DIGESTED CASES

in
Articles 147 and 148
of the Family Code of the Philippines



Property Regime of Unions without Marriage




1. Valdes v. RTC (260 SCRA 221)

2. Mallilin v. Castro (G.R. No. 136803, 16 June 2000)

3. Francisco v. Master Iron Works Construction Corp. (G.R. No.
151967, 16 February 2005)

4. Agapay v. Palang (276 SCRA 341)

5. Juaniza v. Jose (89 SCRA 306)

6. Tumlos v. Fernandez (G.R. No. 137650, 12 April 2000)




Prepared by:

JONA ADDATU-CAMBRI
LLB - 1





SUMMARY OF THE PROVISIONS ON ARTICLES 147 AND 148

Article 147

Article 148
Applicability

1. No legal impediment to marry;

2. Void marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Presence of legal impediment:

1. Adulterous relationships

2. Bigamous/polygamous marriages

3. Incestuous void marriages under Art
37

4. Void marriages by reason of public
policy (Art. 38)
Salaries & wages
Owned in equal shares Separately owned by the parties. If any is
married, his/her salary pertains to the
CPG of the legitimate marriage.
Property exclusively acquired
Belongs to party upon proof of
acquisition through exclusive funds
Belongs to such party
Property acquired by both through their work or industry
Governed by rules of co-ownership
Owned in common in proportion to their
respective contributions
Presumption
Property acquired while living together
presumed obtained by their joint efforts,
work or industry and owned by them in
equal shares.
If one party did not participate in
acquisition: presumed to have
contributed through care and
maintenance of family and household.
No presumption of joint acquisition.
Actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by
them in common proportion.
However, their contributions are
presumed equal, in the absence of proof
to the contrary
Forfeiture
When only one is in GF, share of party in
BF in the co-ownership be forfeited in
favor of:

1. their common children

2. innocent party in default of / waiver
by any/all common children, or by their
descendants
If one of the parties is validly married to
another, his/her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the ACP or
CPG existing in the marriage.
If the party who acted in BF is not validly
married to another or if both parties are
in BF, such share be forfeited in manner
provided in last par of Art. 147
Proof of actual contribution
Not necessary Necessary
MALLILIN JR. vs CASTILLO
G.R. No. 136803 June 16, 2000

EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR., petitioner, vs.
MA. ELVIRA CASTILLO, respondent.


FACTS:

Mallilin and Castillo cohabited together while their respective marriage still
subsisted. During their union, they set up Superfreight Customs Brokerage
Corporation. The business flourished and the couple acquired real and personal
properties which were registered solely in Castillo's name. Due to irreconcilable
differences, the couple separated. Mallilin filed a complaint for partition and/or
payment of Co-ownership share, accounting and damages against Castillo.
Castillo, in her answer, alleged that co-ownership could not exist between them
because according to Article 144 of the Civil Code, rules on co-ownership shall
govern the properties acquired by a man and a woman living together as
husband and wife but not married, they are not capacitated to marry each
other because of their valid subsisting marriage. She claimed to be the exclusive
owner of all real and personal properties involved in Mallilin's action of partition
on the ground that they were acquired entirely out of her own money and
registered solely in her name.

ISSUE:

Whether or not co-ownership exists between them.

RULING:

Yes. Co-ownership exists between Mallilin and Castillo even though they are
incapacitated to marry each other. Article 144 of the Civil Code does not cover
parties living in an adulterous relationship. Their property regime falls under Article
148 of the Family Code where co-ownership is limited, properties acquired by
them through their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal.














VALDEZ vs. RTC

260 SCRA 221

ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner, vs
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-
VALDEZ, respondents.


FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5
children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence,
marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological
incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother
while the other 3 siblings are free to choose whom they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage.
During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing
desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof,
the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto
jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.















FRANCISCO vs. MASTER IRON WORKS CONSTRUCTION CORP.

G.R. No. 151967, 16 February 2005

JOSEFINA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs.
MASTER IRON WORKS & CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.


FACTS:

Josefina Castillo, married to Eduardo Francisco, bought two parcels of residential
land and a house thereon. The Register of Deeds issued TCTs in the name of
Josefina Castillo Francisco married to Eduardo G. Francisco. Eduardo had
written an Affidavit of Waiver stating that before his marriage to Josefina, the
latter purchased two parcels of land, including the house constructed thereon,
with her own savings and that he was waiving whatever claims he had over the
property. The property was mortgaged to Leonila Cando with marital conformity
of Eduardo.

When Eduardo failed to pay for the 7,500 bags of cement worth P768,750.00 from
Master Iron Works, the court issued a writ of execution levying the two parcels of
land owned by Josefina. Before Josefina could commence presenting her
evidence against MIWCC, Josefina filed a petition to annul her marriage to
Eduardo on the ground that the latter had a subsisting marriage to one
Carmelita Carpio when the two were married. Said annulment was granted by
the RTC.

ISSUE:

WON the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina and Eduardo.

RULING:

The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property
with her personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she was
the sole owner. The Deed of Absolute Sale on record showed it was issued after
her marriage. Their case fall under Article 148 and since they got married before
the Family Code, the provision, pursuant to Art 256, can be applied retroactively
if it does not prejudice vested rights. Petitioner likewise failed that she had any
vested right.

Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that
invalidates such marriage, Art 148 should be applied. In the absence of proof
that the wife/husband has actually contributed money, property, or industry to
the properties acquired during such union the presumption of co-ownership will
not arise.

The petition was denied for lack of merit. The decision of CA that the property
was conjugal was affirmed.


AGAPAY vs. PALANG

276 SCRA 341
G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997

ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner, vs.
CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ, respondents.


FACTS:

Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left
to work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was
born in May 1950. The trial court found evident that as early as 1957, Miguel
attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he
refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone in a house in Pozzorubio
Pangasinan.

The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old
Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a
parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in
the same place was likewise purchased. On the other hand, Miguel and Carlina
executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement and agreed
to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child
Herminia.

Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979,
they were convicted of concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. 2 years later,
Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter instituted this case for recovery of
ownership and possession with damages against petitioner. They sought to get
back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly purchase
by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed the
complaint but CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor
of Erlinda Agapay.

RULING:

The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and
Erlinda. However, their marriage is void because of the subsisting marriage with
Carlina. Only the properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint
contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their respective
contributions. It is required that there be an actual contribution. If actual
contribution is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of
equal shares.

Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business of buy
and sell and had a sari-sari store. However, she failed to persuade the court that
she actually contributed money to buy the subjected riceland. When the land
was acquired, she was only around 20 years old compared to Miguel who was
already 64 years old and a pensioner of the US Government. Considering his
youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have contributed the P3,750 as her
share. Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the co-ownership with Miguel over
the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by CA, revert to the
conjugal partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.

It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their
conjugal property in favor of Herminia. Separation of property between spouses
during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or without
judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage
settlements. The judgment resulted from the compromise was not specifically for
separation of property and should not be so inferred.

With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who prepared the
deed of conveyance for the property revealed the falsehood of Erlindas claim
that she bought such property for P20,000 when she was 22 years old. The lawyer
testified that Miguel provided the money for the purchase price and directed
Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee.

The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which
was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of the law because it was
made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code, expressly provides that the
prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to donations
between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage,

for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out
to be better than those in legal union.






















JUANIZA vs. JOSE

89 SCRA 306
GR. No. L50127-28, March 30, 1979

VICTOR JUANIZA, Heirs of Josefa P. Leus etc., et al., plaintiffs and appellees,
vs.
EUGENIO JOSE, THE ECONOMIC INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and ROSALIA
ARROYO, defendants and appellants.


FACTS:

Eugenio Jose, a registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney
involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the PNR that took place
in November 1969 resulted in the 7 deaths and 5 physical injuries of its
passengers. That time, Eugenio was married to Socorro but had been cohabiting
with Rosalia Arroyo, defendant-appellant for 16 years as husband and wife. Trial
court decision rendered them jointly and severally liable to pay damages to the
heir of the deceased, Victor Juaniza. A motion was prayed for by Rosalia for the
decision to be reconsidered.

ISSUE:

WON Eugenio and Rosalia are co-owners of the jeepney.

RULING:

The co-ownership provided in Article 147 applied only when the parties are not
incapacitated to marry. Hence, the jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership
with the lawful wife. The common-law wife not being the registered owner
cannot be held liable for the damages caused by its operation. There is
therefore no basis for her liability in the damages arising from the death of and
physical injuries suffered by the passengers.















TUMLOS vs. FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. 137650, 12 April 2000

GUILLERMA TUMLOS, petitioner, vs.
SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ, respondents.


FACTS:

Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action for ejectment filed
against Guillerma, Gina and Toto Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez
alleged that they are the absolute owners of an apartment building that through
their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos to occupy the apartment for the last 7
years without payment of any rent. It was agreed that Guillerma will pay 1,600 a
month while the other defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month which was not
complied with. Demand was made several times for the defendants to vacate
the premises as they are in need of the property for the construction of a new
building.

Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma had an amorous
relationship and that they acquired the property in question as their love nest. It
was likewise alleged that they lived together in the said apartment building with
their 2 children for about 10 years and that Gullerma administered the property
by collecting rentals from the lessees until she discovered that Mario deceived
her as to the annulment of their marriage.

ISSUE:

WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said apartment under Article 148.

RULING:

SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-owners of the subject
property. The claim was not satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were
no other evidence presented to validate it except for the said affidavit. Even if
the allegations of having cohabited with Mario and that she bore him two
children were true, the claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario is
validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to
marry each other. The property relation governing their supposed cohabitation is
under Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual contribution is required by the said
provision in contrast to Art 147 which states that efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the
acquisitions of common property by one who has no salary, income, work or
industry. Such is not included in Art 148. If actual contribution is not proven then
there can be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.




ELNA MERCADO-FEHR vs. BRUNO FEHR
[G.R. No. 152716. October 23, 2003]

FACTS:

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity for inability to comply with the essential marital obligations under
Article 36 of the Family Code was filed by petitioner Elna Mercado-Fehr against
respondent Bruno Fehr before the RTC. The RTC declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent void ab initio and ordered the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership of property and in lieu thereof established a regime of
complete separation of property between the said spouses in accordance with
the pertinent provisions of the Family Code. As a consequence of which, an
order was issued declaring a condominium unit as the exclusive property of the
respondent considering that the same was purchased by respondent with his
exclusive funds prior to his marriage. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of said order alleging that the condominium unit was purchased on installment
basis at the time when petitioner and respondent were living exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules
on co-ownership should apply in accordance with Article 147 of the Family
Code. Resolving said motion, the RTC held that since the marriage between
petitioner and respondent was declared void ab initio, the rules on co-ownership
should apply in the liquidation and partition of the properties they owned in
common pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code. The court, however, noted
that the parties have already agreed in principle to divide the properties and/or
proceeds from the sale thereof proportionately among them and their children
as follows: 1/3 for petitioner, 1/3 for respondent and 1/3 for the children. It also
affirmed its previous ruling that the condominium unit was acquired prior to the
couple's cohabitation and therefore pertained solely to respondent. The CA
dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner for lack of merit. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUES:
1. Is the condominium unit an exclusive property of respondent?
2. Will Article 147 of the Family Code applying the rules on co-ownership apply?

RULINGS:

1. NO. It appears from the facts, as found by the RTC, after two years of long-
distance courtship, petitioner moved in with respondent in the latter's residence
in Metro Manila. Their relations bore fruit and their first child, Michael Bruno Fehr,
was born on December 3, 1983. The couple got married on March 14, 1985. Prior
to their marriage, they purchased on installment the condominium unit, as
evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983. Petitioner also signed the
contract as witness and upon completion of payment, the title to the
condominium unit was issued in the name of petitioner. In light of these facts, we
give more credence to petitioner's submission that the condominium unit was
acquired during the parties' cohabitation.

2. YES. Under Article 147 of the Family Code, the property regime of the parties
should be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void, as in the case at bar. This provision creates a co-ownership with
respect to the properties they acquire during their cohabitation.

Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be
capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is
void. All these elements are present in the case at bar. It has not been shown
that petitioner and respondent suffered any impediment to marry each other.
They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife when petitioner
moved in with respondent in his residence and were later united in marriage.
Their marriage, however, was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family
Code because of respondent's psychological incapacity to comply with
essential marital obligations.

There is nothing in the records that support the pronouncement of the trial court
that the parties have agreed to divide the properties into three 1/3 share each
to the petitioner, the respondent and their children. Petitioner, in fact, alleges in
her petition before this Court that the parties have agreed on a four-way division
of the properties 1/4 share each to the petitioner and the respondent, and 1/4
share each to their two children. Moreover, respondent's argument that the
three-way partition is in accordance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code
does not hold water as said provisions relate only to voidable marriages and
exceptionally to void marriages under Article 40 of the Family Code, i.e., the
declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior
void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void.























































































VALDES v. RTC

260 SCRA 221. July 31, 1996

ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-
VALDEZ, respondents.

Petition on a pure question of law

Facts:
1. Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971 and later
had 5 kids.
2. On June 22, 1992, Antonio sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage
pursuant to Art. 36 of the FC.
3. The RTC of Quezon City rendered judgment and declared the marriage null and
void under Art. 36 of the FC on the ground of their mutual psychological
incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations and ordered the
liquidation of their common properties as defined by Art. 147 of the FC and to
comply with the provisions of Art. 50, 51 and 52 of the FC
4. Consuelo sought a clarification of the order of the court and asserted that the FC
did not have provisions for the liquidation of common property in unions without
marriage
5. The court explained in an order dated May 5, 1995 that the property including
the family home acquired during their union are presumed to have been
obtained through joined efforts and the property would be owned by them in
equal shares and the liquidation and partition of property would be governed by
the regime of co-ownership
6. The court also explained that Art 102 does not apply since it refers to the
procedure for liquidation of conjugal partnership property. Art 129 also does not
apply because it refers to procedures for liquidation of the absolute community
of property
7. Antonio moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied.

Issues:
WON Art 147 is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at
bar
WON Art 147 applies to marriages declared null and void pursuant to Art. 36

Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the
trial court are AFFIRMED

Ratio:
1. In void marriages, the property relations of the parties during the cohabitation
period is governed by the provisions of Art. 147 or Art. 148
2. In the case at bar, Art. 147 applies because there was no legal impediment to
their marriage and they were capacitated wherein the word capacitated refers
to legal capacity of a party to contract marriage

Notes:
Potential conflict between Art. 129 and Art. 147
Trial courts decision
o The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdes and respondent Consuelo
Gomez-Valdes is hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to
comply with their essential marital obligations;
o The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela
Rosario shall choose which parent they would want to stay with.
o "Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their
mother, herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
o "The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children
who are in the custody of the other.
o The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the
liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the
Family Code, and to comply with the provisions ofArticles 50, 51 and 52 of
the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
Alleged Errors:
o "Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties
are psychological incapacitated.
o "Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family
Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a
marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by
reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.
o "Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared
void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse,
the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
o "It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children
wish to stay."