Drug Court Civil Suit

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

AT NEW ALBANY
CASE NO. 4:14-cv-00012-SEB-TAB

DESTINY HOFFMAN, NATHAN CLIFFORD, )
JOSHUA FOLEY, JESSE HASH, ASHLEIGH )
SANTIAGO, JAMES BENNETT, AMY BENNETT, )
LEE SPAULDING, MICHAEL CAMPBELL, )
AMY TUTTLE, AMANDA CAMPBELL, )
BOBBY UPTON, SHANE BRATCHER )
(formerly COURTNEY COWHERD), )
JUSTIN LANHAM, TRENTNEY RHODES, )
JOANIE WATSON )
)
On behalf of themselves and on behalf of )
others similarly situated )
)
Plaintiffs ) Electronically Filed
v. )
)
JUDGE JEROME F. JACOBI, SUSAN KNOEBEL, )
JEREMY SNELLING, HENRY FORD, CLARK )
COUNTY SHERIFF DANNY RODDEN, DANIELLE )
GRISSETT, STEPHEN MASON, JOSH SEYBOLD )
UNKNOWN CLARK COUNTY WORK RELEASE )
EMPLOYEE(S)), UNKNOWN CLARK COUNTY )
CIRCUIT COURT CLERK AND CLARK )
COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS )
)
Defendants )

FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND DAMAGES

*** *** *** *** *** ***

Come the Plaintiffs, Destiny Hoffman, Nathan Clifford, Joshua Foley, Jesse Hash,
Ashleigh Santiago, James Bennett, Amy Bennett, Lee Spaulding, Michael Campbell, Amy
Tuttle, Amanda Campbell, Bobby Upton, Shane Bratcher (formerly Courtney Cowherd),
Case 4:14-cv-00012-SEB-TAB Document 17 Filed 04/08/14 Page 1 of 58 PageID #: 144
2
Justin Lanham, Trentney Rhodes, and Joanie Watson
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on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, by counsel, and for their First Amended Complaint, filed herein as a matter of
right pursuant to FRCP 15, against the Defendants, Judge Jerome F. Jacobi, Susan Knoebel,
Jeremy Snelling, Henry Ford, Clark County Sheriff Danny Rodden, Danielle Grissett, Stephen
Mason, Josh Seybold, Unknown Clark County Work Release Employee(s) responsible for
incarcerating James Bennett on August 8, 2013, Unknown Clark County Circuit Court Clerk
Responsible for the Erroneous Entry Alleging that Mr. Spaulding Failed to Appear on July 16,
2013, and Clark County Board of Commissioners, state as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION
1. This class action is filed pursuant to 42 USC 1983 due to Clark Countys fundamentally
ingrained and customary policies and practices that have resulted in wholesale constitutional
violations against Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated.
2. Clark County Circuit Court 2 (formerly Superior Court II), by and through individuals
employed in this Court and by other government employees, operated the Clark County Drug
Treatment Court Program (hereinafter Drug Court). In the course of said operation, these
government actors knowingly deprived multiple probationers and Drug Court participants of
their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution,
among others. The rights of other named, individual Plaintiffs involved with the Clark County
Judicial System were similarly violated.
3. Specifically, Defendants intentionally planned and executed policies, broad in scope,
extended in time, and clearly illegal in nature, that caused the systematic deprivation of these
individuals liberty without due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth

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newly added parties in bold
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Amendments. These constitutional violations included jailing Plaintiffs and those similar situated
for extended periods of time without counsel, notice or hearing before a neutral and detached
hearing officer, and without the corresponding opportunities to appear and present evidence,
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, or receive a written finding as to the evidence
relied upon and the reasons that they were to remain incarcerated. Additionally, certain
Defendants arrested these individuals in the absence of legal authority, resulting in violations of
their Fourth Amendment right to be free of unlawful and unreasonable seizures.
4. As explained in greater detail below, this pattern of unlawful and unconstitutional
conduct was so flagrant, so egregious, and so customary that declaratory and injunctive relief is
necessary to protect the rights of Plaintiffs as well as all other citizens of Clark County, Indiana
who may be under the jurisdiction of Clark County Circuit Court 2 in the future.
5. In addition to the requested relief for each individually named Plaintiff, this action seeks
relief on behalf of the following classes of individuals:
A. All persons who were probationers and/or participants in Clark County
Indianas Drug Treatment Court Program, Clark County Circuit Court 2,
and who were incarcerated for more than 72 hours without hearing or
other due process of law in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment
rights (as enunciated by Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 US 778 (1973) and
Gosha v. State of Indiana, 931 N.E.2d 432 (Ind. App. 2010), among
others), from February 18, 2012 to the date of the order granting class
certification.

B. All persons who are or will be subject to the jurisdiction of Clark County
Indianas Drug Treatment Court Program and/or Clark County Circuit
Court 2, as a probationer or Clark County Drug Court participant and who
therefore faces or will face the possibility of being alleged or determined
to be in violation of the rules, terms, and or policies of probation or Drug
Court.

C. All persons who were arrested in Clark County, Indiana by state actors
working in Clark County Circuit Court 2 with no arrest powers and whose
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arrest was not otherwise lawful pursuant to Indiana Code 35-33-1-4,
from February 18, 2012 to the date of the order granting class certification.

D. All persons who are or will be subject to arrest in Clark County, Indiana
by state actors working in Clark County Circuit Court 2 with no arrest
powers and whose arrest is not or will not be otherwise lawful pursuant to
Indiana Code 35-33-1-4.

6. Plaintiffs seek money damages on behalf of Classes A and C, and declaratory and
injunctive relief on behalf of Classes B and D.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
7. This action arises under the United States Constitution, particularly under the provisions
of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States, and under federal
law, particularly Title 42 of the United States Code 1983 (Civil Rights Act).
8. This Court possesses jurisdiction of this case under the provisions of Title 28 of the
United States Code, 1331 and 1343, particularly 1343(3), which contains no jurisdictional
amount requirement.
9. Venue lies in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
pursuant to Title 28 of the United States Code, 1391.
10. Plaintiffs are not required to provide any state agency or state employee with pre-suit
notice of this 1983 class action or otherwise exhaust their state administrative remedies,
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, as interpreted by Felder v.
Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988), and Union Carbide Corp. v. State Bd. Of Tax Commrs of the State
of Indiana, 161 F.R.D. 359 (S.D. Ind. 1993).
III. PARTIES
A. Named Plaintiffs
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11. Plaintiff Destiny Hoffman is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and
resident of Lexington, Scott County, Indiana.
12. Plaintiff Nathan Clifford is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and
resident of Jeffersonville, Clark County, Indiana.
13. Plaintiff Joshua Foley is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and resident
of Jeffersonville, Clark County, Indiana.
14. Plaintiff Jesse Hash is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and resident of
New Albany, Floyd County, Indiana.
15. Plaintiff Ashleigh Santiago (formerly Ashleigh Hendricks) is, and at all times relevant
hereto has been, a citizen and resident of Clarksville, Clark County, Indiana.
16. Plaintiff James Bennett is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and resident
17. Plaintiff Amy Bennett is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and resident
of New Albany, Floyd County, Indiana.
18. Plaintiff Lee Spaulding is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and resident
of Charlestown, Clark County, Indiana.
19.
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Plaintiff Michael Campbell is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and
resident of Scottsburg, Scott County, Indiana.
20. Plaintiff Amy Tuttle is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and resident of
New Albany, Floyd County, Indiana.
21. Plaintiff Amanda Campbell is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and
resident of Louisville, Jefferson County, Kentucky.
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22. Plaintiff Robert Upton is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and resident
23. Plaintiff Shane Bratcher (formerly Courtney Cowherd) is, and at all times relevant hereto
has been, a citizen and resident of Jeffersonville, Clark County, Indiana.
24. Plaintiff Justin Lanham is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and resident
of Clarksville, Clark County, Indiana.
25. Plaintiff Trentney Rhodes is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and
resident of Louisville, Jefferson County, Kentucky.
26. Plaintiff Joanie Watson is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and resident
of Henryville, Clark County, Indiana.
B. Named Defendants
27. Defendant Judge Jerome F. Jacobi is a state Circuit Court Judge and elected official
within the State of Indiana for Clark County Circuit Court 2 (previously Clark Superior Court II)
and Clark County Drug Treatment Court. Judge Jacobi is sued in his official and individual
capacities solely for the purposes of declaratory judgment declaring the rights and legal relations
of Plaintiffs in this actual and live controversy herein pursuant to Title 28 of the United States
Code, 2201.
28. Defendant Susan Knoebel (hereinafter Knoebel) was, at all relevant times, an employee
of Clark County, Indiana and working as a Probation Officer in Clark Circuit Court 2 (previously
Clark Superior Court II). Defendant Knoebel is sued in her individual capacity for her actions
and inactions which directly caused constitutional deprivations and in her official capacity for her
intentional actions in implementing and executing Clark Countys unconstitutional policies,

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amended paragraphs numbered in bold
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decisions, customs and practices, as well as her unlawful inactions which were the result of and
represented deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs.
29. Defendant Jeremy Snelling (hereinafter Snelling) was, at all relevant times, an
employee of Clark County, Indiana and working as a Court Bailiff in Clark Circuit Court 2
(previously Clark Superior Court II). Defendant Snelling is sued in his individual capacity for his
actions and inactions which directly caused constitutional deprivations and in his official capacity
for his intentional actions in implementing and executing Clark Countys unconstitutional
policies, decisions, customs and practices, as well as his unlawful inactions which were the result
of and represented deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs.
30. Defendant Henry Ford (hereinafter Ford) was, at all relevant times, an employee of
Clark County, Indiana and working as Chief Probation Officer of Clark County, where he
supervised Defendant Knoebel. Defendant Ford is sued in his individual capacity for his actions
and inactions which directly caused constitutional deprivations and in his official capacity for his
intentional actions in implementing and executing Clark Countys unconstitutional policies,
decisions, customs and practices, as well as his unlawful inactions which were the result of and
represented deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs.
31. Defendant Clark County Sheriff Danny Rodden (hereinafter Sheriff Rodden) was, at all
relevant times, an employee of Clark County, Indiana and Clark County Sheriff. The Clark
County Sheriff provides law enforcement services in Clark County and operates the Clark
County Jail. Defendant Rodden is sued in his individual capacity for his actions and inactions
which directly caused constitutional deprivations and in his official capacity for his intentional
actions in implementing and executing Clark Countys unconstitutional policies, decisions,
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customs and practices, as well as his unlawful inactions which were the result of and represented
deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs.
32. Defendant Danielle Grissett (hereinafter Grissett) was, at all relevant times, an
employee of Clark County, Indiana employed as Clark County Work Release Director and
managed the Clark County Work Release Program. Defendant Grissett is sued in her individual
capacity for her actions and inactions which directly caused constitutional deprivations and in her
official capacity for her intentional actions in implementing and executing Clark Countys
unconstitutional policies, decisions, customs and practices, as well as her unlawful inactions
which were the result of and represented deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of
Plaintiffs.
33. Defendant Stephen Mason (hereinafter Mason) was, at all relevant times, an employee
of Clark County, Indiana and employed as Executive Director of Clark County Community
Corrections, where he was responsible for the Work Release Program and supervised Defendant
Grissett. Defendant Mason is sued in his individual capacity for his actions and inactions which
directly caused constitutional deprivations and in his official capacity for his intentional actions
in implementing and executing Clark Countys unconstitutional policies, decisions, customs and
practices, as well as his unlawful inactions which were the result of and represented deliberate
indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs.
34. Defendant Josh Seybold (hereinafter Seybold) was, at all relevant times, an employee
of Clark County, Indiana and employed as a Drug Court Case Manager, where he was
responsible for the management of Drug Court participants. Defendant Seybold is sued in his
individual capacity for his actions and inactions which directly caused constitutional deprivations
and in his official capacity for his intentional actions in implementing and executing Clark
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Countys unconstitutional policies, decisions, customs and practices, as well as his unlawful
inactions which were the result of and represented deliberate indifference to the constitutional
rights of Plaintiffs.
35. Defendant Unknown Clark County Work Release Employee(s) responsible for
incarcerating James Bennett on August 8, 2013, was, at all relevant times, an employee of Clark
County, Indiana and employed with the Work Release Program. This unknown Defendant is sued
in an individual capacity for actions and inactions which directly caused constitutional
deprivations and in an official capacity for intentional actions in implementing and executing
Clark Countys unconstitutional policies, decisions, customs and practices, as well as the
employees unlawful inactions which were the result of and represented deliberate indifference
to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs.
36. Defendant Unknown Clark County Circuit Court Clerk Responsible for the Erroneous
Entry Alleging that Mr. Spaulding Failed to Appear on July 16, 2013, was, at all relevant times,
an employee of Clark County, Indiana and employed as a Court Clerk. This unknown Defendant
is sued in an individual capacity for actions and inactions which directly caused constitutional
deprivations and in an official capacity for intentional actions in implementing and executing
Clark Countys unconstitutional policies, decisions, customs and practices, as well as the
employees unlawful inactions which were the result of and represented deliberate indifference
to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs.
37. Defendant Clark County Board of Commissioners (hereinafter Clark County
Commissioners), an extension and/or political subdivision of the State of Indiana and/or Clark
County, Indiana, serves as the governing body of Clark County, acts as the County Executive,
and has the capacity to sue and be sued. Clark County Board of Commissioners has supervisory
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authority over and/or is responsible for the following involved entities: Clark County Drug
Treatment Court, Clark County Probation and Supervision, Clark County Controlled Substances
Supervision, Clark County Sheriffs Department, Clark County Drug Court Advisory Committee
(Team), Clark County Work Release Program and Clark County Community Corrections. The
Clark County Board of Commissioners is sued as an Executive Body for its actions in
implementing and executing Clark Countys unconstitutional policies, ordinances, regulations,
decisions, customs and practices, as well as its unlawful inactions which were the result of and
represented deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs. No Clark County
Commissioner is sued individually herein.
IV. FACTUAL, STATUTORY AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Indiana Drug and Alcohol Programs, Problem-Solving Courts, and Drug Courts
38. Near the end of the last century, courts throughout the United States began to recognize
and wrestle with the inherent problems of the traditional judicial approach regarding those
citizens with substance abuse issues that committed non-violent crimes directly related to and
caused by those issues. These problems included the growing recognition by judges and other
experts of the ill-fit and ultimate ineffectiveness of traditional practices of incarceration alone as
applied to those with addiction issues, as these issues commonly resulted from complex
psychological, pathological and genetic origins that could not be overcome by the threat of
punishment alone. Also, courts were concerned with the concurrent and rising economic and
societal problems associated with jail overcrowding that was due, in part, to the extensive
incarceration of non-violent offenders convicted of self-sabotaging crimes committed solely to
feed their own addictions.
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Criminologists and legal scholars began to reach consensus on the application of
theoretical concepts such as therapeutic jurisprudence and restorative justice, theories that
offered alternative judicial practices to address the counterbalancing concerns of society as a
whole and those individuals that used and abused substances in violation of the law and due to
disease process. See Richard C. Boldt, A Circumspect Look at Problem-Solving Courts,
University of Maryland School of Law (2009); Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions are not
Enough: Problem-Solving Courts and the Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 SMU L. Rev. 1459
(Fall 2004).
39. To address these societal concerns, in 1992 the Indiana Legislature was one of the early
states to create a framework for the establishment of alcohol and drug services programs by
any Indiana city or county court having misdemeanor jurisdiction. Ind. Code 12-23-14 et seq. In
1997, the Indiana General Assembly transferred responsibility over these programs from the
executive branch to the Indiana Judicial Center, which established a committee of the Judicial
Conference of Indiana known as the Court Alcohol and Drug Program Advisory Committee
(CADPAC). The programs mission statement is to develop, train, certify, and support court-
administered alcohol and drug programs operating under the provisions of Ind. Code 12-23-14
and the Rules for Court-Administered Alcohol & Drug Program promulgated by the Judicial
Conference of Indiana. According to the Indiana Judicial Center, currently there are
approximately 55 Indiana courts with court-administered alcohol and drug programs, including
Clark County Circuit Court.
40. In 2010, the legislature passed statutes amending these frameworks and providing for
additional Problem Solving Courts, which it defined as courts providing a process for
immediate and highly structured intervention for eligible individuals that incorporates, among
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other problem-solving concepts, enhanced information to improve decision making and
evaluating the effectiveness of operations continuously. Ind. Code 33-23-16-8.
41. One particular type of Problem Solving Court authorized and amended by Indiana law
in 2010 is Drug Court, defined as a problem solving court focused on addressing the
substance abuse issues of defendantsin the criminal justice system by bringing together
substance abuse rehabilitation professionals, local social programs, and intensive judicial
monitoring. Ind. Code 33-23-16-5(a)(1). Concurrently, the legislature permitted Indiana cities
and counties to establish said drug courts. Ind. Code 33-23-16-11.
B. Clark County Drug Court
42. Pursuant to the authority above, in 2002 Clark County established a drug court under the
jurisdiction of Clark Superior Court II. After the unification of Clark County courts in early
January of 2012, Clark County Circuit Court 2, presided over by Judge Jacobi, maintained
jurisdiction of this drug court.
43. During all relevant times herein, Judge Jacobi served as the supervising drug court judge,
and Defendant Knoebel served as the drug court supervisor, administering same through the
Controlled Substances Supervision division of Clark County Probation and Supervision,
which was headed by Defendant Ford. The drug court received operating funds through user
fees obtained from individual probationers as well as grants and charitable giving. Defendant
Knoebel, as the drug court coordinator, was responsible for the daily operation and
administration of the drug court.
44. As described in the Indiana Judicial Centers May 2013 Drug Court Certification
Review of Clark Circuit Court, Clark Countys Drug Court targets non-violent felony
offenders who are determined a high risk to reoffend by the Indiana Risk Assessment System
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(IRAS) and meet the diagnostic criteria for substance abuse or dependence. While Ind. Code
33-23-16-13 provides various modes of obtaining jurisdiction over criminal defendants by drug
court, in Clark County this jurisdiction was customarily obtained either through a deferral of
prosecution or as a condition of probation. Clark County Drug Court participants were required,
among other things, to attend AA meetings, submit to random drug screens, and meet regularly
with their probation officer and appear before Judge Jacobi. Additionally, Clark County
established a Drug Court Committee or Team which, in theory, was to consist of Judge Jacobi,
Susan Knoebel, Jeremy Snelling, a prosecutor, defense attorney, and representatives of local
substance abuse healing agencies.
45. As of May 31, 2013, there were 74 current Clark County Drug Court participants and, as
of March 11, 2013, an additional 112 other participants who had successfully completed the drug
court program, according to the Indiana Judicial Centers Certification Review. Clark County
Drug Court also accepts participants from Indiana counties other than Clark County.
C. Statutory Rights of Indiana Drug Court Participants, Probationers, and Arrestees
46. The United States Constitution provides the following protections to Plaintiffs herein:
A. The Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
B. The Fifth Amendment right to be free from the deprivation of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment applies these
protections to the citizens of each and every state: nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
C. The Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive bail and cruel and unusual
punishments.
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47. Under Ind. Code 33-23-16-14.5, if a drug court participant is alleged to have violated
any condition of the program, Clark County Drug Court, through Judge Jacobi, could remand
that participant into custody, issue a summons, or issue a warrant for arrest upon determination
that the participant is a flight risk or a risk to himself or others. Once the allegation of violation is
made, the drug court Judge shall conduct a hearing concerning an alleged violation of a
condition of the program with the following restrictions in place: proof of violation by a
preponderance of evidence; presentment of evidence in open court; and entitlement of the alleged
violator to a) receive written notice of the alleged violation; b) obtain the disclosure of evidence
against the individual; c) confront and cross-examine witnesses; and (d) be represented by
counsel. Ind. Code 33-23-16-14.5(c)(1-3). See also Gosha v. Indiana, 931 N.E.2d 432 (Ind.
2010).
48. Under Section 27 of the Judicial Conference of Indiana Problem-Solving Court Rules,
any termination proceedings must provide the drug court participant with: (1) written notice of
the alleged violation(s); (2) a hearing in open court before the problem-solving court judge or
another judicial officer; (3) representation by counsel; (4) disclosure of the evidence against the
participant; (5) an opportunity to be heard and present evidence; (6) confrontation and cross-
examination of witnesses; and (7) a determination that the participant violated one or more
conditions of the participants participation agreement or case management plan by a
preponderance of the evidence.
49. Additionally, Indiana probationers have a statutory right, prior to revocation, to the
consideration of a reasonable bail, a release after 15 days for those alleged violators incarcerated
and denied bail unless final hearing has been held, and to a final revocation hearing, consisting of
the proof of violation by the state in open court under a preponderance of evidence standard, with
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the probationers entitlement to confrontation, cross examination, and representation by counsel.
Ind. Code 35-38-2-3.
50. Ind. Code 35-33-7-3 requires that a person arrested be brought before a court within 72
hours of arrest for an initial hearing in which a determination of probable cause is made and the
arrestee is informed of the charges and bond is considered.
51. Clark County Circuit Court 2 required criminal defendants to sign an Agreement to
Enter Clark County Drug Treatment Court Program which generally provided, among other
items, the following:
If the Court determines that the Defendant has violated a condition of the Drug
Court Agreement, the Court may terminate the Defendants participation in the
Drug Treatment Court Program after a due process hearing on a Petition to
Terminate

The Defendant retains the right to counsel upon the filing of a Petition to
Terminate from the Drug Treatment Program

The participant may request the assistance of counsel when the court is
considering ordering sanctions resulting in a loss of liberty

The Defendant acknowledges that non-compliance with Drug Court requirements
as defined in this Agreement or in the Handbook may result in sanctions from the
Judge, including short-term jail detention for each new incident and the possibility
of termination from the program.

V. SPECIFIC FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS RE: NAMED PLAINTIFFS
A. DESTINY HOFFMAN
52. On or about April 12, 2012, Plaintiff Destiny Hoffman entered a guilty plea to Possession
of a Controlled Substance, a Class D Felony, in Circuit Court Division 2. The judgment of
conviction and term of the sentence is to be withheld upon the Defendant entering into the Clark
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County Drug Treatment Court Program. Ms. Hoffmans counsel withdrew further representation
via entry of Order on April 18, 2012.
53. It appears from Ms. Hoffmans Chronological Case Summary (hereinafter CCS) that
she was either detained following her April 12 hearing or detained soon thereafter, as the June
14, 2012 entry states Participant appears from CC jail for DTC Phase I. Next DTC 6/28/12.
Participant waiting on placement. The following day it appears that a transport order was
entered.
54. Over the course of the next 14 months, Ms. Hoffman remained a drug court participant
and appeared to be, in general, successfully complying with its rules and regulations, being
promoted to phase 2 of the program. However, on or about May 1, 2013, Ms. Hoffman appeared
before Judge Jacobi, along with Ms. Knoebel and other drug court officials. Ms. Hoffman was
found to have a dirty drug screen and Ms. Hoffman admitted to this rule violation, according to
her CCS. On that date, Judge Jacobi ordered Participant taken into custody pending staffing
of DTC [Drug Treatment Court] on 5/2/13.
55. Ms. Hoffman remained incarcerated in Clark County Jail and at a hearing on May 16,
2013, Judge Jacobi ordered Sanction- Continue to hold in CCJ pending placement after June 10,
2013, 500 word essay due by EOB on 5/20/2013. Positive ds [drug screen]. Two weeks later, on
May 30, 2013, another hearing was held in which the Court ordered hold in CCJ until a
minimum of 30 days sobriety, then until placement at the Bliss is available. Eventually, Ms.
Hoffman was released to the Bliss House on June 20, 2013, resulting in a total incarceration for
this violation of 51 days.
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56. On or about August 22, 2013, Ms. Hoffman appeared and her corresponding CCS entry
provides, in toto: Participant appears, Phase 1, RB 9/12/2013, Sanction 48 hours CCJ, then hold
pending evaluation and treatment recommendation. Second dilute. ks.
57. For the next 154 days, from August 22, 2013 until January 24, 2014, Ms. Hoffman
remained incarcerated in the Clark County Jail without a hearing of the evidence against her or
the right to confront and cross examine, consideration of bail, appointment of counsel, written
notice of the violations she was found to have committed or accused of, or any other due process
considerations. Despite the fact that her initial sanction only called for a detention of 48 hours,
Ms. Hoffman remained incarcerated for more than five months.
58. During this unconstitutional incarceration, Ms. Hoffman wrote multiple letters to Drug
Court personnel and repeatedly questioned jail deputies about the status of her incarceration
without the benefit of counsel. On or about January 20, 2014, Ms. Hoffman wrote a letter to
Magistrate Judge Dawkins regarding her continued incarceration. Two days later, the State
prosecutor filed its motion for immediate status conference and Ms. Hoffman was soon (and
finally) released.
B. NATHAN CLIFFORD
59. On or about December 16, 2011, Nathan Clifford entered a guilty plea to possession of a
hypodermic needle, a Class D Felony, in Clark County Superior/Circuit 2. Pursuant to a plea
agreement, Mr. Cliffords judgment of conviction and term of sentence [were] to be withheld
upon the Defendant entering the Clark County Drug Treatment Court program. 12 days later,
Judge Jacobi signed an Order allowing Mr. Cliffords attorney to withdraw.
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60. According to Mr. Cliffords CCS, on or about February 21, 2013, Judge Jacobi
sanctioned Mr. Clifford to 48 hours CC jail effective immediately for an apparent alleged
violation of drug court rules.
61. On or about March 14, 2013, according to Mr. Cliffords CCS, a court proceeding was
held resulting in an order by Judge Jacobi to continue to hold in CCJ pending placement.
Nothing else is stated in this hearing entry.
62. From February 21 to June 5, 2013, a total of 104 days, Mr. Clifford remained in the Clark
County Jail without hearing of the evidence against him or the right to confront and cross
examine, consideration of bail, appointment of counsel, written notice of the violations he was
found to have committed or alleged against him, or any other due process considerations, and
despite the fact that his sanction only called for a 48-hour detention. The first entry in Mr.
Cliffords CCS after March 14 was not entered until June 5, 2013, and simply states:
Transport Order Entered.
63. On or about August 1, 2013, a hearing journal entry before Magistrate William Dawkins
states; Susan Knoebel present in Magistrate Courtroom B. Drug Court Program Participant
tested positive for craven on Monday 7/29/13, and the Court hereby issues Warrant for Mr.
Clifford and orders him held on a 48 hour hold. Mr. Clifford was not present for this
proceeding. On August 5 an arrest warrant was issued to detain with no bond. Later that
month, drug court officials filed a formal Petition to Terminate Mr. Clifford from the program.
64. Ultimately, on or about January 16, 2014, the arrest warrant was served on Mr. Clifford
while he was at an area hospital awaiting the birth of his son and on that date he was detained
without bond. However, according to Mr. Cliffords CCS an initial hearing was not initially
scheduled until February 13, 2014. In the interim, on or about January 30, 2014, defense counsel
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entered an appearance on behalf of Mr. Clifford and the following day a hearing was held that
Defendant completed his sentence before termination date, therefore case is completed.
Defendant has served his executed sentence
C. JOSHUA FOLEY
65. On or about February 28, 2013, Plaintiff Joshua Foley entered a guilty plea to possession
of methamphetamine within 1000 feet of a public park, a Class B Felony, and sentenced in Clark
County Circuit 2 to six years imprisonment with the Indiana Department of Corrections. The
judgment of conviction and term of the sentence is to be withheld upon the Defendant entering
into the Clark County Drug Treatment Court Program. On March 6, 2013, Mr. Foley entered an
appearance representing himself pro se.
66. On or about June 27, 2013, the Court ordered, without further explanation, Sanction-
positive for Alcohol on 6/19/2013, 30 days CCJ for third positive drug test, and hold pending
placement.
67. For the next 68 days, from June 27 to September 3, 2013, Mr. Foley remained
incarcerated in the Clark County Jail without a hearing of the evidence against him or the right to
confront and cross examine, consideration of bail, appointment of counsel, written notice of the
violations he was found to have committed, or any other due process considerations, and despite
the fact that his sanction only called for a 30 day placement (which in and of itself was
unconstitutional and in violation of state law). The first entry in Mr. Cliffords CCS after June
27 was not entered until September 3, 2013, and simply states: Order of Transport and Release
granted.
D. JESSE HASH
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68. On or about July 15, 2013, Plaintiff Jesse Hash was arrested, without warrant, and
charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class C Felony, and released on his own
recognizance. On July 24, 2013 in Clark County Circuit Court 2, an arrest warrant was issued
with no bond based on Mr. Hashs failure to appear. This warrant was served and Mr. Hash
was immediately incarcerated at the Clark County Jail on August 8, 2013.
69. For the next 60 days, Mr. Hash remained in the Clark County Jail without any appearance
whatsoever before a judicial officer, without a probable cause hearing, consideration of bail,
appointment of counsel, notice of the charges against him, or any other due process
considerations.
70. The first entries in Mr. Hashs CCS subsequent to the service of the arrest warrant was
the early October scheduling of an initial hearing on October 7, 2013, at which time Judge Jacobi
entered a plea of denial for Mr. Foley, advised him of the charges against him, and took other
actions customarily performed during an initial hearing and constitutionally required to be
performed within days of detention.
E. ASHLEIGH SANTIAGO (previously Ashleigh Hendricks)
71. On or about July 27, 2012, Plaintiff Ashleigh Santiago (aka Ashleigh Hendricks) entered
a guilty plea to Possession of a Narcotic Drug, a Class D Felony, in Clark County Circuit Court
2. Judgment of conviction and term of the sentence is to be withheld upon the Defendant
entering into the Clark County Drug Treatment Court Program. On August 6, the Court ordered
the withdrawal of her criminal counsel.
72. Upon information and belief, on or about May 16, 2013, Ms. Santiago and about fifteen
other Drug Court participants were accused by Drug Court officials of testing positive for
something referred to in her CCS as kratum. Kratom, or Kratum, is a tropical deciduous and
21
evergreen tree indigenous to Southeast Asia and is ingested by eating the trees leaves, which
have medicinal properties. Kratom is not currently regulated by the United States Government
and, according to recent news reports, is only banned in Tennessee and Indiana (Indiana Code
35-31.5-2-321, as amended in 2012). However, in January, 2013 Senate Bill No. 132 was
introduced in the Indiana Legislature which would amend this statute by removing Kratoms
active ingredients (mitragynine and 7-hydroxymitragynine) from the banned list and thus re-
legalize Kratom in Indiana.
73. Upon information and belief, Defendants Knoebel and Snelling entered the room with
plastic Kroger grocery bags filled with handcuffs and arrested Ms. Santiago and the other
accused participants, even though neither individual had arrest powers under Indiana law. The
accused participants were immediately incarcerated in the Clark County Jail.
74. Ms. Santiagos CCS entries regarding the events of May 16 state: Participant
appearsSanction- 72 hours CCJ and 72 hours CCJ total of 6 days, 30/30 1 meeting a day for 30
days, 500 word essay due by EOB on 5/20/2013. Positive DS & Verbal Warning on Dilute. ks.
The second 72 hrs. CCJ on 5/16/2013 was ordered due to 3 missed meetings/appt. and/or group.
75. Despite this 6-day sanction imposed on May 16, a hearing entry from 7 days later, on
May 23, ordered: Continue to hold in CCJ pending staffing. The following week, on May 30,
Ms. Santiago was still incarcerated and appeared for hearing, when it was noted that the Staffing
team has voted to file Petition to Terminate. However, this Petition was not actually filed by the
state until June 18, 2013.
76. Judge Jacobi held an initial hearing on this Petition on June 21, 2013, at which time he
entered a plea of denial on behalf of Ms. Santiago, appointed her counsel, set her final pre-trial
22
conference for July 3, 2013, and ordered no bond, while noting that she had remained in
custody throughout this period.
77. For a period of 36 days, from May 16 to June 21, 2013, Ms. Santiago remained
incarcerated in the Clark County Jail without a hearing of the evidence against her or the right to
confront and cross examine, consideration of bail, appointment of counsel, written notice of the
violations she was found to have committed or accused of, or any other due process
considerations. Despite the fact that her initial sanction only called for a detention of six days, in
reality she was detained for 36 days. During this time without the benefit of counsel, she
routinely questioned officials why she remained incarcerated and asked family members for
assistance.
78. After being appointed counsel and receiving notice of the alleged violations and reasons
for her continued incarceration on June 21, Ms. Santiago remained incarcerated until her eventual
release from Clark County Jail on October 25, 2013, more than five months after she was
initially detained on a six-day sanction.
F. JAMES BENNETT
79. On or about December 21, 2011, James Bennett, after being found guilty of possession of
a narcotic drug, a Class D Felony, by Judge Jacobi in absentia, was sentenced by Judge Jacobi in
Clark Superior/Circuit 2 to a total term of six years, four years to be executed and two years
suspended.
80. On or about March 4, 2013, Judge Jacobi signed an Order modifying the sentence to
allow for the remaining portion of the executed sentence to be served in the Clark County Work
Release Program. Mr. Bennett was immediately transported into the custody of the Clark County
Work Release Center.
23
81. On or about August 8, 2013, unknown Work Release officials accused Mr. Bennett of
violating minor terms of his work release and immediately incarcerated him in the Clark County
Jail. To this day, Mr. Bennett is still unaware of the precise violation that he is alleged to have
committed that resulted in his lengthy incarceration.
82. For the next 74 days, Mr. Bennett remained in the Clark County Jail without a probable
cause hearing, consideration of bail, appointment of counsel, notice of the charges against him,
or any other due process considerations. In fact, a review of Mr. Bennetts CCS from Clark
County Circuit Court contains no entry even mentioning this August incarceration until October
21, 2013 when the record indirectly reflects: Letter received from the Defendant.
83. On October 21, 2013 Mr. Bennett appeared before Judge Jacobi on the Work Release
Centers Petition to Terminate. Judge Jacobi ordered no bond and scheduled a status hearing.
Eventually, on December 9, 2013, Judge Jacobi ordered that Mr. Bennett be reinstated to the
work release program.
G. AMY BENNETT
85. On or about September 11, 2012, Plaintiff Amy Bennett entered a guilty plea and was
convicted of possession of methamphetamine, a Class D Felony. Her imposed sentence was
withheld upon the Defendant entering into the Clark County Drug Treatment Court Program.
On or about September 20, 2012, Judge Jacobi signed an Order granting the withdrawal of Ms.
Bennetts trial counsel.
86. On or about October 26, 2012, Knoebel filed a Petition to terminate Ms. Bennett from the
Drug Court Program and hearing was set for November 1, 2012. On that date, Ms. Bennett failed
to appear for hearing on the Petition to Terminate and Judge Jacobi ordered that she be held on
no bond.
24
87. On or about August 9, 2013, at midnight, Defendants Knoebel and Snelling followed Ms.
Bennetts vehicle to her residence. After Ms. Bennett parked in her homes driveway,
Defendants Knoebel and Snelling approached Ms. Bennett and her boyfriend, James Lindell.
Mr. Snelling handcuffed Ms. Bennett, informed Mr. Lindell that he had a gun in his pocket and
would use it if necessary, and placed Ms. Bennett in the backseat of his vehicle. Ms. Knoebel
then searched Plaintiffs purse as she and Mr. Snelling transported Ms. Bennett to the Clark
County Jail, where Ms. Bennett remained in custody for several months. Pursuant to Indiana state
law, neither Ms. Knoebel, as a probation officer, nor Mr. Snelling, as a court bailiff, have arrest
powers. Indiana Code 35-33-1-1 through 4.
H. LEE SPAULDING
88. On or about March 5, 2013, Plaintiff Lee Spaulding was arrested and charged with
Possession of Marijuana, a Class A Misdemeanor in Circuit Court Division 3.
89. On or about July 16, 2013, Mr. Spaulding appeared for a regularly scheduled court date
and signed and entered into a Misdemeanor Pretrial Diversion Agreement. Generally, this
agreement provided that the State of Indiana would withhold the prosecution of the misdemeanor
marijuana charge and dismiss the charge after 12 months if Mr. Spaulding paid $330 in user
fees to the Clark County Clerk, not commit any criminal offenses during the diversion period,
and report to the Misdemeanor Diversion Coordinator and attend counseling programs at
reasonable times as directed. A Deputy Clark County Prosecuting Attorney also signed the
Agreement on July 16.
90. Despite this clear documentation of Mr. Spauldings entry into the Diversion Agreement,
inexplicably on this same date, July 16, 2013, Judge Joseph P. Weber entered an arrest warrant
against Mr. Spaulding, without bond, for failure to appear for the July 16 pre-trial conference.
25
91. On or about September 11, 2013, Mr. Spaulding was arrested and incarcerated at the
Clark County Jail solely based on the improperly entered arrest warrant entered two months
prior, and he remained incarcerated until the following day. Mr. Spaulding was then released and
the diversion agreement signed by both Mr. Spaulding and the Deputy Prosecutor was finally
entered with the Court on September 13, 2013, nearly two months after its signing.
I. MICHAEL CAMPBELL
92. On or about June 8, 2012, Plaintiff Michael Campbell entered a guilty plea to Possession
of a Narcotic Drug, a Class D Felony, in Circuit Court Division 2. The judgment of conviction
and term of the sentence is to be withheld upon the Defendant entering into the Clark County
Drug Treatment Court Program. Mr. Campbells counsel withdrew further representation via
entry of Order on June 26, 2012.
93. On or about May 23, 2013, according to Mr. Campbells CCS, he was sanctioned a
total of 48 hours incarceration at Clark County Jail for driving without a license and missing an
appointment with Danielle. On or about June 13, a hearing entry states Participant appears,
Phase 1, RB 6/27/13. The next entry involves a hearing on June 27, 2013 when the Court
ordered Hold in CCJ pending placement. A subsequent hearing was held on July 25, 2013 and
the corresponding Order noted that Michael remained in custody: Hold in CCJ pending
placement.
94. For a time period between 54 to 59 days, from May 23 until either July 26 or 31 2013,
Mr. Campbell remained incarcerated in the Clark County Jail without a hearing of the evidence
against him or the right to confront and cross examine, consideration of bail, appointment of
counsel, written notice of the violations he was found to have committed or accused of, or any
26
other due process considerations, despite the fact that his initial sanction only called for a
detention of 48 hours.
95. It is not clear from the record if and when he was released, but on or about August 2,
2013, Drug Court issued an arrest warrant for Mr. Campbell due to his failure to inform drug
court staff of his recent arrest for theft and trespassing. This warrant, issued with no bond, was
served on Mr. Campbell on August 7, 2013 by Defendants Knoebel and Snelling, who entered a
fenced-in backyard where Mr. Campbell was playing with his children. Defendant Snelling
handcuffed Mr. Campbell and, along with Defendant Knoebel, drove him to CCJ in Defendant
Snellings personal vehicle. The Clark County Jails booking sheet lists Jeremy Snelling as the
arresting officer. Pursuant to Indiana state law, neither Ms. Knoebel, as a probation officer, nor
Mr. Snelling, as a court bailiff, have arrest powers. Indiana Code 35-33-1-1 through 4. The
following day he was ordered to remain in CCJ due to the new charges and the recent filing of a
Petition to Terminate. Mr. Campbells CCS indicates that he had previously posted a $3,000
court cash bond relative to these new charges of theft and trespassing.
96. On or about August 20, 2013, an initial hearing was held on the Probation officers
Petition to Terminate Mr. Campbell from the drug court program. No bond was ordered and the
public defender was appointed. Mr. Campbell remained incarcerated pending this Motion to
Terminate until February 20, 2014, at which time Mr. Campbell was terminated from the
program and released because Defendant fully served executed sentence in 365 actual days.
Surplus of 50 actual days is to be used toward Defendants probationary sentence in Circuit
Court 3.
J. AMY TUTTLE
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97. On or about April 12, 2012, Plaintiff Amy Tuttle entered a guilty plea to Possession of a
Narcotic Drug, a Class D Felony, in Circuit Court Division 2. The judgment of conviction and
term of the sentence is to be withheld upon the Defendant entering into the Clark County Drug
Treatment Court Program.
98. It appears from Ms. Tuttles CCS that an Arrest Warrant for Failure to
Appear/Violation of Court Order, NO BOND! was issued six days later, on April 18, 2012.
However it is entirely unclear what proceeding for which Ms. Tuttle failed to appear, as she had
no scheduled hearing dates in the six-day interim. On May 1, 2012, Ms. Tuttle was in custody
and a hearing was held. Advise of rights hearing held. NO BOND. Defendant is being held for
Drug Court. Defendant will be staffed on Thursday, May 3, 2012, by Drug Court Staffing.
99. It is unclear whether Ms. Tuttles case was actually staffed on May 3, 2012, as there is
no hearing entry for that date. The next entry is from June 14, six weeks later, and states:
Participant appears for DTC Phase 1 from CC Jail. Participant waiting on placement. Next DTC
6/28/12. According to Ms. Tuttles booking sheet, she was released from the CC Jail on June
28, 2012.
100. Thus, Ms. Tuttle was incarcerated for a total of 58 days on this first occasion without a
hearing of the evidence against her or the right to confront and cross examine, consideration of
bail, appointment of counsel, written notice of the violations she was found to have committed or
accused of, or any other due process considerations.
101. On May 10, 2013, Ms. Tuttle was once again detained for allegedly testing positive on a
drug screen. (KRATOM) Court orders Defendant be held in CCJ pending staffing next week.
On May 16, the hearing entry states: Sanction- Hold in CCJ pending placement, 500 word essay
due by EOB on 5/20/13. Positive DS. Two weeks later, an order was entered to continue to
28
hold Ms. Tuttle in Clark County Jail pending placement. Eventually, on July 8, 2013, Ms.
Tuttle was released from jail to a half-way house. (St. Elizabeth Maternity Home).
102. On this second occasion, Ms. Tuttle remained incarcerated for a total of 59 days, from
May 10 until July 8, 2013, without a hearing of the evidence against her or the right to confront
and cross examine, consideration of bail, appointment of counsel, written notice of the violations
she was found to have committed or accused of, or any other due process considerations.
K. AMANDA CAMPBELL
103. On or about April 5, 2012, Plaintiff Amanda Campbell entered a guilty plea to Dealing in
Cocaine, a Class B Felony, in Circuit Court Division 2. The judgment of conviction and term of
the sentence is to be withheld upon the Defendant entering into the Clark County Drug Treatment
Court Program. Ms. Campbells counsel was withdrawn from further representation pursuant to
the Courts Order of April 16, 2012.
104. The Courts journal entry of February 5, 2013, hearing conducted by Judge Vicki
Carmichael, states Drug Court Participant and Drug Court Staff Member appears before the
Court. Parties sworn. Testimony heard. Participant to be held in the Clark County Jail pending
staffing on February 7, 2013.
105. On February 7, Ms. Campbell was ordered, based on staffing recommendation, to hold
pending placement. The next entry of hearing does not occur until May 7, 2013, at which time
an Order of Transport & Release was entered and Ms. Campbell was taken by the Sheriff
from jail to Matties House.
106. Therefore, Ms. Campbell remained incarcerated in Clark County Jail for a total of 89
days, from February 7 to May 7, 2013, without a hearing of the evidence against her or the right
to confront and cross examine, consideration of bail, appointment of counsel, written notice of
29
the violations she was found to have committed or accused of, or any other due process
considerations.
L. ROBERT UPTON
107. On or about October 28, 2010, Plaintiff Robert Bobby Upton entered a guilty plea to
Resisting Law Enforcement, a Class D Felony, in Circuit Court Division 2. Judgment and
sentence are to be withheld upon the Defendant entering Drug Treatment Court.
108. According to Mr. Uptons CCS he was sanctioned to serve 6 days in the Clark County
Jail on July 19, 2012. Upon his release on July 25, 2012, Mr. Upton drove to a residence with
his girlfriend while being followed by Defendant Knoebel. Defendant Knoebel confronted Mr.
Upton in the residences driveway and informed that he violated a no-contact order between he
and his girlfriend. Defendant Knoebel instructed a police officer to arrest Mr. Upton and place
him in the police car. Defendant Knoebel then entered the residence and conducted a search.
109. According to Mr. Uptons CCS, he was once again detained on May 16, 2013 for
allegedly testing positive on a drug screen. According to Mr. Uptons booking sheet from the
Clark County Jail, he remained incarcerated from May 16, 2013 to November 27, 2013.
However, Mr. Uptons CCS indicates attorney Larry Wilder appeared on his behalf on June 18,
2013 and subsequently filed a series of continuances which eventually resulted in his August 8,
2013 Drug Court Termination Hearing.
110. Therefore, Mr. Upton remained incarcerated in Clark County Jail for a total of 33 days,
from May 16, 2013 to June 18, 2013, without a hearing of the evidence against him or the right
to confront and cross examine, consideration of bail, appointment of counsel, written notice of
the violations he was found to have committed or accused of, or any other due process
considerations.
30
M. SHANE BRATCHER (formerly Courtney Cowherd)
111. On or about April 30, 2012, Plaintiff Courtney Cowherd (now Shane Bratcher) entered
a guilty plea to Possession of a Narcotic Drug, a Class D Felony, in Circuit Court Division 2.
The judgment of conviction and term of the sentence is to be withheld upon the Defendant
entering into the Clark County Drug Treatment Court Program. Mr. Bratchers counsel
withdrew further representation via entry of Order on May 22, 2012.
112. Mr. Bratcher appeared to comply with all the rules as well as the numerous and often
undefined payments associated with the Drug Court. On March 21, 2013 Judge Jacobi informed
Mr. Bratcher that he would graduate from Drug Court on May 9, 2013. Later that week, Mr.
Bratcher was told by case manager Josh Seybold that his next appearance would be on May 9,
2013 for graduation. However, on or about April 19, 2013, Mr. Bratcher was called into Drug
Court where Defendant Seybold and Defendant Knoebel sanctioned him for 48 hours and
instructed Mr. Bratcher that he will not graduate on May 9, 2013 because he missed a court date
on April 18, 2013.
113. Mr. Bratcher did not graduate and was forced to remain in the Drug Court program and
continue paying significant sums of money until February 6, 2014 when Prosecutor McKayla
Gilbert submitted an Agreed Order to Terminate. Defendant terminated from his placement in
Drug Court Program and case shall be dismissed with prejudice. (RJO) (Notice) (The State has
the discretion to dismiss any criminal case it chooses).
114. Therefore, Mr. Bratcher remained on probation and as a court-mandated Drug Court
participant for nearly two years. Upon information and belief, Mr. Bratchers executed sentence
of probation well exceeded the sentence originally imposed and the maximum possible length of
31
time outlined in his Drug Court Agreement solely due to his inability to pay the excessive fees
imposed monthly.
N. JUSTIN LANHAM
115. On or about August 1, 2013, Plaintiff Justin Lanham entered a guilty plea to Theft, a
Class D Felony, in Circuit Court Division 4. Judgment withheld due to defendant entering Drug
Court Program. Mr. Lanhams counsel withdrew further representation via entry of Order on
August 7, 2013.
116. On August 2, 2013, Mr. Lanham was sanctioned and held in CCJ pending placement.
He was eventually released to the Serenity House on August 26, 2013.
117. Therefore, Mr. Lanham remained incarcerated in Clark County Jail for a total of 24 days,
from August 2, 2013 to August 26, 2013, without a hearing of the evidence against him or the
right to confront and cross examine, consideration of bail, appointment of counsel, written notice
of the violations he was found to have committed or accused of, or any other due process
considerations.
O. TRENTNEY RHODES
118. On or about March 1, 2012, Plaintiff Trentney Rhodes entered a guilty plea to Dealing in
Cocaine, a Class B Felony, in Circuit Court Division 2. The judgment of conviction and term of
the sentence is to be withheld upon the Defendant entering into the Clark County Drug Treatment
Court Program. Mr. Rhodes counsel withdrew further representation via entry of Order on
April 16, 2012.
119. It appears from Mr. Rhodes CCS that a bench warrant was issued for Mr. Rhodes
failure to appear on November 29, 2012. Mr. Rhodes was unable to appear because at the
32
scheduled date and time he was attending a mandated probation meeting in Jefferson County,
Kentucky. Mr. Rhodes had previously informed Defendant Seybold of this conflict.
120. Mr. Rhodes was arrested and incarcerated to the CCJ on December 3, 2012 where he
remained until December 21, 2012 when he was transported to the Serenity House.
121. Mr. Rhodes remained incarcerated in Clark County Jail for a total of 18 days, from
December 3, 2012 to December 21, 2012, without a hearing of the evidence against him or the
of the violations he was found to have committed or accused of, or any other due process
considerations.
P. JOANIE WATSON
122. On or about October 27, 2011, Plaintiff Joanie Watson entered a guilty plea to Illegally
Acquiring a Controlled Substance, a Class D Felony, in Circuit Court Division 2. The judgment
of conviction and term of the sentence is to be withheld upon the Defendant entering into the
Clark County Drug Treatment Court Program. Ms. Watsons counsel withdrew further
representation via entry of Order on November 2, 2011.
123. It appears from Ms. Watsons CCS that she was sanctioned to 30 days in the CCJ on
December 8, 2011. Mag. William Dawkins presiding over Drug Treatment Court. Participant
appear for DTC Phase 1 from CC Jail. Participant given a 30 day, beginning today, sanction for
violation of DTC Rule and Participant to be held pending placement. Next DTC date 12/22/11.
The next entry into the CCS was dated December 29, 2011, and it simply stated,
Correspondence received from the Defendant. Ms. Watson appeared from the CCJ for some
type of hearing on January 5, 2012, but she was not released from the CCJ until January 25,
2012.
33
124. Therefore, Ms. Watson remained incarcerated in Clark County Jail for a total of 48 days,
from December 8, 2012 to January 25, 2013, without a hearing of the evidence against her or the
of the violations she was found to have committed or accused of, or any other due process
considerations.
125. Ms. Watson was again sanctioned to the CCJ on May 16, 2013. Ms. Watson and
approximately 15 other Drug Court participants were placed in handcuffs by Drug Court staff,
including Jeremy Snelling and Susan Knoebel, and taken to the CCJ for allegedly testing positive
for kratum. Ms. Watsons CCS indicates she was held in the CCJ pending further order from the
court. According to the Clark County Jails booking sheet, Ms. Watson was incarcerated from
May 16, 2013 to October 30, 2013. However, Ms. Watson presented to an initial hearing and
was appointed counsel on June 14, 2013.
126. Ms. Watson was incarcerated for another 29 days, from May 16, 2013 to June 14, 2013,
until she was appointed counsel. In total, Ms. Watson was incarcerated for 77 days without a
hearing of the evidence against her or the right to confront and cross examine, consideration of
bail, appointment of counsel, written notice of the violations he was found to have committed or
accused of, or any other due process considerations.
VI. CLASS ALLEGATIONS
128. The Named Plaintiffs seek to pursue claims both for themselves and for the class of those
others similarly situated. Named Plaintiffs submit that the classes should be organized into four
separate classes as outlined below.
129. At the outset, it should be noted that it is well-settled Supreme Court precedent that
[c]lass relief is peculiarly appropriate when the issues involved are common to the class as a
34
whole and when they turn on questions of law applicable in a manner to each member of the
class. Estate of Vandam v. Daniels, 278 F.R.D. 415 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of
Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982)). Claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 are uniquely
qualified for treatment as a class action. Generally federal courts are encouraged to liberally
construe Fed. Rule of Civ. Proc. 23 as applied to civil rights class actions, as the purpose of 42
USC 1983 is to provide a broad remedy for all who fit the plaintiffs class. Carey v. Greyhound
Bus Co., 500 F.2d 1372, 1380 (5
th
Cir. 1974).
130. In summary, the above Plaintiffs, representative of proposed Classes A and/or B, endured
the following sentences as drug court participants without hearing or counsel:
A. Destiny Hoffman (counsel withdrawn April 18, 2012):
1. 51 days (May 1-June 20, 2013): taken into custody pending staffing, hold
pending placement;
2. 154 days (June 20, 2013-January 24, 2014): Initially sanctioned 48 hours; hold
pending evaluation and treatment recommendations.

B. Nathan Clifford (counsel withdrawn December 28, 2011):
1. 104 days (February 21-June 5, 2013): Initially sanctioned 48 hours; continue
to hold in CCJ pending placement.

C. Joshua Foley (represented himself as of March 6, 2013):
1. 68 days (June 27-September 3, 2013); initially sanctioned 30 days (without full
hearing); hold pending placement.

D. Jesse Hash (pre-trial detainment; counsel not appointed until October 7, 2013):
1. 60 days (August 8-October 7, 2013).

E. Ashleigh Santiago (counsel withdrawn August 6, 2012):
1. 36 days (May 16-June 21, 2013): initially sanctioned 72 hours x 2; continue to
hold in CCJ pending staffing.

F. Michael Campbell (counsel withdrawn June 26, 2012):
1. 54-59 days (May 23- July 26 or 31, 2013): initially sanctioned 48 hours;
pending placement.

G. Amy Tuttle
1. 58 days (May 1-June 28, 2012): Participant waiting on placement.
35
2. 59 days (May 10-July 8, 2013): Hold in CCJ pending placement.

H. Amanda Campbell (counsel withdrawn April 16, 2012)
1. 89 days (February 7-May 7, 2013): pending staffing; pending placement.

I. Robert Upton
1. 33 days (May 16-June 18, 2013); Hold in CCJ pending further order.

J. Justin Lanham
1. 24 days (August 2-26, 2013): held pending placement.

K. Trentney Rhodes (counsel withdrawn April 16, 2012)
1. 18 days (August 2-August 26, 2013)

L. Joanie Watson (counsel withdrawn November 2, 2011)
1. 48 days (December 3-December 21, 2012): initially sanctioned 30 days; to be
held pending placement.
2. 29 days (May 16-June 14, 2013): Hold in CCJ pending further order.

A. Class A
131. Class A, represented by Named Plaintiffs Destiny Hoffman, Nathan Clifford, Joshua
Foley, Ashleigh Santiago, Michael Campbell, Amy Tuttle, Amanda Campbell, Robert Upton,
Justin Lanham, Trentney Rhodes, and Joanie Watson, consists of:
All persons who were probationers and/or participants in Clark County Indianas
Drug Treatment Court Program, Clark County Circuit Court 2, and who were
incarcerated for more than 72 hours without hearing or other due process of law in
violation of their 14
th
Amendment rights (as enunciated by Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 US 778 (1973) and Gosha v. State of Indiana, 931 N.E.2d 432 (Ind. App.
2010), among others), from February 19, 2012 to the date of the order granting
class certification.

132. As defined above, Class A meets all the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Particularly:
A. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The precise
number of class members is unknown at this time but is expected to well exceed 40
individuals for the following reasons:
36
1. As of May 31, 2013, there were 74 current drug court participants, and
obviously many more participants had been either released from the Court prior to
that date or added to drug court subsequent to that date; and

2. The legislatively-known nature of addiction, combined with the consistently
applied unconstitutional practices of Clark County Circuit Court 2, necessitates a
presumption that a majority of these drug court participants were alleged to have
violated a rule and consequently were incarcerated for more than 72 hours.

B. There are questions of law and fact common to the proposed class. Each
prospective class member has sustained the same exact injury, unlawful incarceration
(albeit to varying degrees) and each class members claim depends on a common
contention, that the standard practices of detaining Clark County Drug Treatment Court
participants for more than 72 hours without due process is an unconstitutional deprivation
of liberty. Common questions of law and fact include:
1. Whether the practice of Clark County Circuit Division 2, by and through
employees working in its Court and other employees, agencies and bodies of
Clark County, Indiana, of imposing de facto probation revocations of more than
72 hours without providing hearing and/or related due process rights was
unconstitutional;

2. Whether the Courts customary and repetitive practices of holding drug court
participants in jail well after the sanctioned incarceration period has expired for
the stated reasons of pending placement, pending staffing, pending
evaluation and treatment and similar explanations, amount to partial probation
revocations and/or the deprivation of liberty interests which require due process;

3. Whether the Courts consistent failure to grant any bond whatsoever or
reconsider bond at any time during these lengthy incarcerations is an
unconstitutional violation of the class members due process rights;

4. Whether the Courts customary practices of finding that the class member(s)
violated the Drug Courts rules or probation based on information provided solely
by probation officers at the initial hearing without a second hearing and full
presentment of the evidence, the opportunity of cross examination, written
notification of the allegations and findings, or the right to counsel is a
constitutional violation; and

37
5. Whether each of the named Defendants is liable for said constitutional
violations and the nature of this liability.

C. The Claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class. The
eleven named representatives were participants of Clark County Drug Treatment Court
during the relevant time period, were all under the jurisdiction of Judge Jacobi and
Circuit Court 2, and were all incarcerated for a minimum of 18 days for alleged violations
of drug court rules and probation without hearing or bond. As each of the eleven
members CCS contain nearly identical entries regarding the reasons for incarceration,
such as sanction, pending placement, pending staffing, etc., it is anticipated that
remaining members of the class will have been incarcerated for similar stated reasons and
similarly without bail, hearing, or other due process rights.
D. The eleven representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class. Named Plaintiffs, as well as the class as a whole, all have similar stories to tell,
similar claims to make, and identical interests in a successful resolution of the claims of
each and every other class member. The interests of each representative party are
perfectly aligned with those of every other representative party as well as every member
of the prospective class. Additionally, the named representative parties have retained
counsel to represent the class as a whole that is experienced and uniquely skilled in the
filing, litigation and trial of claims arising under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and other federal court
actions, and also experienced in the litigation of class action suits. The prospective class
is adequately represented.
133. Class A is seeking remedies in the form of money and punitive damages against
Defendants and is brought under Rule 23(b)(3). This requirement is satisfied, as the questions of
38
law or fact common to the members of the prospective class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members (see paragraph 132(B) above), and a certification of Class A is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
Specifically, there are no known or anticipated interests or concerns of prospective class
members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions, there are no known
causes of action that have been filed to date alleging similar claims, all litigation would properly
be concentrated in the Southern District of Indiana, and there should be no extraordinary
difficulty in the management of a class action as the total number of class members will be
manageable and the identities of all prospective class members will be readily accessible.
134. The potential liability of the Defendants is a common question that can be decided for all
proposed class members, even if the extent of any damages among them variesThe overriding
legal issue is whether the Defendant had a policy, practice, or custom in place that accounted for
the length of the class members detentions. The only individualized issues that are apparent at
this stage of the litigation are those related to damages. The significant and common issue of
whether the Defendant is liable for unconstitutional restraints on liberty outweighs individualized
damages issues, and the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) has been met. Donovan v.
St. Joseph County Sheriff, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63847 (N.D. Ind. 2012).
B. Class B
135. Class B, represented by Named Plaintiffs Destiny Hoffman, Nathan Clifford, Joshua
Foley, Ashleigh Santiago, Amy Bennett, Jesse Hash, Amy Tuttle, Amanda Campbell, Robert
Upton, Justin Lanham, Trentney Rhodes, and Joanie Watson, consists of:
All persons who are or will be subject to the jurisdiction of Clark County
Indianas Drug Treatment Court Program, Clark County Circuit Court 2, as a
probationer or Clark County Drug Court participant and who therefore face or will
39
face the possibility of being alleged or determined to be in violation of the rules,
terms, and or policies of probation or Drug Court;

136. Class B meets all the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
namely numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation for the same reasons
as Class A, as noted in paragraph 132 above. Additionally, it is anticipated that the number of
prospective class members is even higher than those in Class A (although still a manageable
number of easily identifiable individuals) and that each class member shares a precisely identical
motivation, to obtain a declaration that Clark County Circuit Court 2s incarceration policies,
practices and customs are unconstitutional and obtaining a permanent injunction to ensure that
the class members will not be subjected to the deprivation of liberty without due process of law.
137. Class B is seeking remedies in the form of injunctive and declaratory judgment against
Defendants and is brought under Rule 23(b)(1) and (2). This requirement is satisfied, as the
named representative Plaintiffs are seeking are seeking remedies that would enjoin the
Defendants from further unconstitutional action and inaction and declare the actions taken
against all those who are currently under the jurisdiction of Clark County Circuit Court 2 or will
be in the future. Thus, prosecution of separate actions for each member of Class B would create
an identifiable risk of inconsistent orders that would establish incompatible standards of conduct
for the various defendants or be practically dispositive of the interests of all unnamed Plaintiffs.
Additionally, Rule 23(b)(2) is satisfied because the Defendants have or will act(ed)/refuse(d) to
act on grounds which are wholly applicable to all members of proposed Class B. Final injunctive
and declaratory relief would be appropriately applied to all those under the Courts jurisdiction or
who will be in the future.
C. Class C
40
138. Class C, represented by Named Plaintiffs Amy Bennett, Ashleigh Santiago, Michael
Campbell, and Robert Upton, consists of:
All persons who were arrested in Clark County, Indiana by state actors working in
Clark County Circuit Court 2 with no arrest powers and whose arrest was not
otherwise lawful pursuant to Indiana Code 35-33-1-4, from February 18, 2012 to
the date of the order granting class certification.

139. As defined above, Class C meets all the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Particularly:
A. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The precise
number of class members is unknown at this time but is expected to well exceed the
requirements of numerosity for the following reasons:
1. As of May 31, 2013, there were 74 current drug court participants, and
obviously many more participants had been either released from the Court prior to
that date or added to drug court subsequent to that date; and

2. While there are only four named Plaintiffs that currently fit in this class, upon
information and belief several other individuals have come forward with similar
stories of unlawful arrest by Ms. Knoebel and Mr. Snelling. Each have made
statements that such practices of arresting (or escorting as it has been
improperly and inconsequentially labeled) individuals by themselves without
contacting appropriate authorities were routine.

B. There are questions of law and fact common to the proposed class. Each
prospective class member has sustained the same exact injury, unlawful arrest by those
without legal authority to do so (and without the commiserate training, supervision and
experience to do it properly), and each class members claim depends on a common
contention, that the standard practices of certain employees working in Clark County
Circuit Court 2 to arrest citizens when they had no arrest powers are unconstitutional.
Common questions of law and fact include:
41
1. Whether Ms. Knoebel and Mr. Snelling had the legal authority to arrest under
Indiana Code Indiana Code 35-33-1-1 through 4;

2. Whether the actions of Ms. Knoebel and Mr. Snelling amount to an arrest
and/or seizure of the person under the Fourth Amendment, defined by the
Supreme Court as a governmentally caused termination of an individuals
freedom of movement. Brower v. City of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989);

3. Whether the state actors named in their individual capacities are entitled to
qualified immunity or whether these actors violated clearly established
constitutional rights; and

4. Whether the actions and inactions of other named Defendants sued in their
official capacities amounted county policies, practices, and customs, formal or
informal, and whether any such inactions were caused by deliberate indifference
to the constitutional rights of the proposed class members.

5. Whether each of the named Defendants is liable for said constitutional
violations and the nature of this liability.

C. The Claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class. The
named representatives were arrested by the same two individuals, and presumably all
other Class B members were arrested by these employees as well under similar
circumstances.
D. The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class. Named Plaintiffs, as well as the class as a whole, all have been arrested under very
similar situations and all will have identical interests in a successful resolution of the
claims of each and every other class member. The interests of each representative party
are perfectly aligned with those of every other representative party as well as every
member of the prospective class. Additionally, the named representative parties have
retained counsel to represent the class as a whole that is experienced and uniquely skilled
in the filing, litigation and trial of claims arising under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and other federal
42
court actions, and also experienced in the litigation of class action suits. The prospective
class is adequately represented.
140. Class C is seeking remedies in the form of money and punitive damages against
Defendants and is brought under Rule 23(b)(3). This requirement is satisfied, as the questions of
law or fact common to the members of the prospective class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members (see paragraph 139(B) above), and a certification of Class C is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
Specifically, there are no known or anticipated interests or concerns of prospective class
members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions, there are no known
causes of action that have been filed to date alleging similar claims, all litigation would properly
be concentrated in the Southern District of Indiana, and there should be no extraordinary
difficulty in the management of a class action as the total number of class members will be
manageable and the identities of all prospective class members will be readily accessible.
Furthermore, the damages sustained by each prospective class member will be very similar, if not
identical.
D. Class D
141. Class D, represented by Named Plaintiffs Destiny Hoffman, Nathan Clifford, Joshua
Foley, Ashleigh Santiago, Amy Bennett, Jesse Hash, Amy Tuttle, Amanda Campbell, Robert
Upton, Justin Lanham, Trentney Rhodes, and Joanie Watson, consists of:
All persons who are or will be subject to arrest in Clark County, Indiana by state
actors working in Clark County Circuit Court 2 that have no arrest powers and
whose arrest was not otherwise lawful pursuant to Indiana Code 35-33-1-4.

142. Class D meets all the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
namely numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation for the same reasons
43
as Class C, as noted in paragraph 139 above. Additionally, it is anticipated that the number of
prospective class members is even higher than those in Class C (although still a manageable
number of easily identifiable individuals) and that each class member shares a precisely identical
motivation, to obtain a declaration that the policies, practices and customs of Clark County and
Circuit Court 2 in allowing employees without arrest powers arresting citizens is unconstitutional
and obtaining a permanent injunction to ensure that the class members will not be subjected to
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
143. Class D is seeking remedies in the form of injunctive and declaratory judgment against
Defendants and is brought under Rule 23(b)(1) and (2). This requirement is satisfied, as the
named representative Plaintiffs are seeking remedies that would enjoin the Defendants from
further unconstitutional action and inaction and declare the actions taken against all those who
are arrested unlawfully by individuals acting under the color of law or will be in the future. Thus,
prosecution of separate actions for each member of Class D would create an identifiable risk of
inconsistent orders that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the various
Defendants or be practically dispositive of the interests of all unnamed Plaintiffs. Additionally,
Rule 23(b)(2) is satisfied because the Defendants have or will act(ed)/refuse(d) to act on grounds
which are wholly applicable to all members of proposed Class D. Final injunctive and
declaratory relief would be appropriately applied to all those under the Courts jurisdiction or
who will be in the future.
E. Adequacy of Representation
144. Undersigned counsel for the Named Plaintiffs are appropriate and adequate attorneys to
fairly and adequately represent the interests of each of the four classes and should be so
appointed pursuant to Rule 23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Said counsel have
44
expended considerable hours identifying and investigating potential claims in this action, have
considerable experience in handling class actions, complex litigation, and 42 U.S.C. 1983
claims and vast knowledge of the issues and law applicable herein, and are willing to commit the
necessary resources necessary to successfully prosecute the claims of each of the four prospective
classes.
VII. ALLEGATIONS OF NAMED PLAINTIFFS
A. Claims of Plaintiffs Hoffman, Clifford, Foley, Santiago, Michael Campbell, Tuttle,
Amanda Campbell, Upton, Bratcher, Lanham, Rhodes, and Watson Re: Due Process
Violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, or, in the Alternative, Eighth
Amendment Violations of Excessive Bail and Cruel and Unusual Punishment

145. The aforementioned actions and/or inactions of certain Defendants amounts to the
unconstitutional deprivation of Plaintiffs Hoffman, Clifford, Foley, Santiago, Michael Campbell,
Tuttle, Amanda Campbell, Upton, Bratcher, Lanham, Rhodes, and Watsons constitutional right
to be free from deprivation of their liberty interests without due process, as well as the rights of
those unnamed Plaintiffs similarly situated.
146. The specific conduct described, which generally consisted of incarceration for lengthy
periods of time without hearing, notice, counsel, the consideration of bond, or the opportunity to
hear evidence against them and cross examine witnesses, and/or the imposition of probation for a
time period beyond that originally sentenced, is in violation of the Plaintiffs due process rights
under the 5
th
and 14
th
Amendments, as explained in many well settled cases from over 40 years
of jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court (Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)), Seventh Circuit (United States v. Kirtley, 5 F.3d
1110 (7
th
Cir. 1993)), U.S. District Courts of Indiana (White v. Steuben County, 2011 U.S. Dist.
45
LEXIS 110404 (N.D. Ind. 2011), and Indiana State Court (Gosha v. State of Indiana, 931 N.E.2d
432 (Ind. App. 2010)).
147. In the alternative, if Plaintiffs are identified as prisoners without liberty interests, then this
classification implicates the Eighth Amendment protections against excessive bail and cruel and
unusual punishments, which has been violated by the actions and inactions of certain Defendants
amounting to deliberate indifference to the rights of Plaintiffs.
148. Judge Jacobi is sued herein for the sole purposes of obtaining a declaration that all current
and future Clark County Drug Treatment Court participants and probationers have a
constitutional right to be free from incarceration without due process of law and that Judge
Jacobis current policies, practices and customs are in violation of those constitutional rights.
149. Defendants Knoebel, Snelling, Seybold, and Ford are each liable in their individual
capacities because each was directly responsible for the due process violations sustained by the
above-named Plaintiffs, as well as unnamed Plaintiffs similarly situated. The four state actors
were all responsible for the administration of drug court and monitoring of participants, and their
actions and inactions in incarcerating these Plaintiffs and in failing to prevent, address or stop the
lengthy incarcerations and failing to insure that the Plaintiffs received due process prior to
incarceration directly caused these constitutional deprivations and amount to deliberate
indifference to the rights of the Plaintiffs named above. None of the four Defendants are entitled
to qualified immunity as the constitutional violations that each committed were clearly
established in this jurisdiction, as evidenced in Paragraph 146 herein.
150. Defendants Knoebel, Snelling, Seybold, and Ford are each liable in their official
capacities as employees and agents of Clark County because each had policymaking authority
with regards to the incarceration and adjudication of drug court participants and/or each
46
implemented or executed policies, practices and customs of Clark County which were
unconstitutional, and each was deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs
named above, as well as the rights of unnamed Plaintiffs similarly situated.
151. Defendant Clark County Sheriff Danny Rodden is liable in his individual capacity
because he was directly responsible for the due process violations sustained by the above-named
Plaintiffs, as well as unnamed Plaintiffs similarly situated. Sherriff Rodden is responsible for the
management of the Clark County Jail and the care and custody of those inmates incarcerated in
the Jail, including the Plaintiffs named above. Sheriff Roddens actions and inactions in failing to
address the lengthy incarcerations of the Plaintiffs named above and/or notify the Court and court
administrators of the continued custody of these Plaintiffs directly caused the constitutional
deprivations detailed herein. Defendant Sheriff Rodden is not entitled to qualified immunity as s
the constitutional violations that he directly committed were clearly established in this
jurisdiction, as evidenced in Paragraph 146 herein.
152. Defendant Sheriff Rodden liable in his official capacity as an employee and agent of
Clark County because he has policymaking authority with regards to the continued incarceration
and custody of drug court participants and/or he implemented or executed policies, practices and
customs of Clark County which were unconstitutional, and he was deliberately indifferent to
the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs named above, as well as the rights of unnamed Plaintiffs
similarly situated.
153. Defendant Clark County Commissioners, as a body politic and the county executive of
Clark County, Indiana is liable to Plaintiffs named above, and those unnamed Plaintiffs similarly
situated, because it has policymaking authority over the treatments of its citizens, the operations
of Clark County Drug Treatment Court, Clark County Probation and Supervision, Clark County
47
Controlled Substances Supervision, Clark County Sheriffs Department and Clark County Drug
Court Advisory Committee/Team, and the hiring, supervision, and training of Clark County
employees. Clark County Commissioners implemented or executed policies, practices and
customs of Clark County which were unconstitutional, and the body was deliberately
indifferent to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs named above, as well as the rights of
unnamed Plaintiffs similarly situated.
154. Plaintiffs Hoffman, Clifford, Foley, Santiago, Michael Campbell, Tuttle, Amanda
Campbell, Upton, Bratcher, Lanham, Rhodes, and Watson, on behalf of themselves and those
similarly situated, are respectfully seeking monetary damages in the form of compensatory,
consequential and punitive damages, and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining
further violation of their constitutional rights against Defendants Knoebel, Snelling, Seybold,
Ford, Sheriff Rodden, both in their individual and official capacities, and Clark County
Commissioners in its official capacity.
B. Claims of Plaintiff Jesse Hash Re: Violations of the Fourth Amendment for
Unreasonable Seizure of the Person and Due Process Violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments

unconstitutional deprivation of Plaintiff Jesse Hashs constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable seizure of the Person, protected by the Fourth Amendment, and from deprivation of
his liberty interests without due process, protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
156. The specific conduct described, which consisted of the significant incarceration of this
pretrial detainee, who was charged without warrant, for 60 days without finding of probable
cause, hearing, notice, counsel, the consideration of bond, or the opportunity to hear evidence
against him and cross examine witnesses, is in violation of Plaintiff Jesse Hashs due process
48
rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as explained in many well settled
cases from over 40 years of jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court (Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103 (1974), Seventh Circuit (Sivard v. Pulaski County, 959 F.2d 662 (7
th
Cir. 1993))
(The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment requires a prompt judicial
determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to an extended pretrial detention following a
warrantless arrest); Coleman v. Fantz, 754 F.2d 719 (7
th
Cir. 1985) (holding that an 18-day
detention without appearance before a judge or magistrate is a deprivation of liberty without due
process of law)), and the Southern District of Indiana (Holloway v. Del. County Sheriff, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77804 (S.D. Ind. 2012).
and future Clark County Circuit Court 2 pretrial detainees arrested without warrant have a
constitutional right to a prompt probable cause hearing and to be free from a significant
deprivation of liberty without probable cause and other requisite due process considerations and
that Judge Jacobis current policies, practices and customs are in violation of those constitutional
rights.
because he was directly responsible for the due process violations sustained by Plaintiff Jesse
Hash. Sherriff Rodden is responsible for the management of the Clark County Jail and the care
and custody of those inmates and pretrial detainees incarcerated in the Jail, including Mr. Hash.
Sheriff Roddens actions and inactions in failing to address the lengthy incarceration of the
Plaintiff and/or notify the Court and court administrators of the continued custody of Jesse Hash
directly caused the constitutional deprivations detailed herein. Defendant Sheriff Rodden is not
49
entitled to qualified immunity as s the constitutional violations that he directly committed against
Jesse Hash were clearly established in this jurisdiction, as evidenced in Paragraph 156 herein.
159. Defendant Sheriff Rodden is liable in his official capacity as an employee and agent of
and custody of inmates and pretrial detainees and/or he implemented or executed policies,
practices and customs of Clark County which were unconstitutional, and he was deliberately
indifferent to the constitutional rights of Jesse Hash.
Clark County, Indiana is liable to Plaintiff Jesse Hash because it has policymaking authority over
the treatments of its citizens, the operations of Clark County Jail, Clark County Sheriffs Office
and Clark County Commissioners implemented or executed policies, practices and customs of
Clark County which were unconstitutional, and the body was deliberately indifferent to the
constitutional rights of Plaintiff Jesse Hash.
161. Plaintiff Jesse Hash is respectfully seeking monetary damages in the form of
compensatory, consequential and punitive damages, and preliminary and permanent injunctive
relief enjoining further violation of his constitutional rights against Defendant Sherriff Rodden,
in his individual and official capacities, and Clark County Commissioners in its official capacity.
C. Claims of Plaintiff James Bennett Re: Due Process Violations of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, or, in the Alternative, Eighth Amendment Violations of Excessive
Bail and Cruel and Unusual Punishment

unconstitutional deprivation of Plaintiff James Bennetts constitutional right to be free from
deprivation of his liberty interests without due process.
50
163. The specific conduct described, which generally consisted of incarceration of this
individual probationer on work release for 74 days without hearing, notice, counsel, the
consideration of bond, or the opportunity to hear evidence against him and cross examine
witnesses, is in violation of Plaintiff James Bennetts due process rights under the 5
th
and 14
th

Amendments, as explained in many well settled cases from over 40 years of jurisprudence of the
United States Supreme Court (Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972)), Seventh Circuit (United States v. Kirtley, 5 F.3d 1110 (7
th
Cir. 1993)),
U.S. District Courts of Indiana (White v. Steuben County, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110404 (N.D.
Ind. 2011), and Indiana State Court (Gosha v. State of Indiana, 931 N.E.2d 432 (Ind. App.
2010)).
164. In the alternative, if Plaintiff, as a convicted individual on work release, is identified as a
prisoner without liberty interests, then this classification implicates the Eighth Amendment
protections against excessive bail and cruel and unusual punishments, which has been violated by
the actions and actions of certain Defendants amounting to deliberate indifference to the rights
of Plaintiff James Bennett.
and future Clark County Circuit Court 2 probationers on work release have a constitutional right
to be free from incarceration without due process of law and that Judge Jacobis current policies,
practices and customs are in violation of those constitutional rights.
166. Defendants Unknown Clark County Work Release Employee(s) responsible for
incarcerating James Bennett on August 8, 2013, Grissett and Mason are each liable in their
individual capacities because each was directly responsible for the due process violations
sustained by James Bennett as described above. The three state actors were all responsible for the
51
administration of the work release program and monitoring of work release participants, and their
actions and inactions in incarcerating Mr. Bennett and failing to prevent, address or stop his
lengthy incarceration failing to insure that Mr. Bennett received due process prior to
incarceration directly caused his constitutional deprivations and amount to deliberate indifference
to the rights of the Plaintiff James Bennett. None of the three Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity as the constitutional violations that each committed against James Bennett were clearly
established in this jurisdiction, as evidenced in Paragraph 163 herein.
167. Defendants Unknown Clark County Work Release Employee(s) responsible for
incarcerating James Bennett on August 8, 2013, Grissett and Mason are each liable in their
official capacities as employees and agents of Clark County because each had policymaking
authority with regards to the incarceration and adjudication of work release participants and/or
each implemented or executed policies, practices and customs of Clark County which were
unconstitutional, and each was deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs
James Bennett.
because he was directly responsible for the due process violations sustained by Plaintiff James
Bennett. Sherriff Rodden is responsible for the management of the Clark County Jail and the care
and custody of those inmates incarcerated in the Jail, including Mr. Bennett. Sheriff Roddens
actions and inactions in failing to address the lengthy incarceration of the Plaintiff and/or notify
the Court and court administrators of the continued custody of James Bennett directly caused the
constitutional deprivations detailed herein. Defendant Sheriff Rodden is not entitled to qualified
immunity as the constitutional violations that he directly committed against James Bennett were
clearly established in this jurisdiction, as evidenced in Paragraph 163 herein.
52
169. Defendant Sheriff Rodden liable in his official capacity as an employee and agent of
and custody of work release participants and/or he implemented or executed policies, practices
and customs of Clark County which were unconstitutional, and he was deliberately indifferent
to the constitutional rights of James Bennett.
of Clark County Work Release Program, Clark County Probation and Supervision, Clark County
Community Corrections, and Clark County Sheriffs Department, and the hiring, supervision,
and training of Clark County employees. Clark County Commissioners implemented or executed
policies, practices and customs of Clark County which were unconstitutional, and the body was
deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of Plaintiff James Bennett.
171. Plaintiff James Bennett is respectfully seeking monetary damages in the form of
compensatory, consequential and punitive damages, and preliminary and permanent injunctive
relief enjoining further violation of his constitutional rights against Defendants Unknown Clark
County Work Release Employee(s) responsible for incarcerating James Bennett on August 8,
2013, Grissett, Mason and Sheriff Rodden, both in their individual and official capacities, and
Clark County Commissioners in its official capacity.
D. Claims of Plaintiffs Amy Bennett, Santiago, Michael Campbell, and Upton Re:
Unlawful Arrest in Violations of the Fourth Amendment

unconstitutional deprivation of Plaintiffs Amy Bennett, Ashleigh Santiago, Robert Upton, and
53
Michael Campbell constitutional right to be free unreasonable searches and seizures of their
persons, as well as the rights of those unnamed Plaintiffs similarly situated.
173. The specific conduct described, which consisted of the termination of freedom of
movement through means intentionally applied by certain Defendants acting under the color of
state law, but without lawful arrest powers, is in violation of the Plaintiffs rights under the
Fourth Amendment, as explained in Brower v. City of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989); Malone v.
County of Suffolk, 968 F.2d 1480 (2
nd
Cir. 1992) (whether officers have valid authority to arrest
pursuant to state law affects the constitutionality of the arrest); Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349
(10
th
Cir. 1990) (warrantless arrest executed outside of the arresting officers jurisdiction is
analogous to a warrantless arrest without probable cause which is presumptively
unreasonable); and United States v. Foster, 566 F. Supp. 14003 (D.D.C. 1983) (concept of
reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment logically presupposes an exercise of lawful
authority by a police officer).
174. Judge Jacobi is sued herein for the sole purposes of obtaining a declaration that his
policy, practices and custom of authorizing, instructing or permitting those individuals employed
in Clark County Circuit Court 2 is in violation of the constitutional rights of all current and future
individuals under his jurisdiction and that all said individuals have a constitutional right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures performed by individuals without lawful arrest
powers.
175. Defendants Knoebel and Snelling are each liable in their individual capacities because
each was directly responsible for the due process violations sustained by the above-named
Plaintiffs, as well as unnamed Plaintiffs similarly situated. These state actors were the ones who
actually arrested Plaintiffs Amy Bennett, Ashleigh Santiago, and Michael Campbell and neither
54
had the authority to arrest under Indiana law, thus both Knoebel and Snelling directly caused the
constitutional deprivations complained of herein. Neither Defendant is entitled to qualified
immunity on these claims of Fourth Amendment violations because the right to be free from
unlawful arrest was clearly established, as evidenced in Paragraph 173 herein.
176. Defendants Knoebel, Snelling and Ford are each liable in their official capacities as
employees and agents of Clark County for the claims made by Plaintiffs Amy Bennett, Ashleigh
Santiago, Robert Upton, and Michael Campbell above because each had policymaking authority
with regards to the arrest of drug court participants and/or each implemented or executed
policies, practices and customs of Clark County which were unconstitutional, and each was
deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs named above, as well as the
rights of unnamed Plaintiffs similarly situated.
of Clark County Drug Treatment Court, Clark County Probation and Supervision, and Clark
County Controlled Substances Supervision, and the hiring, supervision, and training of Clark
County employees. Clark County Commissioners implemented or executed policies, practices
and customs of Clark County which were unconstitutional and allowed those employees to arrest
citizens without legal authority, and the body was deliberately indifferent to the constitutional
rights of Plaintiffs named above, as well as the rights of unnamed Plaintiffs similarly situated.
178. Plaintiffs Amy Bennett, Ashleigh Santiago, Robert Upton, and Michael Campbell, on
behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, are respectfully seeking monetary damages in
the form of compensatory, consequential and punitive damages, and preliminary and permanent
55
injunctive relief enjoining further violation of their constitutional rights against Defendants
Knoebel and Snelling both in their individual and official capacities, and Defendants Ford and
Clark County Commissioners in their official capacities.
E. Claims of Plaintiff Lee Spaulding Re: Violations of the Fourth Amendment for
Unreasonable Seizure of the Person and Due Process Violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments

unconstitutional deprivation of Plaintiff Lee Spauldings constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable seizure of the Person, protected by the Fourth Amendment, and from deprivation of
his liberty interests without due process, protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
180. The specific conduct described, which consisted of an apparent wrongful entry in the
court record directly resulting in the subsequent issuance of an arrest warrant against Mr.
Spaulding for failing to appear, when in fact he had appeared on the day in question and entered
into a pretrial diversion agreement, ultimately resulting in Mr. Spauldings unlawful arrest, is in
violation of Plaintiffs due process rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
181. Defendant Unknown Clark County Circuit Court Clerk Responsible for the Erroneous
Entry Alleging that Mr. Spaulding Failed to Appear on July 16, 2013 is liable in his or her
individual capacity because (s) he was directly responsible for the due process violations
sustained by Plaintiff Lee Spaulding. This unknown Defendant is not entitled to qualified
immunity as the constitutional right of a citizen to not have an invalid warrant of arrest placed on
them without reason has been clearly established in this jurisdiction.
Clark County, Indiana is liable to Plaintiff Lee Spaulding because it has policymaking authority
over the treatments of its citizens, had supervisory authority over its employees, and Clark
56
County Commissioners implemented or executed policies, practices and customs of Clark
County which were unconstitutional, and the body was deliberately indifferent to the
constitutional rights of Plaintiff Lee Spaulding. Clark County Commissioners is sued in its
official capacity only.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, pray for
judgment from the Defendants as described in greater detail above and as follows:
1. Declaration of their rights and legal relationships;
2. Preliminary and permanent injunctive relief;
3. The certification of the classes as outlined above;
4. The establishment of a common fund(s) be established to compensate them and
their attorneys and to reimburse all expenses in connection with obtaining this
relief;
5. That the undersigned be named as class counsel for all classes;
6. Compensatory, consequential and actual damages;
7. Punitive damages;
8. Medical Expenses, past and future, if any;
9. Trial by jury on any and all issues so triable;
10. For their costs herein expended, including a reasonable attorneys fees and costs
of suit; and
11. For any and all other relief to which they may otherwise be properly entitled.
57
Respectfully Submitted By,

By: /s/ Michael A. Augustus

James M. Bolus, Jr.
Michael A. Augustus
Brennan Soergel
BOLUS LAW OFFICES
600 West Main Street, Suite 500
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
(502) 584-1210
(502) 584-1212 - Facsimile
bo@boluslaw.com
mike@boluslaw.com
brennan@boluslaw.com

58
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This will certify that on April 8, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing FIRST
AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF,
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND DAMAGE with the clerk of the court by using the CM/ECF
system, which will send a notice of electronic filing to the following:

Rosemary L. Borek
Wayne E. Uhl
STEPHENSON MOROW & SEMLER
3077 E. 98
th
Street, Suite 240
Indianapolis, Indiana 46280
rborek@stephlaw.com
wuhl@stephlaw.com

R. Jeffrey Lowe
KIGHTLINGER & GRAY, LLP
Bonterra Building, Suite 200
3620 Blackiston Boulevard
New Albany, Indiana 47150
jlowe@k-glaw.com

David A. Arthur
Office of the Attorney General
Indiana Government Center South
302 W. Washington Street, 5
th
Floor
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204
David.Arthur@atg.in.gov

/s/ Michael A. Augustus


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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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