G.R. No.

167756 April 8, 2008

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
JERRY NAZARENO, appellant.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, R.T., J .:
IN this rape case, the Court is confronted with remedial questions on (a) specificity of dates in the
Information; (b) quantum of proof; and (c) concurrence of allegation and proof.
For Our final review is the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming with modification
appellant's conviction for rape of his two minor daughters.
The Facts
In line with Our ruling in People v. Cabalquinto,
2
the real names of the rape victims will not be
disclosed. We will instead use fictitious initials to represent them throughout the decision. The
personal circumstances of the victims or any other information tending to establish or compromise
their identities will likewise be withheld.
Private complainants AAA and BBB are the legitimate daughters of appellant Jerry Nazareno with
CCC. AAA was born on April 30, 1983.
2-a
BBB, the second child of the union, was born on June 24,
1984.
2-b
At that time, appellant and CCC were yet to wed. It was only in 1987 that the couple formally
tied the knot in simple church ceremonies. Three more children sprang from the marriage since
then.
3

Sometime in 1990, AAA was inside a room in their house located at Barangay Codon, Municipality of
San Andres, Province of Catanduanes. All of her siblings were playing in their yard. Unexpectedly,
appellant entered the room, and without saying a word, held AAA tightly. He then directed AAA to
crouch on the floor and raise her buttocks (baka-bakahan). While in that position, appellant removed
the girl's short pants and underwear. He then proceeded to remove his own undergarments.
Subsequently, appellant forcibly entered AAA from behind, inserting his penis into the girl's vagina.
She was seven.
4

Appellant threatened AAA not to reveal what happened to her to anyone; or else, she and the rest of
her family would be killed. Expectedly, AAA suffered in silence. She feared for her life as well as that
of her mother and siblings.
5

AAA's ordeal with her father became a regular fare. Appellant would rape her whenever they were
left alone in the house.
6
CCC was rarely home because she attended to farm work and accepted
laundry jobs from neighbors to support the family. Appellant was jobless and stayed at home.
7

On March 25, 1996, appellant again imposed his bestial urges on AAA. AAA distinctly remembered
the incident because she graduated from primary school on that day. At around 2:00 p.m., appellant
and AAA were left alone in the house. He told AAA to remove her shorts and panty. Appellant then
asked her to crouch on the floor and raise her buttocks. Just as he did before, appellant positioned
himself behind the girl and then inserted his penis into her vagina. All that time, appellant's hands
were clutching the girl's back.
8
Coincidentally, AAA's graduation from elementary school also marked
the end of appellant's sexual abuses.
BBB suffered the same fate as her older sister AAA. Sometime in January 1992, appellant and BBB
were left alone in their house. Suddenly, appellant told BBB to kneel on all fours (pig baka-baka).
9

Appellant then removed BBB's shorts and panties. He then removed his maong pants. Appellant
positioned himself at BBB's rear and then inserted his penis into the young girl's vagina. At the time
of the rape, BBB was only seven years old and was a Grade II pupil.
10

Appellant continued raping BBB, using the girl for his sexual gratification every other day. From
BBB's account, appellant would rape her fifteen times in a month. Every time, appellant would
threaten her that he would kill all of them should she tell anyone what was happening between
them.
11

On October 27, 1998, AAA and BBB found the courage to tell their mother CCC what appellant had
been doing to them. AAA accidentally found that BBB was likewise being subjected to sexual abuses
by their father. Gathering strength from one another, AAA and BBB tearfully recounted to their
mother their individual ordeals. CCC was devastated.
12

On December 6, 1998, appellant again attempted to force himself on BBB. He inserted his finger into
BBB's vagina. BBB felt extreme pain from the nails protruding from her father's fingers. That was the
last time appellant abused BBB.
13

On February 16, 1999, CCC, with AAA and BBB, secretly went to the Municipal Building of San
Andres, Catanduanes to file a complaint against appellant for the rape of AAA and BBB. AAA and
BBB were immediately attended to by personnel from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development. The two were later examined at the JMA District Hospital by Dr. Erlinda H. Arcilla.
CCC testified as to the age of the victims AAA and BBB at the time of the commission of the crimes.
She affirmed that AAA was born on April 30, 1983 while BBB was born on June 24, 1984.
14
CCC
narrated that she was shocked when she heard her two daughters complain that they were raped by
their own father. She knew appellant to be temperamental. He would hit AAA and BBB at the
slightest provocation. She failed to act immediately on her daughters' plight for fear of her husband.
CCC was convinced that appellant might make good his threats to kill all of them.
15

Dr. Arcilla narrated that she examined both AAA and BBB on February 16, 1999. During her
examination, she uncovered old healed hymenal lacerations on both AAA and BBB at the 3 o'clock,
6 o'clock and 9 o'clock positions. The lacerations suggested that the two girls were no longer in a
virgin state.
16

On March 17, 1999, appellant Jerry Nazareno was indicted for violation of Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 2638 for the rape of BBB. The information reads:
That sometime and between January 1992 up to December 06, 1998, in Barangay Codon,
Municipality of San Andres, Province of Catanduanes, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force, violence and
intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and repeatedly made sexual
intercourse with his daughter BBB at the age of 7 through 14 years old against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
17

On May 3, 1999, another Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 2650, for the rape of AAA, was
levelled against appellant. The indictment is worded thus:
That from sometime in January 1990 up to December 1998 in barangay Codon, municipality
of San Andres, Catanduanes, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said
accused, being the father of the complainant, did then and there willfully, feloniously and
criminally repeatedly had sexual intercourse with her daughter AAA, then five years old up to
the time when she was 15-years-old against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
18

The case for the People, which portrayed the foregoing facts, revolved around the combined
testimonies of AAA, BBB, CCC, and Dr. Erlinda Arcilla of the JMA District Hospital in San Andres,
Catanduanes.
The defense, anchored on denial, was summed up by the trial court in this wise:
The defense presented JERRY NAZARENO, the accused himself who testified that he is 34
years old, married, fisherman, a resident of Codon, San Andres, Catanduanes.
He denied having raped his daughters. He said that he sometimes beat his children because
he is strict with them in their studies especially during weekdays. He did not want them to
watch television during schooldays. Though he is strict, he could not molest the
complainants because they are his daughters. He said that the reason why his daughters
filed these cases against him was because his father-in-law wants him to be incarcerated for
the reason that from the very start, he was opposed to his marriage to CCC, his daughter.
He also said that in December 1998, the last molestation of BBB, he was in the motor launch
that plies the San Andres and Caramoran route.
19

RTC and CA Dispositions
On October 25, 2002, the trial court handed down a joint judgment of conviction, imposing upon
appellant the capital punishment of death in both cases. The fallo of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the prosecution having proved the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, he is sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH
for raping BBB in Criminal Case No. 2638 and the same penalty for raping AAA in Criminal
Case No. 2650 in accordance with Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
R.A. 7659.
The accused is further ordered to indemnify both complainants the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) each, to pay each of them the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages and the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.
20

Conformably with the pronouncement in People v. Mateo
21
providing for an intermediate review by
the CA of cases in which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the
Court issued a Resolution dated September 21, 2004,
22
transferring the case to the appellate court
for appropriate action and disposition.
On February 22, 2005, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC judgment, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as
defined and penalized under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Anti Rape
Law of 1997, with the aggravating circumstance of relationship and minority, the decision of
the court a quo sentencing him to death in both Criminal Cases Nos. 2638 and 2650 is
hereby AFFIRMED. The award of civil indemnity is MODIFIED and INCREASED
toP75,000.00 each, in both cases. The award of moral damages of P50,000.00 for each
case is AFFIRMED. We also award P25,000.00 as exemplary damages in each case.
Let the records of this case be transmitted to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
23

Issues
On September 27, 2005, the Court resolved to require the parties to submit their respective
supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within thirty (30) days from notice. In a manifestation dated
December 6, 2005, the Public Attorney's Office, representing appellant Jerry Nazareno, informed the
Court that it is adopting its main brief on record.
24
The Office of the Solicitor General, for the People,
similarly opted to dispense with the filing of a supplemental brief in its manifestation dated March 9,
2006.
25

Appellant stands by the same lone error he raised before the appellate court:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED (IN) NOT FINDING THAT THE INFORMATION(S) IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO[S]. 2638 AND 2650 ARE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION FOR ITS (SIC) FAILURE TO STATE THE PRECISE DATES
OF THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.
26
(Corrections and underscoring
supplied)
Our Ruling
In the main, appellant argues that the Informations charging him with the rape of AAA and BBB are
defective for failure to state with specificity the approximate date of the commission of the offenses.
According to him, the twin convictions have no basis in law because the People violated his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him.
The argument is specious. An information is intended to inform an accused of the accusations
against him in order that he could adequately prepare his defense. Verily, an accused cannot be
convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. Thus, to ensure
that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him is not violated, the information should state the name of the accused; the designation
given to the offense by the statute; a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time and date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense has been committed.
27
Further, it must
embody the essential elements of the crime charged by setting forth the facts and circumstances
that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused, so that he can properly prepare for
and undertake his defense.
28

However, it is not necessary for the information to allege the date and time of the commission of the
crime with exactitude unless time is an essential ingredient of the offense.
29
In People v.
Bugayong,
30
the Court held that when the time given in the information is not the essence of the
offense, the time need not be proven as alleged; and that the complaint will be sustained if the proof
shows that the offense was committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations and
before the commencement of the action.
In People v. Gianan,
31
the Court ruled that the time of the commission of rape is not an element of
the said crime as it is defined in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The gravamen of the crime
is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated therein, i.e.: (1) by using
force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3)
when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. In accordance with Rule 110, Section
11 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as long as it alleges that the offense was committed "at
any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed," an information is sufficient.
The doctrine was reiterated with greater firmness in People v. Salalima
32
and in People v. Lizada.
33

In the case under review, the information in Criminal Case No. 2638 alleged that the rape of BBB
transpired "sometime and between January 1992 up to December 6, 1998 in Barangay Codon,
Municipality of San Andres, Province of Catanduanes." In Criminal Case No. 2650, the information
averred that "from sometime in January 1990 up to December 1998 in Barangay Codon, Municipality
of San Andres, Province of Catanduanes," AAA was raped by appellant. To the mind of the Court,
the recitals in the informations sufficiently comply with the constitutional requirement that the
accused be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
In People v. Garcia,
34
the Court upheld a conviction for ten counts of rape based on an Information
which alleged that the accused committed multiple rapes "from November 1990 up to July 21, 1994."
In People v. Espejon,
35
the Court found the appellant liable for rape under an information charging
that he perpetrated the offense "sometime in the year 1982 and dates subsequent thereto" and
"sometime in the year 1995 and subsequent thereto."
Indeed, this Court has ruled that allegations that rapes were committed "before and until October 15,
1994,"
36
"sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter,"
37
and "on or about and sometime in
the year 1988"
38
constitute sufficient compliance with Rule 110, Section 11 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
More than that, the Court notes that the matter of particularity of the dates in the information is being
raised for the first time on appeal. The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that objections as to
matter of form or substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on
appeal.
39
Appellant failed to raise the issue of defective informations before the trial court. He could
have moved to quash the informations or at least for a bill of particulars. He did not. Clearly, he
slumbered on his rights and awakened too late.
Too, appellant did not object to the presentation of the evidence for the People contending that the
offenses were committed "sometime and between January 1992 up to December 6, 1998" for
Criminal Case No. 2632 and "sometime in January 1990, up to December 1998" in Criminal Case
No. 2650. On the contrary, appellant actively participated in the trial, offering denial and alibi as his
defenses. Simply put, he cannot now be heard to complain that he was unable to defend himself in
view of the vagueness of the recitals in the informations.
We now tackle appellant's convictions for the multiple rape of AAA and BBB.
In an effort to exculpate himself, appellant contends that the charges for rape are mere fabrications
and lies. He insists his daughters were instigated by his father-in-law to file the complaints.
According to appellant, his father-in-law has an axe to grind against him. His in-law disdained him
from the very beginning and wanted him out of CCC's life.
In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following jurisprudential guidelines: (a) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) due to the nature of the crime of rape in which only two
persons are usually involved, the testimony of complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution;
and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed
to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
40

Tersely put, the credibility of the offended party is crucial in determining the guilt of a person
accused of rape. By the very nature of this crime, it is usually only the victim who can testify as to its
occurrence. Thus, in rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony
of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things. Elsewise stated, the lone testimony of the offended party, if
credible, suffices to warrant a conviction for rape.
41

In her testimony before the trial court, AAA narrated:
Q Why, when were you particularly raped by your father?
A Since 1990, when I was in Grade I until I was in Grade VI, Sir.
Q When you were in Grade I, how old were you then?
A Seven (7) years old, Sir.
Q Can you remember the first time, you said your father raped you in 1990?
A I could no longer remember the date, Sir.
Q But how did your father rape you, do you remember how he raped you in 1990, the first
time?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Could you please tell us how he raped you for the first time?
A I was croaching with raised buttocks, Sir.
Q Do you remember where did he tell you to make that position?
A No, Sir.
Q Where particularly in your house?
A In our room, Sir.
Q Do you still remember the date, the first time he raped you?
A No, Sir.
Q Who were with you in your house during that time?
A No one, Sir, because all my other siblings are playing outside the house, and my mother
was at work.
Q When you were in that position with your buttocks raised and hands and knees on the
floor, what did your father do next?
A He positioned behind me and s[tar]ted raping me, Sir.
Q When you used the term "rape," what do you mean?
A He inserted his penis into my vagina, Sir.
Q You mean your father inserted his penis to your vagina?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Now after that first time, do you remember the second time that he did it to you?
A I could not remember anymore, Sir.
Q Do you remember how long the period was between the first and the second time he
raped you?
A I could not longer remember, Sir.
COURT
Fiscal, we are only trying here the rape that occurred on March 25, so if you can
prove to us really, maybe several times before that, the court cannot do something
about that, because it is not included in the information.
AYO
Q So when was the last time that your father raped you?
A When I graduated from the elementary school, Sir.
Q When was that?
A March 24, 1996, Sir.
Q Between the first time that your father raped you and the last time that your father raped
you, did you not report this to anybody, the thing that your father had been doing to you?
A I did not report this to anybody, Sir.
Q Why?
A Because I was threatened by my father that if we tell this matter to anybody, he would not
only kill me but the rest of us, Sir.
Q What other things did your father do when you said that he raped you, whenever your
father raped you, you said you have been raped by your father in the time that you are in
Grade I up to the time that you were in Grade VI, what did your father do to you?
CABRERA
The question is vague, because there is no definite date.
COURT
Recess for ten (10) minutes.
COURT
(After ten minutes) Court session resumed.
AYO
Q Do you remember the last time that your father raped you?
A March 25, 1996, Sir.
Q Where?
A In our house, Sir.
Q How old were you then?
A Thirteen (13) years old, Sir.
Q How did he rape you?
A I was croaching with raised buttocks, Sir.
Q And what did he do again when you are in that position?
A He told me to remove my shorts and my panty, Sir.
Q And did you do it?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Then what did he do next?
A He positioned behind me and he raped me, Sir.
Q In that position while he was raping you, where was (sic) his hands?
A His hands were on my back, Sir.
42

Upon the other hand, BBB testified thus:
AYO
Q Now, Miss witness, you said your first rape by your father in 1992, do you remember the
specific time when he first raped you?
A I could no longer recall the date, because that has been sometime already, Sir.
Q In 1992, were you already in school then?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What grade were you in when your father first raped you?
A Grade II, Sir.
Q Do you recall the circumstances when you were first raped by your father in 1992?
A I was made to lie on top of my father, Sir.
Q When you used the term "Pig baka-baka," will you please demonstrate to us how it is
done?
A (Witness demonstrating by kneeling and had her two hands on the floor, a position similar
to four-legged animal, and she stated that her father is at her rear portion).
Q And that was the first time your father raped with that position?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And what clothes were you wearing at that time when you were at that position, if you can
still remember?
A Yes, Sir, I can remember, I was wearing shorts.
Q How about your father, do you remember what clothes he was wearing in that position?
A He was wearing maong pants, Sir.
Q And what was your father doing aside from having that position?
A He removed my shorts and panty, Sir.
Q And after removing your shorts and panty, what did he do?
A My father inserted his penis in my vagina, Sir.
Q That was the first time you said he raped you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Do you remember the date again, the first time that he raped you?
A I could no longer remember the exact date, Sir.
Q You could only remember the month and the year?
A Yes, Sir, I could not remember the date, but I remember only the month and the year.
Q How about the second time, do you remember when he raped you, the second time?
A I could not, Sir.
43

On cross-examination, BBB stated that:
CABRERA
Q You said you were allegedly raped by your own father, sometime in 1992, will you tell us
what time is that alleged incident committed to you?
A About 2:00 p.m., Sir.
Q And who were the persons in the house, at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon?
A The two of us only, Sir.
Q Where were your companions in the home?
A By that time, my mother is working in the farm, my ate is in school, and the rest of my
siblings are playing outside, Sir.
Q What was your age then at the time you were allegedly raped?
A I was eight years old, Sir.
Q You were never forced to have that position of "baka-bakahan"?
A I was forced to do that, Sir.
Q You were only told in mild manner, correct?
A He kepts (sic) on telling me that I should do that position, although I don't like it, he kepts
(sic) on prodding me, Sir.
Q At that time your father was telling you on a very low voice, because you were near to the
children who are playing?
A They were playing, Sir.
Q Will you describe to us your house, what is the elevation of your house from the ground
floor?
A The flooring of our house is quite elevated. (Witness is demonstrating a height of about
one [1] foot).
Q Who were those children playing outside the house?
A My three (3) siblings are playing outside the house, Sir.
Q Your house has a window fronting the yard, correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And that yard was the playing ground of the children while your father was telling you that
position of "baka-bakahan"?
A They were playing in our yard, but they are playing near the house of our neighbor, Sir.
Q How far is the house of your neighbor to your house?
A (Witness demonstrating a distance of one two-arms length).
Q And those children could hear what your father is saying?
A They could not have heard what my father said, because they were playing, Sir.
Q Why, what kind of game they are playing?
A They were playing hide and seek, Sir.
Q What time did you eat your lunch?
A I took my lunch at 11:00 o'clock a.m., Sir.
Q Will you tell us what was the nature of your father's work at that time you were allegedly
raped?
A He is jobless, Sir.
Q Who is the one providing for your subsistence?
A My mother, Sir.
Q From where does your mother get your subsistence?
A She is doing some laundry works and works in the farm, Sir.
Q If your story is correct that you were allegedly raped, will you tell us what happened to your
vagina after the alleged rape?
A My vagina became painful, Sir.
Q Was there blood that oozed in your vagina?
A I do not know if there was blood, what I could feel was the pain, Sir.
Q After the alleged intercourse, did you wear your panty?
A Yes, Sir.
Q After the rape, what time did your mother arrive in your home?
A My mother arrived at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Sir.
Q Since you were still a child, if your story is correct, why did you not tell your mother that
you were allegedly raped at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon?
A I did not tell my mother because he threatened me, Sir.
Q Were you threatened before, during, or after the rape?
A Before I was raped, Sir.
Q And you were silent after the rape, he did not threaten you anymore?
A Yes, Sir, he threatened me again after he committed the rape.
Q Would you tell us the exact words, what did your father tell you?
A He told me that if you will tell anybody, I am going to kill all of you, Sir.
Q Was there any occasion on the part of your mother and you that you were alone without
the presence of your father, after the rape?
A There was none, Sir.
Q You mean your father was always in your house?
A There are times that he stays outside the house, he is jobless, he hangs around, Sir.
Q After you were allegedly raped, did you have any occasion in the evening to talk to your
mother immediately after this alleged rape?
A There are, but then I could not tell my mother, because I was afraid of my father, Sir.
Q But there was an occasion that you were together with your mother and you could have
told her what happened to you, is that correct?
A Yes, there were occasions and opportunities that I could tell my mother, but I could not
because of the threat of my father, Sir.
Q Was there any occasion that actually happened after that threat when you were harmed by
your father?
A Yes, Sir.
Q When was that?
A Right after that evening, I did not do anything wrong, he just punished us, because he is
not tempered, Sir.
Q Your father is not insane, he will not do anything to you without any reason?
A Yes, because every time he has no money, he becomes ill tempered, because he wanted
to gamble, Sir.
Q You are a young child then, is it not a fact that as a loving father he tried to discipline you,
because of your mischievous acts?
A We do not considered that a discipline, although we feel we did not do anything wrong, he
keeps on punishing us, because he is ill tempered, Sir.
Q Where was your mother when your father is trying to harm you?
A She is at work, Sir.
Q You mean he tried to harm you when your mother is out?
A When my mother is around, he punishes us every time we did something wrong, but then
he does that too when my mother is not around, Sir.
Q Do you tell that to your mother that your father punished you without any reason?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Will you tell us the date, the first you were abused by your father in the year 1992?
A I could no longer remember the date, Sir.
Q But you can recall the fifteen (15) times?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What is important to you is the fifteen (15) times, but the first rape is not important to you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q You said you were last raped on February 16, 1998, is that correct?
A No, Sir, December 16, 1998. February 16 was when we reported to the police.
Q This last incident, did you tell your mother about this?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And what did your mother say?
A My mother told us that we report the matter, but we told her that we could not manage to
do it, Sir.
Q How were you raped on December 6, 1998?
A He used his finger, Sir.
Q Was there any nail in the finger?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And how did you feel when your father used his finger?
A It is painful, Sir.
Q What he used is finger only?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Could it be possible that there was inside your vagina and your father is trying to remove
it?
A There is none, Sir.
44
(Underscoring supplied)
The trial court observed that AAA's and BBB's testimonies bear the hallmarks of truth. Their
testimonies are "spontaneous, convincing and highly-credible."
45
We find no cogent reason not to
apply here the oft-repeated rule that the matter of assigning values to the declaration of witnesses
on the stand is a matter best left to the discretion of the trial court. The trial court has the advantage
of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the
angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter
of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; or the furtive glance, the blush of
conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness,
the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath,
the carriage and mien.
46
This doctrine assumes greater significance when the determination of the
trial court on the credibility of a witness has been affirmed by the appellate court.
47

The Court has consistently ruled that no young girl would concoct a sordid tale of defloration at the
hands of her own father, undergo medical examination, then subject herself to the stigma and
embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive were other than a fervent desire to seek justice.
48
A
rape victim's testimony against her parent is entitled to great weight since Filipino children have a
natural reverence and respect for their elders. These values are so deeply ingrained in Filipino
families, and it is unthinkable for a daughter to brazenly concoct a story of rape if such were not
true.
49
Certainly, a rape victim or any other member of her family would not dare to publicly expose
the dishonor of the family, more specifically, if such accusation is against a fellow member of the
family, unless the crime was, in fact, committed.
50

We sustain the trial court and the CA's rejection of appellant's defense founded on denial and alibi.
Denial and alibi, being weak defenses, cannot overcome the positive testimonies of the offended
parties and their witnesses. As this Court has reiterated often enough, denial and alibi cannot prevail
over positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses.
51
The positive, consistent
and straightforward testimonies of the victims and the other witnesses for the People sufficiently
established appellant's culpability.
In order to merit credibility, alibi must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability. Verily, for
the said defense to prosper, accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the
time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity.
52
Appellant dismally failed to discharge this onus.
The trial court and the CA, however, both blundered in convicting appellant of multiple rape of AAA
and BBB, from January 1990 to December 1998 and from January 1992 up to December 6, 1998,
respectively.
The RTC and the CA convicted appellant of multiple rapes under two separate informations,
Criminal Cases Nos. 2638 and 2650. However, both the trial and appellate courts erroneously
sentenced him to a single death penalty for each information.
We find that appellant is guilty of two qualified rapes, instead of multiple rapes under Criminal Case
No. 2650, and only one qualified rape, not multiple, under Criminal Case No. 2638. The legal basis
for conviction for as many offenses as are charged and proved is Section 3, Rule 120 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
53

It is axiomatic that each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime. Verily, each of the
alleged incidents of rape charged should be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
54
In People v.
Matugas,
55
the Court aptly ruled:
This Court cannot thus sustain the conviction of accused-appellant for 29 counts of rape
because only two incidents were sufficiently proven by the prosecution. While we do not
doubt that she was raped on other dates, we cannot ascertain the exact number of times she
was actually raped. It must be remembered that each and every charge of rape is a separate
and distinct crime so that each of the 27 other alleged incidents of rape charged should be
proven beyond reasonable doubt. If, as complainant claimed, the number could be more, the
possibility that it could be much less than 27 cannot be discounted.
56

In People v. De la Torre,
57
the Court held that:
Each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime; hence, each of the eight
other rape charges should be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is required
to establish, by the necessary quantum of proof, the elements of rape for each charge. Baby
Jane's testimony on the first rape charge was explicit, detailing the participation of each
appellant in the offense and clearly illustrating all the elements of the offense of rape.
However her simple assertion that the subsequent rapes occurred in exactly the same
manner as in previous incidents is clearly inadequate and grossly insufficient to establish to a
degree of moral certainty the guilt of the appellants insofar as the eight rape charges are
concerned. Her testimony was too general as it failed to focus on material details as to how
each of the subsequent acts was committed. Even her testimony on cross-examination did
not add anything to support her accusations of subsequent rape. Thus, only the rape alleged
to have been committed on September 1992 was proven beyond reasonable doubt and the
appellants may be penalized only for this offense.
58

In the case under review, the evidence bear out that what were proved by the People beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 2650 were the rapes committed by appellant on AAA
sometime in 1990 and then again on March 25, 1996. AAA was categorical that she was first raped
by appellant sometime in 1990. Her account of the first rape was vivid, candid and straightforward.
She further disclosed that appellant repeatedly abused her. However, when asked by the court to
clarify her claim that the sexual abuses were repeated, AAA failed to supply the details. But she was
able to recount the last incident of rape on March 25, 1996. According to her, that day was of
significance to her since she graduated from primary school on that day.
59

Applying De la Torre, We hold that AAA's assertion that the subsequent rapes occurred in exactly
the same manner as in previous incidents is clearly inadequate and grossly insufficient to establish
to a degree of moral certainty the guilt of appellant insofar as the other rape incidents are concerned.
Her testimony was too general as it failed to focus on material details as to how each of the
subsequent acts was committed. In fine, appellant should have been convicted, in Criminal Case No.
2650, only of the qualified rape of AAA sometime in 1990 and then again on March 25, 1996.
With respect to private complainant BBB in Criminal Case No. 2638, what is extant from the records
is that appellant succeeded in raping her in January 1992. BBB, like AAA, failed to give an account
of the alleged rape subsequent to January 1992 when she testified in the court below.
60
As with AAA,
We hold that BBB's account of the rapes subsequent to January 1992 but before December 6, 1998
is too general and unconvincing.
Likewise borne by the records is the insertion of appellant's finger into BBB's vagina on December 6,
1998. BBB testified that appellant raped her for the last time on December 6, 1998. When asked by
the court to clarify what she meant, BBB disclosed that appellant inserted his finger into her vagina.
61

What appellant did was rape by sexual assault, punishable under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353. The said law provides:
Art. 266-A. Rape; when and how committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another
person.
62
(Underscoring supplied)
Rape by sexual assault was introduced into our penal system via the amendatory Anti-Rape Law of
1997 (R.A. No. 8353), which took effect on October 22, 1997. With these amendments, rape was
reclassified as a crime against person and not merely a crime against chastity.
63

Considering that the law was already in force at the time of the insertion of appellant's finger into
BBB's vagina on December 6, 1998, he should have been prosecuted and tried for rape by sexual
assault and not under the traditional definition of rape. The People, however, failed in this regard.
That is fatal.
Sections 8 and 9 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure state:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation
of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and
specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense,
reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances for the court to pronounce
judgment.
Under the new rules, the information or complaint must state the designation of the offense given by
the statute and specify its qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances. Otherwise stated, the
accused will not be convicted for the offense proved during the trial if it was not properly alleged in
the information. Although the rule took effect on December 1, 2000, the same may be applied
retroactively because it is a cardinal rule that rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive
application insofar as they benefit the accused.
64

In sum, in Criminal Case No. 2638, appellant should have been convicted only of the qualified rape
of BBB in January 1992. The rape by sexual assault committed on December 6, 1998, although
proven, should not have been considered by the trial and appellate courts for lack of a proper
allegation in the information.
We go now to the penalty and the award of damages.
Appellant is liable for the rape of AAA sometime in 1990 and on March 25, 1996. He is also guilty of
raping BBB in January 1992. At that time, the law penalizing rape was still Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The said law provides:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed.
x x x x
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
In view of the passage of R.A. No. 9346 entitled, "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty
in the Philippines," the death penalty should be downgraded. Pursuant to Section 2 of the said law,
the penalty to be meted out to appellant shall be reclusion perpetua. Said section reads:
Section 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature
of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
Notwithstanding the reduction of the penalty imposed on appellant, he is not eligible for parole
following Section 3 of the said law, which provides:
Section 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentences will be reduced toreclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for
parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended.
With regard to the award of damages, the same must be modified. The CA correctly increased the
amount of indemnity from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 each for AAA and BBB. Civil indemnity
of P75,000.00 is warranted if the crime is qualified by circumstances which warrant the imposition of
the death penalty.
65
The award of additional P25,000.00 each by way of exemplary damages
deserves affirmance due to the presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship.
66

However, the CA erred in affirming the RTC award of moral damages of P50,000.00 which should
be increased toP75,000.00 without need of pleading or proof of basis.
67

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION, as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 2650, appellant Jerry Nazareno is hereby found GUILTY of two counts of
qualified rape and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each felony, without eligibility for parole. He
is further ordered to indemnify the victim in the amount of P75,000.00, another P75,000.00 in moral
damages and P25,000.00 in exemplary damages, for each count.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 2638, appellant is found GUILTY of one count of qualified rape and is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. He is likewise ordered to pay the
complainant P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178300 March 17, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DOMINGO REYES y PAJE, ALVIN ARNALDO y AVENA and JOSELITO FLORES y
VICTORIO, Accused-Appellants.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
For review is the Decision,
1
dated 14 August 2006, and Resolution,
2
dated 18 October 2006, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02301 affirming with modifications the Decision,
3
dated 26
February 2002, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case
No. 1611-M-99 finding herein accused-appellants Domingo Reyes y Paje (Reyes), Alvin Arnaldo y
Avena (Arnaldo) and Joselito Flores y Victorio (Flores) guilty of the special complex crime of
kidnapping for ransom with homicide and imposing upon each of them the capital punishment of
death.
The facts culled from the records are as follows:
On 11 August 1999, an Information
4
was filed before the RTC charging appellants with the special
complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. The accusatory portion of the information
reads:
The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice hereby accuses Domingo Reyes y
Paje, Alvin Arnaldo y Avena and Joselito Flores y Victorio of the crime of kidnapping for ransom with
homicide defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
committed as follows:
That on or about 11:00 p.m. on July 16, 1999, at Sitio Lambakin, barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves
together with Juanito Pataray y Cayaban, Federico Pataray y Cabayan and Rommel Libarnes y
Acejo, who are still at large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force
and intimidation and with use of firearms, carry away and deprive Robert Yao, Yao San, Chua Ong
Ping Sim, Raymond Yao, Ronald Matthew Yao, Lennie Yao, Charlene Yao, Jona Abagatnan ang
Josephine Ortea against their will and consent on board their Mazda MVP van for the purpose of
extorting money in the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), that during the detention of
Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymong Yao, said accused with intent to kill, willfully and unlawfully
strangled Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao to death to the damage and prejudice of their heirs
in such amount as may be awarded to them by this Honorable Court.
During their arraignment,
5
appellants, assisted by a counsel de oficio, pleaded "Not guilty" to the
charge. Trial on the merits thereafter followed.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Jona Abagatnan (Abagatnan), Robert Yao (Robert), Yao
San, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Alex Alberto, PO3 Roberto Jabien, Atty. Florimond Rous (Atty. Rous)
and Atty. Carlo Uminga (Atty. Uminga). Their testimonies, taken together, attest to the following:
The Yao family is composed of Yao San (father), Chua Ong Ping Sim (mother), Robert and
Raymond (children), Lenny (daughter-in-law, wife of Robert), Matthew and Charlene (grandchildren),
and Jona Abagatnan and Josephine Ortea (housemaids). The Yao family owns and operates a
poultry farm in Barangay Santo Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
On 16 July 1999, at about 11:00 p.m., the Yao family, on board a Mazda MVP van, arrived at the
their poultry farm in Barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. Yao San alighted from the
van to open the gate of the farm. At this juncture, appellant Reyes and a certain Juanito Pataray
(Pataray) approached, poked their guns at Yao San, and dragged him inside the van. Appellant
Reyes and Pataray also boarded the van. Thereupon, appellants Arnaldo and Flores, with two male
companions, all armed with guns, arrived and immediately boarded the van. Appellant Flores took
the drivers seat and drove the van. Appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts then blindfolded
each member of the Yao family inside the van with packaging tape.
6

After about 30 minutes of traveling on the road, the van stopped. Per order of appellants and their
cohorts, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Jona Abagatnan (Abagatnan) stepped out of
the van with appellants Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one of their male companions.
7
Appellant
Flores, with the other male companion, drove the van with the remaining members of the Yao family
inside the vehicle.
8

Later, the van stopped again. Appellant Flores and his male companion told Yao San to produce the
amount of five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) as ransom in exchange for the release of Chua Ong
Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan. Thereafter, appellant Flores and his male companion
left the van and fled; while Yao San, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene and Josephine remained inside the
van. Upon sensing that the kidnappers had already left, Yao San drove the van towards the poultry
farm and sought the help of relatives.
9

Meanwhile, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan were taken on foot by appellants
Reyes and Arnaldo, Pataray and one male companion to a safe-house situated in the mountainous
part of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan where they spent the whole night.
10

On the morning of the following day, at around 4:00 a.m., appellants and their cohorts tried to
contact Yao San regarding the ransom demanded, but the latter could not be reached. Thus,
appellants instructed Abagatnan to look for Yao San in the poultry farm. Appellants Reyes and
Arnaldo and one male companion escorted Abagatnan in proceeding to the poultry farm. Upon
arriving therein, Abagatnan searched for Yao San, but the latter could not be found. Appellants
Reyes and Arnaldo told Abagatnan to remind Yao San about the ransom demanded. Thereafter,
appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their male companion left Abagatnan in the poultry farm and went
back to the safe-house.
11

In the safe-house, appellants told Robert that they would release him so he could help Abagatnan in
locating Yao San. Robert and appellants left the safe-house, and after 30 minutes of trekking,
appellants abandoned Robert. Robert then ran towards the poultry farm. Upon arriving at the poultry
farm, Robert found Yao San and informed him about the ransom demanded by the appellants.
Robert also told Yao San that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were still held by appellants and
their cohorts.
12

On 18 July 1999, appellants called Yao San through a cellular phone and demanded the ransom
of P5 million for Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Yao San acceded to appellants demand.
Appellants allowed Yao San to talk with Chua Ong Ping Sim.
13

On the morning of 19 July 1999, appellants again called Yao San via a cellular phone and
threatened to kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond because of newspaper and radio reports
regarding the incident. Yao San clarified to appellants that he did not report the incident to the police
and also pleaded with them to spare the life of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond. Appellants then
instructed Yao San to appear and bring with him the ransom of P5 million at 3:00 p.m. in the Usan
dumpsite, Litex Road, Fairview, Quezon City. Yao San arrived at the designated place of the pay-off
at 4:00 p.m., but none of the appellants or their cohorts showed up. Yao San waited for appellants
call, but none came. Thus, Yao San left.
14

On 23 July 1999, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were found at the La Mesa Dam,
Novaliches, Quezon City.
15
Both died of asphyxia by strangulation.
16

On 26 July 1999, appellant Arnaldo surrendered to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task
Force (PAOCTF) at Camp Crame, Quezon City. Thereupon, appellant Arnaldo, with the assistance
of Atty. Uminga, executed a written extra-judicial confession narrating his participation in the
incident. Appellant Arnaldo identified appellants Reyes and Flores, Pataray and a certain Tata and
Akey as his co-participants in the incident. Appellant Arnaldo also described the physical features of
his cohorts and revealed their whereabouts.
17

Subsequently, appellant Reyes was arrested in Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
Thereafter, appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were identified in a police line-up by Yao San, Robert and
Abagatnan as their kidnappers.
18

On 10 August 1999, agents of the PAOCTF arrested appellant Flores in Balayan, Batangas.
Afterwards, appellant Flores, with the assistance of Atty. Rous, executed a written extra-judicial
confession detailing his participation in the incident. Appellant Flores identified appellants Reyes and
Arnaldo, Pataray and a certain Tata and Akey as his co-participants in the incident. Appellant Flores
was subsequently identified in a police line-up by Yao San, Robert and Abagatnan as one of their
kidnappers.
19

The prosecution adduced documentary evidence to bolster the aforesaid allegations, to wit: (1)
Sinumpaang Salaysay of Abagatnan (Exhibit A);
20
(2) Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San (Exhibit B);
21
(3) sketch made by Abagatnan (Exhibit C);
22
(4) death
certificates of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond (Exhibits D & E);
23
(5) Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Robert (Exhibit F);
24
(6) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Yao San (Exhibit H);
25
(7) joint affidavit of Police
Senior Inspector Loreto P. Delelis and PO3 Roberto Jabien (Exhibit I);
26
(8) joint affidavit of PO3 Alex
Alberto and PO3 Leonito Fermin (Exhibit J);
27
(9) written extra-judicial confession of appellant Flores
(Exhibit K);
28
(10) written extra-judicial confession of appellant Arnaldo (Exhibit L);
29
and (11) sketch
made by appellant Arnaldo (Exhibit M).
30

For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of appellants, Marina Reyes, Irene Flores
Celestino, Wilfredo Celestino, Jr., Rachel C. Ramos, and Isidro Arnaldo. Appellants denied any
liability and interposed alibis and the defense of frame-up. Their testimonies, as corroborated by
their witnesses, are as follows:
Appellant Arnaldo testified that he was an "asset" of the PAOCTF. He narrated that on 25 July 1999,
while he was at the tricycle terminal of Brgy. Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, a police
officer named Liwanag of the PAOCTF approached and invited him to go to Camp Crame to shed
light on a kidnapping case allegedly committed by a certain Brgy. Captain Ramos and by members
of the Aguirre and Bautista families. He accepted the invitation. Subsequently, he proceeded to
Camp Crame and met therein Colonel Cesar Mancao III (Colonel Mancao) of the PAOCTF. Colonel
Mancao told him that the PAOCTF would arrest Brgy. Capt. Ramos and certain persons named
Gerry Bautista and Dadie Bautista. Colonel Mancao instructed him to identify said persons as
responsible for the kidnapping of the Yao family. He refused to do so because he feared Brgy. Capt.
Ramos. The day after, Colonel Mancao called appellant Arnaldo to his office. Upon arriving thereat,
the latter saw Yao San. Yao San promised him that if their kidnappers would be apprehended
through his cooperation, he would give him P500,000.00. He accepted Yao Sans offer under the
condition that he would identify a different set of suspects. Later, Colonel Mancao gave
him P30,000.00.
31

Subsequently, he pointed to appellants Reyes and Flores as his cohorts in kidnapping the Yao
family. He implicated appellants Reyes and Flores to get even with them, since the two had
previously mauled him after he sold their fighting cocks and failed to give them the proceeds of the
sale.
32

He denied having met with Atty. Uminga. He was not assisted by the latter when he was forced by
the PAOCTF to make a written extra-judicial confession on the kidnapping of the Yao family. Further,
he claimed that while he was under the custody of PAOCTF, a certain Major Paulino utilized him as
a drug pusher. Upon failing to remit the proceeds of the drug sale, he was beaten up by PAOCTF
agents and thereafter included as accused with appellants Reyes and Flores for the kidnapping of
the Yao family.
33

On the other hand, appellant Reyes testified that he slept in his house with his family from 6:00 p.m.
of 16 July 1999 until the morning of the next day; that on the early morning of 26 July 1999, five
policemen barged into his house and arrested him; that the policemen told him that he was a
suspect in the kidnapping of the Yao family; that he was mauled by the policemen outside his house;
that the policemen forcibly brought him to Camp Crame, where he was subsequently tortured; that
he knew the Yao family because he worked as a carpenter in the familys poultry farm at Brgy. Sto.
Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan; that he had no involvement in the kidnapping of the family; and
that appellant Arnaldo implicated him in the kidnapping of the family because appellant Arnaldo held
a grudge against him.
34

For his part, appellant Flores testified that he stayed in his sisters house at Antipolo City from 12
July 1999 up to 30 July 1999; that he went to her house on 12 July 1999 because it was the birthday
of her child; that he worked as a construction worker during his stay in his sisters house; that he was
arrested in Batangas and thereafter brought to Camp Crame, where he was beaten up by policemen
for refusing to admit involvement in the kidnapping of the Yao family; that after three days of beating,
he was forced to sign a document which he later found out to be a written extra-judicial confession;
that he never met nor did he know Atty. Rous; that he knew the Yao family because he lived near
the familys poultry farm, and he used to work therein as a welder; that he had no participation in the
kidnapping of the family; and that appellant Arnaldo implicated him in the kidnapping of the family
because he and appellant Reyes had mauled appellant Arnaldo several years ago.
35

The defense proffered documentary and object evidence to buttress their foregoing claims, to wit: (1)
prayer booklet of appellant Arnaldo (Exhibit 1 for appellant Arnaldo);
36
(2) calling card of Colonel
Mancao (Exhibit 2 for appellant Arnaldo);
37
and (3) pictures allegedly showing appellant Flores
working as a carpenter in Antipolo City (Exhibits 1 & 2 for appellant Flores).
38

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated 26 February 2002 convicting appellants of the special
complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer the
supreme penalty of death. Appellants were also ordered to pay jointly and severally the Yao
family P150,000.00 as civil indemnity, P500,000.00 as moral damages and the costs of the
proceedings. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding herein three (3) accused DOMINGO REYES y PAJE, ALVIN ARNALDO y
AVENA, and JOSELITO FLORES y VICTORIO guilty as principals beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH (DOUBLE) HOMICIDE as charged, they are hereby
sentenced each to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH as mandated by law, to jointly and
severally indemnify the heirs of deceased Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond Yao in the amount of
One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00), and all the private offended parties or victims,
including the heirs of the deceased, in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00)
as moral damages, subject to the corresponding filing fee as a first lien, and to pay the costs of the
proceedings.
39

By reason of the death penalty imposed on each of the appellants, the instant case was elevated to
us for automatic review. However, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,
40
we remanded the
instant case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition.
On 14 August 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming with modifications the
RTC Decision. The appellate court reduced the penalty imposed by the RTC on each of the
appellants from death penalty to reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole. It also
decreased the amount of civil indemnity from P150,000.00 to P100,000.00. Further, it directed
appellants to pay jointly and severally the Yao family P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. The fallo
of the Court of Appeals decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 12, dated February 26, 2002, in Criminal Case No. 1611-M-99 convicting accused-appellants
of the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom with (Double) Homicide, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS in that:
1) accused-appellants are instead sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
2) the award of civil indemnity ex delicto is hereby reduced to P100,000; and
3) accused-appellants are further ordered to pay private complainants the amount
of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
41

Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision but this was denied.
Hence, appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on 25 August 2006.
In their separate briefs,
42
appellants assigned the following errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING A CONSPIRACY BETWEEN APPELLANTS;
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL
CONFESSIONS OF APPELLANT ARNALDO AND APPELLANT FLORES;
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TOTALLY IGNORING THE CORROBORATED EVIDENCE OF THE
DEFENSE;
V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD PROVEN
APPELLANTS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
43

Anent the first assigned error, appellants assail the credibility of prosecution witnesses Abagatnan,
Robert and Yao San.
In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this Court is guided by the following
well-settled principles: (1) the reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the lower court, unless
there is a showing that the latter overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance that may affect the result of the case; (2) the findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality, as it had the
opportunity to examine their demeanor when they testified on the witness stand; and (3) a witness
who testifies in a clear, positive and convincing manner is a credible witness.
44

After carefully reviewing the evidence on record and applying the foregoing guidelines to this case,
we found no cogent reason to overturn the RTCs ruling finding the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses credible. Prosecution witnesses Abagatnan, Robert, and Yao San positively identified
appellants and their cohorts as their kidnappers during a police line-up and also during trial.
Abagatnan specifically testified during the trial that after appellants and their cohorts forcibly entered
the van where she and the Yao family were, appellant Flores drove the van away from the poultry
farm; that appellants Reyes and Arnaldo were among the kidnappers who guarded her, Robert,
Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond in the safe-house; and that appellants Reyes and Arnaldo
accompanied her in going to the poultry farm to search for Yao San and remind him about the
ransom demanded.
45
Robert confirmed that appellants and their cohorts blindfolded them inside the
van during the incident. He also recounted that appellants and their cohorts detained him and Chua
Ong Ping Sim, Raymond and Abagatnan in a safe-house. He was later instructed by appellants to
find Yao San and remind him about the ransom.
46
Yao San declared that during the incident,
appellant Reyes and Pataray approached him, poked their guns at him, and dragged him into the
van. Appellant Flores took the drivers seat and drove the van. Appellant Flores and his male
companion told him to produce P5 million as ransom money in exchange for the release of Chua
Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Abagatnan.
47

Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San testified in a clear and candid manner during the trial. Their
respective testimonies were consistent with one another. They were steadfast in recounting their
ordeal despite the grueling cross examination of the defense. Moreover, their testimonies were in
harmony with the documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of
Appeals found their testimonies credible and trustworthy. Both courts also found no ill motive for
Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San to testify against appellants.
Appellants, nonetheless, maintain that Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San could not have identified
their kidnappers, because (1) the incident occurred in the darkness of the night; (2) they were
blindfolded then; and (3) the heads of the kidnappers were covered by T-shirts.
It appears that the crime scene was well-lighted during the incident. At that time, there was a light
from a fluorescent bulb hanging above the gate of the poultry farm wherein Yao San was held at
gunpoint by appellant Reyes and Pataray.
48
The headlights of the van were also turned on, making it
possible for Abagatnan and Robert to see the faces of appellant Reyes and Pataray as the two
approached and poked their guns at Yao San.
49
Further, there was a bulb inside the van, which
turned on when the doors van was opened. This bulb lighted up when appellants and their cohorts
forcibly boarded the van, thus, allowing Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San to glance at the faces of
appellants and their cohorts.
50

Although the Yao family was blindfolded during the incident, it was, nevertheless, shown that it took
appellants and their cohorts about 10 minutes before all members of the Yao family were
blindfolded.
51
During this considerable length of time, Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San were able to
take a good look at the faces of appellants and their cohorts. In addition, Abagatnan and Robert
narrated that their respective blindfolds loosened several times, giving them the opportunity to have
a glimpse at the faces of appellants and their cohorts.
52

Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San testified that even though the heads of appellants and their cohorts
were covered by T-shirts, their faces were, nonetheless, exposed and uncovered, allowing them to
see their faces.
53
Robert and Yao San also declared that they recognized the faces of appellants
during the incident because the latter resided near the poultry farm of the Yao family, which used to
hire them several times in the farm as carpenters/welders.
54

Appellants, however, insist that the testimonies of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San that they were
able to recognize the kidnappers -- because although the kidnappers heads were covered with T-
shirts, their faces were nevertheless exposed or uncovered -- are incredible. Appellants argue that it
is against human nature and experience that kidnappers would cover only their heads and not their
faces in concealing their identities.
It is not illogical or against human nature for appellants and their cohorts to cover their heads with T-
shirts, while leaving their faces exposed and uncovered when they kidnapped the Yao family.
Perhaps, appellants and their cohorts thought that putting T-shirts on their heads without covering
their faces was sufficient to conceal their identities. Regardless of their reason, the fact remains that
Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San positively identified appellants as their kidnappers, and their said
identification and testimonies were found by the RTC, the Court of Appeals and by this Court to be
credible. In People v. Barredo,
55
the victim testified that he was able to identify the accused as his
assailants because the latter took off their masks during the assault. The accused argued that the
victims testimony was incredible because persons who wore masks would not take them off so
casually in the presence of their victims, as doing so would reveal their identities. The trial court,
nonetheless, ruled that the victims testimony was credible and truthful. We sustained such ruling of
the trial court and ratiocinated:
Appellants dispute the plausibility of Enrico Cebuhanos claim that he was able to identify the
assailants because they took off their masks. Persons who wear masks would not take them off so
casually in the presence of their victims, as doing so would thereby reveal their identities. x x x.
The above arguments are untenable. In his testimony, Enrico Cebuhano clearly stated that the men
who entered his home removed their masks when he was brought downstairs. Why they did so was
known only to them. It is possible that they thought that there was no one in the vicinity who could
identify them, or that they wanted Enrico to see who they were so as to intimidate him. It is also
possible that they felt secure because there were 14 of them who were all armed. In any event, what
is important is that the trial court found Enrico Cebuhanos testimony to be both credible and
believable, and that he was able to positively identify appellants herein, because the men who
entered his home removed their masks, x x x.
It is significant to note that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were brutally killed as a result of the
kidnapping. It is difficult to believe that Robert and Yao San would point to appellants and their
cohorts as their kidnappers if such were not true. A witness relationship to the victim of a crime
makes his testimony more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative interested in vindicating a
crime done to their family to accuse somebody other than the real culprit.
56
Relationship with a victim
of a crime would deter a witness from indiscriminately implicating anybody in the crime. His natural
and usual interest would be to identify the real malefactor and secure his conviction to obtain true
justice for the death of a relative.
57

Appellants put in issue the failure of Robert and Yao San to immediately report the incident and
identify appellants to authorities despite their common claim that they recognized appellants, as the
latter used to work in the poultry farm.
Robert and Yao San cannot be blamed for not immediately reporting the incident to the authorities.
Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were still held by appellants and their cohorts when the ransom
was demanded for their release. Appellants and their cohorts were armed and dangerous.
Appellants and their cohorts also threatened to kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond if Yao San
and Robert would report the incident to the authorities.
58
Understandably, Yao San and Robert were
extremely fearful for the safety of their loved ones, and this caused them to refrain from reporting the
incident. Robert and Yao San cannot also be blamed for not reporting the incident to the police even
after the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond had already been found, and appellants and
their cohorts had cut their communication with them. Certainly, the killings of Chua Ong Ping Sim
and Raymond had a chilling/paralyzing effect on Robert and Yao San. Also, appellants and their
cohorts were still at large then, and the possibility that they would harm the remaining members of
the Yao family was not remote, considering that appellants and their cohorts were familiar with the
whereabouts of the Yao family. At any rate, we have held that failure to immediately report the
kidnapping incident does not diminish the credibility of the witnesses.
59
The lapse of a considerable
length of time before a witness comes forward to reveal the identities of the perpetrators of the crime
does not taint the credibility of the witness and his testimony where such delay is satisfactorily
explained.
60

Apropos the second assigned error, appellants contend that the prosecution failed to prove that they
conspired in kidnapping the Yao family.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to
commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy presupposes unity of purpose and unity in the
execution of the unlawful objective among the accused.
61
When the accused by their acts aimed at
the same object, one performing one part and the other performing another part as to complete the
crime, with a view to the attainment of the same object, conspiracy exists.
62

As can be gleaned from the credible testimonies and sworn statements of Abagatnan, Robert and
Yao, appellant Reyes and Pataray
63
approached and poked their guns at Yao San, and thereafter
dragged the latter into the van. Appellant Flores then took the drivers seat and drove the van, while
each member of the Yao family was blindfolded by appellants Reyes and Arnaldo and their cohorts
inside the van. Thereafter, appellant Flores instructed Yao San to produce the amount of P5 million
as ransom money in exchange for the release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and
Abagatnan. Appellant Reyes and appellant Arnaldo were among the kidnappers who guarded
Abagatnan, Robert, Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond in the safe-house. They also accompanied
Abagatnan and Robert in going to the poultry farm to search for and remind Yao San about the
ransom demanded. Further, appellants Arnaldo and Flores narrated in their respective extra-judicial
confessions
64
how they planned and executed the kidnapping of the Yao family. Their extra-judicial
confessions also detailed the particular role/participation played by each of appellants and their
cohorts in the kidnapping of the family. Clearly, the foregoing individual acts of appellants and their
cohorts demonstrated their unity of purpose and design in kidnapping the Yao family for the purpose
of extorting ransom.
Appellants, however, challenge the legality and admissibility of the written extra-judicial confessions.
Appellant Reyes claims that his alleged participation in the kidnapping of the Yao family was based
solely on the written extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores. He maintains,
however, that said extra-judicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence, because they were
obtained in violation of his co-appellants constitutional right to have an independent counsel of their
own choice during custodial investigation. Appellant Reyes alleges that the agents of the PAOCTF
did not ask his co-appellants during the custodial investigation whether they had a lawyer of their
own choice, and whether they could afford to hire a lawyer; that the agents of the PAOCTF
suggested the availability of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous to his co-appellants; and that Atty. Uminga
and Atty. Rous were associates of the PAOCTF. Appellant Reyes also asseverates that the extra-
judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores cannot be utilized against him.
Appellant Flores argues that his written extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence,
because it was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to have an independent counsel of his
own choice during custodial investigation. He insists that his written extra-judicial confession was
elicited through force, torture and without the assistance of a lawyer. He avers that he was not
assisted by any lawyer from the time he was arrested until he was coerced to sign the purported
confession; that he was forced to sign it because he could not anymore endure the beatings he
suffered at the hands of the PAOCTF agents; and that he never met or knew Atty. Rous who,
according to the PAOCTF, had assisted him during the custodial investigation.
Appellant Arnaldo contends that his written extra-judicial confession should be excluded as
evidence, as it was procured in violation of his constitutional right to have an independent counsel of
his own choice during custodial investigation. He claims that he was not given freedom to choose his
counsel; that the agents of the PAOCTF did not ask him during the custodial investigation whether
he had a lawyer of his own choice, and whether he could afford to hire a lawyer; and that the agents
of the PAOCTF suggested the availability of Atty. Uminga to him.
An extra-judicial confession is a declaration made voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement
by a person under custodial investigation, stating or acknowledging that he had committed or
participated in the commission of a crime.
65
In order that an extra-judicial confession may be
admitted in evidence, Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the following
safeguards be observed
66
:
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.1awphi.zw+
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall
be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other forms of detention
are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
Thus, we have held that an extra-judicial confession is admissible in evidence if the following
requisites have been satisfied: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
67

The mantle of protection afforded by the above-quoted constitutional provision covers the period
from the time a person is taken into custody for the investigation of his possible participation in the
commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the
offense although not yet in custody.
68

The right of an accused to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of
an abstract constitutional principle.
69
Such right contemplates effective communication which results
in the subject understanding what is conveyed.
70

The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as
would lead the accused to admit something false.
71
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of
the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or
confessions or admissions from the accused.
72
The lawyer called to be present during such
investigation should be, as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the accused. If the lawyer is one
furnished in behalf of accused, he should be competent and independent; that is, he must be willing
to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused.
73
A competent and independent counsel is
logically required to be present and able to advice and assist his client from the time the latter
answers the first question asked by the investigator until the signing of the confession. Moreover, the
lawyer should ascertain that the confession was made voluntarily, and that the person under
investigation fully understood the nature and the consequence of his extra-judicial confession vis-a-
vis his constitutional rights.
74

However, the foregoing rule is not intended to deter to the accused from confessing guilt if he
voluntarily and intelligently so desires, but to protect him from admitting what he is being coerced to
admit although untrue. To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions
being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from
saying anything which might incriminate him; but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to
preclude the slightest coercion on the accused to admit something false. The counsel should never
prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
75

We have gone over the records and found that the PAOCTF investigators have duly apprised
appellants Arnaldo and Flores of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel of their own choice during their respective custodial investigations.
The Pasubali
76
of appellants Arnaldo and Floress written extra-judicial confessions clearly shows
that before they made their respective confessions, the PAOCTF investigators had informed them
that the interrogation about to be conducted on them referred to the kidnapping of the Yao family.
Thereafter, the PAOCTF agents explained to them that they had a constitutional right to remain
silent, and that anything they would say may be used against them in a court of law. They were also
told that they were entitled to a counsel of their own choice, and that they would be provided with
one if they had none. When asked if they had a lawyer of their own, appellant Arnaldo replied that he
would be assisted by Atty. Uminga, while appellant Flores agreed to be represented by Atty. Rous.
Thereafter, when asked if they understood their said rights, they replied in the affirmative. The
appraisal of their constitutional rights was done in the presence of their respective lawyers and in the
Tagalog dialect, the language spoken and understood by them. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores and
their respective counsels, Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous, also signed and thumbmarked the extra-
judicial confessions. Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous attested to the veracity of the afore-cited facts in
their respective court testimonies.
77
Indeed, the appraisal of appellants constitutional rights was not
merely perfunctory, because it appeared certain that appellants had understood and, in fact,
exercised their fundamental rights after being informed thereof.
Records reflect that appellants Arnaldo and Reyes were likewise accorded their right to competent
and independent counsel during their respective custodial investigations.
As regards appellant Arnaldo, Atty. Uminga testified that prior to the questioning of appellant Arnaldo
about the incident, Atty. Uminga told the PAOCTF investigators and agents to give him and
appellant Arnaldo space and privacy, so that they could freely converse. After the PAOCTF
investigators and agents left them, he and appellant Arnaldo went to a cubicle where only the two of
them were present. He interviewed appellant Arnaldo in the Tagalog language regarding the latters
personal circumstances and asked him why he was in the PAOCTF office and why he wanted a
lawyer. Appellant Arnaldo replied that he wanted to make a confession about his participation in the
kidnapping of the Yao family. Thereupon, he asked appellant Arnaldo if the latter would accept his
assistance as his lawyer for purposes of his confession. Appellant Arnaldo agreed. He warned
appellant Arnaldo that he might be sentenced to death if he confessed involvement in the incident.
Appellant Arnaldo answered that he would face the consequences because he was bothered by his
conscience. He inquired from appellant Arnaldo if he was harmed or intimidated into giving self-
incriminating statements to the PAOCTF investigators. Appellant Arnaldo answered in the negative.
He requested appellant Arnaldo to remove his shirt for him to check if there were torture marks on
his body, but he found none. He also observed that appellant Arnaldos appearance and movements
were normal. His conference with appellant Arnaldo lasted for 15 minutes or more. Thereafter, he
allowed the PAOCTF investigators to question appellant Arnaldo.
78

Further, Atty. Uminga sat beside appellant Arnaldo during the inquiry and listened to the latters
entire confession. After the taking of appellant Arnaldos confession, Atty. Uminga requested the
PAOCTF investigators to give him a copy of appellant Arnaldos confession. Upon obtaining such
copy, he read it entirely and thereafter gave it to appellant Arnaldo. He instructed appellant Arnaldo
to read and comprehend the same carefully. He told appellant Arnaldo to ask him for clarification
and comment if he did not agree or understand any part of his written confession. Appellant Arnaldo
read his entire written confession and handed it to him. Atty. Uminga asked him if he had objections
to it. Appellant Arnaldo replied in the negative. He then reminded appellant Arnaldo that the latter
could still change his mind, and that he was not being forced to sign. Appellant Arnaldo manifested
that he would sign his written confession. Later, he and appellant Arnaldo affixed their signatures to
the written confession.
79

With respect to appellant Flores, Atty. Rous declared that before the PAOCTF investigators began
questioning appellant, Atty. Rous interviewed him in Tagalog inside a room, where only the two of
them were present. He asked appellant Flores about his personal circumstances. Appellant Flores
replied that he was a suspect in the kidnapping of the Yao family, and he wanted to give a
confession regarding his involvement in the said incident. He asked appellant Flores whether he
would accept his assistance as his lawyer. Appellant Flores affirmed that he would. He asked
appellant Flores why he wanted to give such confession. Appellant Flores answered that he was
bothered by his conscience. Atty. Rous warned appellant Flores that his confession would be used
against him in a court of law, and that the death penalty might be imposed on him. Appellant Flores
told him that he wanted to tell the truth and unload the burden on his mind. He requested appellant
Flores to lift his shirt for the former to verify if there were torture marks or bruises on his body, but
found none. Again, he cautioned appellant Flores about the serious consequences of his confession,
but the latter maintained that he wanted to tell the truth. Thereafter, he permitted the PAOCTF
investigators to question appellant Flores.
80

Additionally, Atty. Rous stayed with appellant Flores while the latter was giving statements to the
PAOCTF investigators. After the taking of appellant Flores statements, he instructed appellant
Flores to read and check his written confession. Appellant Flores read the same and made some
minor corrections. He also read appellant Flores written confession. Afterwards, he and appellant
Flores signed the latters written confession.
81

It is true that it was the PAOCTF which contacted and suggested the availability of Atty. Uminga and
Atty. Rous to appellants Arnaldo and Flores, respectively. Nonetheless, this does not automatically
imply that their right to counsel was violated. What the Constitution requires is the presence of
competent and independent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his clients defense without
any intervening conflict of interest.
82
There was no conflict of interest with regard to the legal
assistance rendered by Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous. Both counsels had no interest adverse to
appellants Arnaldo and Flores. Although Atty. Uminga testified that he was a former National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) agent, he, nevertheless, clarified that he had been separated therefrom since
1994
83
when he went into private practice. Atty. Uminga declared under oath that he was a private
practitioner when he assisted appellant Arnaldo during the custodial investigation.
84
It appears that
Atty. Uminga was called by the PAOCTF to assist appellant Arnaldo, because Atty. Umingas
telephone number was listed on the directory of his former NBI officemates detailed at the PAOCTF.
Atty. Rous, on the other hand, was a member of the Free Legal Aid Committee of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, Quezon City at the time he rendered legal assistance to appellant Flores.
85
Part of
Atty. Rous duty as member of the said group was to render legal assistance to the indigents
including suspects under custodial investigation. There was no evidence showing that Atty. Rous
had organizational or personal links to the PAOCTF. In fact, he proceeded to the PAOCTF office to
assist appellant Flores, because he happened to be the lawyer manning the office when the
PAOCTF called.
86
In People v. Fabro,
87
we stated:
The Constitution further requires that the counsel be independent; thus, he cannot be a special
counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is
admittedly adverse to that of the accused. Atty. Jungco does not fall under any of said enumeration.
Nor is there any evidence that he had any interest adverse to that of the accused. The indelible fact
is that he was president of the Zambales Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and not a
lackey of the lawmen.
Further, as earlier stated, under Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, an accused is
entitled to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. The phrase
"preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person
under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys
from handling the defense. Otherwise, the tempo of custodial investigation would be solely in the
hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct, the progress of the interrogation by simply
selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest.
88
While the
choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford the
services of counsel or where the preferred lawyer is not available is naturally lodged in the police
investigators, the suspect has the final choice, as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask
for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he
does not raise any objection to the counsels appointment during the course of the investigation, and
the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing
officer.
89
Appellants Arnaldo and Flores did not object to the appointment of Atty. Uminga and Atty.
Rous as their lawyers, respectively, during their custodial investigation. Prior to their questioning,
appellants Arnaldo and Flores conferred with Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous. Appellant Arnaldo
manifested that he would be assisted by Atty. Uminga, while appellant Flores agreed to be
counseled by Atty. Rous. Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous countersigned the written extra-judicial
confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores, respectively. Hence, appellants Arnaldo and Flores
are deemed to have engaged the services of Atty. Uminga and Atty. Rous, respectively.
Since the prosecution has sufficiently established that the respective extra-judicial confessions of
appellant Arnaldo and appellant Flores were obtained in accordance with the constitutional
guarantees, these confessions are admissible. They are evidence of a high order because of the
strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a
crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience.
90
Consequently, the burden of proving that undue
pressure or duress was used to procure the confessions rests on appellants Arnaldo and Flores.
91

In the case at bar, appellants Arnaldo and Flores failed to discharge their burden of proving that they
were forced or coerced to make their respective confessions. Other than their self-serving
statements that they were maltreated by the PAOCTF officers/agents, they did not present any
plausible proof to substantiate their claims.lawphil. net They did not submit any medical report showing that
their bodies were subjected to violence or torture. Neither did they file complaints against the
persons who had allegedly beaten or forced them to execute their respective confessions despite
several opportunities to do so. Appellants Arnaldo and Flores averred that they informed their family
members/relatives of the alleged maltreatment, but the latter did not report such allegations to
proper authorities. On the contrary, appellants Arnaldo and Flores declared in their respective
confessions that they were not forced or harmed in giving their sworn statements, and that they were
not promised or given any award in consideration of the same. Records also bear out that they were
physically examined by doctors before they made their confessions.
92
Their physical examination
reports certify that no external signs of physical injury or any form of trauma were noted during their
examination.
93
In People v. Pia,
94
we held that the following factors indicate voluntariness of an extra-
judicial confession: (1) where the accused failed to present credible evidence of compulsion or
duress or violence on their persons; (2) where they failed to complain to the officers who
administered the oaths; (3) where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against
their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; (4) where there appeared to be no marks of violence on
their bodies; and (5) where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to
buttress their claim.
It should also be noted that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores are
replete with details on the manner in which the kidnapping was committed, thereby ruling out the
possibility that these were involuntarily made. Their extra-judicial confessions clearly state how
appellants and their cohorts planned the kidnapping as well as the sequence of events before,
during and after its occurrence. The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language
if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its
integrity, it being replete with details which could only be supplied by the accused.
95

With respect to appellant Reyess claim that the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and
Flores cannot be used in evidence against him, we have ruled that although an extra-judicial
confession is admissible only against the confessant, jurisprudence makes it admissible as
corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused.
96
In People v.
Alvarez,
97
we ruled that where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the
probability of participation by the co-conspirator, that confession is receivable as evidence against a
co-accused. In People v. Encipido
98
we elucidated as follows:
It is also to be noted that APPELLANTS extrajudicial confessions were independently made without
collusion, are identical with each other in their material respects and confirmatory of the other. They
are, therefore, also admissible as circumstantial evidence against their co-accused implicated
therein to show the probability of the latters actual participation in the commission of the crime. They
are also admissible as corroborative evidence against the others, it being clear from other facts and
circumstances presented that persons other than the declarants themselves participated in the
commission of the crime charged and proved. They are what is commonly known as interlocking
confession and constitute an exception to the general rule that extrajudicial confessions/admissions
are admissible in evidence only against the declarants thereof.
Appellants Arnaldo and Flores stated in their respective confessions that appellant Reyes
participated in their kidnapping of the Yao family. These statements are, therefore, admissible as
corroborative and circumstantial evidence to prove appellant Reyes guilt.
Nevertheless, even without the extra-judicial confessions of appellants Arnaldo and Flores, evidence
on record is sufficient to sustain a finding of culpability of appellant Reyes. As earlier found,
Abagatnan, Robert and Yao positively identified appellant Reyes as one of their kidnappers. They
specifically testified that during the incident, appellant Reyes (1) approached and pointed a gun at
Yao San and dragged the latter inside the van; and (2) accompanied Abagatnan and Robert in going
to the poultry farm to search for and remind Yao San about the ransom demanded. The RTC, Court
of Appeals and this Court found such testimonies credible.
Appellants argue that their alibis cast reasonable doubt on their alleged guilt. Appellant Reyes avers
that he could not have been one of those who kidnapped the Yao family on the night of 16 July 1999
at around 11:00 p.m., because he was sleeping with his family in their residence during such time
and date. Likewise, appellant Flores asseverates that he could not have been present at the crime
scene on such date and time, as he was already sleeping in his sisters house at Antipolo City. For
his part, appellant Arnaldo asserts that he is a victim of a police frame-up. He alleges that he was an
asset of the PAOCTF, but was later utilized as a drug pusher by the said agency. Upon failing to
remit the proceeds of a shabu sale to the PAOCTF officers, he was beaten up and included as
accused in the kidnapping of the Yao family.
Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to prove. Alibi must be
proved by the accused with clear and convincing evidence; otherwise it cannot prevail over the
positive testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. For alibi to prosper, it is
not enough for the accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed.
He must likewise prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or
its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
99

The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can
easily be concocted but is difficult to prove. In order to prosper, the defense of frame-up must be
proved by the accused with clear and convincing evidence.
100

It should be observed that the family residence/house of appellant Reyes where he claimed to have
slept when the incident occurred is located within Brgy. Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan.
101
This is the same barangay where the Yao familys poultry farm is situated. Appellant
Reyes, in fact, admitted that the poultry farm is near his residence.
102
There is a huge possibility that
appellant Reyes slept for a while, woke up before 11:00 p.m., and thereafter proceeded to the Yao
familys poultry farm to participate in the kidnapping of the family. The same is true with appellant
Flores. Wilfredo, appellant Flores nephew, testified that he and appellant went to bed and slept
together in the house of appellants sister in Antipolo City at about 8:00 p.m. of 16 July 1999.
103
It is
greatly possible that Wifredo did not notice when appellant Flores woke up later at 9:00 p.m. and
immediately proceeded to the Yao familys poultry farm to participate in the kidnapping of the family,
arriving therein at about 11:00 p.m. It is a fact that a person coming from Antipolo City may reach
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan in two hours via a motor vehicle, considering that there was no more
heavy traffic at that late evening. Obviously, appellants Reyes and Flores failed to prove
convincingly that it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene during the incident.
Appellant Flores submitted two pictures which, according to him, show that he worked as a
construction worker from 12 July 1999 up to 30 July 1999 while staying in his sisters house at
Antipolo City. These pictures, however, do not clearly and convincingly support such claim, because
(1) the pictures were undated; (2) the shots were taken from a far distance; and (3) the face of the
man in the pictures which appellant Flores claims as his is blurred, unrecognizable and almost
hidden, as such person is wearing a cap and is in a position where only the right and back portions
of his head and body are visible.
Appellant Arnaldo also failed to prove with convincing evidence his defense of frame-up. Aside from
his self-serving testimony that he was a former PAOCTF agent and that he was beaten and included
as accused in the kidnapping of the Yao family by the PAOCTF agents because he failed to remit to
the PAOCTF officers the proceeds of his sale of shabu, he did not present convincing proof to
support said allegations. He submitted the calling card of Colonel Mancao, which appears to have
been signed by the latter at the back portion, but there is nothing on it which indicates or verifies that
appellant Arnaldo was indeed a former PAOCTF agent. He also submitted a prayer book containing
his handwritten narration of torture he allegedly experienced at the hands of the PAOCTF agents,
but this does not conclusively show that he was beaten by the PAOCTF agents. As we earlier found,
appellant Arnaldo did not produce any medical records/certificates or file any complaint against the
PAOCTF agents to bolster his claim of maltreatment.
It is true that the alibis of appellants Reyes and Flores and the defense of frame-up of appellant
Arnaldo were corroborated on some points by the testimonies of some of their relatives/friends. We
have, however, held that alibi and the defense of frame-up become less plausible when they are
corroborated only by relatives and friends because of perceived partiality.
104

Indeed, the positive and credible testimonies of Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San prevail over the
alibis and defense of frame-up of appellants.
105

We shall now determine the propriety of appellants conviction for the special complex crime of
kidnapping for ransom with homicide and the corresponding penalties imposed.
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of kidnapping is committed with the
concurrence of the following elements: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or
detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or
kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is
present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by
simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female,
or a public officer.
106
All of the foregoing elements were duly establish by the testimonial and
documentary evidences for the prosecution in the case at bar. First, appellants and their cohorts are
private individuals. Second, appellants and their cohorts kidnapped the Yao family by taking control
of their van and detaining them in a secluded place. Third, the Yao family was taken against their
will. And fourth, threats to kill were made and the kidnap victims include females.
Republic Act No. 7659 provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if any of the two qualifying
circumstances is present in the commission of the kidnapping: (1) the motive of the kidnappers is to
extort ransom for the release of the kidnap victims, although none of the circumstances mentioned
under paragraph four of the elements of kidnapping were present. Ransom means money, price or
consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person that would release him
from captivity.
107
Whether or not the ransom is actually paid to or received by the perpetrators is of
no moment.
108
It is sufficient that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of exacting
ransom;
109
and (2) the kidnap victims were killed or died as a consequence of the kidnapping or was
raped, or subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts. Both of these qualifying circumstances are
alleged in the information and proven during trial.
As testified to by Abagatnan, Robert and Yao San, appellants and their cohorts demanded the
amount of P5 million for the release of Chua Ong Pong Sim and Raymond. In fact, Yao San went to
the Usan dumpsite, Litex Road, Fairview, Quezon City, to hand over the ransom money to
appellants and their cohorts, but the latter did not show up. It was also apparent that Chua Ong Ping
Sim and Raymond were killed or died during their captivity. Yao San declared that appellants and
their cohorts called up and told him that they would kill Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond who were
still under their custody, because they heard the radio report that the incident was already known to
the police. True to their threats, the corpses of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were later found
dumped in La Mesa Dam. Their respective death certificates show that they died of asphyxia by
strangulation.
Withal, the death penalty cannot be imposed on the appellants in view of the passage of Republic
Act No. 9346 on 24 June 2006 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty in the Philippines. In
accordance with Sections 2 and 3 thereof, the penalty that should be meted out to the appellants is
reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole. The Court of Appeals, therefore, acted
accordingly in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole on each of
the appellants.
The Court of Appeals was also correct in ordering appellants to jointly and severally pay civil
indemnity and exemplary damages to the Yao family. Nonetheless, their corresponding amounts
should be modified. In People v. Quiachon,
110
we explained that even if the death penalty was not to
be imposed on accused because of the prohibition in Republic Act No. 9346, the civil indemnity
of P75,000.00 was still proper, as the said award was not dependent on the actual imposition of the
death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death
penalty attended the commission of the offense. As earlier stated, both the qualifying circumstances
of demand for ransom and the double killing or death of two of the kidnap victims were alleged in the
information and proven during trial. Thus, for the twin deaths of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond,
their heirs (Yao San, Robert, Lenny, Matthew and Charlene) are entitled to a total amount
of P150,000.00 as civil indemnity. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction
for the public good.
111
In criminal offenses, exemplary damages may be recovered when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying.
112
Since
both the qualifying circumstances of demand for ransom and the killing or death of two of the kidnap
victims (Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond) while in captivity were alleged in the information and
proven during trial, and in order to deter others from committing the same despicable acts, the award
of exemplary damages is proper. The total amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages should
be modified. In several cases,
113
we awarded an amount of P100,000.00 to each of the kidnap
victims. As in this case, the amount ofP100,000.00 as exemplary damages should be awarded each
to Yao San, Robert, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene, Abagatnan and Ortea. This makes the total amount
of exemplary damages add up to P700,000.00.
The appellate court aptly held that the award of moral damages is warranted. Under Article 2217 of
the New Civil Code, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock and similar injury. Article 2219 of the same Code provides
that moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal detention. There is no doubt that each
member of the Yao family suffered physical and/or psychological trauma because of the ordeal,
especially because two of the family members were ruthlessly killed during their captivity. Pursuant
to prevailing jurisprudence,
114
Yao San, Robert, Lenny, Matthew, Charlene, Abagatnan and Ortea
should each receive the amount ofP100,000.00 as moral damages. Per computation, the total
amount of moral damages is P700,000.00 and notP500,000.00 as fixed by the RTC and the Court of
Appeals.
Finally, we observed that the RTC and the Court of Appeals denominated the crime committed by
appellants in the present case as the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with double
homicide since two of the kidnap victims were killed or died during the kidnapping. The word
"double" should be deleted therein. Regardless of the number of killings or deaths that occurred as a
consequence of the kidnapping, the appropriate denomination of the crime should be the special
complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide.
WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated 14 August 2006, and Resolution, dated 18 October 2006, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02301 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: (1) the total amount of civil indemnity is P150,000.00; (2) the total amount of
exemplary damages is P700,000.00; (3) the total amount of moral damages is P700,000.00; and (4)
the appropriate denomination of the crime committed by appellants is the special complex crime of
kidnapping for ransom with homicide.
SO ORDERED.


















G.R. No. 176933 October 2, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LUIS PLAZA Y BUCALON, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J .:
Raising only questions of law, the Peoples petition for review on certiorari assails the January 31,
2007 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the November 12, 2002 Order of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Br. 29 in Criminal Case No. 5144 (the case) fixing bail for the
temporary liberty of Luis Bucalon Plaza alias Loloy Plaza (respondent) who was indicted for Murder.
The case was originally raffled to Branch 30 of the Surigao RTC presided by Judge Floripinas
Buyser (Judge Buyser).
After the prosecution rested its case, respondent, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer to
Evidence.
2
The Demurrer was denied by Judge Buyser by Order
3
of March 14, 2002, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
x x x x
The evidence thus presented by the prosecution is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt,but only for the crime of homicide and not for murder, as charged. This is
because the qualifying circumstance of treachery alleged in the information cannot be appreciated in
this case.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The defense thereupon presented evidence
4
in the course of which respondent filed a Motion to Fix
Amount of Bail Bond,
5
contending that in view of Judge Buysers ruling that the prosecution evidence
is sufficient to prove only Homicide, he could be released on bail. He thus prayed that the bail bond
for his temporary liberty be fixed at P40,000.00 which he claimed was the usual bond for Homicide in
the RTC of Surigao City and Surigao del Norte.
In its Opposition to Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond,
6
the prosecution contended, in the main, that
the case being for Murder, it is non-bailable as the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal to death;
that it is the public prosecutor who has exclusive jurisdiction to determine what crime the accused
should be charged with; that the accused should have filed a motion/application to bail and not just a
motion to fix the amount of the bail bond; that the accused had already waived his right to apply for
bail at that stage of the proceedings; that Judge Buysers March 14, 2002 Order, being a mere
opinion and not a ruling or a dispositive part thereof, produced no legal effect inasmuch as it had no
jurisdiction to rule on a matter outside the Demurrer; and that under the Rules, the prosecution could
still prove the existence of treachery on rebuttal after the defense has rested its case.
During the hearing of the Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, Senior State Prosecutor Rogelio
Bagabuyo questioned Judge Buysers impartiality, prompting the judge to inhibit himself and to order
the case transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC for further proceedings.
Branch 29 Presiding Judge Jose Manuel Tan (Judge Tan) heard the Motion to Fix Amount of Bail
Bond.
By Order
7
of November 12, 2002, Judge Tan, concurring with the finding of Judge Buyser that since
the prosecution evidence proved only Homicide which is punishable by reclusion temporal and,
therefore, bailable, ruled that respondent could no longer be denied bail. He accordingly granted
respondents Motion and fixed the amount of his bond at P40,000.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration cum prayer for inhibition of Judge Tan was denied for lack of
merit.
8

Respondent was subsequently released
9
after he posted a P40,000 bond.
Roberto Murcia (Roberto), the victims brother, impleading the People as co-petitioner, assailed the
trial courts orders via petition for certiorari
10
with the Court of Appeals.
Roberto faulted Judge Tan for granting bail without an application for bail having been filed by
respondent and without conducting the mandatory hearing to determine whether or not the
prosecutions evidence is strong.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) adopted Robertos argument that the grant of bail to
respondent without any separate hearing is contrary to prevailing jurisprudence.
By Decision of January 31, 2007, the appellate court, observing that the allegations in respondents
Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond constituted an application for bail, dismissed Robertos petition
and affirmed Judge Tans orders.
11

In its present petition, the People contends that
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE CONTRARY TO LAW AND
SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE HEARING CONDUCTED SATISFIES
THE REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS AND THAT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO
BAIL
12
(Underscoring supplied)
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that "All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable byreclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law."
Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, thus provides that all persons in
custody shall, beforeconviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right.1avvphi 1
The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an accused charged with a
capital offense thus depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Stressing this point, this
Court held:
. . . [W]hen bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the
court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it, against
the accused to enable the judge to make anintelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the
parties. A summary hearing is defined as "such brief and speedy method of receiving and
considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which
is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail." On such hearing, the court
does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed
to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what
further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the
discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to
substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary examination and cross examination."
13
(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Since Judge Tan concurred with the assessment by Judge Buyser of the prosecution evidence when
he denied the Demurrer and the latters statement that the evidence was sufficient to convict
respondent of Homicide, holding a summary hearing merely to determine whether respondent was
entitled to bail would have been unnecessary as the evidence in chief was already presented by the
prosecution.
The Peoples recourse to Section 5,
14
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to
support its contention that respondent should be denied bail is unavailing, for said Section clearly
speaks of an application for bail filed by the accusedafter a judgment of conviction has already been
handed down by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.














G.R. No. 175241 February 24, 2010
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by its National President, Jose
Anselmo I. Cadiz, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, and JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE MANILA MAYOR JOSE "LITO" ATIENZA, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J .:
Petitioners Integrated Bar of the Philippines
1
(IBP) and lawyers H. Harry L. Roque and Joel R.
Butuyan appeal the June 28, 2006 Decision
2
and the October 26, 2006 Resolution
3
of the Court of
Appeals that found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Jose "Lito" Atienza, the
then mayor of Manila, in granting a permit to rally in a venue other than the one applied for by the
IBP.
On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz (Cadiz), filed
with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application
4
for a permit to rally at the foot of
Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in by IBP officers
and members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations.
Respondent issued a permit
5
dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but
indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which permit the IBP
received on June 19, 2006.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed on June 21, 2006 before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94949.
6
The petition having been unresolved within 24 hours from its
filing, petitioners filed before this Court on June 22, 2006 a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R.
No. 172951 which assailed the appellate courts inaction or refusal to resolve the petition within the
period provided under the Public Assembly Act of 1985.
7

The Court, by Resolutions of July 26, 2006, August 30, 2006 and November 20, 2006, respectively,
denied the petition for being moot and academic, denied the relief that the petition be heard on the
merits in view of the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 94949, and denied the motion for reconsideration.
The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge, after Cadiz discussed with P/Supt.
Arturo Paglinawan whose contingent from the Manila Police District (MPD) earlier barred petitioners
from proceeding thereto. Petitioners allege that the participants voluntarily dispersed after the
peaceful conduct of the program.
The MPD thereupon instituted on June 26, 2006 a criminal action,
8
docketed as I.S. No. 06I-12501,
against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the
permit, to which charge Cadiz filed a Counter-Affidavit of August 3, 2006.
In the meantime, the appellate court ruled, in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949, by the first assailed issuance,
that the petition became moot and lacked merit. The appellate court also denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration by the second assailed issuance.
Hence, the filing of the present petition for review on certiorari, to which respondent filed his
Comment of November 18, 2008 which merited petitioners Reply of October 2, 2009.
The main issue is whether the appellate court erred in holding that the modification of the venue in
IBPs rally permit does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners assert that the partial grant of the application runs contrary to the Pubic Assembly Act
and violates their constitutional right to freedom of expression and public assembly.
The Court shall first resolve the preliminary issue of mootness.
Undoubtedly, the petition filed with the appellate court on June 21, 2006 became moot upon the
passing of the date of the rally on June 22, 2006.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally,
courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. However, even in
cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve the
legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and
public. Moreover, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise
moot if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.
9

In the present case, the question of the legality of a modification of a permit to rally will arise each
time the terms of an intended rally are altered by the concerned official, yet it evades review, owing
to the limited time in processing the application where the shortest allowable period is five days prior
to the assembly. The susceptibility of recurrence compels the Court to definitively resolve the issue
at hand.
Respecting petitioners argument that the issues presented in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949 pose a
prejudicial question to the criminal case against Cadiz, the Court finds it improper to resolve the
same in the present case.
Under the Rules,
10
the existence of a prejudicial question is a ground in a petition to suspend
proceedings in a criminal action. Since suspension of the proceedings in the criminal action may be
made only upon petition and not at the instance of the judge or the investigating prosecutor,
11
the
latter cannot take cognizance of a claim of prejudicial question without a petition to suspend being
filed. Since a petition to suspend can be filed only in the criminal action,
12
the determination of the
pendency of a prejudicial question should be made at the first instance in the criminal action, and not
before this Court in an appeal from the civil action.
In proceeding to resolve the petition on the merits, the appellate court found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent because the Public Assembly Act does not categorically require
respondent to specify in writing the imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil which warrants
the denial or modification of the permit and merely mandates that the action taken shall be in writing
and shall be served on respondent within 24 hours. The appellate court went on to hold that
respondent is authorized to regulate the exercise of the freedom of expression and of public
assembly which are not absolute, and that the challenged permit is consistent with Plaza Mirandas
designation as a freedom park where protest rallies are allowed without permit.
The Court finds for petitioners.
Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act reads:
Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a
permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or
public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2)
working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be
deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse
to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on the
premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil
warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant
who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application [sic] within
twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms
thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its
decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt
of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting
such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall, be immediately
executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours
from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive
judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed. (underscoring
supplied)
In Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) v. Ermita,
13
the Court reiterated:
x x x Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and
discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and
respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with
freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a
right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it
is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech.
To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the American Supreme
Court inThomas v. Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech
and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to
assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All these rights, while not
identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise
of this right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental
actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to
the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other
legitimate public interest.
14
(emphasis supplied)
The Court in Bayan stated that the provisions of the Public Assembly Act of 1985 practically codified
the 1983 ruling inReyes v. Bagatsing.
15
In juxtaposing Sections 4 to 6 of the Public Assembly Act
with the pertinent portion of the Reyescase, the Court elucidated as follows:
x x x [The public official concerned shall] appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant
of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such
refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision
reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or
adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have
recourse to the proper judicial authority.
16
(italics and underscoring supplied)
In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did not
immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The
opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to
court after an unfavorable action on the permit.1avvphi1
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the
standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable condition
to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, which "blank" denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the
appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining
whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence
requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what
may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption especially so where
the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place is that the permit must be for the assembly
being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for
the American Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in
some other place."
17
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Notably, respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or explanation for his action. It
smacks of whim and caprice for respondent to just impose a change of venue for an assembly that
was slated for a specific public place. It is thus reversible error for the appellate court not to have
found such grave abuse of discretion and, under specific statutory
provision, not to have modified the permit "in terms satisfactory to the applicant."
18

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
94949 are REVERSED. The Court DECLARES that respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
in modifying the rally permit issued on June 16, 2006 insofar as it altered the venue from Mendiola
Bridge to Plaza Miranda.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 174994 August 31, 2007
In the Matter of the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus of the person of ARMY MAJOR
JASON LAUREANO AQUINO, PA
MARIA FE S. AQUINO, Petitioner,
vs.
LT. GEN. HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, AFP,
*
in his capacity as Commanding General, Philippine
Army, and the Custodial Officer or Commander, Army Detention Center, G2-21D, Camp Capinpin,
Tanay, Rizal,
**
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking
to nullify the Decision
1
dated 31 August 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 95341, which
denied petitioner Maria Fe S. Aquinos Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus for the person
of her husband, Army Major Jason Laureano Aquino (Major Aquino) of the First Scout Ranger Regiment,
Special Operation Command of the Philippine Army, and the Resolution
2
dated 5 October 2006, of the
same court which denied reconsideration of its earlier Decision.
The facts leading to the arrest of Major Aquino, as set forth in the Solicitor Generals brief,
3
show that on 3
February 2006, Major Aquino, along with several military men, namely, Major Leomar Jose M. Doctolero,
Captain Joey T. Fontiveros, Captain Montano B. Aldomovar,
4
Captain Isagani Criste, and Captain James
Sababa, allegedly met at the resthouse of Captain Aldomovar near Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan
to plot a breach of the Camp Defense Plan of Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo and to take over Camp
Aquinaldo, as well as the Headquarters of the Philippine Army. On 26 February 2006, in the wake of the
groups alleged withdrawal of support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines chain of command and
the current administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Major Aquino was ordered arrested and
confined at the Intelligence Service Group of the Philippine Army in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, upon the order
of Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, (Lt. Gen. Esperon) who was then the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army. On the same day, Lt. Gen. Esperon ordered the Army Inspector General to conduct an
investigation to determine: 1) the circumstances attending Major Aquinos alleged withdrawal of support;
2) the veracity of reports anent the alleged troop movement
5
of some Philippine Military personnel from
their respective stations to Manila to join the protest march at Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue on 24
February 2006 with Brigadier General Danilo Lim (Brig. Gen. Lim); and 3) the participation, responsibility
and culpability of all Philippine Military personnel involved, if any. For this purpose, a panel of
investigators
6
was formed. During the investigation, Major Aquino denied the accusations hurled against
him. He intimated, inter alia, that he had no plan nor did he make any pronouncement of withdrawing
support from the chain of command, and that he pledged to continue to support the same and the duly
constituted authorities.
7

On 4 March 2006, the panel of investigators submitted its Investigation Report to the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army. In its report, the panel of investigators found that the troop movement
8
by
some military personnel from their respective stations to Manila was illegal, implicating Major Aquino
therein, thus:
14.2 Based on the account of MAJ AQUINO, it may be reasonably observed that said Officer and BGEN
LIM were closely coordinating the progress of the latters talks with CSAFP [Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines] on the night of 23 February 2006. Moreover, there are other circumstances
which seem to indicate that the leadership of FSRR [First Scout Ranger Regiment] was preparing some
of its personnel to move should the talks succeed, i.e. movement of the 7SRC & 9SRC personnel to
Manila. Notedly, the following attendant circumstances put to doubt the real intention of FSRR in ordering
the aforementioned troop movement, to wit:
i) There is no indication that CO, 3SRB sought clearance or informed CO, 901st Bde or CG,
91 D of said troop movement;
ii) There was no order or call from HPA or SOCOM for the immediate fill up or augmentation
of the 10th SRC at Fort Bonifacio;
iii) There is no showing that the troop movement was coordinated, approved and/or cleared
with the AOC, the AFPCC or SOLCOM, AFP;
iv) When CO, 901st Bde called CO, 3SRB to inquire about any troop movement, the latter
answered in the negative and immediately ordered his men to go back to command post
v) When the twenty six (26) 7SRC personnel were apprehended, they were in civilian attire
but brought with them their bandoleer with magazines and ammunitions which were placed
inside their backpack.
9

The panel of investigators recommended that: 1) all implicated officers therein mentioned be immediately
relieved from their respective posts; and 2) appropriate charges be filed before the General Court Martial
against Major Aquino, among other military officers/personnel, for violations of Article 67
10
(Attempting to
Begin or Create Mutiny); and Article 97
11
(Disorders and Neglects Prejudicial to Good Order and Military
Discipline) of the Articles of War, to wit:
15.3.1 In addition to the relief of BGEN DANILO D LIM 0-7665 AFP which in itself is already a disciplinary
action, recommend that subj Officer and MAJ JASON LAUREANO Y AQUINO O-10503 (INF) PA be
charged before the PAGCM for violation of AW 67 (CAUSING OR EXCITING A MUTINY) and AW 97
(DISORDERS AND NEGLECTS PREJUDICIAL TO GOOD ORDER AND MILITARY DISCLIPLINE.)
12

Further, the panels Investigation Report was referred by Lt. Gen. Esperon to the Judge Advocate
Generals Office (JAGO) of the Philippine Army for review. On 17 March 2006, the JAGO found the
existence of probable cause against Major Aquino, among other military officers, for violations of Article
96
13
(Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman), Article 97 (Disorders and Neglects Prejudicial to
Good Order and Military Discipline), and Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny) of the Articles
of War.
The JAGOs recommendation reads:
6.3. For publishing, distributing and discussing the pamphlet entitled "The New Order The Solution to
the Filipino Political Problem," which publication is not sanctioned as an official publication of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine Army, and which material tends to urge or incite other military
officers and enlisted men to collectively or concertedly defy standing and lawful orders of the
Commanding General, Philippine Army as well as the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines,
MAJ AQUINO should likewise be charged of (sic) violating AW 96 (CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN
OFFICER AND GENTLEMAN) and AW 97 (Disorders and Neglects Prejudicial to Good Order and Military
Discipline) under a separate specification.
6.4. In the (sic) light of the new averments revealed in the Supplemental Affidavit of 1Lt REYES, there is
now basis for charging MAJ AQUINO, MAJ DOCTOLERO, CPT FONTIVEROS, CPT ALDOMOVAR, CPT
CRISTE, CPT SABABAN for violation of AW 67 (ATTEMPT TO CREATE A MUTINY). Per said
Supplemental Affidavit, it was revealed that subj Officers met at the resthouse of CPT ALDOMOVAR near
the so-called tower area in Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan, on the evening of 03 Feb 2006, discuss
and plot their plan to breach the Camp Defense Plan of Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo and hatch a plan
to take over Camp Aguinaldo and [the] Headquarters [of the] Philippine Army. x x x.
14

On the basis of JAGOs recommendations, Col. Jose R. Recuenco (Col. Recuenco), then Army Provost
Marshal, signed under oath a charge sheet
15
against Major Aquino, charging the latter with violations of
Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny)
16
and Article 96
17
(Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and
Gentleman) of the Articles of War, which was indorsed to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP).
On 12 July 2006, Lt. Gen. Esperon issued an Order
18
to the Commanding Officer, 191st, MP Bn to
exercise custodial responsibility of Major Aquino, together with the other implicated military personnel
who withdrew their support from the chain of command in February 2006, and to place them in
confinement at the Philippine Army Detention Center, Camp Capinpin, Tanay, Rizal. The same Order
also designated the aforementioned Commanding Officer to exercise direct supervision and control over
the concerned detainees.
19

On 20 July 2006, the charge sheet against Major Aquino was amended to set forth more detailed
specifications of the charges.
20
It, however, retained the charges against Major Aquino as stated in the
original charge sheeti.e. violation of Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create a Mutiny) and Article 96
(Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) of the Articles of War.
On 20 July 2006, the Judge Advocate General of the AFP General Headquarters of the AFP issued Office
Order Number 14-06, creating a Pre-trial Investigation Panel
21
for the case of Major Aquino, et al.
On 21 July 2006, petitioner filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus
22
with the Court of Appeals, praying that the
AFP Chief of Staff and the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, or whoever are acting in their
place and stead, be directed to immediately produce the body of Major Aquino and explain forthwith why
he should not be set at liberty without delay. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 95341.
In the meantime, the Pre-trial Investigation Panel of the AFP issued a Subpoena/Notice of Pre-trial
Investigation
23
to Major Aquino, summoning him to appear in person before the panel and to submit his
counter-affidavits and affidavits of witnesses.
24

After hearing,
25
the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
26
dated 31 August 2006, denying the Petition
for Habeas Corpus.
The Court of Appeals held that the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus is futile because charges had
already been preferred
27
against Major Aquino.
28
In tracing the factual antecedents leading to the
preferment of charges against Major Aquino, the Court of Appeals significantly noted that after the
Investigating Panel found probable cause against him for violation of Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or
Create Mutiny) and Article 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) of the Articles of War, Lt.
Gen. Esperon forwarded the panels recommendation to the JAGO for review, which sustained the
same.
29
In view of such developments, a charge sheet against Major Aquino was signed under oath by
Col. Recuenco, then Army Provost Marshall. The latter, thereafter, endorsed the charge sheet to the AFP
Chief of Staff for appropriate Action. Then, the Pre-trial Investigation Panel conducted a pre-trial
investigation whereby Major Aquino appeared before the said body. The Court of Appeals said:
Significantly, even if at the time Major AQUINO was arrested there was yet no formal charge filed against
him, however[,] the remedy of habeas corpus being resorted to by the Petitioner is still unavailing,
considering that, as the records disclosed, charges have been preferred against him even before the filing
by the Petitioner of the instant petition. Basic is the rule that once a person detained is duly charged in
court, he may no longer question his detention via a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
30

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 31 August 2006 Decision, but, the Court of Appeals
denied the same and found no reason to disturb its judgment.
31

Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
For this Courts consideration, petitioner elevates three issues, to wit:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE [COURT OF APPEALS] ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
PREFERMENT OF THE CHARGE SHEET AGAINST ARMY MAJOR AQUINO IS
EQUIVALENT TO FORMALLY CHARGING THE LATTER AS CONTEMPLATED IN
ARTICLE 70 OF THE ARTICLES OF WAR.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE [COURT OF APPEALS] ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS
LEGAL BASIS IN PLACING ARMY MAJOR AQUINO IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN A
MAXIMUM SECURITY DETENTION FACILITY.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE [COURT OF APPEALS] ERRED IN RULING THAT ARMY
MAJOR AQUINOS SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN A MAXIMUM SECURITY DETENTION
FACILITY IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 70 OF THE
ARTICLES OF WAR.
32

The paramount issue posed for resolution is whether the confinement of Major Aquino is legal.
Anent the first issue, petitioner assails the legality of Major Aquinos confinement on the ground that the
latter had not been formally charged. It is petitioners theory that charges can only be deemed formally
filed after a thorough and impartial investigation shall have been made.
33
Thus, petitioner suggests that
the word "charge" as used in Article 70
34
of the Articles of War means that a person is formally charged
only after the conduct of a mandatory pre-trial investigation. According to petitioner, the charge sheet and
the furnishing thereof to any person subject to military law is the act of preferment, which act is evidently
different from the act of filing. Otherwise stated, the charge sheet is not the "charge" contemplated in
Article 70 of the Articles of War for the arrest or confinement of any person subject to military law. Thus,
according to petitioner, the filing of a formal charge can only be done after the conclusion of the pre-trial
investigation, when the case is referred to the general court-martial, akin to the conduct of a preliminary
investigation in civilian courts.
35

We are not persuaded.
First, it is established that Major Aquino is governed by military law. Article 2 of the Articles of
War
36
circumscribes the jurisdiction of military law only over persons subject thereto. Major Aquino, G3 of
the First Scout Ranger Regiment (FSRR) of the Special Operation Command of the Philippine Army, is
subject to military law. Thus:
Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. The following persons are subject to these articles and shall be
understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or "persons subject to military
law", whenever used in these articles:
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of
the Philippine Constabulary; all members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call to
active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all
other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in, the said
service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the
same;
(b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary second lieutenants;
(c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Armed Forces
of the Philippines in the field in time of war or when martial law is declared though not
otherwise subject to these articles;
(d) All persons under sentence adjudged by courts-martial.
(As amended by Republic Acts 242 and 516).
As a regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Major Aquino falls squarely under Article 2 of
the Articles of War. Consequently, he is subject to the applicable provisions of the Articles of War and
Executive Order No. 178;
37
or the Manual for Courts-Martial, Philippine Army.
Second, a scrutiny of the confinement of Major Aquino proves that the same is valid.
Article 70 of the Articles of War governs the cases of arrest or confinement, viz.:
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement. Any person subject to military law charged with crime or with a serious
offense under these articles shall be placed in confinement or in arrest, as circumstances may require;
but when charged with a minor offense only, such person shall not ordinarily be placed in confinement.
Any person placed in arrest under the provisions of this Article shall thereby be restricted to his barracks,
quarters, or tent, unless such limits shall be enlarged by proper authority. Any officer or cadet who breaks
his arrest or who escapes from confinement, whether before or after trial or sentence and before he is set
at liberty by proper authority, shall be dismissed from the service or suffer such other punishment as a
court-martial may direct, and any other person subject to military law who escapes from confinement or
who breaks his arrest, whether before or after trial or sentence and before he is set at liberty by proper
authority, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
Evidently, Article 70 of the Articles of War empowers the commanding officer to place, in confinement or
in arrest, any person subject to military law charged with a crime or with a serious offense under the
Articles of War. Article 70 is the authority for enabling the proper military personnel to put an instant end
to criminal or unmilitary conduct, and to impose such restraint as may be necessary upon the person of a
military offender, with a view of his trial by court-martial.
38

We juxtapose Article 70 with Article 71 of the Articles of War. Under military law, the conduct of
investigations is governed by Article 71 of the Articles of War,
39
to wit:
Art. 71. Charges; Action Upon. Charges and specifications must be signed by a person subject to
military law, and under oath either that he has personal knowledge of, or has investigated, the matters set
forth therein and that the same are true in fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief.
No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and impartial
investigation thereof shall have been made. This investigation will include inquiries as to the truth of the
matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and what disposition of the case should be made in the
interest of justice and discipline. At such investigation[,] full opportunity shall be given to the accused to
cross-examine witnesses against him if they are available and to present anything he may desire in his
own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine available witnesses
requested by the accused. If the charges are forwarded after such investigation, they shall be
accompanied by a statement of the substance of the testimony taken on both sides.
Before directing the trial of any charge by general court-martial[,] the appointing authority will refer it to his
Staff Judge Advocate for consideration and advice.
When any person subject to military law is placed in arrest or confinement immediate steps will be taken
to try the person accused or to dismiss the charge and release him. Any officer who is responsible for
unnecessary delay in investigating or carrying the case to a final conclusion shall be punished as a court-
martial may direct. When a person is held for a trial by general court-martial, the commanding officer,
within eight days after the accused is arrested or confined, if practicable, forward the charges to the
officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction and furnish the accused a copy of such charges. If the
same be not practicable, he will report to superior authority the reasons for delay. The trial judge
advocate will cause to be served upon the accused a copy of the charges upon which trial is to be had,
and a failure so to serve such charges will be ground for a continuance unless the trial be had on the
charges furnished the accused as hereinbefore provided. In time of peace[,] no person shall, against his
objection, be brought to trial before a general court-martial within a period of five days subsequent to the
service of charges upon him. (As amended by RA 242). (Emphasis supplied.)
The formal written accusation in court-martial practice consists of two parts, the technical charge and the
specification.
40
The charge, where the offense alleged is a violation of the articles, merely indicates the
article the accused is alleged to have violated while the specifications sets forth the specific facts and
circumstances relied upon as constituting the violation.
41
Each specification, together with the charge
under which it is placed, constitutes a separate accusation.
42
The term "charges" or "charges and
specifications" is applied to the formal written accusation or accusations against an accused.
43

The first part of Article 71 of the Articles of War categorically provides that charges and specifications
must be signed by a person subject to military law, who under oath states that he either has personal
knowledge of, or has investigated, the matters set forth therein and that the same are true in fact, to the
best of his knowledge and belief. Further, the second paragraph of Article 71 explicitly provides that no
charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and impartial investigation
thereof shall have been made. A charge is made followed by a thorough and impartial investigation and if
the result of the investigation so warrants, the charge is referred to the general court martial. Contrary to
petitioners contention, Article 71 makes no qualification that there can be a "charge" against a person
subject to military law only if a pre-trial has been completed and the case has been referred to a court
martial. What Article 71 instructs is that no charges, i.e. charges and specifications signed by a person
subject to military law under oath, may be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough
and impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. Article 71 does not make the thorough and
impartial investigation a prerequisite before charges may be filed against a person subject to military law.
Clearly, the thorough and impartial investigation is a prerequisite not to making a charge against a person
subject to military law, but to the referral of the charge to the general court martial. It is the charge which
comes prior to the investigation, and which sets into motion the investigation.
We find that there was compliance with the requirements of the Articles of War. As shown by the
evidence on record, the amended charge sheets
44
against Major Aquino, containing the charges and the
specifications for violations of Article 67 (Attempting to Begin or Create Mutiny) and Article 96 (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) of the Articles of War, were personally signed under oath by
Capt. Armando P. Paredes, a person subject to military law. The amended charge sheets were sworn to
by the accuser, Capt. Armando P. Paredes in the manner provided under Article 71.
45
As it is, Major
Aquino stands charged in court martial proceedings for alleged violations of the Articles of War.
In Kapunan, Jr. v. De Villa,
46
this Court denied the writ of habeas corpus prayed for, and upheld the
legality of the confinement even when there was merely a substantial compliance with the procedural
requisites laid down in Article 71. In said case, the Court held that the fact that the charge sheets were
not certified in the manner provided by the pertinent law, i.e., that the officer administering the oath has
personally examined the affiant and is satisfied that the latter voluntarily executed and understood his
affidavit, does not invalidate said charge sheets.
47
With more reason do we herein uphold the validity of
the amended charge sheets against Major Aquino considering that they were executed in accordance
with the law, and without breach of Article 71 of the Articles of War. The preferment of charges under
Article 71 is a ground for the confinement or arrest
48
of Major Aquino pursuant to Article 70
49
of the
Articles of War.
It bears stressing that subsequent to the preferment of charges under Article 70, the Judge Advocate
General of the General Headquarters of the AFP, issued Office Order Number 14-06, creating a Pre-trial
Investigation Panel to investigate the case of Major Aquino and his co-accused. In addition, the Office of
the Judge Advocate General issued a subpoena and a notice of pre-trial investigation to Major Aquino
summoning him to appear in person before the Pre-trial Investigation Panel. Furthermore, Major Aquino
was given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and affidavits of his witnesses. More significantly,
Major Aquino was present during the scheduled investigation. His arrest and confinement cannot be said
to be without due process of law.
Perforce, we do not find that the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioners Petition for Habeas Corpus
for the person of Major Aquino. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled to it.
50
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by
the court which has jurisdiction to do so.
51
Its essential object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from it if such restraint is illegal.
52
In the case at bar, Major
Aquino stands charged in court martial proceedings for alleged violations of Article 67 (Attempting to
Begin or Create Mutiny) and Article 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) of the Articles of
War. The legality of Major Aquinos restraint having been settled, the privilege of the writ is unavailing.
We proceed to discuss jointly the second and third issues raised by the petitioner before this Court.
Petitioner contends that in his confinement, Major Aquino was not restricted to his barracks, quarters or
tent as mandated by Article 70 of the Articles of War; rather, he was placed in solitary confinement in a
maximum security detention cell. When petitioner proceeded to the detention cell, she alleged that she
was restricted from visiting her husband.
53
Petitioner asserts that these are extreme punishments akin to
treating Major Aquino as a convicted criminal.
54

We are not impressed.
At this juncture, it must be stressed that respondents deny the solitary confinement of Major
Aquino.
55
According to respondents, Major Aquino is confined in a U-shaped building without any
division/partition.
56
The place is described as a long hall with 50 double-deck beds.
57
Respondents also
asseverate that Major Aquino is confined along with 16 other military personnel who were similarly
charged in the 23-24 February 2006 incident.
58

While it is true that the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to inquire into
questions of violations of constitutional right,
59
this Court, however, does not find the conditions of Major
Aquinos confinement to be a proper subject of inquiry in the instant Petition.
This Court has declared that habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of confinement.
In Alejano v. Cabuay,
60
lawyers of soldiers and pre-trial detainees accused of coup detat before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati came to this Court bewailing the regulations adopted by the Chief of the
Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) who had custody over their clients.
Therein petitioners claimed that their constitutional rights were violated because they were prevented
from seeing the detaineestheir clientsat any time of the day or night. They also alleged that the
detainees constitutional right to privacy of communication were violated because ISAFP officials opened
and read the personal letters of some of the detainees. They also challenged, as unusual and excessive
punishment, the presence of the bars separating the detainees from their visitors and the boarding of the
iron grills in their cells with plywood. In denying the petition, this Court declared that the fact that the
restrictions inherent in detention intrude into the detainees desire to live comfortably does not convert
those restrictions into punishment.
61
Said the Court in Alejano:
Bell v. Wolfish [441 U.S. 520 (1979)] pointed out that while a detainee may not be punished prior to an
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law, detention inevitably interferes with a
detainees desire to live comfortably. The fact that the restrictions inherent in detention intrude into the
detainees desire to live comfortably does not convert those restrictions into punishment. It is when the
restrictions are arbitrary and purposeless that courts will infer intent to punish. Courts will also infer intent
to punish even if the restriction seems to be related rationally to the alternative purpose if the restriction
appears excessive in relation to that purpose. Jail officials are thus not required to use the least restrictive
security measure. They must only refrain from implementing a restriction that appears excessive to the
purpose it serves.
62
(Emphasis supplied.)1avvphi1
Furthermore, the following guidelines were given by the Court to determine if an action constitutes
punishment, to wit: (1) that action causes the inmate to suffer some harm or "disability," and (2) the
purpose of the action is to punish the inmate.
63
It is also an additional requisite that the harm or disability
be significantly greater than, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement.
64
We do not
see the attendance of the foregoing factors in the instant case. There are no specific facts that are
brought to the attention of this Court to indicate the punitive character of the confinement. The
confinement is not herein imposed as a punishment. We do not see that the confinement of Major Aquino
causes him to suffer some harm or disability.1avvphi1 There is no punitive hardship that exists in the case at bar.
In fact, petitioner does not even allege a single act which would show such harm or such "disability" as to
prove that the same is significantly greater than, or independent of, the inherent discomforts of
confinement.1avvphi 1
To be sure, the first part of Article 70 of the Articles of War grants discretion to military authorities over the
imposition of arrest or confinement of persons subject to military law charged with crime or with serious
offense, viz:
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement. Any person subject to military law charged with crime or with a serious
offense under these Articles shall be placed in confinement or in arrest, as circumstances may require,
but when charged with a minor offense only, such person shall not ordinarily be placed in confinement.
Any person placed in arrest under the provisions of this Article shall thereby be restricted to his barracks,
quarters, or tent, unless such limits shall be enlarged by proper authority. Any officer or cadet who breaks
his arrest or who escapes from confinement, whether before or after trial or sentence and before he is set
at liberty by proper authority, shall be dismissed from the service or suffer such other punishment as a
court-martial may direct, and any other person subject to military law who escapes from confinement or
who breaks his arrest, whether before or after trial or sentence and before he is set at liberty by proper
authority, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. (Emphasis supplied.)
Major Aquino is charged with violations of Article 67, for attempting to begin or create mutiny, and Article
97, for Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. According to Article 67, any person subject to
military law who attempts to create or who begins, excites, causes or joins in any mutiny shall suffer death
or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct. It cannot be gainsaid that in determining the
"circumstances" of arrest and confinement in Article 70 of persons charged with crime or with serious
offense, such circumstances as the gravity of the offense charged may be considered.
Anent petitioners allegation that she was restricted from visiting Major Aquino, the Court had in the past
underscored the "hands-off doctrine"a deference given by courts to military custodians over prison
matters, especially on blanket restrictions on contact visit.
In Alejano, we gave reasons for the allowance of such restrictions, thus:
Block v. Rutherford [468 U.S. 576 (1984)], which reiterated Bell v. Wolfish, upheld the blanket restriction
on contact visits as this practice was reasonably related to maintaining security. The safety of innocent
individuals will be jeopardized if they are exposed to detainees who while not yet convicted are awaiting
trial for serious, violent offenses and may have prior criminal conviction. Contact visits make it possible for
the detainees to hold visitors and jail staff hostage to effect escapes. Contact visits also leave the jail
vulnerable to visitors smuggling in weapons, drugs, and other contraband. The restriction on contact visit
was imposed even on low-risk detainees as they could also potentially be enlisted to help obtain
contraband and weapons. The security consideration in the imposition of blanket restriction on contact
visits was ruled to outweigh the sentiments of the detainees.
Block v. Rutherford held that the prohibition of contact visits bore a rational connection to the legitimate
goal of internal security. This case reaffirmed the "hands-off" doctrine enunciated in Bell v. Wolfish, a form
of judicial self-restraint, based on the premise that courts should decline jurisdiction over prison matters in
deference to administrative expertise.
65

As a rule, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus does not extend into questions of conditions of
confinement; but only to the fact and duration of confinement. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus
was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.
66
Its
object is to inquire into the legality of ones detention, and if found illegal, to order the release of the
detainee.
67
It is not a means for the redress of grievances or to seek injunctive relief or damages. We
reiterate the pronouncement of this Court in Alejano:
The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and convicted prisoners from
petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances. Regulations and conditions in detention and prison
facilities that violate the Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners will be reviewed by the courts
on a case-by-case basis. The courts could afford injunctive relief or damages to the detainees and
prisoners subjected to arbitrary and inhumane conditions. However, habeas corpus is not the proper
mode to question conditions of confinement. The writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is challenged is
the fact or duration of confinement.
68
(Emphasis supplied.)
In sum, we find the present Petition to be devoid of merit.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.






G.R. No. 140529 September 6, 2001
JOSE P. LOPEZ, JR., petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO and HON. MARGARITO P.
GERVACIO, JR. in their official capacities as Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao,
respectively, and the Sandiganbayan,respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J .:
Before us is a Petition for Mandamus seeking: 1) the dismissal of Ombudsman Case No. OMB-3-93-2793
(now Criminal Cases Nos. 25247-25226); and 2) the issuance of a clearance in favor of petitioner Jose P.
Lopez, Jr.
The facts as narrated in the memorandum of petitioner are:
"1. The petitioner is presently the Administrative Officer of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS), Region XII, Cotabato City.
Because of the exigency of the service, the petitioner temporarily stays in Cotabato City
although he is a resident of Paraaque City.
2. On June 30, 1959, the petitioner started working with the DECS as a classroom teacher.
Through hard work, exemplary performance and continuous studies, he was promoted and
assigned to different positions such as Special Education Teacher; Child and Youth
Specialist; 2nd Lt., 36 Battalion Combat Team, Philippine Army (Reserved Force); Asst.
Director and concurrent Director, Child and Youth Research Center (now a defunct office);
and finally, he was appointed as Administrative Officer V, DECS-Region XII, Cotabato City.
3. Among the tasks of the petitioner as Administrative Officer V is to determine whether
certain expenses are necessary in the attainment of the objectives of the DECS-Region XII
and to pass upon, review and evaluate documents and other supporting papers submitted to
him in relation to his duties.
4. Between 1992 and 1993, DECS-Region XII ordered several pieces of laboratory
equipment and apparati requested by different school divisions of the region.
5. The concerned officers of DECS-Region XII submitted to the petitioner the documents
covering the transactions.
6. After careful scrutiny of the documents submitted to him, the petitioner affixed his
signature on the disbursements vouchers that were accompanied by Purchase Orders, Sales
Invoices, Delivery/Memorandum Receipts and proof that the transactions were post audited
by the COA Resident Auditor who found them in order.
7. Disregarding the findings of the COA Resident Auditor - DECS Region XII, Cotabato City,
who post audited the transactions and found them in order, for reasons of his own, the COA
Regional Director formed a Special Audit Team to investigate and audit the transactions.
8. Without seeking the presence of the concerned officials and employees of DECS Region
XII, the COA Special Audit Team conducted an audit of the transactions.
9. On December 20, 1993, the members of the COA Special Audit Team submitted to the
COA Regional Director-Region XII, their Joint Affidavit claiming alleged deficiencies in the
transactions of DECS Region XII implicating thereto the petitioner and some concerned
officials and employees of DECS-Region XII.
10. Dispensing conducting an exit conference and inviting the petitioner to clarify the
allegations of the COA Special Audit Team in their Joint Affidavit-Complaint, in post-haste
the COA Regional Directors indorsed it to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao for
preliminary investigation.
11. The Office of Ombudsman-Mindanao docketed the complaint as Case No. 3-93-27791,
entitled "Commission on Audit vs. Makil Pundaodaya, et al.," for Falsification of Documents
by Public Officers."
12. In her Order dated March 1, 1994, Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) Marie Dinah
Tolentino directed the petitioner to submit a Counter-Affidavit without informing him of his
constitutional right to counsel.
13. On April 14, 1994, without the assistance of counsel, the petitioner wrote the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao requesting for an extension of ten (10) days from April 19, 1994 to
submit his Counter-Affidavit.
14. On April 19, 1994, Atty. Edgardo A. Camello, counsel for Makil Pundaodaya and the
other respondents in Case No. OMB-3-93-8791 filed a Motion for Extension of Time to
submit their Counter-Affidavits.
15. On April 22, 1994, without the assistance of counsel, the petitioner submitted to the
Office of Ombudsman-Mindanao his Counter-Affidavit he personally prepared denying
specifically each and every criminal act attributed to him by the Commission on Audit.
16. Although the petitioner did not submit any written statement authorizing Atty. Camello to
represent him in Case No. OMB 3-93-8791, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
erroneously assumed or deliberately made to appear that he was represented by said
attorney. As a consequence thereof, the Office of Ombudsman-Mindanao did not notify him
of the progress of the preliminary investigation. In fact, it did not issue any order directing
COA, Region XII to furnish him with a copy of the latters Reply-Affidavit, which explained
why petitioner could not be expected to submit a Rejoinder to rebut the issues raised in said
Reply-Affidavit; to summon and compel witnesses to appear and testify before the Graft
Investigation Officer or to bring books, documents and other records relative to the
transactions under their control and to secure the attendance or presence of any absent or
recalcitrant witness.
17. More than four (4) years after he submitted his Counter-Affidavit, the petitioner was
surprised that, without preliminary investigation and clarificatory question asked, on July 17,
1998, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao terminated the preliminary investigation
recommending that he, together with the other respondents in Case No. OMB 3-93-9791, be
prosecuted for violation of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
18. Within the reglementary period, without the assistance of counsel, the petitioner sent a
letter to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao dated June 8, 1999 seeking the
reconsideration of the Resolution in Case No. OMB 33-93-2791 wherein he stressed that he
was deprived of due process and that there was inordinate delay in the resolution of the
preliminary investigation; and there was no exit conference wherein he could have explained
to the Graft Investigation Officer his exculpatory participation in the transactions investigated.
In addition, he also submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a Motion for
Reconsideration or Reinvestigation reiterating the allegations mentioned in his letter dated
June 8, 1999. Unfortunately, said Motion for Reconsideration or Reinvestigation was not
acted upon by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao by giving the excuse that its
Resolution was already forwarded to Ombudsman Aniano Desierto."
1

On the other hand, the facts as narrated in the Memorandum of the Office of the Ombudsman are as
follows:
"Criminal Cases Nos. 25247 to 25276 stemmed from a special audit conducted by the
Commission on Audit (COA), Region XII relative to the purchase by the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), Region XII Office, Cotabato City of school equipment
and laboratory apparati. The report on the special audit was received by the Office of the
Ombudsman, Mindanao on December 22, 1993. Finding the audit report sufficient to conduct
a preliminary investigation the same was docketed as Case No. OMB-3-93-2791.
In an Order dated March 1, 1994, Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) Marie Dinah Tolentino
directed the concerned public officials, among whom was herein petitioner, to submit their
Counter-Affidavits and controverting evidences within ten days from receipt of the Order and
to furnish a copy of their counter-Affidavits to the complainant. The latter was given the same
period of ten (10) days to file their reply to the Counter-Affidavits.
On April 19, 1994 the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao received a pleading denominated
as "APPEARANCE With Motion for Extension of Time to Submit Counter-Affidavits" from
Atty. Edgardo A. Camello, counsel for the respondents in Case No. OMB-3-93-2791. The
Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao granted the motion for extension and gave the
respondents until May 4, 1994 within which to submit their Counter-Affidavits.
On May 10, 1994 the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao received the Counter-Affidavits of
the respondents.
On August 2, 1994 the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao was informed through the letter
of COA Director Eugenio G. Fernandez that the COA was not furnished by the respondents
in Case No. OMB-3-93-2791 of their Counter-Affidavits.
Subsequently, GIO Tolentino issued an Order dropping Alimot Lao Arumpac from the case in
view of his death. The COA on the other hand was directed to submit its Reply-Affidavit
within ten days from receipt of the Order.
On January 11, 1995 the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao received a telegram from
COA, Region XII Office requesting that it be allowed until February 29, 1995 within which to
submit its Reply-Affidavit on the ground that the audit team leader and members who
conducted the special audit of DECS, Region XII Office were preparing for their annual audit
report.
On February 29, 1995 the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao received the Reply-Affidavit
of COA.
In a Resolution dated July 17, 1998 GIO Rachelle L. Ladrera recommended the filing of thirty
(30) Informations against petitioner, Makil U. Pundaodaya, Jose T. Navera, Rogelio de los
Reyes, Daud M. Adiong, Napoleon O. Cedeno, Laga S. Mangelen and Mama S. Macoming.
The said recommendation was approved by public respondents Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao Margarito P. Gervacio on February 27, 1999, and by the Honorable Ombudsman
on April 30, 1999.
The thirty Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 25247 to 25276 were filed with the
Sandiganbayan and raffled to the respondent court on May 5, 1999.
On July 27, 1999 petitioner filed with the respondent court a motion for the reduction of the
bail. The motion was approved by the respondent court in an Order dated August 4, 1999."
2

In his Memorandum, petitioner presents before this Court the sole issue of: "Whether or not there was
undue and unjustifiable delay on the part of the Ombudsman in resolving the complaint filed against the
petitioner which violated his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the Complaint against him; and
whether or not such undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving the Complaint against the petitioner would
warrant its dismissal."
3
Petitioners main argument is that the "complaint against petitioner, Case No.
OMB 3-93-2793, was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao on December 10, 1993 and was
resolved only on April 30, 1998,
4
resulting in a delay of 4 years, 4 months and 10 days." In addition,
petitioner argues that he was deprived of due process because he did not engage a certain Atty. Edgardo
Camello who filed an "Appearance with Motion for Extension of Time to Submit Counter-Affidavits" on
behalf of the respondents in Case No. OMB-3-93-2791; that he was not advised by the Graft Investigation
Officer of his right to attorney; and that he filed his counter-affidavit without the assistance of counsel. On
the other hand, respondent Office of the Ombudsman argues that petitioners cannot, by this special civil
action for mandamus, compel the ombudsman to dismiss the criminal charges filed against them, since
such dismissal involves a discretionary, not a ministerial, duty.
First, we shall discuss the propriety of mandamus as a remedy, an issue which is not novel. This Court
has held that, "while as a general rule, the performance of an official act or duty, which necessarily
involves the exercise of discretion or judgment, cannot be compelled by mandamus, this rule does not
apply in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of
authority."
5
Thus, in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman
6
and Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman
7
the writ
was issued in said instances.
Second, we shall determine if the exceptions cited apply to this case. The Office of the Ombudsman
narrates that the verified audit report of the COA special audit team was received on December 22, 1993,
and finding the same sufficient in form and substance was docketed as OMB Case No. 34-93-2791. On
the basis thereof, a preliminary investigation was conducted. On March 1, 1994, the respondents were
ordered to file their counter-affidavits. On May 10, 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman received the
counter-affidavits of respondents. On February 29, 1995, the Office of the Ombudsman received the
reply-affidavit of COA. In a Resolution dated July 17, 1998, graft investigation officer Rachelle L. Ladrera
recommended the filing of thirty (30) informations against petitioner, Makil U. Pundaodaya, Jose T.
Navera, Rogelio de los Reyes, Daud M. Adiong, Napoleon O. Cedeno, Laga S. Mangelen and Mama S.
Macoming. The said recommendation was approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao Margarito P.
Gervacio on February 27, 1999, and by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto on April 30, 1999. The informations
were filed with the Sandiganbayan on May 5, 1999. In its memorandum, the Office of the Ombudsman
justified the delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation and subsequently, in the filing of the
informations by stating that:
"Records of Case No. OMB 3-93-2791 will show that petitioner, thru his counsel, filed on
April 19, 1994 with the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao for an extension of time to file
his Counter-Affidavit. Petitioner submitted his Counter-Affidavit only on May 11, 1994.
However, in a letter dated August 2, 1994 the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao was
informed by complainant COA that it was not furnished with a copy of the Counter-Affidavits
of the respondents in Case No. OMB-3-93-2791 in complete disregard of the Order of GIO
Tolentino.
Hence, the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao furnished the COA with a copy of the
Counter-Affidavits and ordered the same office to submit its reply thereto within ten (10)
days. It filed its Reply-Affidavit on February 28, 1995.
It will be noted that the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao directed the COA to furnish the
respondents in Case No. OMB 3-93-2791 with a copy of their Reply-Affidavit to afford the
latter an opportunity to controvert the allegations contained therein. Petitioner however, and
his other co-respondents did not file any pleading with, or notified the Office of the
Ombudsman, Mindanao that they were waiving their right to refute the contents of the Reply-
Affidavit. Thus, it is clear that petitioners averment that this case has been pending for more
than six (6) years has no basis.
It should also be considered that there were several transactions involved in Case No. OMB
3-93-2791. This fact is proven by the thirty (30) Informations filed before the respondent
court. Added to this is the fact that from the time the July 17, 1998 Resolution was approved
by public respondent Deputy Ombudsman Gervacio in his office in Mindanao the records of
the case still has to be sent to Manila for the review of the Ombudsman. The basic rule
therefore that in applying the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of
cases particular regard must also be take on the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case, finds meaning herein."
8

We find for petitioner.
Article III of the Constitution provides that:
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The constitutional right to a "speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all
proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings."
9
Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a
case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.
10

However, the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only
when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or even without cause or justifiable motive a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the
balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a
speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the
defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The
concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
11

In this case, the preliminary investigation was resolved close to four (4) years from the time all the counter
and reply affidavits were submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman. After the last reply-affidavit was filed
on February 28, 1995, it was only on July 17, 1998 that a resolution was issued recommending the filing
of the corresponding criminal informations against the petitioner and the others. It took eight months or on
February 27, 1999 for Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. to approve the same and close to
another year or on April 30, 1999 for Ombudsman Aniano Desierto to approve the recommendation.
During this interval, no incidents presented themselves for resolution and the delay could only be
attributed to the inaction on the part of the investigating officials. Indeed, we find that without cause or
justifiable motive, a long period of time was allowed to elapse at the preliminary investigation stage before
the informations were filed.
True, the prosecution is not bound by the findings of the COA and it must rely on its own independent
judgment in the determination of probable cause.
12
However, we find that the cases are not sufficiently
complex to justify the length of time for their resolution. Neither can the long delay in resolving the case
under preliminary investigation be justified on the basis of the number of informations filed before the
Sandiganbayan nor of the transactions involved. The thirty informations consist of sixteen (16) counts of
violations of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019 relative to the overpricing and lack of public bidding of laboratory
apparatus and school equipment; while the fourteen (14) counts are for violations of Section 3 (e) of the
same law relative to the certification in the inspection reports that the subject items have already been
delivered and received, when in fact they have not yet been actually delivered and received, in order to
facilitate payment to the suppliers. There is no statement that voluminous documentary and testimonial
evidence were involved. On the contrary, the Office Ombudsman itself claimed in its memorandum filed
before this Court that "the Complaint and the Counter-Affidavits submitted by the complainant and the
accused respectively, as well as the documents on hand" were sufficient to establish the existence of
probable cause for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019. Hence, a clarificatory hearing was no
longer conducted. Indeed, it appears that the COA special audit team had already come up and provided
the Office of the Ombudsman with the facts and figures on the alleged overpricing, lack of public bidding
and irregular inspection reports, so much so that a delay of almost four years in terminating the
preliminary investigation is not justified.
Verily, the delay in this case disregarded the Ombudsmans duty, as mandated by the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6770, to enforce the criminal liability of government officers or employees in every case
where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service to the people.
13
The failure of said office
to resolve the complaints that have been pending for almost four years is clearly violative of this mandate
and the rights of petitioner as a public official. In such event, petitioner is entitled to the dismissal of the
cases filed against him.
In Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan,
14
this Court dismissed the informations pending before the Sandiganbayan,
after finding the delay of three years in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan
to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases. It was held
therein:
"x x x. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the
light of the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt
of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative assumption
that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to
whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a
former high ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a
double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of
the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement
of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve
complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny"
as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The
other two charges relating to the alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits
to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not
warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the
case."
Similarly, we hold that the circumstances obtaining in the instant case do not warrant or justify the length
of time, that is four years, it took the Ombudsman to resolve the preliminary investigation. What glares
from the pleadings of both the petitioner and the public respondent Ombudsman is that from the
submission of the last reply-affidavit, there was an unexplained interval or inactivity of close to four years,
prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause and directing the filing of the corresponding
informations.
Lastly, petitioner prays for the dismissal of Ombudsman Case No. OMB-3-93-2791, and this Court,
applying the ruling in the Roque case,
15
citing Tatad,
16
likewise resolves to directly dismiss the
informations already filed before the Sandiganbayan against petitioner "in the interest of the speedy
disposition of cases" and considering that "the long and unexplained delay in the resolution of the criminal
complaints against petitioner was not corrected by the eventual filing of the informations."
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Mandamus is GRANTED and Ombudsman Case No. OMB-3-93-2791 is
accordingly DISMISSED. The Office of the Ombudsman is further directed to issue the corresponding
clearance in favor of petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

















G.R. No. 116239 November 29, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELPIDIO MERCADO y HERNANDO and AURELIO ACEBRON y ADORA, accused-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
For automatic review by the court is the decision,
1
dated July 22, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 156, Pasig, convicting accused-appellants SPO2 Elpidio Mercado y Hernando and SPO1
Aurelio Acebron y Adora, of the Philippine National Police of Tanay, Rizal, of kidnapping with murder
and sentencing them as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing discussions and finding the guilt of both accused to be
proven beyond reasonable doubt, while the undersigned Presiding Judge does not believe in the
imposition of the death penalty as a form of punishment, nevertheless, in obedience to the law which
is his duty to uphold, the Court hereby sentences both accused, ELPIDIO MERCADO y
HERNANDO and AURELIO ACEBRON y ADORA, to death, to proportionately indemnify the heirs of
the deceased Richard Buama in the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00); to pay the sum of fifty
two thousand six hundred eighty pesos (P52,680.00) (Exhibit J, J-1 to J-7) as expenses incident
to the burial; and the further sum of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) by way of moral
and exemplary damages, all without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.
"Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of both accused from the Pasig Municipal Jail to
the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
"Let the records of this case be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory review.
"SO ORDERED."
2

The information against accused-appellants charged-
"That on or about the 9th day of February, 1994, in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
them members of the PNP, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding
one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously kidnap one Richard Buama, a 17
year old minor and boarded him in a Red car bearing License plate No. CGZ 835 against his will
thus depriving him of his freedom of liberty (sic), brought him to Tanay, Rizal in a safe house and
there subjected him to extreme/brutal physical violence, and thereafter with abuse of superior
strength and evident premeditation hacked and bludgeoned/clubbed said Richard Buama who
thereby sustained mortal wounds which directly caused his death.
"Contrary to law."
3

Because of the gravity of the charge, no bail was recommended for the provisional release of
accused-appellants.
When arraigned on March 8, 1994, both accused-appellants, assisted by counsel,
4
pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged. During the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Florencio
Villareal, Eric Ona, SPO2 Virgilio Buama, Maria Buama, Lourdes Vergara, SPO2 Delfin Gruta, SPO2
James Mabalot, Jesus Nieves Vergara, and Lupito Buama. Their testimonies are as follows:
Twelve-year-old Florencio Villareal testified that at around 9 oclock in the evening of February 9,
1994, he and Richard Buama were picked up by accused-appellant Elpidio Mercado near Mercados
house in Sto. Tomas, Bukid, Pasig, Metro Manila. Mercado arrived in a car, together with Eric Ona.
Mercado suspected Florencio Villareal and Richard Buama of being the ones who had broken into
his store and stolen money. Florencios friend, Rex Bugayong, was able to run from Mercado.
Florencio and Richard were pushed into Mercados car. Florencio said Mercado poked a gun at
Richard which made the latter say, "Sasama na lang po ako. Wag ninyo lang po akong sasaktan." ("I
will go with you. Just dont hurt me.")
Mercado drove the car to Tanay, Rizal. Florencio and Richard were seated at the back, behind
Mercado and Eric, respectively. Upon reaching Tanay at around 11 oclock in the evening Mercado
took the three of them (Florencio, Richard, and Eric) to an apartment. Florencio was led inside the
apartment while Richard was held outside by Mercado. When Florencio looked through the window,
he saw Mercado slap and box Richard. Then he was brought inside. Mercado later went upstairs.
According to Florencio, Richard asked if they could leave the place as he held his stomach in pain,
but Florencio replied that the door was padlocked. Eventually, Mercado came down with Acebron.
Richard was made to sit on the floor in the kitchen of the apartment. Mercado then told Aceborn that
the had brought him a present ("pasalubong") and that they were going to kill two boys a small one
and a big one who was dark. In reply, Aceborn said, "Pare, huwag yung maliit dahil kasing hawig ng
anak ko, saka magbe-birthday pa kinabukasan." ("Buddy, not the small one because he resembles
my son who will celebrate his birthday tomorrow.") As the conversation was made within his hearing
distance, Richard became so scared that he could not answer when asked by Acebron about a girls
picture found in his wallet. This angered Acebron who boxed Richards in the stomach.
Mercado thereafter ordered Richard to take off all his clothes and lie face down on the kitchen floor.
Mercado asked his aide Jeff to get a rope. Jeff brought a piece of rattan rope and tied Richards
hands, while Mercado tied Richards feet. This happened at about 11:30 in the evening. Mercado
also ordered Jeff to get rags with which to blindfold and gag Richard and then asked Acebron to get
a bolo or a big knife. After getting a bolo, Acebron and Jeff put Richard into the luggage
compartment of Mercado's car. They then drove away, leaving behind Florencio and Eric in the
apartment. After two hours, Mercado and Acebron came back. Florencio saw Acebron washing the
bloodstains off the bolo. He asked Mercado where Richard was, to which Mercado replied, "Wala na.
Pinatahimik ko na." ("Gone. I have already silenced him.")
Mercado and Acebron then took Eric and Florencio to a beerhouse in Tanay, Rizal and warned them
not to tell anyone about the incident or they and their families would be killed. For fear of his life and
that of his family, Florencio promised he would not. From the beerhouse, Mercado drove to
Acebron's apartment, where the latter was dropped off, and then proceeded home to Pasig with Eric
and Florencio.
Florencio waited three days for news about Richard. On February 12, 1994, with still no news about
Richard, Florencio decided to talk to Richard's sister, a flower vendor whose store was located near
the Pasig Church. Florencio told her to look for Richard in Tanay; he even promised to help them
once they found him. Actually, it was Richard's brother, Virgilio Buama, a policeman, who found
Richard's body in a morgue in Morong, Rizal. He was told by a funeral parlor employee that they had
retrieved Richard's body near the boundary of Laguna. Florencio attended the wake of his friend in
Sto. Tomas, Pasig.
5

Virgilio Buama, a policeman and brother of Richard, last saw the latter on December 25, 1993 as
Richard lived with their mother. On February 11, 1994, Virgilio learned from his sister, Maria Buama,
that Richard had been picked up by a policeman on February 9, 1994. Hence, he went to see
Florencio Villareal, who related to him how Richard had been kidnapped and killed by Mercado.
Virgilio took Florencio to his house, and the following day, February 12, 1994, they went to the PNP
headquarters at Hilltop, Taytay, Rizal, where Florencio was shown pictures by Maj. Patricio Abenido.
Florencio picked out pictures of Mercado and Acebron and identified them as the culprits in the
killing of Richard. Florencio gave a sworn statement concerning the incident to SPO2 James
Mabalot at the PNP headquarters. Mercado was thereafter ordered to report to the Provincial
Director, Col. Maralit, and it was there that Florencio pointed to Mercado as the person who had
kidnapped and killed Richard. Acebron was likewise called, and he and Mercado were detained at
the Rizal PNP Command Stockade.
Virgilio found Richard's body at the San Francisco Funeral Homes in Morong, Rizal. The
owner/manager of the funeral parlor told him that Richard's body had been recovered in Mabitac,
Laguna. Virgilio brought the remains of his brother home.
6

Eric Matanggihan Ona, 21 years old, was in the house of his neighbor Coco San Juan, in Sto.
Tomas, Pasig, Metro Manila, at around 9 o'clock in the evening of February 9, 1994 when Mercado
arrived and asked him to go with him, after Mercado had asked Eric's father for permission to do so.
Along the way, Eric asked Mercado where they were going, and the latter said that they would look
for "Bunso" (Florencio Villareal's nickname) who had stolen money from his video machines. Eric
went with Mercado in the latter's car.
Florencio voluntarily went with them when Eric and Mercado saw him. Later, they saw Richard and
Rex Bugayong seated on the street gutter. When the two saw the car stop, Rex stood up and ran
away. Mercado told Eric to go after Rex, but Eric refused to do so because Rex was his friend.
Mercado was able to get Richard. Mercado placed his arm around Richard's shoulders while his
other hand poked a gun at Richard's side. Eric heard Richard pleading with Mercado not to hurt him
and saying that he would go with him. Eric knew that Mercado poked a gun at Richard because the
latter was Mercado's suspect in the robbery of his store. He heard Mercado ask, "Eric, bakit naman
pinasok nina Richard Buama at Florencio Villareal ang tindahan ko?" ("Eric, why did Richard Buama
and Florencio Villareal break into my store?") He answered that he did not know anything about it.
Then, Mercado told Richard and Florencio, "Nagkamali kayo ng tinalo. Isang napakalaking
bangungot ang ginawa ninyo." ("You picked on the wrong guy. What you have done is a big
nightmare.") According to Eric, they then boarded Mercado's car. Along the way, Eric asked
Mercado where they were going, to which Mercado replied, "Sa Tanay. Have you been there?"
Mercado asked Richard how many they were in the family, to which Richard replied that they were
ten and that one of his brothers was "one of them." ("Kabaro ninyo.")Mercado also asked them when
their birthdays were and whether they would like to have another birthday.
Upon reaching Tanay, they were brought to an apartment. There Mercado hit Richard on the face
and told him to take off his clothes. Mercado then went upstairs to wake up Acebron. Acebron tried
to talk to Richard, but the latter would not speak. This so angered Acebron that he boxed Richard
hard on the stomach. Mercado then asked his aide named Jeff to tie Richard's hands and feet and to
blindfold and gag him. This done, Acebron and Jeff loaded Richard into the luggage compartment of
the car. Eric described Richard as pale ("maputla"). He had hematoma on his stomach and a swollen
right cheek that was blackish in color. Eric saw Acebron get a bolo from the kitchen, a long
one, "mapurol" ("dull and not sharp"), and with a black handle. Fearing for his safety, Eric kept quiet.
Mercado warned them not to tell anybody about the incident; otherwise, they would be killed.
After two hours, Mercado and Acebron returned to the apartment without Richard. Eric saw the bolo
with bloodstains. He asked Mercado, "Tata Pedi, where is Richard?" Mercado answered, "Wala na,
pinagpahinga ko na." ("He is gone. I have laid him to rest.")
At around 4 o'clock in the morning, they went to the nearby "Space" beerhouse in Tanay, Rizal
where they were made to drink. It was there that Eric heard Mercado and Acebron's conversation.
Mercado asked, "Pare, ilan na ba ang napatay mo?" ("How many have you killed?") Acebron
said, "Ako, labimpito." ("Me, 17.") Mercado countered, "Pare, ako dalawampu't lima." ("Buddy, me,
25.") Acebron said Richard was the 17th person he had killed while Mercado said that Richard was
his 25th victim.
Thereafter, with Eric and Florencio in tow, Mercado brought Acebron back to the apartment and they
then went home to Pasig in Mercado's car. They reached Sto. Tomas, Pasig at around 5:30 in the
morning. Mercado again warned them: "Eric, Bunso, yung sinabi ko, ha." ("Eric, Bunso, don't forget
what I told you.") Eric took that to mean that they should not tell anyone about the incident;
otherwise, something bad would happen to them. Hence, hounded by fear, Eric did not report the
matter to the police. He also did not know that Richard had been killed. He said if he had known that
Richard was already dead when Mercado brought him home, he would have reported the matter to
police authorities.
Richard's brothers and sisters searched for him the following day, but Eric, fearing for his life, did not
talk to them. It was only when he saw the wake being held for Richard at the Sto. Tomas Chapel that
Eric realized that Richard was dead. After Richard's wake, Mercado told Eric to look for Florencio
lest the latter talk about the incident. Eric did not obey Mercado. When Mercado asked him if he had
seen Florencio, Eric said he had not. Thereafter, someone from the PNP headquarters in Hilltop
picked him up. At the investigation conducted, Eric executed a sworn statement.
7

The sisters Maria Buama and Lourdes Buama Vergara testified that Richard was informally
adopted by the Buama family. When Richard was six months old, his mother gave him to Maria at
the Pasig Immaculate Conception Church on June 18, 1977. They considered Richard as their own
brother and a member of their family. It was Florencio who informed them that Mercado had picked
him up and Richard on February 9, 1994. In the evening of February 11, 1994, upon learning about
the incident, Maria and Lourdes went to Mercado's house cum store in Sto. Tomas, Pasig where
Richard used to play video machines. Mercado's wife told them that Richard no longer came to the
video store as he had done something wrong. Asked what it was that Richard had done, Mercado's
wife failed to answer because someone inside the store said,"Hinahanap si Richard ng mga kapatid
niya." When asked why his parents were not informed about Richard's alleged mischief, Mercado's
wife allegedly replied it was because their store had not yet been emptied. ("Hindi pa raw nauubos
ang tindahan nila.") Lourdes and Maria eventually found Richard's body in the early morning of
February 12, 1994. For the wake the Buama family held for Richard at the Chapel of Sto. Tomas in
Pasig and his funeral, they spent P52,680.00.
8

SPO2 James Mabalot took the statements of Eric and Florencio. When the latter implicated
Mercado and Acebron, SPO2 Mabalot took the two boys to the Administrative Building. From the
pictures of almost all of the more than 100 members of the PNP Rizal, Eric and Florencio picked
those of Mercado and Acebron. The statements that Eric and Florencio executed were signed in the
presence of both SPO2 Mabalot and his superior. SPO2 Mabalot and his team thereafter went to a
funeral parlor in Morong, Rizal where they were told that Richard's body had been taken to the PNP
Crime Laboratory Services for autopsy. They learned that Richard's body had been found at the
boundary of Rizal and Laguna.
On the way to that site, SPO2 Mabalot and his team dropped by the Tanay Police Station to
coordinate with the Tanay police in the investigation of the case. When Florencio, who was with
them, saw Mercado's car parked outside the police station, he recognized it as the one used in
taking them from Pasig to Tanay. When SPO2 Mabalot and his team opened the car, they found
blood spots on the backseat. The car was then taken to the PNP Headquarters in Hilltop, Taytay,
Rizal for proper identification and examination of the bloodstains.
On orders of Col. Maralit, Mercado and Acebron were placed in detention. SPO2 Mabalot wanted
Florencio and Eric to confront Mercado and Acebron, but Florencio and Eric were so scared to do so
for fear that the accused might hurt them.
9

Dr. Jesusa Nieves Vergara, Acting Chief of the Medico-legal Division of the PNP Crime laboratory
in Camp Crame, Quezon City, executed and signed the postmortem examination report on Richard's
body. Her report shows that the cadaver had previously been embalmed; that there were two marks
at the back of the left hand; that both hands were tied with plastic cord while both feet were tied with
rattan; and that it sustained nine injuries on the head, neck, left upper extremity, and the left arm.
There were abrasions, lacerations, and stab wounds. The multiple abrasions on the forehead and
the back of the left arm were possibly secondary to a fall against a hard surface. The lacerations
were on the lower jaw, on the front right ear, at the right ear lobe, and two on the right side of the
neck. These could have been caused by a blunt object such as a piece of wood, an iron bar, a
hollow block, or anything hard. There were also injuries and other lacerations on the back of the
head towards the right side which could have been caused by the application of blunt force. Opening
of the head revealed hematoma or accumulation of blood. The medical report stated that Richard
died of "(i)ntracranial hemorrhage as a result of skull fracture."
10

Accused-appellants' defense was alibi. SPO1 Miguel Catapusan, Administrative Officer of the Tanay
PNP Municipal Station, testified that accused-appellants both reported for work on February 9, 1994
at the police station. The morning and evening Formation Sheets and the Police Duty Roster Book
or the logbook showed that accused-appellant Elpidio Mercado and accused- appellant Aurelio
Acebron were both present from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. However, after signing the logbook in the
morning, accused-appellants were told to report to the Rizal PNP Headquarters Command between
9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. regarding some important matters. After the head count that night, the Chief
of Police briefed the policemen on their assignments for thirty minutes, until 8:30 p.m.
11

Testifying in his own defense, accused-appellant Elpidio Mercado said that before he joined the
PNP Tanay, Rizal, he was with the Philippine Navy since 1976. He was transferred to the Philippine
Coast Guard in 1981 where he served until 1986. When the EDSA Revolution broke out, he was
assigned to Malacaang as a member of the Presidential Security Group (PSG) until 1991. His next
assignment from 1991 to 1992 was at the Maritime Command, Anti-smuggling Division. Thereafter,
he was assigned to Task Force Habagat under Col. Panfilo Lacson of the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission (PACC). In 1993, he was assigned to the PNP of Rizal. For his military and police
services, Mercado claimed he received several awards, commendations, and medals.
12

On February 9, 1994, Mercado reported to the Tanay police station because Col. Maralit had
summoned him the night before. After signing the logbook, Mercado, together with Acebron and one
SPO4 Bias, asked permission from their superior officer to go to the PNP Hilltop Headquarters for an
investigation. They left the Tanay Police Station at 8:10 a.m. and proceeded to the Hilltop
Headquarters where they stayed until 5:00 p.m. They went back to the Tanay Police Station to
attend the evening formation that lasted up to 8:30 p.m. Thereafter, Mercado went home with
Acebron. They invited SPO4 Bias to have dinner with them in their house at Plaza Aldea, Tanay.
The house was provided to them by the local government of Tanay, and they shared it with SPO2
Sagat and Chief Inspector Genabe. After SPO4 Bias went home at 10 o'clock in the evening,
Mercado went to bed. At around 7 o'clock in the morning the following day, February 10, 1994,
Acebron woke Mercado up as he prepared to go to the office. Mercado told Acebron to inform his
officer that he would not attend the morning formation.
Mercado said he was married and that his wife stayed in their house in Sto. Tomas, Baltazar St.,
Pasig, Metro Manila, to attend to their store and two video machines. He usually went home every
15th and 30th of the month except when there were special occasions. He owned a red Chevrolet
car, but it was seized by the 221st Mobile Force on the ground that it was used in a crime. Mercado
claimed that the travel time from Pasig to Tanay was one-and-a-half hours and if traffic was heavy,
two hours.
Mercado denied the allegations against him. He claimed that Eric and Florencio implicated them in
the crime because of an incident on January 23, 1994 in which Eric created trouble in his video
machine shop. Mercado saw Eric strangling a kid. He was going to pacify Eric, but the latter uttered
bad words against him. So, he slapped Eric. The youngsters scampered, but Acebron, who was
visiting Mercado, was able to grab Florencio. Mercado hit Florencio on the back of the head and told
him not to show their faces anymore in his store because they were driving away his customers.
Since then, Eric and Florencio harbored ill feelings against him. They had been calling his house and
threatening his family that they would kill his son and rape his daughters. Hence, as a precautionary
measure, he sent his children to Cavite; only his wife, sister-in-law, and their maid remained in their
house in Pasig.
13

Aurelio Acebron, the other accused-appellant, also testified. He said that before he joined the
Tanay Police Force in November 1993, he had been a member of the Philippine Constabulary since
1975. He was assigned to the 61st PC Battalion in Basilan and Cebu until 1978. From 1978 to 1979,
he was an investigator of the Constabulary Metrocom. From 1979 to 1982, he was also an
investigator at the regional headquarters of the RT Division in Zamboanga City. From 1982 to 1985,
he served in the Military Police Brigade in Camp Aguinaldo. At the Rizal PNP Command, he was
also an investigator. During his active duty, he received 22 commendations, two medals, and six
military merit medals. He was also awarded a bronze medal in the aftermath of the 1989 failed coup
d' etat in Makati.
Acebron claimed that on February 9, 1994, he reported for work before 8 o'clock in the morning as
shown by the logbook he signed. With Mercado and SPO4 Bias, he was ordered to report to Supt.
Crescencio Maralit at Hilltop, Taytay, Rizal. They left Tanay at 8: 10 a.m. and arrived at Hilltop at 9
o'clock that same morning. They conferred with Supt. Maralit from 2 until 5 o'clock in the afternoon.
They then went back to the Tanay PNP station and reported to Major Genabe. Acebron attended the
evening formation that lasted up to 8:30 in the evening, after which he went home to Plaza Aldea,
Tanay together with Mercado and SPO4 Bias. They had dinner with Bias and Major Genabe. Bias
left at 10 o'clock in the evening and they settled for the night. The following morning, he woke up at 6
o'clock. Before leaving for the office, he woke up Mercado who, however, said that he would not
attend the morning formation as he would go directly to his assignment at Post No. 2.
Acebron also denied all accusations against him. He claimed that he had been implicated in revenge
for what happened on January 23, 1994 when he collared Florencio and Mercado hit the boy's back
for causing trouble in Mercado's video shop. Acebron claimed that he had been asked by police
officers Mabalot and Ople to testify against Mercado, but he refused. He claimed he had been
detained on February 12, 1994 after he was implicated in this case.
14

Corroborating other defense witnesses, SPO4 Teofilo Paz Bias swore that at 7:30 in the morning
on February 9, 1994, he attended the morning formation at the Tanay police station. Mercado and
Acebron were there present. At past 8:00 a.m., as he accompanied Mercado and Acebron to the
headquarters at Hilltop, Taytay, Rizal, they saw Col. Maralit with whom they conferred from 2:00
p.m. until 5:00 p.m. They then went back to Tanay to attend the evening formation which lasted until
about 8:45 in the evening. Major Genabe ordered him to go with Mercado and Acebron to discuss in
the house the result of the investigation at Hilltop, Taytay. They arrived in that house at 9:00 p.m.
While they were having dinner, they discussed what had happened at the investigation of Mercado
and Acebron by the Provincial Director. At 10 o'clock that evening, after supper, Bias went home to
Pililla, Rizal. The following morning, he saw Acebron report to work.
15

On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the trial court found both accused guilty and sentenced them
to death. Hence, this appeal. The joint brief of accused-appellants Mercado and Acebron contains
the following assignment of errors:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN GIVING CREDENCE TO CLASHING
MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES ON THE TESTIMONIES OF THE TWO (2)
PROSECUTIONS (sic) PRINCIPAL WITNESSES. THEIR CONTRADICTING TESTIMONIES AND
EVIDENCES CREATED NOT ONLY REASONABLE DOUBT BUT RATHER ESTABLISHED
FACTUAL ERROR THAT WOULD BRING ABOUT ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DISREGARDING THE DIRECT
MATERIAL EVIDENCE CONSISTING OF POLICE LOGBOOK OR DUTY ROSTER BOOK
(EXHIBITS "6" -MERCADO AND "4" -ACEBRON) AND TESTIMONIES OF SPO2 POLICE
CATAPUSAN THAT BOTH ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ATTENDED THE MORNING FORMATION
AT 8:00 IN THE MORNING OF FEBRUARY 9, 1994 AT TANAY, RIZAL, THEN ATTENDED A
CONFERENCE CALL OF SUPT. CHIEF COLONEL MARALIT THE WHOLE DAY AT TAYTAY,
RIZAL, THEN BACK TO TANAY, RIZAL AT 6:00 P.M. AND BOTH ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
ATTENDED THE EVENING FORMATION AT 8:00 P.M. WHICH LASTED UP TO 8:45 P.M., AFTER
WHICH, THEY (SPO1 BIAS, MERCADO & ACEBRON) PROCEEDED TO MAJOR GENABE AT
THE TANAY APARTMENT AND MADE REPORT REGARDING THE CONFERENCE
CONDUCTED BY COL. MARALIT UP TO 10:00 P.M. HENCE, PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR
THE ACCUSED MERCADO TO PICK UP THE VICTIM AT 9:00 P.M. AT PASIG, METRO MANILA.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THERE EXIST (sic) A
CONSPIRACY, WITHOUT ANY EVIDENCE AND BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW THAT WILL
SUPPORT ITS DECISION.
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME KIDNAPPING WITH
HOMICIDE, THERE BEING NO EVIDENCE ADDUCED THAT HOMICIDE HAS BEEN COMMITTED
IN FURTHERANCE OR AS A CONSEQUENCE OF KIDNAPPING.
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN WRITING THE DECISION WITH
UNDUE HASTE AND INCREDIBLE SPEED ONE (1) DAY AFTER THE SUBMISSION OF
ACCUSED (sic) 32-PAGE JOINT MEMORANDUM ON JULY 21, 1994, WITHIN THE 15-DAY
PERIOD GRANTED BY THE COURT AND PROMULGATING ITS DECISION ON THE NEXT DAY,
JULY 22, 1994, CONSISTING OF 39 PAGES, THUS, RESULTING IN FATAL ERROR OF
CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED SENTENCING THEM TO DEATH BASED ON WRONG
APPRECIATION OF FACTS, SPECULATIONS AND PROBABILITIES AND DESPITE PATENT
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE WHAT HAVE BEEN ALLEGED UNDER THE
CRIMINAL INFORMATION.
These assigned errors boil down to the following main issues: (1) credibility of witnesses, (2) alibi as
a defense, and (3) the presence of conspiracy.
These issues will be discussed in the course of this decision, although not necessarily in the order
discussed by accused-appellants in their brief. But before doing so, we first consider the threshold
question raised in the Supplemental Brief filed for accused-appellants by collaborating counsel Rene
V. Sarmiento with regard to the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 providing for the death
penalty for 13 heinous crimes.
I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF R.A. 7659 AND R.A. 8177
Accused-appellants argue that Republic Act 7659 violates the 1987 Constitution because -
1. There are no compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for the crimes of treason, qualified
piracy, qualified bribery, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention,
robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons, destructive arson, rape, plunder, importation
of prohibited drugs, etc.
2. R.A. No.7659 violates the constitutional ban against infliction of cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment.
3. R.A. No. 7659 impugns the constitutional right to equality before the law.
4. R.A. No. 7659 repudiates the obligation of the Philippines under international law.
5. Death penalty is not deterrence to the commission of crimes.
16

The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 has already been settled in the Court's 12-3 per
curiam Resolution in People vs. Echegaray,
17
wherein the following rulings were made:
1. The death penalty is not a "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment." It is an exercise of
the state's power to "secure society against the threatened and actual evil."
2. The offenses for which Republic Act No. 7659 provides the death penalty satisfy "the element of
heinousness" by specifying the circumstances which generally qualify a crime to be punishable by
death;
3. Republic Act No. 7659 provides both procedural and substantial safeguards to insure its correct
application.
4. The Constitution does not require that "a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of
crime should first be perceived and statistically proven" before the death penalty may be prescribed.
Congress is authorized under the Constitution to determine when the elements of heinousness and
compelling reasons are present, and the Court would exceed its own authority if it questioned the
exercise of such discretion.
In the subsequent case of Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice,
18
the Court sustained the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8177, providing for death by lethal injection against claims that
death by lethal injection was cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment, and that the law violated
treaty obligations. Petitioner in that case argued that death by lethal injection constituted cruel,
degrading, and inhuman punishment because: (1) Republic Act No. 8177 failed to provide for the
drugs to be used in administering lethal injection, the dosage for the drug to be administered, and
the procedure in administering drug(s) to the convict; (2) Republic Act No. 8177 and its implementing
rules did not fix either the date of execution of the convict or the time for notifying him, with the result
that such uncertainties cause pain and suffering to the convict, and (3) the possibility of botched
executions or mistakes in administering drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.
Rejecting petitioner's contention that death by lethal injection violates the prohibition against cruel,
degrading, and inhuman punishment in Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution, the Court said:
"Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment. In the oft-cited case of Harden v. Director of Prisons, this Court held that
'[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death
is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.' Would the lack in
particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law 'cruel,
degrading or inhuman'? The Court believes not. For reasons hereafter discussed, the implementing
details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and expertise of
administrative officials."
19

As to the contention that the re-imposition of the death penalty violates international treaty
obligations, particularly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Court explained:
"Indisputably, Article 6 of the Covenant enshrines the individual's right to life. Nevertheless, Article
6(2) of the Covenantexplicitly recognizes that capital punishment is an allowable limitation on the
right to life, subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the most serious crimes.' Pursuant to
Article 28 of the Covenant, a Human Rights Committee was established and under Article 40 of
the Covenant, States Parties to the Covenant are required to submit an initial report to the
Committee on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized within
the Covenant and on the progress made on the enjoyment of those rights within one year of its entry
into force for the State Party concerned and thereafter, after five years. On July 27, 1982, the
Human Rights Committee issued General Comment No. 6 interpreting Article 6 of
the Covenant stating that '(while) it follows from Article 6(2) to (6) that State parties are not obliged to
abolish the death penalty totally, they are obliged to limit its use and, in particular, to abolish it for
other than the 'most serious crimes.' Accordingly, they ought to consider reviewing their criminal laws
in this light and, in any event, are obliged to restrict the application of the death penalty to the 'most
serious crimes.' The article strongly suggests (pars. 2[2] and [6]) that abolition is desirable. x x x. The
Committee is of the opinion that the expression 'most serious crimes' must be read restrictively to
mean that the death penalty should be a quite exceptional measure. Further, The Safeguards
Guaranteeing Protection of Those Facing the Death Penalty adopted by the Economic and Social
Council of the United Nations declare that the ambit of the term 'most serious crimes' should not go
beyond intentional crimes, with lethal or other extremely grave consequences.
"The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on December 16, 1966, and signed and ratified by the
Philippines on December 19, 1966 and August 22, 1989, respectively. The Optional
Protocol provides that the Human Rights Committee shall receive and consider communications
from individuals claiming to be victims of violations of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.
"On the other hand, the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly on
December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document. Evidently, petitioner's
assertion of our obligation under the Second Optional Protocol ismisplaced."
20

Accused-appellants further argue that Republic Act No. 7659 denies equality before the law. They
cite studies here and abroad allegedly showing that "the death penalty has most often been used
against the poor." This statement is too sweeping to merit further serious consideration. Anyone,
regardless of his economic status in life, may commit a crime. While there may be perceived
imbalances in the imposition of penalties, there are adequate safeguards in the Constitution, the law,
and procedural rules to ensure due process and equal protection of the law. As pointed out by
Representative Pablo Garcia when interpellated by Representative Joker Arroyo during the
congressional deliberation on the death penalty bill:
"x x x. (T)here is something more in the bill that protects the rights of every accused person, be he
rich or poor. I refer to the provisions under the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. The Constitution
itself protects, envelops the accused with the mantle of protection guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law. In other words, the accused cannot be deprived of his life
without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. In other
words, the laws protect the rich and the poor, the lettered and the unlettered. That is guaranteed by
the Constitution. x x x."
21

Similarly, in People vs. Mijano,
22
this Court recently said:
"Finally, accused-appellant in his reply brief contends that the death penalty law is violative of the
equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution because it punishes only people like him, the poor,
the uneducated, and the jobless.
"The equality the Constitution guarantees is legal equality or, as it is usually put, the equality of all
persons before the law. Under this guarantee, each individual is dealt with as an equal person in the
law, which does not treat the person differently because of who he is or what he is or what he
possesses (Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, 1987 ed., p.
6).
x x x x x x x x x
"Apparently, as it should be, the death penalty law makes no distinction. It applies to all persons and
to all classes of persons - rich or poor, educated, or uneducated, religious or non-religious. No
particular person or classes of persons are identified by the law against whom the death penalty
shall be exclusively imposed."
Accused-appellants' claim that the death penalty does not deter the commission of crimes is without
any basis. To be sure, deterrence is not the only aim of the law. As Representative Pablo Garcia, the
principal author of the death penalty bill, explained "more than deterrence, x x x is retributive
justice."
23
In People vs. Echegaray, it was further stated:
"The abolitionists in Congress insisted that all criminal reforms first be pursued and implemented
before the death penalty be reimposed in case such reforms prove unsuccessful. They claimed that
the only compelling reason contemplated by the Constitution is that nothing else but the death
penalty is left for the government to resort to that could check the chaos and the destruction that is
being caused by unbridled criminality. Three of our colleagues are of the opinion that the compelling
reason required by the constitution is that there occurred a dramatic and significant change in the
socio-cultural milieu after the suspension of the death penalty on February 2, 1987 such as an
unprecedented rise in the incidence of criminality. Such are, however, interpretations only of the
phrase 'compelling reasons' but not of the conjunctive phrase 'compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes.' The imposition of the requirement that there be a rise in the incidence of criminality because
of the suspension of the death penalty, moreover, is an unfair and misplaced demand, for what it
amounts to, in fact, is a requirement that the death penalty first prove itself to be a truly deterrent
factor in criminal behavior. If there was a dramatically higher incidence of criminality during the time
that the death penalty was suspended, that would have proven that the death penalty was indeed a
deterrent during the years before its suspension. Suffice it to say that the constitution in the first
place did not require that the death penalty be first proven to be a deterrent; what it requires is that
there be compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
"Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that Congress, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision
imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of
a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven following the
suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be
resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in
society. It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an 'alarming
upsurge of such crimes,' for the same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to
determine the existence of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A.
No. 7659 states is that 'the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the
need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons
to impose the death penalty for said crimes.'"
24

Indeed, today, even members of the Court who originally dissented from the majority ruling
sustaining the validity of Republic Act No. 7659 agree on the imposition of the death penalty without
in the least changing their view about the constitutionality of the penalty.
As we did in People vs. Godoy,
25
we restate mankind's age-old observation and experience on the
penological and societal effect of capital punishment: "If it is justified, it serves as a deterrent; if
injudiciously imposed, it generates resentment."
26

We now consider the merits of this case.
II. THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
The question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine.
27
For this reason,
its observations and conclusions are accorded great respect on appeal.
28
This rule is variously stated
thus: The trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight. It is
conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight,
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been considered.
29
Absent any showing
that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
which would affect the result of the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the
credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by appellate courts.
30

In the case at bar, inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimonies of the two principal
prosecution witnesses, Florencio Villareal and Eric Ona, are alleged as undermining their credibility,
to wit:
(1) Florencio testified that on February 9, 1994 at about 9 o'clock in the evening, he and the victim,
Richard Buama, were picked up by Mercado and Eric while he and Richard, in the company of Rex
Bugayong, were passing time near Mercado's house. Eric belied this testimony when, on cross-
examination, he said that he and Mercado saw Florencio first at about 8 o'clock, not 9 o'clock in the
evening of February 9, 1994 at the corner of Sto. Tomas Street, Pasig, one block away from the
place where they later found Richard.
(2) Florencio testified that when they were apprehended at the corner of Baltazar Street, Mercado
pushed him straight into the car, and held and poked a gun at Richard. On the other hand, Eric
testified that Florencio voluntarily went with them into the car as Mercado, with a .38 black gun
tucked at his side, placed his arm around Richard's shoulder.
(3) In his sworn statement, Florencio stated in answer to Question No.3, "At kami po ay dinala ng
pulis na humuli sa amin doon sa inuupahan niyang bahay at isinakay kami sa kanyang kotse at kami
ay dinala sa Tanay, Rizal." However, in answer to Question No. 6, Eric said "Una kaming
dinala sa bahay na inuupahan ni Elpidio Mercado dito sa Pasig." Eric denied Florencio's statement
that they did not stay in Mercado's house; instead, they just circled the place and then proceeded to
Tanay, Rizal right away. Florencio in fact contradicted his own statement at the trial by declaring that
they just passed by Mercado's house and did not stay there.
(4) In his testimony, Florencio said that on their way to Tanay, Rizal, he did not hear conversation
between Mercado and Eric. Yet Eric testified that, upon reaching Rosario, he talked to Mercado and
asked him where they were going. Mercado answered, "Sa Tanay, have you been there?" Mercado
even asked them their birthdays and if they still wanted to have birthdays.
(5) Florencio testified that upon reaching Tanay, Rizal and alighting from the car he was brought
inside the apartment and that when he peeped through the window he saw Mercado slapping
Richard on the face. On the contrary, Eric testified that upon their arrival in Tanay, Rizal, they
alighted from the car and were told to go inside the apartment and it was there where Mercado
slapped Richard on the face and asked him to undress.
(6) Florencio further testified that after Richard had taken off his clothes as ordered by Mercado, the
latter asked Richard to lie down, face downward, and thereafter, Richard's feet and hands were tied
by Mercado and his aide, Jeff, with a rattan rope. Eric stated on cross-examination that when
Richard was lying down, Mercado stepped on Richard's left cheek, implying that Richard lay not with
his face down but with his right cheek on the ground.
(7) Florencio stated in his sworn statement that upon reaching Tanay, Rizal, they were taken into an
apartment opposite a beerhouse. On the other hand, Eric claimed that the apartment was some 130
to 150 meters away from the beerhouse.
(8) Florencio stated in his sworn statement that after Richard was beaten up, his hands and feet
were tied and then Mercado and his police companion loaded (sinakay) Richard into the car. Eric,
however, testified that Richard was loaded in the baggage compartment of the car by Acebron and
Jeff. On cross-examination, Florencio contradicted himself by admitting that it was Acebron and Jeff
who loaded Richard into the car.
(9) Florencio testified that, although Mercado asked Acebron to get a bolo, the latter got a long knife
(not a bolo) with a "sharp pointed edge" (sic). Eric declared that the bolo taken by Acebron
was "mapurol."
(10) Eric testified that on February 12, 1994, he was investigated ahead of Florencio by SPO2
James Mabalot and insisted that his statement was the truth. He even stated that as he was being
investigated, Florencio was around, talking. However, this testimony was contradicted by SPO2
James Mabalot who declared that it was Florencio who was first investigated as shown by the fact
that Florencio was investigated at 6:20 p.m., while Eric was investigated at 10:45 p.m. of February
12, 1994.
(11) On cross-examination, Eric testified that while SPO2 Mabalot was investigating him and
Florencio, SPO1 Buama was just outside the office and even saw him. SPO1 Buama confirmed this
statement. However, SPO2 Mabalot said that when he investigated Florencio and Eric, SPO1
Buama was not present having then already left.
(12) SPO1 Buama testified that Richard was his full blood brother, but his sister, Maria Buama, said
that Richard was an adopted child, although they considered him their full blood brother.
31

Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer only to minor details and collateral
matters do not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is consistency in
relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants. Slight contradictions in
fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not
rehearsed. They are thus safeguards against memorized perjury.
32

Nor are such inconsistencies and even improbabilities unusual, for there is no person with perfect
faculties or senses.
33
An adroit cross-examiner may trap a witness into making statements
contradicting his testimony on direct examination. Intensive cross-examination on points not
anticipated by a witness and his lawyer may make a witness blurt out statements which do not
dovetail even with his own testimony. Yet, if it appears that the same witness has not willfully
perverted the truth, as may be gleaned from the tenor of his testimony and the conclusion of the trial
judge regarding his demeanor and behavior on the witness stand, his testimony on material points
may be accepted.
A witness' testimony may likewise contradict that of another witness. As long as the contradiction
involves minor details and collateral matters, the credibility of both witnesses will not be deemed
impaired. After all, no two witnesses could testify on a matter from the same point of view or
perception. The recollection of different witnesses with respect to the time, place, and other
circumstances of a criminal event would naturally differ in various details. Absolute uniformity in
every detail of testimonies cannot be expected of witnesses who by nature react differently to what
they see and hear depending upon their situation and state of mind.
34
On the contrary , if witnesses
should agree on every detail of a transaction that occupied a considerable space of time and should
undertake to tell all that occurred in precisely the same order, each giving the same incidents as the
others in precisely the same words, that fact should make their testimonies suspect.
35

Applying these rules to this case, the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of Florencio Villareal
and Eric Ona pointed out by appellants concern only minor details which do not detract from the
essential points of their testimonies that accused-appellants, after beating up the victim, took him
away in accused-appellant Mercado's car, and, when they returned to the apartment, both admitted
that they had "silenced" the victim or had "laid him to rest."
The alleged inconsistencies between the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and their
affidavits, on the other hand, refer to minor matters that do not affect the substance of the
prosecution's evidence. Affidavits are not entirely reliable evidence in court due to their
incompleteness and the inaccuracies that may have attended their formulation.
36
In general, such
affidavits are not prepared by the affiants themselves but by another person (i.e., investigator) who
may have used his own language in writing the statement or misunderstood the affiant or omitted
material facts in the hurry and impatience that usually attend the preparation of such affidavits. As
this Court has often said:
"An affidavit, 'being taken ex-parte, is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes
from partial suggestion, and sometimes from want of suggestion and inquiries, without the aid of
which the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the
correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that belongs to
the subject.'"
37

"'We have too much experience of the great infirmity of affidavit evidence. When the witness is
illiterate and ignorant, the language presented to the court is not his; it is; and must be, the language
of the person who prepares the affidavit; and it may be, and too often is, the expression of that
person's erroneous inference as to the meaning of the language used by the witness himself; and
however carefully the affidavit may be read over to the witness, he may not understand what is said
in a language so different from that which he is accustomed to use. Having expressed his meaning
in his own language, and finding it translated by a person on whom he relies, into language not his
own, and which he does not perfectly understand, he is too apt to acquiesce; and testimony not
intended by him is brought before the court as his.' (2 Moore on Facts, sec. 952, p. 1105; People v.
Timbang, 74 Phil. 295, 299)."
38

For this reason, affidavits have generally been considered inferior to testimony given in open court.
39

Neither is the credibility of prosecution witnesses Florencio Villareal and Eric Ona in any way
lessened, much less impaired, by the motives imputed to them by accused-appellants who claim that
the former testified against them on account of an incident on January 23, 1994 when Mercado
slapped Eric and hit Florencio on the back. Accused-appellants' contention is nothing more than a
desperate attempt to discredit said witnesses. It is inconceivable that these principal prosecution
witnesses, two young boys, would impute a crime as heinous as kidnapping with murder to anyone if
the same was not true. Indeed, it would be contrary to the natural order of events and of human
nature, and against the presumption of good faith for Florencio and Eric to falsely testify against
accused- appellants.
40
These young boys, in testifying against accused-appellants, would have
nothing to gain and everything to lose, including their lives. Florencio and Eric knew that, even if
accused-appellants were bemedalled military and police officers, they had no compunction at all in
claiming to have killed a number of people. Even granting that such braggadocio was simply meant
to frighten these young boys into silence, it would nonetheless have the same effect on them and
would have deterred them from testifying against accused-appellants had what they testified to been
a mere fabrication.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION
It is true that no eyewitnesses were presented by the prosecution o testify on the actual killing of
Richard Buaman. But it is settled that a conviction may rest on purely circumstantial evidence,
provided the following requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
41
Thus, in People vs. Fulinara,
42
wherein
the victim was kidnapped in the evening and the following day his body found in a ravine, this Court
said:
"While the positive identification made by the key witness does not refer to the actual killing of the
deceased, the circumstantial evidence on record constitutes an unbroken chain which leads to a fair
and reasonable conclusion that accused-appellants are indeed guilty of the offense charged. It is not
only by direct evidence upon which guilt may be predicated. The accused may also be convicted on
circumstantial evidence."
In this case, the following circumstances, viewed in their entirety, show beyond shadow of a doubt
that accused-appellants are indeed guilty of kidnapping with murder:
(1) Mercado picked up Richard on the night of February 9, 1994 near his (Mercado's) house in Pasig
and, poking a gun at him, forced him to ride with him in his car;
(2) Mercado took Richard to his apartment in Tanay;
(3) Mercado slapped and boxed Richard before bringing him inside the apartment;
(4) Mercado went up the second floor of the apartment and came down with Acebron;
(5) Mercado and Acebron took turns in subjecting Richard to physical abuse;
(6) Mercado ordered his aide named Jeff to get a piece of rope with which to bind Richard and Jeff
obliged by getting a rattan rope;
(7) Richard was gagged and his limbs were bound;
(8) Acebron and Jeff put Richard into the luggage compartment of Mercado's car;
(9) Mercado asked Acebron to get a bolo before they drove away;
(10) Accused-appellants rode together in the car with Richard in its compartment;
(11) After two hours, accused-appellants returned to the apartment without Richard;
(12) When Florencio asked Mercado about Richard's whereabouts, Richard replied, "Wala na,
pinatahimik ko na." ("Gone, I already silenced him").
(13) When Eric asked Mercado the same question, the latter replied, "Wala na, pinagpahinga ko
na." ("He is gone. I have laid him to rest").
(14) Eric saw Acebron wiping off bloodstains on the bolo;
(15) At the disco bar, accused-appellants bragged about the fact that Richard was the 25th person
and the 17th person Mercado and Acebron had killed, respectively;
(16) Richard's body was found in a morgue on February 12, 1994;
(17) The victim's body showed signs that his hands and feet had been tied and his mouth stuffed
with a towel; and
(18) Mercado warned Eric and Florencio not to talk to anyone regarding the incident.
These circumstances constitute an unbroken chain clearly pointing to accused-appellants' culpability
to the crime of kidnapping with murder.
IV. THE EVIDENCE OF CONSPIRACY
Accused-appellants argue that the trial court erred in finding conspiracy in the commission of the
crime because the prosecution allegedly failed to establish a common resolution between them to
commit the crime charged. This argument is likewise without merit.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. To establish the existence of conspiracy, direct proof is not essential,
as it may be shown by the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the
crime.
43
It may be proven by facts and circumstances from which may logically be inferred the
existence of a common design among the accused to commit the offense charged, or it may be
deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated.
44
In this case, the
concatenation of facts and circumstances establish beyond a shadow of a doubt that accused-
appellants conspired to kill Richard, to wit: (1) upon reaching the Tanay apartment, which he shared
with Acebron, Mercado went upstairs and called Acebron; (2) as they came downstairs, Mercado
told appellant Acebron that he had a present for him and that they were going to kill someone,
saying "Pare, may regalo ako sa iyo, may papatayin tayo"; (3) Mercado and Acebron slapped and
boxed Richard; (4) when told by Mercado to get a bolo, Acebron did so; (5) Acebron helped in
loading Richard into the car's luggage compartment; (6) Mercado and Acebron left the apartment
together in Mercado's car with Richard in the car's luggage compartment; (7) after two hours, the two
came back to the apartment without Richard; (8) when Eric and Florencio asked them where Richard
was, they answered that Richard had been "silenced" or had been "laid to rest"; and (9) Acebron
washed a bloodstained bolo.
V. ACCUSED-APPELLANTS' ALIBI
Invoking alibi as a defense, accused-appellants argue that it was impossible for them to be in Pasig
at the time of the commission of the crime because they were then in Tanay, Rizal on official duty,
as members of the PNP force in that town. For this purpose, they cite the PNP logbook, duly signed
by them. However, as the trial court pointed out:
"This defense, however, collapsed with the testimony of SPO4 Bias when he affirmed before the
Court that travel time between Tanay and Pasig could take less than an hour, especially at
nighttime. Moreover, the Court finds wanting the evidence presented by the defense to support its
claim that both accused were indeed present at the Tanay PNP Headquarters until about 8:30 p.m.
of February 9, 1994.
"Firstly, it was admitted by the defense that the duty log-book and the morning/evening formation
sheet do not always reflect the whereabouts of the Tanay PNP members for the day such that even
when they have deviated from their regular assignments, no note whatsoever appears on said log-
book. Accused were at the Hilltop Headquarters in Taytay from around 9:15 a.m. to 5 p.m. of
February 9, 1994 and yet, the duty log-book they submitted in Court show otherwise. In said log-
book, the Post/Assignment of accused Acebron was "Intel Optvs/follow-up" while accused Mercado
was supposed to be at "Post OP #2." The Court does not believe this log-book is reliable. Secondly,
again by the defense' own admission, Tanay PNP members sign their names once on the log-book
and this will be enough to confirm their presence or attendance for the entire day. Surely, the
possibility that all the PNP members do not in fact arrive at and leave their office at the same time of
8 a.m. and 8 p.m. can not be disregarded. Still, a reading of the entries in the log-book submitted by
the defense would somehow suggest this. The physical impossibility of accused Mercado, at least,
being in Pasig at around 9 p.m. on February 9, 1994 is not established. The defense of alibi is,
therefore, rejected by the Court."
45

Indeed, alibi is generally regarded with suspicion and is always received with caution, not only
because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because it can be easily fabricated and
concocted. For alibi to prosper as a defense, it must be convincing enough to preclude any doubt on
the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminisor its immediate vicinity
at the time of the incident.
46
An accused who invokes the defense of alibi must prove (a) his
presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime and (b) the physical
impossibility for him to be at the scene of the crime.
47

In this case, even granting that accused-appellants were in Tanay at the time they were supposed to
have taken the two prosecution witnesses and the victim to Pasig, it was still not physically
impossible for them to be in that place. Pasig is only an hour's drive from Tanay and when traffic is
light, as it would generally be late in the evening, the distance could be negotiated in less time.
Significantly, when the three young men were taken from Pasig at around 9 o'clock in the evening,
accused-appellants had already been discharged from their duties because, by their own admission,
the evening formation at the Tanay Police Station ended at around 8:30 that evening.
Above all, given Florencio and Eric's clear and positive identification of accused-appellants as the
perpetrators of the crime, the failure of the defense to give any plausible reason for Florencio and
Eric to testify falsely against accused-appellants renders the latter's alibi bereft of any probative
value.
48

Their positive identification by the witnesses prevails over their alibi and denial.
49

VI. ACCUSED-APPELLANTS' CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY
Accused-appellants are guilty of kidnapping because, by placing the victim in an enclosed place
consisting of the luggage compartment of the car, they detained or otherwise deprived him of his
liberty. There was also actual restraint of the victim's liberty when he was taken at gunpoint from
Pasig to accused-appellants' apartment in Tanay.
50
The evidence proves that Mercado initiated the
kidnapping of the victim. Acebron's subsequent loading of the victim into the car's compartment after
tying the latter shows community of criminal purpose with Mercado. However, although both were
police officers, they acted in this case in their private capacities.
51

The crime was committed by accused-appellants on February 9, 1994, after the amendment of the
Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by Republic Act No. 7659. Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as thus amended, provides:
"Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another,
or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of
the parents, female or a public officer;
"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-
mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
"When the victim is killed or dies as a conseguence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed." (Underscoring supplied)
In People vs. Ramos,
52
the accused was found guilty of two separate heinous crimes of kidnapping
for ransom and murder committed on July 13, 1994 and sentenced to death. On appeal, this Court
modified the ruling and found the accused guilty of the "special complex crime" of kidnapping for
ransom with murder under the last paragraph of Article 267, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
This Court said:
"x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of 'special complex crime' of
kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts
between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the
accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an
afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of
the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought,
the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as
separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art.
267, as amended by RA No. 7659." (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, in the case at bar, the trial court correctly found accused-appellants guilty of kidnapping with
murder and sentenced each of them to death.
Four (4) members of the Court, although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions
expressed in People vs. Echegaray
53
that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of
death, is unconstitutional, nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is
constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
It does not matter whether there are circumstances qualifying the killing as murder.1wphi 1 Under the last
paragraph of Article 267, it is sufficient that the victim is "killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention." In any event, the killing of Richard Buama as a consequence of his kidnapping was
committed under circumstances which make it murder. His limbs were tied and his mouth gagged
before he was taken away. When his body was discovered, his limbs were still tied and his mouth
gagged, indicating that treachery attended the killing of Richard Buama.
The trial court awarded P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P100,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary
damages to the Buama family as heirs of the deceased Richard Buama pursuant to Articles 2206
and 2230 of the Civil Code. It is not disputed, however, that Richard had not been legally adopted by
the Buamas, and so the latter cannot be considered his heirs, the term "heirs" being limited to the
deceased's "spouse, legitimate, and illegitimate ascendants and descendants" per the definition of
"heirs" under Articles 782 and 2206 of the Civil Code. For this reason, in one case,
54
the award of
moral damages for the death of a brother caused by quasi-delict was disallowed. In this case, since
the heirs of the deceased Richard Buama are not known, the awards of civil indemnity and moral
and exemplary damages to the Buamas should be disallowed.
As to the award of P52,680.00 for actual damages incurred for wake and funeral expenses, only the
amount of P22,690.00is supported by receipts (Exhs. J-2 to J-7). Accused-appellants contend that
these receipts constitute hearsay evidence because the witness who identified them, Lourdes
Vergara, admitted that she merely collated the same but had otherwise no personal knowledge of
the facts pertaining to their issuance.
55
In People vs. Paraiso,
56
this Court disregarded the list of
burial expenses for being hearsay since it was prepared by the victim's sister-in-law and not by the
victim's eldest son who testified thereon. The Court held that actual damages should be based upon
competent proof and on the best evidence available.
One receipt (Exh. J-5) for P1,300.00 shows that it was issued by the Immaculate Conception Parish
Church in Pasig to Lourdes Vergara, and it was for Richard Buama's burial mass. Another receipt
(Exh. J-7), for the amount of P2,210.00 for flowers for Richard Buama's wake, was issued by
Lourdes Vergara herself as the owner of the flower shop. These two receipts should be considered
competent evidence of the amount of expenses indicated therein, and therefore the total amount of
P3,510.00 should be awarded to Lourdes Vergara as actual damages.
VII. ALLEGED HASTE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN DECIDING THE CASE
One last point. Accused-appellants bewail the fact that the trial court rendered its decision just a day
after it had received their Joint Memorandum.
57
Accused-appellants charge that their case was
decided with "fantastic, incredible and unbelievable speed" with the result that "grave and serious
errors" were committed in convicting them.
58

This contention has no merit. A review of the trial court's decision shows that its findings were based
on the records of this case and the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial. The
speed with which the trial court disposed of the case cannot thus be attributed to the injudicious
performance of its function. Indeed, a judge is not supposed to study a case only after all the
pertinent pleadings have been filed. It is a mark of diligence and devotion to duty that a judge studies
a case long before the deadline set for the promulgation of his decision has arrived. The one-day
period between the filing of accused-appellants' memorandum and the promulgation of the decision
was sufficient time to consider their arguments and to incorporate these in the decision. As long as
the trial judge does not sacrifice the orderly administration of justice in favor of a speedy but reckless
disposition of a case, he cannot be taken to task for rendering his decision with due dispatch. The
trial court in this case committed no reversible errors and, consequently, except for some
modification, its decision should be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City, finding accused-
appellants Elpidio Mercado y Hernando and Aurelio Acebron y Adora guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of kidnapping with murder and imposing upon each of them the DEATH
PENALTY, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the awards of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages are DELETED and accused-
appellants are ORDERED to pay jointly and severally to Lourdes Vergara the amount of P3,510.00
as reimbursement for the expenses she incurred for the victim's wake and funeral.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, upon the finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
Office of the President for his use in case he decides to exercise his prerogative of mercy.
SO ORDERED.





















G.R. No. 116239 November 29, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELPIDIO MERCADO y HERNANDO and AURELIO ACEBRON y ADORA, accused-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
For automatic review by the court is the decision,
1
dated July 22, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 156, Pasig, convicting accused-appellants SPO2 Elpidio Mercado y Hernando and SPO1
Aurelio Acebron y Adora, of the Philippine National Police of Tanay, Rizal, of kidnapping with murder
and sentencing them as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing discussions and finding the guilt of both accused to be
proven beyond reasonable doubt, while the undersigned Presiding Judge does not believe in the
imposition of the death penalty as a form of punishment, nevertheless, in obedience to the law which
is his duty to uphold, the Court hereby sentences both accused, ELPIDIO MERCADO y
HERNANDO and AURELIO ACEBRON y ADORA, to death, to proportionately indemnify the heirs of
the deceased Richard Buama in the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00); to pay the sum of fifty
two thousand six hundred eighty pesos (P52,680.00) (Exhibit J, J-1 to J-7) as expenses incident
to the burial; and the further sum of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) by way of moral
and exemplary damages, all without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.
"Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of both accused from the Pasig Municipal Jail to
the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
"Let the records of this case be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory review.
"SO ORDERED."
2

The information against accused-appellants charged-
"That on or about the 9th day of February, 1994, in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
them members of the PNP, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding
one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously kidnap one Richard Buama, a 17
year old minor and boarded him in a Red car bearing License plate No. CGZ 835 against his will
thus depriving him of his freedom of liberty (sic), brought him to Tanay, Rizal in a safe house and
there subjected him to extreme/brutal physical violence, and thereafter with abuse of superior
strength and evident premeditation hacked and bludgeoned/clubbed said Richard Buama who
thereby sustained mortal wounds which directly caused his death.
"Contrary to law."
3

Because of the gravity of the charge, no bail was recommended for the provisional release of
accused-appellants.
When arraigned on March 8, 1994, both accused-appellants, assisted by counsel,
4
pleaded not guilty
to the crime charged. During the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Florencio
Villareal, Eric Ona, SPO2 Virgilio Buama, Maria Buama, Lourdes Vergara, SPO2 Delfin Gruta, SPO2
James Mabalot, Jesus Nieves Vergara, and Lupito Buama. Their testimonies are as follows:
Twelve-year-old Florencio Villareal testified that at around 9 oclock in the evening of February 9,
1994, he and Richard Buama were picked up by accused-appellant Elpidio Mercado near Mercados
house in Sto. Tomas, Bukid, Pasig, Metro Manila. Mercado arrived in a car, together with Eric Ona.
Mercado suspected Florencio Villareal and Richard Buama of being the ones who had broken into
his store and stolen money. Florencios friend, Rex Bugayong, was able to run from Mercado.
Florencio and Richard were pushed into Mercados car. Florencio said Mercado poked a gun at
Richard which made the latter say, "Sasama na lang po ako. Wag ninyo lang po akong sasaktan." ("I
will go with you. Just dont hurt me.")
Mercado drove the car to Tanay, Rizal. Florencio and Richard were seated at the back, behind
Mercado and Eric, respectively. Upon reaching Tanay at around 11 oclock in the evening Mercado
took the three of them (Florencio, Richard, and Eric) to an apartment. Florencio was led inside the
apartment while Richard was held outside by Mercado. When Florencio looked through the window,
he saw Mercado slap and box Richard. Then he was brought inside. Mercado later went upstairs.
According to Florencio, Richard asked if they could leave the place as he held his stomach in pain,
but Florencio replied that the door was padlocked. Eventually, Mercado came down with Acebron.
Richard was made to sit on the floor in the kitchen of the apartment. Mercado then told Aceborn that
the had brought him a present ("pasalubong") and that they were going to kill two boys a small one
and a big one who was dark. In reply, Aceborn said, "Pare, huwag yung maliit dahil kasing hawig ng
anak ko, saka magbe-birthday pa kinabukasan." ("Buddy, not the small one because he resembles
my son who will celebrate his birthday tomorrow.") As the conversation was made within his hearing
distance, Richard became so scared that he could not answer when asked by Acebron about a girls
picture found in his wallet. This angered Acebron who boxed Richards in the stomach.
Mercado thereafter ordered Richard to take off all his clothes and lie face down on the kitchen floor.
Mercado asked his aide Jeff to get a rope. Jeff brought a piece of rattan rope and tied Richards
hands, while Mercado tied Richards feet. This happened at about 11:30 in the evening. Mercado
also ordered Jeff to get rags with which to blindfold and gag Richard and then asked Acebron to get
a bolo or a big knife. After getting a bolo, Acebron and Jeff put Richard into the luggage
compartment of Mercado's car. They then drove away, leaving behind Florencio and Eric in the
apartment. After two hours, Mercado and Acebron came back. Florencio saw Acebron washing the
bloodstains off the bolo. He asked Mercado where Richard was, to which Mercado replied, "Wala na.
Pinatahimik ko na." ("Gone. I have already silenced him.")
Mercado and Acebron then took Eric and Florencio to a beerhouse in Tanay, Rizal and warned them
not to tell anyone about the incident or they and their families would be killed. For fear of his life and
that of his family, Florencio promised he would not. From the beerhouse, Mercado drove to
Acebron's apartment, where the latter was dropped off, and then proceeded home to Pasig with Eric
and Florencio.
Florencio waited three days for news about Richard. On February 12, 1994, with still no news about
Richard, Florencio decided to talk to Richard's sister, a flower vendor whose store was located near
the Pasig Church. Florencio told her to look for Richard in Tanay; he even promised to help them
once they found him. Actually, it was Richard's brother, Virgilio Buama, a policeman, who found
Richard's body in a morgue in Morong, Rizal. He was told by a funeral parlor employee that they had
retrieved Richard's body near the boundary of Laguna. Florencio attended the wake of his friend in
Sto. Tomas, Pasig.
5

Virgilio Buama, a policeman and brother of Richard, last saw the latter on December 25, 1993 as
Richard lived with their mother. On February 11, 1994, Virgilio learned from his sister, Maria Buama,
that Richard had been picked up by a policeman on February 9, 1994. Hence, he went to see
Florencio Villareal, who related to him how Richard had been kidnapped and killed by Mercado.
Virgilio took Florencio to his house, and the following day, February 12, 1994, they went to the PNP
headquarters at Hilltop, Taytay, Rizal, where Florencio was shown pictures by Maj. Patricio Abenido.
Florencio picked out pictures of Mercado and Acebron and identified them as the culprits in the
killing of Richard. Florencio gave a sworn statement concerning the incident to SPO2 James
Mabalot at the PNP headquarters. Mercado was thereafter ordered to report to the Provincial
Director, Col. Maralit, and it was there that Florencio pointed to Mercado as the person who had
kidnapped and killed Richard. Acebron was likewise called, and he and Mercado were detained at
the Rizal PNP Command Stockade.
Virgilio found Richard's body at the San Francisco Funeral Homes in Morong, Rizal. The
owner/manager of the funeral parlor told him that Richard's body had been recovered in Mabitac,
Laguna. Virgilio brought the remains of his brother home.
6

Eric Matanggihan Ona, 21 years old, was in the house of his neighbor Coco San Juan, in Sto.
Tomas, Pasig, Metro Manila, at around 9 o'clock in the evening of February 9, 1994 when Mercado
arrived and asked him to go with him, after Mercado had asked Eric's father for permission to do so.
Along the way, Eric asked Mercado where they were going, and the latter said that they would look
for "Bunso" (Florencio Villareal's nickname) who had stolen money from his video machines. Eric
went with Mercado in the latter's car.
Florencio voluntarily went with them when Eric and Mercado saw him. Later, they saw Richard and
Rex Bugayong seated on the street gutter. When the two saw the car stop, Rex stood up and ran
away. Mercado told Eric to go after Rex, but Eric refused to do so because Rex was his friend.
Mercado was able to get Richard. Mercado placed his arm around Richard's shoulders while his
other hand poked a gun at Richard's side. Eric heard Richard pleading with Mercado not to hurt him
and saying that he would go with him. Eric knew that Mercado poked a gun at Richard because the
latter was Mercado's suspect in the robbery of his store. He heard Mercado ask, "Eric, bakit naman
pinasok nina Richard Buama at Florencio Villareal ang tindahan ko?" ("Eric, why did Richard Buama
and Florencio Villareal break into my store?") He answered that he did not know anything about it.
Then, Mercado told Richard and Florencio, "Nagkamali kayo ng tinalo. Isang napakalaking
bangungot ang ginawa ninyo." ("You picked on the wrong guy. What you have done is a big
nightmare.") According to Eric, they then boarded Mercado's car. Along the way, Eric asked
Mercado where they were going, to which Mercado replied, "Sa Tanay. Have you been there?"
Mercado asked Richard how many they were in the family, to which Richard replied that they were
ten and that one of his brothers was "one of them." ("Kabaro ninyo.")Mercado also asked them when
their birthdays were and whether they would like to have another birthday.
Upon reaching Tanay, they were brought to an apartment. There Mercado hit Richard on the face
and told him to take off his clothes. Mercado then went upstairs to wake up Acebron. Acebron tried
to talk to Richard, but the latter would not speak. This so angered Acebron that he boxed Richard
hard on the stomach. Mercado then asked his aide named Jeff to tie Richard's hands and feet and to
blindfold and gag him. This done, Acebron and Jeff loaded Richard into the luggage compartment of
the car. Eric described Richard as pale ("maputla"). He had hematoma on his stomach and a swollen
right cheek that was blackish in color. Eric saw Acebron get a bolo from the kitchen, a long
one, "mapurol" ("dull and not sharp"), and with a black handle. Fearing for his safety, Eric kept quiet.
Mercado warned them not to tell anybody about the incident; otherwise, they would be killed.
After two hours, Mercado and Acebron returned to the apartment without Richard. Eric saw the bolo
with bloodstains. He asked Mercado, "Tata Pedi, where is Richard?" Mercado answered, "Wala na,
pinagpahinga ko na." ("He is gone. I have laid him to rest.")
At around 4 o'clock in the morning, they went to the nearby "Space" beerhouse in Tanay, Rizal
where they were made to drink. It was there that Eric heard Mercado and Acebron's conversation.
Mercado asked, "Pare, ilan na ba ang napatay mo?" ("How many have you killed?") Acebron
said, "Ako, labimpito." ("Me, 17.") Mercado countered, "Pare, ako dalawampu't lima." ("Buddy, me,
25.") Acebron said Richard was the 17th person he had killed while Mercado said that Richard was
his 25th victim.
Thereafter, with Eric and Florencio in tow, Mercado brought Acebron back to the apartment and they
then went home to Pasig in Mercado's car. They reached Sto. Tomas, Pasig at around 5:30 in the
morning. Mercado again warned them: "Eric, Bunso, yung sinabi ko, ha." ("Eric, Bunso, don't forget
what I told you.") Eric took that to mean that they should not tell anyone about the incident;
otherwise, something bad would happen to them. Hence, hounded by fear, Eric did not report the
matter to the police. He also did not know that Richard had been killed. He said if he had known that
Richard was already dead when Mercado brought him home, he would have reported the matter to
police authorities.
Richard's brothers and sisters searched for him the following day, but Eric, fearing for his life, did not
talk to them. It was only when he saw the wake being held for Richard at the Sto. Tomas Chapel that
Eric realized that Richard was dead. After Richard's wake, Mercado told Eric to look for Florencio
lest the latter talk about the incident. Eric did not obey Mercado. When Mercado asked him if he had
seen Florencio, Eric said he had not. Thereafter, someone from the PNP headquarters in Hilltop
picked him up. At the investigation conducted, Eric executed a sworn statement.
7

The sisters Maria Buama and Lourdes Buama Vergara testified that Richard was informally
adopted by the Buama family. When Richard was six months old, his mother gave him to Maria at
the Pasig Immaculate Conception Church on June 18, 1977. They considered Richard as their own
brother and a member of their family. It was Florencio who informed them that Mercado had picked
him up and Richard on February 9, 1994. In the evening of February 11, 1994, upon learning about
the incident, Maria and Lourdes went to Mercado's house cum store in Sto. Tomas, Pasig where
Richard used to play video machines. Mercado's wife told them that Richard no longer came to the
video store as he had done something wrong. Asked what it was that Richard had done, Mercado's
wife failed to answer because someone inside the store said,"Hinahanap si Richard ng mga kapatid
niya." When asked why his parents were not informed about Richard's alleged mischief, Mercado's
wife allegedly replied it was because their store had not yet been emptied. ("Hindi pa raw nauubos
ang tindahan nila.") Lourdes and Maria eventually found Richard's body in the early morning of
February 12, 1994. For the wake the Buama family held for Richard at the Chapel of Sto. Tomas in
Pasig and his funeral, they spent P52,680.00.
8

SPO2 James Mabalot took the statements of Eric and Florencio. When the latter implicated
Mercado and Acebron, SPO2 Mabalot took the two boys to the Administrative Building. From the
pictures of almost all of the more than 100 members of the PNP Rizal, Eric and Florencio picked
those of Mercado and Acebron. The statements that Eric and Florencio executed were signed in the
presence of both SPO2 Mabalot and his superior. SPO2 Mabalot and his team thereafter went to a
funeral parlor in Morong, Rizal where they were told that Richard's body had been taken to the PNP
Crime Laboratory Services for autopsy. They learned that Richard's body had been found at the
boundary of Rizal and Laguna.
On the way to that site, SPO2 Mabalot and his team dropped by the Tanay Police Station to
coordinate with the Tanay police in the investigation of the case. When Florencio, who was with
them, saw Mercado's car parked outside the police station, he recognized it as the one used in
taking them from Pasig to Tanay. When SPO2 Mabalot and his team opened the car, they found
blood spots on the backseat. The car was then taken to the PNP Headquarters in Hilltop, Taytay,
Rizal for proper identification and examination of the bloodstains.
On orders of Col. Maralit, Mercado and Acebron were placed in detention. SPO2 Mabalot wanted
Florencio and Eric to confront Mercado and Acebron, but Florencio and Eric were so scared to do so
for fear that the accused might hurt them.
9

Dr. Jesusa Nieves Vergara, Acting Chief of the Medico-legal Division of the PNP Crime laboratory
in Camp Crame, Quezon City, executed and signed the postmortem examination report on Richard's
body. Her report shows that the cadaver had previously been embalmed; that there were two marks
at the back of the left hand; that both hands were tied with plastic cord while both feet were tied with
rattan; and that it sustained nine injuries on the head, neck, left upper extremity, and the left arm.
There were abrasions, lacerations, and stab wounds. The multiple abrasions on the forehead and
the back of the left arm were possibly secondary to a fall against a hard surface. The lacerations
were on the lower jaw, on the front right ear, at the right ear lobe, and two on the right side of the
neck. These could have been caused by a blunt object such as a piece of wood, an iron bar, a
hollow block, or anything hard. There were also injuries and other lacerations on the back of the
head towards the right side which could have been caused by the application of blunt force. Opening
of the head revealed hematoma or accumulation of blood. The medical report stated that Richard
died of "(i)ntracranial hemorrhage as a result of skull fracture."
10

Accused-appellants' defense was alibi. SPO1 Miguel Catapusan, Administrative Officer of the Tanay
PNP Municipal Station, testified that accused-appellants both reported for work on February 9, 1994
at the police station. The morning and evening Formation Sheets and the Police Duty Roster Book
or the logbook showed that accused-appellant Elpidio Mercado and accused- appellant Aurelio
Acebron were both present from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. However, after signing the logbook in the
morning, accused-appellants were told to report to the Rizal PNP Headquarters Command between
9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. regarding some important matters. After the head count that night, the Chief
of Police briefed the policemen on their assignments for thirty minutes, until 8:30 p.m.
11

Testifying in his own defense, accused-appellant Elpidio Mercado said that before he joined the
PNP Tanay, Rizal, he was with the Philippine Navy since 1976. He was transferred to the Philippine
Coast Guard in 1981 where he served until 1986. When the EDSA Revolution broke out, he was
assigned to Malacaang as a member of the Presidential Security Group (PSG) until 1991. His next
assignment from 1991 to 1992 was at the Maritime Command, Anti-smuggling Division. Thereafter,
he was assigned to Task Force Habagat under Col. Panfilo Lacson of the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission (PACC). In 1993, he was assigned to the PNP of Rizal. For his military and police
services, Mercado claimed he received several awards, commendations, and medals.
12

On February 9, 1994, Mercado reported to the Tanay police station because Col. Maralit had
summoned him the night before. After signing the logbook, Mercado, together with Acebron and one
SPO4 Bias, asked permission from their superior officer to go to the PNP Hilltop Headquarters for an
investigation. They left the Tanay Police Station at 8:10 a.m. and proceeded to the Hilltop
Headquarters where they stayed until 5:00 p.m. They went back to the Tanay Police Station to
attend the evening formation that lasted up to 8:30 p.m. Thereafter, Mercado went home with
Acebron. They invited SPO4 Bias to have dinner with them in their house at Plaza Aldea, Tanay.
The house was provided to them by the local government of Tanay, and they shared it with SPO2
Sagat and Chief Inspector Genabe. After SPO4 Bias went home at 10 o'clock in the evening,
Mercado went to bed. At around 7 o'clock in the morning the following day, February 10, 1994,
Acebron woke Mercado up as he prepared to go to the office. Mercado told Acebron to inform his
officer that he would not attend the morning formation.
Mercado said he was married and that his wife stayed in their house in Sto. Tomas, Baltazar St.,
Pasig, Metro Manila, to attend to their store and two video machines. He usually went home every
15th and 30th of the month except when there were special occasions. He owned a red Chevrolet
car, but it was seized by the 221st Mobile Force on the ground that it was used in a crime. Mercado
claimed that the travel time from Pasig to Tanay was one-and-a-half hours and if traffic was heavy,
two hours.
Mercado denied the allegations against him. He claimed that Eric and Florencio implicated them in
the crime because of an incident on January 23, 1994 in which Eric created trouble in his video
machine shop. Mercado saw Eric strangling a kid. He was going to pacify Eric, but the latter uttered
bad words against him. So, he slapped Eric. The youngsters scampered, but Acebron, who was
visiting Mercado, was able to grab Florencio. Mercado hit Florencio on the back of the head and told
him not to show their faces anymore in his store because they were driving away his customers.
Since then, Eric and Florencio harbored ill feelings against him. They had been calling his house and
threatening his family that they would kill his son and rape his daughters. Hence, as a precautionary
measure, he sent his children to Cavite; only his wife, sister-in-law, and their maid remained in their
house in Pasig.
13

Aurelio Acebron, the other accused-appellant, also testified. He said that before he joined the
Tanay Police Force in November 1993, he had been a member of the Philippine Constabulary since
1975. He was assigned to the 61st PC Battalion in Basilan and Cebu until 1978. From 1978 to 1979,
he was an investigator of the Constabulary Metrocom. From 1979 to 1982, he was also an
investigator at the regional headquarters of the RT Division in Zamboanga City. From 1982 to 1985,
he served in the Military Police Brigade in Camp Aguinaldo. At the Rizal PNP Command, he was
also an investigator. During his active duty, he received 22 commendations, two medals, and six
military merit medals. He was also awarded a bronze medal in the aftermath of the 1989 failed coup
d' etat in Makati.
Acebron claimed that on February 9, 1994, he reported for work before 8 o'clock in the morning as
shown by the logbook he signed. With Mercado and SPO4 Bias, he was ordered to report to Supt.
Crescencio Maralit at Hilltop, Taytay, Rizal. They left Tanay at 8: 10 a.m. and arrived at Hilltop at 9
o'clock that same morning. They conferred with Supt. Maralit from 2 until 5 o'clock in the afternoon.
They then went back to the Tanay PNP station and reported to Major Genabe. Acebron attended the
evening formation that lasted up to 8:30 in the evening, after which he went home to Plaza Aldea,
Tanay together with Mercado and SPO4 Bias. They had dinner with Bias and Major Genabe. Bias
left at 10 o'clock in the evening and they settled for the night. The following morning, he woke up at 6
o'clock. Before leaving for the office, he woke up Mercado who, however, said that he would not
attend the morning formation as he would go directly to his assignment at Post No. 2.
Acebron also denied all accusations against him. He claimed that he had been implicated in revenge
for what happened on January 23, 1994 when he collared Florencio and Mercado hit the boy's back
for causing trouble in Mercado's video shop. Acebron claimed that he had been asked by police
officers Mabalot and Ople to testify against Mercado, but he refused. He claimed he had been
detained on February 12, 1994 after he was implicated in this case.
14

Corroborating other defense witnesses, SPO4 Teofilo Paz Bias swore that at 7:30 in the morning
on February 9, 1994, he attended the morning formation at the Tanay police station. Mercado and
Acebron were there present. At past 8:00 a.m., as he accompanied Mercado and Acebron to the
headquarters at Hilltop, Taytay, Rizal, they saw Col. Maralit with whom they conferred from 2:00
p.m. until 5:00 p.m. They then went back to Tanay to attend the evening formation which lasted until
about 8:45 in the evening. Major Genabe ordered him to go with Mercado and Acebron to discuss in
the house the result of the investigation at Hilltop, Taytay. They arrived in that house at 9:00 p.m.
While they were having dinner, they discussed what had happened at the investigation of Mercado
and Acebron by the Provincial Director. At 10 o'clock that evening, after supper, Bias went home to
Pililla, Rizal. The following morning, he saw Acebron report to work.
15

On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the trial court found both accused guilty and sentenced them
to death. Hence, this appeal. The joint brief of accused-appellants Mercado and Acebron contains
the following assignment of errors:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN GIVING CREDENCE TO CLASHING
MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES ON THE TESTIMONIES OF THE TWO (2)
PROSECUTIONS (sic) PRINCIPAL WITNESSES. THEIR CONTRADICTING TESTIMONIES AND
EVIDENCES CREATED NOT ONLY REASONABLE DOUBT BUT RATHER ESTABLISHED
FACTUAL ERROR THAT WOULD BRING ABOUT ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DISREGARDING THE DIRECT
MATERIAL EVIDENCE CONSISTING OF POLICE LOGBOOK OR DUTY ROSTER BOOK
(EXHIBITS "6" -MERCADO AND "4" -ACEBRON) AND TESTIMONIES OF SPO2 POLICE
CATAPUSAN THAT BOTH ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ATTENDED THE MORNING FORMATION
AT 8:00 IN THE MORNING OF FEBRUARY 9, 1994 AT TANAY, RIZAL, THEN ATTENDED A
CONFERENCE CALL OF SUPT. CHIEF COLONEL MARALIT THE WHOLE DAY AT TAYTAY,
RIZAL, THEN BACK TO TANAY, RIZAL AT 6:00 P.M. AND BOTH ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
ATTENDED THE EVENING FORMATION AT 8:00 P.M. WHICH LASTED UP TO 8:45 P.M., AFTER
WHICH, THEY (SPO1 BIAS, MERCADO & ACEBRON) PROCEEDED TO MAJOR GENABE AT
THE TANAY APARTMENT AND MADE REPORT REGARDING THE CONFERENCE
CONDUCTED BY COL. MARALIT UP TO 10:00 P.M. HENCE, PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR
THE ACCUSED MERCADO TO PICK UP THE VICTIM AT 9:00 P.M. AT PASIG, METRO MANILA.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THERE EXIST (sic) A
CONSPIRACY, WITHOUT ANY EVIDENCE AND BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW THAT WILL
SUPPORT ITS DECISION.
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME KIDNAPPING WITH
HOMICIDE, THERE BEING NO EVIDENCE ADDUCED THAT HOMICIDE HAS BEEN COMMITTED
IN FURTHERANCE OR AS A CONSEQUENCE OF KIDNAPPING.
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN WRITING THE DECISION WITH
UNDUE HASTE AND INCREDIBLE SPEED ONE (1) DAY AFTER THE SUBMISSION OF
ACCUSED (sic) 32-PAGE JOINT MEMORANDUM ON JULY 21, 1994, WITHIN THE 15-DAY
PERIOD GRANTED BY THE COURT AND PROMULGATING ITS DECISION ON THE NEXT DAY,
JULY 22, 1994, CONSISTING OF 39 PAGES, THUS, RESULTING IN FATAL ERROR OF
CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED SENTENCING THEM TO DEATH BASED ON WRONG
APPRECIATION OF FACTS, SPECULATIONS AND PROBABILITIES AND DESPITE PATENT
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE WHAT HAVE BEEN ALLEGED UNDER THE
CRIMINAL INFORMATION.
These assigned errors boil down to the following main issues: (1) credibility of witnesses, (2) alibi as
a defense, and (3) the presence of conspiracy.
These issues will be discussed in the course of this decision, although not necessarily in the order
discussed by accused-appellants in their brief. But before doing so, we first consider the threshold
question raised in the Supplemental Brief filed for accused-appellants by collaborating counsel Rene
V. Sarmiento with regard to the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 providing for the death
penalty for 13 heinous crimes.
I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF R.A. 7659 AND R.A. 8177
Accused-appellants argue that Republic Act 7659 violates the 1987 Constitution because -
1. There are no compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for the crimes of treason, qualified
piracy, qualified bribery, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention,
robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons, destructive arson, rape, plunder, importation
of prohibited drugs, etc.
2. R.A. No.7659 violates the constitutional ban against infliction of cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment.
3. R.A. No. 7659 impugns the constitutional right to equality before the law.
4. R.A. No. 7659 repudiates the obligation of the Philippines under international law.
5. Death penalty is not deterrence to the commission of crimes.
16

The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 has already been settled in the Court's 12-3 per
curiam Resolution in People vs. Echegaray,
17
wherein the following rulings were made:
1. The death penalty is not a "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment." It is an exercise of
the state's power to "secure society against the threatened and actual evil."
2. The offenses for which Republic Act No. 7659 provides the death penalty satisfy "the element of
heinousness" by specifying the circumstances which generally qualify a crime to be punishable by
death;
3. Republic Act No. 7659 provides both procedural and substantial safeguards to insure its correct
application.
4. The Constitution does not require that "a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of
crime should first be perceived and statistically proven" before the death penalty may be prescribed.
Congress is authorized under the Constitution to determine when the elements of heinousness and
compelling reasons are present, and the Court would exceed its own authority if it questioned the
exercise of such discretion.
In the subsequent case of Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice,
18
the Court sustained the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8177, providing for death by lethal injection against claims that
death by lethal injection was cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment, and that the law violated
treaty obligations. Petitioner in that case argued that death by lethal injection constituted cruel,
degrading, and inhuman punishment because: (1) Republic Act No. 8177 failed to provide for the
drugs to be used in administering lethal injection, the dosage for the drug to be administered, and
the procedure in administering drug(s) to the convict; (2) Republic Act No. 8177 and its implementing
rules did not fix either the date of execution of the convict or the time for notifying him, with the result
that such uncertainties cause pain and suffering to the convict, and (3) the possibility of botched
executions or mistakes in administering drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.
Rejecting petitioner's contention that death by lethal injection violates the prohibition against cruel,
degrading, and inhuman punishment in Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution, the Court said:
"Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment. In the oft-cited case of Harden v. Director of Prisons, this Court held that
'[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death
is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life.' Would the lack in
particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law 'cruel,
degrading or inhuman'? The Court believes not. For reasons hereafter discussed, the implementing
details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and expertise of
administrative officials."
19

As to the contention that the re-imposition of the death penalty violates international treaty
obligations, particularly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Court explained:
"Indisputably, Article 6 of the Covenant enshrines the individual's right to life. Nevertheless, Article
6(2) of the Covenantexplicitly recognizes that capital punishment is an allowable limitation on the
right to life, subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the most serious crimes.' Pursuant to
Article 28 of the Covenant, a Human Rights Committee was established and under Article 40 of
the Covenant, States Parties to the Covenant are required to submit an initial report to the
Committee on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized within
the Covenant and on the progress made on the enjoyment of those rights within one year of its entry
into force for the State Party concerned and thereafter, after five years. On July 27, 1982, the
Human Rights Committee issued General Comment No. 6 interpreting Article 6 of
the Covenant stating that '(while) it follows from Article 6(2) to (6) that State parties are not obliged to
abolish the death penalty totally, they are obliged to limit its use and, in particular, to abolish it for
other than the 'most serious crimes.' Accordingly, they ought to consider reviewing their criminal laws
in this light and, in any event, are obliged to restrict the application of the death penalty to the 'most
serious crimes.' The article strongly suggests (pars. 2[2] and [6]) that abolition is desirable. x x x. The
Committee is of the opinion that the expression 'most serious crimes' must be read restrictively to
mean that the death penalty should be a quite exceptional measure. Further, The Safeguards
Guaranteeing Protection of Those Facing the Death Penalty adopted by the Economic and Social
Council of the United Nations declare that the ambit of the term 'most serious crimes' should not go
beyond intentional crimes, with lethal or other extremely grave consequences.
"The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on December 16, 1966, and signed and ratified by the
Philippines on December 19, 1966 and August 22, 1989, respectively. The Optional
Protocol provides that the Human Rights Committee shall receive and consider communications
from individuals claiming to be victims of violations of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.
"On the other hand, the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly on
December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document. Evidently, petitioner's
assertion of our obligation under the Second Optional Protocol ismisplaced."
20

Accused-appellants further argue that Republic Act No. 7659 denies equality before the law. They
cite studies here and abroad allegedly showing that "the death penalty has most often been used
against the poor." This statement is too sweeping to merit further serious consideration. Anyone,
regardless of his economic status in life, may commit a crime. While there may be perceived
imbalances in the imposition of penalties, there are adequate safeguards in the Constitution, the law,
and procedural rules to ensure due process and equal protection of the law. As pointed out by
Representative Pablo Garcia when interpellated by Representative Joker Arroyo during the
congressional deliberation on the death penalty bill:
"x x x. (T)here is something more in the bill that protects the rights of every accused person, be he
rich or poor. I refer to the provisions under the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. The Constitution
itself protects, envelops the accused with the mantle of protection guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law. In other words, the accused cannot be deprived of his life
without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. In other
words, the laws protect the rich and the poor, the lettered and the unlettered. That is guaranteed by
the Constitution. x x x."
21

Similarly, in People vs. Mijano,
22
this Court recently said:
"Finally, accused-appellant in his reply brief contends that the death penalty law is violative of the
equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution because it punishes only people like him, the poor,
the uneducated, and the jobless.
"The equality the Constitution guarantees is legal equality or, as it is usually put, the equality of all
persons before the law. Under this guarantee, each individual is dealt with as an equal person in the
law, which does not treat the person differently because of who he is or what he is or what he
possesses (Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, 1987 ed., p.
6).
x x x x x x x x x
"Apparently, as it should be, the death penalty law makes no distinction. It applies to all persons and
to all classes of persons - rich or poor, educated, or uneducated, religious or non-religious. No
particular person or classes of persons are identified by the law against whom the death penalty
shall be exclusively imposed."
Accused-appellants' claim that the death penalty does not deter the commission of crimes is without
any basis. To be sure, deterrence is not the only aim of the law. As Representative Pablo Garcia, the
principal author of the death penalty bill, explained "more than deterrence, x x x is retributive
justice."
23
In People vs. Echegaray, it was further stated:
"The abolitionists in Congress insisted that all criminal reforms first be pursued and implemented
before the death penalty be reimposed in case such reforms prove unsuccessful. They claimed that
the only compelling reason contemplated by the Constitution is that nothing else but the death
penalty is left for the government to resort to that could check the chaos and the destruction that is
being caused by unbridled criminality. Three of our colleagues are of the opinion that the compelling
reason required by the constitution is that there occurred a dramatic and significant change in the
socio-cultural milieu after the suspension of the death penalty on February 2, 1987 such as an
unprecedented rise in the incidence of criminality. Such are, however, interpretations only of the
phrase 'compelling reasons' but not of the conjunctive phrase 'compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes.' The imposition of the requirement that there be a rise in the incidence of criminality because
of the suspension of the death penalty, moreover, is an unfair and misplaced demand, for what it
amounts to, in fact, is a requirement that the death penalty first prove itself to be a truly deterrent
factor in criminal behavior. If there was a dramatically higher incidence of criminality during the time
that the death penalty was suspended, that would have proven that the death penalty was indeed a
deterrent during the years before its suspension. Suffice it to say that the constitution in the first
place did not require that the death penalty be first proven to be a deterrent; what it requires is that
there be compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
"Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that Congress, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision
imposes a requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of
a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven following the
suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be
resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in
society. It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an 'alarming
upsurge of such crimes,' for the same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to
determine the existence of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A.
No. 7659 states is that 'the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and the
need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons
to impose the death penalty for said crimes.'"
24

Indeed, today, even members of the Court who originally dissented from the majority ruling
sustaining the validity of Republic Act No. 7659 agree on the imposition of the death penalty without
in the least changing their view about the constitutionality of the penalty.
As we did in People vs. Godoy,
25
we restate mankind's age-old observation and experience on the
penological and societal effect of capital punishment: "If it is justified, it serves as a deterrent; if
injudiciously imposed, it generates resentment."
26

We now consider the merits of this case.
II. THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
The question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine.
27
For this reason,
its observations and conclusions are accorded great respect on appeal.
28
This rule is variously stated
thus: The trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight. It is
conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight,
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been considered.
29
Absent any showing
that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
which would affect the result of the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the
credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by appellate courts.
30

In the case at bar, inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimonies of the two principal
prosecution witnesses, Florencio Villareal and Eric Ona, are alleged as undermining their credibility,
to wit:
(1) Florencio testified that on February 9, 1994 at about 9 o'clock in the evening, he and the victim,
Richard Buama, were picked up by Mercado and Eric while he and Richard, in the company of Rex
Bugayong, were passing time near Mercado's house. Eric belied this testimony when, on cross-
examination, he said that he and Mercado saw Florencio first at about 8 o'clock, not 9 o'clock in the
evening of February 9, 1994 at the corner of Sto. Tomas Street, Pasig, one block away from the
place where they later found Richard.
(2) Florencio testified that when they were apprehended at the corner of Baltazar Street, Mercado
pushed him straight into the car, and held and poked a gun at Richard. On the other hand, Eric
testified that Florencio voluntarily went with them into the car as Mercado, with a .38 black gun
tucked at his side, placed his arm around Richard's shoulder.
(3) In his sworn statement, Florencio stated in answer to Question No.3, "At kami po ay dinala ng
pulis na humuli sa amin doon sa inuupahan niyang bahay at isinakay kami sa kanyang kotse at kami
ay dinala sa Tanay, Rizal." However, in answer to Question No. 6, Eric said "Una kaming
dinala sa bahay na inuupahan ni Elpidio Mercado dito sa Pasig." Eric denied Florencio's statement
that they did not stay in Mercado's house; instead, they just circled the place and then proceeded to
Tanay, Rizal right away. Florencio in fact contradicted his own statement at the trial by declaring that
they just passed by Mercado's house and did not stay there.
(4) In his testimony, Florencio said that on their way to Tanay, Rizal, he did not hear conversation
between Mercado and Eric. Yet Eric testified that, upon reaching Rosario, he talked to Mercado and
asked him where they were going. Mercado answered, "Sa Tanay, have you been there?" Mercado
even asked them their birthdays and if they still wanted to have birthdays.
(5) Florencio testified that upon reaching Tanay, Rizal and alighting from the car he was brought
inside the apartment and that when he peeped through the window he saw Mercado slapping
Richard on the face. On the contrary, Eric testified that upon their arrival in Tanay, Rizal, they
alighted from the car and were told to go inside the apartment and it was there where Mercado
slapped Richard on the face and asked him to undress.
(6) Florencio further testified that after Richard had taken off his clothes as ordered by Mercado, the
latter asked Richard to lie down, face downward, and thereafter, Richard's feet and hands were tied
by Mercado and his aide, Jeff, with a rattan rope. Eric stated on cross-examination that when
Richard was lying down, Mercado stepped on Richard's left cheek, implying that Richard lay not with
his face down but with his right cheek on the ground.
(7) Florencio stated in his sworn statement that upon reaching Tanay, Rizal, they were taken into an
apartment opposite a beerhouse. On the other hand, Eric claimed that the apartment was some 130
to 150 meters away from the beerhouse.
(8) Florencio stated in his sworn statement that after Richard was beaten up, his hands and feet
were tied and then Mercado and his police companion loaded (sinakay) Richard into the car. Eric,
however, testified that Richard was loaded in the baggage compartment of the car by Acebron and
Jeff. On cross-examination, Florencio contradicted himself by admitting that it was Acebron and Jeff
who loaded Richard into the car.
(9) Florencio testified that, although Mercado asked Acebron to get a bolo, the latter got a long knife
(not a bolo) with a "sharp pointed edge" (sic). Eric declared that the bolo taken by Acebron
was "mapurol."
(10) Eric testified that on February 12, 1994, he was investigated ahead of Florencio by SPO2
James Mabalot and insisted that his statement was the truth. He even stated that as he was being
investigated, Florencio was around, talking. However, this testimony was contradicted by SPO2
James Mabalot who declared that it was Florencio who was first investigated as shown by the fact
that Florencio was investigated at 6:20 p.m., while Eric was investigated at 10:45 p.m. of February
12, 1994.
(11) On cross-examination, Eric testified that while SPO2 Mabalot was investigating him and
Florencio, SPO1 Buama was just outside the office and even saw him. SPO1 Buama confirmed this
statement. However, SPO2 Mabalot said that when he investigated Florencio and Eric, SPO1
Buama was not present having then already left.
(12) SPO1 Buama testified that Richard was his full blood brother, but his sister, Maria Buama, said
that Richard was an adopted child, although they considered him their full blood brother.
31

Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer only to minor details and collateral
matters do not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is consistency in
relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants. Slight contradictions in
fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not
rehearsed. They are thus safeguards against memorized perjury.
32

Nor are such inconsistencies and even improbabilities unusual, for there is no person with perfect
faculties or senses.
33
An adroit cross-examiner may trap a witness into making statements
contradicting his testimony on direct examination. Intensive cross-examination on points not
anticipated by a witness and his lawyer may make a witness blurt out statements which do not
dovetail even with his own testimony. Yet, if it appears that the same witness has not willfully
perverted the truth, as may be gleaned from the tenor of his testimony and the conclusion of the trial
judge regarding his demeanor and behavior on the witness stand, his testimony on material points
may be accepted.
A witness' testimony may likewise contradict that of another witness. As long as the contradiction
involves minor details and collateral matters, the credibility of both witnesses will not be deemed
impaired. After all, no two witnesses could testify on a matter from the same point of view or
perception. The recollection of different witnesses with respect to the time, place, and other
circumstances of a criminal event would naturally differ in various details. Absolute uniformity in
every detail of testimonies cannot be expected of witnesses who by nature react differently to what
they see and hear depending upon their situation and state of mind.
34
On the contrary , if witnesses
should agree on every detail of a transaction that occupied a considerable space of time and should
undertake to tell all that occurred in precisely the same order, each giving the same incidents as the
others in precisely the same words, that fact should make their testimonies suspect.
35

Applying these rules to this case, the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of Florencio Villareal
and Eric Ona pointed out by appellants concern only minor details which do not detract from the
essential points of their testimonies that accused-appellants, after beating up the victim, took him
away in accused-appellant Mercado's car, and, when they returned to the apartment, both admitted
that they had "silenced" the victim or had "laid him to rest."
The alleged inconsistencies between the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and their
affidavits, on the other hand, refer to minor matters that do not affect the substance of the
prosecution's evidence. Affidavits are not entirely reliable evidence in court due to their
incompleteness and the inaccuracies that may have attended their formulation.
36
In general, such
affidavits are not prepared by the affiants themselves but by another person (i.e., investigator) who
may have used his own language in writing the statement or misunderstood the affiant or omitted
material facts in the hurry and impatience that usually attend the preparation of such affidavits. As
this Court has often said:
"An affidavit, 'being taken ex-parte, is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes
from partial suggestion, and sometimes from want of suggestion and inquiries, without the aid of
which the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the
correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that belongs to
the subject.'"
37

"'We have too much experience of the great infirmity of affidavit evidence. When the witness is
illiterate and ignorant, the language presented to the court is not his; it is; and must be, the language
of the person who prepares the affidavit; and it may be, and too often is, the expression of that
person's erroneous inference as to the meaning of the language used by the witness himself; and
however carefully the affidavit may be read over to the witness, he may not understand what is said
in a language so different from that which he is accustomed to use. Having expressed his meaning
in his own language, and finding it translated by a person on whom he relies, into language not his
own, and which he does not perfectly understand, he is too apt to acquiesce; and testimony not
intended by him is brought before the court as his.' (2 Moore on Facts, sec. 952, p. 1105; People v.
Timbang, 74 Phil. 295, 299)."
38

For this reason, affidavits have generally been considered inferior to testimony given in open court.
39

Neither is the credibility of prosecution witnesses Florencio Villareal and Eric Ona in any way
lessened, much less impaired, by the motives imputed to them by accused-appellants who claim that
the former testified against them on account of an incident on January 23, 1994 when Mercado
slapped Eric and hit Florencio on the back. Accused-appellants' contention is nothing more than a
desperate attempt to discredit said witnesses. It is inconceivable that these principal prosecution
witnesses, two young boys, would impute a crime as heinous as kidnapping with murder to anyone if
the same was not true. Indeed, it would be contrary to the natural order of events and of human
nature, and against the presumption of good faith for Florencio and Eric to falsely testify against
accused- appellants.
40
These young boys, in testifying against accused-appellants, would have
nothing to gain and everything to lose, including their lives. Florencio and Eric knew that, even if
accused-appellants were bemedalled military and police officers, they had no compunction at all in
claiming to have killed a number of people. Even granting that such braggadocio was simply meant
to frighten these young boys into silence, it would nonetheless have the same effect on them and
would have deterred them from testifying against accused-appellants had what they testified to been
a mere fabrication.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION
It is true that no eyewitnesses were presented by the prosecution o testify on the actual killing of
Richard Buaman. But it is settled that a conviction may rest on purely circumstantial evidence,
provided the following requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
41
Thus, in People vs. Fulinara,
42
wherein
the victim was kidnapped in the evening and the following day his body found in a ravine, this Court
said:
"While the positive identification made by the key witness does not refer to the actual killing of the
deceased, the circumstantial evidence on record constitutes an unbroken chain which leads to a fair
and reasonable conclusion that accused-appellants are indeed guilty of the offense charged. It is not
only by direct evidence upon which guilt may be predicated. The accused may also be convicted on
circumstantial evidence."
In this case, the following circumstances, viewed in their entirety, show beyond shadow of a doubt
that accused-appellants are indeed guilty of kidnapping with murder:
(1) Mercado picked up Richard on the night of February 9, 1994 near his (Mercado's) house in Pasig
and, poking a gun at him, forced him to ride with him in his car;
(2) Mercado took Richard to his apartment in Tanay;
(3) Mercado slapped and boxed Richard before bringing him inside the apartment;
(4) Mercado went up the second floor of the apartment and came down with Acebron;
(5) Mercado and Acebron took turns in subjecting Richard to physical abuse;
(6) Mercado ordered his aide named Jeff to get a piece of rope with which to bind Richard and Jeff
obliged by getting a rattan rope;
(7) Richard was gagged and his limbs were bound;
(8) Acebron and Jeff put Richard into the luggage compartment of Mercado's car;
(9) Mercado asked Acebron to get a bolo before they drove away;
(10) Accused-appellants rode together in the car with Richard in its compartment;
(11) After two hours, accused-appellants returned to the apartment without Richard;
(12) When Florencio asked Mercado about Richard's whereabouts, Richard replied, "Wala na,
pinatahimik ko na." ("Gone, I already silenced him").
(13) When Eric asked Mercado the same question, the latter replied, "Wala na, pinagpahinga ko
na." ("He is gone. I have laid him to rest").
(14) Eric saw Acebron wiping off bloodstains on the bolo;
(15) At the disco bar, accused-appellants bragged about the fact that Richard was the 25th person
and the 17th person Mercado and Acebron had killed, respectively;
(16) Richard's body was found in a morgue on February 12, 1994;
(17) The victim's body showed signs that his hands and feet had been tied and his mouth stuffed
with a towel; and
(18) Mercado warned Eric and Florencio not to talk to anyone regarding the incident.
These circumstances constitute an unbroken chain clearly pointing to accused-appellants' culpability
to the crime of kidnapping with murder.
IV. THE EVIDENCE OF CONSPIRACY
Accused-appellants argue that the trial court erred in finding conspiracy in the commission of the
crime because the prosecution allegedly failed to establish a common resolution between them to
commit the crime charged. This argument is likewise without merit.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. To establish the existence of conspiracy, direct proof is not essential,
as it may be shown by the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the
crime.
43
It may be proven by facts and circumstances from which may logically be inferred the
existence of a common design among the accused to commit the offense charged, or it may be
deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated.
44
In this case, the
concatenation of facts and circumstances establish beyond a shadow of a doubt that accused-
appellants conspired to kill Richard, to wit: (1) upon reaching the Tanay apartment, which he shared
with Acebron, Mercado went upstairs and called Acebron; (2) as they came downstairs, Mercado
told appellant Acebron that he had a present for him and that they were going to kill someone,
saying "Pare, may regalo ako sa iyo, may papatayin tayo"; (3) Mercado and Acebron slapped and
boxed Richard; (4) when told by Mercado to get a bolo, Acebron did so; (5) Acebron helped in
loading Richard into the car's luggage compartment; (6) Mercado and Acebron left the apartment
together in Mercado's car with Richard in the car's luggage compartment; (7) after two hours, the two
came back to the apartment without Richard; (8) when Eric and Florencio asked them where Richard
was, they answered that Richard had been "silenced" or had been "laid to rest"; and (9) Acebron
washed a bloodstained bolo.
V. ACCUSED-APPELLANTS' ALIBI
Invoking alibi as a defense, accused-appellants argue that it was impossible for them to be in Pasig
at the time of the commission of the crime because they were then in Tanay, Rizal on official duty,
as members of the PNP force in that town. For this purpose, they cite the PNP logbook, duly signed
by them. However, as the trial court pointed out:
"This defense, however, collapsed with the testimony of SPO4 Bias when he affirmed before the
Court that travel time between Tanay and Pasig could take less than an hour, especially at
nighttime. Moreover, the Court finds wanting the evidence presented by the defense to support its
claim that both accused were indeed present at the Tanay PNP Headquarters until about 8:30 p.m.
of February 9, 1994.
"Firstly, it was admitted by the defense that the duty log-book and the morning/evening formation
sheet do not always reflect the whereabouts of the Tanay PNP members for the day such that even
when they have deviated from their regular assignments, no note whatsoever appears on said log-
book. Accused were at the Hilltop Headquarters in Taytay from around 9:15 a.m. to 5 p.m. of
February 9, 1994 and yet, the duty log-book they submitted in Court show otherwise. In said log-
book, the Post/Assignment of accused Acebron was "Intel Optvs/follow-up" while accused Mercado
was supposed to be at "Post OP #2." The Court does not believe this log-book is reliable. Secondly,
again by the defense' own admission, Tanay PNP members sign their names once on the log-book
and this will be enough to confirm their presence or attendance for the entire day. Surely, the
possibility that all the PNP members do not in fact arrive at and leave their office at the same time of
8 a.m. and 8 p.m. can not be disregarded. Still, a reading of the entries in the log-book submitted by
the defense would somehow suggest this. The physical impossibility of accused Mercado, at least,
being in Pasig at around 9 p.m. on February 9, 1994 is not established. The defense of alibi is,
therefore, rejected by the Court."
45

Indeed, alibi is generally regarded with suspicion and is always received with caution, not only
because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because it can be easily fabricated and
concocted. For alibi to prosper as a defense, it must be convincing enough to preclude any doubt on
the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminisor its immediate vicinity
at the time of the incident.
46
An accused who invokes the defense of alibi must prove (a) his
presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime and (b) the physical
impossibility for him to be at the scene of the crime.
47

In this case, even granting that accused-appellants were in Tanay at the time they were supposed to
have taken the two prosecution witnesses and the victim to Pasig, it was still not physically
impossible for them to be in that place. Pasig is only an hour's drive from Tanay and when traffic is
light, as it would generally be late in the evening, the distance could be negotiated in less time.
Significantly, when the three young men were taken from Pasig at around 9 o'clock in the evening,
accused-appellants had already been discharged from their duties because, by their own admission,
the evening formation at the Tanay Police Station ended at around 8:30 that evening.
Above all, given Florencio and Eric's clear and positive identification of accused-appellants as the
perpetrators of the crime, the failure of the defense to give any plausible reason for Florencio and
Eric to testify falsely against accused-appellants renders the latter's alibi bereft of any probative
value.
48

Their positive identification by the witnesses prevails over their alibi and denial.
49

VI. ACCUSED-APPELLANTS' CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY
Accused-appellants are guilty of kidnapping because, by placing the victim in an enclosed place
consisting of the luggage compartment of the car, they detained or otherwise deprived him of his
liberty. There was also actual restraint of the victim's liberty when he was taken at gunpoint from
Pasig to accused-appellants' apartment in Tanay.
50
The evidence proves that Mercado initiated the
kidnapping of the victim. Acebron's subsequent loading of the victim into the car's compartment after
tying the latter shows community of criminal purpose with Mercado. However, although both were
police officers, they acted in this case in their private capacities.
51

The crime was committed by accused-appellants on February 9, 1994, after the amendment of the
Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by Republic Act No. 7659. Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as thus amended, provides:
"Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another,
or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of
the parents, female or a public officer;
"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-
mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
"When the victim is killed or dies as a conseguence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed." (Underscoring supplied)
In People vs. Ramos,
52
the accused was found guilty of two separate heinous crimes of kidnapping
for ransom and murder committed on July 13, 1994 and sentenced to death. On appeal, this Court
modified the ruling and found the accused guilty of the "special complex crime" of kidnapping for
ransom with murder under the last paragraph of Article 267, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
This Court said:
"x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of 'special complex crime' of
kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts
between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the
accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an
afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of
the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought,
the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as
separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art.
267, as amended by RA No. 7659." (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, in the case at bar, the trial court correctly found accused-appellants guilty of kidnapping with
murder and sentenced each of them to death.
Four (4) members of the Court, although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions
expressed in People vs. Echegaray
53
that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of
death, is unconstitutional, nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is
constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
It does not matter whether there are circumstances qualifying the killing as murder.1wphi 1 Under the last
paragraph of Article 267, it is sufficient that the victim is "killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention." In any event, the killing of Richard Buama as a consequence of his kidnapping was
committed under circumstances which make it murder. His limbs were tied and his mouth gagged
before he was taken away. When his body was discovered, his limbs were still tied and his mouth
gagged, indicating that treachery attended the killing of Richard Buama.
The trial court awarded P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P100,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary
damages to the Buama family as heirs of the deceased Richard Buama pursuant to Articles 2206
and 2230 of the Civil Code. It is not disputed, however, that Richard had not been legally adopted by
the Buamas, and so the latter cannot be considered his heirs, the term "heirs" being limited to the
deceased's "spouse, legitimate, and illegitimate ascendants and descendants" per the definition of
"heirs" under Articles 782 and 2206 of the Civil Code. For this reason, in one case,
54
the award of
moral damages for the death of a brother caused by quasi-delict was disallowed. In this case, since
the heirs of the deceased Richard Buama are not known, the awards of civil indemnity and moral
and exemplary damages to the Buamas should be disallowed.
As to the award of P52,680.00 for actual damages incurred for wake and funeral expenses, only the
amount of P22,690.00is supported by receipts (Exhs. J-2 to J-7). Accused-appellants contend that
these receipts constitute hearsay evidence because the witness who identified them, Lourdes
Vergara, admitted that she merely collated the same but had otherwise no personal knowledge of
the facts pertaining to their issuance.
55
In People vs. Paraiso,
56
this Court disregarded the list of
burial expenses for being hearsay since it was prepared by the victim's sister-in-law and not by the
victim's eldest son who testified thereon. The Court held that actual damages should be based upon
competent proof and on the best evidence available.
One receipt (Exh. J-5) for P1,300.00 shows that it was issued by the Immaculate Conception Parish
Church in Pasig to Lourdes Vergara, and it was for Richard Buama's burial mass. Another receipt
(Exh. J-7), for the amount of P2,210.00 for flowers for Richard Buama's wake, was issued by
Lourdes Vergara herself as the owner of the flower shop. These two receipts should be considered
competent evidence of the amount of expenses indicated therein, and therefore the total amount of
P3,510.00 should be awarded to Lourdes Vergara as actual damages.
VII. ALLEGED HASTE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN DECIDING THE CASE
One last point. Accused-appellants bewail the fact that the trial court rendered its decision just a day
after it had received their Joint Memorandum.
57
Accused-appellants charge that their case was
decided with "fantastic, incredible and unbelievable speed" with the result that "grave and serious
errors" were committed in convicting them.
58

This contention has no merit. A review of the trial court's decision shows that its findings were based
on the records of this case and the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial. The
speed with which the trial court disposed of the case cannot thus be attributed to the injudicious
performance of its function. Indeed, a judge is not supposed to study a case only after all the
pertinent pleadings have been filed. It is a mark of diligence and devotion to duty that a judge studies
a case long before the deadline set for the promulgation of his decision has arrived. The one-day
period between the filing of accused-appellants' memorandum and the promulgation of the decision
was sufficient time to consider their arguments and to incorporate these in the decision. As long as
the trial judge does not sacrifice the orderly administration of justice in favor of a speedy but reckless
disposition of a case, he cannot be taken to task for rendering his decision with due dispatch. The
trial court in this case committed no reversible errors and, consequently, except for some
modification, its decision should be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City, finding accused-
appellants Elpidio Mercado y Hernando and Aurelio Acebron y Adora guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of kidnapping with murder and imposing upon each of them the DEATH
PENALTY, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the awards of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages are DELETED and accused-
appellants are ORDERED to pay jointly and severally to Lourdes Vergara the amount of P3,510.00
as reimbursement for the expenses she incurred for the victim's wake and funeral.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, upon the finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
Office of the President for his use in case he decides to exercise his prerogative of mercy.
SO ORDERED.





















G.R. No. 189754 October 24, 2012
LITO BAUTISTA and JIMMY ALCANTARA, Petitioners,
vs.
SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J .:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision
1

elated May 19, 2009 and Resolution
2
dated September 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in
CA-G.R. SP No. 104885, entitled Sharon G. Cuneta-Pangilinan v. lion. Rizalina T Capco-Urnali, in
her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Mandaluyong City, Branch 212, Lito
Bautista, and Jimmy Alcantara, which granted the
petition for certiorari of respondent Sharon G. Cuneta-Pangilinan. TheCA Decision reversed and set
aside the Order
3
dated April 25, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 212, Mandaluyong
City, but only insofar as it pertains to the granting of the Demurrer to Evidence filed by petitioners
Lito Bautista (Bautista) and Jimmy Alcantara (Alcantara), and also ordered that the case be
remanded to the trial court for reception of petitioners' evidence.
The antecedents are as follows:
On February 19, 2002, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City filed two (2)
informations, both dated February 4, 2002, with the RTC, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City, against
Pete G. Ampoloquio, Jr. (Ampoloquio), and petitioners Bautista and Alcantara, for the crime of libel,
committed by publishing defamatory articles against respondent Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan in the
tabloid Bandera.
In Criminal Case No. MC02-4872, the Information dated February 4, 2002 reads:
That on or about the 24th day of April, 2001, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together with Jane/John Does unknown directors/officer[s] of Bandera Publishing Corporation,
publisher of Bandera, whose true identities are unknown, and mutually helping and aiding one
another, with deliberate intent to bring SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN into public dishonor,
shame and contempt, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with malice and
ridicule, cause to publish in Bandera (tabloid), with circulation in Metro Manila, which among others
have the following insulting and slanderous remarks, to wit:
MAGTIGIL KA, SHARON!
Sharon Cuneta, the mega-taba singer-actress, Id like to believe, is really brain-dead. Mukhang totoo
yata yung sinasabi ng kaibigan ni Pettizou Tayag na ganyan siya.
Hayan at buong ingat na sinulat namin yung interview sa kaibigan ng may-ari ng Central Institute of
Technology at ni isang side comment ay wala kaming ginawa and all throughout the article, weve
maintained our objectivity, pero sa interview sa aparadoric singer- actress in connection with an
album launching, ay buong ningning na sinabi nitong shes supposedly looking into the item that
weve written and most probably would take some legal action.
x x x
Magsalita ka, Missed Cuneta, at sabihin mong hindi ito totoo.
Ang hindi lang namin nagustuhan ay ang pagbintangan kaming palagi naman daw namin siyang
sinisiraan, kaya hindi lang daw niya kami pinapansin, believing na part raw siguro yun ng aming
trabaho.
Dios mio perdon, what she gets to see are those purportedly biting commentaries about her
katabaan and kaplastikan but she has simply refused to acknowledge the good reviews weve done
on her.
x x x
Going back to this seemingly disoriented actress whos desperately trying to sing even if she truly
cant, itanggi mo na hindi mo kilala si Pettizou Tayag gayung nagkasama raw kayo ng tatlong araw
sa mother's house ng mga Aboitiz sa Cebu more than a month ago, in connection with one of those
political campaigns of your husband.
x x x
thereby casting publicly upon complainant, malicious contemptuous imputations of a vice, condition
or defect, which tend to cause complainant her dishonor, discredit or contempt.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
4

In Criminal Case No. MC02-4875, the Information dated February 4, 2002 reads:
That on or about the 27th day of March, 2001, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together with Jane/John Does unknown directors/officers of Bandera Publishing Corporation,
publisher of Bandera, whose true identities are unknown, and mutually helping, and aiding one
another, with deliberate intent to bring SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN into public dishonor,
shame and contempt did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with malice and
ridicule, cause to publish in Bandera (tabloid), with circulation in Metro Manila, which, among others,
have the following insulting and slanderous remarks, to wit:
NABURYONG SA KAPLASTIKAN NI SHARON ANG MILYONARYANG SUPPORTER NI KIKO!
FREAKOUT pala kay Sharon Cuneta ang isa sa mga loyal supporters ni Kiko Pangilinan na si
Pettizou Tayag, a multi-millionaire who owns Central Institute of Technology College in Sampaloc,
Manila (it is also one of the biggest schools in Paniqui, Tarlac).
x x x
Which in a way, she did. Bagama't busy siya (she was having a meeting with some business
associates), she went out of her way to give Sharon security.
So, ang ginawa daw ni Ms. Tayag ay tinext nito si Sharon para mabigyan ito ng instructions para
kumportable itong makarating sa Bulacan.
She was most caring and solicitous, pero tipong na-offend daw ang megastar at nagtext pang "You
dont need to produce an emergency SOS for me, Ill be fine."
Now, nang makara[t]ing na raw sa Bulacan si Mega nagtatarang daw ito at binadmouth si Pettizou.
Kesyo ang kulit-kulit daw nito, atribida, mapapel at kung anu-ano pang mga derogatory words na
nakarating siyempre sa kinauukulan.
Anyhow, if its true that Ms. Pettizou has been most financially supportive of Kiko, how come Sharon
seems not to approve of her?
"She doesnt want kasi her husband to win as a senator because when that happens, mawawalan
siya ng hold sa kanya," our caller opines.
Pettizou is really sad that Sharon is treating her husband like a wimp.
"In public," our source goes on tartly, "pa kiss-kiss siya. Pa-embrace-embrace pero kung silang
dalawa na lang parang kung sinong sampid kung i-treat niya si Kiko."
My God Pete, Harvard graduate si Kiko. Hes really intelligent as compared to Sharon who appears
to be brain dead most of the time.
Yung text message niyang "You dont need to produce an emergency SOS for me," hindi bat she
was being redundant?
Another thing, I guess its high time that she goes on a diet again. Jesus, she looks 611 crosswise!
x x x
Kunsabagay, she was only being most consistent. Yang si Sharon daw ay talagang mega-brat,
mega-sungit. But who does she think she is? Her wealth, dear, would pale in comparison with the
Tayags millions. Kunsabagay, shes brain dead most of the time.
x x x
thereby casting publicly upon complainant, malicious contemptuous imputation of a vice, condition or
defect, which tend to cause complainant her dishonor, discredit or contempt.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
5

Upon arraignment, petitioners, together with their co-accused Ampoloquio, each entered a plea of
not guilty. Thereafter, a joint pre-trial and trial of the case ensued.
6

Respondents undated Complaint-Affidavit
7
alleged that Bautista and Alcantara were Editor and
Associate Editor, respectively, of the publication Bandera, and their co-accused, Ampoloquio, was
the author of the alleged libelous articles which were published therein, and subject of the two
informations. According to respondent, in April 2001, she and her family were shocked to learn about
an article dated March 27, 2001, featured on page 7 of Bandera (Vol. 11, No. 156), in the column
Usapang Censored of Ampoloquio, entitled Naburyong sa Kaplastikan ni Sharon ang
Milyonaryang Supporter ni Kiko, that described her as plastic (hypocrite), ingrate, mega-brat, mega-
sungit, and brain dead, which were the subject of Criminal Case No. MC02-4875.
8
Another article,
with the same title and similar text, also featured on the same date, appeared on page 6 of Saksi
Ngayon, in the column Banatan of Ampoloquio.
9
Moreover, respondent averred that on April 24,
2001, Ampoloquio wrote two follow-up articles, one appeared in his column Usapang Censored,
entitled Magtigil Ka, Sharon!, stating that she bad-mouthed one Pettizou Tayag by calling the latter
kulit-kulit (annoyingly persistent), atribida (presumptuous), mapapel (officious or self-important), and
other derogatory words; that she humiliated Tayag during a meeting by calling the latter bobo
(stupid); that she exhibited offensive behavior towards Tayag; and that she was a dishonest person
with questionable credibility, which were the subject of Criminal Case No. MC02-4872.
10
Another
article, entitled Magtigil Ka, Sharon Cuneta!!!!, also featured on the same date with similar text, and
appeared on page 7 of Saksi Ngayon (Vol. 3, No. 285), in the column Banatan of Ampoloquio,
11
with
the headline in bold letters, Sharon Cuneta, May Sira? on the front page of the said
issue.
12
Respondent added that Ampoloquios articles impugned her character as a woman and wife,
as they depicted her to be a domineering wife to a browbeaten husband. According to Ampoloquio,
respondent did not want her husband (Senator Francis Pangilinan) to win (as Senator) because that
would mean losing hold over him, and that she would treat him like a wimp and sampid (hanger-on)
privately, but she appeared to be a loving wife to him in public. Respondent denied that Tayag
contributed millions to her husbands campaign fund. She clarified that Tayag assisted during the
campaign and was one of the volunteers of her husbands Kilos Ko Movement, being the first cousin
of one Atty. Joaquinito Harvey B. Ringler (her husbands partner in Franco Pangilinan Law Office);
however, it was Atty. Ringler who asked Tayag to resign from the movement due to difficulty in
dealing with her.
After presenting respondent on the witness stand, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of
Documentary Exhibits dated October 11, 2006, which included her undated Complaint-Affidavit.
13

On November 14, 2006, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File the Attached Demurrer
to Evidence.
14
In their Demurrer to Evidence,
15
which was appended to the said Motion, Bautista and
Alcantara alleged that the prosecution's evidence failed to establish their participation as Editor and
Associate Editor, respectively, of the publication Bandera; that they were not properly identified by
respondent herself during her testimony; and that the subject articles written by Ampoloquio were
not libelous due to absence of malice.
On April 25, 2008, the RTC issued an Order
16
granting petitioners Demurrer to Evidence and
dismissed Criminal Case Nos. MCO2-4872 and MCO2-4875. The trial court opined, among others,
that since the prosecution did not submit its Comment/Opposition to the petitioners' Demurrer to
Evidence, the averments therein thus became unrebutted; that the testimonial and documentary
evidence adduced by the prosecution failed to prove the participation of petitioners as conspirators
of the crime charged; and that during the direct examination on July 27, 2004 and cross-examination
on August 1, 2006, respondent neither identified them, nor was there any mention about their actual
participation.
As a consequence, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit
17
dated May 29, 2008, with the attached
Comment (to Accused Lito Bautista and Jimmy Alcantara's Demurrer to Evidence)
18
dated March 24,
2008, stating that during the pendency of the trial court's resolution on the petitioners' Motion for
Leave of Court to File the Attached Demurrer to Evidence, with the attached Demurrer to Evidence,
the prosecution intended to file its Comment, by serving copies thereof, through registered mail,
upon counsels for the petitioners, including the other accused, and the respondent; however, said
Comment was not actually filed with the trial court due to oversight on the part of the staff of the
State Prosecutor handling the case.
19
Claiming that it was deprived of due process, the prosecution
prayed that its Comment be admitted and that the same be treated as a reconsideration of the trial
court's Order dated April 25, 2008.
In an Order dated June 3, 2008, the RTC granted the prosecutions' Motion to Admit, with the
attached Comment, and ruled that its Comment be admitted to form part of the court records.
On August 19, 2008, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, seeking to set aside the
RTC Orders dated April 25, 2008 (which granted petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence and ordered the
dismissal of the cases against them) and June 3, 2008 (which noted and admitted respondent's
Comment to form part of the records of the case).
In a Decision dated May 19, 2009, the CA granted respondent's petition, thereby reversing and
setting aside the RTC Order dated April 25, 2008, but only insofar as it pertains to the grant of
petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence, and ordered that the case be remanded to the trial court for
reception of petitioners' evidence.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2009 which, however, was
denied by the CA in a Resolution dated September 28, 2009.
Hence, petitioners filed this present petition, raising the following arguments:
I.
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS IS
BARRED BY THE PETITIONERS' RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
II.
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS
DOES NOT LIE TO CORRECT ALLEGED ERRORS OF JUDGMENT COMMITTED BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING PETITONERS' DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE.
Petitioners allege that the Order of the RTC, dated April 25, 2008, granting the Demurrer to
Evidence was tantamount to an acquittal. As such, the prosecution can no longer interpose an
appeal to the CA, as it would place them in double jeopardy. Petitioners contend that respondent's
petition for certiorari with the CA should not have prospered, because the allegations therein, in
effect, assailed the trial court's judgment, not its jurisdiction. In other words, petitioners posit that the
said Order was in the nature of an error of judgment rendered, which was not correctible by a
petition for certiorari with the CA.
Petitioners aver that although the CA correctly ruled that the prosecution had not been denied due
process, however, it erred in ruling that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
granting petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence, on the basis that the prosecution failed to prove that they
acted in conspiracy with Ampoloquio, the author of the questioned articles. They added that what the
prosecution proved was merely their designations as Editor and Associate Editor of the publication
Bandera, but not the fact that they had either control over the articles to be published or actually
edited the subject articles.
Respondent counters that petitioners failed to show special and important reasons to justify their
invocation of the Court's power to review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. She avers that the
acquittal of petitioners does not preclude their further prosecution if the judgment acquitting them is
void for lack of jurisdiction. Further, she points out that contrary to petitioners contention, the
principle of double jeopardy does not attach in cases where the court's judgment acquitting the
accused or dismissing the case is void, either for having disregarded the State's right to due process
or for having been rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and not merely errors of judgment.
Respondent also avers that even if the prosecution was deemed to have waived its right to file a
Comment on the petitioners Motion for Leave of Court to File the Attached Demurrer to Evidence,
this did not give the trial court any reason to deprive the prosecution of its right to file a Comment on
the petitioners Demurrer to Evidence itself, which was a clear violation of the due process
requirement. By reason of the foregoing, respondent insists that petitioners cannot invoke violation
of their right against double jeopardy.
The petition is impressed with merit.
At the onset, it should be noted that respondent took a procedural misstep, and the view she is
advancing is erroneous. The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the
Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35
(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG
shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials
and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. It
shall have specific powers and functions to represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all
civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official
capacity is a party.
20
The OSG is the law office of the Government.
21

To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him
can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant
or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the
accused is concerned. In a catena of cases, this view has been time and again espoused and
maintained by the Court. In Rodriguez v. Gadiane,
22
it was categorically stated that if the criminal
case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the
case must be instituted by the Solicitor General in behalf of the State. The capability of the private
complainant to question such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to the civil aspect of the case. The
same determination was also arrived at by the Court in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v.
Veridiano II.
23
In the recent case of Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan,
24
the Court again upheld this guiding
principle.
Worthy of note is the case of People v. Santiago,
25
wherein the Court had the occasion to bring this
issue to rest. The Court elucidated:
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If
a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the
criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor
General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may
appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is
alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or
on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved.
In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The
complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action
questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing,
complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may
be prosecuted in name of said complainant.
26

Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State,
the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability
arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal
of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the
solicitor general. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on
appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.
27

In the case at bar, the petition filed by the respondent before the CA essentially questioned the
criminal aspect of the Order of the RTC, not the civil aspect of the case. Consequently, the petition
should have been filed by the State through the OSG. Since the petition for certiorari filed in the CA
was not at the instance of the OSG, the same should have been outrightly dismissed by the CA.
Respondent lacked the personality or legal standing to question the trial courts order because it is
only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), who can bring actions on behalf of the State in
criminal proceedings, before the Supreme Court and the CA.
28
Thus, the CA should have denied the
petition outright.
Moreover, not only did the CA materially err in entertaining the petition, it should be stressed that the
granting of petitioners Demurrer to Evidence already amounted to a dismissal of the case on the
merits and a review of the order granting the demurrer to evidence will place the accused in double
jeopardy. Consequently, the Court disagrees with the CAs ruling reversing the trial courts order
dismissing the criminal cases against petitioners.
Under Section 23,
29
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court on Demurrer to Evidence, after the prosecution
terminates the presentation of evidence and rests its case, the trial court may dismiss the case on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon the filing of a Demurrer to Evidence by the accused with
or without leave of court. If the accused files a Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court and the
same is denied, he may adduce evidence in his defense. However, if the Demurrer to Evidence is
filed by the accused without prior leave of court and the same is denied, he waives his right to
present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution.
Corollarily, after the prosecution rests its case, and the accused files a Demurrer to Evidence, the
trial court is required to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient
enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the trial court finds that
the prosecution evidence is not sufficient and grants the accused's Demurrer to Evidence, the ruling
is an adjudication on the merits of the case which is tantamount to an acquittal and may no longer be
appealed. Any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would, thus, violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.
30

Anent the prosecutions claim of denial of due process. As correctly found by the CA, the
prosecution was not denied due process. Suffice it to state that the prosecution had actively
participated in the trial and already rested its case, and upon petitioners' filing of their Demurrer to
Evidence, was given the opportunity to file its Comment or Opposition and, in fact, actually filed its
Comment thereto, albeit belatedly. The CA emphasized that the word "may" was used in Section 23
of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that if leave of court is
granted, and the accused has filed the Demurrer to Evidence within a non-extendible period of ten
(10) days from notice, the prosecution "may" oppose the Demurrer to Evidence within a similar
period from its receipt.1wphi 1 In this regard, the CA added that the filing of a Comment or Opposition by
respondent is merely directory, not a mandatory or jurisdictional requirement, and that in fact the trial
court may even proceed with the resolution of the petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence even without the
prosecution's Comment.
One final note. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code specifies the persons that can be held liable
for libel. It provides:
ART. 360. Persons responsible. Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper,
magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamation contained therein to the same
extent as if he were the author thereof.
31

From the foregoing, not only is the person who published, exhibited or caused the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing shall be responsible for the same, all other persons who
participated in its publication are liable, including the editor or business manager of a daily
newspaper, magazine or serial publication, who shall be equally responsible for the defamations
contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof. The liability which attaches to
petitioners is, thus, statutory in nature.
In Fermin v. People,
32
therein petitioner argued that to sustain a conviction for libel under Article 360
of the Code, it is mandatory that the publisher knowingly participated in or consented to the
preparation and publication of the libelous article. She also averred that she had adduced ample
evidence to show that she had no hand in the preparation and publication of the offending article,
nor in the review, editing, examination, and approval of the articles published in Gossip Tabloid. The
Court struck down her erroneous theory and ruled that therein petitioner, who was not only the
Publisher of Gossip Tabloid but also its President and Chairperson, could not escape liability by
claiming lack of participation in the preparation and publication of the libelous article.
Similarly, in Tulfo v. People,
33
therein petitioners, who were Managing Editor, National Editor of
Remate publication, President of Carlo Publishing House, and one who does typesetting, editing,
and layout of the page, claim that they had no participation in the editing or writing of the subject
articles which will hold them liable for the crime of libel and, thus, should be acquitted. In debunking
this argument, the Court stressed that an editor or manager of a newspaper, who has active charge
and control over the publication, is held equally liable with the author of the libelous article. This is
because it is the duty of the editor or manager to know and control the contents of the paper, and
interposing the defense of lack of knowledge or consent as to the contents of the articles or
publication definitely will not prosper.
The rationale for the criminal culpability of those persons enumerated in Article 360 was already
elucidated as early as in the case of U.S. v. Ocampo,
34
to wit:
According to the legal doctrines and jurisprudence of the United States, the printer of a publication
containing libelous matter is liable for the same by reason of his direct connection therewith and his
cognizance of the contents thereof. With regard to a publication in which a libel is printed, not only is
the publisher but also all other persons who in any way participate in or have any connection with its
publication are liable as publishers.
35

Accordingly, Article 360 would have made petitioners Bautista and Alcantara, being the Editor and
Assistant Editor, respectively, of Bandera Publishing Corporation, answerable with Ampoloquio, for
the latters alleged defamatory writing, as if they were the authors thereof. Indeed, as aptly
concluded by the court a quo:
The aforestated provision is clear and unambiguous. It equally applies to an editor of a publication in
which a libelous article was published and states that the editor of the same shall be responsible for
the defamation in writing as if he were the author thereof. Indeed, when an alleged libelous article is
published in a newspaper, such fact alone sufficient evidence to charge the editor or business
manager with the guilt of its publication. This sharing of liability with the author of said article is
based on the principle that editors and associate editors, by the nature of their positions, edit, control
and approve the materials which are to be published in a newspaper. This means that, without their
nod of approbation, any article alleged to be libelous would not be published.
Hence, by virtue of their position and the authority which they exercise, newspaper editors and
associate editors are as much critical part in the publication of any defamatory material as the writer
or author thereof.
36

Nevertheless, petitioners could no longer be held liable in view of the procedural infirmity that the
petition for certiorari was not undertaken by the OSG, but instead by respondent in her personal
capacity. Although the conclusion of the trial court may be wrong, to reverse and set aside the Order
granting the demurrer to evidence would violate petitioners constitutionally-enshrined right against
double jeopardy. Had it not been for this procedural defect, the Court could have seriously
considered the arguments advanced by the respondent in seeking the reversal of the Order of the
RTC.
The granting of a demurrer to evidence should, therefore, be exercised with caution, taking into
consideration not only the rights of the accused, but also the right of the private offended party to be
vindicated of the wrongdoing done against him, for if it is granted, the accused is acquitted and the
private complainant is generally left with no more remedy. In such instances, although the decision
of the court may be wrong, the accused can invoke his right against double jeopardy. Thus, judges
are reminded to be more diligent and circumspect in the performance of their duties as members of
the Bench, always bearing in mind that their decisions affect the lives of the accused and the
individuals who come to the courts to seek redress of grievances, which decision could be possibly
used by the aggrieved party as basis for the filing of the appropriate actions against them.
Perforce, the Order dated April 25, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City,
in Criminal Case Nos. MC02-4872 and MC02-4875, which dismissed the actions as against
petitioners Lito Bautista and Jimmy Alcantara, should be reinstated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 19, 2009 and Resolution dated
September 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 104885, are REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The portion of the Order dated April 25, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212,
Mandaluyong City, in Criminal Case Nos. MC02-4872 and MC02-4875, which dismissed the actions
as against petitioners Lito Bautista and Jimmy Alcantara, is REINSTATED.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176389 January 18, 2011
ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176864
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO
FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.
R E S O L U T I O N
ABAD, J .:
On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals (CA) and acquitted
the accused in this case, Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio
Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong of the charges against them on the
ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate relative of the victims, asked
the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it "denied the prosecution due process of law;
seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility; issued a
tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted in the miscarriage of
justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution witnesses."
1

But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accused under
double jeopardy. The Constitution provides in Section 21, Article III, that:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. x x x
To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished for the
crime of which he has already been absolved. There is reason for this provision of the Constitution.
In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused. If there is no limit to
attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite
power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm
the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.
As the Court said in People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan:
2

[A]t the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to
a second judgment for the same offense would arm the government with a potent instrument of
oppression. The provision therefore guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
Societys awareness of the heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual
defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the government to a single criminal proceeding to
vindicate its very vital interest in the enforcement of criminal laws.
3

Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But the grounds
are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its
discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the
State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
4

Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable to bring his pleas
for reconsideration under such exceptions. For instance, he avers that the Court "must ensure that
due process is afforded to all parties and there is no grave abuse of discretion in the treatment of
witnesses and the evidence."
5
But he has not specified the violations of due process or acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly committed. His claim that "the highly
questionable and suspicious evidence for the defense taints with serious doubts the validity of the
decision"
6
is, without more, a mere conclusion drawn from personal perception.
Complainant Vizconde cites the decision in Galman v. Sandiganbayan
7
as authority that the Court
can set aside the acquittal of the accused in the present case. But the government proved in Galman
that the prosecution was deprived of due process since the judgment of acquittal in that case was
"dictated, coerced and scripted."
8
It was a sham trial. Here, however, Vizconde does not allege that
the Court held a sham review of the decision of the CA. He has made out no case that the Court
held a phony deliberation in this case such that the seven Justices who voted to acquit the accused,
the four who dissented, and the four who inhibited themselves did not really go through the process.
Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Courts appreciation of the evidence and
assessment of the prosecution witnesses credibility. He ascribes grave error on the Courts finding
that Alfaro was not a credible witness and assails the value assigned by the Court to the evidence of
the defense. In other words, private complainant wants the Court to review the evidence anew and
render another judgment based on such a re-evaluation. This is not constitutionally allowed as it is
merely a repeated attempt to secure Webb, et als conviction. The judgment acquitting Webb, et al is
final and can no longer be disturbed.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES for lack of merit complainant Lauro G. Vizcondes motion for
reconsideration dated December 28, 2010.
For essentially the same reason, the Court DENIES the motions for leave to intervene of Fr. Robert
P. Reyes, Sister Mary John R. Mananzan, Bishop Evangelio L. Mercado, and Dante L.A. Jimenez,
representing the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption and of former Vice President Teofisto
Guingona, Jr.
No further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.
SO ORDERED.




G.R. No. 151258 February 1, 2012
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 154954
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
The HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, Jr.,
JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO
GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO
MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE
FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL BRIGOLA, PAUL
ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH
LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 155101
FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ
SARUCA, Jr., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, J .:
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa the victim in this case on 10
February 1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing.
1
Due in large part to the brave
efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups were organized, condemning his senseless
and tragic death. This widespread condemnation prompted Congress to enact a special law, which
became effective in 1995, that would criminalize hazing.
2
The intent of the law was to discourage
members from making hazing a requirement for joining their sorority, fraternity, organization, or
association.
3
Moreover, the law was meant to counteract the exculpatory implications of "consent"
and "initial innocent act" in the conduct of initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing punishable
or mala prohibita.
4

Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the country.
5
Within a year of
his death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths emerged those of Frederick Cahiyang of the
University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan
ng Araullo in Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito
Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of the University of the
Philippines in Baguio City.
6

Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case the general
condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a fundamental principle in
our criminal justice system "[N]o act constitutes a crime unless it is made so by law."
7
Nullum
crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral
or injurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its commission. As
interpreters of the law, judges are called upon to set aside emotion, to resist being swayed by strong
public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on the elements of the offense and the facts allowed in
evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258 (Villareal v. People), G.R.
No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057
and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona).
Facts
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA)
8
and the trial court,
9
are as follows:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar
"Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert"
Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity
(Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufos Restaurant to have
dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the
neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be
physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for
three days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for
the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the
Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of
the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were
then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run,"
which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering
blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their
backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over
their legs; the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the
"auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation
rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs
by two Aquilans; and the "Auxies Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the
opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also
indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes were made to present comic
plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila
Fraternitys principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or
legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment
them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing
that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially
ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members
10
Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and
Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson
Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he
reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected
the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle
blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him
complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings,
Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the
initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at
the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and incoherent
mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just
overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans
started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him
warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340
1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried.
11
On the
other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in
abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.
12

On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding
the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion
temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
13
A few weeks after the trial court rendered
its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine
accused commenced anew.
14

On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)
15
set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial
court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused
according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following
Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez,
De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero,
Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) were acquitted, as their individual
guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano
Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) were found guilty of the crime of slight
physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to
jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P 30,000 as indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They
were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum
ofP 50,000 and to pay the additional amount of P 1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused
Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.
16
Meanwhile, on different dates
between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of
accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
17
On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos.
89060 & 90153
18
reversed the trial courts Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.
19

From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually brought
before this Court.
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The
Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January
2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
20

While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a Notice of
Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March
2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does
not survive the death of the accused.
G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People
Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning the CAs Decision dated
10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520.
21
Petitioner sets forth
two main issues first, that he was denied due process when the CA sustained the trial courts
forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and, second, that he was deprived of due process when
the CA did not apply to him the same "ratio decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the other
accused."
22

As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited Dizons right to present
evidence during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on an earlier date since a
co-accused, Antonio General, no longer presented separate evidence during trial. According to
Dizon, his right should not have been considered as waived because he was justified in asking for a
postponement. He argues that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the hearing dates and in fact
insisted that he was ready to present evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an
earlier hearing date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise been acquitted, like
the other accused, since his acts were also part of the traditional initiation rites and were not tainted
by evil motives.
23
He claims that the additional paddling session was part of the official activity of the
fraternity. He also points out that one of the neophytes admitted that the chairperson of the initiation
rites "decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the initiation so Mr. Villareal proceeded to do
the paddling."
24
Further, petitioner echoes the argument of the Solicitor General that "the individual
blows inflicted by Dizon and Villareal could not have resulted in Lennys death."
25
The Solicitor
General purportedly averred that, "on the contrary, Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by
Lenny could not be considered fatal if taken individually, but if taken collectively, the result is the
violent death of the victim."
26

Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill will. He claims that Lennys
father could not have stolen the parking space of Dizons father, since the latter did not have a car,
and their fathers did not work in the same place or office. Revenge for the loss of the parking space
was the alleged ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances regarding a stolen parking
space were only part of the "psychological initiation." He then cites the testimony of Lennys co-
neophyte witness Marquez who admitted knowing "it was not true and that he was just making it
up."
27

Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated by his show of concern
for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the testimony of one of the neophytes, who
mentioned that the former had kicked the leg of the neophyte and told him to switch places with
Lenny to prevent the latters chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon, together with Victorino,
helped Lenny through a sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair. According to petitioner, his
alleged ill motivation is contradicted by his manifestation of compassion and concern for the victims
well-being.
G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CAs Decision dated 10 January
2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it acquitted 19
(Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight
physical injuries.
28
According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that there could have
been no conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been criminalized
at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been upheld,
inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries
led to the victims death, petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally liable for the
resulting crime of homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
29
The said article
provides: "Criminal liability shall be incurred [b]y any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended."
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable. According to the Solicitor
General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in
setting aside the trial courts finding of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal liability of all the
accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of the crime.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying for the reversal of the CAs
Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17 May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060
and 90153.
30
The Petition involves the dismissal of the criminal charge filed against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
Due to "several pending incidents," the trial court ordered a separate trial for accused Escalona,
Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S. Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal
Case No. C-38340) to commence after proceedings against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case
No. C-38340(91) shall have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court found the 26 accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-38340
involving the nine other co-accused recommenced on 29 November 1993. For "various reasons," the
initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005, or almost 12 years after the
arraignment of the nine accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused, namely,
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to assert their right to
speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She also points out that the prosecution cannot be
faulted for the delay, as the original records and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but
were still in the appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.
Issues
1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizons right to present evidence constitutes denial of
due process;
2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for
violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial;
3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated the
liability of each accused according to individual participation;
4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and
5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.
Discussion
Resolution on Preliminary Matters
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution, this Court took
note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is totally
extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is
extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term "personal penalties" refers to the
service of personal or imprisonment penalties,
31
while the term "pecuniary penalties" (las
pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs,
32
including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense
complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto).
33
However, civil liability based on a source of obligation
other than the delict survives the death of the accused and is recoverable through a separate civil
action.
34

Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for both personal
and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict complained of.
Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed
and terminated.
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception of evidence for
accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September; and the 5th and 12 of October
1993.
35
The Order likewise stated that "it will not entertain any postponement and that all the
accused who have not yet presented their respective evidence should be ready at all times down the
line, with their evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part to present evidence when required
shall therefore be construed as waiver to present evidence."
36

However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in open court that his client
Antonio General would no longer present separate evidence. Instead, the counsel would adopt the
testimonial evidence of the other accused who had already testified.
37
Because of this development
and pursuant to the trial courts Order that the parties "should be ready at all times down the line,"
the trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on the next trial date 25 August 1993 instead
of his originally assigned dates. The original dates were supposed to start two weeks later, or on 8
September 1993.
38
Counsel for accused Dizon was not able to present evidence on the accelerated
date. To address the situation, counsel filed a Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to
appear in a previously scheduled case, and that he would be ready to present evidence on the dates
originally assigned to his clients.
39
The trial court denied the Manifestation on the same date and
treated the Constancia as a motion for postponement, in violation of the three-day-notice rule under
the Rules of Court.
40
Consequently, the trial court ruled that the failure of Dizon to present evidence
amounted to a waiver of that right.
41

Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process of law when the trial
court forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him, the postponement of the 25 August
1993 hearing should have been considered justified, since his original pre-assigned trial dates were
not supposed to start until 8 September 1993, when he was scheduled to present evidence. He
posits that he was ready to present evidence on the dates assigned to him. He also points out that
he did not ask for a resetting of any of the said hearing dates; that he in fact insisted on being
allowed to present evidence on the dates fixed by the trial court. Thus, he contends that the trial
court erred in accelerating the schedule of presentation of evidence, thereby invalidating the finding
of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution
itself.
42
Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel" This constitutional right includes the right
to present evidence in ones defense,
43
as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in
person at every stage of the proceedings.
44

In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,
45
the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the defenses presentation
of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995 hearing was cancelled due to "lack of
quorum in the regular membership" of the Sandiganbayans Second Division and upon the
agreement of the parties. The hearing was reset for the next day, 22 June 1995, but Crisostomo and
his counsel failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very same day, issued an Order directing
the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Crisostomo and the confiscation of his surety bond. The
Order further declared that he had waived his right to present evidence because of his
nonappearance at "yesterdays and todays scheduled hearings." In ruling against the Order, we held
thus:
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, Crisostomos non-
appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely a waiver of his right to be present for trial on
such date only and not for the succeeding trial dates
x x x x x x x x x
Moreover, Crisostomos absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not have been deemed as a
waiver of his right to present evidence. While constitutional rights may be waived, such waiver must
be clear and must be coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right. Crisostomo did not
voluntarily waive in person or even through his counsel the right to present evidence. The
Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of the prosecution, Calingayan, and
Calingayan's counsel.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, the court is
called upon to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the consequences of a waiver
of the right to present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned of the
consequences of another failure to attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first explain to
the accused personally in clear terms the exact nature and consequences of a waiver. Crisostomo
was not even forewarned. The Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right
to present evidence without even allowing Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22 June 1995
hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case involving a grave penalty is not
assumed and taken lightly. The presence of the accused and his counsel is indispensable so that
the court could personally conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver x x x.
46
(Emphasis supplied)
The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25 August
1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have considered the
excuse of counsel justified, especially since counsel for another accused General had made a
last-minute adoption of testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since
Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five
hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to impose its Order strictly, the most it
could have done was to forfeit one out of the five days set for Dizons testimonial evidence. Stripping
the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to due process.
Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the right to present
evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal case or to
enforce an automatic remand of the case to the trial court.
47
In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that
where facts have adequately been represented in a criminal case, and no procedural unfairness or
irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver, the
rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is supported beyond
reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.
48

We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to resolve the case at bar.
Neither can we see any "procedural unfairness or irregularity" that would substantially prejudice
either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact, the arguments set forth
by accused Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material facts relevant to decide the matter. Instead,
what he is really contesting in his Petition is the application of the law to the facts by the trial court
and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation in the hazing of Lenny Villa by alleging in his
Petition that "all actions of the petitioner were part of the traditional rites," and that "the alleged
extension of the initiation rites was not outside the official activity of the fraternity."
49
He even argues
that "Dizon did not request for the extension and he participated only after the activity was
sanctioned."
50

For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one judge or justice to
another at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme Court. Remanding the case for the
reception of the evidence of petitioner Dizon would only inflict further injustice on the parties. This
case has been going on for almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue. Since the key facts
necessary to decide the case have already been determined, we shall proceed to decide it.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano should not have
been dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of
time. She points out that the accused failed to raise a protest during the dormancy of the criminal
case against them, and that they asserted their right only after the trial court had dismissed the case
against their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also emphasizes that the trial court denied the
respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano, because it found that
"the prosecution could not be faulted for the delay in the movement of this case when the original
records and the evidence it may require were not at its disposal as these were in the Court of
Appeals."
51

The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.
52
This right requires that there be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or
oppressive delays.
53
The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified
postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being
tried and for no cause or justifiable motive.
54
In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial,
courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the
scheduled hearings of the case.
55
The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be
weighed.
56
Also to be considered are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-
assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant.
57

We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to the right of
the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal.
58
As a consequence, an appeal or a
reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of double jeopardy.
59
As
we have previously discussed, however, where the dismissal of the case is capricious, certiorari
lies.
60
The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition challenges the validity of the order
of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof.
61
Rather, grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack
of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from attaching.
62

We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case against accused
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial. The
court held thus:
An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that the following factors
contributed to the slow progress of the proceedings in the case below:
x x x x x x x x x
5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals and the prosecutions
failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring them to secure certified true copies of the
same.
x x x x x x x x x
While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that contributed to the delay of
the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right to speedy trial has been
utterly violated in this case x x x.
x x x x x x x x x
[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the case were
elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the court a
quo requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from the records is the
fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an Order requiring the
prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure the complete records of the case from the
Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in fact, the same directive
was repeated by the court a quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no
compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such order was complied with. It
appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not at the disposal of
the trial court because the lack of it was made the basis of the said court in granting the motion to
dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion x x x.
x x x x x x x x x
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of almost
seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed
by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by
petitioner Sarucas motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court did not act upon,
the case remained dormant for a considerable length of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is
precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon x x x.
63
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was filed against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De
Vera.
64
On 29 November 1993, they were all arraigned.
65
Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did
not commence until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.
66

As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or inactivity of the
Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of the accused amounts to an
unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases a clear violation of the right of the accused to a
speedy disposition of cases.
67
Thus, we held:
The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition of cases
in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found the delay of six years by the
Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally guaranteed
right to a speedy disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman, where the
Court held that the delay of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on
complaints before him; and in Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in not quashing the information which was filed six
years after the initiatory complaint was filed and thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case. So it must be in the instant case, where the reinvestigation by the
Ombudsman has dragged on for a decade already.
68
(Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that accused
Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in the records that would
show that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De
Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates that when a
person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in
any other manner without the consent of the accused the accused cannot again be charged with
the same or an identical offense.
69
This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and
conscience.
70
It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found in the common law of
England and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence.
71
It found expression in the Spanish
Law, in the Constitution of the United States, and in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental
rights of the citizen,
72
viz:
Article III Bill of Rights
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular constitutional right,
provides as follows:
73

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by
a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order to reverse
the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the
same Rules.
74
The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid
complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the
charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him or her was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendants express consent.
75

As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, "[a] verdict of acquittal is
immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts,
will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several
avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument
of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also
serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively
retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State,
following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater
penalty."
76
We further stressed that "an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a
direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal."
77

This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower courts acquittal of the
accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1)
where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount
to a deprivation of due process;
78
(2) where there is a finding of mistrial;
79
or (3) where there has
been a grave abuse of discretion.
80

The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.
81
Here, the party asking for the review must show
the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a
patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility;
82
or a blatant abuse of authority to
a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice.
83
In such
an event, the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.
84

The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of (1) the
acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of slight
physical injuries, both on the basis of a misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to the
Petition, "the decision of the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because private
complainant and petitioner were denied due process of law when the public respondent completely
ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x and c) the
petitioners Comment x x x."
85
Allegedly, the CA ignored evidence when it adopted the theory of
individual responsibility; set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court; and failed to apply
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
86
The Solicitor General also assails the finding that the physical
blows were inflicted only by Dizon and Villareal, as well as the appreciation of Lenny Villas consent
to hazing.
87

In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the probative value
of the evidence presented by the parties.
88
In People v. Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of
discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and
the evidence.
89
Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ of certiorari.
90
Therefore, pursuant
to the rule on double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the Petition contra Victorino et al. the
19 acquitted fraternity members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug the
four fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies when the
state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused.
91
We have also recognized,
however, that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that
the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice.
92
The present case is one of those instances of grave abuse of discretion.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug, the CA
reasoned thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion of the fatal wounds inflicted by
the accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries sustained by the victim as a result of the physical
punishment heaped on him were serious in nature. However, by reason of the death of the victim,
there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or the medical attendance
required. To do so, at this stage would be merely speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where
the category of the offense and the severity of the penalty depend on the period of illness or
incapacity for labor, the length of this period must likewise be proved beyond reasonable doubt in
much the same manner as the same act charged [People v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26,
1950]. And when proof of the said period is absent, the crime committed should be deemed only as
slight physical injuries [People v. De los Santos, CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil.
398]. As such, this Court is constrained to rule that the injuries inflicted by the appellants, Tecson,
Ama, Almeda and Bantug, Jr., are only slight and not serious, in nature.
93
(Emphasis supplied and
citations included)
The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa
94
in finding that the four accused should
be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA, because of "the death of the
victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or medical
attendance required."
95
The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of that case would
reveal that the accused therein was guilty merely of slight physical injuries, because the victims
injuries neither caused incapacity for labor nor required medical attendance.
96
Furthermore, he did
not die.
97
His injuries were not even serious.
98
Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim
allegedly suffered physical injuries and not death, the ruling cited by the CA was patently
inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were liable
merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact. According to the court,
the four accused "were found to have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken during
such initiation rites on the person of Villa."
99
It then adopted the NBI medico-legal officers findings
that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the "multiple traumatic injuries" he suffered
from the initiation rites.
100
Considering that the CA found that the "physical punishment heaped on
[Lenny Villa was] serious in nature,"
101
it was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal
liability to slight physical injuries, which is a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the
consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is
found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries
that results in the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal framework
governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion.
The CAs application of the legal framework governing physical injuries punished under Articles
262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies is therefore tantamount to a
whimsical, capricious, and abusive exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. According
to the Revised Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable penalty in case the victim dies
should be based on the framework governing the destruction of the life of a person, punished under
Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies, and not under the
aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that these two types of felonies are distinct from and
legally inconsistent with each other, in that the accused cannot be held criminally liable for physical
injuries when actual death occurs.
102

Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their acts, in and of themselves,
caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs own findings. From proof that the death of
the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered,
103
the only logical conclusion
is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven to have directly
participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising on his body
caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug
criminally liable for slight physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy,
we therefore give due course to the Petition in G.R. No. 154954.
Resolution on Ultimate Findings
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a crime, the
intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious act under Articles 263 to
266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling against the accused, the court a quo found that
pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members were guilty of
homicide, as it was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the physical injuries they had
intentionally inflicted.
104

The CA modified the trial courts finding of criminal liability. It ruled that there could have been no
conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had knowingly consented to the conduct of
hazing during their initiation rites. The accused fraternity members, therefore, were liable only for the
consequences of their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused Victorino et al. were
acquitted; 4 of them Tecson et al. were found guilty of slight physical injuries; and the remaining
2 Dizon and Villareal were found guilty of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the perpetrator clearly commits
a felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage over, to harm maliciously, or to get even
with, the victim. Rather, the case involves an ex ante situation in which a man driven by his own
desire to join a society of men pledged to go through physically and psychologically strenuous
admission rituals, just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order to understand how our criminal
laws apply to such situation absent the Anti-Hazing Law, we deem it necessary to make a brief
exposition on the underlying concepts shaping intentional felonies, as well as on the nature of
physical and psychological initiations widely known as hazing.
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought.
105
The classical theory posits
that a human person is essentially a moral creature with an absolute free will to choose between
good and evil.
106
It asserts that one should only be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so
long as free will appears unimpaired.
107
The basic postulate of the classical penal system is that
humans are rational and calculating beings who guide their actions with reference to the principles of
pleasure and pain.
108
They refrain from criminal acts if threatened with punishment sufficient to
cancel the hope of possible gain or advantage in committing the crime.
109
Here, criminal liability is
thus based on the free will and moral blame of the actor.
110
The identity of mens rea defined as a
guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent is the predominant
consideration.
111
Thus, it is not enough to do what the law prohibits.
112
In order for an intentional
felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means of dolo or "malice."
113

The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and
intent.
114
The first element, freedom, refers to an act done with deliberation and with power to choose
between two things.
115
The second element, intelligence, concerns the ability to determine the
morality of human acts, as well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit and an illicit act.
116
The
last element, intent, involves an aim or a determination to do a certain act.
117

The element of intent on which this Court shall focus is described as the state of mind
accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act.
118
It refers to the purpose of the mind and the
resolve with which a person proceeds.
119
It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the
act, while intent concerns the result of the act.
120
While motive is the "moving power" that impels one
to action for a definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the
result.
121
On the other hand, the term "felonious" means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or
proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.
122
With these elements taken together, the requirement of
intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of
mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of
dolus malus that the act or omission be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent,"
and "with malice aforethought."
123
The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is
not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent.
124
As is
required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
125

In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy to attach. Article 8 of
the Revised Penal Code which provides that "conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it" is to be
interpreted to refer only to felonies committed by means of dolo or malice. The phrase "coming to an
agreement" connotes the existence of a prefaced "intent" to cause injury to another, an element
present only in intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on
another is unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result of an act performed without malice
or criminal design.
126
Here, a person performs an initial lawful deed; however, due to negligence,
imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful act.
127
Verily, a deliberate
intent to do an unlawful act, which is a requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a
felony committed by means of culpa.
128

The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in establishing
the commission of the intentional felony of homicide.
129
Being mala in se, the felony of homicide
requires the existence of malice or dolo
130
immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of
injuries.
131
Intent to kill or animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is
proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.
132
Furthermore, the victims death must not have been
the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide.
133
If death resulted from an act executed without
malice or criminal intent but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence the act must be
qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.
134

Hazing and other forms of initiation rites
The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society.
135
It is said that, throughout history,
hazing in some form or another has been associated with organizations ranging from military groups
to indigenous tribes.
136
Some say that elements of hazing can be traced back to the Middle Ages,
during which new students who enrolled in European universities worked as servants for
upperclassmen.
137
It is believed that the concept of hazing is rooted in ancient Greece,
138
where
young men recruited into the military were tested with pain or challenged to demonstrate the limits of
their loyalty and to prepare the recruits for battle.
139
Modern fraternities and sororities espouse some
connection to these values of ancient Greek civilization.
140
According to a scholar, this concept lends
historical legitimacy to a "tradition" or "ritual" whereby prospective members are asked to prove their
worthiness and loyalty to the organization in which they seek to attain membership through hazing.
141

Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student wishing to join an
organization to receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte for a particular chapter.
142
The
neophyte period is usually one to two semesters long.
143
During the "program," neophytes are
required to interview and to get to know the active members of the chapter; to learn chapter history;
to understand the principles of the organization; to maintain a specified grade point average; to
participate in the organizations activities; and to show dignity and respect for their fellow neophytes,
the organization, and its active and alumni members.
144
Some chapters require the initiation activities
for a recruit to involve hazing acts during the entire neophyte stage.
145

Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that serves as prerequisite for
admission to an organization.
146
In hazing, the "recruit," "pledge," "neophyte," "initiate," "applicant"
or any other term by which the organization may refer to such a person is generally placed in
embarrassing or humiliating situations, like being forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or other similar
tasks or activities.
147
It encompasses different forms of conduct that humiliate, degrade, abuse, or
physically endanger those who desire membership in the organization.
148
These acts usually involve
physical or psychological suffering or injury.
149

The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more than a century ago, our
national hero Andres Bonifacio organized a secret society named Kataastaasan
Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Venerable
Association of the Sons and Daughters of the Nation).
150
The Katipunan, or KKK, started as a small
confraternity believed to be inspired by European Freemasonry, as well as by confraternities or
sodalities approved by the Catholic Church.
151
The Katipunans ideology was brought home to each
member through the societys initiation ritual.
152
It is said that initiates were brought to a dark room,
lit by a single point of illumination, and were asked a series of questions to determine their
fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve.
153
They were made to go through vigorous trials such
as "pagsuot sa isang lungga" or "[pagtalon] sa balon."
154
It would seem that they were also
made to withstand the blow of "pangherong bakal sa pisngi" and to endure a "matalas na
punyal."
155
As a final step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to sign
membership papers with the his own blood.
156

It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the Americans to the Philippines in
the late 19th century. As can be seen in the following instances, the manner of hazing in the United
States was jarringly similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on Lenny Villa.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth classmen to do exhausting
physical exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent physical damage; to eat or drink
unpalatable foods; and in various ways to humiliate themselves.
157
In 1901, General Douglas
MacArthur got involved in a congressional investigation of hazing at the academy during his second
year at West Point.
158

In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-victim was injured during the
shriners hazing event, which was part of the initiation ceremonies for Hejaz membership.
159
The
ritual involved what was known as the "mattress-rotating barrel trick."
160
It required each candidate to
slide down an eight to nine-foot-high metal board onto connected mattresses leading to a barrel,
over which the candidate was required to climb.
161
Members of Hejaz would stand on each side of
the mattresses and barrel and fun-paddle candidates en route to the barrel.
162

In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, were
seen performing a ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper jump wings directly onto the neophyte
paratroopers chests.
163
The victims were shown writhing and crying out in pain as others pounded
the spiked medals through the shirts and into the chests of the victims.
164

In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University chapter of Kappa Alpha
Psi invited male students to enter into a pledgeship program.
165
The fraternity members subjected
the pledges to repeated physical abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes at the nape, the chest,
and the back; caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to the back with the use of a
heavy book and a cookie sheet while the pledges were on their hands and knees; various kicks and
punches to the body; and "body slamming," an activity in which active members of the fraternity lifted
pledges up in the air and dropped them to the ground.
166
The fraternity members then put the
pledges through a seven-station circle of physical abuse.
167

In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went through hazing by fraternity members of
the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in Alabama.
168
The hazing included the following: (1)
having to dig a ditch and jump into it after it had been filled with water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers,
and vomit; (2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being pushed and kicked, often onto walls or
into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like peppers, hot sauce, butter, and "yerks" (a mixture of hot
sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans, and other items); (5) doing chores for the fraternity and its
members, such as cleaning the fraternity house and yard, being designated as driver, and running
errands; (6) appearing regularly at 2 a.m. "meetings," during which the pledges would be hazed for a
couple of hours; and (7) "running the gauntlet," during which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and
hit as they ran down a hallway and descended down a flight of stairs.
169

In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim Sylvester Lloyd was accepted
to pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity.
170
He participated in
initiation activities, which included various forms of physical beatings and torture, psychological
coercion and embarrassment.
171

In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-victim suffered injuries from
hazing activities during the fraternitys initiation rites.
172
Kenner and the other initiates went through
psychological and physical hazing, including being paddled on the buttocks for more than 200
times.
173

In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones a university student in Florida sought initiation into the campus
chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the 2005-06 academic year.
174
The pledges efforts
to join the fraternity culminated in a series of initiation rituals conducted in four nights. Jones,
together with other candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned on his face and
buttocks.
175
In these rituals described as "preliminaries," which lasted for two evenings, he received
approximately 60 canings on his buttocks.
176
During the last two days of the hazing, the rituals
intensified.
177
The pledges sustained roughly 210 cane strikes during the four-night initiation.
178
Jones
and several other candidates passed out.
179

The purported raison dtre behind hazing practices is the proverbial "birth by fire," through which the
pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing proves his or her worth.
180
Some organizations
even believe that hazing is the path to enlightenment. It is said that this process enables the
organization to establish unity among the pledges and, hence, reinforces and ensures the future of
the organization.
181
Alleged benefits of joining include leadership opportunities; improved academic
performance; higher self-esteem; professional networking opportunities; and the esprit dcorp
associated with close, almost filial, friendship and common cause.
182

Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.
The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing in the military.
183
The
hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed services was so prevalent that Congress prohibited all
forms of military hazing, harmful or not.
184
It was not until 1901 that Illinois passed the first state anti-
hazing law, criminalizing conduct "whereby any one sustains an injury to his [or her] person
therefrom."
185

However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the efforts of the Committee to
Halt Useless College Killings and other similar organizations, that states increasingly began to enact
legislation prohibiting and/or criminalizing hazing.
186
As of 2008, all but six states had enacted
criminal or civil statutes proscribing hazing.
187
Most anti-hazing laws in the U.S. treat hazing as a
misdemeanor and carry relatively light consequences for even the most severe situations.
188
Only a
few states with anti-hazing laws consider hazing as a felony in case death or great bodily harm
occurs.
189

Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing that results in death or
great bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony.
190
In a Class 4 felony, a sentence of imprisonment shall
be for a term of not less than one year and not more than three years.
191
Indiana criminal law
provides that a person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally performs hazing that results in
serious bodily injury to a person commits criminal recklessness, a Class D felony.
192

The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly weapon.
193
As an element
of a Class C felony criminal recklessness resulting in serious bodily injury, death falls under the
category of "serious bodily injury."
194
A person who commits a Class C felony is imprisoned for a
fixed term of between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence being four (4)
years.
195
Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the act creates a
substantial risk to the life of the student or prospective member, in which case it becomes a Class C
felony.
196
A Class C felony provides for an imprisonment term not to exceed seven years.
197

In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail felony.
198
An individual adjudged
guilty of a state jail felony is punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of not more than two
years or not less than 180 days.
199
Under Utah law, if hazing results in serious bodily injury, the
hazer is guilty of a third-degree felony.
200
A person who has been convicted of a third-degree felony
may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to exceed five years.
201
West Virginia law provides
that if the act of hazing would otherwise be deemed a felony, the hazer may be found guilty thereof
and subject to penalties provided therefor.
202
In Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G felony if
hazing results in the death of another.
203
A Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or
imprisonment not to exceed 10 years, or both.
204

In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited remedies, as there was no hazing
statute.
205
This situation was exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, wherein Barry
Ballous family resorted to a civil action for wrongful death, since there was no anti-hazing statute in
South Carolina until 1994.
206

The existence of animus interficendi or intent to kill not proven beyond reasonable doubt
The presence of an ex ante situation in this case, fraternity initiation rites does not automatically
amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is proven beyond reasonable doubt
that the perpetrators were equipped with a guilty mind whether or not there is a contextual
background or factual premise they are still criminally liable for intentional felony.
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that with the exception of
Villareal and Dizon accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not have the animus
interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or the other neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court and found that the two
accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict physical injuries
on him. It justified its finding of homicide against Dizon by holding that he had apparently been
motivated by ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his fathers parking space had
been stolen by the victims father.
207
As to Villareal, the court said that the accused suspected the
family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a hand in the death of Villareals
brother.
208
The CA then ruled as follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very clear that they acted with
evil and criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is unrebutted and so for the death of Villa,
appellants Dizon and Villareal must and should face the consequence of their acts, that is, to be held
liable for the crime of homicide.
209
(Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.
The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to determine the
existence of animus interficendi. For a full appreciation of the context in which the supposed
utterances were made, the Court deems it necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of witness
Marquezs testimony:
Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngis] room and we were briefed as to what to expect
during the next three days and we were told the members of the fraternity and their batch and we
were also told about the fraternity song, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngis] house and we were made to ride a van and we
were brought to another place in Kalookan City which I later found to be the place of Mariano
Almeda, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head down and to link our arms and then the
driver of the van and other members of the Aquilans who were inside left us inside the van, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the effect, "Villa akin ka," "Asuncion Patay ka"
and the people outside pound the van, rock the van, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and how strong a voice these remarks
uttered upon your arrival?
Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense of excitement in their voices, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being rocked through and through, what were
the voices or utterances that you heard?
Witness "Villa akin ka," "Asuncion patay ka," "Recinto patay ka sa amin," etc., sir.
Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did they continue during the rocking of the
van which lasted for 5 minutes?
x x x x x x x x x
Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on hearing voices, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical beating] were being inflicted, was there any
utterances by anybody?
Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were discouraging, and some were encouraging others
who were pounding and beating us, it was just like a fiesta atmosphere, actually some of them
enjoyed looking us being pounded, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you heard?
Witness One particular utterance always said was, they asked us whether "matigas pa yan, kayang-
kaya pa niyan."
Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those particular words that you quote?
Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were utterances simultaneously, I could not
really pin point who uttered those words, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during the conduct of this Bicol Express?
Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court what were the utterances that you
remember?
Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon stepped on my thigh, he would say that
and I quote "ito, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko," so that would in turn sort of
justifying him in inflicting more serious pain on me. So instead of just walking, he would jump on my
thighs and then after on was Lenny Villa. He was saying to the effect that "this guy, his father stole
the parking space of my father," sir. So, thats why he inflicted more pain on Villa and that went on,
sir.
Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular accused?
Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.
Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was accusing you of having your family have
his brother killed, what was your response?
Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that he was just making it up sir. So he said
that I knew nothing of that incident. However, he just in fact after the Bicol Express, he kept on
uttering those words/statements so that it would in turn justify him and to give me harder blows, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular mentioning that Lenny Villas father stole the
parking space allotted for his father, do you recall who were within hearing distance when that
utterance was made?
Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Witness There were different times made this accusation so there were different people who heard
from time to time, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the next accusation against Lenny Villas
father was made?
Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet Dizon came near to us and when Lenny
Villas turn, I heard him uttered those statements, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to Lenny Villas father?
Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.
Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?
Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villas thighs and sometime he stand up and he
kicked his thighs and sometimes jumped at it, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right now. You mentioned also that
accusations made by Dizon"you or your family had his brother killed," can you inform this Honorable
Court what exactly were the accusations that were charged against you while inflicting blows upon
you in particular?
Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in particular if I knew that his family who
had his brother killed, and he said that his brother was an NPA, sir so I knew that it was just a story
that he made up and I said that I knew nothing about it and he continued inflicting blows on me, sir.
And another incident was when a talk was being given, Dizon was on another part of the pelota court
and I was sort of looking and we saw that he was drinking beer, and he said and I quote: "Marquez,
Marquez, ano ang tinitingin-tingin mo diyan, ikaw yung pamilya mo ang nagpapatay sa aking
kapatid, yari ka sa akin," sir.
Atty. Tadiar What else?
Witness Thats all, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did ever a doctor or a physician came around
as promised to you earlier?
Witness No, sir.
210
(Emphasis supplied)
On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus:
Judge Purisima When you testified on direct examination Mr. Marquez, have you stated that there
was a briefing that was conducted immediately before your initiation as regards to what to expect
during the initiation, did I hear you right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?
Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.
Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what they told you to expect during the
initiation?
Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a particular place, we would be mocked at,
sir.
Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at, ridiculed, humiliated etc., and the likes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there would be physical contact?
Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.
x x x x x x x x x
Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could immediately go back to school. All the bruises
would be limited to our arms and legs, sir. So, if we wear the regular school uniforms like long
sleeves, it would be covered actually so we have no thinking that our face would be slapped, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that you would have bruises on your body but
that will be covered?
Witness Yes, sir.
JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or implements that you expect that would create
bruises to your body?
Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be hitting by a paddling or paddle, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much of the initiation procedures is
psychological in nature?
Witness Combination, sir.
211
(Emphasis supplied)
x x x x x x x x x
Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist only of physical initiation, meaning
body contact, is that correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called psychological initiation, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of things calculated to terrify you, scare you,
correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made belief situation intended to, I repeat, terrify
you, frighten you, scare you into perhaps quitting the initiation, is this correct?
Witness Sometimes sir, yes.
Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was initiating you, he said or he was supposed
to have said according to you that your family were responsible for the killing of his brother who was
an NPA, do you remember saying that?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that statement said to you by Dizon that you did not
believe him because that is not true, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing you perhaps, the purpose as I have
mentioned before, terrifying you, scaring you or frightening you into quitting the initiation, this is
correct?
Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I think, why he was saying those things was
because he wanted to inflict injury.
Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only perception, correct?
Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling this to Villareal, he was hitting me.
Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were] subjected to the same forms of initiation by
all the initiating masters? You said that earlier, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who jumped on you or kicked you said something
similar as was told to you by Mr. Dizon?
Witness No, sir.
Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express for instance, the masters would run on
your thighs, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was followed by the initiating masters not only on
you but also on the other neophytes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that whatever forms of initiation was administered by
one master, was also administered by one master on a neophyte, was also administered by another
master on the other neophyte, this is correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
212
(Emphasis supplied)
According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the CA to Dizon and Villareal
were "baseless,"
213
since the statements of the accused were "just part of the psychological initiation
calculated to instill fear on the part of the neophytes"; that "[t]here is no element of truth in it as
testified by Bienvenido Marquez"; and that the "harsh words uttered by Petitioner and Villareal are
part of tradition concurred and accepted by all the fraternity members during their initiation rites."
214

We agree with the Solicitor General.
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of substantial proportion on
the part of the CA it mistook the utterances of Dizon for those of Villareal. Such inaccuracy cannot
be tolerated, especially because it was the CAs primary basis for finding that Villarreal had the intent
to kill Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of the intentional felony of homicide. To repeat,
according to Bienvenido Marquezs testimony, as reproduced above, it was Dizon who uttered both
"accusations" against Villa and Marquez; Villareal had no participation whatsoever in the specific
threats referred to by the CA. It was "Boyet Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquezs] thigh"; and who told
witness Marquez, "[I]to, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko." It was also Dizon who
jumped on Villas thighs while saying, "[T]his guy, his father stole the parking space of my father."
With the testimony clarified, we find that the CA had no basis for concluding the existence of intent to
kill based solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to the entire factual milieu
and contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and understand the testimony of witness
Marquez. At the outset, the neophytes were briefed that they would be subjected to psychological
pressure in order to scare them. They knew that they would be mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated.
They heard fraternity members shout, "Patay ka, Recinto," "Yari ka, Recinto," "Villa, akin ka,"
"Asuncion, gulpi ka," "Putang ina mo, Asuncion," "Putang ina nyo, patay kayo sa amin," or some
other words to that effect.
215
While beating the neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of the death of
the formers purported NPA brother, and then blamed Lenny Villas father for stealing the parking
space of Dizons father. According to the Solicitor General, these statements, including those of the
accused Dizon, were all part of the psychological initiation employed by the Aquila Fraternity.
216

Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizons way of inflicting psychological pressure was through
hurling make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories, so that he could
"justify" giving the neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation and role playing.
Even one of the neophytes admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-up.
The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing. In fact, during the
Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing Law, former Senator Lina spoke as follows:
Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the period of interpellations on
why we included the phrase "or psychological pain and suffering."
x x x x x x x x x
So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the recruit but the recruit or
neophyte is made to undergo certain acts which I already described yesterday, like playing the
Russian roulette extensively to test the readiness and the willingness of the neophyte or recruit to
continue his desire to be a member of the fraternity, sorority or similar organization or playing and
putting a noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit, making the recruit or neophyte stand on the
ledge of the fourth floor of the building facing outside, asking him to jump outside after making him
turn around several times but the reality is that he will be made to jump towards the inside portion of
the building these are the mental or psychological tests that are resorted to by these organizations,
sororities or fraternities. The doctors who appeared during the public hearing testified that such acts
can result in some mental aberration, that they can even lead to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This
is what we want to prevent.
217
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizons behavior must not be automatically viewed as
evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be taken within the context
of the fraternitys psychological initiation. This Court points out that it was not even established
whether the fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with each other as would lend
credence to the veracity of Dizons threats. The testimony of Lennys co-neophyte, Marquez, only
confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he "knew it was not true and that [Dizon] was just
making it up."
218
Even the trial court did not give weight to the utterances of Dizon as constituting
intent to kill: "[T]he cumulative acts of all the accused were not directed toward killing Villa, but
merely to inflict physical harm as part of the fraternity initiation rites x x x."
219
The Solicitor General
shares the same view.
Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus interficendi cannot and
should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.
220
Instead, we
adopt and reinstate the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that none of the fraternity
members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.
221

The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious intent to injure not proven beyond reasonable doubt
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny
Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor General then posits that since all of the
accused fraternity members conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and death ensued, all
of them should be liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal
Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal
Code,
222
the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is
mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state
of the wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused
cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the Revised
Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the
physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain
bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt
act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in
an intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his
intentions are.
223

Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances
224
that the mere infliction of physical injuries, absent
malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony. In Bagajo v.
People,
225
the accused teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her students behind her legs
and thighs as a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and bruises from the corporal
punishment. In reversing the trial courts finding of criminal liability for slight physical injuries, this
Court stated thus: "Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility [w]e are persuaded
that she did not do what she had done with criminal intent the means she actually used was
moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent." Considering the
applicable laws, we then ruled that "as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for
her act of whipping her pupil." In People v. Carmen,
226
the accused members of the religious group
known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima under the guise of a "ritual or treatment"
plunged the head of the victim into a barrel of water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his
chest with fists, and stabbed him on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of "nervous
breakdown" by expelling through those means the bad spirits possessing him. The collective acts of
the group caused the death of the victim. Since malicious intent was not proven, we reversed the
trial courts finding of liability for murder under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead ruled
that the accused should be held criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under
Article 365 thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accuseds initial acts of inflicting physical pain on the
neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof. In People v. Regato, we ruled
that malicious intent must be judged by the action, conduct, and external acts of the
accused.
227
What persons do is the best index of their intention.
228
We have also ruled that the
method employed, the kind of weapon used, and the parts of the body on which the injury was
inflicted may be determinative of the intent of the perpetrator.
229
The Court shall thus examine the
whole contextual background surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.
Lenny died during Aquilas fraternity initiation rites. The night before the commencement of the rites,
they were briefed on what to expect. They were told that there would be physical beatings, that the
whole event would last for three days, and that they could quit anytime. On their first night, they were
subjected to "traditional" initiation rites, including the "Indian Run," "Bicol Express," "Rounds," and
the "Auxies Privilege Round." The beatings were predominantly directed at the neophytes arms and
legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present comic plays and to play
rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles.
Late in the afternoon, they were once again subjected to "traditional" initiation rituals. When the
rituals were officially reopened on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes were
subjected to another "traditional" ritual paddling by the fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes. The auxiliaries protected
the neophytes by functioning as human barriers and shielding them from those who were designated
to inflict physical and psychological pain on the initiates.
230
It was their regular duty to stop foul or
excessive physical blows; to help the neophytes to "pump" their legs in order that their blood would
circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every physical activity or "round"; to serve food and water;
to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give them whatever they needed.
These rituals were performed with Lennys consent.
231
A few days before the "rites," he asked both
his parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity.
232
His father knew that Lenny would go
through an initiation process and would be gone for three days.
233
The CA found as follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented to undergo physical
initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration of facts, they voluntarily agreed to join
the initiation rites to become members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the initiation, they were
given briefings on what to expect. It is of common knowledge that before admission in a fraternity,
the neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they were made aware that traditional methods
such as mocking, psychological tests and physical punishment would take place. They knew that the
initiation would involve beatings and other forms of hazing. They were also told of their right and
opportunity to quit at any time they wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness Navera testified that
accused Tecson told him that "after a week, you can already play basketball." Prosecution witness
Marquez for his part, admitted that he knew that the initiates would be hit "in the arms and legs," that
a wooden paddle would be used to hit them and that he expected bruises on his arms and legs.
Indeed, there can be no fraternity initiation without consenting neophytes.
234
(Emphasis supplied)
Even after going through Aquilas grueling traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny continued his
participation and finished the second day of initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing clear malicious
intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was not present in this case.
Even if the specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical pain
were done voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements of freedom and
intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven was that the acts were done
pursuant to tradition. Although the additional "rounds" on the second night were held upon the
insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were officially reopened with the consent of the head
of the initiation rites; and the accused fraternity members still participated in the rituals, including the
paddling, which were performed pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other "weapon" was
used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and the arms.
The designation of roles, including the role of auxiliaries, which were assigned for the specific
purpose of lending assistance to and taking care of the neophytes during the initiation rites, further
belied the presence of malicious intent. All those who wished to join the fraternity went through the
same process of "traditional" initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or
given a different treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized that hazing is uniquely
different from common crimes.
235
The totality of the circumstances must therefore be taken into
consideration.
The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical injuries was rooted may also be
determined by Lennys continued participation in the initiation and consent to the method used even
after the first day. The following discussion of the framers of the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law is
enlightening:
Senator Guingona. Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished under the Revised Penal
Code.
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Guingona. If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the charge would be murder
or homicide.
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Guingona. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated homicide or serious physical
injuries.
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Guingona. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it can be penalized under
rape or acts of lasciviousness.
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Guingona. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense under this definition of the
crime of hazing?
Senator Lina. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a sorority, fraternity or
any association from making this requirement of initiation that has already resulted in these specific
acts or results, Mr. President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that no group or
association can require the act of physical initiation before a person can become a member without
being held criminally liable.
x x x x x x x x x
Senator Guingona. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that imposition? Because the
distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking the
punishment of an initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the punishment of certain acts
that resulted in death, et cetera as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing, abusive hazing, but it
may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or offenses, because these very same
acts are already punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
Senator Lina. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a person or group of
persons resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the intent to commit
a wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr.
President, let us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then the
intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of hazing is the basis, what is
important is the result from the act of hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the sororities or fraternities;
that they should really shun this activity called "hazing." Because, initially, these fraternities or
sororities do not even consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of lasciviousness are
even committed initially, Mr. President.
So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why there is need to
institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-recruit.
Wala talaga silang intensiyong makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero
dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga iyong
neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng murder kung namatay
na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na: "Huwag ninyong
gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo."
x x x x x x x x x
Senator Guingona. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished Sponsor. But I am
again disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not have to prove the intent that resulted
in the death, that resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of lasciviousness
or deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of the accused in proving or establishing
the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel situation where we create the special crime without
having to go into the intent, which is one of the basic elements of any crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate, then there is no offense.
And even the distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to
have a new society or a new club is,per se, not punishable at all. What are punishable are the acts
that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be proven by intent, but just because there
was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr.
President.
Senator Lina. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being criminalized because in the context
of what is happening in the sororities and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one will admit
that their intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact of inflicting physical
pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred, discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters intended to kill or the
masters intended to maim. What is important is the result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the
masters or those who inflict the physical pain can easily escape responsibility and say, "We did not
have the intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do not have any
intention to kill or maim."
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged therefore with the ordinary
crime of homicide, mutilation, et cetera, where the prosecution will have a difficulty proving the
elements if they are separate offenses.
x x x x x x x x x
Senator Guingona. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that initiated and a person died. The
charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the prosecution have to
prove conspiracy or not anymore?
Senator Lina. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x
Senator Guingona. The persons are present. First, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy?
Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?
Senator Lina. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no need to
prove intent to kill.
Senator Guingona. But the charge is murder.
Senator Lina. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr.
President.
236
(Emphasis supplied)
During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue of whether to include
sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator Lina further clarified thus:
Senator Biazon. Mr. President, this Representation has no objection to the inclusion of sodomy as
one of the conditions resulting from hazing as necessary to be punished. However, the act of
sodomy can be committed by two persons with or without consent.
To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the commission of sodomy forced into another
individual by another individual. I move, Mr. President, that sodomy be modified by the phrase
"without consent" for purposes of this section.
Senator Lina. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we qualify sodomy with the concept that it is only
going to aggravate the crime of hazing if it is done without consent will change a lot of concepts
here. Because the results from hazing aggravate the offense with or without consent. In fact, when a
person joins a fraternity, sorority, or any association for that matter, it can be with or without the
consent of the intended victim. The fact that a person joins a sorority or fraternity with his consent
does not negate the crime of hazing.
This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens from the malpractices that attend initiation
which may have been announced with or without physical infliction of pain or injury, Mr. President.
Regardless of whether there is announcement that there will be physical hazing or whether there is
none, and therefore, the neophyte is duped into joining a fraternity is of no moment. What is
important is that there is an infliction of physical pain.
The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be protected from himself if he joins a
fraternity, so that at a certain point in time, the State, the individual, or the parents of the victim can
run after the perpetrators of the crime, regardless of whether or not there was consent on the part of
the victim.
x x x x x x x x x
Senator Lina. Mr. President, I understand the position taken by the distinguished Gentleman from
Cavite and Metro Manila. It is correct that society sometimes adopts new mores, traditions, and
practices.
In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private proclivities of some individuals when they do
their acts in private as we do not take a peek into the private rooms of couples. They can do their
thing if they want to make love in ways that are not considered acceptable by the mainstream of
society. That is not something that the State should prohibit.
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act may even be
entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done with the consent
of the neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make the act of hazing not punishable because
the neophyte accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said, "Well, he allowed it upon
himself. He consented to it." So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was done with the consent
of the victim, then we would not have passed any law at all. There will be no significance if we pass
this bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the infliction of pain or suffering.
He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to prohibit. That the defense of
consent will not apply because the very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering is, by
itself, a punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely
aggravates the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify the
criminal nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it is committed
without consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this proposed law will collapse.
Senator Biazon. Thank you, Mr. President.
Senator Lina. Thank you very much.
The President. Is there any objection to the committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair hears
none; the same is approved.
237

(Emphasis supplied)
Realizing the implication of removing the states burden to prove intent, Senator Lina, the principal
author of the Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of intent or whether
there it is mala in se or malaprohibita. There can be a radical amendment if that is the point that he
wants to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law on hazing. We will not
include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that
suggestion, Mr. President.
238
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of mala
in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact an amendment
thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita.
This dilemma faced by Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing unique as against
typical crimes cast a cloud of doubt on whether society considered the act as an inherently wrong
conduct or mala in se at the time. It is safe to presume that Lennys parents would not have
consented
239
to his participation in Aquila Fraternitys initiation rites if the practice of hazing were
considered by them as mala in se.
Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now retired Chief
Justice) Hilario Davide that "in our nations very recent history, the people have spoken, through
Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously considered harmless by
custom, as criminal."
240
Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum, the statement
nonetheless shows recognition that hazing or the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or
psychological suffering has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law,
there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly considered an intentional
felony. And when there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of
the accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule against the trial
courts finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus
iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background of his death, the
unique nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity
members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies
that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the
wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an
immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it.
241
In this case, the danger is visible
and consciously appreciated by the actor.
242
In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises
an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a
mere lack of foresight or skill.
243
Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not
openly visible.
244

The test
245
for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a
prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the
person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law
imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure to
do so constitutes negligence.
246

As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of
precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved.
247
If, on account of a
certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who
chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or
avoid damage or injury.
248
In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required.
249
It is thus
possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an
individual, "from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort."
250
The duty of the person to
employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.
251

There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.
According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure secondary to multiple
traumatic injuries.
252
The officer explained that cardiac failure refers to the failure of the heart to work
as a pump and as part of the circulatory system due to the lack of blood.
253
In the present case, the
victims heart could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it was deprived of its requisite
blood and oxygen.
254
The deprivation was due to the "channeling" of the blood supply from the entire
circulatory system including the heart, arteries, veins, venules, and capillaries to the thigh, leg,
and arm areas of Lenny, thus causing the formation of multiple hematomas or blood clots.
255
The
multiple hematomas were wide, thick, and deep,
256
indicating that these could have resulted mainly
from injuries sustained by the victim from fist blows, knee blows, paddles, or the like.
257
Repeated
blows to those areas caused the blood to gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the circulating
blood became so markedly diminished as to produce death.
258
The officer also found that the brain,
liver, kidney, pancreas, intestines, and all other organs seen in the abdominals, as well as the
thoracic organ in the lungs, were pale due to the lack of blood, which was redirected to the thighs
and forearms.
259
It was concluded that there was nothing in the heart that would indicate that the
victim suffered from a previous cardiac arrest or disease.
260

The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villas arms and thighs, resulting from repeated
blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital organs and led to his eventual death.
These hematomas must be taken in the light of the hazing activities performed on him by the Aquila
Fraternity. According to the testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny, they were punched, kicked,
elbowed, kneed, stamped on; and hit with different objects on their arms, legs, and thighs.
261
They
were also "paddled" at the back of their thighs or legs;
262
and slapped on their faces.
263
They were
made to play rough basketball.
264
Witness Marquez testified on Lenny, saying: "[T]inamaan daw sya
sa spine."
265
The NBI medico-legal officer explained that the death of the victim was the cumulative
effect of the multiple injuries suffered by the latter.
266
The relevant portion of the testimony is as
follows:
Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony on various cross examinations of
defense counsels that the injuries that you have enumerated on the body of the deceased Lenny
Villa previously marked as Exhibit "G-1" to "G-14" individually by themselves would not cause the
death of the victim. The question I am going to propound to you is what is the cumulative effect of all
of these injuries marked from Exhibit "G-1" to "G-14"?
Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the demise of the victim. So, it is not fair for us to
isolate such injuries here because we are talking of the whole body. At the same manner that as a
car would not run minus one (1) wheel. No, the more humane in human approach is to interpret all
those injuries in whole and not in part.
267

There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members were drinking during
the initiation rites.
268

Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness, which
made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that organizations owe
to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process.
269
With the foregoing facts, we
rule that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-
legal officer found that the victims death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal
responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and contributed to the infliction of
physical injuries.
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been prevented, or at least
mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity accused Dizon and Villareal restrained themselves
from insisting on reopening the initiation rites. Although this point did not matter in the end, as
records would show that the other fraternity members participated in the reopened initiation rites
having in mind the concept of "seniority" in fraternities the implication of the presence of alumni
should be seen as a point of review in future legislation. We further note that some of the fraternity
members were intoxicated during Lennys initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits to Congress,
for legislative consideration, the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication
and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating
circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly or unwittingly impose the misery of hazing and
employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must be a better way to establish
"kinship." A neophyte admitted that he joined the fraternity to have more friends and to avail himself
of the benefits it offered, such as tips during bar examinations.
270
Another initiate did not give up,
because he feared being looked down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he did not have a
choice.
271
Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila Fraternity entailed a leap
in the dark. By giving consent under the circumstances, they left their fates in the hands of the
fraternity members. Unfortunately, the hands to which lives were entrusted were barbaric as they
were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall cover
only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect
then, these five accused fraternity members would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing
punishable by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).
272
Since there was no law prohibiting the act of
hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule according to existing laws at the time of his
death. The CA found that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, Victorino et al.s
individual participation in the infliction of physical injuries upon Lenny Villa.
273
As to accused Villareal,
his criminal liability was totally extinguished by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the applicability of the Anti-
Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the modification of criminal liability from slight
physical injuries to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only with respect to
accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
The accused liable to pay damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the amounts of P 50,000 as civil
indemnity ex delicto and P1,000,000 as moral damages, to be jointly and severally paid by accused
Dizon and Villareal. It also awarded the amount ofP 30,000 as indemnity to be jointly and severally
paid by accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.1wphi1
Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of death of the victim.
274
In
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,
275
we sustain the CAs award of indemnity in the amount
of P 50,000.
The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages, including expenses incurred
in connection with the death of the victim, so long as the claim is supported by tangible
documents.
276
Though we are prepared to award actual damages, the Court is prevented from
granting them, since the records are bereft of any evidence to show that actual expenses were
incurred or proven during trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor General does not interpose
any claim for actual damages.
277

The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered on account of the
victims death.
278
This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code, which provides that the
"spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased."
279
Thus, we hereby we
affirm the CAs award of moral damages in the amount of P 1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of
homicide is hereby MODIFIED and set aside IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954
finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson
guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries is also MODIFIED and set aside in part. Instead,
Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent
Tecson are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They
are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa
civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P 50,000, and moral damages in the amount
of P 1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the
finality of this Decision until satisfaction.
280
Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby affirmed. The
appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise affirmed. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of
the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case
against Artemio Villareal deemed closed and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the
fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.






















G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J .:
The Case
The petition seeks the review
1
of the Orders
2
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-
silencio a lower courts ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second
prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite
the accuseds previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries
sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of
respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was
meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the
same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
3

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile,
petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366,
including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of
petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.
4
Seven days later, the MeTC issued a
resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until
after his arrest.
5
Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion
remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of
S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioners loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its
ruling on petitioners forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTCs order
to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus,
without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner
sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.
6

Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to
forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case
from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants because
his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal
of a judgment of conviction.
7

Petitioner laments the RTCs failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking
jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been
previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence
charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such
crime are material only to determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting petitioners
standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Courts
attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be
complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g.
homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366
for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to
property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor Generals motion not to file a
comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private
respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief
in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment
in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioners constitutional right under
the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not
divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by
the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment
for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of the terms of
his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,
8
in relation to Section 1,
Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals
to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes
from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the
appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of
convictions.
The RTCs dismissal of petitioners special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment
ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTCs reliance
on People v. Esparas
9
undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparasstands for a proposition
contrary to the RTCs ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was
sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and
was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of
death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124.
10

The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal
Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the
Rules of Courts treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings.
Under Section 21, Rule 114
11
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendants absence
merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the
bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and,
should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the
30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-
appearance does not ipso facto convert the accuseds status to that of a fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTCs observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the
scheduled proceeding"
12
at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment,
petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTCs proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of
his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTCs refusal to defer arraignment (the
order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioners arrest), petitioner sought
reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense"
13
protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense,
with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.
14
It is not
disputed that petitioners conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal
Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the
affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is
an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."
15

We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing
quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted
a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum
period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the
value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five
pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by
simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have
constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to
the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the
first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next
lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem
proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of
a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the
offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the
penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a
modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic
rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless
imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the
mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible,"
16
unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These
structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional
crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as
the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v.
Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself
but simply a way of committing it x x x"
17
on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in
quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as
distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal
intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a
crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal
liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be
committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately
from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes,
the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental
attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the
penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory
would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed
for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be
a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365)
fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional
[medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the
latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that
the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in
relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.
18
(Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission
results in damage, either to person or property.
19

Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for
"Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges
for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the element of
imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law
20
(the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since
repeatedly reiterated,
21
stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement
in People v. Faller
22
that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of
committing it x x x,"
23
has long been abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in
1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Fallers
conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species
of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon
jurisprudence
24
only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of
criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of
quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of
jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions
for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense
alleging another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the
second prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not
merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts,
undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article
365 starting with People v. Diaz,
25
decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence"
because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act
upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the
same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of
reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the
consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the
affirmative in People v. Belga
26
(promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v.
Lutero
27
(promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas
28
(promulgated in
1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva
29
(promulgated in 1962 by the Court en
banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay
30
(promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per
Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan
31
(promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L.,
acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals
32
(promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova,
J.), and People v. City Court of Manila
33
(promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.).
These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double
Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where,
in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru
reckless imprudence" because of the accuseds prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained:
34

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the
quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the
consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of
the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person
or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be
split into different crimes and prosecutions.
35
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion
the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding
Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,
36
decided by the pre-war colonial
Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical
injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second
prosecution was based. Estiponas inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence
suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in
Buerano.
37
There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals conviction of an accused for "damage to
property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight and less serious physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the same act upon which the second charge was
based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan:
38

Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of
People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22
SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the
quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the
consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of
the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person
or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be
split into different crimes and prosecutions.
x x x x
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court
of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents
his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the
same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy
for the same offense.
39
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva,
joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Courts attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12,
1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioners plea
of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal
Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence
should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless
act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow
where the same reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical injuries.
Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any
amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap."
40
(Emphasis
supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioners submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his
favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence
could not be tailored to petitioners case than People v. Silva,
41
a Diaz progeny. There, the accused,
who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate Informations with "Slight
Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru
Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the
latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on
reconsideration, found merit in the accuseds claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the
trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v.
Belga:
42

On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case,
holding:
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in
People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of
the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence
arising from a collision between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without
the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal
complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same collision
one for damage to property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner
of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical injuries through
reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of
these two complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted
of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to
quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by
the injured passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief
of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose
Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the
meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners
of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay
after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand,
the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through reckless
imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the
defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov.
Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief of
police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to
property through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was
charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a fast and reckless manner ... thereby
causing an accident. After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court
for failure of the Government to prosecute. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an
information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to
property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be P249.50. Pleading
double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the
ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor
Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to
property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of
double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another
test is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts
alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and
vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x
x x x x
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting
attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been
joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this
case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecutions
contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of
homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the
defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which
acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which
arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously
cleared by the inferior court.
43

Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for
the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application."
44
We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of
double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical
Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits
that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the
order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-
examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its
application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga
case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no practical
advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or
clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated
the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669,
April 30, 1959.
45
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems
from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and
procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and
Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural
device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when
a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation
light felonies
46
); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The
legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple
penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental
attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,"
47
a single
mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one
quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single
prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences.
However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under
either models that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to
persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The
ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should
Article 48s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal)
consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or
should the prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of
the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article
365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue
of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple
consequences
48
unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were split
by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the
charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies
and filing the charge with the first level courts.
49
Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly
sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691,
50
the MeTC
has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is
prision correccional in its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized
under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because
there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one
of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less
grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light
offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects
of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or
severity,
51
penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,
52
we interpreted
paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the
value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed
therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty
for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for
the damage to property, x x x.
53
(Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands
choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime
by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize
a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the
Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate
intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the
application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single
prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize
each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted
under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line
of cases.1avvphi 1
A becoming regard of this Courts place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make
laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional
felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article
365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or
more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing
another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor Generals argument that
double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be joined with the other charge
for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or
less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejectedby this Court in the case of
People vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first
prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having
first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a
position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the
defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x
of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted
for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the
province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular
accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.
54
(Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under
Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of
constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state
resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless
of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than
apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall
be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first
level court.
55

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler
protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby
denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-
crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence
prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-
crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed
under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light
offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient
schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should
cushion the effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2
May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in
Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
SO ORDERED.







G.R. No. 171513 February 6, 2012
ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, HON. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA and HON.
EFREN N. DE LA CRUZ, in their official capacities as Presiding Justice and Associate
Justices, respectively, of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan, and NIERNA S.
DOLLER, Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 190963
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
FIRST DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN and ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J .:
Before us are consolidated petitions assailing the rulings of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
27963, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Arnold James M. Ysidoro."
G.R. No. 171513 is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
(Rules) filed by petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro to annul the resolutions, dated July 6, 2005
1
and
January 25, 2006,
2
of the Sandiganbayan granting the "Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite."
G.R. No. 190963, on the other hand, is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by the People of
the Philippines through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (People) to annul and set aside the
decision,
3
dated October 1, 2009, and the resolution,
4
dated December 9, 2009, of the
Sandiganbayan which acquitted Ysidoro for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts), as amended.
The Antecedents
Ysidoro, as Municipal Mayor of Leyte, Leyte, was charged before the Sandiganbayan, with the
following information:
That during the period from June 2001 to December 2001 or for sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, at the Municipality of Leyte, Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of [the]
Honorable Court, above-named accused, ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, a public officer, being the
Municipal Mayor of Leyte, Leyte, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office,
with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally, withhold and fail to give to Nierna S. Doller, Municipal Social Welfare and
Development Officer (MSWDO) of Leyte, Leyte, without any legal basis, her RATA for the months of
August, September, October, November and December, all in the year 2001, in the total amount of
TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE PESOS (P22,125.00), Philippine
Currency, and her Productivity Pay in the year 2000, in the amount of TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(P2,000.00), Philippine Currency, and despite demands made upon accused to release and pay her
the amount of P22,125.00 and P2,000.00, accused failed to do so, thus accused in the course of the
performance of his official functions had deprived the complainant of her RATA and Productivity Pay,
to the damage and injury of Nierna S. Doller and detriment of public service.
5

Ysidoro filed an omnibus motion to quash the information and, in the alternative, for judicial
determination of probable cause,
6
which were both denied by the Sandiganbayan. In due course,
Ysidoro was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty.
The Sandiganbayan Preventively Suspends Ysidoro
On motion of the prosecution,
7
the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended Ysidoro for ninety (90)
days in accordance with Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, which states:
Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under
this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as complex offense and in whatever
stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Ysidoro filed a motion for reconsideration, and questioned the necessity and the duration of the
preventive suspension. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration, ruling
that -
Clearly, by well established jurisprudence, the provision of Section 13, Republic Act 3019 make[s] it
mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend, for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days, any
public officer who has been validly charged with a violation of Republic Act 3019, as amended or
Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or any offense involving fraud upon government of public
funds or property.
8

Ysidoro assailed the validity of these Sandiganbayan rulings in his petition (G.R. No. 171513) before
the Court. Meanwhile, trial on the merits in the principal case continued before the Sandiganbayan.
The prosecution and the defense presented their respective evidence.
The prosecution presented Nierna S. Doller as its sole witness. According to Doller, she is the
Municipal Social Welfare Development Officer of Leyte. She claimed that Ysidoro ordered her name
to be deleted in the payroll because her husband transferred his political affiliation and sided with
Ysidoros opponent. After her name was deleted from the payroll, Doller did not receive her
representation and transportation allowance (RATA) for the period of August 2001 to December
2001. Doller also related that she failed to receive her productivity bonus for the year 2000
(notwithstanding her performance rating of "VS") because Ysidoro failed to sign her Performance
Evaluation Report. Doller asserted that she made several attempts to claim her RATA and
productivity bonus, and made representations with Ysidoro, but he did not act on her requests.
Doller related that her family failed to meet their financial obligations as a result of Ysidoros actions.
To corroborate Dollers testimony, the prosecution presented documentary evidence in the form of
disbursement vouchers, request for obligation of allotment, letters, excerpts from the police blotter,
memorandum, telegram, certification, order, resolution, and the decision of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman absolving her of the charges.
9

On the other hand, the defense presented seven (7) witnesses,
10
including Ysidoro, and
documentary evidence. The defense showed that the withholding of Dollers RATA was due to the
investigation conducted by the Office of the Mayor on the anomalies allegedly committed by Doller.
For this reason, Ysidoro ordered the padlocking of Dollers office, and ordered Doller and her staff to
hold office at the Office of the Mayor for the close monitoring and evaluation of their functions. Doller
was also prohibited from outside travel without Ysidoros approval.
The Sandiganbayan Acquits Ysidoro
In a decision dated October 1, 2009,
11
the Sandiganbayan acquitted Ysidoro and held that the
second element of the offense that there be malice, ill-motive or bad faith was not present. The
Sandiganbayan pronounced:
This Court acknowledges the fact that Doller was entitled to RATA. However, the antecedent facts
and circumstances did not show any indicia of bad faith on the part of [Ysidoro] in withholding the
release of Dollers RATA.
In fact, this Court believes that [Ysidoro] acted in good faith and in honest belief that Doller was not
entitled to her RATA based on the opinion of the COA resident Auditor and Section 317 of the
Government Accounting and Auditing Manual.
It may be an erroneous interpretation of the law, nonetheless, [Ysidoros] reliance to the same was a
clear basis of good faith on his part in withholding Dollers RATA.
With regard to the Productivity Incentive Bonus, Doller was aware that the non-submission of the
Performance Evaluation Form is a ground for an employees non-eligibility to receive the Productivity
Incentive Bonus:
a) Employees disqualification for performance-based personnel actions which would require the
rating for the given period such as promotion, training or scholarship grants, and productivity
incentive bonus if the failure of the submission of the report form is the fault of the employees.
Doller even admitted in her testimonies that she failed to submit her Performance Evaluation Report
to [Ysidoro] for signature.
There being no malice, ill-motive or taint of bad faith, [Ysidoro] had the legal basis to withhold
Dollers RATA and Productivity pay.
12
(italics supplied)
In a resolution dated December 9, 2009,
13
the Sandiganbayan denied the prosecutions motion for
reconsideration, reasoning that -
It must be stressed that this Court acquitted [Ysidoro] for two reasons: firstly, the prosecution failed
to discharge its burden of proving that accused Ysidoro acted in bad faith as stated in paragraph 1
above; and secondly, the exculpatory proof of good faith xxx.
Needless to state, paragraph 1 alone would be enough ground for the acquittal of accused Ysidoro.
Hence, the COA Resident Auditor need not be presented in court to prove that [Ysidoro] acted in
good faith. This is based on the legal precept that "when the prosecution fails to discharge its
burden, an accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf."
14
(italics supplied)
Supervening events occurred after the filing of Ysidoros petition which rendered the issue in G.R.
No. 171513 i.e., the propriety of his preventive suspension moot and academic. First, Ysidoro
is no longer the incumbent Municipal Mayor of Leyte, Leyte as his term of office expired in 2007.
Second, the prosecution completed its presentation of evidence and had rested its case before the
Sandiganbayan. And third, the Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting Ysidoro of the crime
charged.
In light of these events, what is left to resolve is the petition for certiorari filed by the People on the
validity of the judgment acquitting Ysidoro of the criminal charge.
The Peoples Petition
The People posits that the elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 have been duly established by
the evidence, in that:
First. [Ysidoro] was the Municipal Mayor of Leyte, Leyte when he ordered the deletion of private
complainants name in the payroll for RATA and productivity pay.
Second. He caused undue injury to [Doller] when he ordered the withholding of her RATA and
productivity pay. It is noteworthy that complainant was the only official in the municipality who did not
receive her RATA and productivity pay even if the same were already included in the budget for that
year. x x x
Consequently, [Doller] testified that her family suffered actual and moral damages due to the
withholding of her benefits namely: a) the disconnection of electricity in their residence; x x x b)
demand letters from their creditors; x x x c) her son was dropped from school because they were not
able to pay for his final exams; x x x d) [h]er children did not want to go to school anymore because
they were embarrassed that collectors were running after them.
Third. Accused clearly acted in evident bad faith as he used his position to deprive [Doller] of her
RATA and productivity pay for the period mentioned to harass her due to the transfer of political
affiliation of her husband.
15
(emphasis supplied)
The People argues
16
that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion, and exceeded its, or
acted without, jurisdiction in not finding Ysidoro in bad faith when he withheld Dollers RATA and
deprived her of her productivity bonus. The Sandiganbayan failed to take into account that: first, the
Commission on Audit (COA) resident auditor was never presented in court; second, the
documentary evidence showed that Doller continuously discharged the functions of her office even if
she had been prevented from outside travel by Ysidoro; third, Ysidoro refused to release Dollers
RATA and productivity bonus notwithstanding the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the cases against
her for alleged anomalies committed in office; and fourth, Ysidoro caused Dollers name to be
dropped from the payroll without justifiable cause, and he refused to sign the disbursement vouchers
and the request for obligation of allotment so that Doller could claim her RATA and her productivity
bonus.
In the same manner, the People asserts that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when
it ruled that Doller was not eligible to receive the productivity bonus for her failure to submit her
Performance Evaluation Report. The Sandiganbayan disregarded the evidence showing the strained
relationship and the maneuverings made by Ysidoro so that he could deny her this incentive.
In his Comment,
17
Ysidoro prays for the dismissal of the petition for procedural and substantive
infirmities. First, he claims that the petition was filed out of time considering the belated filing of the
Peoples motion for reconsideration before the Sandiganbayan. He argues that by reason of the late
filing of the motion for reconsideration, the present petition was filed beyond the 60-day
reglementary period. Ysidoro also argues that the 60-day reglementary period should have been
counted from the Peoples receipt of the Sandiganbayans decision since no motion for
reconsideration was seasonably filed. Second, Ysidoro claims that the Sandiganbayans ruling was
in accord with the evidence and the prosecution was not denied due process to properly avail of the
remedy of a writ of certiorari. And third, Ysidoro insists that he can no longer be prosecuted for the
same criminal charge without violating the rule against double jeopardy.
The Issue Raised
The ultimate issue to be resolved is whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion and
exceeded its, or acted without, jurisdiction when it acquitted Ysidoro of the crime charged.
The Courts Ruling
We first resolve the preliminary issue raised by Ysidoro on the timeliness of the Peoples petition for
certiorari. The records show that the motion for reconsideration was filed by the People before the
Sandiganbayan on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to file the motion which fell on
October 16, 2009, a Friday. Although the date originally appearing in the notice of hearing on the
motion was September 22, 2009 (which later on was corrected to October 22, 2009), the error in
designating the month was unmistakably obvious considering the date when the motion was filed. In
any case, the error cannot detract from the circumstance that the motion for reconsideration was
filed within the 15-day reglementary period. We consider, too, that Ysidoro was not deprived of due
process and was given the opportunity to be heard on the motion. Accordingly, the above error
cannot be considered fatal to the right of the People to file its motion for reconsideration. The
counting of the 60-day reglementary period within which to file the petition for certiorari will be
reckoned from the receipt of the People of the denial of its motion for reconsideration, or on
December 10, 2009. As the last day of the 60-day reglementary period fell on February 8, 2010, the
petition which was filed on February 5, 2010 was filed on time.
Nevertheless, we dismiss the petitions for being procedurally and substantially infirm.
A Review of a Judgment of Acquittal
Generally, the Rules provides three (3) procedural remedies in order for a party to appeal a decision
of a trial court in a criminal case before this Court. The first is by ordinary appeal under Section 3,
Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The second is by a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules. And the third is by filing a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65. Each procedural remedy is unique and provides for a different mode of review. In
addition, each procedural remedy may only be availed of depending on the nature of the judgment
sought to be reviewed.
A review by ordinary appeal resolves factual and legal issues. Issues which have not been properly
raised by the parties but are, nevertheless, material in the resolution of the case are also resolved in
this mode of review. In contrast, a review on certiorari under a Rule 45 petition is generally limited to
the review of legal issues; the Court only resolves questions of law which have been properly raised
by the parties during the appeal and in the petition. Under this mode, the Court determines whether
a proper application of the law was made in a given set of facts. A Rule 65 review, on the other
hand, is strictly confined to the determination of the propriety of the trial courts jurisdiction
whether it has jurisdiction over the case and if so, whether the exercise of its jurisdiction has or has
not been attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
While an assailed judgment elevated by way of ordinary appeal or a Rule 45 petition is considered
an intrinsically valid, albeit erroneous, judgment, a judgment assailed under Rule 65 is characterized
as an invalid judgment because of defect in the trial courts authority to rule. Also, an ordinary appeal
and a Rule 45 petition tackle errors committed by the trial court in the appreciation of the evidence
and/or the application of law. In contrast, a Rule 65 petition resolves jurisdictional errors committed
in the proceedings in the principal case. In other words, errors of judgment are the proper subjects of
an ordinary appeal and in a Rule 45 petition; errors of jurisdiction are addressed in a Rule 65
petition.
As applied to judgments rendered in criminal cases, unlike a review via a Rule 65 petition, only
judgments of conviction can be reviewed in an ordinary appeal or a Rule 45 petition. As we
explained in People v. Nazareno,
18
the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy
proscribes appeals of judgments of acquittal through the remedies of ordinary appeal and a Rule 45
petition, thus:
The Constitution has expressly adopted the double jeopardy policy and thus bars multiple criminal
trials, thereby conclusively presuming that a second trial would be unfair if the innocence of the
accused has been confirmed by a previous final judgment. Further prosecution via an appeal from
a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the government has already been afforded a
complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendants culpability; after failing to persuade the court
to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on
multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The reason is not only the defendants already
established innocence at the first trial where he had been placed in peril of conviction, but also the
same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial initiated by a government who has at
its disposal all the powers and resources of the State. Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily
result, as the government would then be allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of
the defendants guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a
process where the governments power and resources are once again employed against the
defendants individual means. That the second opportunity comes via an appeal does not make the
effects any less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and conscience.
19
(emphases
supplied)
However, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be properly invoked in a Rule 65 petition,
predicated on two (2) exceptional grounds, namely: in a judgment of acquittal rendered with grave
abuse of discretion by the court; and where the prosecution had been deprived of due process.
20
The
rule against double jeopardy does not apply in these instances because a Rule 65 petition does not
involve a review of facts and law on the merits in the manner done in an appeal. In certiorari
proceedings, judicial review does not examine and assess the evidence of the parties nor weigh the
probative value of the evidence.
21
It does not include an inquiry on the correctness of the evaluation
of the evidence.
22
A review under Rule 65 only asks the question of whether there has been a validly
rendered decision, not the question of whether the decision is legally correct.
23
In other words, the
focus of the review is to determine whether the judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds.
24

Applying these legal concepts to this case, we find that while the People was procedurally correct in
filing its petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the petition does not raise any jurisdictional error
committed by the Sandiganbayan. On the contrary, what is clear is the obvious attempt by the
People to have the evidence in the case reviewed by the Court under the guise of a Rule 65 petition.
This much can be deduced by examining the petition itself which does not allege any bias, partiality
or bad faith committed by the Sandiganbayan in its proceedings. The petition does not also raise any
denial of the Peoples due process in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.
We observe, too, that the grounds relied in the petition relate to factual errors of judgment which are
more appropriate in an ordinary appeal rather than in a Rule 65 petition. The grounds cited in the
petition call for the Courts own appreciation of the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan on the
sufficiency of the Peoples evidence in proving the element of bad faith, and the sufficiency of the
evidence denying productivity bonus to Doller.
The Merits of the Case
Our consideration of the imputed errors fails to establish grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Sandiganbayan. As a rule, misapplication of facts and
evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on evidence do not, by the mere fact that errors were
committed, rise to the level of grave abuse of
discretion.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/168982.htm - _ftn
25
That an
abuse itself must be "grave" must be amply demonstrated since the jurisdiction of the court, no less,
will be affected.
26
We have previously held that the mere fact, too, that a court erroneously decides a
case does not necessarily deprive it of
jurisdiction.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/august2009/168982.htm - _ftn
27

Jurisprudence has defined grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
this wise:
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility.
28

Under this definition, the People bears the burden of convincingly demonstrating that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in the appreciation of the evidence. We find that the
People failed in this regard.
We find no indication from the records that the Sandiganbayan acted arbitrarily, capriciously and
whimsically in arriving at its verdict of acquittal. The settled rule is that conviction ensues only if
every element of the crime was alleged and proved.
29
In this case, Ysidoro was acquitted by the
Sandiganbayan for two reasons: first, his bad faith (an element of the crime charged) was not
sufficiently proven by the prosecution evidence; and second, there was exculpatory evidence of his
good faith.
As bad faith is a state of mind, the prosecution must present evidence of the overt acts or omissions
committed by Ysidoro showing that he deliberately intended to do wrong or cause damage to Doller
by withholding her RATA. However, save from the testimony of Doller of the strained relationship
between her and Ysidoro, no other evidence was presented to support Ysidoros bad faith against
her. We note that Doller even disproved Ysidoros bad faith when she admitted that several cases
had been actually filed against her before the Office of the Ombudsman. It bears stressing that these
purported anomalies were allegedly committed in office which Ysidoro cited to justify the withholding
of Dollers RATA.
The records also show other acts that tend to negate Ysidoros bad faith under the circumstances.
First, the investigation of the alleged anomalies by Ysidoro was corroborated by the physical transfer
of Doller and her subordinates to the Office of the Mayor and the prohibition against outside travel
imposed on Doller. Second, the existence of the Ombudsmans cases against Doller. And third,
Ysidoros act of seeking an opinion from the COA Auditor on the proper interpretation of Section 317
of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual before he withheld the RATA. This section
provides:
An official/employee who was wrongly removed or prevented from performing his duties is entitled to
back salaries but not RATA. The rationale for the grant of RATA is to provide the official concerned
additional fund to meet necessary expenses incidental to and connected with the exercise or the
discharge of the functions of an office. If he is out of office, [voluntarily] or involuntarily, it necessarily
follows that the functions of the office remain undischarged (COA, Dec. 1602, October 23, 1990).
And if the duties of the office are not discharged, the official does not and is not supposed to incur
expenses. There being no expenses incurred[,] there is nothing to be reimbursed (COA, Dec. 2121
dated June 28, 1979).
30

Although the above provision was erroneously interpreted by Ysidoro and the COA Auditor, the
totality of the evidence, to our mind, provides sufficient grounds to create reasonable doubt on
Ysidoros bad faith. As we have held before, bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence but imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong
or a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent, or ill-will to partake the nature of
fraud.
31
An erroneous interpretation of a provision of law, absent any showing of some dishonest or
wrongful purpose, does not constitute and does not necessarily amount to bad faith.
32

Similarly, we find no inference of bad faith when Doller failed to receive the productivity bonus. Doller
does not dispute that the receipt of the productivity bonus was premised on the submission by the
employee of his/her Performance Evaluation Report. In this case, Doller admitted that she did not
submit her Performance Evaluation Report; hence, she could not have reasonably expected to
receive any productivity bonus. Further, we cannot agree with her self-serving claim that it was
Ysidoros refusal that led to her failure to receive her productivity bonus given that no other hard
evidence supported this claim. We certainly cannot rely on Dollers assertion of the alleged
statement made by one Leo Apacible (Ysidoros secretary) who was not presented in court. The
alleged statement made by Leo Apacible that "the mayor will get angry with him and he might be laid
off,"
33
in addition to being hearsay, did not even establish the actual existence of an order from
Ysidoro or of his alleged maneuverings to deprive Doller of her RATA and productivity bonus.
In light of these considerations, we resolve to dismiss the Peoples petition.1avvphi 1 We cannot review a
verdict of acquittal which does not impute or show any jurisdictional error committed by the
Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby resolves to:
1. DISMISS the petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 171513, filed by
Arnold James M. Ysidoro for being moot and academic.
2. DISMISS the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 190963, filed by the People of
the Philippines, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.




G.R. No. 160869 May 11, 2007
AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND
ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of
Justice, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J .:
This is an original action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon
Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws governing citizenship.
1
Petitioner prays that a writ
of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An
Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent,
Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes."
Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the
1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall
be dealt with by law."
Rep. Act No. 9225, signed into law by President Gloria M. Arroyo on August 29, 2003, reads:
SECTION 1. Short Title.-This Act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act
of 2003."
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.-It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.-Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I ___________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept
the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a
foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted,
below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of
this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of
office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took
that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot
be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are
naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in the active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed
forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
SEC. 6. Separability Clause. - If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid,
any other section or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.
SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication
in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
In this petition for prohibition, the following issues have been raised: (1) Is Rep. Act No. 9225
unconstitutional? (2) Does this Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance?
We shall discuss these issues jointly.
Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers that Sections
2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner
maintains that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign
citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits
dual allegiance because said law allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their
Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign
allegiance.
2
The Constitution, however, is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to the national
interest.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a state policy that
"Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims that the oath in Section 3 does not allow dual
allegiance since the oath taken by the former Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and
repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The fact that the applicant taking the oath recognizes and
accepts the supreme authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation of his
undivided loyalty to the Republic.
3

In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the deliberations of Congress is necessary to
determine the intent of the legislative branch in drafting the assailed law. During the deliberations,
the issue of whether Rep. Act No. 9225 would allow dual allegiance had in fact been the subject of
debate. The record of the legislative deliberations reveals the following:
x x x x
Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two situations exist - - the
retention of foreign citizenship, and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In this case, he
observed that there are two citizenships and therefore, two allegiances. He pointed out that under
the Constitution, dual allegiance is inimical to public interest. He thereafter asked whether with the
creation of dual allegiance by reason of retention of foreign citizenship and the reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, there will now be a violation of the Constitution
Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address the constitutional injunction on
dual allegiance as inimical to public interest. He said that the proposed law aims to facilitate the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by speedy means. However, he said that in one sense, it
addresses the problem of dual citizenship by requiring the taking of an oath. He explained that the
problem of dual citizenship is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country because the
latest oath that will be taken by the former Filipino is one of allegiance to the Philippines and not to
the United States, as the case may be. He added that this is a matter which the Philippine
government will have no concern and competence over.
Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's concern, when dual allegiance is
involved.
Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the original version of the bill, which did
not require an oath of allegiance. Since the measure now requires this oath, the problem of dual
allegiance is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country concerned, he explained.
x x x x
Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not denounce his foreign
citizenship and therefore still owes allegiance to the foreign government, and at the same time, owes
his allegiance to the Philippine government, such that there is now a case of dual citizenship and
dual allegiance.
Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly
renounces his foreign citizenship. However, he said that this is not a matter that he wishes to
address in Congress because he is not a member of a foreign parliament but a Member of the
House.
x x x x
Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual allegiance contrary to national
interest should be dealt with by law. However, he said that the dual allegiance problem is not
addressed in the bill. He then cited the Declaration of Policy in the bill which states that "It is hereby
declared the policy of the State that all citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act." He stressed
that what the bill does is recognize Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the other
citizenship.
Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is created wherein a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to another country and in that oath says that he
abjures and absolutely renounces all allegiance to his country of origin and swears allegiance to that
foreign country. The original Bill had left it at this stage, he explained. In the present measure, he
clarified, a person is required to take an oath and the last he utters is one of allegiance to the
country. He then said that the problem of dual allegiance is no longer the problem of the Philippines
but of the other foreign country.
4
(Emphasis supplied.)
From the above excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the legislature in
drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63
5
which
takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of
other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino
citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of
the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep.
Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting
the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens
to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress has not yet passed any law on
the matter of dual allegiance, such absence of a law should not be justification why this Court could
not rule on the issue. He further contends that while it is true that there is no enabling law yet on dual
allegiance, the Supreme Court, through Mercado v. Manzano,
6
already had drawn up the guidelines
on how to distinguish dual allegiance from dual citizenship.
7

For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, dual
allegiance shall be dealt with by law. Thus, until a law on dual allegiance is enacted by Congress,
the Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to entertain issues regarding dual allegiance.
8

To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-
executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3
of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the
status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization.
9
Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of
what really constitutes dual allegiance.
10
Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial
department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed since the case of
Mercado had already set the guidelines for determining dual allegiance. Petitioner
misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but
merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.
Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,
11
we said that the courts must assume that the legislature is
ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge
of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
Hence, in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we
must proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance.
12
The doctrine of
separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters of
what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of
determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.




















G.R. No. 182701 July 23, 2008
EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA, Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
REYES, R.T., J .:
A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines
unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the
certificate of candidacy.
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules on Civil Procedure
assailing the (1) Resolution
1
and (2) Omnibus Order
2
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
Second Division, disqualifying petitioner from running as Barangay Chairman.
Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay
Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Elections held on October 29, 2007.
On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition
3
before the Provincial Election
Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he
is an American citizen, hence, ineligible from running for any public office. In his Answer,
4
petitioner
argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the same time an American, by virtue of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003.
5
He returned to the Philippines and resided in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he
possessed all the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman.
After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the winner.
6

On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution granting the petition for
disqualification, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Disqualification is GRANTED and
respondent Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez is DISQUALIFIED from running as Barangay Chairman of
Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo.
SO ORDERED.
7

In ruling against petitioner, the COMELEC found that he was not able to regain his Filipino
citizenship in the manner provided by law. According to the poll body, to be able to qualify as a
candidate in the elections, petitioner should have made a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship. This, petitioner failed to do.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner resorted to the present petition,
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for disqualifying him from running
and assuming the office of Barangay Chairman.
We dismiss the petition.
Relying on Valles v. Commission on Elections,
8
petitioner argues that his filing of a certificate of
candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.
We note, however, that the operative facts that led to this Courts ruling in Valles are substantially
different from the present case. In Valles, the candidate, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, was a dual citizen
by accident of birth on foreign soil.
9
Lopez was born of Filipino parents in Australia, a country which
follows the principle of jus soli.lauuphi1 As a result, she acquired Australian citizenship by operation of
Australian law, but she was also considered a Filipino citizen under Philippine law. She did not
perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than the Philippines.
In contrast, petitioner was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American citizenship and
renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino
citizenship.1awphi 1
More importantly, the Courts 2000 ruling in Valles has been superseded by the enactment of R.A.
No. 9225
10
in 2003. R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-
acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law
states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
x x x x
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law explicitly provides
that should one seek elective public office, he should first "make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath."
Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. We quote with approval the COMELEC observation
on this point:
While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law
when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate Generals
Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is not enough to allow him to run for a public office. The
above-quoted provision of law mandates that a candidate with dual citizenship must make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath. There is no evidence presented that will show that respondent
complied with the provision of R.A. No. 9225. Absent such proof we cannot allow respondent to run
for Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay.
For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of
law who is authorized to administer an oath. The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms
that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In the instant case, respondent
Lopezs failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that
will prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe that he failed to comply with the positive
mandate of law. For failure of respondent to prove that he abandoned his allegiance to the United
States, this Commission holds him disqualified from running for an elective position in the
Philippines.
11
(Emphasis added)
While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions
of Barangay Chairman, his victory can not cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most
number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of
the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.
12

In sum, the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner as
candidate for Chairman in the Barangay elections of 2007.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

















G.R. No. 137000 August 9, 2000
CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PURISIMA, J .:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of
the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by
the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May
1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to
the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa
Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the
Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic
Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as
a voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental.
Her election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed
as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding
no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on
Elections en banc dismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:
"A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned resolution shows that
respondent was able to produce documentary proofs of the Filipino citizenship of her late father...
and consequently, prove her own citizenship and filiation by virtue of the Principle of Jus Sanguinis,
the perorations of the petitioner to the contrary notwithstanding.
On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents . . . no other evidence
substantial in nature surfaced to confirm the allegations of petitioner that respondent is an Australian
citizen and not a Filipino. Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under
Commonwealth Act No. 63 is an equivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance
and consequence. The evidence adduced by petitioner are inadequate, nay meager, to prove that
respondent contemplated renunciation of her Filipino citizenship".
1

In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as governor of
Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA
No. 95-066 before the COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said
petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.
The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-
election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned
by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.
On July 17, 1998, the COMELECs First Division came out with a Resolution dismissing the petition,
and disposing as follows:
"Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to dispose the instant case on the
merits trying it de novo, the above table definitely shows that petitioner herein has presented no new
evidence to disturb the Resolution of this Commission in SPA No. 95-066. The present petition
merely restates the same matters and incidents already passed upon by this Commission not just in
1995 Resolution but likewise in the Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having put forth any new
evidence and matter substantial in nature, persuasive in character or sufficiently provocative to
compel reversal of such Resolutions, the dismissal of the present petition follows as a matter of
course.
x x x x x x x x x
"WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters and issues tendered, We find
no convincing reason or impressive explanation to disturb and reverse the Resolutions promulgated
by this Commission in EPC 92-54 and SPA. 95-066. This Commission RESOLVES as it hereby
RESOLVES to DISMISS the present petition.
SO ORDERED."
2

Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution but to no avail. The
same was denied by the COMELEC in its en banc Resolution of January 15, 1999.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition; questioning the citizenship
of private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino
citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is
a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the
1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino
citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her
Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs
of Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian
Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and
SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of
Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an Australian citizen, placing
reliance on the admitted facts that:
a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an
Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated
September 19, 1988;
b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence
(ICR), and
c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the private respondent had
renounced her Filipino citizenship. He contends that in her application for alien certificate of
registration and immigrant certificate of residence, private respondent expressly declared under oath
that she was a citizen or subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship,
and operated to disqualify her to run for elective office.
As regards the COMELECs finding that private respondent had renounced her Australian citizenship
on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had
her Australian passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by the Australian Embassy
here in Manila, petitioner argues that the said acts did not automatically restore the status of private
respondent as a Filipino citizen. According to petitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire
Philippine citizenship she must comply with the mandatory requirements for repatriation under
Republic Act 8171; and the election of private respondent to public office did not mean the
restoration of her Filipino citizenship since the private respondent was not legally repatriated.
Coupled with her alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship, private respondent has effectively
become a stateless person and as such, is disqualified to run for a public office in the Philippines;
petitioner concluded.
Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in applying the principle of res
judicata to the case under consideration; citing the ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
Immigration,
3
that:
"xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative
case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
again as the occasion may demand. xxx"
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child
follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as
opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of
birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome,
Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet,
Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935
Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were
the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the
Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as
the Jones Law.
Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the Philippine islands. The
Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine citizens as:
SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish
subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in the
Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except
such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (underscoring ours)
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day
of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such
as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of
some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby
authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who cannot come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular
possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are
citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of
the United States if residing therein. (underscoring ours)
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private
respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a
fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen.
By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforos
daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus
sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was
subsequently retained under the 1973
4
and 1987
5
Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent,
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her
being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows
the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship
resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a Filipino citizen,
she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner
cited private respondents application for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her of an Australian
passport on March 3, 1988.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign
country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed
forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted:
and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in
her husbands country, she acquires his nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioners
contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her
Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs.
COMELEC
6
and in the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC.
7

In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a
certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an
application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent Manzano
was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was
holding an American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy
for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality before the termination of
his American citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian
passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation
of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to
effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express.
8
As held by this court in the
aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an
express renunciation or repudiation of ones citizenship. The application of the herein private
respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the
case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she
effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she
was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another
country has not been included as a ground for losing ones Philippine citizenship. Since private
respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioners claim that respondent
must go through the process of repatriation does not hold water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent had dual
citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of
Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which states:
"SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
x x x x x x x x x
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
x x x x x x x x x
Again, petitioners contention is untenable.
In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified "dual citizenship" as used in the
Local Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution
on dual allegiance.
9
Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any
act, and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen
of another state, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens
with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:
"xxx the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not
fall under this disqualification."
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her
from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it
is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship.
10
The filing of a certificate of candidacy
sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual
citizen.
11
This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino
citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective
renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed her certificate
of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent executed a
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992,
the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary
Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the
aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez. Since her renunciation was effective, petitioners claim that private respondent must go
through the whole process of repatriation holds no water.
Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative
proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered res judicata in any
subsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner
of Immigration.
12
He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew.
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res
judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the case
of Burca vs. Republic,
13
an exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that
case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the
following must be present:
1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is
a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof, and
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose
the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on
these antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier or
simpler.
14
Indeed, there appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on
Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the
herein private respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence
presented in these two prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event
to warrant a reversal of such prior resolutions. However, the procedural issue notwithstanding,
considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17,
1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to run for governor of
Davao Oriental. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.










G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE,
JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner,
vs.
RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
x-----------------------------x
G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS
FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J .:
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of
the privilege. It is a "precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition,"
1
that cannot be
taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of profound
importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a
presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our people are waiting for the judgment
of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the
main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial roots and
reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid
of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.
(hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of
the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming
national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of
birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus
Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate
of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe,
was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the
allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a
prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if
no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of
respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support
of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a
certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her
having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after
discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit
aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued
by the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was
no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the
Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of
the National Archives to the effect that no available information could be found in the files of the
National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant
ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National
Archives that there appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the
registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the
Archives Division of the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan
F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original
Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name
of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in
the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the
purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued
by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said
office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later,
or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06
February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of
the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary
restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality
and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No. 161434,
entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections,
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the other,
docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a.
Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under
Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original
and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due course
to or cancel FPJs certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that
FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false"
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus
Election Code -
"Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers
and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive
charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections
for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections" -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any
interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any
nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per
Rule 64
2
in an action for certiorari under Rule 65
3
of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7,
Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A
case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law which power "includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government."
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and
could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our
people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or
should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the
provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction
of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to
instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited
reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate
its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973
Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential
contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,
4
as "not (being) justiciable"
controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact
Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try,
Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-
Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793
designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of
the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the
1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up,
nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election
contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct
remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A
perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this
premise -
"Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.
"Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or
a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall
not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an
election protest.
"Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President
of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the
election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified
petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the
proclamation of the winner."
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as
being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office.
5
In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule
14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number
of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of
the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the
qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on
Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on the concept
of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384
to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and
in the holding of an office.
6
Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the constituency of the
"State," which he described as being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number
to achieve a self-sufficient existence.
7
The concept grew to include one who would both govern and
be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected.
Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant
obligations, on the other.
8
In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally
willing to submit his private interests to the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the
concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary for
individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice.
9
Its meaning expanded
during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in
the exercise of political power.
10
The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social
citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social
security.
11
The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so
developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the
rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of citizenship.
12

The Local Setting - from Spanish Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or
"Spanish subjects."
13
In church records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the
inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th
century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these
citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those
explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.
14

Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain
on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to be the
subject of differing views among experts;
15
however, three royal decrees were undisputably made
applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,
16
the Royal
Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the political status of children born in the Philippine
Islands,
17
and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made
applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.
18

The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of the
express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of the Ultramar among which
this country was included, would be governed by special laws.
19

It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which
came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. -
"(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
"(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,
"(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
"(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of
the Monarchy."
20

The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of decline as a
superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world power,
the United States. An accepted principle of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty,
while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws,
which would remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United
States.
21
Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of
the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by its Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the
present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may
remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to
sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry
on their industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws
as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the
date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve
such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to
have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.
Thus
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to
the United States shall be determined by the Congress."
22

Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on the
subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did
not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and
were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection
of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902,
also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation
of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were
Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their
children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions
of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth
eighteen hundred and ninety eight."
23

Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant of the
Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11
th
day of April 1899. The term "inhabitant" was taken to
include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an
inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.
24

Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July
1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the
view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law principle of jus soli,
otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and England,
governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that period.
25
More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to the
Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not
come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the United
States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens
of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."
26

With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first
time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in
the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos."
In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions
of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -
"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day
of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their
children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain
in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such
others as have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine
Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the
foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such
other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who
could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States, if residing
therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the
Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the
Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of
acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law, by
adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino
citizenship -
"Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines -
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution
"(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
"(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
"(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law provisions at
the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire
that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the
women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate
children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino
women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new
Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns -
"Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship,
unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have renounced her
citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for
subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable
proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election,
and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
27

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the
1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli,
res judicata and jus sanguinis
28
had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could
qualify a person to being a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
Customs
29
(1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of
Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor
30
(1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now
become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established
direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the
father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence,
his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan,
and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father
of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou,
and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an "uncertified" copy of a
supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936.
The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be
on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old,
unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an
American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to
Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-
one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth
certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could
be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born
Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of
FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a
public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during
the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The
marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent.
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last
two documents were submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in
reference to the facts which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the
date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of
Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who
had utilized those material statements in his argument. All three documents were certified true
copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
"Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
"x x x x x x x x x
"(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a
public office."
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe
and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents.
Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
"Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated."
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be
grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty
which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such
statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors
as might have occurred.
31

The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age
of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born
sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue
that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902
considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the Records Management and
Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place
during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San
Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude,
or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his
residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives
Office would have had complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the child to
the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of an
illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules
under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until
the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment
was required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or
voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of
the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a
public document.
32
Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law
expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -
"In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the
parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not
be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to
acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be
identified."
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation
or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such
requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition.
33
In
Mendoza vs. Mella,
34
the Court ruled -
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here really
is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of the
registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily
recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the
names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to
its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it
was not even they or either of them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil register.
Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document
wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same
Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement in the
document that the parent recognizes the child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the document was
the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to
have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of voluntary recognition
remained to be "some other public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,
35
this Court defined what could
constitute such a document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by
private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent
public officials by reason of their office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as
one of the means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into
voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made in a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal
acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was
recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded
generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to
claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the
heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the
lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing," so as to be
an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable
writing of the father. The term would include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a
notary public or other competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:
"Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
"(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
"(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
"(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
"(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
"Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime
and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of
insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute
the action.
"The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either
or both of the parties.
"x x x x x x x x x.
"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same, evidence as legitimate children.
"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent."
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,
36
the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided
under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that
'the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if
the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950.
Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of
illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart
legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and
welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs of
the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the
individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While,
indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in
the context of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the
family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts
which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among
members of a family, and those which exist among members of a society for the protection of
private interests."
37

In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,
38
the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards
although they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil
nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile
of the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of their properties,
the rules governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the classification
of their property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it,
and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of
the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of the husband
and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on
citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil
Code,
39
such as on successional rights and family relations.
40
In adoption, for instance, an adopted
child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their
legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil law
41
and not his
political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be
traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining proprietary and successional
rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate
children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth
were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by
foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and
the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our
own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the sphere of civil law
and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be
deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes.
The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not
have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on
evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily
precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
"Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable
to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage,
may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
`pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when
and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also
facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree."
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to
testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the
person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has
occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in
question must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe
submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe,
recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his
children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton,
California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that:
"1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
"2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly
known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
"4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena
Street, Manila.
"x x x x x x x x x
"7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were
students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to Fernando Poe,
Sr., by my sister that same year.
"8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
"9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan
and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family's house on Dakota
St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some
months between 1943-1944.
"10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children after
Ronald Allan Poe.
"x x x x x x x x x
"18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is
a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas Declarant DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to
obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child
and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear
up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,
42
this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of
DNA testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and
scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for
identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research
Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using
short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person
has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the
mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a
novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as
the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence.
For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress."
Petitioners Argument For Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to
petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage
with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and
respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between
Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence
introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a
marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father
and an American mother who were married to each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940.
Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an
illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen,
basing his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,
43
citing Chiongbian vs. de Leo
44
and
Serra vs. Republic.
45

On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most
convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the
pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would
be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement
was irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter
dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these
cases.
"First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It
was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a
Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the
stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the
naturalized stepfather.
"Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino
father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Filipino by election to public
office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935
Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.
"Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father.
Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The issue was
whether one who was already a Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be
naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.
"Finally, Paa vs. Chan.
46
This is a more complicated case. The case was about the
citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his
father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin
therefore argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court
said that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The
Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither
was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not
even a Filipino.
"The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The
Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be
Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary
to fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure
and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the
Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution not once but
twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an
illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the
illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
"The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People
vs. Cayat.
47
I would grant that the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate
children rests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do not justify invidious
distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another
purpose.
"x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What
possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a
public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive
the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate
child from holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his
parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor
rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and
must be reprobated."
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court), Professor
Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis of
petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did
so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien
father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and
had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate
against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935 Constitution,
the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be
more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that
among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." There
utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none
provided.
In Sum
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the
petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003
which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the position of
President in the 10
th
May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has committed
material representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No.
161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in the latters
capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest
under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked
only after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been
committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the
father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the
affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking
after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship
of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84
years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines
was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his
death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou),
if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The
1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in
his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to
Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his
case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present
their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,
48
must not only
be material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr.,
Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando
Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on
Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.," for failure to show
grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing
the petition in SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., see separate opinion, concurring.
Puno, J., on leave but was allowed to vote; see separate opinion.
Panganiban, J., on official leave; allowed to vote but did not send his vote on the matter.
Quisumbing, J., joins the dissent of Justices Tinga and Morales; case should have been remanded.
Ynares-Santiago, J., concurs and also with J. Punos separate opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., concurs, please see separate opinion.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., concurs, please see separate opinion.
Corona, J., joins the dissenting opinion of Justice Morales.
Carpio-Morales, J., see dissenting opinion.
Callejo, Sr., J., please see concurring opinion.
Azcuna, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Tinga, J., dissents per separate opinion.

SEPARATE OPINION
DAVIDE, JR. C.J.:
The procedural and factual antecedents of these consolidated cases are as follows:
On 9 January 2004, petitioner Victorino X. Fornier filed with public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) a petition to disqualify private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) and to
deny due course to or cancel his certificate of candidacy for the position of President in the
forthcoming 10 May 2004 presidential elections. As a ground therefore, he averred that FPJ
committed falsity in a material representation in his certificate of candidacy in declaring that he is a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth and in fact he is not, since he is the illegitimate son of
Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, and Allan Poe, a Spanish national. The case was docketed as
COMELEC Case SPA No. 04-003 and assigned to the COMELECs First Division.
At the hearing before the First Division of the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier offered FPJs record of
birth to prove that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, and Allan
Poe, who was then married to Paulita Gomez. Upon the other hand, FPJ tried to establish that his
father was a Filipino citizen whose parents, although Spanish nationals, were Filipino citizens. He
adduced in evidence a copy of the marriage contract of Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley, showing that
they were married on 16 September 1940 in Manila.
In its Resolution of 23 January 2004, the First Division of the COMELEC dismissed COMELEC Case
SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. It declared that COMELECs jurisdiction is limited to all matters
relating to election, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials, but
not those of national officials like the President. It has, however, jurisdiction to pass upon the issue
of citizenship of national officials under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code on petitions to
deny due course or cancel certificates of candidacy on the ground that any material representation
contained therein is false. It found that the evidence adduced by petitioner Fornier is not substantial,
and that FPJ did not commit any falsehood in material representation when he stated in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
His motion for reconsideration filed before the COMELEC en banc having been denied, petitioner
Fornier filed a petition with this Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 161824.
Meanwhile, petitioners Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr. came to this Court via a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 161434,
to challenge the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the issue of the citizenship of FPJ. They assert
that only this Court has jurisdiction over the issue in light of the last paragraph of Section 4 of Article
VII of the Constitution, which provides:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.
On 29 January 2004 petitioner Velez filed a similar petition, which was docketed as G.R. No.
161634.
The core issues in these consolidated cases, as defined by the Court during the oral argument, are
as follows:
(1) Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions to deny due course to or cancel
certificates of candidacy of Presidential candidates;
(2) Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petitions of (a) Tecson, et al., (b)
Velez, and (c) Fornier; and
(3) Whether respondent FPJ is a Filipino citizen, and if so, whether he is a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
These consolidated petitions must be dismissed.
Both the petitions of Tecson and Velez invoke the jurisdiction of this Court as provided for in the last
paragraph of Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution, and raise the issue of the ineligibility of a
candidate for President on the ground that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. The
actions contemplated in the said provision of the Constitution are post-election remedies, namely,
regular election contests and quo warranto. The petitioner should have, instead, resorted to pre-
election remedies, such as those prescribed in Section 68 (Disqualifications), in relation to Section
72; Section 69 (Nuisance candidates); and Section 78 (Petition to deny course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy), in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code, which are
implemented in Rules 23, 24 and 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. These pre-election
remedies or actions do not, however, fall within the original jurisdiction of this Court.
Under the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the COMELEC has the
original jurisdiction to determine in an appropriate proceeding whether a candidate for an elective
office is eligible for the office for which he filed his certificate of candidacy or is disqualified to be a
candidate or to continue such candidacy because of any of the recognized grounds for
disqualification. Its jurisdiction over COMELEC SPA No. 04-003 is, therefore, beyond question.
Upon the other hand, this Court has jurisdiction over Forniers petition (G.R. No. 161824) under
Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case
or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof.
This Court can also take cognizance of the issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the challenged resolution in
COMELEC SPA No. 04-003 by virtue of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution, which reads as
follows:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of nay branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
On the issue of whether private respondent FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen, the following facts
have been established by a weighty preponderance of evidence either in the pleadings and the
documents attached thereto or from the admissions of the parties, through their counsels, during the
oral arguments:
1. FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 in Manila, Philippines.
2. FPJ was born to Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley.
3. Bessie Kelley and Allan Poe were married on 16 September 1940.
4. Allan Poe was a Filipino because his father, Lorenzo Poe, albeit a Spanish subject, was
not shown to have declared his allegiance to Spain by virtue of the Treaty of Paris and the
Philippine Bill of 1902.
From the foregoing it is clear that respondent FPJ was born before the marriage of his parents.
Thus, pursuant to the Civil Code then in force, he could either be (a) a natural child if both his
parents had no legal impediments to marry each other; or (b) an illegitimate child if, indeed, Allan
Poe was married to another woman who was still alive at the time FPJ was born.
Petitioner Fornier never alleged that Allan Poe was not the father of FPJ. By revolving his case
around the illegitimacy of FPJ, Fornier effectively conceded paternity or filiation as a non-issue. For
purposes of the citizenship of an illegitimate child whose father is a Filipino and whose mother is an
alien, proof of paternity or filiation is enough for the child to follow the citizenship of his putative
father, as advanced by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, one of the amici curiae. Since paternity or filiation is in
fact admitted by petitioner Fornier, the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding
that FPJ is a Filipino citizen, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, which reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
I agree with the amici curiae that this provision makes no distinction between legitimate and
illegitimate children of Filipino fathers. It is enough that filiation is established or that the child is
acknowledged or recognized by the father.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I dissent from the majority opinion.
The Antecedent Proceedings
Petitioner Fornier filed before the Commission on Elections ("Comelec") a "Petition for
Disqualification of Presidential Candidate Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." on the
ground that Fernando Poe, Jr. ("FPJ") is not a natural-born Philippine citizen. The Comelec First
Division dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioner failed to present substantial evidence that FPJ
committed "any material misrepresentation when he stated in his Certificate of Candidacy that he is
a natural-born citizen." On motion for reconsideration, the Comelec En Banc affirmed the ruling of
the First Division. Petitioner Fornier now assails the Comelec En Banc resolution under Rule 64 in
relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The Undisputed Facts
The undisputed facts are based on two documents and the admission of FPJ. The first document is
the Birth Certificate of FPJ, showing he was born on 20 August 1939. The Birth Certificate is an
evidence of FPJ.[1] The second document is the Marriage Certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley, showing that their marriage took place on 16 September 1940. The Marriage Certificate is
also an evidence of FPJ.[2] Moreover, FPJ admits that his mother Bessie Kelley was an American
citizen.[3]
Based on these two documents and admission, the undisputed facts are: (1) FPJ was born out of
wedlock and therefore illegitimate,[4] and (2) the mother of FPJ was an American citizen.
The Issues
The issues raised in Forniers petition are:
(a) Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the petition to disqualify FPJ as a candidate for
President on the ground that FPJ is not a natural-born Philippine citizen;
(b) Whether FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Jurisdiction
The Comelec has jurisdiction to determine initially the qualifications of all candidates. Under Section
2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the Comelec has the power and function to "[E]nforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election." The initial determination of
who are qualified to file certificates of candidacies with the Comelec clearly falls within this all-
encompassing constitutional mandate of the Comelec. The conduct of an election necessarily
includes the initial determination of who are qualified under existing laws to run for public office in an
election. Otherwise, the Comelecs certified list of candidates will be cluttered with unqualified
candidates making the conduct of elections unmanageable. For this reason, the Comelec weeds out
every presidential election dozens of candidates for president who are deemed nuisance candidates
by the Comelec.[5]
Section 2(3), Article IX-C of the Constitution also empowers the Comelec to "[D]ecide, except those
involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections x x x." The power to decide "all questions
affecting elections" necessarily includes the power to decide whether a candidate possesses the
qualifications required by law for election to public office. This broad constitutional power and
function vested in the Comelec is designed precisely to avoid any situation where a dispute affecting
elections is left without any legal remedy. If one who is obviously not a natural-born Philippine
citizen, like Arnold Schwarzenneger, runs for President, the Comelec is certainly not powerless to
cancel the certificate of candidacy of such candidate. There is no need to wait until after the
elections before such candidate may be disqualified.
Under Rule 25 on "Disqualification of Candidates" of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, a voter may
question before the Comelec the qualifications of any candidate for public office. Thus, Rule 25
provides:
Section 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications
of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act
declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate.
Section 2. Who May File Petition for Disqualification. Any citizen of voting age, or duly registered
political party, organization or coalition of political parties may file with the Law Department of the
Commission a petition to disqualify a candidate on grounds provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The Comelec adopted its Rules of Procedure pursuant to its constitutional power to promulgate its
own rules of procedure[6] to expedite the disposition of cases or controversies falling within its
jurisdiction.
The Comelec has ruled upon the qualifications of candidates, even if the Constitution provides that
some other body shall be the "sole judge" of the qualifications of the holders of the public offices
involved. The Court has upheld the jurisdiction of Comelec to issue such rulings,[7] even when the
issue is the citizenship of a candidate.[8] Thus, the Comelec has jurisdiction to determine initially if
FPJ meets the citizenship qualification to run for President.
However, the Comelec En Banc, in its scanty resolution, failed to state the factual bases of its ruling.
The Comelec En Banc also failed to rule conclusively on the issue presented whether FPJ is a
natural-born Philippine citizen. The Comelec En Banc affirmed the First Division ruling that "[W]e feel
we are not at liberty to finally declare whether or not the respondent is a natural-born citizen." In
short, the Comelec En Banc allowed a candidate for President to run in the coming elections without
being convinced that the candidate is a natural-born Philippine citizen. Clearly, the Comelec En
Banc acted with grave abuse of discretion. Under Section 1, Article VIII, as well as Section 5, Article
VIII, of the Constitution, the Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the issue in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65.
To hold that the Court acquires jurisdiction to determine the qualification of a candidate for President
only after the elections would lead to an absurd situation. The Court would have to wait for an alien
to be elected on election day before he could be disqualified to run for President. If the case is not
decided immediately after the election, an alien who wins the election may even assume office as
President before he is finally disqualified. Certainly, this is not what the Constitution says when it
provides that "[N]o person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines."[9] The clear and specific language of the Constitution prohibits the election of one who
is not a natural-born citizen. Thus, the issue of whether a candidate for President is a natural-born
Philippine citizen must be decided before the election.
Governing Laws
Since FPJ was born on 20 August 1939, his citizenship at the time of his birth depends on the
Constitution and statutes in force at the time of his birth.[10] FPJs citizenship at the time of his birth
in 1939, applying the laws in force in 1939, determines whether he is a natural-born Philippine
citizen.
Natural-born Philippine citizens are "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."[11] If a person has to
perform an act, such as proving in an administrative or judicial proceeding, that an event subsequent
to his birth transpired thus entitling him to Philippine citizenship, such person is not a natural born
citizen.[12]
The 1935 Constitution and the Spanish Civil Code, the laws in force in 1939, are the governing laws
that determine whether a person born in 1939 is a Philippine citizen at the time of his birth in 1939.
Any subsequent legislation cannot change the citizenship at birth of a person born in 1939 because
such legislation would violate the constitutional definition of a natural-born citizen as one who is a
Philippine citizen from birth. In short, one who is not a Philippine citizen at birth in 1939 cannot be
declared by subsequent legislation a natural-born citizen.
General Principles
A legitimate child of a Filipino father follows the citizenship of the father. A child born within wedlock
is presumed to be the son of the father[13] and thus carries the blood of the father. Under the
doctrine of jus sanguinis, as provided for in Section 1(3), Article III of the 1935 Constitution, a
legitimate child, by the fact of legitimacy, automatically follows the citizenship of the Filipino father.
An illegitimate child, however, enjoys no presumption at birth of blood relation to any father unless
the father acknowledges the child at birth.[14] The law has always required that "in all cases of
illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved."[15] The only legally known parent of an
illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the child who conclusively carries the
blood of the mother. Thus, unless the father acknowledges the illegitimate child at birth, the
illegitimate child can only acquire the citizenship of the only legally known parent - the mother.
However, if the Filipino father is legally known because the filiation (blood relation of illegitimate child
to the father) of the child to the Filipino father is established in accordance with law, the child follows
the citizenship of the Filipino father. This gives effect, without discrimination between legitimate and
illegitimate children, to the provision of the 1935 Constitution that "[T]hose whose fathers are citizens
of the Philippines"[16] are Philippine citizens.
Nature of Citizenship
If the Filipino father acknowledges the illegitimate child at birth, the child is a natural-born Philippine
citizen because no other act after his birth is required to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
The child possesses all the qualifications to be a Philippine citizen at birth.
If the Filipino father acknowledges the child after birth, the child is a Philippine citizen as of the time
of the acknowledgment. In this case, the child does not possess all the qualifications to be a
Philippine citizen at birth because an act - the acknowledgement of the Filipino father - is required for
the child to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. Statutory provisions on retroactivity of
acknowledgment cannot be given effect because they would be contrary to the constitutional
definition of natural- born citizens as those who are Philippine citizens at birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
If the illegitimacy of a child is established, there is no presumption that the child has the blood of any
man who is supposed to be the father. There is only a conclusive presumption that the child has the
blood of the mother. If an illegitimate child claims to have the blood of a man who is supposed to be
the childs father, such blood relation must be established in accordance with proof of filiation as
required by law.
Where the illegitimate child of an alien mother claims to follow the citizenship of the putative father,
the burden is on the illegitimate child to establish a blood relation to the putative Filipino father since
there is no presumption that an illegitimate child has the blood of the putative father. Even if the
putative father admits paternity after the birth of the illegitimate child, there must be an administrative
or judicial approval that such blood relation exists upon proof of paternity as required by law.
Citizenship, being a matter of public and State interest, cannot be conferred on an illegitimate child
of an alien mother on the mere say so of the putative Filipino father. The State has a right to
examine the veracity of the claim of paternity. Otherwise, the grant of Philippine citizenship to an
illegitimate child of an alien mother is left to the sole discretion of the putative Filipino father. For
example, a Philippine citizen of Chinese descent can simply claim that he has several illegitimate
children in China. The State cannot be required to grant Philippine passports to these supposed
illegitimate children born in China of Chinese mothers just because the putative Filipino father
acknowledges paternity of these illegitimate children. There must be either an administrative or
judicial determination that the claim of the putative Filipino father is true.
The case of the illegitimate Vietnamese children, born in Vietnam of Vietnamese mothers and
allegedly of Filipino fathers, is illustrative. These children grew up in Vietnam, many of them studying
there until high school. These children grew up knowing they were Vietnamese citizens. In 1975, a
Philippine Navy vessel brought them, together with their Vietnamese mothers, to the Philippines as
Saigon fell to the communists. The mothers of these children became stateless when the Republic of
(South) Vietnam ceased to exist in 1975. The Department of Justice rendered Opinion No. 49 dated
3 May 1995 that being children of Filipino fathers, these Vietnamese children, even if illegitimate, are
Philippine citizens under Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1(2), Article III
of the 1973 Constitution. This Opinion is cited by FPJ as basis for his claim of being a natural-born
Philippine citizen.[17] However, this Opinion categorically stated that before the illegitimate
Vietnamese children may be considered Filipino citizens "it is necessary in every case referred to
that such paternity be established by sufficient and convincing documentary evidence."[18]
In short, the illegitimate child must prove to the proper administrative or judicial authority the
paternity of the alleged Filipino father by "sufficient and convincing documentary evidence." Clearly,
an administrative or judicial act is necessary to confer on the illegitimate Vietnamese children
Philippine citizenship. The mere claim of the illegitimate child of filiation to a Filipino father, or the
mere acknowledgment of the alleged Filipino father, does not automatically confer Philippine
citizenship on the child. The State must be convinced of the veracity of such claim and approve the
same. Since the illegitimate Vietnamese children need to perform an act to acquire or perfect
Philippine citizenship, they are not natural-born Philippine citizens. They become Philippine citizens
only from the moment the proper administrative or judicial authority approve and recognize their
filiation to their alleged Filipino fathers.
The rationale behind requiring that only natural-born citizens may hold certain high public offices[19]
is to insure that the holders of these high public offices grew up knowing they were at birth citizens of
the Philippines. In their formative years they knew they owed from birth their allegiance to the
Philippines. In case any other country claims their allegiance, they would be faithful and loyal to the
Philippines of which they were citizens from birth. This is particularly true to the President who is the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces.[20] The President of the Philippines must owe, from birth,
allegiance to the Philippines and must have grown up knowing that he was a citizen of the
Philippines at birth. The constitutional definition of a natural-born Philippine citizen would lose its
meaning and efficacy if one who was at birth recognized by law as an alien were declared forty
years later[21] a natural-born Philippine citizen just because his alleged Filipino father subsequently
admitted his paternity.
Proof of Filiation
Article 131[22] of the Spanish Civil Code, the law in force in 1939, recognized only the following as
proof of filiation of a natural child:
a. acknowledgment in a record of birth;
b. acknowledgment in a will;
c. acknowledgment in some other public document.
To establish his Philippine citizenship at birth, FPJ must present either an acknowledgement in a
record of birth, or an acknowledgment in some other public document executed at the time of his
birth. An acknowledgment executed after birth does not make one a citizen at birth but a citizen from
the time of such acknowledgment since the acknowledgment is an act done after birth to acquire or
perfect Philippine citizenship.
After the birth of one who is not a natural-born Philippine citizen, a subsequent legislation liberalizing
proof of filiation cannot apply to such person to make him a natural-born citizen. A natural-born
Philippine citizen is expressly defined in the Constitution as one who is a citizen at birth. If a person
is not a citizen at birth, no subsequent legislation can retroactively declare him a citizen at birth since
it would violate the constitutional definition of a natural-born citizen.
Burden of Proof
Any person who claims to be a citizen of the Philippines has the burden of proving his Philippine
citizenship. Any person who claims to be qualified to run for President because he is, among others,
a natural-born Philippine citizen, has the burden of proving he is a natural-born citizen. Any doubt
whether or not he is natural-born citizen is resolved against him. The constitutional requirement of a
natural-born citizen, being an express qualification for election as President, must be complied with
strictly as defined in the Constitution. As the Court ruled in Paa v. Chan: [23]
It is incumbent upon a person who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the
Court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of
Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State.
Since the undisputed facts show that FPJ is an illegitimate child, having been born out of wedlock,
the burden is on FPJ to prove his blood relation to his alleged Filipino father. An illegitimate child
enjoys no presumption of blood relation to any father. Such blood relationship must be established in
the appropriate proceedings in accordance with law.
Private party litigants cannot stipulate on the Philippine citizenship of a person because citizenship is
not a private right or property, but a matter of public and State interest. Even if petitioner Fornier
admits that FPJ, although illegitimate, is the son of Allan F. Poe, such admission cannot bind the
State for the purpose of conferring on FPJ the status of a natural-born Philippine citizen or even of a
naturalized citizen. Certainly, the Court will not recognize a person as a natural-born Philippine
citizen just because the private party litigants have admitted or stipulated on such a status. In the
present case, the Solicitor General, as representative of the Government, is strongly disputing the
status of FPJ as a natural-born Philippine citizen.
Legitimation
Under Article 123[24] of the Spanish Civil Code, legitimation took effect as of the date of marriage.
There was no retroactivity of the effects of legitimation on the rights of the legitimated child. Thus, a
legitimated child acquired the rights of a legitimate child only as of the date of marriage of the natural
parents. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married on 16 September 1940 while FPJ was born
more than one year earlier on 20 August 1939. Assuming that Allan F. Poe was FPJs natural father,
the effects of legitimation did not retroact to the birth of FPJ on 20 August 1939.
Besides, legitimation vests only civil, not political rights, to the legitimated child. As the Court held in
Ching Leng:[25]
The framers of the Civil Code had no intention whatsoever to regulate therein political questions.
Hence, apart from reproducing the provisions of the Constitution on citizenship, the Code contains
no precept thereon except that which refers all matters of "naturalization", as well as those related to
the "loss and reacquisition of citizenship" to "special laws." Consistently with this policy, our Civil
Code does not include therein any rule analogous to Articles 18 to 28 of the Civil Code of Spain,
regulating citizenship. (Underscoring in the original)
Clearly, even assuming that the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley legitimated FPJ, such
legitimation did not vest retroactively any civil or political rights to FPJ.
Treaty of Paris of 1898 and Philippine Bill of 1902
FPJ admits that his grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, was a Spanish citizen who came to the Philippines
from Spain.[26] To benefit from the mass naturalization under the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the
Philippine Bill of 1902, FPJ must prove that Lorenzo Pou was an inhabitant and resident of the
Philippines on 11 April 1899. Once it is established that Lorenzo Pou was an inhabitant and resident
of the Philippines on 11 April 1899, then he is presumed to have acquired Philippine citizenship
under the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of 1902.[27] Being an inhabitant and
resident of the Philippines on 11 April 1899 is the determinative fact to fall under the coverage of the
Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of 1902.[28]
There is, however, no evidence on record that Lorenzo Pou was a Philippine inhabitant and resident
on 11 April 1899. The date of arrival of Lorenzo Pou in the Philippines is not known. If he arrived in
the Philippines after 11 April 1899, then he could not benefit from the mass naturalization under the
Treaty of Paris of 1898 and the Philippine Bill of 1902. There is also no evidence that Lorenzo Pou
was naturalized as a Philippine citizen after 11 April 1899. Thus, there can be no presumption that
Lorenzo Pou was a Philippine citizen.
There is also no evidence on record that Allan F. Poe, the son of Lorenzo Pou and the alleged father
of FPJ, was naturalized as a Philippine citizen. Thus, based on the evidence adduced there is no
legal basis for claiming that Allan F. Poe is a Philippine citizen. Nevertheless, there is no need to
delve further into this issue since the Court can decide this case without determining the citizenship
of Lorenzo Pou and Allan F. Poe. Whether or not Lorenzo Pou and Allan F. Poe were Philippine
citizens is not material in resolving whether FPJ is a natural-born Philippine citizen.
Convention on the Rights of the Child
The Philippines signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 26 January 1990 and ratified
the same on 21 August 1990. The Convention defines a child to mean "every human being below
the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier."
Obviously, FPJ cannot invoke the Convention since he is not a child as defined in the Convention,
and he was born half a century before the Convention came into existence. FPJs citizenship at birth
in 1939 could not in any way be affected by the Convention which entered into force only on 2
September 1990.
The Convention has the status of a municipal law[29] and its ratification by the Philippines could not
have amended the express requirement in the Constitution that only natural-born citizens of
Philippines are qualified to be President. While the Constitution apparently favors natural-born
citizens over those who are not, that is the explicit requirement of the Constitution which neither the
Executive Department nor the Legislature, in ratifying a treaty, could amend. In short, the
Convention cannot amend the definition in the Constitution that natural-born citizens are "those who
are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship."
In any event, the Convention guarantees a child "the right to acquire a nationality,"[30] and requires
States Parties to "ensure the implementation" of this right, "in particular where the child would
otherwise be stateless."[31] Thus, as far as nationality or citizenship is concerned, the Convention
guarantees the right of the child to acquire a nationality so that he may not be stateless. The
Convention does not guarantee a child a citizenship at birth, but merely "the right to acquire a
nationality" in accordance with municipal law. When FPJ was born in 1939, he was apparently under
United States law an American citizen at birth.[32] After his birth FPJ also had the right to acquire
Philippine citizenship by proving his filiation to his alleged Filipino father in accordance with
Philippine law. At no point in time was FPJ in danger of being stateless. Clearly, FPJ cannot invoke
the Convention to claim he is a natural-born Philippine citizen.
The Doctrine in Ching Leng v. Galang
The prevailing doctrine today is that an illegitimate child of a Filipino father and an alien mother
follows the citizenship of the alien mother as the only legally known parent. The illegitimate child,
even if acknowledged and legally adopted by the Filipino father, cannot acquire the citizenship of the
father. The Court made this definitive doctrinal ruling in Ching Leng v. Galang,[33] which involved
the illegitimate minor children of a naturalized Filipino of Chinese descent with a Chinese woman, Sy
An. The illegitimate children were later on jointly adopted by the naturalized Filipino and his legal
wife, So Buan Ty.
The facts in Ching Leng as quoted by the Court from the trial courts decision are as follows:
After the petitioner Ching Leng Alias Ching Ban Lee obtained judgment in this Court dated May 2,
1950 granting his petition for naturalization, he together with his wife So Buan Ty filed another
petition also in this Court in Special Proc. No. 1216 for the adoption of Ching Tiong Seng, Ching
Liong Ding, Victoria Ching Liong Yam, Sydney Ching and Ching Tiong An, all minors and admittedly
the illegitimate children of petitioner Ching Leng with one Sy An, a Chinese citizen. Finding the
petition for adoption proper, this Court granted the same in a decision dated September 12, 1950,
declaring the said minors free from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect
to their mother Sy An and to all legal intents and purposes the children of the adopter Ching Leng
alias Ching Ban Lee and So Buan Ty with all the legal rights and obligations provided by law.
On September 29, 1955, Ching Leng took his oath of allegiance and became therefore a full pledge
(sic) Filipino citizen. Believing now that his adopted illegitimate children became Filipino citizens by
virtue of his naturalization, petitioner Ching Leng addressed a communication to the respondent
Commissioner of Immigration requesting that the alien certificate of registration of the said minors be
cancelled. (Bold underscoring supplied)
In Ching Leng, the Court made a definitive ruling on the meaning of "minor child or children" in
Section 15 of the Naturalization Law,[34] as well as the meaning of children "whose parents are
citizens of the Philippines" under the Constitution. The Court categorically ruled that these children
refer to legitimate children only, and not to illegitimate children. Thus, the Court held:
It is claimed that the phrases "minor children" and "minor child", used in these provisions, include
adopted children. The argument is predicated upon the theory that an adopted child is, for all intents
and purposes, a legitimate child. Whenever, the word "children" or "child" is used in statutes, it is
generally understood, however, to refer to legitimate children, unless the context of the law and its
spirit indicate clearly the contrary. Thus, for instance, when the Constitution provides that "those
whose parents are citizens of the Philippines, "and "those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines," who shall elect Philippine citizenship "upon reaching the age of majority", are citizens of
the Philippines (Article IV, Section 1, subdivisions 3 and 4), our fundamental law clearly refers to
legitimate children (Chiong Bian vs. De Leon, 46 Off. Gaz., 3652-3654; Serra v. Republic, L-4223,
May 12, 1952).
Similarly, the children alluded to in said section 15 are those begotten in lawful wedlock, when the
adopter, at least is the father. In fact, illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the
mother and follow her nationality, not that of the illegitimate father (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil.
332, 335-336; Santos Co vs. Govt of the Philippines, 52 Phil. 543, 544; Serra v. Republic, supra;
Gallofin v. Ordoez, 70 Phil. 287; Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953). Although,
adoption gives "to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of
the adopter", pursuant to said Article 341 of our Civil Code, we have already seen that the rights
therein alluded to are merely those enumerated in Article 264, and do not include the acquisition of
the nationality of the adopter.
Moreover, as used in said section 15 of the Naturalization Law, the term "children" could not possibly
refer to those whose relation to the naturalized person is one created by legal fiction, as, for
instance, by adoption, for, otherwise, the place and time of birth of the child would be immaterial.
The fact that the adopted persons involved in the case at bar are illegitimate children of appellant
Ching Leng does not affect substantially the legal situation before us, for, by legal fiction, they are
now being sought to be given the status of legitimate children of said appellant, despite the
circumstance that the Civil Code of the Philippine does not permit their legitimation. (Bold
underscoring supplied)
Ching Leng, penned by Justice Roberto Concepcion in October 1958, was a unanimous decision of
the Court En Banc. Subsequent Court decisions, including Paa v. Chan[35] and Morano et al. v.
Vivo,[36] have cited the doctrine laid down in Ching Leng that the provision in the 1935 Constitution
stating "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines" refers only to legitimate children. When
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions were drafted, the framers did not attempt to change the intent of
this provision, even as they were presumably aware of the Ching Leng doctrine.
Nevertheless, I believe that it is now time to abandon the Ching Leng doctrine. The inexorable
direction of the law, both international and domestic in the last 100 years, is to eliminate all forms of
discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate children. Where the Constitution does not
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children, we should not also distinguish, especially
when private rights are not involved as in questions of citizenship. Abandoning the Ching Leng
doctrine upholds the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Abandoning the Ching Leng
doctrine is also in compliance with our treaty obligation under the Covenant on the Rights of Children
mandating States Parties to eliminate all forms of discrimination based on the status of children,
save of course those distinctions prescribed in the Constitution itself like the reservation of certain
high public offices to natural-born citizens.
Abandoning the Ching Leng doctrine does not mean, however, that an illegitimate child of a Filipino
father and an alien mother automatically becomes a Philippine citizen at birth. We have repeatedly
ruled that an illegitimate child does not enjoy any presumption of blood relation to the alleged father
until filiation or blood relation is proved as provided by law.[37] Article 887 of the Civil Code
expressly provides that "[I]n all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved." The
illegitimate child becomes a Philippine citizen only from the time he establishes his blood relation to
the Filipino father. If the blood relation is established after the birth of the illegitimate child, then the
child is not a natural-born Philippine citizen since an act is required after birth to acquire or perfect
his Philippine citizenship.
Conclusion
In conclusion, private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is not a natural-born Philippine citizen since
there is no showing that his alleged Filipino father Allan F. Poe acknowledged him at birth. The
Constitution defines a natural-born citizen as a Philippine citizen "from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect" his Philippine citizenship. Private respondent Fernando Poe,
Jr. does not meet this citizenship qualification.
Therefore, I vote to grant the petition of Victorino X. Fornier. However, I vote to dismiss the petitions
of Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, Felix B. Desiderio, Jr. and Zoilo Antonio Velez on the ground that their
direct petitions invoking the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 4, paragraph 7, Article VII of the
Constitution are premature, there being no election contest in this case.
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,
vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
R E S O L U T I O N

KAPUNAN, J .:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father
validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This
is the question sought to be resolved in the present case involving the application for admission to
the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A.
Dulay, a Filipino, was horn in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching
has resided in the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis
University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of
this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the
condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following
documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the
Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public
accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election
Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that
Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing
that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union
during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the
successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5
May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed
to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to
submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the
documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and
continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship"
1
in
strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the
Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother
is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine
citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the age of majority."
2
In this regard, the
OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may
be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines;
and (b) said election must be made upon reaching the age of majority."
3
The OSG then explains the
meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a
reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the
Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO,supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of
Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino (ibid.,citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953).
But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not
made within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if
ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence.
However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the
relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the
allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his
oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.1wphi1.nt
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of
Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation,
Ching states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my school
records and other official documents;
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino
citizens;
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan from 1992 to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a
notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to
the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic) the
Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is
whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether
his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV,
Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority,
the child elected Philippine citizenship.
4
This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the
1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the
Philippines.
5
Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution
which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens.
6
It should be noted, however, that
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be
understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those
covered by the 1935 Constitution.
7
If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old
charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been
commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.
8

C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party
concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election
should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon
reaching twenty-one (21) years.
9
In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the
validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the
decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper
period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of
State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable
time" after attaining the age of majority.
10
The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean
that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority.
11
However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice,
12
that the three (3) year period is not an
inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after
reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3)
years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional
provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino.
13

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is
not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became
of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951,
when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he
had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made
"upon reaching the age of majority."
14

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old
when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14)
years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon
reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the
allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that
the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public
official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements
for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as
informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio
Mallare,
15
the pertinent portion of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an alien,
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban
Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when
he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the elections and
campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his
preference for Philippine citizenship.
16

Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very
different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was
born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the
requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing
Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling inMallare was an obiter
since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect
Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino
mother. In this regard, the Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a
Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and
privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332;
Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic,
L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano
vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the
erroneous belief that he is a non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to
which he is rightfully entitled.
17

The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House
of Representatives,
18
where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal
process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the
exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the
Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age
constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis
supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his
life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be excepted to have
elected Philippine citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re
Mallare rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still
have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up,
there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a
profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a
qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other
categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations for these
persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien.
Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt
in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in
an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
19

The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the
special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his
consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree
with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect
Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age
of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond
the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover,
Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed
procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that
is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter,
file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making
his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient.
20
One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an
inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and
promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a
result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for
admission to the Philippine Bar.1wphi 1.nt
SO ORDERED.


















G.R. No. 170603 January 29, 2007
EDISON SO, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J .:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 80437 which reversed the Decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 8, in Naturalization Case No. 02-102984. Likewise assailed is the appellate courts
Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration of its Decision.
Antecedents
On February 28, 2002, petitioner Edison So filed before the RTC a Petition for Naturalization
3
under
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as
amended. He alleged the following in his petition:
He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in No. 528
Lavezares St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he derives an average annual income
of around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and other benefits; he is single, able to speak
and write English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is exempt from the filing of Declaration of Intention to
become a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, as
amended, because he was born in the Philippines, and studied in a school recognized by the
Government where Philippine history, government and culture are taught; he is a person of good
moral character; he believes in the principles underlying the Philippine constitution; he has
conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in
the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which
he is living; he has mingled socially with the Filipinos and has evinced a sincere desire to learn and
embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino people; he has all the qualifications
provided under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of C.A. No. 473, as
amended; he is not opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments; he is not defending or
teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or
predominance of mens ideas; he is not a polygamist or a believer in the practice of polygamy; he
has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; he is not suffering from any incurable
contagious diseases or from mental alienation; the nation of which he is a citizen is not at war with
the Philippines; it is his intention in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce
absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty, and particularly to China; and he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the time
of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission as citizen of the Philippines. The petition
was docketed as Naturalization Case No. 02-102984.
Attached to the petition were the Joint Affidavit
4
of Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr. and Mark B. Salcedo; and
petitioners Certificate of Live Birth,
5
Alien Certificate of Registration,
6
and Immigrant Certificate of
Residence.
7

On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order
8
setting the petition for hearing at 8:30 a.m. of
December 12 and 17, 2002 during which all persons concerned were enjoined to show cause, if any,
why the petition should not be granted. The entire petition and its annexes, including the order, were
ordered published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also in a
newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise ordered that copies of the
petition and notice be posted in public and conspicuous places in the Manila City Hall Building.
9

Petitioner thus caused the publication of the above order, as well as the entire petition and its
annexes, in the Official Gazette on May 20, 2002
10
and May 27, 2002,
11
and in Today, a newspaper
of general circulation in the City of Manila, on May 25, 2002 and June 1, 2002.
No one opposed the petition. During the hearing, petitioner presented Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified
that he came to know petitioner in 1991 as the legal consultant and adviser of the So familys
business. He would usually attend parties and other social functions hosted by petitioners family. He
knew petitioner to be obedient, hardworking, and possessed of good moral character, including all
the qualifications mandated by law. Atty. Adasa, Jr. further testified that petitioner was gainfully
employed and presently resides at No. 528 Lavezares Street, Binondo, Manila; petitioner had been
practicing Philippine tradition and those embodied in the Constitution; petitioner had been socially
active, mingled with some of his neighbors and had conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines; and petitioner and his family
observed Christmas and New Year and some occasions such as fiestas. According to the witness,
petitioner was not disqualified under C.A. No. 473 to become a Filipino citizen: he is not opposed to
organized government or believes in the use of force; he is not a polygamist and has not been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; neither is he suffering from any mental alienation or
any incurable disease.
12

Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known petitioner for ten (10)
years; they first met at a birthday party in 1991. He and petitioner were classmates at the University
of Santo Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy. Petitioner was a member of some school
organizations and mingled well with friends.
13
Salcedo further testified that he saw petitioner twice a
week, and during fiestas and special occasions when he would go to petitioners house. He has
known petitioner to have resided in Manila since birth. Petitioner is intelligent, a person of good
moral character, and believes in the principles of the Philippine Constitution. Petitioner has a gainful
occupation, has conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner and has all the
qualifications to become a Filipino citizen.
Petitioner also testified and attempted to prove that he has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become a citizen of the Philippines.
At the conclusion of his testimonial evidence, petitioner offered in evidence the following documents:
(1) Certificate of Live Birth;
14
(2) Alien Certificate of Registration;
15
(3) Immigrant Certificate of
Residence;
16
(4) Elementary Pupils
17
and High School Students
18
Permanent Record issued by
Chang Kai Shek College; (5) Transcript of Record issued by the University of Santo Tomas;
19
(6)
Certification of Part-Time Employment dated November 20, 2002;
20
(7) Income Tax Returns and
Certificate of Withholding Tax for the year 2001;
21
(8) Certification from Metrobank that petitioner is a
depositor;
22
(9) Clearances that he has not been charged or convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude;
23
and (10) Medical Certificates and Psychiatric Evaluation issued by the Philippine General
Hospital.
24
The RTC admitted all these in evidence.
The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003.
25
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and declaring that petitioner
EDISON SO has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen
and he is hereby admitted as citizen of the Philippines, after taking the necessary oath of allegiance,
as soon as this decision becomes final, subject to payment of cost of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
26

The trial court ruled that the witnesses for petitioner had known him for the period required by law,
and they had affirmed that petitioner had all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to
become a Filipino citizen. Thus, the court concluded that petitioner had satisfactorily supported his
petition with evidence.
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed
the decision to the CA on the following grounds:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2) CHARACTER WITNESSES, NAMELY: ARTEMIO ADASA, JR.
AND MARK SALCEDO WERE NOT QUALIFIED CHARACTER WITNESSES.
II.
PETITIONER IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE ADMITTED AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES.
27

Respondent contended that based on the evidence on record, appellee failed to prove that he
possesses all the qualifications under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4 of
C.A. No. 473. It insisted that his two (2) character witnesses did not know him well enough to vouch
for his fitness to become a Filipino citizen; they merely made general statements without giving
specific details about his character and moral conduct.
28
The witnesses did not even reside in the
same place as petitioner.
29
Respondent likewise argued that petitioner himself failed to prove that he
is qualified to become a Filipino citizen because he did not give any explanation or specific answers
to the questions propounded by his lawyer. He merely answered "yes" or "no" or gave general
statements in answer to his counsels questions. Thus, petitioner was unable to prove that he had all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required by law to be a naturalized Filipino
citizen.
30

On the other hand, petitioner averred that he graduated cum laude from the UST with the degree of
Bachelor of Science in Pharmacy. He is now on his second year as a medical student at the UST
Medicine and Surgery. He avers that the requirements for naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as
amended by LOI 270, in relation to Presidential Decree Nos. 836 and 1379, had been relaxed after
the Philippine government entered into diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China; the
requirements were further relaxed when Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9139 was signed into
law.
31
Petitioner pointed out that the petition, with all its annexes, was published in the official gazette
and a newspaper of general circulation; notices were likewise sent to the National Bureau of
Investigation, Department of Justice, Department of Foreign Affairs, and the OSG. But none from
these offices came forward to oppose the petition before the lower court.
32
Petitioner insisted that he
has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become Filipino. This was clearly
established by his witnesses.
In its Reply Brief, respondent alleged that R.A. No. 9139 applies to administrative naturalization filed
with the Special Committee on Naturalization. It insisted that even in the absence of any opposition,
a petition for naturalization may be dismissed.
In its Decision
33
dated August 4, 2005, the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC and dismissed the
petition for naturalization without prejudice.
34
According to the CA, petitioners two (2) witnesses
were not credible because they failed to mention specific details of petitioners life or character to
show how well they knew him; they merely "parroted" the provisions of the Naturalization Act without
clearly explaining their applicability to petitioners case.
35
The appellate court likewise ruled that
petitioner failed to comply with the requirement of the law that the applicant must not be less than 21
years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition; during the first hearing on December 12, 2002,
petitioner was only twenty (20) years, nine (9) months, and twenty five (25) days old, falling short of
the requirement.
36
The CA stated, however, that it was not its intention to forever close the door to
any future application for naturalization which petitioner would file, and that it believes that he would
make a good Filipino citizen in due time, a decided asset to this country.
37

Petitioners motion for reconsideration
38
was denied in a Resolution
39
dated November 24, 2005;
hence, the present petition grounded on the sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA.
40

In support of his petition, petitioner reiterates the arguments he set forth in the Brief filed before the
CA.
In its Comment
41
on the petition, respondent countered that R.A. No. 9139 (which took effect on
August 8, 2001 and where the applicants age requirement was lowered to eighteen (18) years old),
refers only to administrative naturalization filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization; it does
not apply to judicial naturalization before the court, as in the present case.
42
Respondent, through the
OSG, avers that its failure to oppose the petition before the court a quo does not preclude it from
appealing the decision of the RTC to the CA; it is even authorized to question an already final
decision by filing a petition for cancellation of citizenship.
43
Lastly, respondent reiterates its argument
that petitioners character witnesses are not qualified to prove the formers qualifications.
In determining whether or not an applicant for naturalization is entitled to become a Filipino citizen, it
is necessary to resolve the following issues: (1) whether or not R.A. No. 9139 applies to petitions for
naturalization by judicial act; and (2) whether or not the witnesses presented by petitioner are
"credible" in accordance with the jurisprudence and the definition and guidelines set forth in C.A. No.
473.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by
clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen.
44
Under current and existing laws, there are three
ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization
pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c)
legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to
an alien.
45

Petitioners contention that the qualifications an applicant for naturalization should possess are those
provided for in R.A. No. 9139 and not those set forth in C.A. No. 473 is barren of merit. The
qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by judicial act are set forth in
Sections 2
46
and 4
47
of C.A. No. 473. On the other hand, Sections 3
48
and 4
49
of R.A. No. 9139
provide for the qualifications and disqualifications of an applicant for naturalization by administrative
act.
Indeed, R.A. No. 9139 was enacted as a remedial measure intended to make the process of
acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging.
50
It likewise
addresses the concerns of degree holders who, by reason of lack of citizenship requirement, cannot
practice their profession, thus promoting "brain gain" for the Philippines.
51
These however, do not
justify petitioners contention that the qualifications set forth in said law apply even to applications for
naturalization by judicial act.
First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws the former covers all aliens
regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their
lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have
demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions.
52
To
reiterate, the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of
acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is
administrative rather than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is a
need to liberalize the naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it can be
inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the
legislature had in mind was merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship
which may be availed of by native born aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien has
the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications
and disqualifications.
In the instant case, petitioner applied for naturalization by judicial act, though at the time of the filing
of his petition, administrative naturalization under R.A. No. 9139 was already available.
Consequently, his application should be governed by C.A. No. 473.
Second. If the qualifications prescribed in R.A. No. 9139 would be made applicable even to judicial
naturalization, the coverage of the law would be broadened since it would then apply even to aliens
who are not native born. It must be stressed that R.A. No. 9139 applies only to aliens who were born
in the Philippines and have been residing here.
Third. Applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9139 to judicial naturalization is contrary to the intention of
the legislature to liberalize the naturalization procedure in the country. One of the qualifications set
forth in R.A. No. 9139 is that the applicant was born in the Philippines and should have been
residing herein since birth. Thus, one who was born here but left the country, though resided for
more than ten (10) years from the filing of the application is also disqualified. On the other hand, if
we maintain the distinct qualifications under each of the two laws, an alien who is not qualified under
R.A. No. 9139 may still be naturalized under C.A. No. 473.
Thus, absent a specific provision expressly amending C.A. No. 473, the law stands and the
qualifications and disqualifications set forth therein are maintained.
In any event, petitioner failed to prove that the witnesses he presented were competent to vouch for
his good moral character, and are themselves possessed of good moral character. It must be
stressed that character witnesses in naturalization proceedings stand as insurers of the applicants
conduct and character. Thus, they ought to testify on specific facts and events justifying the
inference that the applicant possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided by law.
53

Petitioners witnesses, Atty. Adasa and Salcedo, did not testify on his specific acts; they did not
elaborate on his traits. Their testimonies do not convince the Court that they personally know
petitioner well and are therefore in a position to vouch for his qualifications. As correctly found by the
CA, the witnesses testimonies consisted mainly of general statements in answer to the leading
questions propounded by his counsel. What they conveniently did was to enumerate the
qualifications as set forth in the law without giving specific details. The pertinent portion of Atty.
Adasas testimony follows:
q Do you know the petitioner Edison So?
a Yes, Sir.
q Will you please tell us how did you come to know him?
a Well I came to know him[,] the petitioner[,] when I was the legal consultant and adviser of their
family business and I used to ah (sic) me[e]t him during my visit to their place way back in 1991 to
1992.
q From that day of 1991 up to the present, is your relationship with the petitioner more or less
contin[u]ous?
a Yes, sir, because aside from the usual professional visit that I did to their family some social
function was sponsored normally and I am (sic) invited and I used to attend.
q During the birthday party of the petitioner, did you usually attend petitioners birthday?
a On several occasions I attend the birthday.
q Will you please tell us where the petitioner resides at present?
a At present the petitioner resides at No. 528 Lavezares Street, Binondo, Manila.
q Do you know for how long the petitioner resides in the Philippines?
a As far as I personally known (sic) Your Honor is that since birth.
q During all the times that you have know[n] the petitioner, what is your impression of his conduct?
a Well ah (sic) I have personally known him to be obedient and hard working individual and ah (sic)
he has a good moral character and he has been ah (sic) no adverse report concerning the character
of the petitioner.
q In your opinion does the petitioner has the qualifications necessary to become [a] citizen of the
Philippines?
a Yes.
q Can you tell us why do you say so?
a I would say Your Honor that petitioner has posses (sic) all the qualifications mandated by law and
presently he is more than 21 years old and he has resided in the Philippines particularly in the City of
Manila contin[u]ously for more than ten (10) years and that since his birth; and that he has good
moral character and I have observed that ah (sic) he has been practicing Philippine traditions and ah
(sic) those embodied in the Philippine constitution and he has been socially active and meddle (sic)
some of his neighbors and ah (sic) I am sure he has desire to embrace and learn the customs and
ideas and traditions in the Philippine[s] and as I earlier mentioned that he conducted himself in
proper and approachable (sic) manner during his entire residence in our country and he has a
gainful occupation.
q Will you please tell us what are these customs which the petitioner embraced?
a Well I have observed that ah (sic) together with his family they used to ah observed (sic) the usual
Filipino celebration during Christmas and new year and some occasions such as fiestas.
q And do you know whether petitioner is not disqualified under Commonwealth Act to become
Filipino citizen of the Philippines (sic)?
a Ah there has been no incident or occasion which I learned that would disqualify of coming (sic) the
citizen of the Republic of the Philippines. I have noticed that ah (sic) he is qualified under
Commonwealth Act 473 as amended because he is not opposed to ah (sic) organized government.
His family and himself does not believed (sic) in the use of force in the success of his ideas and ah
(sic) he is not a poligamist (sic) or believer in the practice of illegal and he has not been convicted in
any crime involving him in any crime (sic). and he is not suffering from any mental alienation or any
incurable contidious (sic) disease. as provided for.
q Will you please tell us why you know all these stage?
a Because of ah (sic) the personal attachment with his family we have continuously having ah (sic)
the usual contact with his family.
54

It can thus be inferred that Atty. Adasa is close to petitioners family, but not specifically to petitioner.
Atty. Adasas statements refer to his observations on the familys practices and not to petitioner in
particular. Nothing in his testimony suggests that he was close to petitioner and knew him well
enough to vouch for his qualifications.
Salcedo, on the other hand, testified thus:
q Now do you know the petitioner in this case Edison So?
a Yes, Sir.
q Are you personally acquainted with him?
a Yes, Sir.
q How long have you known the petitioner?
a I have known him for about ten (10) years, Sir.
q Will you please inform the Honorable court under what circumstances did you come to know the
petitioner?
a I met him in a birthday party in 1991, Sir.
q And from 1991 up to the present is your relationship with the petitioner more or less contin[u]ous?
a Yes, Sir.
q How often did you see the petitioner?
a I see him twice a week, Sir.
q And during this time that you met the petitioner, what did you usually do?
a We play some games, Sir. We play Patentero (sic).
q Do you go to church together?
a Yes, Sir.
q During fiestas in your place, did the petitioner go?
a Yes, Sir.
q How about during fiestas in the place where the petitioner reside[s], did you also go during fiestas?
a Yes, Sir.
q During occasion in the house of the petitioner, are you invited?
a Yes, Sir.
q How many time[s] did you go to his (sic) residence of the petitioner?
a Twice a week, sir.
q Will you please tell us where the petitioner resides?
a The petitioner resides at 528 Lavezares Street, Tondo, Manila, Sir.
q For how long does the petitioner reside in that address?
a Since birth, Sir.
q During all the times that you have known the petitioner, will you please tell us your impression of
his conduct?
a He is a person of good moral, sir, and he believed in the principles of the Philippines (sic)
Constitution.
q Will you please cite one or two of these principles underlined the principles (sic) of the Philippines
(sic) Constitution?
a Ah the Philippines is a Republican of the (sic) state, sovereignty preside (sic) over the people and
the government authority emanate from within; and the other one is the civilian government is not
supreme over the military.
q Now in your opinion does the petitioner have all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of
the Philippines?
a Yes, Sir.
q What are these qualifications?
a He is at least 21 years old, he is a person of good moral and has been residing in the Philippines
since birth.
q What else?
a He must be a Filipino and ah must practice the traditions and customs, Sir.
q Do you know whether the petitioner conducted himself in a proper and appraochable (sic) manner
during the period of his residence in the Philippines?
a Yes, Sir.
q Do you know if the petitioner has a gainful occupation?
a Yes, Sir.
q What is the occupation of the petitioner?
a Ah (sic) he is the secretary in a wood factory in Commonwealth, Sir.
q And aside from being the secretary, what else did the petitioner do?
a He help (sic) in the factory cargo, Sir.
q Is the petitioner still a student?
a Yes, Sir.
q Where is he studying?
a In UST, Sir.
q Is he your classmate?
a Yes, Sir.
q What was his course?
a Pharmacy, Sir.
q So when you said he was the secretary he only works as part time secretary?
a Yes, Sir.
q You said the petitioner meddle (sic) socially with the Filipinos?
a Yes, Sir.
q Will you please name at least one of those Filipinos the petitioner meddle (sic) with?
a Samuel Falmera, Sir, Marlon Kahocom, Sir.
q Who else?
a Elmer Ramos, Sir.
q Who else?
a Sharmaine Santos, Sir.
q You said the petitioner is of good moral character?
a Yes, Sir.
q Why do you know that?
a As a classmate I can see him I go with him and ah (sic) I can see that he has ah better
approached (sic) with other people and I can see that he mixed very well with friends.
q So during school days you see him everyday?
a Yes, Sir.
q When there are no classes during the vacation you see the petitioner twice a week?
a Yes, Sir.
q Does the petitioner (sic), do you think the petitioner is not disqualified to become the citizen of the
Republic of the Philippines?
a Yes, Sir, he is not disqualified, Sir.
q Why do you say that he is not disqualified?
a Because he abide [by] any law in the government, sir, ah (sic) he is not polygamus and he is not
convicted of any crime, Sir.
q Do you know ever the petitioner oppose to any organized government?
a No, Sir.
q Do you know whether he believe[s] in the use of force in any such ideas?
a No, Sir.
q Do you know if the petitioner is a believer in the practice of polygamy?
a No, Sir.
q Do you know whether the petitioner suffer[s] from mental alienation or incurable disease illnesses?
a No, Sir.
q Why do you know?
a I know him personally, sir, I have been with him as my classmate, sir and ah (sic) he is a very
intelligent person, Sir.
q Is the petitioner a member also of any organization or association in your school?
a Yes, Sir.
q What organization?
a He is a member of Wishten and a member of starget, Sir.
q What does starget means?
a Starget is an organization of Chinese community in UST, Sir.
q How about the other one which you mentioned?
a Ah (sic) these are twisting, sir he represents the ah the (sic) school intercollegiate, Sir.
55

Again, Salcedo did not give specific details on petitioners qualifications.
In sum, petitioners witnesses clearly did not personally know him well enough; their testimonies do
not satisfactorily establish that petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
prescribed by law.
In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his own good moral
character but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible
persons.
56
Within the purview of the naturalization law, a "credible person" is not only an individual
who has not been previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has no police
record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not incredible. What must
be credible is not the declaration made but the person making it. This implies that such person must
have a good standing in the community; that he is known to be honest and upright; that he is reputed
to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a good warranty
of the applicants worthiness.
57

The records likewise do not show that the character witnesses of petitioner are persons of good
standing in the community; that they are honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and
reliable. The most that was established was the educational attainment of the witnesses; however,
this cannot be equated with their credibility. In fine, petitioner focused on presenting evidence
tending to build his own good moral character and neglected to establish the credibility and good
moral character of his witnesses.
58

We do not agree with petitioners argument that respondent is precluded from questioning the RTC
decision because of its failure to oppose the petition. A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial
adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A
certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant
obtained it by misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the
cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent to the
granting of the certificate.
59
If the government can challenge a final grant of citizenship, with more
reason can it appeal the decision of the RTC within the reglementary period despite its failure to
oppose the petition before the lower court.
Thus, petitioner failed to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of naturalization
law. For this reason, we affirm the decision of the CA denying the petition for naturalization without
prejudice.
It must be stressed that admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges that the Republic of
the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that should not be conferred except upon
persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict compliance with the law.
60

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.











G.R. No. 125793 August 29, 2006
JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and DEPORTATION and WILSON
SOLUREN,Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J .:
Citizenship is a priceless possession. Former U.S. Chief Justice Earl Warren fittingly emphasized its
crowning value when he wrote that "it is mans basic right for it is nothing less than to have
rights."
1
When a person loses citizenship, therefore, the State sees to it that its reacquisition may
only be granted if the former citizen fully satisfies all conditions and complies with the applicable law.
Without doubt, repatriation is not to be granted simply based on the vagaries of the former Filipino
citizen.
The Case
The instant petition for review
2
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure contests the
denial by the Court of Appeals (CA) of the Petition for Habeas Corpus interposed by petitioner
Joevanie Arellano Tabasa from the Order of Summary Deportation issued by the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID) for his return to the United States.
The Facts
The facts as culled by the CA from the records show that petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968,
3
when petitioner was seven years old,
4
his father,
Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen
5
of the United States. By derivative naturalization
(citizenship derived from that of another as from a person who holds citizenship by virtue of
naturalization
6
), petitioner also acquired American citizenship.
Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1995, and was admitted as a "balikbayan" for one
year. Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and detained by agent Wilson Soluren of the BID on May
23, 1996, pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72 in Baybay, Malay, Aklan; subsequently, he
was brought to the BID Detention Center in Manila.
7

Petitioner was investigated by Special Prosecutor Atty. Edy D. Donato at the Law and Investigation
Division of the BID on May 28, 1996; and on the same day, Tabasa was accused of violating Section
8, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative Code, in a charge sheet which alleged:
1. That on 3 August 1995, respondent (petitioner herein [Tabasa]) arrived in the Philippines and was
admitted as a balikbayan;
2. That in a letter dated 16 April 1996, Honorable Kevin Herbert, Consul General of [the] U.S.
Embassy, informed the Bureau that respondents Passport No. 053854189 issued on June 10, 1994
in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., had been revoked by the U.S. Department of State;
3. Hence, respondent [petitioner Tabasa] is now an undocumented and undesirable alien and may
be summarily deported pursuant to Law and Intelligence Instructions No. 53 issued by then
Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago to effect his deportation (Exhibit 3).
8

The pertinent portion of the Herbert letter is as follows:
The U.S. Department of State has revoked U.S. passport 053854189 issued on June 10, 1994 in
San Francisco, California under the name of Joevanie Arellano Tabasa, born on February 21, 1959
in the Philippines. Mr. Tabasas passport has been revoked because he is the subject of an
outstanding federal warrant of arrest issued on January 25, 1996 by the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, for violation of Section 1073, "Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution," of
Title 18 of the United States Code. He is charged with one count of a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of California Penal Code, Section 12021(A)(1), and one count of sexual battery,
in violation of California Penal Code, Section 243.4 (D).
9

The BID ordered petitioners deportation to his country of origin, the United States, on May 29, 1996,
in the following summary deportation order:
Records show that on 16 April 1996, Mr. Kevin F. Herbert, Consul General of the U.S. Embassy in
Manila, filed a request with the Bureau to apprehend and deport the abovenamed [sic] respondent
[petitioner Tabasa] on the ground that a standing warrant for several federal charges has been
issued against him, and that the respondents Passport No. 053854189 has been revoked.
By reason thereof, and on the strength of Mission Order No. LIV-96-72, Intelligence operatives
apprehended the respondent in Aklan on 23 May 1996.
In Schonemann vs. Commissioner Santiago, et al., (G.R. No. 81461 [sic, 81461 should be 86461],
30 May 1989), the Supreme Court ruled that if a foreign embassy cancels the passport of an alien,
or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country.
Further, under Office Memorandum Order No. 34 issued on 21 August 1989, summary deportation
proceedings lie where the passport of the alien has expired.
It is, thus, apparent that respondent has lost his privilege to remain in the country.
10

Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order
11
on May 29, 1996, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 40771.
Tabasa alleged that he was not afforded due process; that no warrant of arrest for deportation may
be issued by immigration authorities before a final order of deportation is made; that no notice of the
cancellation of his passport was made by the U.S. Embassy; that he is entitled to admission or to a
change of his immigration status as a non-quota immigrant because he is married to a Filipino
citizen as provided in Section 13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940; and that
he was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines prior to his derivative naturalization when he was
seven years old due to the naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968.
At the time Tabasa filed said petition, he was already 35 years old.
12

On May 30, 1996, the CA ordered the respondent Bureau to produce the person of the petitioner on
June 3, 1996 and show the cause of petitioners detention, and restrained the Bureau from
summarily deporting him. On June 3, 1996, the BID presented Tabasa before the CA; and on June
6, 1996, the CA granted both parties ten (10) days within which to file their memoranda, after which
the case would be considered submitted for decision.
13
Meanwhile, the Commissioner of
Immigration granted the petitioners temporary release on bail on a PhP 20,000.00 cash bond.
14

However, on June 13, 1996, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired
Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with Republic Act No. 8171 (RA 8171), and that
because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the respondent Bureau.
15

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA, in its August 7, 1996 Decision,
16
denied Tabasas petition on the ground that he had not
legally and successfully acquiredby repatriationhis Filipino citizenship as provided in RA 8171.
The court said that although he became an American citizen by derivative naturalization when his
father was naturalized in 1968, there is no evidence to show that he lost his Philippine citizenship
"on account of political or economic necessity," as explicitly provided in Section 1, RA 8171the law
governing the repatriation of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship. The affidavit does
not state that political or economic necessity was the compelling reason for petitioners parents to
give up their Filipino citizenship in 1968. Moreover, the court a quo found that petitioner Tabasa did
not dispute the truth of the April 16, 1996 letter of the United States Consul General Kevin F. Herbert
or the various warrants issued for his arrest by the United States court. The court a quo noted that
after petitioner was ordered deported by the BID on May 29, 1996, he successively executed an
Affidavit of Repatriation on June 6, 1996 and took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on June 13, 1996more than ten months after his arrival in the country on August 3,
1995. The appellate court considered petitioners "repatriation" as a last ditch effort to avoid
deportation and prosecution in the United States. The appellate court concluded that his only reason
to want to reacquire Filipino citizenship is to avoid criminal prosecution in the United States of
America. The court a quo, therefore, ruled against Tabasa, whose petition is now before us.
The Issue
The only issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship
under RA 8171. If there is no valid repatriation, then he can be summarily deported for his being an
undocumented alien.
The Courts Ruling
The Court finds no merit in this petition.
RA 8171, "An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine
Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos," was enacted on October 23, 1995. It
provides for the repatriation of only two (2) classes of persons, viz:
Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born
Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of
political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the
manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended:Provided, That the
applicant is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
association for the predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.
17
(Emphasis supplied.)
Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by
reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171?
He does not.
Persons qualified for repatriation under RA 8171
To reiterate, the only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following:
a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and
b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account
of political or economic necessity.
Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-
born Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when he was still
a minor.
Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to
natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to
the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced his
Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171,
his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a situation
where a former Filipino subsequently had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign
country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship
and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood
relationship:
18
the children acquire the citizenship of their parent(s) who are natural-born Filipinos.
To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition
for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity for
all acts of civil life much less the capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship.
On their own, the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their
parents.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was still
a minor, his father was naturalized as an American citizen; and by derivative naturalization,
petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner now wants us to believe that he is entitled to
automatic repatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country due to political or
economic necessity. This is absurd. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his "repatriation"
on June 13, 1996. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time
of the filing of the petition for repatriation.
Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or economic
necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political or
economic exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by economic or political
reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his parents and not his. The
privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos who could
prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to political and economic reasons, and
extended indirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation.
In sum, petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. However, he can
possibly reacquire Philippine citizenship by availing of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9225) by simply taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Where to file a petition for repatriation pursuant to RA 8171
Even if we concede that petitioner Tabasa can avail of the benefit of RA 8171, still he failed to follow
the procedure for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He has to file his petition for repatriation with
the Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN), which was designated to process petitions for
repatriation pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O. No. 285) dated August 22, 1996, to wit:
Section 1. Composition.The composition of the Special Committee on Naturalization, with the
Solicitor General as Chairman, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director-General of the
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, as members, shall remain as constituted.
Sec. 2. Procedure.Any person desirous of repatriating or reacquiring Filipino citizenship pursuant
to R.A. No. 8171 shall file a petition with the Special Committee on Naturalization which shall
process the same. If their applications are approved[,] they shall take the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their
certificate of registration (emphasis supplied).
Sec. 3. Implementing Rules.The Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and
regulations and prescribe the appropriate forms and the required fees for the processing of petitions.
Sec. 4. Effectivity.This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.
In the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171 issued by the SCN on August 5,
1999, applicants for repatriation are required to submit documents in support of their petition such as
their birth certificate and other evidence proving their claim to Filipino citizenship.
19
These
requirements were imposed to enable the SCN to verify the qualifications of the applicant particularly
in light of the reasons for the renunciation of Philippine citizenship.
What petitioner simply did was that he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
then, executed an affidavit of repatriation, which he registered, together with the certificate of live
birth, with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. The said office subsequently issued him a
certificate of such registration.
20
At that time, the SCN was already in place and operational by virtue
of the June 8, 1995 Memorandum issued by President Fidel V. Ramos.
21
Although A.O. No. 285
designating the SCN to process petitions filed pursuant to RA 8171 was issued only on August 22,
1996, it is merely a confirmatory issuance according to the Court in Angat v. Republic.
22
Thus,
petitioner should have instead filed a petition for repatriation before the SCN.
Requirements for repatriation under RA 8171
Even if petitionernow of legal agecan still apply for repatriation under RA 8171, he nevertheless
failed to prove that his parents relinquished their Philippine citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity as provided for in the law. Nowhere in his affidavit of repatriation did he mention
that his parents lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic reasons. It is
notable that under the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171, the SCN requires a
petitioner for repatriation to set forth, among others, "the reason/s why petitioner lost his/her Filipino
citizenship, whether by marriage in case of Filipino woman, or whether by political or economic
necessity in case of [a] natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his/her Filipino citizenship. In case of the
latter, such political or economic necessity should be specified."
23

Petitioner Tabasa asserts, however, that the CA erred in ruling that the applicant for repatriation
must prove that he lost his Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. He
theorizes that the reference to political or economic reasons is "merely descriptive, not restrictive, of
the widely accepted reasons for naturalization in [a] foreign country."
24

Petitioners argument has no leg to stand on.
A reading of Section 1 of RA 8171 shows the manifest intent of the legislature to limit the benefit of
repatriation only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political
or economic necessity, in addition to Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage
to aliens. The precursor of RA 8171, Presidential Decree No. 725 (P.D. 725),
25
which was enacted
on June 5, 1975 amending Commonwealth Act No. 63, also gives to the same groups of former
Filipinos the opportunity to repatriate but without the limiting phrase, "on account of political or
economic necessity" in relation to natural-born Filipinos. By adding the said phrase to RA 8171, the
lawmakers clearly intended to limit the application of the law only to political or economic migrants,
aside from the Filipino women who lost their citizenship by marriage to aliens. This intention is more
evident in the following sponsorship speech of Rep. Andrea B. Domingo on House Bill No. 1248, the
origin of RA 8171, to wit:
Ms. Domingo: x x x
From my experience as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, I observed
that there are only four types of Filipinos who leave the country.
The first is what we call the "economic refugees" who go abroad to work because there is no work to
be found in the country. Then we have the "political refugees" who leave the country for fear of their
lives because they are not in consonance with the prevailing policy of government. The third type is
those who have committed crimes and would like to escape from the punishment of said crimes.
Lastly, we have those Filipinos who feel that they are not Filipinos, thereby seeking other citizenship
elsewhere.
Of these four types of Filipinos, Mr. Speaker, the first two have to leave the country not of choice, but
rather out of sacrifice to look for a better life, as well as for a safer abode for themselves and their
families. It is for these two types of Filipinos that this measure is being proposed for approval by this
body. (Emphasis supplied.)
x x x x
x x x [I]f the body would recall, I mentioned in my short sponsorship speech the four types of
Filipinos who leave their country. And the two typesthe economic and political refugeesare the
ones being addressed by this proposed law, and they are not really Filipino women who lost their
citizenship through marriage. We had a lot of problems with these people who left the country
because of political persecution or because of pressing economic reasons, and after feeling that
they should come back to the country and get back their citizenship and participate as they should in
the affairs of the country, they find that it is extremely difficult to get their citizenship back because
they are treated no different from any other class of alien.
26

From these two sources, namely, P.D. 725 and the sponsorship speech on House Bill No. 1248, it is
incontrovertible that the intent of our legislators in crafting Section 1 of RA 8171, as it is precisely
worded out, is to exclude those Filipinos who have abandoned their country for reasons other than
political or economic necessity.
Petitioner contends it is not necessary to prove his political or economic reasons since the act of
renouncing allegiance to ones native country constitutes a "necessary and unavoidable shifting of
his political allegiance," and his fathers loss of Philippine citizenship through naturalization "cannot
therefore be said to be for any reason other than political or economic necessity."
27

This argument has no merit.
While it is true that renunciation of allegiance to ones native country is necessarily a political act, it
does not follow that the act is inevitably politically or economically motivated as alleged by petitioner.
To reiterate, there are other reasons why Filipinos relinquish their Philippine citizenship. The
sponsorship speech of former Congresswoman Andrea B. Domingo illustrates that aside from
economic and political refugees, there are Filipinos who leave the country because they have
committed crimes and would like to escape from punishment, and those who really feel that they are
not Filipinos and that they deserve a better nationality, and therefore seek citizenship elsewhere.
Thus, assuming petitioner Tabasa is qualified under RA 8171, it is incumbent upon him to prove to
the satisfaction of the SCN that the reason for his loss of citizenship was the decision of his parents
to forfeit their Philippine citizenship for political or economic exigencies. He failed to undertake this
crucial step, and thus, the sought relief is unsuccessful.
Repatriation is not a matter of right, but it is a privilege granted by the State. This is mandated by the
1987 Constitution under Section 3, Article IV, which provides that citizenship may be lost or
reacquired in the manner provided by law. The State has the power to prescribe by law the
qualifications, procedure, and requirements for repatriation. It has the power to determine if an
applicant for repatriation meets the requirements of the law for it is an inherent power of the State to
choose who will be its citizens, and who can reacquire citizenship once it is lost. If the applicant, like
petitioner Tabasa, fails to comply with said requirements, the State is justified in rejecting the petition
for repatriation.
Petitioner: an undocumented alien subject to summary deportation
Petitioner claims that because of his repatriation, he has reacquired his Philippine citizenship;
therefore, he is not an undocumented alien subject to deportation.
This theory is incorrect.
As previously explained, petitioner is not entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 for he has not shown
that his case falls within the coverage of the law.
Office Memorandum No. 34 dated August 21, 1989 of the BID is enlightening on summary
deportation:
2. The Board of Special Inquiry and the Hearing Board IV shall observe summary deportation
proceedings in cases where the charge against the alien is overstaying, or the expiration or
cancellation by his government of his passport. In cases involving overstaying aliens, BSI and the
Hearing Board IV shall merely require the presentation of the aliens valid passport and shall decide
the case on the basis thereof.
3. If a foreign embassy cancels the passport of the alien, or does not reissue a valid passport to him,
the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country, under the Immigration Act, Sections 10 and 15
(Schonemann v. Santiago, et al., G.R. No. 81461 [sic, should be 86461], 30 May 1989). The
automatic loss of the privilege obviates deportation proceedings. In such instance, the Board of
Commissioners may issue summary judgment of deportation which shall be immediately executory.
28

In addition, in the case of Schonemann v. Defensor Santiago, et al., this Court held:
It is elementary that if an alien wants to stay in the Philippines, he must possess the necessary
documents. One of these documents is a valid passport. There are, of course, exceptions where in
the exercise of its sovereign prerogatives the Philippines may grant refugee status, refuse to
extradite an alien, or otherwise allow him or her to stay here even if he [the alien] has no valid
passport or Philippine visa. "Boat people" seeking residence elsewhere are examples. However, the
grant of the privilege of staying in the Philippines is discretionary on the part of the proper
authorities. There is no showing of any grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or whimsicality in the
questioned summary judgment. x x x
29

Petitioner Tabasa, whose passport was cancelled after his admission into the country, became an
undocumented alien who can be summarily deported. His subsequent "repatriation" cannot bar such
deportation especially considering that he has no legal and valid reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.
WHEREFORE, this petition for review is DISMISSED, and the August 7, 1996 Decision of the Court
of Appeals isAFFIRMED. No costs to the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.