Emergence of legal decolonization in the mid-twentieth century is often understood through the lens of race. Transnational feminist contention that colonial racial order was also gendered. Colonialists rely on a paternalist masculinity to legitimate their rule. Anti-colonialists reply with a resistance masculinity.
Emergence of legal decolonization in the mid-twentieth century is often understood through the lens of race. Transnational feminist contention that colonial racial order was also gendered. Colonialists rely on a paternalist masculinity to legitimate their rule. Anti-colonialists reply with a resistance masculinity.
Emergence of legal decolonization in the mid-twentieth century is often understood through the lens of race. Transnational feminist contention that colonial racial order was also gendered. Colonialists rely on a paternalist masculinity to legitimate their rule. Anti-colonialists reply with a resistance masculinity.
Contending masculinities: the gendered (re) negotiation
of colonial hierarchy in the United Nations debates
on decolonization Vrushali Patil Published online: 11 November 2008 # Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2008 Abstract The emergence of legal decolonization in the mid-twentieth century, as evidenced by the 1960 United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, is often understood through the lens of race and the disruption of racial hierarchy. If we take seriously the transnational feminist contention that the colonial racial order was also gendered, however, how might this perspective shift our understanding of decolonization? In this article, I explore the debates on decolonization that take place in the UN General Assembly from 1946 1960 that lead to the 1960 Declaration from a transnational feminist perspective to answer this question. Specifically, I use comparative historical and discourse methods of analysis to explore how colonialists and anti-colonialists negotiate the onset of legal decolonization, focusing especially on how colonialist hierarchies of race, culture, and gender are addressed in these debates. I argue that, on the one hand, colonialists rely on a paternalist masculinity to legitimate their rule (i.e., our dependencies require our rule the way a child requires a father). In response, anti-colonialists reply with a resistance masculinity (i.e., colonialismis emasculating; decolonization is necessary for a return of masculine dignity). I argue that decolonization in the United Nations transpires via contentions among differentially racialized masculinities. Ultimately, a transnational feminist perspective that centers the intersection of race and gender offers a richer analysis than a perspective that examines race alone. Although the edifice of Europes colonial empires had already started to crumble some time before, the passage of the 1960 United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Declaration) can be seen as a crucial moment in the discursive delegitimation of colonialism on a global scale (Crawford 2002; Strang 1990: 851; Ziring et al. 1999:312). Indeed when the Charter for the United Nations was being drawn up after World War II, the all- powerful United States and its allies were keen to protect states rights, and anti- Theor Soc (2009) 38:195215 DOI 10.1007/s11186-008-9076-y V. Patil (*) Department of Sociology & Anthropology, Florida International University, University Park, DM 212, 11200 S.W. 8th St., Miami, FL 33199, USA e-mail: vrushali.patil@gmail.com colonialists goals of decolonization were thwarted (Lauren 1998). Anti-colonialists attempts to bring decolonization onto the United Nations agenda continued to be met by this prioritization of states rights for years to come. Nevertheless, when the Declaration finally came to a vote in 1960, no country voted against it; and the mere handful of opponents only abstained from voting. How are we to interpret this shift? Many scholars have rightly recognized decolonization as a decided if incomplete rupture with the white supremacist past (Winant 2001:134), and a number of scholars have also examined the Declaration itself from the perspective of race (Churchill 2003; Grovogui 1996; Obadele 1996). Nevertheless, this work is curiously silent on an important transnational feminist insight: that the multiply inflected hierarchies of the colonial era were not merely racialized but also gendered/sexualized and that indeed, race and gender/sexuality were thoroughly imbricated (see, for example, Burton 1994; McClintock 1995). By transnational feminism, I mean feminist literature on the relationship of particular gender ordersin their multiple configurations with various racial, sexual, class, national, and cultural ordersto historical processes of globalization (for a nice introduction, see Kim-Puri 2005; McClintock 1995). Whether the topic is imperial and colonial formations (Hall 2002; Stoler 1997) or neo-liberal restructuring (Grewal 2005; Salzinger 2004) or contemporary cultural movements (Gerami 2005; Kimmel 2003), transnational feminist work explores both how multiple gender orders inform particular transnational processes and how these orders are affected in turn. It makes connections among seemingly disparate gender orders, and it also demonstrates how arenas that seem to have little to do with gender may in fact benefit from gender analysis. If we take the transnational feminist argument on colonialism seriously, how might such a perspective shift our questions regarding the Declaration in particular and the discursive delegitimation of colonialism more generally? What might we learn from such an approach regarding gender relations in a transnational frame in the post-1960s period? Moreover the Declaration, beyond its location within the racialized and gendered/sexualized context of European colonialism, is a document almost entirely negotiated between (variously politically situated) men. That is, the great bulk of the representatives of the member states of the United Nations General Assembly, those who participated in the negotiation of and passage of the document, were men. I am particularly interested in the implications of this dimension of the discursive delegitimation of colonialism. In this article I employ a transnational feminist perspective, particularly recent work on masculinities in a transnational frame, to examine the debates on decolonization that took place in the United Nations General Assembly from 19461960 that lead to the passage of the Declaration. Furthermore, although the documents significance lies primarily in its discursive interventions, most scholars have focused either on institutional structure and politics (El-Ayouty 1971; Hovet 1960; Singh 1993) or international law (Araim 1976; Grovogui 1996; Obadele 1996). There has been some focus on discourse, particularly on ethical argument (Crawford 2002), moral claims-making (Reus-Smit 2001), and the discursive construction of subjectivity (Grovogui 1996). However, none of this work examines the interrelationships between race and gender/sexuality. In this study, I use narrative and rhetorical methods of analysis to explore the role of race and 196 Theor Soc (2009) 38:195215 gender/sexuality in these debates. I particularly explore how the largely male speakers, situated in various ways in relation to the colonial question, renegotiate notions of racial and cultural hierarchy, gender, and democracy and political independence in this key moment of transition to the postcolonial world. Thinking masculinities in a transnational frame Recent work on masculinities in a transnational frame has emerged from a number of (inter)disciplinary locations, including postcolonial feminism, feminist International Relations, and sociological work on globalization and masculinities. Key contrib- utors in this area are Connell and Messerschmidt (2005), who offer the concept of global hegemonic masculinity. They write that we may understand hegemonic masculinity as a normative masculinity defined in relation to femininity and a variety of subordinated masculinities, and one level on which we can observe such masculinity is the global arena (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005:842849). Considering such global hegemonic masculinity historically, a world-historical moment cited repeatedly as significant in both creating and relying on a certain kind of global hegemonic masculinity is European imperialism and colonialism (henceforth, colonialism) (Banerjee 2005:810; Connell 2000). Not only did colonialism rely on a series of gendered practices (Connell 2000; McClintock 1995; Stoler 1997), masculinity was a key dimension of this gendering. Scholars Banerjee, Connell, and Doty point to a set of overwhelmingly (racialized, sexualized, and classed) masculinist discourses, which constructed a certain global hegemonic masculinity through tropes such as the exploration, discovery, penetra- tion, and conquest of distant, feminized lands (McClintock 1995). This global hegemonic masculinity understood itself in relation to othered peoples, particularly groups of othered men, as insufficiently masculine (Nandy 1988; Sinha 1995), as hypermasculine (Fanon 1967; West 1993), and sometimes, as both (Hassan 2003; Hooper 2001:72). Such feminization and/or hypermasculinization could intersect with infantilization, as subordinated men were often understood as children that (progressive) colonial enthusiasts spoke of training and parenting (Colwill 1998; Nandy 1987; Nandy 1988). Moreover the United States, though distinct in a number of ways from European colonial empires, is nevertheless the inheritor of some of these masculinist discourses, including the hypermasculinization, feminization, and infantilization of subordinated peoples/men and the association of imperialism and colonialism with virility (Bederman 1995; Doty 1996; Gilmore 1996). Ultimately the racial and cultural hierarchies of colonialism were enabled in large part through the creation of a hierarchy of masculinities, the legacies of which are still with us today (for a recent discussion, see Banerjee 2005). Beyond European imperialism and colonialism, work on masculinities in a transnational frame has also explored how contemporary processes of globalization implicate gender in general and masculinity in particular. While akin to the aforementioned global hegemonic masculinity, a transnational business masculinity has been identified, scholars argue that contemporary transnational phenomena such as neo-liberal restructuring and womens movements present a challenge to long standing hegemonic masculinities (Connell 2005; Derne 2002; Kimmel 2003). Theor Soc (2009) 38:195215 197 According to Charlotte Hooper (2000), indeed, we may now understand globaliza- tion itself as a site for gendered interpretative struggles as the meaning of globalization is contested. In the process, different elements or ingredients of masculinity and femininity are coopted in new or old configurations to serve particular interests, and particular gendered (and other) identities are consolidated and legitimated or downgraded and devalued. This involves power struggles between men and women, but also between different groups of men as they jostle for position and control; articulating and re-articulating the relationship between masculinity and power as they go. (Hooper 2000:60) In this vein, foregrounding especially experiences of contemporary economic globalization, Michael Kimmel argues that what connects numerous extremist groups todayfrom white supremacists in the United States to Al Qaedais the experience of massive male displacement and downward mobility in the global economy. He argues that all deploy masculinity as a formof symbolic capital, an ideological resource to understand and explicate their plight [and thus all attempt to] re-establish and reassert domestic and public patriarchies (Kimmel 2003:605). While there does appear to be a predominant focus on the economy in this work on contemporary globalization, a smaller literature also focuses on the ongoing legacies of histories of racialization. For example, in contrast to Kimmels economist approach above, others point out that when it comes to groups like Al Qaeda, we cannot forget that Islamic fundamentalism is essentially a form of resistance to western imperialism and the repressive postcolonial governments that implemented failed projects of Eurocentric modernization (Hassan 2003:321). In fact, this fundamentalism is a solution to the problem of Muslim nations in the late 20 th century (Gerami 2005). Indeed, scholars that focus on the masculinity politics of historically racialized men in the contemporary global arena underscore the necessity of exploring the ongoing legacies of historical racialization. For example, regarding the aforementioned transnational business arena, Dorrine Kondo (1999) examines an ad campaign for a Japanese suit for men. She argues that the campaign constructs a notion of superior Japanese masculinity in the world economy that necessarily must grapple with histories of orientalization and emasculation. Interestingly, she argues that even as it attempts to combat such racialization, the campaign inadvertently reinscribes it instead. Indeed, the most compelling line of work here explores how the resistance politics of historically racialized men inevitably embody such contradictions. For example, Hodgson argues that during the colonial period, colonial interventions in Tanzania marginalized Maasai men by defining them as traditional. Over time, Maasai men themselves embraced such reifications and went on to critique other modern men (Hodgson 1999). Similarly, during the colonial period, British colonialists argued that Singapore lacked masculinized discipline, in order to legitimate its conquest. In the period after independence, the new nation used this same colonialist notion of masculinized discipline to produce the new nation (Holden 1998). Banerjee (2005) adds how even militant Hindu masculinity, which explicitly defines itself in opposition to a putative westernization, adapts colonialist notions of militarism. Again, these tensions are especially striking in the case of Japan. According to Low, in the late nineteenth century, the Japanese embarked on a programme of Westernisation that 198 Theor Soc (2009) 38:195215 can be interpreted as the Caucasianisation of the Japanese and the appropriation of Western ideas of masculinity (Low 2003:8182). Such self-conscious whitening- masculinizing was to serve to distinguish Japan from its Asian neighbors and show Europe that Japan was a world power worthy of respect (Low 2003). Consequently, studies of historically racialized men in contemporary globalization emphasize the ongoing significance of older histories of globalization, particularly European imperialism and colonialism. They point out that the negotiation of contemporary globalization processes is but the latest in a series of such negotiations that have taken place for centuries. As such, contemporary negotiations are potentially shaped by older negotiations, as the latter provide a repertoire of discursive frameworks and strategies within which to make sense of newer experiences. Collectively, the literature on masculinities in a transnational frame offers three central insights. First, masculinities in particular and gender in general must be explored within a transnational frame that takes account of historic transnational power relations such as colonialism and imperialism as well as more recent processes such as neo-liberal restructuring. Second, there are multiple masculinities that exist at multiple levels in shifting, intersecting hierarchies. Finally, power-laden transnational economic, political, and cultural processesto the extent that they are dominated by groups of menare better understood via a transnational feminist approach that centers masculinities. What might a focus on the General Assembly debates and on the declaration add to this literature? Firstly, they are particularly relevant to the discursive delegitimation of colonialism on a global scale. They occur within an international forum in the context of not just the delegates of other countries but also countless news media, and thus their audience goes beyond the immediate gathering and can be assumed to be universal (See Donahue and Prosser 1997). And yet, though the declaration is a major moment in the transnational resistance of historically subordinated peoples and men to colonialisma major moment when subordinate masculinities confront and contend with colonial masculinitiesthere is very little work that looks at the declaration from the perspective of contending masculinities. Moreover, given the two main foci in the literature delineated above, historical colonialism and contemporary globalization, an examination of the declaration provides a focus on a central point of transition and connection between them. Finally, though colonialism was certainly enacted differently in different times and places, transnational feminist scholars point out that it was a key moment in the transnational story of gender and race. And yet, though scholars have examined different instances of resistance to colonialism, including masculinist resistance, there seems to be very little that also frames these multiple resistances as part of that one transnational story. The declaration debates draw together different groups of subordinated menas well as the apologists of this subordinationinto one conversation. While the debates of course cannot give us unmediated knowledge on any of these questions, they are one window onto these negotiations. Data and method The main source of materials for analysis is the General Assembly Official Records for the years 19461960. These records are public documents and are available at Theor Soc (2009) 38:195215 199 the United Nations Information Centre of Washington, DC. The General Assembly is the main deliberative organ of the United Nations. It meets annually for regular sessions, as well as for special and emergency special sessions. Each session is organized as a general debate, in which Member States, represented by their diplomatic delegations, express their views on a wide range of matters of international concern. Included are required reports submitted by the Secretary- General, as well as by a number of other bodies. Because of the great number of questions that the General Assembly is called upon to consider, the General Assembly allocates most questions to its six Main Committees. Some questions are considered directly in plenary meetings, rather than in one of the Main Committees. All questions are voted on in plenary meetings, usually towards the end of the regular session, after the committees have completed their consideration of them and submitted draft resolutions to the plenary Assembly (UnitedNations 2003). The Official Records of the General Assembly consist of the meeting records, committee reports, and resolutions. The records of specific interest to me are the Verbatim Records, or the meeting records of the statements/speeches made and actions taken during General Assembly meetings. These include discussion of any submitted committee reports and draft resolutions, as well as votes on draft resolutions and explanations of particular votes. The Verbatim Records provide a full, first-person account of the proceedings of a meeting, and are particularly useful for discourse analysis. The Verbatim Records are published as bound volumes, one (or two) for each annual session. The front matter of each volume includes a Table of Contents with a listing of the agenda for that session, as well as what was discussed. I selected records for analysis by the subject headings that were listed on the agenda. Specifically, I chose anything that mentioned the terms: NSGT Territories, Trust Territories, and colonialism. (There were various indexes, which listed these records and what they contained, including an online index, a Journal of the General Assembly, an Index to Proceedings (formerly, Disposition of Agenda Items). However, I found that such indexes often left out material I was interested in and the most reliable method was to go through the Table of Contents of the actual records themselves). I fully recognize that such a strategy may leave out important debates on the problem of colonialism that are not captured by this terminology. However, I adopted this strategy as a way of reducing and managing information. As the agenda terminology guides the topic of discussion, I believe my focus on NSGTs, Trusts, and colonialism will sufficiently capture the material that I require for my purposes. Debates of interest on particular agenda items sometimes spanned several meetings. One meeting could also contain several debates of interest. Hence, there is no direct relationship between the number of debates examined and the number of meetings covered. In total, I examined the speeches/statements that transpired in almost 100 debates on Trusts, NSGTs, or colonialism, spanning 100 meetings over a 15-year period. The statements of diplomats within the General Assembly constitute a particular genre of discourse. This genre includes a series of monologues in which the head of each delegation takes a tour dhorizon of the current state of the worlds problems as seen in light of the policy of her or his government and 200 Theor Soc (2009) 38:195215 then takes a stance on the issue under consideration (Donahue and Prosser 1997). The strategy of inquiry here consists of a discourse analysis of these statements. Following Tischer, Meyer, Wodak, and Vetter (2000: 149), I first explore the debates as constitutive discourse. That is, they are simultaneously constitutive of different categories of identity (or identity distinctions), the relations among these categories of identity, and systems of knowledge and beliefs about these identities. To explore how the different arguments might constitute such alternative identity distinctions, relationships, and knowledges regarding colonialism and decoloniza- tion, I begin with the technique of analysis known as cluster-agon analysis. Cluster-agon analysis was initially formulated by Kenneth Burke (1973; 1984) in order to compare the worldviews and meaning systems of different speakers. Burke argues that every work produced by a rhetor contains a set of implicit equations, or associational clusters. The meanings that key symbols or terms (also known as god terms) have for the rhetor can be discovered by charting the symbols that cluster around those key symbols in the rhetorical artifact. In cluster-agon analysis, key symbols or terms are first identified by their frequency or intensity within a text. After the key terms/symbols have been identified, the words that cluster (i.e., appear in close proximity to the key term, or are joined by a conjunction to the key term, or are connected by a cause-and-effect relationship to the key term, and so on) around those key terms are charted. Next, any patterns that might appear within the clusters are charted. For example, is a particular word or symbol always associated with a key term? Next, one may perform an agon analysis, where opposing terms (also known as devil terms) are examined. Here, the goal is to discover what terms/symbols oppose or contradict the key terms/symbols. The final step is to use the pattern that emerges in the analysis to identify the speakers motive (Burke 1973; Burke 1984; Foss 1989). Cluster-agon analysis is particularly useful for comparing the rhetoric of several speakers (Berthold 1976). Through the comparison of different speakers key term clusters and opposing term clusters, one may compare structures of binary logic that undergrid and constitute varying meaning systems. In the case of this study, I use cluster-agon analysis to compare the meaning systems of not only different speakers but also different groups of speakers. Beyond this notion of constitutive discourse, the statements offered by different diplomats in the United Nations General Assembly may also be seen as persuasive discourse, aimed at justifying a speakers own stance on a draft resolution and also of convincing others to take on a similar stance. I follow Walter Fishers approach to persuasive communication that human beings are above all story-telling creatures, and that human communication is composed of competing stories/accounts on the world. From this perspective, a story/account is acceptable to an audience when constituted by good reasons and when it satisfies certain requirements of narrative probability and fidelity. Its central goal is identification with the audience, and it inevitably functions as a moral inducement. I am also interested in these debates as competing stories/accounts of the world. Ultimately, I am interested in the United Nations General Assembly debates as simultaneously constitutive and persuasive, as alternative visions of the meaning of colonialism and decolonization, which themselves presume and imply alternative stories regarding colonialism and decolonization. Theor Soc (2009) 38:195215 201 Analysis Although one might expect certain patterns of discourse based on political perspective, particular groups were not identified a priori. Rather, groupings of speakers (and the countries that they represented) that tended to make similar kinds of arguments, to base their arguments on similar kinds of appeals, and to support one another against others, were allowed to emerge from the data. In this fashion, two overarching groupings emerged: first, former and contemporary European colonialist powers, and second, former dependent, newly independent territories. The United States and a number of former dependent territories in the Americas (such as Argentina, Peru, and Columbia) tended to side with the first group. The Soviet Union, and its associated bloc of countries, along with a number of different former dependent territories in the Americas (such as Mexico and Guatemala), tended to side with the second. As the first group tended to prioritize the perspective of the colonialist powers, I term this group the colonialist view. As the second group did the same for former and contemporary dependent territories, I term this group the anti-colonialist view. I do not intend to imply unproblematically with these terms that the United States was somehow a colonialist power or that the Soviet Union was not a colonialist power. In what follows, I argue that while both perpetuated hierarchical constructions of space and identity, as did the European colonialist powers, the particular discourse of colonialism produced within the United Nations did not allow for a ready recognition of these practices as colonialist practices. Hence, although on occasion Soviet bloc countries especially targeted what they termed the colonialist practices of the United States and vice versa, both the United States and the Soviet Union were allowed to position themselves as outside the history of colonialism. While at times, it was recognized that the United States was indeed a colonialist power, it was nevertheless positioned as a good power compared to other bad powers. In what follows, I first perform cluster analyses of key terms within arguments offered by colonialists and anti-colonialists, exploring how these arguments offer different understandings of the meaning of colonialism and decolonization. I describe how particular key terms were identified, what associational clusters were found, and consider the competing stories/accounts of the world that are implied within these worldviews. I also offer representative quotations from different speakers to illustrate key differences among different groups. The colonialist narrative: paternalist masculinity as wise beneficence For colonialist argument, an initial examination of statements made indicates a series of interrelated key terms: political independence, freedom, autonomy and sovereignty, and so I began with a cluster analysis of these four terms. As language is inexact, I examined any discussions of these terms without requiring this precise language (as examples will demonstrate). The terms found to cluster around these key terms were: progress, advancement, development, evolution, higher civilization, and modernity. In the following statement on colonialism, for example, development and independence are placed 202 Theor Soc (2009) 38:195215 in a cause-and-effect relationship where (political) development is seen as a precondition for independence: We recognize that the colonial system is the best way of slowly guiding, by gentle but ever-lengthening steps, peoples of little political education so that they can develop their political sense and become independent nations able to take their places with us here and thus constitute a truly universal assembly of nations. (Mr. Sourdis, Colombia, Sess 2, 1947: 689) Likewise, in the following statement made by a colonialist speaker on the exclusive rights of administering authorities to determine the status of their territories, the terms self-government and development are positioned within a cause-and-effect relationship where development is seen as a precondition for obtaining self-government: Only the administering Power is left in the position to decide when a particular Territory under its administration has reached a stage of political development when it can be deemed to be self-governing. (Sir P. Spender, Australia, Sess 9, 1954: 301) For my purposes, I interpreted this discussion of self-government as a discussion of political independence in the sense I am interested in, and I included this discussion within the cluster analysis. Moreover, all six terms that clustered around the key terms seemed to define each other, as they repeatedly appeared in close proximity to each other, appeared in conjunction with each other, appeared in cause-and-effect relationship with each other, and functioned interchangeably within statements. In the following statement on the Danish administration of the dependent territory of Greenland, for example, the terms development and advancement are joined together by the conjunction and: United we will work for the further advancement and development of the Greenland community ... the new order will be a blessing and a benefit to the people of Greenland. (Mr. Lannung, Denmark, Sess 9, 1954: 307) Similarly, in this next statement, the terms advancement and progress seem to be defined in terms of each other: On principle, we sympathize with the advancement of the [dependent territories called] NSGTs and consider that their political, social, and economic progress should lead them to assume full responsibility for their own destinies, in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the Charter. (Mr. P. Perez, Venezuela, Sess 10, 1955: 461) After exploring this first cluster, I next performed a second cluster analysis concerning the key terms political dependence and lack of sovereignty. The terms that repeatedly clustered around these key terms were: native, primitive, backward, underdeveloped, incompetent, uneducated, lack of civilization, and simplistic civilization. The logic of this cluster seems inherent in the logic of the first cluster. That is, if development, advancement, progress, modernity, and so forth are prerequisites for political independence, it follows that the lack of these qualifying conditions is a justification for political dependence. Indeed, the most Theor Soc (2009) 38:195215 203 common argument made by colonialist powers and administering authorities to legitimate their rule over a dependent territory was the notion that they were in fact preparing and training their dependent territories, by virtue of imparting modernity, progress and so forth, for independence at some future date. In the following statement, for example, lack of education and preparation (which I interpret here as a synonym for competence) are associated with political dependence and so offered as the justification for political dependence by Brazil: We must encourage the political education of the peoples that were not yet ready for independence, and prepare the ground for them so that they might shape their own future and direct their own affairs. (Mr. De Oliveira, Brazil, Sess 12, 1957: 518) Ultimately, both clusters relied on each other for their meaning and significance within the debates. Considering the two in conjunction, colonialist discourse in the General Assembly debates conjoined the abstractions of progress, advancement, development, evolution, higher civilization, and modernity into a singular narrative of linear progression. Separately and together, these abstractions were quantified and placed on a linear scale. Countries that were higher or more advanced, with a quantitatively greater amount of the qualities listed therein, were associated with political independence. Countries situated as lower on the scale, or less advanced, and possessing quantitatively less of the qualities listed therein, were associated with political dependence. While differential placement of territories on this scale of linear progression helped to construct central identity distinctions such as independent territories versus dependent territories, an additional set of images and symbols helped to construct appropriate kinds of relationships between these categories of identity. Thus, a second set of terms clustered around the key terms political independence, freedom, autonomy and sovereignty and its associated imagery of linear progression: growth, maturity, responsibility (including responsibility for self), autonomy, and the ability to make decisions for self. How did this imagery facilitate certain kinds of relationships between those higher and those lower on the scale of linear progression? For starters, consider how the following speaker associates level of advancement on the scale of linear progression and responsibility: The struggle over backwards populations has passed from London to Washington, from Lisbon to Rio, Rome to Addis Ababa; but the situation always remains the same: a population of higher civilization, responsible for the well-being and advancement of peoples of another race. (Mr. Ryckmans, Belgium, Sess 2, 1947: 672) Hence, a higher level of advancement on the scale of linear progression meant not just the ability to be responsible for self, but also responsible for others. Meanwhile, a lower level on the scale implied an inability to be responsible for self. Through such imagery, political independence for dependent territories was envisioned as the end product of a naturalized, evolutionary process of tutelage under a more responsible state until one was determined capable of taking responsibility for self. This argument could of course also be used to justify the denial of political 204 Theor Soc (2009) 38:195215 independence, as in the following case where the United Kingdom explained its views on political independence in a general sense: Democracy is a growth. In the case of all the territories coming under our jurisdiction, we have been attempting, will continue to attempt, to provide all the assistance we can towards this growthand, as I have said, it is essentially a growth. With all our cooperation and all the help we can offer, time is needed to build tradition and, to create political and public responsibility and to create the social services which are the only sound foundation for political freedom. (Mr. McNeil, United Kingdom, Sess 2, 1947: 666) As in the two opposing clusters for linear progression, if this second set of terms of maturity, responsibility, and so forth clustered around the key terms of political independence, autonomy, freedom, and sovereignty, its binary opposites again clustered around the key terms political dependence and lack of sovereignty. Particularly evident were the terms/symbols immaturity, lack of responsibility (including responsibility for the self), dependency, wards, and children. In the following statement, for example, the speaker makes clear the connection between political dependence and child-like status: Those under the Trusteeship System are wards of the international community (Mr. Soward, Canada, Sess 11, 1956: 667). Hence, dependent territories were imaged here, above all, as children. The easy slippage between the naturalized condition of childhood and the status of political dependence is evident in their characterization throughout the 15 years examined as minors, wards, not yet able to stand alone in the modern world, unable to govern themselves, and not developed enough to have an opinion that counts. Lack of sovereignty was especially figured as a state of irresponsibility. Against this, the state of independence was characterized as the ability to have full responsibility for the self. In contrast, administering authorities were parents given the duty, the sacred duty, and the sacred trust of guiding dependent people, providing wise guidance, tutelage, political education, and teaching responsibility for self. Thus, in these debates, the overwhelmingly male colonialist speakers constructed distinct identities, relations between these identities, and knowledge about them with two primary sets of images. First, the image of linear progression provided an entire lexicon of quantified and linearized abstractions, including progress, advancement, development, modernity, evolution, and higher civilizationall terminology that has been identified as constituting a post-Enlightenment metanarrative (Harding 2000; Lyotard 1984). This metanarrative produced particular kinds of identities based on where territories were deemed to be located along the scale of linear progression, including backwards, primitive, and less evolved dependent territories versus advanced, modern, and civilized countries. Beyond this, hierarchical sets of relationships between these identities was constructed through a racialized, gendered paternalism that distinguished more childlike and incompetent dependent territories from wiser and more competent administering authorities. Such distinctions produced and indeed naturalized the paternalistic relationship of tutelage and guidance between them: We in the United Kingdom are proud of what we are doing in the colonial field. It is with great pride that we have been able to bring various members of the Theor Soc (2009) 38:195215 205 British Commonwealth and Empire along the road to full self-government. We feel the same pride that a parent feels when he sees his children going out into the world and making their own waywe have seen growing affection between ourselves and our children and we look forward to an extension of that process. We shall feel increasing pride as we see ourselves able to bring more and more of the dependent peoples who look up to us, along this road to self-government and independence. (Mr. Thomas, United Kingdom, Sess 1, 1946: 1271) In constructing these identity distinctions and the relationships between them, these two sets of images (re)produced the historic colonialist knowledge that while dependent peoples were children, the guidance of more responsible colonial powers could bring them into growth and maturity. This colonialist narrative persisted throughout the 15 years of debate. Thus, the male representatives of European colonial empires and their allies in the United Nations General Assembly debates articulated a certain kind of historic, colonialist masculinitya paternalist masculinitythat, within the context of mounting challenges from its recipients, stressed its benevolence, wisdom, and good intentions. But why is this a masculinist rhetoric and not simply a parental or even a maternal rhetoric? While there is no essentially masculine or feminine rhetoric and its substance may clearly shift across space and time, a rhetoric can be said to be masculin-ized (or femin-ized) if it connects with the production of masculine (or feminine) identities within a particular historical context. The above discussion of benevolent tutelage and guidance constitutes the reproduction of a paternalist masculinity, connected with the speakers identities as men, because of the history of paternalism within colonial rule. That is, as outlined above, European colonialism was primarily a masculinist affair (for more on this, see Colwill 1998; de Groot 2000; Hall 1999). Particularly from the Enlightenment period, it acquired a paternalist tenor that emphasized its benevolence toward dependent territories (McClintock 1995; Nandy 1987; Nandy 1988). As one scholar puts it, for example, Victorian ideals of manliness and gentlemanliness shaped colonial strategies of rule, as administrators conceived of themselves as fathers to childlike natives(Conklin 1999: 97). Thus, the arguments of colonial speakers in these debates reproduce a paternalist masculinity that historically constitutes a centerpiece of colonialist discourse. The anti-colonialist response: ambiguity, contradiction, and the reclaiming of masculinity To their historical experiences of colonialism and to its defense as articulated by colonialist speakers in the General Assembly, anti-colonialists launched a decided yet ambiguous challenge. As a recurring term in their statements was backward- ness, I began with a cluster analysis of the term that reveals that various anti- colonialists actually understood their designation as backward within the colonialist narrative in some very different ways from one another. In one response, what I term the colonialist anti-colonialist narrative, backwardness was tantamount to a lack of linearized abstractions such as development, advancement, progress, and evolution. In consequence, this narrative agreed that dependent territories must be 206 Theor Soc (2009) 38:195215 prepared for independence, and so must be developed, advanced, and helped to evolve. This colonialist, anti-colonialist narrative also appealed to both sets of images that the colonialist narrative deployed, those of linear progression and paternalism. For example, one speaker in the anti-colonialist camp proclaimed: The [United Nations] Charter, with the object of leading the backward peoples step by step towards the light and towards an evolution which will enable them to take their responsibility for their social and political destinies upon their shoulders [and] the Trusteeship System [are] more in keeping with our modern ideas, which require that the peoples of the world should rise from one stage of civilization to the next. (Mr. Vieux, Haiti, Sess 2, 1947: 611) This colonialist anti-colonial narrative was the most common anti-colonialist narrative throughout the 15 years examined. In contrast, while the second anti-colonialist narrative agreed that backwardness was indeed about lack of development, which was also connected to a lack of political independence, it made the critical distinction that this lack of advancement was actually not an inherent condition but caused by the exogenous factor of European colonialism: [The Colonial] Powers alleged among other things that the colonial peoples still lacked the necessary maturity to administer themselves. Those arguments show the complete hypocrisy and bad faith of these Powers. On the one hand the Colonial States actually keep the countries under their domination at an extremely low standard of living, exploit them ruthlessly and withhold from them, even the most elementary means of education. On the other hand, whenever it suits their convenience, they use as an argument a state of affairs which is merely the result of their own policy, in order to demonstrate that the conquered peoples would not be capable of self-government. (Mr. Winiewicz, Poland, Sess 10, 1955, p. 370371) Articulated in the early years to a limited extent by the Soviet bloc and its associated countries, towards the close of the fifties newly independent countries started joining in as well, making this the second most common anti-colonialist narrative. Together, these countries argued that colonialismis not civilization, that before colonialism, Africans were highly developed, that colonialism [itself] is bad for development, is indeed emasculating, and that there is a new kind of backwardness [that of] those who continue colonialism. From this perspective, the civilizing mission or white mans burden was seen as a guise and an excuse. One speaker argued: youve been claiming to train us for 350 years, and havent done so. Furthermore, because this discourse dissociated colonialism from development, this approach could deconstruct the notion of advancement or progress on a linear scale as the precondition for independence. This discourse thus inverted the relationship between progress on a linear scale and independence, arguing that progress did not so much lead to independence, but rather, that independence would lead to progress or develop- ment. With regard to the image of paternalist guidance, it argued that independence would lead to maturity, and that independence is the best way to mature the people. Overall, while this narrative accepted the identity distinctions of backwards versus advanced in the colonialist narrative, it rejected the purported relationship between Theor Soc (2009) 38:195215 207 these identities as well as the colonialist knowledge about them. In the process, it redefined the significance of those identity distinctions themselves. Against both of these perspectives, the third anti-colonialist narrative problem- atized the notion of backwardness as defined by the colonialist powers: Former colonial peoples and those who are still not independent have their own cultures, their own civilizations, their own traditions, their own languages and their own customs. They are not only proud of their heritage but they want to maintain it. They are determined to preserve it and to develop it in their own way [italics added] these activities can be carried out just as well, if not better, if the colonialists make an exit, and a quick exit now. (Mr. Asha, United Arab Republic, Sess 15, 1960: 1048) It necessarily, then, also rejected colonialist knowledge about these entities and ultimately, this discourse rejected each element of the colonialist discourse. While appearing throughout the fifteen-year time span and intensifying especially toward the end, relative to the other two, this argument was less common in the debates. Despite these variable understandings of the notion of backwardness, therefore, it is evident that most speakers actually accepted their colonialist designations as backward, underdeveloped, and so on. How, then, was the argument for changefor decolonizationarticulated? The debates reveal that this challenge was posed primarily on the gendered/sexualized terrain of nature, violation, and mascu- linity. Firstly, colonialism was challenged as against the rules of creation: [At the eve of World War II, colonialism was so extensive that] contrary to the rules of creation, the child was manifoldly bigger than its parents, indeed all the parents put together. (Mr. Shukairy, Saudi Arabia, Sess 15, 1960:101314) As an unnatural circumstance, it was understood as a violation, or a moral prostitution and a rape (Mr. Perera, Ceylon, Sess 15, 1960:1001)one that served, moreover, to emasculate already grown men: [Colonialism] is a system that takes the manhood out of those exposed to it. (Mr. Dosumu-Johnson, Liberia, Sess 15, 1960:1069) [The colonized] man, in whom all dignity has been blunted, is thus morally diminished. (Mr. Kaka, Niger, Sess 15, 1960:1125) Decolonization, from this perspective, was necessary for redressing this emascula- tion. One speaker described having freedomreturned after being colonized, for instance, as once again being master in ones own house (Mr. Thors, Iceland, Sess 15, 1960: 1147). Speaking of the decolonization process already underway, another argued that nearly a thousand million men have recovered their outraged dignity and freedom (Mr. Champassak, Laos, Sess 15, 1960:1108). Moreover, as the paternalistic relations of colonialism violated the rules of nature, anti-colonialists now sought to replace them with the more natural masculinist relations of brotherhood: [This moment is the] universal moment of truth. It is a moment between a past of inequality and a glorious future, in which all peoples of the world seem 208 Theor Soc (2009) 38:195215 resolved to re-establish human brotherhood, now won back at last, and to work together for their common happiness, on a footing of equality and the solidarity of free men. (Mr. Vakil, Iran, Sess 15, 1960:990) Our age is one of co-operation among free and equal peoples and men. More still, it is an age of human brotherhood, association and mutual assistance. (Mr. Ammoun, Lebanon, Sess 15, 1960:1162) [With this new Declaration, a new chapter is opened] one based on equality and the brotherhood of man. (Mr. Rossides, Cyprus, Sess 15, 1960:1281) Thus in anti-colonialist discourse, a transnational resistance masculinity defined both the experience of being colonized and the freedom being fought for, transforming the struggles of still-dependent peoples into the adult, masculine battles of our brethren in Africa, our Algerian brothers, our Congolese brothers, and our brothers in courage. And yet, the ambiguous positioning in relation to the notion of backwardness introduced certain tensions and contradictions into this politics of adult masculinity. While for some anti-colonialists, every territory was always already of age, for others, the once young territories had only now come of age and so only now deserved freedom. Describing his own country of India, one speaker transformed one of the oldest civilizations in existence into a young country, and the representative from Ghana described his country as at once ancient and reborn. This ambiguous relationship of many anti-colonialists to the imagery of birth, youth, growth, and adulthood, clearly emergent from the history of colonialist paternalism, is especially evident in the following speech: Every child, in his youth, inexperience and lack of initiative, lives under the wing of his parents. When he grows up, he leaves his parents home, goes out into the world and makes a home for himself far from those who reared him, because he feels free in his person and personality. Then should the colonized, ever submissive, have his freedom rationed by his colonizer? Not long ago we were being poisoned with the sugared venom of colonialism but we have outgrown the stage of servitude, we are no longer credulous children who can be made to believe in Santa Claus forever. Those days are over, and colonialism has been outstripped at every point. (Mr. Lheyet-Gaboka, Congo (Brazzaville), Sess 15, 1960: 1178) Here, the speaker moves between the image of a (male) child who grows up and obtains his freedom to the notion of a fleeting credulity or gullibility that is now decidedly gone. Such ambiguity made itself felt in an uneven critique that embraced and sought economic and technical development assistance even as it decon- structed political tutelage: Assistance and co-operation are indispensable for the progress of under- developed countries, [as] the gap separating them from the technically advanced countries can only be bridged if loyal cooperation is established within the framework of national independence for all countries, for the task of transforming and industrializing the economic structures of backward countries. (Mr. Ismal, Guinea, Sess 15, 1960: 1083) Theor Soc (2009) 38:195215 209 Thus, while paternalist tutelage in the political arena had been thoroughly critiqued, economic and technical assistance between brothers was deemed acceptable and even necessary: Real brotherhood [means that] the strong supports the weak; the wealthy helps the needy; the developed assists the under-developed; and when all such aids are made without conditions or strings attached. (Mr. RifaI, Jordan, Sess 15, 1960: 1057) Finally, such assistance was especially appropriate if provided by the machinery of the United Nations: Newly liberated countries will need such aid, whether economic or technical. None of these States will be able to do without it if it wants to develop economically and socially. In general, this urgent need of new States provides a good opportunity for competition between the different forces in the world, and particularly between the two [Cold War] blocks, each seeking to impose its influence therefore, the value of this aid would be enormously advanced if it were given through the United Nations. (Mr. Slim, Tunisia, Sess 15, 1960: 1045) Discussion What do these conversations tell us? At the simplest level, to the racialized, sexualized paternalist masculinity (re)produced by colonialists, anti-colonialists in the post-1945 United Nations General Assembly debates responded with a certain kind of resistance masculinity. The counter-politics of historically racialized men, this masculinity negotiated an in-between space premised on simultaneously accepting and rejecting key elements of the logic of its subordination. While, on the one hand, it overwhelmingly accepted its location as backward, underdevel- oped and so forth within the colonial narrative and sought assistance to rectify this situation, it also demanded the return of a masculinity denied. How did the shifting post-war global power structure condition this discourse? Both colonialist and anti-colonialist categories, as mentioned earlier, were blocks made up of discrete groups of countries, each with differing goals in the post-1945 world. The block that I termed colonialist was composed of former and contemporary European colonial powers, the United States, and a number of Latin American countries such as Argentina, Colombia, and Peru. Each of these had distinct reasons for their similar rhetorical and voting patterns. For example, this was a moment characterized by a decline in the hegemony of European colonial powers. Thus in these conversations, colonial powers like Britain and France were engaged in defending a world order quickly losing its legitimacy, and so they stressed especially a gentle, well-intentioned fatherhood (while at the same time, attempting to maintain power through new politico-economic structures such as the Commonwealth and French Union). This order, moreover, was being eclipsed by a new global-scale conflict and the rising power of especially the United States. On one level, the United States is harder to pin down than European colonial powers, with its professions of support for democracy and the anti-colonialist cause. Scholars 210 Theor Soc (2009) 38:195215 point out, however, that in the Cold War climate, an American cold warrior masculinity either sought to contain the threat of communism (Clark 2003) or worried that it was not masculine enough to do so (Cuordileone 2005; Dean 2001). U.S. professions of support for democracy and development for underdeveloped nations were made with such concerns in mind (Dean 2001; Grosfoguel 2003). Others add that any support anti-colonialists did get was also about reducing the power of European rivals (Kelly and Kaplan 2004). Regardless of such complexities, however, in rhetorical and voting patterns, the United States perpetuated the colonial narrative. Finally, many Latin American countries also aligned themselves with colonialist Europe and the United States, which should perhaps come as little surprise. The legacies of Spanish colonialism left a privileged elite, mainly white descendants of the European conquerors, later joined by immigrants from Europe, which preserved their power over mestizos, native Indians and descendants of African slaves (McWilliams and Piotrowski 2001:311312). There is no reason to assume the elites that represented these states felt any association with newly independent Asian and African countries. Indeed, countries like Argentina and Colombia contributed some of the most racist arguments to the colonialist narrative in the United Nations General Assembly debates. Additionally, despite growing resentment toward US power, the United States also dangled military and economic aid (McWilliams and Piotrowski 2001:313); and in international organizations the Latin American states were usually found supporting U.S. positions (Robertson 1997:37). Constituents of the anti-colonialist block, too, came together for varying reasons. The core of this block was newly independent Asian and African countries, which coalesced especially after the Bandung Conference (Hovet 1960:8788), and which continued to develop a sense of collective identity and purpose throughout the 1950s (Berger 2004; Legum 1958; Mortimer 1984). While the analysis above identifies two key anti-colonial narratives, with one emphasizing that underdevelopment leads to dependency and the other arguing that dependency leads to underdevelopment, I do not want to make too much of this distinction. Not only did individual speakers often vacillate between the two, both narratives agree on the fundamental condition of underdevelopment. The central element to focus on here is the acceptance of this dimension of the colonialist narrative. Additionally in the shadow of the aforementioned growing resentment to US power, Latin American states were split in the United Nations General Assembly, and so countries like Guatemala and Mexico also contributed to anti-colonialist rhetorical and voting patterns. In the 1960s, these states also started to produce whats been called dependency theory (Robertson 1997:175), which echoed especially the second anti-colonial narrative discussed above. Finally, these anti- colonialists were joined by the Soviet Union, which despite its own racialized identity (see especially chapters 2 and 3, Patil 2007), in its new contest with the United States sought to connect western colonialism with capitalism. In this, it was uniformly joined by the Soviet-bloc. In the context of the shifting political climate, and with a general orientation to development and any development assistance offered by their new superpower suitors on the part of newly independent countries (see also Gelvin 2002; Mason 1997), these countries especially targeted European powers. The problematic Theor Soc (2009) 38:195215 211 practices of both the United States and the Soviet Union were largely ignored. While there may have been some connection to the emerging position of non-alignment, newly independent Asian and African countries were acutely aware of the imperialist practices of the Soviet Union regarding its satellites and republics, as well as problematic relationships between the Unites States and its own dependencies like Puerto Rico. Indeed, both issues were debatedboth within the United Nations General Assembly meetings and without. Nevertheless, on all counts, newly independent Asian and African countries chose to focus on and target Europe (see especially chapters 2 and 3, Patil 2007). Ultimately, this shifting global power structure was central in shaping anti- colonialist discourse. While most anti-colonialist speakers critiqued the political dependence imposed by European colonialism, they failed to engage sufficiently the potentially problematic relationships with those that might now offer economic development and other kinds of assistance. In the case of the second anti-colonialist narrative, which argued that dependency leads to underdevelopment, perhaps the notion that development aid would come largely through the auspices of the United Nations mitigated this contradiction. Nevertheless, scholars continue to comment on this moment and its consequent complexities to this day. In the case of the third anti- colonialist narrative as expounded by the United Arab Republic, which in the United Nations General Assembly rejected the very notion of development itself in 1960, such nationalist radicalism (Mason 1997) was short-lived. The United Arab Republic came into existence in the late 1950s when, in the wake of the Suez War and Syrian fears of a US plot to compromise its sovereignty, the government in Syria decided to merge with a stronger Egypt (Mason 1997:169170). Both Syria and Egypt, however, had long had orientations to development (Gelvin 2002:8485). Their union fell apart only a few years later in 1961. Conclusion Ultimately, the negotiation of the 1960 Declaration sheds light on some important transnational feminist concerns. If in this moment of resistance to racial and cultural hierarchy, freedom is articulated as the reclaiming of a masculinity hitherto denied, what might be the implications for women, as well as for other masculinities? That this resistance emerges in the UN debates, moreover, points to its transnational dimension. Although I do not wish to argue that this resistance masculinity manifests in the same way in every postcolonial country, or that it manifests in the same way in 2008 as it did in 1960, this sort of resistance masculinity is also clearly still relevant today. It is evident from the insistence on an authentic masculinity that actually adapts colonialist notions of masculinity to definitions of the modern nation or culture that do the same (Banerjee 2005; Hodgson 1999; Holden 1998; Low 2003). Moreover, even more local studies point to the prevalence of this sort of resistance masculinity in the politics of racially marginalized men (see, for example, Archer and Yamashita 2003; Chen 1999; Messner 2000; Weis et al. 2002). Thus if we connect these instances of resistance masculinity as exhibiting a key transnational pattern of resistance today, we may see the United Nations debates as one significant, constitutive moment in the formation of this transnational pattern of 212 Theor Soc (2009) 38:195215 resistance. Moreover, it is a moment that provides a discursive framework that historically racialized men (and perhaps others) continue to draw from to make sense of their experiences today. Finally, although my analysis does not tackle this question directly, the debates also point to the complexity of this masculinity politics as it becomes intertwined with multiple negotiations of development and by implication, multiple approaches to state and nation-building. Thus, we need to pay better attention to how different negotiations of development implicate different definitions of masculinity (and femininity). Indeed, as development continues to be articulated and rearticulated by subjects previously excluded from the sites of its negotiation (womens movements, indigenous movements), we need more work exploring the interrela- tionships between these different negotiations of development and the formation of masculinities and femininities. References Araim, A. S. (1976). The legal aspects of decolonization in the United Nations. government and politics. New York: St Johns University. Archer, L., & Yamashita, H. (2003). Theorizing inner-city masculinities: race, Class, gender and education. Gender and Education, 15, 115132. Banerjee, S. (2005). Make me a man! masculinity, Hinduism and nationalism in India. Albany: State University of New York Press. Bederman, G. (1995). Theodore Roosevelt: Manhood, nation, and civilization. manliness and civilization pp. 170216. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Berger, M. T. (2004). After the third world? History, destiny and the fate of third worldism. Third World Quarterly, 25, 939. Berthold, C. A. (1976). Kenneth Burkes Cluster-Agon method: its development and an application. Central States Speech Journal, 27, 302309. Burke, K. (1973). The philosophy of literary form. Berkeley: University of California Press. Burke, K. (1984). Attitudes toward history. Berkeley: University of California Press. Burton, A. (1994). Burdens of history: British feminists, Indian Women, and imperial culture, 18651915. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Chen, A. (1999). Lives at the center of the periphery, lives at the periphery of the center: chinese American masculinities and bargaining with hegemony. Gender and Society, 13, 584607. Churchill, W. (2003). Perversions of justice: Indigenous Peoples and Angloamerican law. San Francisco, CA: City Lights Books. Clark, S. (2003). Cold warriors: Manliness on trial in the rhetoric of the west. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Colwill, E. (1998). Sex, savagery, and slavery in the shaping of the french body politic. In S. E. Melzer, & K. Norberg (Eds.), From the royal to the Republican Body: Incorporating the political in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century France (pp. 198223). Berkeley: University of California Press. Conklin, A., & Fletcher, I. (Eds.). (1999). European imperialism, 18301930: Climax and contradiction. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. Connell, R. W. (2005). Change among the gatekeepers: men, masculinities, and gender equality in the global arena. Signs, 30, 18011825. Connell, R. W., & Messerschmidt, J. W. (2005). Hegemonic masculinity: rethinking the concept. Gender and Society, 19, 829859. Connell, R. W. (2000). The Men and the Boys. St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin. Crawford, N. (2002). Argument and change in world politics: Ethics, decolonization, and humanitarian intervention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cuordileone, K. A. (2005). Manhood and american political culture in the cold war. New York: Routledge. Theor Soc (2009) 38:195215 213 de Groot, J. (2000). Sex and Race: The construction of language and image in the nineteenth century. In C. Hall (Ed.), Cultures of empire (pp. 3760). Manchester: Manchester University Press. Dean, R. D. (2001). Imperial brotherhood: Gender and the making of cold war foreign policy. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Derne, S. (2002). Globalization and the reconstitution of local gender arrangements. Men and Masculinities, 5, 144164. Donahue, R. T., & Prosser, M. H. (1997). Diplomatic discourse: International conflict at the United Nations: Addresses and analysis. London: Ablex Publishing Corporation. Doty, R. (1996). Imperial encounters: The politics of representation in North-South relations. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. El-Ayouty, Y. (1971). The United Nations and decolonization: The role of Afro-Asia. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. Fanon, F. (1967). Black skin, white masks. New York: Grove Press. Foss, S. K. (1989). Rhetorical criticism: Exploration and practice. Prospect Heights, Illinois: Waveland Inc. Gelvin, J. L. (2002). Developmentalism, revolution, and freedom in the Arab East: The cases of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. In R. H. Taylor (Ed.), The Idea of Freedom in Asia and Africa (pp. 6296). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Gerami, S. (2005). Islamist masculinity and muslim masculinities. In M. S. Kimmel, J. Hearn, & R. W. Connell (Eds.), Handbook of studies on Men and masculinities pp. 448457. London: Sage. Gilmore, G. E. (1996). Gender and Jim Crow: Women and the politics of white supremacy in North Carolina, 1896-1920. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Grewal, I. (2005). Transnational America: Race and Gender after 9/11. In Transnational America: Feminisms, Diasporas, Neoliberalisms (pp. 196220). Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Grosfoguel, R. (2003). Colonial subjects: Puerto Ricans in a global perspective. Berkeley: University of California Press. Grovogui, S. N. (1996). Sovereigns, quasi sovereigns, and Africans: Race and self-determination in international law. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Hall, C. (1999). An imperial Man in Australasia and the West Indies. In A. Conklin, & I. Fletcher (Eds.), European imperialism, 18301930: Climax and contradiction (pp. 100110). Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. Hall, C. (2002). Civilizing subjects: Metropole and colony in the English imagination, 18301867. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Harding, S. (2000). Gender, development and post-enlightenment philosophies of science. In U. Narayan, &S. Harding (Eds.), in Decentering the Center (pp. 240261). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Hassan, W. S. (2003). Gender (and) Imperialism: Structures of Masculinity in Tayeb Salihs Season of Migration to the North. Men and Masculinities 5. Hodgson, D. (1999). Once intrepid warriors: modernity and the production of maasai masculinities. Ethnology, 38, 121150. Holden, P. (1998). The significance of uselessness: resisting colonial masculinity in Philip Jeyaretnams Abrahams promise. Jouvert: A Journal of Postcolonial Studies 2. Hooper, C. (2000). Masculinities in transition: The Case of Globalisation. In M. Marchand, & A. S. Runyan (Eds.), Gender and Global Restructuring. Sightings, sites and resistances (pp. 5973). London: Routledge. Hooper, C. (2001). Manly states: Masculinities, international relations, and gender politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Hovet Jr., T. (1960). Bloc politics in the United Nations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kelly, J. D., & Kaplan, M. (2004). My ambition is much higher than independence.. In P. Duara (Ed.), Decolonization: Perspectives from now and then. New York: Routledge. Kim, H., & Puri, J. (2005). Conceptualizing gender-sexuality-state-nation. Gender and Society, 19, 137 159. Kimmel, M. (2003). Globalization and its Mal(e)contents: the gendered moral and political economy of terrorism. International Sociology, 18, 603620. Kondo, D. (1999). Fabricating masculinity: Gender, race and nation in a transnational frame. In C. Kaplan, N. Alarcon, & M. Moallem (Eds.), Between Woman and nation: Nationalisms, transnational feminisms, and the state (pp. 296319). Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Lauren, P. G. (1998). The evolution of international human rights. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 214 Theor Soc (2009) 38:195215 Legum, C. (1958). Bandung, Cairo and Accra: A report on the first conference of independent African States: The Africa Bureau. Low, M. (2003). The Emperors sons go to war: Competing masculinities in modern Japan. In K. Louie, & M. Low (Eds.), Asian masculinities: The meaning and practice of manhood in China and Japan (pp. 8199). London: RoutledgeCurzon. Lyotard, J.-F. (1984). The postmodern condition. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Mason, M. (1997). Development and disorder: A history of the third world since 1945. Hanover and London: University Press of New England. McClintock, A. (1995). Imperial leather: Race, gender and sexuality in the colonial conquest. New York: Routledge. McWilliams, W. C., & Piotrowski, H. (2001). The world since 1945: A history of international relations. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Messner, M. (2000). Politics of masculinities. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press. Mortimer, R. A. (1984). The third world coalition in international politics. Boulder and London: Westview. Nandy, A. (1987). Traditions, tyranny and Utopias. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Nandy, A. (1988). The intimate enemy: Loss and recovery of self under colonialism. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Obadele, I. A. (1996). The new international law regime and United States foreign policy. baton route. LA: Malcolm Generation, Inc. Patil, V. (2007). Negotiating decolonization in the United Nations: Politics of space, identity and international community. New York: Routledge. Reus-Smit, C. (2001). Human rights and the social construction of sovereignty. Review of International Studies, 27, 519538. Robertson, C. L. (1997). International politics since world war II: A short history. Armonk, NY: M.E.Sharpe. Salzinger, L. (2004). From gender as object to gender as verb: rethinking how global restructuring happens. Critical Sociology, 30, 4362. Singh, L. P. (1993). India and Afro-Asian independence: Liberation diplomacy in the United Nations. New Delhi: National Book Organization. Sinha, M. (1995). Colonial masculinity: The manly Englishman and the effeminate Bengali in the late nineteenth century. New Delhi, IN: Raj Press. Stoler, A. L. (1997). Making empire respectable: The politics of race and sexual morality in twentieth century colonial cultures. In A. McClintock, A. Mufgti, &E. Shohat (Eds.), Dangerous liasons: Gender, nation & postcolonial perspectives (pp. 344373). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Strang, D. (1990). From dependency to sovereignty: An event history analysis of decolonization 1870 1987. American Sociological Review, 55, 846860). Titscher, S., Meyer, M., Wodak, R., & Vetter, E. (2000). Two approaches to critical discourse analysis. In S. Titscher, M. Meyer, R. Wodak, & E. Vetter (Eds.), Methods of text and discourse analysis (pp. 144170). London: Sage. United Nations. (2003). United Nations documentation: Research guide. Department of public information (DPI), Dag Hammarskjld Library (DHL). Weis, L., Centrie, C., Valentin-Juarbe, J., & Fine, M. (2002). Puerto Rican men and the struggle for place in the United States: an exploration of cultural citizenship, gender, and violence. Men and Masculinities, 4, 286302. West, C. (1993). Race matters. Boston: Beacon. Winant, H. (2001). The world is a ghetto: Race and democracy since world war II. New York: Basic Books. Ziring, L., Riggs, R. E., & Plan, J. C. (1999). The United Nations: International organization and world politics: Wadsworth. Vrushali Patil is a sociologist. She holds a joint appointment with the Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies and the Womens Studies Center at Florida International University. Patil is the author of Negotiating Decolonization in the United Nations: Politics of Space, Identity and International Community (2008). She is currently working on an examination contemporary tourism promotion strategies within India from a postcolonial and feminist perspective. Theor Soc (2009) 38:195215 215
(Urban and Landscape Perspectives 15) Marco Mareggi (Auth.), Dietrich Henckel, Susanne Thomaier, Benjamin Könecke, Roberto Zedda, Stefano Stabilini (Eds.)-Space–Time Design of the Public City-Springer