepared Exhibit A. Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr. positively identified the signatures
appearing therein to be that (sic) of the spouses and witnesses Luis de Vera and
Ismael Estela, in his capacity as Notary Public who ratified the document.
4

After the due execution of the document has been established, it must next be proved that said
document has been lost or destroyed. The destruction of the instrument may be proved by any
person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by
any one who had made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places
where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody
the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation
which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost.
5

However, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for before using copies. For, since all the
duplicates or multiplicates are parts of the writing itself to be proved, no excuse for non-production of
the writing itself can be regarded as established until it appears that all of its parts are unavailable
(i.e. lost, retained by the opponent or by a third person or the like).
6

In the case at bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., notary public who notarized the document testified that
the alleged deed of sale has about four or five original copies.
7
Hence, all originals must be accounted
for before secondary evidence can be given of any one. This petitioners failed to do. Records show that
petitioners merely accounted for three out of four or five original copies.
In reversing the trial court, the respondent Court of Appeals considered the following points:
Asked on the witness stand where the original of the document (Exhibit A) was,
plaintiff-appellee Luis de Vera answered that it was with the Provincial Assessor in
Malolos, Bulacan, whereupon the appellees reserved its (sic) right to present it in
evidence (p. 11, tsn., August 11, 1981, Steno, Tecson). The same question
propounded to the same witness at the next hearing, he replied that in the early part
of 1976 his sister Maria borrowed from him the original document and a certified true
copy thereof and brought them to the Office of the Register of Deeds in Malolos "for
the purpose of having it registered;" and that when she returned she told him that the
original copy of the document was submitted to that office "and it (the property) was
transferred in the name of Marcosa Bernabe instead of Mariano Aguilar" (p. 8, tsn.,
December 10, 1981, Steno, Crisostomo; p. 9, tsn., Mar. 16, 1982, Steno, Vallarta).
Indeed, upon the appellees' own evidence the original of the deed of sale in
question, a purported xerox copy and certified true copy of which are marked as
Exhibits A and B, has not been lost or destroyed. It was submitted to the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Malolos for registration. The appellees, therefore, should have
asked the office to produce it in court and if it could not be produced for one reason
or another should have called the Register of Deeds or his representative to explain
why. That they failed to do. The loss or destruction of the original of the document in
question has not, therefore, been established. Hence, secondary evidence of it is
inadmissible . . . .
Neither did the testimony of notary public Ibasco, Jr. to the effect that he did not have
a copy of the deed of sale in question because his files were burned when his office
at Ronquillo Street, Manila was gutted by fire in 1971 and 1972 (p. 4, tsn., November
10, 1981, Steno, Crisostomo) establish the loss or destruction of the original
document in question. What was lost or destroyed in the custody of Atty. Ibasco, Jr.
was but one of the duplicate original copies on file with him. Nor did the testimony of
Hipolito Timoteo, representative of the Assessor's Office of Bulacan, to the effect that
he failed to see the deed of absolute sale annotated on the simple copy of tax
declaration No. 15412 (p. 7, tsn., Aug. 12, 1982, Steno, Vallarta) and of David
Montenegro, Jr. of the National Archives to the effect that his office had no copy of
the document in question because the notary public might not have submitted a copy
thereof; or that it was lost or destroyed during the transmittal; and that most of the
record before 1960 were destroyed by termites (pp. 8-12, tsn., Oct. 5, 1982, Steno,
Tecson), prove loss or destruction of the original and of all the duplicate original
copies of the document in question.
8

We find no cogent reason to rule otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 27, 1987 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.























THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 150905. September 23, 2003]
CITIBANK, N.A. MASTERCARD, petitioner, vs. EFREN S. TEODORO,
respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
Before secondary evidence may be admitted to prove the contents of original
documents, the offeror must prove the due execution and the subsequent loss or
unavailability of the original.
The Case
The Petition for Review
95[1]
before us assails the July 31, 2001 Decision
96[2]
and the
November 22, 2001 Resolution
97[3]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No.
62891. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED; and the
Decisions of the trial courts are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
98[4]

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner operates a credit card system through which it extends credit
accommodations to its cardholders for the purchase of goods and services from its
member establishments. The purchases are later on paid for by cardholders upon
receipt of the billings or statements of account from the company. Respondent Efren S.
Teodoro was one such cardholder. On December 14, 1990, he applied for membership
with petitioner. After his application was approved, he was issued Citibank, N.A.
Mastercard No. 5423-3920-4457-7009.
Under the terms and conditions governing the use of the Citibank credit card, the
cardholder undertakes to pay all the purchases made using the card within the period









indicated on the statement of account or within thirty (30) days from the date or dates of
its use. Charges that remain unpaid within the period fixed in the monthly statement of
account shall earn interest at the rate of 3.5 percent per month plus a penalty fee
equivalent to 5 percent of the amount due for every month or even a fraction of a
months delay.
Respondent made various purchases through his credit card. Accordingly, he was
billed by petitioner for those purchases, for which he tendered various payments.
Petitioner claims that as of January 20, 1995, the obligations of respondent stood at
P191,693.25, inclusive of interest and service charges. Several times it demanded
payment from him, but he refused to pay, claiming that the amount demanded did not
correspond to his actual obligations. His refusal prompted petitioner to file a Complaint
for collection on January 25, 1996 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-092 and raffled to Branch 133.
The RTC, in an Order dated April 23, 1996, dismissed the Complaint for lack of
jurisdiction over the amount involved. The case was then transferred to the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MTC) of Makati City, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 51586 and
raffled to Branch 66.
During the trial, petitioner presented several sales invoices or charge slips, which
added up to only P24,388.36. Although mere photocopies of the originals, the invoices
were marked in evidence as Exhibits F to F-4. Because all these copies appeared to
bear the signatures of respondent, the trial court deemed them sufficient proof of his
purchases with the use of the credit card. Accordingly, the MTC in its July 25, 2000
Decision
99[5]
ordered him to pay petitioner the amount of P24,388.36 plus interest and
penalty fee. The material portion of the Decision reads:
[Petitioner] is claiming that [respondent] made use of its credit card. And as of
January 20, 1995, [respondents] obligation to [petitioner] ballooned to the sum of
P191,693.25.
This is clear according to [petitioner] as shown by the Statement of Accounts.
To the mind of this Court, the Statement of Account alone will not prove that
[respondent] has an outstanding obligation to [petitioner] in the amount of P191,693.95.
This must be substantiated by the Sales Invoices which unearthed the purchases
made by [respondent] when he availed himself of the credit card of [petitioner].
While it is true that [petitioner] has offered the Sales Invoices (Exhibits F, F-1,
F-4) to show the purchases made by [respondent], it is equally true also that adding
all the amount in said invoices, the sum of P191,693.95 which according to [petitioner]
is the outstanding obligation of [respondent], is hardly met. [Petitioner] even admitted
that it could not produce all the invoices. Without the other Sales Invoices, there is a
cloud of doubt hovering over the claim of [petitioner] to [respondent].



In fact, summing up all the amount[s] indicated in the aforesaid Sales Invoices the
fact that the [respondent] has incurred to [petitioner] an obligation in the amount of
P24,388.36 as a result of the formers availment of the credit card of the latter.
It is elementary procedure that [petitioner] must prove [its] case with
preponderance of evidence. Without all the other Sales Invoices to uncover the
purchases made by [respondent] when he used the credit card of [petitioner], it is
undeniable x x x that [petitioner] is caught in the web of doubt with respect to the
accuracy of its claim to the [respondent].
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment as
follows:
1. Ordering [respondent] to pay [petitioner] P24,388.36 with an interest of 3.5%
and a penalty fee equivalent to another 5% of the amount due for every month due or a
fraction of a months delay starting February 21, 1995 until the entire obligation is fully
paid;
2. Ordering [respondent] to pay [petitioner] 25% of any and all amounts due and
payable as agreed attorneys fees plus cost of suit.
100[6]

Thereafter, respondent appealed the MTC judgment to the RTC of Makati City,
where the appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1051 and raffled to Branch 146. In
its October 30, 2000 Decision,
101[7]
the RTC affirmed the MTC Decision in toto.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The focal issue of the case according to the CA was whether the photocopies of the
sales invoices or charge slips, marked as Exhibits F to F-4, were competent proofs of
the obligations of respondent. These were the only evidence presented by petitioner
that could prove the actual amount of obligation he had incurred in favor of the former.
In reversing the trial courts, the CA ruled that this evidence was insufficient to prove any
liability on respondents part.
According to Sections 3 and 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, whenever the
subject of inquiry is the content of a document, its original must be produced, as it is the
best evidence to prove such content. Secondary evidence, like the subject photocopies,
is inadmissible. It will be admissible only if the offeror proves (a) any of the exceptions
enumerated in Section 3 and (b) the conditions for its admissibility set forth in Section 5
of Rule 130. For secondary evidence to be admissible, there must be satisfactory proof
of (1) the due execution of the original; (2) the originals loss, destruction or





unavailability that is not due to the offerors bad faith; and (3) reasonable diligence and
good faith in the search for or attempt to produce the original.
Although petitioner was able to prove the existence of the original sales invoices, it
failed to prove their due execution or to account for their loss or unavailability.
Hence, this Petition.
102[8]

Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
I. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting aside the
decision of the trial courts for insufficiency of evidence to support its findings.
II. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to prove
the due execution and the cause of the unavailability and non-production of the
charge slips marked in evidence as Exhibits F to F-4.
103[9]

In brief, the main issue boils down to whether the photocopies of the sales invoices
or charge slips marked during trial as Exhibits F to F-4 are admissible in evidence.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Admissibility of Photocopies
Petitioner contends that the testimony
104[10]
of its principal witness - Mark
Hernando, assistant manager of Citibank, N.A. Mastercard -- proves the following:
a) the existence or due execution of the original sales invoices which sufficiently







proved respondents liability of P24,388.36;
b) the loss or unavailability of the original sales invoices; and
c) petitioners reasonable diligence and good faith in the search for or attempt to
produce the originals.
It further argues that Hernando competently identified the signatures of respondent
on the sales invoices, having recognized them as identical to the signature on the
latters credit card application form.
On the other hand, respondent maintains that petitioner failed to prove the due
execution of the sales invoices. According to him, Hernando was not privy to such
execution and could not have properly or competently declared that the signatures on
the invoices and on the application form belonged to the former. The latter was not the
person before whom the application form was signed, executed or acknowledged; he
was not even present then. As to the sales invoices and respondents alleged
signatures thereon, he saw them only after the Complaint had been filed in court or long
after those invoices had been executed. He was therefore not competent to identify the
signatures.
Because Hernandez had not actually witnessed the execution of the sales invoices
and the application form, respondent concludes that petitioner failed to observe Section
5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides that the contents of the original may
be proven by the testimony of witnesses.
Finally, respondent contends that the alleged loss or unavailability of the original
sales invoices was not sufficiently established. Allegedly, Hernandez had requested the
originals from Equitable Credit Card Network, Inc., but failed to show in court that he
had followed up his request as advised by another witness, Zen Hipolito. Therefore, the
requirement of reasonable diligence and good faith in the search for or attempt to
produce the originals was not satisfied, because he had shown no proof of having
followed up the request.
The burden of proof rests upon petitioner, as plaintiff, to establish its case based on
a preponderance of evidence. It is well-settled that in civil cases, the party that alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it.
105[11]
Petitioner failed to prove that respondent had an
obligation in the principal amount of P24,388.36, because the photocopies of the
original sales invoices it had presented in court were inadmissible in evidence.
Moreover, had they been admissible, they would still have had little probative
value.
106[12]






The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence to prove the alleged
obligation. Photocopies thereof are mere secondary evidence. As such, they are
inadmissible because petitioner, as the offeror, failed to prove any of the exceptions
provided under Section 3
107[13]
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as well s the
conditions of their admissibility. Because of the inadmissibility of the photocopies in the
absence of the originals, respondents obligation was not established.
Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document
has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of
its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his
part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
Applying the above Rule to the present case, before a party is allowed to adduce
secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original sales invoices, the offeror must
prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and
destruction of the original or the reason for its nonproduction in court; and (3) on the
part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can
be attributed.
108[14]
The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss,
and contents. At the sound discretion of the court, this order may be changed if
necessary.
109[15]

In the present case, the existence of the original sales invoices was established by
the photocopies and the testimony of Hernandez. Petitioner, however, failed to prove
that the originals had been lost or could not be produced in court after reasonable
diligence and good faith in searching for them.
Indeed, the loss of the originals and reasonable diligence in the search for them
were conditions that were not met, because the sales invoices might have been found
by Equitable. Hernandez, testifying that he had requested the originals from Equitable,
failed to show that he had subsequently followed up the request.
110[16]










Finally, when more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them
have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence
can be given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without accounting for the other
originals.
111[17]

In Santos v. Santos
112[18]
the Court upheld the pronouncement of the CA that before
the appellees therein could be allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the
contents of the original, they had to prove -- with the requisite quantum of evidence --
the loss, the destruction or the unavailability of all original copies of the document.
In the present case, triplicates were produced, although the cardholder signed the
sales invoice only once.
113[19]
During the trial, Hernandez explained that an original copy
had gone to respondent, another to the merchant, and still another to petitioner.
114[20]

Each of these three copies is regarded as an original in accordance with Section 4
(b) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
115[21]
Petitioner failed to show that all three original
copies were unavailable, and that due diligence had been exercised in the search for
them.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

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