AND THE ITALIAN GREAT PRIMAVERA(SPRING) ATTACK ( January 7 un!" Mar#$ %&' ()*( ) The General Military Situation in the beginning of 1941 ( Sketch-map no. 13 ) (7+, As previously mentioned in the development of operations until this point, on November l, the !reek forces undertook to launch a "eneral counter-attack throu"hout the entire Albanian #heatre of $perations. After a t%o-month hard stru""le under e&tremely adverse %eather conditions and despite the stubborn resistance and the continual reinforcement of the enemy %ith ne% units, they mana"ed to repulse the 'talians far beyond the !reek-Albanian borders, from 3( to )( kilometres inland, and %ere able to reach the "eneral line of *imara-+oliena- #serevonda-Souka"ora mountain-,amia mountain- -o"radet.. #he "eneral disposition of the !reek forces on the evenin" of /anuary 0, 111, %as the follo%in"2 -'n the Southern Sector, the A3 Army 4orps, %ith its *5 at 6ervitsani, had been set up defensively in the .one from *imara to mount 6ebelit and had the ''', 7''' and '' 6ivisions at its disposal in the direction %est to east. -'n the 4entral Sector, the +3 Army 4orps, %ith its *5 at -remeti, continuin" its o8ensive operations, occupied the .one from the valley of Aoos river (included) to #omoros mountain and had the ', 97 and 9' 6ivisions at its disposal in the direction south to north. 124 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4, -'n the Northern Sector, the ><@AS, %ith its *5 at ,oritsa, included the 43 and ;3 Army 4orps and occupied the .one from #omoros mountain to -o"radet.. #he 43 Army 4orps, %ith its *5 at ,oritsa, had the '9 and 9''' 6ivisions as Arst echelon and the 97'' 6ivision at the second echelon, from south-%est to north-east. #he ;3 Army 4orps further south, %ith its *5 at +obotista, %as provided %ith only the 9 6ivision, %hich had been defensively established as a Arst echelon. #his 4orps %as also e&pected to be reinforced %ith the 97' 6ivision, %hich had been formed in @lorina from the 97' +ri"ade a fe% days earlier and %as preparin" to transfer to the area of the rivers 6evolis and #omoritsa north-%est of <oschopolis. -:eserves of the 4ommander in 4hief, %ere the 7 6ivision in the area of ,oritsa, the '7 6ivision in the area ?iebhova-,akavia and the 4avalry 6ivision in the area of ;lea. #hus, the !reek forces allocated to the Northern ;pirus #heatre of $perations, on /anuary 0, amounted to thirteen 'nfantry 6ivisions and a 4avalry division, %ith the prospect of the transfer of one additional 6ivision, that of the 7' from the +ul"arian #heatre of $perations. (7&, $pposite the above !reek forces, in the evenin" of /anuary 0, 111, the 'talians had the follo%in" units at their disposal2 -@ifteen 'nfantry 6ivisions, namely2 11th B+renneroC, D1th B-iedmonteC, l1th B7ene..iaC, D3rd B@erraraC, 33rd BAEuiC, 3Fth B<odenaC, Gth B#aroC, 1th B-armaC, )lst BSiennaC, )3rd BAre..oC, )0th B,a.aleC, Dnd Alpine B#ridentinaC, 3rd Alpine B!iuliaC, th Alpine B,ouneenseC and )th Alpine B-ousteriaC. -#he 131st Armoured 6ivision B4entaursC reinforced %ith the )th +ersa"lieri :e"iment. -#he Dnd +ersa"lieri :e"iment, the 3rd !renadieri :e"iment, t%o 4avalry re"iments and a number of +lackshirts, Albanians and <achine-"un battalions. 125 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
-A section of the B4uneoC and B>olves of #uscanyC 6ivisions, %hich landed in Albania in the end of 6ecember and %ere "radually advancin" to%ards the .one of operations. (77, #he operations of the ?ar"e Hnits until /anuary 0, 111, %ere conducted, as already mentioned, in accordance %ith the !eneral *eadEuarters instructions of 6ecember 1D, 11(. #he operations %ere conducted under adverse conditions, such as severe %inter, diIculties in the re- supply and evacuations and "reat losses due to frostbite %hich e&ceeded the casualties of battle. @urthermore, there %as a necessity to supplement the shorta"es that had arisen after the t%o-month e&pedition in personnel, pack animals, automatic %eapons and supplies - materiel of all kinds. #he above conditions forced the *i"h 4ommand to suspend, as previously mentioned, the lar"e scale o8ensive operations. #his decision, %hich %as initially taken on 6ecember DG, %as later implemented %ith the "eneral instructions of the 4ommander-in-chief, %hich %ere issued on /anuary 0, 111. #hrou"h these instructions, it %as determined that until the improvement of %eather conditions, the lar"e units %ould take measures to or"anise the defensive disposition of their forces in order to secure the occupied positions and %ould conduct local operations in order to improve their positions and preserve the a""ressive spirit of their troops. 'n "eneral, the missions of the lar"e units %ere the follo%in" 2 -#he A3 Army 4orps, in the valley of river Ja"orias %as to limit its activity in pushin" the enemy north of Aoos river, in order to safe"uard the Kunction of ,lissoura. 'n the valley of the river 6rinos, it %as to limit its activity to small scale local operations in order to repulse the enemy to%ards Aoos and to safely block o8 the valley of 6rinos from that direction. #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 126 -#he +3 Army 4orps %as to conduct o8ensive operations in order to sei.e the Kunction of ,lissoura, to block o8 the deAle of ,lissoura from the %est and sei.e the "eneral line -od"orani-Souka-<ali !aronin 1 . -#he ><@AS %as to limit its activity to securin" the hi"h plateau of ,oritsa. @urthermore, it %as obli"ed to secure the liaison %ith the +3 Army 4orps in the valley of #omoritsa river and to conduct limited, local operations as appropriate in order to improve its positions. The Ofensive Operations of the B' Army orps to!ar"s #lissoura $ Trebessina $ Boubessi %&anuary '$()* 1941+ (Sketch-map no. 1) (7-, #he operations of the +3 Army 4orps for the occupation of the road Kunction of ,lissoura had been prepared follo%in" prior instructions of the !eneral *eadEuarters. $n the basis of these instructions, the +3 Army 4orps issued its orders on /anuary 3, %hich concerned the sei.ure of the mountain ran"e <ali #opoyianit-Spi 7aristolian and their safe"uardin" from all directions as far as <ali *irotse and <ali !aronin. After%ards, actions %ould be taken alon" the south %estern direction, in order to cut o8 the ,lissoura-7erati road and to sei.e ,lissoura. #he main attack %ould be conducted by the ' 6ivision to the left (south) and the 97 6ivision to the ri"ht (north), %hile the 9' 6ivision %as assi"ned to assist the e8ort of the 97 6ivision. (7), #he attack had been planned to commence in the mornin" of /anuary ). 't %as postponed, ho%ever, and %as Anally launched in the 1 Sketch-map no. 1 127 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
mornin" of /anuary G so that in the meantime the 97 6ivision could be reinforced %ith artillery. #he ' 6ivision commenced its attack at 1((( hrs %hile, in the meantime, the 97 6ivision had sei.ed the summit of the <ali #opoyianit hei"ht. #he attack %as launched a"ainst the hei"hts south and south-%est of <ali #opoyianit in the direction of ,lissoura and, by that evenin", they %ere sei.ed, by the 6ivision, despite the stubborn resistance of the 'talians. #he enemy abandoned more than 3(( dead and a lar"e Euantity of %ar supplies on the battleAeld. $n the follo%in" day, /anuary 1, the 6ivision sei.ed the hei"hts north of #o"liari villa"e and further south, the hei"hts of -anariti villa"e. #his e8ort %as supported %ith the Are of the 6etachment headed by ?ieutenant 4olonel 6imokostoulas of the '' 6ivision (A3 Army 4orps), %hich operated at the same time south of Aoos river at the area of +resdani villa"e. #he 97 6ivision commenced its attack at (F(( hrs and by (1(( hrs it had sei.ed the summit of <ali #opoyianit by force of bayonet. 'n spite of the stubborn resistance and the successive counter-attacks of the enemy, it continued its o8ensive to%ards the <ali *irotse hei"ht, %hich it mana"ed to sei.e durin" the early hours of the evenin", %hile further to the Northeast it took the hei"ht of +re"ou ?ipes. #he morale of the troops en"a"ed in the attack %as e&cellent and the self-sacriAce of the oIcers and soldiers uneEualled. #he enemy abandoned more than G(( killed in action and %ounded from the B!iuliaC 6ivision units. #he si"ht of the battleAeld %as indeed macabre. #he prisoners included 1 oIcers and 31 soldiers on the 'talian side. 'n addition, pack artillery "uns, D0 mortars of G1mm and an abundance of food and supplies %ere sei.ed. #he casualties of the 97 6ivision durin" that day, %ere F oIcers and 111 soldiers killed in action and 1 oIcers and DG0 soldiers %ounded. 6urin" the ni"ht of /anuary G to 1, 6ivision troops continued their o8ensive to the %est of the #opoyianit #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 128 hei"ht, in order to cut o8 the carria"e road ,lissoura- 7erati. At (D(( hrs on /anuary 1, they sei.ed the Souka villa"e, placed the abovementioned road under their Are and attacked the %ithdra%in" enemy troops of the BAEuiC 6ivision, %hich had been sent to reinforce the B!iuliaC 6ivision. +y the mornin" of /anuary 1, 1F 'talian oIcers and 0(( soldiers had been taken prisoners and abundant %ar supplies had been sei.ed. #he 97 6ivision attack continued on /anuary 1 under adverse %eather conditions and at around 1(( hrs the <ali !aronin hei"ht %as occupied alon" %ith the area of the #sepova villa"e, to the south-%est. #he 9' 6ivision, operatin" north of the 97 6ivision, assisted the action of the latter %ith its Are on /anuary G and 1, %hile preparin" to cross Apsos river %ith part of its troops in order to sei.e the villa"e of Slatina and to cut o8 the enemy that intended to escape in the direction of 7erati. (-., #he +3 Army 4orps, follo%in" this successful development of operations, issued a ne% operation order on /anuary 1 accordin" to %hich any further operations of the ' and 9' 6ivisions %ould be oriented to%ards the north-%est, in order to sei.e the area lyin" on both sides of the deep line of river 6esnitsa, alon" %hich the ,lissoura-7erati road %inds, %ith po%erful cover from the direction of #epeleni-,lissoura. #he ' 6ivision be"an its attack at (F3( hrs on /anuary 1( and part of its troops sei.ed !ivanai villa"e and the hei"hts east of -od"orani villa"e, %hile further to the north the 6ivision sei.ed the southern hei"hts of :oden. #he Fth :e"iment of the 6ivision, %hich %as operatin" in the direction of ,lissoura and %as supported by the Are of the 6imokostoulas 6etachment, took possession of ,lissoura at around 1(3( hrs. +y 1F(( hrs it had advanced to the position of ,astelo rid"e at the eastern slopes of the #rebessina mountain, %hich terminate in the river Aoos, directly %est of ,lissoura. 129 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
An 'talian counter-attack %ith tanks, that %as launched from the deAle of ,lissoura-#epeleni, %as contained by the Are of the artillery. 'n the course of their %ithdra%al, the 'talians set Are to ,lissoura and destroyed the stone brid"e of the river 6esnitsa to%ards #epeleni as %ell as the %ooden brid"e of the ,lissoura--remeti road. #he 97 6ivision operated North%est of the !aronin mountain and, after a hard stru""le, advanced as far as the steep slopes of <ali #abayian, north-east of :oden. 'n the sector of the 9' 6ivision, the situation remained unchan"ed. #he sei.ure of ,lissoura constituted an important success for the A"htin" troops of the +3 Army 4orps and a serious blo% for the 'talians. #he latter attached "reat si"niAcance to this important road Kunction and had striven hard to retain it %ith the B!iuliaC 6ivision. Since /anuary 3, in particular, they be"an to reinforce the latter %ith the B>olves of #uscanyC 6ivision, %hich had been transferred to Avlonas from 'taly at that time. #he follo%in" dramatic plea by 4avallero, 4ommander in chief of the 'talian forces in Albania, that %as addressed by phone to the 4ommander of the B!iuliaC 6ivision is characteristic of the si"niAcance attached to that location by the 'talians. #his has been recorded in the diary kept by 4avallero, in the entry of /anuary 11, 111 2 B#he B!iuliaC 6ivision has fulAlled its duty. >e are satisAed despite its %ithdra%al. #oday, ne% forces are pourin" in, part of %hich are already in 7erati. 't is necessary to close the "ap, be it %ith your o%n sacriAce. 'f the area is broken throu"h, %e %ill no lon"er hold our "round. #he @atherland demands it, even if %e are about to die for that cause, and ' %ill come to die %ith you. ' am askin" you to make this last e8ort, in the name of 'taly. ' am certain that you too %ill be satisAed in the ne&t fe% days, for then %e %ill reach victory. #he reinforcements are arrivin" and you %ill "o and rest. >e shall re-or"anise and create a "lorious B!iuliaC, but for no% you must hold onC. #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 130 <oreover, the -rime <inister of !reece, in reco"nition of the importance of the sei.ure of ,lissoura, addressed the follo%in" tele"ram to the +3 Army 4orps on /anuary 13. ,O-.ers an" men* / .ongratulate you for your latest e0ploits in the area of #lissoura12 $n the follo%in" day, /anuary 11, the units of the +3 Army 4orps mainly had the task of securin" the area of ,lissoura from the direction of #epeleni and the North%est and they attempted to improve their positions. 4oncurrently, they repulsed enemy counter-attacks. (-(, $n /anuary lD, the +3 Army 4orps communicated a plan of action concernin" both the sei.ure of the Art.a- +re"ou Sialesi-<ali Spandarit line and the e8ort to secure the area of ,lissoura from the direction of #epeleni and the North%est. #he 4orps %ould be operatin" in three phases %ith its main e8ort alon" the rid"eline of <ali !aronin- +re"ou <emoula.it-+osEuetto and, by employin" the '9 6ivision, %ould simultaneously seek to establish brid"eheads south of Apsos river, up to the villa"es of 7er.ie.ia and 'strora. #he attack %as planned to commence in the mornin" of /anuary l0, %hile the crossin" of Apsos river by the 9' 6ivision %ould be conducted after orders of the Army 4orps. 'n order to secure ,lissoura and mop up the area south of Aoos river as far as the ,lissoura deAle, since /anuary l3 the !eneral *eadEuarters provided the +3 Army 4orps %ith the 6imokostoulas 6etachment alon" %ith the rest of the '' 6ivision that %ere operatin" east of the Ja"oria Stream. After the order of the +3 Army 4orps, these troops formed the L,lissoura #eamM, a uniAed "roup, that %as under the command of ?ieutenant 4olonel 6imokostoulas and %as subordinate to the Army 4orps. 6urin" the period until the commencement of the attack, the units mainly dealt %ith the improvement of their disposition and their positions of departure, despite the adverse %eather and the sno% depth %hich had 131 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
reached the one meter in the area of #rebessina. 6ue to the %eather conditions and the shorta"es in fora"e, 0(N of the pack animals have perished . (-%, Since the mornin" of /anuary l0, the +3 Army 4orps resumed its o8ensive operations. $n /anuary 1G the ' 6ivision, after havin" repelled enemy counter-attacks for t%o consecutive days and despite the adverse %eather conditions, sent troops in order to conduct reconnaisance in force to%ards the -sari hei"ht of #rebessina mountain and also to%ards the hei"ht #souka @esit. $n /anuary l1, it sei.ed -avari villa"e, east of *ani +alaban. #he L,lissoura #eamM repulsed an enemy counterattack that %as launched from the direction of #epeleni and sei.ed the hei"ht 10D( on #rebessina mountain. #he 97 6ivision, en"a"ed in action since (1(( hrs on /anuary l0, sei.ed the hei"hts #souka @esit and <ali #abayian under adverse %eather conditions and after a Aerce battle. $n the follo%in" day, it sei.ed the hei"ht 6ras-e-,ais and continued its advance to%ards the <ali ,orap and +re"ou <emoula.it hei"hts, %here it took about F(( 'talian prisoners includin" the 4ommander of the FFth :e"iment of the B>olves of #uscanyC 6ivision. 6urin" the ni"ht and the follo%in" day, /anuary lG, the sno%fall and the severe frost continued, visibility fell belo% 1( meters and deaths due to frost %ere recorded in the battle positions. #hus, no important activity took place. #he 6ivision resumed the o8ence durin" the ne&t day, /anuary l1, %ith its men displayin" an e&cellent morale, in spite of the hardships and the severe frost. At 10(( hrs the hei"ht ,iafe SoAout %as sei.ed, but any further advance %as halted in the early evenin" hours. #he 9' 6ivision, a%aitin" the order of the 4orps, in order to cross river Apsos, did not display any note%orthy activity %ithin its sector durin" the same period. #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 132 (-/, Since /anuary l1, the !eneral *eadEuarters assi"ned the 7 6ivision (minus) to the +3 Army 4orps. #he 7 6ivision had been a "eneral reserve of the 4ommander in 4hief %ithin the .one of the 43 Army 4orps until then. SubseEuently, the +3 Army 4orps ordered the 7 6ivision to move from the ,oritsa hi"h plateau as of the evenin" of /anuary D1 and to concentrate its forces in the area of ?eskoviki by /anuary D0. #he 4orps ordered the ' 6ivision to sei.e the rid"eline 13(G-1(0( at the northern section of #rebessina mountain and to retain the necessary reserve %est of 6esnitsa river, so as to cover the left Oank of the Army 4orps. #he 97 6ivision %as assi"ned to mop up the area north of the ,iafe Sofout hei"ht, as far as the river Apsos. (-*, #he ' 6ivision, continuin" its operations on /anuary D(, mana"ed to sei.e the hei"ht +re"ou -sari under bad %eather conditions and severe cold. At the same time, 6ivision troops ascended the northern section of #rebessina mountain and sei.ed the hei"ht 13(G, east of -sari villa"e. @urthermore, other 6ivision troops sei.ed the hei"hts east of *ani +oubessi and the northern hei"hts of +alaban. $n the follo%in" day the %eather improved and the enemy airforce mercilessly strafed not only the rear area but also the front line troops. Nevertheless, the 6ivision continued the stru""le and despite the enemy counter-action it mana"ed to sei.e the eastern rid"es of ,iafe ?ou.it, %hile 6ivision troops crossed 6esnitsa in the south of *ani +oubessi, in the ni"ht of /anuary D1 to DD. $n the same day (/anuary D1) in the sector of ,lissoura, the enemy succeeded in overthro%in" the troops on the hei"ht 10D( by counter-attack and these troops %ithdre% to%ards !ropa on the south-eastern slopes of #rebessina mountain, near the river Aoos. After this, the +3 Army 4orps reinforced the L,lissoura #eamM %ith t%o battalions of the reserve. 133 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
#he ' 6ivision continued its o8ensive e8ort and on /anuary DD, after a tou"h A"ht that lasted the %hole day, it mana"ed to sei.e the hei"ht of ,iafe ?ou.it. @urther to the north it sei.ed the hei"ht of Spi ,amarate, %here it took about )(( 'talian prisoners and sei.ed supplies of all kinds. $n /anuary D3, the hei"ht 10D( in the sector of ,lissoura %as recaptured, %hile in the northern sector of the 6ivision, in the area of the *ani +oubessi, the +re"ou :apit (F1F) hei"ht %as taken as %ell as the F3l hei"ht. #%o consecutive counterattacks of the enemy a"ainst the +re"ou :apit hei"ht failed. About 3)( 'talians %ere taken prisoners includin" many oIcers. 6urin" the t%o-day period of /anuary D and D), the enemy launched po%erful counter-attacks throu"hout the entire front of the 6ivision, concentratin" its main e8ort in the sector of ,lissoura a"ainst the hei"ht 10D( and in the northern section of #rebessina a"ainst the hei"hts 13(G- 1(0(. +oth counterattacks %ere repulsed %ith many losses for the enemy in personnel and eEuipment. $n /anuary D( and Dl, the 97 6ivision repulsed stron" enemy counter-attacks a"ainst the saddles of ,iafe SoAout and ,iafe <ourit respectively. @rom /anuary DD to D, no important activity %as recorded, because of the unfavourable %eather conditions and the 6ivision troops dealt %ith the re-or"anisation and the preparation of the attack. $n /anuary D), the 6ivision resumed the o8encive and in spite of the adverse %eather conditions and the stubborn resistance of the enemy, it sei.ed the 7inan villa"e, the +re"ou ?ioulei hei"ht and by 1)3( hrs and after a hard stru""le, the hei"ht of <ali Spandarit. #en oIcers and appro&imately 1(( 'talian soldiers %ere taken prisoners. #he 9' 6ivision, %hich %as operatin" north of Apsos river, accordin" to the Army 4orps instructions, %ould assist the operations of the 97 6ivision to%ards <ali #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 134 Spandarit and to transport a combat team of re"iment stren"th across Apsos to the %est of this river. #hus, on /anuary D(, the 6ivision sei.ed the ,ala hei"ht by surprise, %ith a small section of its troops that had crossed over to the %est of Apsos river, %hile t%o days later, on /anuary DD, it captured the rid"e to the east of <ali Spandarit. SubseEuently, on /anuary D and D), the 6ivision transported one of its re"iments to the %est of Apsos and advanced it to the area of villa"es Jaber.ani and +ele.eska. #he river crossin" took place via the brid"e of ?apani villa"e and throu"h the fords in the area of Jo"as villa"e. (-+, >ith the above operations, by /anuary 1(, 111, the +3 Army 4orps had mana"ed to occupy the line -od"orani-!aronin and the road Kuction of ,lissoura, and by /anuary D), it had occupied the north-eastern and south-%estern rid"es of #rebessina mountain, the saddle of +oubessi and <ali Spandarit mountain. #hus, on /anuary D), it had almost reached the end of its e8orts and %as likely to revert to a defensive disposition, since the bad %eather, the terrain and the time of year hindered the continuation of lar"e scale o8ensive operations. #he enemy divisions %hich it confronted %ithin its .one %ere ori"inally the 3rd Alpine B!iuliaC 6ivision, the Fth 'nfantry B+ariC 6ivision, the )th Alpine B-ousteriaC 6ivision, as %ell as units from the 0th 'nfantry B4uneoC 6ivision and the Fth 'nfantry B>olves of #uscanyC 6ivision. @urthermore, around the end of the above period, the follo%in" divisions appeared %ithin the .one of the Army 4orps2 #he Dth 'nfantry B-ineroloC 6ivision, the DDnd 'nfantry BAlpine *untersC 6ivision and units from the 3Fth 'nfantry B<odenaC 6ivision and the )lst 'nfantry BSiennaC 6ivision. 't is evident from the above that the ', 97 and 9' 6ivisions of the +3 Army 4orps encountered at least F 'talian divisions durin" this period. #o this disparity of 135 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
forces one must also add the numerical superiority of the 'talian Airforce and the superiority of the 'talian units in curved traKectory %eapons that %ere appropriate for mountain A"htin", as %ell as the re-supply diIculties of the !reek forces, %hich pulled them a%ay from their supply bases, in contrast to the enemy forces %hich in %ithdra%in" approached their o%n bases. @urthermore, the continuous bad %eather and the severe sno%storms subKected the men to harsh trials since the increasin" number of frostbite cases incapacitated a "reater number of men than the casualties of battle. At the same time the situation of the pack animals kept %orsenin" and the losses e&ceeded a third of their ori"inal stren"th, due to insuIcient food, hardships and their intense use, a fact that hindered transportation and re-supply. Operations in the 3orthern an" Southern Se.tors %of the 4igh 5lateau of #oritsa an" 6pirus+ %&anuary '$()* 1941+ (-&, 'n the Northern Sector, on the basis of the mission assi"ned to the ><@AS by the !eneral *eadEuarters - concernin" the securin" of the ,oritsa hi"h plateau, the liaison %ith and the cover of the ri"ht Oank of the +3 Army 4orps and, also, the conduct of limited local operations - there %ere no important operations carried out durin" this time. #hus, as of the Arst ten-day period of /anuary the >@<AS (43-;3 Army 4orps) essentially reverted to a defensive disposition. #he activity of the units %as conAned to the repulsion of local 'talian attacks, the #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 136 improvement of the occupied positions and the defensive or"anisation. (-7, 'n the Southern Sector (;pirus), the same situation prevailed. #he A3 Army 4orps, havin" reverted to a defensive disposition and due to the bad %eather, suspended its o8ensive operations and its activity %as conAned to observin" the situation, improvin" the occupied positions and or"anisin" and stren"thenin" the front-line. #he !eneral *eadEuarters, supplementin" its "eneral instructions of /anuary 0, %hich outlined that on the part of the A3 Army 4orps, action %as to be taken in the eastern areas of 6rinos river, authorised the 4orps, on /anuary 1(, to apply pressure, to%ards the %est of 6rinos as %ell, a"ainst #epeleni. +esides, havin" planned to assume po%erful o8ensive operations in the future as soon as the %eather conditions and the re-or"anisation of the forces %ould allo% it, the !eneral *eadEuarters %as re"ardin" the reinforcement of the A3 Army 4orps %ith an additional division as deAnite possibility. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the bad state of the lines of communication and the insuIcient transportation means for the re-supply, constituted a fundamental obstacle. >hen this situation %as partially improved - "iven that the '7 6ivision had already retired from the A3 Army 4orps front, bein" in need of a lon" rest -the !eneral *eadEuarters ordered the 7 6ivision, %hich %as situated in the area of the ,oritsa hi"h plateau, to advance to%ards the front of ;pirus. $n /anuary 1, the !eneral *eadEuarters informed the A3 Army 4orps that there %as a disa"reement bet%een !eneral 4avallero, the 'talian 4hief of the Army !eneral Sta8 and Soddu, the 'talian 4hief of the 'talian forces in Albania, because !eneral 4avallero supported the assumption of a "eneral attack a"ainst the !reeks, %hile !eneral Soddu insisted that the only hope left for the 137 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
'talian Army %as the conduct of strate"ic %ithdra%al as far as the Skoubi river. #he fact that on 6ecember D1 Soddu %as relieved of his duties and 4avallero assumed the command of the 'talian forces in Albania, proved that the 4avalleroCs opinion had prevailed and, conseEuently, an 'talian attack %as to be e&pected. $n /anuary lG, the A3 Army 4orps submitted its proposals to the !eneral *eadEuarters, re"ardin" the continuation of the operations to%ards Avlonas %ithout the support of the 7 6ivision, provided that the +3 Army 4orps %ould Arst sei.e and hold the area of !lava as far as the river Aoos. #he !eneral *eadEuarters deemed that the assumption of o8ensive operations by the A3 Army 4orps %as not possible in the immediate future and placed, as mentioned, the 7 6ivision at the disposal of the +3 Army 4orps. The /talian atta.7 against #lissoura %&anuary (8$91* 1941+ (Sketch-map no. 1) (--, $n /anuary D), the !reek 4ommander in 4hief visited the *eadEuarters of the +3 Army 4orps in +andiloyia and %as briefed on the situation. SubseEuently, on the same date, he issued an oral order %hich deAned all that %as relevant to the further continuation of operations. $n the basis of this order, the +3 Army 4orps %as to operate in the "eneral direction of !aronin-!lava %ith vie% to the occupation of the line +ou.i-!lava. At the same time it %ould operate in the south-%est direction of +ou.i-Aoos-6eplan (1 km %est of #epeleni) in order to threaten and place the #epeleni-Avlonas road under its Are. #hereafter, and provided that conditions %ere favourable, it %ould advance north%ards to%ards 7erati #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 138 and %est%ards, thou"h not at the e&pense of its action to%ards 6eplan. 6urin" a second sta"e, it %ould assist the operations of the A3 Army 4orps to%ards Avlonas. 6urin" the same period, and dependin" on the e&tent of its operatin" abilities, the ><@AS (43 and ;3 Army 4orps) %ould undertake operations in the sector of -o"radet. and in the valley of #omoritsa. *o%ever, the adverse %eather conditions and the concentration of 'talian forces opposite the +3 Army 4orps as a %arnin" of the L-rimaveraM (Sprin") attack, did not allo% to conduct any of the abovementioned operations, %ith the e&ception of a fe% limited local ones in the valley of #omoritsa. (-), #he 'talians, havin" lost the road Kunction of ,lissoura and the eastern e&it of the homonymous deAle and despite the desperate pleas of 4avallero for Bdefence to the endC in the area, Anally mana"ed to contain the advance of the !reek attack, holdin" their "round steadily in the area east of #epeleni mountain that blocks o8 the %estern e&it of the deAle. #he 'talians considered of "reat importance the retainin" of these positions and thus they concentrated stron" forces in order to create a B%allC , accordin" to the characteristic e&pression of !eneral 4avallero. A"ainst the forces of the '' 6ivision that comprised 1D battalions defensively established south of Aoos river, the 'talians had deployed 1 battalions on the east of 6rinos and 1D battalions on the %est of the river and the B4entaursC Armoured 6ivision in the area of #epeleni. #hus, after consolidatin" their ne% positions, they sou"ht to reoccupy ,lissoura, in order to unlock the deAle and break throu"h the valley of river 6esnitsa, %hereupon a serious threat %ould be set up a"ainst the left Oank of the !reek +3 Army 4orps. #akin" advanta"e of a sli"ht improvement of %eather conditions, that occurred after /anuary D(, they concentrated the forces of the B?enianoC 6ivision in the area of #epeleni. #his division %as assi"ned 139 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
to conduct the operation, %ith the assistance of troops from the B4entaursC Armoured 6ivision and an Alpine battalion. ()., #he 'talian attack commenced in the mornin" of /anuary D0, north of Aoos river in the direction alon" the rid"eline #rebessina-hei"ht 11D3-10D(- !ropa-,lissoura and south of Aoos river, in the direction of -estani- +re.dani. #he attack a"ainst the hei"ht 10D( %as initially repulsed. *o%ever, it %as repeated later and at appro&imately 1(( hrs, the enemy sei.ed the hei"ht 10D( and spread further to%ards the south-east as far as <outsin, <ertsoura and @rastani, threatenin" seriously ,lissoura. At this critical moment, the ''' +attalion of the th :e"iment of the ' 6ivision launched an attack from the area of -od"orani to%ards the hei"ht 11D3 at the centre of #rebessina mountain and struck the Oank of the 'talians, thus containin" their move to%ards ,lissoura. #he 'talian counter-attack to%ards the south of Aoos from -estani and +re.dani (hei"ht 1DG)) %as repulsed after a heroic stru""le at close combat durin" %hich the commander of the defendin" battalion and the battery commander %ere both %ounded. After the repulsion of the counter-attack, the '' 6ivision reinforced the troops positioned on the hei"ht %ith one additional battalion. #he 'talian attack a"ainst ,lissoura alarmed the +3 Army 4orps. #he pocket that had been created constituted a serious threat a"ainst its left Oank. @urthermore, the possible sei.ure of ,lissoura %ould serve to cut o8 the Army 4orps troops that %ere en"a"ed in action %est of 6esnitsa river. 'n order to cope %ith the situation, the Army 4orps considered necessary to sei.e the entire rid"eline of #rebessina mountain so as to prevent the 'talians from usin" it either as an observation post or as a base of attack. @or the implementation of this decision, the 4orps made the necessary predisposition of forces and, havin" #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 140 reinforced the ' 6ivision %ith t%o battalions from the 97 6ivision, it ordered the former to operate in the direction -od"orani-!ivanoi, to%ards the hei"hts 11D3 and 10D(, to repulse the enemy and to sei.e the hei"ht 11D3. @urthermore, it ordered the 7 6ivision to move to%ards and deploy its forces in the area of ,lissoura, %ith the prospect of assumin" an active sector in the .one of the 4orps. After takin" the above measures, the +3 Army 4orps contained the further advance of the 'talians in the area of ,lissoura and established a continuous and stable front alon" its left Oank, %ith the prospect of repulsin" the enemy beyond the rid"eline of #rebessina. ()(, #he A3 Army 4orps, due to the situation that had arisen and the information provided by prisoners, concernin" the importance attached by the 'talians to the attack a"ainst ,lissoura, reEuested and received the approval of the !eneral *eadEuarters to e&tend its ri"ht boundary as far as the river Aoos, in order to include the L,lissoura #eamM under its command. /anuary DF %ent by %ith no important activity recorded in the sector of the L,lissoura #eamM. About t%enty enemy tanks, that attempted to break throu"h the deAle, %ere hit by the anti-tank "uns of the #eam and retired after three had been destroyed. <oreover, in the southern le" of the ,lissoura deAle the 'talians also made persistent e8orts to sei.e the hei"ht 1DG) (+re.dani). #he attack %as confronted successfully, after a A"ht durin" %hich the scales %ere constantly %averin" bet%een the t%o sides, both of %hich su8ered heavy losses. $n the follo%in" day, /anuary DG, in the northern section of the deAle, the hei"ht 10D( %as recaptured by the L,lissoura #eamM. $n /anuary D1, in the southern sector and after the ferocious shellin" of the artillery, the attack a"ainst the hei"ht 1DG) and the villa"es ?imari and <alesova %as repeated and repulsed. @urthermore, Ave probin" attacks 141 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
of the enemy, %hich took place durin" the ni"ht of /anuary D1 to 3( %ere also repulsed %ith success. $n /anuary 3(, there %ere t%o further counter-attacks of the enemy a"ainst the hei"ht 1DG), %hich %ere a"ain repulsed and %ith heavy losses for the enemy. #he Anal e8ort of the 'talians a"ainst the hei"ht 1DG) %as made at D1(( hrs on /anuary 31 and %as successfully repulsed. #hus, due to the !reek resistance, their e8ort to break throu"h the deAle of ,lissoura ended %ithout any territorial "ain. *o%ever, they succeeded in en"a"in" and holdin" the !reek forces in position, %hereas in a di8erent case these %ould be operatin" in the direction of 7erati. 6espite the failure of the 'talians to sei.e ,lissoura, the !eneral *eadEuarters considered that the threat in that direction continued to e&ist. 't %as therefore necessary not only to resolve the situation and block o8 the deAle to a "reat depth, but also to improve the front by reducin" its deployment. @urthermore and re"ardin" the creation of a "eneral diversionary action, the !eneral *eadEuarters issued an operation order on /anuary D1, by %hich it authorised the conduct of o8ensive operations %ithin the .one of the ><@AS to%ards -o"radet. and the valley of the river #omoritsa. The mopping up of the :i"geline of Trebessina Mountain (Sketch-map no. 1) ()%, @ollo%in" the measures taken in order to resolve the situation, the +3 Army 4orps issued speciAc orders deAnin" the missions assi"ned to the ' and 7 6ivisions. #hus, the 7 6ivision %as to sei.e and hold the rid"eline of mount #rebessina and then advance and secure the saddle of <ed."orani, <ali Sendeli and the villa"e of <ed."orani and to mop up the deAle of ,lissoura as far as the villa"e of 6ra"oti. #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 142 #he ' 6ivision %ould conduct an attack from the hei"ht 1G10 alon" the rid"eline of #rebessina mountain. ()/, <ean%hile, on the evenin" of /anuary DG, the 7 6ivision terminated its concentration and reconnaissance, %ith its re"iments in the area of ,lissoura-,oukiari and ,osina. At (F(( hrs on /anuary D1, 6ivision troops sallied forth to complete the sei.ure of #rebessina rid"eline from the area of !ropa hei"ht. After a tou"h, alternatin" A"ht, that carried on for the entire day, the attackin" troops mana"ed to sei.e the hei"ht 11D3 in the late afternoon hours, takin" at the same time 1F3 'talian prisoners and sei.in" important %ar supplies. #he follo%in" mornin", the 'talians launched a vi"orous counter-attack, supported by the concentrated Are of their artillery and airforce, in order to recapture the hei"ht 11D3. #heir attempt failed due to the self-denial and self-sacriAce of the defendin" !reek troops that launched a counter-attack and forced the attackers to %ithdra% in disarray, abandonin" their dead, %ounded and numerous %ar supplies on the battleAeld. $n the follo%in" day, /anuary 31, a severe bli..ard did not permit the continuation of the operations beyond the hei"ht 11D3, neither an action a"ainst the hei"ht 1G10 in the northern section of #rebessina to consolidate the liaison %ith the ' 6ivision, nor to%ards the <ed."orani saddle at its southern section. #he situation in the other sectors of the +3 Army 4orps durin" this period did not present any essential chan"es. ;nemy counter-attacks a"ainst the front of the 9' 6ivision, %hich had e&tended its boundary south of Apsos river and had included <ali Spandarit %ithin its .one, %ere successfully repulsed. #he counter-attacks a"ainst the front of the 97 6ivision %ere also repulsed %ith success in the area of *ani +oubessi as %ell as those a"ainst the ' 6ivision in the area of +re"ou :apit and the hei"ht F3l, 143 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
a"ainst %hich the enemy had launched successive counter-attacks. #he involvement of the 7 6ivision in the operations forced the !eneral *eadEuarters to or"anise a reserve in the .one of the +3 Army 4orps. *ence, it assi"ned to the 4orps the 97'' 6ivision, %hich had been a reserve of the ><@AS until then. 'n its place it assi"ned to the ><@AS the 7' 6ivision that %as to %ithdra% from the +ul"arian #heatre of $perations. #he movement of the 97'' 6ivision to its destination, the area of +orova-?eskoviki, %as scheduled to commence on @ebruary D. ()*, >ithin the .one of the ><@AS in the northern sector (,oritsa), no important operations took place durin" this period. #he units dealt %ith the reor"anisation, the improvement of their positions and also %ith the improvement of the livin" conditions of the troops, and pack animals, that had su8ered a lot due to the %eather. :e"ardin" the disposition of forces, as of /anuary D0, the 97' 6ivision %as placed under the command of the ;3 Army 4orps and its forces %ere deployed in the area of ?io.ani--optsisti-#resova-+oritsa. 'n the Southern Sector (;pirus), %ithin the .one of the A3 Army 4orps, small-scale local operations took place for the improvement of the positions, %ithout e8ectin" any essential chan"es in the front-line. 'n the .one of the '' 6ivision, repeated counterattacks by the 'talians a"ainst the area of +oliena that constricted the pocket of #epeleni, %ere repulsed after a hard A"ht. 6urin" the t%o-day period of /anuary D)-D0, the 'talians bombed the area %ith more that ei"ht thousand artillery shells, %hile on /anuary DF, they bombed the to%n of Ar"yrokastro, usin" D)( and 3(( ," bombs, causin" 1G( dead and about (( %ounded of the inhabitants and soldiers. >hile this %as takin" place on the front, in the mainland the -rime <inister 'oannis <eta&as died suddenly, on /anuary D1. $n the same day, Ale&andros #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 144 ,ory.is, economist and politician, %ho had been <inister of Social services from 1130 to 1131 and head of the National +ank since 1131, %as appointed as -rime <inister. ;o.al Operations from <ebruary 1 to 1(* 1941 ()+, 6urin" the period from @ebruary 1 to 1D, despite the adverse %eather conditions and the fact that the troops, the pack animals and %eapons had been %orn do%n, the operations continued, thou"h on a limited scale, in all three sectors of the front, in accordance %ith the !eneral *eadEuarters instructions, issued on /anuary D1. #he principal factor that dictated the limitation of the operations %ere the bad %eather conditions %ith the continuous sno%falls. 'n many mountainous areas the sno% depth e&ceeded the t%o meters. 4onseEuently, the cases of frostbite surpassed the casualties of battle and the deaths of pack animals, due to the lo% temperatures and e&haustion amounted one third of their total stren"th. #his fact seriously a8ected the transportation and re- supply units. ()&, Hnder such adverse conditions and havin" opened a passa"e in the sno% of one and a half meters %ide and t%o to three meters deep, on @ebruary 1 and l(, '9 6ivision troops sei.ed %ithin the .one of the 43 Army 4orps, in the Northern sector, the <nima !reas hei"ht and part of !ouri #opit in the mountain ran"e of Sara !ravpova. After this operation, the 6ivision mana"ed to secure the minimum depth reEuired for the better support of its left Oank. 'n the 4entral Sector, 97 6ivision troops sei.ed the villa"e of +oubessi on @ebruary , as %ell as the hei"ht 145 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
G(D, by close combat and despite the vi"orous resistance of the enemy %hich abandoned DF oIcers and 3(( soldiers killed in action, more than 1G( prisoners and all kinds of %ar supplies. Actions of the +3 Army 4orps a"ainst Sendeli and the saddle of <ed."orani failed to have the desired results, due to the enemy counter-actions and the adverse %eather conditions. #o the south of the river Aoos, continuous enemy counter-actions a"ainst the hei"ht 1DG) and *ormova %ere repulsed. ?ocal actions of the A3 Army 4orps units durin" the same time sou"ht to improve the occupied positions and create favourable conditions for the conduct of further operations to%ards #epeleni and Avlonas. 'n the meantime, from @ebruary 1 to , the 4ommander in chief visited the *eadEuarters of the ><@AS, the 43 and ;3 Army 4orps and, also, the 9''', 97' and 97'' 6ivisions, %here he had a brieAn" on the situation and issued the necessary instructions. The Organi=ation of the 6pirus <iel" Army Se.tion %6<AS+ ()7, Hntil the be"innin" of @ebruary, the A3 and +3 Army 4orps %ere directly under the orders of the 4ommander in 4hief, %hose advanced *eadEuarters had been in 'oannina since 6ecember 10, 11(, in order to ensure better co-ordination of the operations in Albania. *o%ever, in the event of a confrontation of forces in the direction of the +ul"arian #heatre of $perations, %hereupon the 4ommander in chief %ould be forced to move from the #heatre of ;pirus, it %as necessary to or"anise, from then on, a *eadEuarters to co-ordinate the actions of the A3 and +3 Army 4orps. #o that end, the !eneral *eadEuarters, by its orders on @ebruary 0 and F, authorised the or"anisation of the ;pirus @ield Army Section (;@AS), %hich %ould have its *5 at 'oannina under #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 146 the commands of ?ieutenant !eneral <arkos 6rakos, %ho had been 4ommander of the ;astern <acedonia @ield Army Section (;<@AS) until then. #he 4ommand of the ;@AS %as assumed at ((( hrs on @ebruary l. #he ;@AS comprised the A3 Army 4orps %ith the '', ''', '7 and 7''' 6ivisions and the +3 Army 4orps %ith the ', 7, 9', 97 and 97'' 6ivisions. #he boundaries of its .one of responbility %ere the 'onian sea to the %est and the Apsos river to the east, in liaison %ith the ><@AS. #he !eneral *eadEuarters, by its orders of @ebruary lD, assi"ned the ;@AS %ith the co-ordination of the operations of the A3 and +3 Army 4orps for the sei.ure of Avlonas. #he missions of the Army 4orps %ere "enerally outlined as follo%s2 -#he A3 Army 4orps %ould operate alon" the valley of the Siousitsa river and the carria"e road #epeleni-Avlonas, in order to sei.e the harbour of Avlonas. -#he +3 Army 4orps %ould operate to sei.e the hei"hts of !lava. #hen, it %ould advance to%ards Aoos river and it %ould operate %ith its left Oank to%ards Avlonas in conKuction %ith the action of the A3 Army 4orps. 3e! Attempts to!ar"s Tepeleni %<ebruary 19 $ (>* 1941+ (Sketch-map no. 1) and 10) ()-, Accordin" to the order issued by the +3 Army 4orps on @ebruary 1 for the assumption of operations to%ards #rebessina-Sendeli, in the mornin" of @ebruary 13, troops 147 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
of the 7 6ivision, %hich had taken their positions of attack on #rebessina durin" the ni"ht of @ebruary 1D to 13 under a heavy bli..ard, launched their attack and by 1(( hrs sei.ed one after the other the villa"e of Art.a di Sopra, the hei"ht 11FG, the Art.a di <e..o and the hei"ht F1(. @urther to the south, other troops of the 6ivision sei.ed the hei"ht 1G10 on #rebessina mountain but, because of continuous sno%storm, they %ere unable to advance to%ards the saddle of <ed."orani. $n the follo%in" day, @ebruary l, the attack to sei.e the -unta Nord hei"ht continued in the northern section of Sendeli mountain, but %ithout any success. @urthermore, Aerce enemy counter-attacks to recapture the hei"ht 11FG %ere repulsed %ith the attackin" troops su8erin" heavy losses. 6espite their hard stru""le, by the evenin" hours, the 6ivision units had only sli"htly improved the positions %hich they had occupied on the previous day. #he attack %ent on the ne&t day and after a tou"h A"ht at close Euarters, the eastern section of the -unta Nord hei"ht %as sei.ed, but its occupation %as not completed. 'n the direction of <ed."orani, the saddle of <ed."orani bet%een #rebessina and Sendeli %as taken at 1(( hrs. #he enemy launched ferocious counter-attacks, to recapture the -unta Nord and <ed."orani durin" the daytime and in the ni"ht of @ebruary 1) to l0, %hich %ere unsuccessful. #he 'talians abandoned about D(( killed in action and )(( prisoners. #he occupation of the -unta Nord %as completed on @ebruary l0. #he repeated enemy counter-attacks to recapture that hei"ht as %ell as the hei"hts 1D0( and 11FG %ere repulsed %ith many casualties on both sides. 'n the direction of <ed."orani, no success %as recorded due to the sno%storm, the hi"h depth of the sno% and the rou"h terrain. Ne% 'talian counter-attacks, that launched in the ni"ht of @ebruary 10 to lF, in order to recapture the hei"hts 1D0( and -unta Nord, %ere successfully repulsed. @rom @ebruary 1G to D), no chan"es %ere recorded in the #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 148 occupied positions of the 7 6ivision, because of the severely bad %eather that had occurred and did not permit the continuation of operations to%ards Sendeli mountain. Since its entry into combat, on /anuary D1, the 7 6ivision had endured severe hardships and its casualties, includin" the killed in action, %ounded and frostbite cases e&ceeded 3,3)( men. 6urin" the same period, the number of its pack animals %as reduced by F)G animals. #he ' and 97 6ivisions had also endured hardships, A"htin" continuously on the front-line since the be"innin" of %ar. #his is %hy, the ;@AS authorised their "radual relief, %hen conditions %ould permit it. ()), 'n conKuction %ith the action of the 7 6ivision of the +3 Army 4orps to%ards Sendeli-<ed."orani, an o8ensive of the '' 6ivision (A3 Army 4orps) had been planned to take place to%ards ?ekli and -estani. #his operation %as not carried out on @ebruary 13, because the units of the +3 army 4orps %hich %ould operate to%ards <ed."orani %ere unable to advance in that direction. #he 4ommander of the ;@AS, after assumin" his duties on @ebruary l, ordered the A3 Army 4orps to conduct the o8ensive a"ainst ?ekli and -estani, as prepared. #hus, the attack of the '' 6ivision %as launched on @ebruary l), bet%een Aoos river and mount Nemertska, despite the heavy 'talian bombin" a"ainst the positions of the attackin" troops since (D(( hrs. #he attack %as launched at (F3( hrs a"ainst the hei"ht 1DG), yet its occupation %as not completed durin" the day. After a ni"ht probin" attack the sei.ure of the hei"ht 1DG) %as achieved %ith the e&ception of its north- %estern part. #he action to%ards the villa"e of -estani %as unsuccessful. $n @ebruary l0, the attack %as continued from the direction of the hei"ht 1DG) and the brid"e of Ja"orias river %as placed under control. 6urin" this t%o day stru""le, more than (( 'talians %ere captured, includin" 149 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
t%o senior oIcers. #he attack also continued durin" the follo%in" day, ho%ever %ithout any note%orthy results, mainly on account of the enemy Oankin" Are from the dominatin" !oliko hei"ht, in the south. $n @ebruary lG, the hei"ht 1FD3 in the ran"e of !oliko %as sei.ed and the entire force en"a"ed in its defence and comprisin" three oIcers and ei"hty Ave soldiers %ere captured. @urthermore, the north-eastern outskirts of the -estani villa"e %ere taken, but many losses %ere su8ered by the attackin" re"iment of the 6ivision. 'n the direction of ?ekli, no pro"ress %as recorded, due to the stron" or"anisation of the terrain and the counter-action of the enemy %ith an incessant barra"e of Are. After the limited successes in the direction of ?ekli and -estani, the 6ivision decided to focus its main e8ort to%ards !oliko, assistin" thus the moves to%ards ?ekli on the left and -estani on the ri"ht. #hus, on @ebruary l1, the attack continued and the villa"e of -estani %as sei.ed, %here over 3(( prisoners %ere taken and %ar supplies of all kinds %ere captured. *o%ever, further advance %as contained by the Oankin" Are of the tanks, that %ere Arin" from the northern bank of Aoos alon" the road #epeleni-,lissoura. An e8ort a"ainst the hei"ht F31, to the %est of -estani failed due to the artillery barra"e that spread to the villa"e of -estani and caused many losses to the attackin" troops as %ell as to the inhabitants. $n @ebruary D(, an action to%ards ?ekli did not have any pro"ress, %hile the advance on !oliko to%ards the hei"ht 101) continued and the eastern part of that hei"ht %as sei.ed. 6urin" the period from @ebruary D1 to DG, the o8ensive operations %ere suspended, on account of the e&tremely adverse %eather that prevailed in the area in conKunction %ith the continuously increasin" number of casualties due to the ceaseless poundin" of the enemy artillery and frostbite cases that had arisen to alarmin" #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 150 proportions. #he attack a"ainst the hei"ht F31 %as repeated on @ebruary DG, despite the unfavourable %eather conditions, but %ith no successP neither did the 'talian counter-attack a"ainst the hei"ht of !oliko. #he casualties of the '' 6ivision durin" the month of @ebruary amounted to 13 oIcers and D0G soldiers killed in action and D0 oIcers and FD( soldiers %ounded, not includin" the frostbite cases, %hich amounted to 0(-G( per day, only in the area of !oliko. %.., 6urin" the same period, in the other sectors of the front, there %ere no lar"e-scale operations takin" place, apart from local en"a"ements for the improvement of positions %ithin the occupied front-line. #he activities of the commands and units %ere focused on the or"anisation of the terrain, the protection of the personnel and animals from the bad %eather conditions, the maintenance of %eapons and eEuipment, the reor"anisation and resupply of the units and, in "eneral, the preparation of future operations. On the 6ve of the /talian ?5rimavera@ %Spring+ Atta.7 %.(, #he repeated !reek successes and the continuin" advance of the !reek Army into the Northern ;pirus territory, "reatly alarmed the 'talian hi"h 4ommand, as mentioned previously. #hus, on 6ecember D1, 11(, <ussolini %as forced to order the replacement of the 4ommander in chief for the Albanian #heatre of $perations, !eneral Soddu, by the 4hief of the Army !eneral Sta8, !eneral 4avallero. @urthermore, he reEuested *itler to reinforce the 'talian forces in Albania , %ith the stren"th of a !erman Army 4orps. A series of meetin"s ensued, on the study of the transportation and 151 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
use of !erman forces in Albania in order to stren"then the front. <ussolini took to heart the defeat of his forces in Albania, %hich constituted for him the main theatre of operations. #hus, he %as seekin" for a victory, even %ith the !erman aid, over the !reeks, %ho %ere, at that moment, threatenin" Avlonas and 7erati. *itler, on his part, bein" in a hurry to be"in the campai"n a"ainst :ussia, %as disheartened by the 'talian inability to overpo%er the !reek forces, despite the reassurances of <ussolini, and therefore ordered the plannin" of a !erman attack a"ainst !reece. $n /anuary 11 and D(, 111, a "reat conference took place in Sal.bur", and apart from *itler and <ussolini, the <inisters of @orei"n A8airs 7on :ibbentrop and 4iano took part, as %ell as the !erman !enerals /odle, *alder, 7on +rauhit. and 7on :idelen alon" %ith the 'talian !enerals !u..oni and <aras, %ho %as the liaison in the !erman *eadEuarters. 'n the conference, the 'talians stated that their intention %as to halt the !reek advance and to hold the front, %hich %as supported by t%enty-one 'talian divisions, %hile there %as an intention to send another three. 'n the near future they %ould reinforce it %ith ten additional divisions, in order to launch a counter-attack %ithin the ne&t t%o and a half months from the direction of ,oritsa to%ards ;rseka. 'n the minutes kept durin" the conference, %hich %ere later found by the Americans, the !ermans state their reservations as to the %hether the 'talians %ould be able to concentrate the reEuired forces in the appropriate time, %hich meant that !ermany should not e&pect any help from 'taly, in the event of a !erman attack from +ul"aria a"ainst !reece. $n the contrary, the !erman attack %ould "reatly relieve the 'talian front in Albania. %.%, After the deAnite and Anal decisions of the !ermans to attack !reece, <ussolini, in order to save his #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 152 fallen presti"e, renounced the !erman reinforcement and, as early as the ne&t day, be"an to reinforce the Albanian front aimin" at a victory a"ainst the !reeks before the outbreak of the !erman attack, that %ould put an end to the campai"n a"ainst !reece and %ould secure the !erman Army Oank durin" the campai"n a"ainst :ussia. #hus, by the end of @ebruary, ten ne% 'talian divisions %ere transferred to Albania, %hile tens of ships %ere daily transportin" thousands of tons of supplies, ammunitions, motor vehicles and %eapons. At the same time, in order to heal the moral crisis and restore the A"htin" spirit of the 'talian Army, he issued, immediately upon his return from Sal.bur", an order of the day throu"h the <inistry of Armed @orces, encoura"in" all the fascist factors, even ministers, to enlist and Koin the 'talian Armed forces at the Albanian front. :espondin" to the above call, by the end of @ebruary those that volunteered to enlist and Koin the 'talian forces as oIcers in order to inspire the 'talian Army %ere the <inisters +artai, -avolini, :ichardi, :i..i, !orla, the loudest of the senior oIcials of fascism, <arina..i and !ianetti, as %ell as the son-in-la% of <ussolini !aleatso 4iano. %./, At the end of @ebruary everythin" %as ready for the ne% attack a"ainst the !reek forces, codenamed B-:'<A7;:AC (S-:'N!) by the 'talians and %as or"anised and prepared to the last detail by <ussolini, %ho had placed himself in char"e of it. 'ndeed, %hen the 6uce %as convinced that he had completed all preparations, he departed in the mornin" of <arch D, %ith his personal aeroplane %hich he piloted himself, for the airAeld of #irana, %here he %as received by the 4ommander in chief 4avallero, the !overnor appointed by the 'talian 4ro%n !iacomonti and !eneral :an.a. 4avallero assured him that the situation in Albania had improved and that everythin" %as ready for the attack. 153 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
@rom the speech delivered by <ussolini, on /une 11, 111, it can be concluded that the forces provided for this purpose comprised t%enty Ave full divisions and three 4avalry re"iments, four +ersa"lieri re"iments, one !renadieri re"iment and a number of +lackshirt battalions, %hich %ere eEuivalent to Ave additional divisions. As he added himself this %as Ban assembly of forces %hich %ere truly imposin"C. As soon as he arrived in Albania, <ussolini visited and inspected all forces of the front, even the battalions of the Albanian volunteers, he delivered speeches and dined %ith oIcers, stressin" the importance for 'taly of this ne% attack. 'n the event that this "reat e8ort, %ith %hich <ussolini had associated his personal presti"e and the honour of 'taly, %ould be successful and his le"ions, as he had hoped and promised *itler, mana"ed to break throu"h the !reek front and Oood !reece, the +alkan -eninsula %ould belon" to the A&is by the end of <arch 111. #hus, !ermany %ould not be forced to send the enormous stren"th of D divisions a"ainst !reece and =u"oslavia. $n the contrary, it %ould be able to orient its forces to%ards the eastern front and to commence the attack a"ainst :ussia by mid <ay, thus "ainin" time, of about ( days. #he development of the situation accordin" to those predictions %ould have inOuenced the outcome of the :ussian resistance, the duration of the %ar as %ell as the Anal victory, as is accepted by military e&perts all over the %orld, includin" the :ussians. Aarnings of the /talian Atta.7 an" the Be.isions of the Gree7 4igh omman" #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 154 %.*, #he concentrations of the enemy forces in the 4entral Sector, a"ainst the +3 Army 4orps, had been noticed since @ebruary l(, by both "round and air reconnaissance. Simultaneously, intelli"ence reports, provided by prisoners and other sources refered to an impendin" serious operation in the direction of !lava- +oubessi-,lissoura. #hus, the !eneral *eadEuarters, as of @ebruary lG, dre% the attention of the ;@AS to a possible 'talian attack in the .one of the +3 Army 4orps and placed the '7 and 7' 6ivisions at the disposal of the ;@AS by the end of @ebruary. 6urin" a meetin", in Athens on @ebruary D), %ith the attendance of the ,in", the -rime <inister, the <inister of the <ilitary and the 4ommander in 4hief, the 4ommander of the ;@AS delivered a detailed account of the situation of his units. @urthermore, he e&pressed his personal opinion about a lar"e-scale operation, to "ain possession over the area of mount #epeleni, %hich held the particular interest of the !overnment. *is belief %as that it could not be undertaken %ith "reat chances of success, unless there %as a relief of the ', 9' and 97 6ivisions of the +3 Army 4orps or of their "reatest part and only follo%in" the replacement of their casualties and a rest period of D( to D) days. <oreover, he added that local operations, %ith the forces that %ere already deployed in the front, %ere not considered to be advanta"eous, since they %ould only serve to %ear out the personnel, and e&haust supplies and ammunitions, producin" no %orth%hile results. 'nstead, he proposed a short period of %aitin" in order to reinforce, re- or"anise and redeploy the units and create favourable conditions for the assumption of lar"e scale operations, as these %ere deAned in the principal mission of the ;@AS. #he 4ommander of the ;@AS returned to 'oannina on <arch 1 and, on the follo%in" day, a meetin" %as held in the Army *eadEuarters and %as attended by the 4ommander of the ;@AS, the 4ommanders of the A3 and +3 Army 4orps and 4ro%n -rince -aul. 6urin" the meetin" it %as decided that the operation %ould be conducted in 155 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
order to complete the occupation of the <ed."orani- Sendeli area, north of Aoos river and the area of ?ekli in the valley of 6rinos south of Aoos. -articular attention %as "iven to the co-ordination of the actions of the A3 and +3 Army 4orps. +ased on the conclusions of the meetin", the ;@AS issued an order to the A3 Army 4orps on the same day, instructin" it to assist the action of the +3 Army 4orps, that %as to commence on <arch F aimin" at the completion of the sei.ure of the area <ed."orani-Sendeli. #he assistance %ould include artillery Are and a co- ordinated o8ensive e8ort from the area of !oliko to%ards ,ondra, in order to sei.e the valley of Aoos and to cut o8 the 'talian forces at ?ekli. #he ;@AS estimated that, %ith the occupation of the ?ekli-,ondra area favourable conditions %ould be created in order to block o8 the sector of <ou.ati and to complete the sei.ure of the rid"eline of Sefer A"ait to%ards #epeleni. %.+, >hile the above events took place in the #heatre of ;pirus, other serious events of "reater overall importance for !reece %ere happenin" in the nei"hbourin" countries and %ithin +ul"aria in particular. #he latter had already Koined the #ripartite -act and !erman troops be"an to enter into its territory on <arch D and %ere advancin" to%ards the !reek-+ul"arian borders. #he discernible immediate threat a"ainst !reece from that direction and the e&pected repercussions on the troops A"htin" in the Northern ;pirus territory, forced the !eneral *eadEuarters to issue an order on <arch l, by %hich it decreed that, %hatever the development of the situation in the +alkans, the mission of the A"htin" forces in the Northern ;pirus front %as clear and deAnite and sou"ht to2 -Secure the occupied territory and conduct active defence. #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 156 -4onduct the necessary operations %ith vie% to the improvement of defence conditions, %henever the %eather conditions and the available forces %ould allo% it. --rotect and maintain the hi"h morale of the Army from bein" possibly a8ected by any causes or threats re"ardless of their source. At the same time, the !eneral *eadEuarters, in order to prevent the potential encirclement and cut o8 that threatened the forces of the Northern ;pirus front in the occasion of a !erman invasion from +ul"aria, ordered on <arch F, the ;@AS and the ><@AS to consider the possible %ithdra%al of their forces to the line of -ieria-Aliakmonas river-7enetikos river-Smolikas mountain-<erd.ani and from there on to the !reek-Albanian borders or even further to the south as far as the line of -ieria-Aliakmonas- 7enetikos-Jy"os <etsovou-Arachthos river. @urthermore, on account of the di8erence of opinions that arose re"ardin" the further continuation of the operations, on <arch 0, the *i"h 4ommand proceeded to replace the 4ommanders of the ;@AS and the A3 and +3 Army 4orps. #hus, the 4ommander of the ;@AS, ?ieutenant !eneral <arkos 6rakos, %as replaced by ?ieutenant !eneral 'oannis -itsikas, %ho had been 4ommander of the ><@AS until then and %hose *eadEuarters %ere abolished. #he 43 Army 4orps %as renamed and %as thereby kno%n as ><@AS, under the command of the 4orps 4ommander ?ieutenant !eneral !eor"ios #solako"lou. #he 4ommander of the A3 Army 4orps, ?ieutenant !eneral !eor"ios ,osmas %as replaced by ?ieutenant !eneral -ana"hiotis 6emestihas, %ho had been 4ommander of the ;3 Army 4orps until then and %hose *eadEuarters %as abolished and his units had come under the command of the ><@AS. #he 4ommander of the +3 Army 4orps ?ieutenant !eneral 6imitrios -apadopoulos %as replaced by the 4ommander of the ''' 6ivision, <aKor !eneral !eor"ios +akos. 157 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
Ofensive Operations to!ar"s Sen"eli an" Tepeleni %Mar.h ' $ >* 1941+ (Sketch-map no. 1F) %.&, Since @ebruary D0, the +3 Army 4orps had deAned that the mission of the 97'' 6ivision %ould be the completion of the sei.ure of <ed."orani area and the sei.ure of the area 6amsi-,atsisti on the %estern borders of mount Sendeli. #he operation %ould take place in t%o phases. 6urin" the Arst phase, the rocky rid"eline to the %est of <ed."orani villa"e %ould be taken alon" %ith hei"hts 1D3D-+esisti, %hile in the second phase the area ,atsisti-6amsi %ould be sei.ed. A proposal of the 4ommander of the 97'' 6ivision to free, by preliminary action, the carria"e road ,lissoura- 6ra"oti %as accepted by the Army 4orps, in spite of its o%n reservations re"ardin" the outcome, because of the action of the 'talian tanks alon" that road. #he terrain %as rou"h, precipitous and %ith deep ravines, presentin" enormous diIculties. #he only approach to the Sendeli mountain %as possible throu"h the saddle of <ed."orani, %hich connects the #rebessina mountain to the Sendeli mountain. 6espite these diIculties, in the ni"ht of <arch D to 3, the 6ivision acted %ith a battalion "roup, reinforced %ith an ;n"ineers company, from the north to%ards the villa"e of <ed."orani, in order to create footholds and a base of attack. #he !roup mana"ed, by raidin" action, to inAltrate deep into the deAle, establish its forces on the hei"ht F3( and cut o8 the carria"e road, by di""in" a ditch F meters %ide and D.G( meters deep. #hus, it mana"ed to cut o8 and then capture the entire company, the tanks, the anti- tank and the anti-aircraft "uns that covered the deAle, e&tendin" the control of the 6ivision by nine kilometres %est of Sene"ol. After the success of this probin" attack, the 6ivision launched its attack, on <arch F, in the direction of #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 158 <ed."orani-Sendeli. 6espite the adverse %eather conditions and the sno% depth %hich in many places had risen to one meter, by 1(( hrs, beneAtin" from the fo" and the e&cellent co-ordination of the artillery Are, the 6ivision mana"ed to pass throu"h the villa"e of <ed."orani, sei.e the rocky foot to the %est of the villa"e and to halt the retreat of the 'talians. 6urin" the same period, the stone brid"e on the carria"e road %as taken and destroyed in order to block o8 the movement of the enemy tanks east%ards. #hus, as the area north of the villa"e of <ed."orani %as bein" ti"htly constricted, by 1F(( hrs, the enemy resistance "ave in and the enemy forces be"an to surrender in lar"e "roups. +y dusk, the villa"e of <ed."orani %ith the entire area around it had been sei.ed. <ore than 1,((( prisoners %ere taken (includin" D( oIcers) alon" %ith their armament, and Aeld "uns, 3 anti-tank "uns and many automatic %eapons and mortars %ere captured alon" %ith depots Alled %ith %ar supplies and food. 6urin" the ni"ht of <arch F to G, the advance %est%ards continued and the hei"ht 13F on the eastern slopes of Sendeli %as sei.ed. $n the follo%in" day, <arch G, the e8ort to occupy the rid"eline of Sendeli continued, but the adverse %eather conditions, the precipitous terrain and the drastic Are of the defendin" troops, %hich %ere continuously reinforced, did not permit an advance beyond the eastern rid"es of the Sendeli rid"eline, %hereon the line of defence %as Anally consolidated. %.7, 6urin" the same period, in the .one of the A3 Army 4orps, the '' 6ivision, in co-ordination %ith the 97'' 6ivision operations to%ards <ed."orani-Sendeli, launched an attack a"ainst the area of !oliko (bet%een 6rinos and Aoos, east of #epeleni), at (01)hrs, on <arch F and, in the area of +ou.ae Sefer A"ait (%est of 6rinos), it adopted a 159 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
defensive attitude , in order to cover its left Oank as %ell as the ri"ht Oank of the 7''' 6ivision. #he attackin" troops mana"ed to repulse the enemy by close combat %est of the !oliko hei"ht and to sei.e the hei"ht 101), takin" about D(( prisoners. An e8ort to%ards the hei"ht ))0, in order to envelop ?ekli villa"e and place ?ou.ati brid"e of river 6rinos under control, failed, because in the meantime, the enemy had created a stron" %all of forces and eEuipment, east and south of #epeleni. A parallel action to%ards the hei"ht F31, to place the 6ra"oti brid"e of Aoos river under control, recorded no pro"ress. 't %as Anally sei.ed on the follo%in" day, <arch G, after a Aerce close combat, durin" %hich 3(( 'talians %ere taken prisoners, includin" the commander of the defendin" battalion and his sta8. @urther advance %as halted, due to the enemy resistance. 'n the other sectors of the front, durin" the same period, no note%orthy events took place, e&cept for the usual artillery and patrol activity and the action of the enemyCs airforce. #he units dealt %ith the or"anisation of the terrain, the improvement of the road net%ork, their re"roupin" and the resupply. <ean%hile, administrative movements of units took place, in order to make relieves on the front-line or return to their parent formations. The Great ?5rimavera@ %Spring+ Atta.7 of the /talians % Mar.h 9$1)* 1941 + ( Sketch-map no. 1G and 11 ) %.-, So far, the feverish preparations of the 'talians in order to inOict a decisive blo% a"ainst the !reeks have been referred. #he 'talian Army in Albania, after a three month desperate resistance, had been considerably reinforced in personnel and means and %as already in a position to launch a "eneral attack. An impressive victory %as e&pedient, in order to save its #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 160 presti"e, before the !ermans launched their o%n attack a"ainst !reece. *o%ever, contrary to the hopes and aspirations of the 'talian ?eadership and of <ussolini himself for an impressive victory, the plan that had been %orked out by 4avallero had limited "oals, since its Anal obKective %as 'oannina. #he entire operation %as assi"ned to the ;leventh Army, under the command of !eneral !elo..o, %hile the Ninth Army, that %as deployed further to the north, %as not even notiAed that the 'talian Army %ould be en"a"ed in its "reatest e8ort since the be"innin" of the %ar. Accordin" to the plan of 4avallero, the 'talian attack %ould be launched on <arch 1 and alon" a limited front bet%een the rivers Aoos and Apsos, in the "eneral direction !lava-+oubessi, so as to create a "ap and break throu"h the valley of 6esnitsa river. #he main e8ort, alon" a front of si& kilometres, %as assi"ned to the 7''' Army 4orps, under the command of !eneral !abara, %ith the B4a"liariC, B-u"lieC, B-ineroloC and B+ariC 6ivisions as %ell as t%o +lackshirt +attalions. #he 7''' Army 4orps %ould operate bet%een the BSfor.eskaC 6ivision of the 997 Army 4orps on the ri"ht (south) and the BAlpine *untersC 6ivision of the '7 Army 4orps on the left (north). <ore speciAcally, the plan provided for an attack in three directions. #he main e8ort %ould be directed to the sector of the !reek ' 6ivision. #he Arst obKective %ould be the line -od"orani-Souka, and the second the line ,lissoura-@ratari-<ali ,ressova. #hereafter an advance to%ards ?eskoviki-'oannina %ould be anticipated. #he Anal result %ould be pursued by frontal attack in conKuction %ith local envelopin" actions, immediately after the creation of the "ap. @rom the abovementioned and also from other evidence, it turns out that the 'talians %ere plannin" to advance, after breakin" throu"h the front in the sector of the ' 6ivision, bet%een #rebessina and +oubessi, to%ards the road Kunction of ,lissoura. #hus, havin" cut o8 the 7 161 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
and 97'' !reek 6ivisions in #rebessina and Sendeli and havin" repulsed the 97 and 9' 6ivisions to%ards !aronin, they %ould break throu"h the valley of 6esnitsa. After%ards, they %ould advance throu"h the valley of Aoos, to%ards -remeti-?eskoviki-<erd.ani and the area of ;rseka, in order to separate the north front from the south front and %ould then proceed in the direction of 'oannina. %.), #he +3 Army corps, in the .one of %hich the Anal attack %ould be launched, had the 97'', 7, ', 97 and 9' 6ivisions at its disposal, from Aoos to Apsos. +ehind the front-line on a second echelon, as reserves of the ;@AS, there %ere three re"iments, one from each of the 97, 97'' front-line 6ivisions and one from the 7' 6ivision, %hich %as in the area north of ,lissoura. @urthermore, in the area of ?iebhova villa"e (S; of Ar"yrokastro), the '7 6ivision %as ready for a possible move %ithin the .one of the +3 Army 4orps. A"ainst the forces of the +3 Army 4orps, the 'talians %ere provided %ith a Arst echelon %hich comprised, from north to south, the DDnd BAlpine *untersC 6ivision, the )1th B4a"liariC 6ivision, the 3Gth B-u"lieC 6ivision, the 1)D and 1)) +lackshirt +attalions (on the saddle Sisiput and astride the carria"eable road), the Dth 3-inerolo3 6ivision and the Dnd BSfor.eskaC 6ivision. $n a second echelon they had the Fth B+ariC 6ivision and, later on, the )lst BSiennaC 6ivision and the Fth B>olves of #uscanyC 6ivision. ?astly, their reserves in the area of #epeleni %ere the D1th B-iedmonteC 6ivision and the 131st B4entaursC Armoured 6ivision. Apart from the abovementioned forces, bet%een Apsos and Aoos they had various +ersa"lieri re"iments as %ell as Alpine and +lackshirts battalions at their disposal, the total stren"th of %hich amounted to about Afteen 'nfantry battalions and t%o <achine-"un battalions. %(., #he !reek forces, ho%ever, did not lack in preparation for the confrontation of an impendin" 'talian attack. #he preparations of the 'talians had #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 162 attracted their attention, as previously mentioned, as of the Arst ten-day period of @ebruary and, on @ebruary 1, the +3 Army 4orps, in accordance %ith the !eneral *eadEuarters instructions, %hile still continuin" its local o8ensive operations, had issued an order of defensive or"anisation. #hus, time %as "iven to the necessary preparation for the confrontation of the 'talian attack. #his period %as decisive in order to complete the defence and to create the hi"h morale of the troops, %ho had "ot used to the idea of the impendin" enemy assault and its repulsion. 6urin" the last fe% days before the outbreak of the attack, the 'talian airforce escalated its activity %ith bombardments alon" the front-line and the rear area. $n <arch G in particular, it bombed reserves, concentrations, artillery positions, command stations and observation posts. %((, #he e&pected "reat 'talian attack %as launched at (03( hrs, on <arch 1, %ith artillery preparation that lasted on for t%o and a half hours alon" the entire front of the +3 Army 4orps. 'n the sector of the ' 6ivision, alon" a si& kilometre .one, the density of Are corresponded to that of 3(( "uns, -%hich Ared about 1((,((( shells- not to include the shells of the 0( mortars of Glmm calibre of each 'talian division en"a"ed in the attack. #he hei"hts F1F (+re"ou :apit) and F31 %ere du" up and everythin" %as destroyed. #he telephone communications %ere cut o8 and the smoke, dust and Oames did not allo% the fuction of visual si"nals3 eEuipment. #he 'talian Airforce also supported the attack, by bombin" the area. #he attack %as launched alon" the entire front of the ' 6ivision, from hei"ht 13(G on the northern slopes of #rebessina mountain and as far as the villa"e of +oubessi, %here the enemy also directed its main e8ort in order to create a "ap. #he enemy attacked %ith similar intensity a"ainst the hei"ht F31 as %ell, but the defenders of the hei"ht decimated the attackers by close combat and 163 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
forced them to fall back. A ne% e8ort of the 'talians, %ith another unit, mana"ed to sei.e the hei"ht F1F ()((m %est of F31), an advanced outpost %hich %as outside the defensive area. #he hei"ht %as soon recaptured by counter-attack. At appro&imately 1D(( hrs, the 'talians launched a ne% attack a"ainst the hei"hts 1(0(, ,iafe ?ou.it, F31 and F1F, only mana"in" to recapture hei"ht F1F that %as o8 the defensive disposition. At 1(( hrs and 10)( hrs, t%o ne% attacks a"ainst the hei"hts ,iafe ?ou.it-F31 and +re"ou :apit failed as %ell, %ith the enemy su8erin" considerable losses. #hus, durin" the Arst day, the enemy attack a"ainst the sector of the ' 6ivision, %here the main e8ort %as directed, %as a Oat failure, despite the successive attempts and the over%helmin" support of the abundant means of Are and the 11( aircraft, of %hich F( %ere bombers. #he 'talian losses %ere e&tremely heavy. %(%, #he +3 Army 4orps, after ascertainin" durin" the course of the battle that the enemy %as directin" its main e8ort in the .one of the ' 6ivision, proceeded to reinforce the division %ith a ne% re"iment from the 7' 6ivision and %ith t%o additional battalions from its o%n reserves. 'n the .one of the 97 6ivision that %as en"a"ed in defence further to the north of the ' 6ivision, the enemy met %ith a similar fate and its successive attacks %ere repulsed %ith heavy casualties. At the ri"ht Oank of the Army 4orps that %as occupied by the 9' 6ivision, the enemy sou"ht to "ain possession of the +re"ou ?ioulei and the <ali Spandarit hei"hts %ith Aerce attacks that %ere, ho%ever, repulsed by the defendin" troops. #he same fate befell the attack in the .one of the 7 6ivision, %hich %as en"a"ed in defence further to the south of the ' 6ivision in #rebessina. #he 97'' 6ivision -%hich, as mentioned, %as conductin" o8ensive operations since <arch F, to the north of Aoos river as far as the saddle of <ed."orani- #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 164 also succeeded in confrontin" the 'talian attack %ithin its .one that %as directed %ith "reater intensity a"ainst the hei"ht 13F and the saddle of <ed."orani. 'n the sector of the '' 6ivision, south of Aoos, the 'talian activity %as conAned to severe shellin" %ith artillery and mortars. #hus, the Arst day of the "reat BSprin"C attack of the 'talians ended %ith entirely insi"niAcant territorial "ains on their part, despite their enormous e8ort and to the "reat disappointment of <ussolini, %ho had been %atchin" its development durin" the %hole day from his observatory on the ,omarit hei"ht (!lava). #he +3 Army 4orps kept the main defensive area intact, and its troops that had su8ered the attack fou"ht back %ith e&ceptional coura"e and hi"h morale. %(/, +y (0) hrs in the follo%in" mornin", <arch l(, the 'talians rene%ed their o8ensive e8ort by attackin" the area of the ' 6ivision %ith the sustained Are of the artillery and infantry, the intensity of %hich %ere similar to the shellin" of 7erden durin" the @irst >orld >ar. ;verythin" %as du" up a"ain, but the heroic A"hters remained unshaken. Successive attacks ensued a"ainst the hei"hts F3l, +re"ou :apit and #rebessina, that lasted the entire day, failin", ho%ever, to produce any result and causin" heavy casualties on the 'talian side. #he A"ht %as hard and, in many cases, the !reek troops %ere forced to confront the enemy by force of bayonet. A :e"iment of the B-u"lieC 6ivision movin" as of 111)hrs alon" the carria"e road, %hich attempted to envelop the hei"ht F31 from the south, %as hit by the sustained Are of all Arms from the occupied hei"hts #rebessina-,iafe ?ou.it and F3l, and %as thus overthro%n and forced to disband. Another envelopin" action of the 'talians throu"h the ravine of -roi <ath %as similarly halted before the hei"ht F31. #he +3 Army 4orps, ackno%led"in" the outstandin" action of the ' 6ivision durin" the t%o-day A"ht, issued the follo%in" order on <arch 1(. 165 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
B <ighters of the / Bivision Before your in"efatigable heroism sin.e yester"ay all "esperate enemy attempts have been shattere"2 Before your lines of steel* three ne! Bivisions !ere .rushe" "uring the t!o "ay perio"2 / am prou" of being in .omman" of su.h heroes2 The <atherlan" is also prou" of you2 This or"er shoul" be .ommuni.ate" "o!n to the last sol"ier of the Bivision2 MaCor General G2 Ba7os B As of (F((hrs, in the sector of the 97 6ivision, the heavy shellin" of the artillery and mortars that %as mainly directed a"ainst the +oubessi (hei"ht F1() and the hei"ht G01 centre of resistance, %as follo%ed by successive attacks %hich %ere repulsed %ith serious losses on the enemyCs side. 'n the sector of the 9' 6ivision, the sustained Are of the artillery and mortars lasted from (0)( hrs to (G(( hrs %ith particular intensity a"ainst the hei"ht <ali Spandarit, a"ainst %hich a po%erful 'talian attack %as launched at (13( hrs. #he close combat that ensued, under thick fo" and pourin" rain, ended in a !reek victory. ;nemy troops that had mana"ed to inAltrate throu"h to the south of <ali Spandarit, hidden in the fo", %ere destroyed by the counter-attacks of a battalion that advanced in time to re"ain control of the area. #he 97'' 6ivision, accordin" to a previous plan, launched an attack to sei.e the hei"ht 10D3 of #rebessina %est of the hei"ht 13F, but the e&tremely adverse conditions and the barra"e of Are forced it to halt its attack. 'n the sectors of the '' and 7 6ivisions, the enemy attacked %ith its artillery and mortars, poundin" mainly a"ainst the hei"ht of -unta Nord. %(*, #he third day of the o8ensive e8ort to break throu"h the area commenced at (3(hrs, %ith the same momentum as on the previous days and %ith the #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 166 main e8ort once a"ain directed a"ainst the hei"ht F3l. #he defenders %ere on the alert and counter-acted %ith a barra"e of Are and an immediate counter-attack, thus causin" the attackers a"ainst both the hei"ht F31 and the +re"ou :apit to break up. #he enemy, to"ether %ith the frontal attack, proceeded in the direction of *ani 7inoka.it, continuin" the envelopin" action that had been launched throu"h the ravine of -roi <ath and %hich had been halted temporarily. 6espite the thick fo" that prevailed, the anti- tank artillery troops positioned in the ravine %ere able to perceive the 'talian inAltration in time and directed their sustained Are a"ainst it from the sides and the rear. -andemonium follo%ed. #he 'talians frantically rushed to their safety, but as they %ere Ared a"ainst from all directions, they %ere eventually decimated. #he Are Anally ceased at noon, %hen the 'talians raised %hite kerchiefs all alon" the -roi <ath ravine and surrendered unarmed %ith their hands in the air. #he mop up of the ravine delivered )D1 prisoners, includin" three senior oIcers. #here %ere D)( dead counted and all kind of %ar supplies %ere sei.ed. <ean%hile, there %as an escalation of the bombin"s of the !reek positions in #rebessina-,iafe ?ou.it and F31, a"ainst %hich the enemy launched a ne% po%erful attack. #he A"ht continued %ith obstinacy on the entire front of the ' 6ivision until 13((hrs, %hereupon the attack %as Anally confronted %ith terrible losses for the enemy. A ne% attack follo%in" stron" bombardin" a"ainst the hei"ht +re"ou :apit faced a similar fate. 'n the sector of the 97 6ivision, after heavy shellin" by the artillery, the 'talians launched t%o attacks (at (G(( hrs and at 10(( hrs), %hich %ere repulsed %ith heavy losses. 'n the sector of the 97'' 6ivision, after an eEually heavy shellin", the enemy attacked the hei"hts <ed."orani and 13F, but here too, its forces %ere 167 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
repulsed %ith "reat losses. #%o ne% successive attacks at 1F(( hrs and at 113( hrs %ere once a"ain repulsed. 'n the sectors of the 7 and 9' 6ivisions, the poundin" of the area %ith sustained artillery and mortar Are %as continued, %hile small-scale enemy attacks %ere successfully repulsed. 'n the sector of the '' 6ivision too, the activity of the enemy artillery did not display the intensity of the t%o previous days. #hus, the third day of the attack ended, %ithout the 'talians bein" able to Bset footC on the main defensive area of the +3 Army 4orps. #he losses of the 'talian B-u"lieC 6ivision that %as A"htin" a"ainst the ' 6ivision and those of the +lackshirts battalions %ere enormous, forcin" the 'talian command to advance the reserve B+ariC 6ivision to the above area on <arch 11 and on the ni"ht of 11 to 1D. %(+, At (() hrs on <arch 1D, a ne% 'talian attack %as launched in the sector of the ' 6ivision, a"ainst the hei"hts F31 and +re"ou :apit, %ith the support of artillery. #he attach also spread on the hei"ht ,iafe ?ou.it %as e&tremely vi"orous and %as conducted by intact units of the ne%ly-committed to action B+ariC 6ivision. #he enemy had velied on the surprise, but the !reek troops, that had stepped up the alert, confronted the attackers %ith a dense barra"e of Are and repulsed them by close combat. At ()3( hrs, the attack %as repeated %ithout any preparation -it %as the eleventh in a ro%- in the sector from the hei"ht 1(0( of #rebessina to the hei"ht +re"ou :apit. #he counter-action of the defendin" !reek troops %as immediate and decisive, forcin" the 'talians that %ere en"a"ed in the attack a"ainst the hei"hts 1(0( and ,iafe ?ou.it to be held in position by the barra"e of defence Are. <ean%hile, on the hei"ht F3l, the A"ht continued until (0) hrs, %hereupon the attackers %ere Anally repulsed by hand-"renades and bayonet. At (13( hrs enemy troops attempted to inAltrate throu"h to ,iafe ?ou.it, but %ere hit by the heavy Are of #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 168 the artillery and fell back. As of 11(( hrs, the enemy activity %as conAned to artillery shellin" throu"hout the entire area of the ' 6ivision front. 'n the sector of the 97 6ivision, the 'talians conducted t%o attacks a"ainst +oubessi, %hich %ere repulsed. 'n the sectors of the '', 7, and 9' 6ivisions, the artillery Are continued durin" the entire D-hour period. 'n the sector of the 97'' 6ivision, a raid to%ards the south-%est of <ed."orani, conducted by t%o sEuads headed by a @irst ?ieutenant, resulted in capturin" 1D 'talian oIcers and DD3 soldiers at their base of attack. #he "lorious success of this small detachment came as a surprise even to the 'talian prisoners, as soon as they realised its actual stren"th. #he fourth day ended, like the previous one, %ith a Oat failure of the 'talians. #his situation "reatly alarmed <ussolini, %ho had been %atchin" the development of the attack from the day of its commencement. $n the mornin" of <arch lD, the fourth day of the 'talian attack, <ussolini received a report of !eneral !elo..o, 4ommander of the '' Army, by %hich he claimed that the %hole operation %as to be re"arded as a failure. After this, on the evenin" of the same day, <ussolini convoked a meetin" of all the ?ar"e Hnit commanders, in order to assess the situation, as it had developed and %hich %as turnin" into a Oat failure for the attackers. 6urin" the meetin", <ussolini stressed the need to continue the o8ensive %ith all available forces, in order to achieve the obKectives before the !ermans launched their o%n attack a"ainst !reece in the be"innin" of April, as %as e&pected, and concluded as follo%s2 B' have al%ays done my utmost to keep the name and presti"e of the 'talian Army hi"h but it is no% e&pedient to alter the situation. ' have told his ;&cellency !u..oni to send all e&istin" supplies in 'taly here, because the 'talian Army is here, the %ar is here, and it is here that %e must %inC. 169 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
$n the basis of this decision of his to provide all the means of support reEuired for the success of the o8ence, at D11) hrs, he summoned !eneral -riccolo, 4hief of the Airforce !eneral Sta8 and ordered him to place the entire Airforce at the disposal of the o8ensive operations. %(&, $n the follo%in" day, by noon, the front of the ' 6ivision displayed the usual shellin" action of the artillery and mortars. As of 133( hrs, a vi"orous bombardment started throu"hout the entire front of the 6ivision, coverin" the entire depth of its .one. At 1)3( hrs an e&tremely po%erful attack %as launched a"ainst the hei"hts F31 and +re"ou :apit, %hile simultaneously, 31 A"hter aircraft, %hich escorted D(-D) bombers, %hich %ere bombin" in "roups of ), %ere continuously Oyin" over the 6ivision sector and bombin" the artillery and reserve positions, %hile incessantly straAn" the front-line troops. #he A"ht %as conducted %ith unprecedented obstinacy. >herever the attackers mana"ed to approach the trenches, their brave defenders %ould sprin" from them %ith A&ed bayonets and %ould overrun them by a hand to hand A"ht. #he A"ht lasted until the evenin", %hereupon the attackers %ere Anally overrun. #he losses %ere "reat on both sides. At 1G(( hrs, the 'talians launched a ne% attack %ithout artillery preparation a"ainst the hei"ht F3l, the thirteenth in a ro%, %hich %as also repulsed. 'n the sectors of the 7, 9', 97 and 97'' 6ivisions, there %as only artillery action takin" place, %ith particular intensity a"ainst the 4entre of resistance of hei"ht F1( (+oubessi) and south, as far as ,iafe ?ou.it. #he 'talian Airforce, %ith D(( sorties in consecutive %aves, bombarded the entire .one of the +3 Army 4orps and, in particular, hei"hts 13(G, ,iafe ?ou.it and <ali Spandarit. #hus the Afth day of continuous A"htin" ended, %ith a complete failure for the 'talians, in spite of the e&hortations, admonitions and a"onised pleas of #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 170 <ussolini, the massive use of the Airforce and the terrible barra"e of their Artillery. #he brave defenders of the hei"hts F31 and +re"ou :apit retained their positions unshaken and overran the successive attacks a"ainst them. %(7, #he ni"ht of <arch 13 to 1 displayed the usual artillery and mortar activity. >ithin the sector of the ' 6ivision, the 'talians, as of ((3( hrs, be"an to advance small sections to the -roi 7eles ravine, north of +re"ou :apit, %hich %ere, nevertheless, perceived at da%n and %ere thereafter held in position. A !reek counter-attack %as launched and the 'talian troops %ere forced to retreat in disarray, abandonin", apart from the %ar supplies, about D) prisoners as %ell. 'n the mornin", heavy shellin" by the artillery recommenced a"ainst the ri"ht Oank of the 6ivision %ithout interruption until 1((( hrs, %hereupon the 'talians once a"ain launched an e&tremely vi"orous counter-attack a"ainst the hei"hts F31 and +re"ou :apit %ith a re"iment of the B+ariC 6ivision and a re"iment of the B4a"liariC 6ivision respectively. #he A"ht lasted until 1D3( hrs and the attackers %ere repulsed %ith e&tremely "rave losses. #he shellin" of the artillery and the bombin" of the airforce a"ainst the front of the 6ivision continued and at 1)(( hrs a ne% attack, the Afteenth, %as launched a"ainst the hei"hts F31 and +re"ou :apit. #he A"ht %as relentless %ith alternatin" phases until 1F(( hrs. 6urin" this period, the 'talians succeeded in Bsettin" footC on the %est of the hei"ht F1F and for the Arst time on the front-lines of the hei"ht F3l, but only for a very short %hile. >ith a stron" counter-attack, their heroic defenders overran the attackers, %ho abandoned on site a considerable number of automatic %eapons, mortars and prisoners. An attempt of the enemy to concentrate its forces in the -roi 7eles ravine and to reor"anise them for a ne% 171 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
attack a"ainst the hei"ht F1F, %as impeded by the Are of the artillery. At 1G(( hrs, the 'talians launched a ne% surprise attack a"ainst the hei"ht F3l, the si&teenth in a ro%, %ith no artillery preparation, yet %ith a vi"orous bombardment of the remainder of the 6ivision .one. #he attack %as repulsed at 113( hrs. #he same fate befell the attack that %as launched a"ainst the hei"ht 1(0(, on the left Oank of the 6ivision. #he A"ht %as marked by such violence from the very Arst day of the attack, that the forest coverin" the hei"hts F31 and F1F (+re"ou :apit) disappeared as if full-scale timberfellin" had been conducted beforehand. 'n the sectors of the 9', 97 and 97'' 6ivisions , only limited artillery action %as recorded. 'n the sector of the 7 6ivision, t%o attacks %ere launched a"ainst the hei"ht -unta Nord, at (F(( hrs and at 1D(( hrs, and %ere repulsed. 6urin" the si&th day of the attack the 'talians also failed completely. #he successive attacks and the continuous bombin"s of the 'talian Airforce, that came in %aves and %hich had e&ceeded 3(( sorties durin" that day, could not shake the heroic A"hters of the ' 6ivision. %(-, $n the follo%in" day, until 13(( hrs, calmness prevailed, thou"h a little later, the enemy artillery a"ain be"an to Are e8ectively a"ainst the hei"hts F31 and +re"ou :apit and, from time to time, a"ainst the hei"hts ,iafe ?ou.it and <a.iani. #he shellin" continued until 1G3( hrs and at D((( hrs the 'talians launched a surprise attack a"ainst the hei"ht F3l, %ithout any artillery preparation. >ith the commencement of the attack, ho%ever, the artillery support %as immediate and almost covered the entire front of the 6ivision simultaneously. #he A"ht %as stubborn, but, in the end, the attack %as repulsed at appro&imately D1(( hrs, by hand-"renades and direct #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 172 counter-attacks. #he losses %ere considerable on both sides. 'n the sectors of the '', 7, 9', 97 and 97'' 6ivisions, only artillery action %as recorded, %ithout any o8ensive moves. #he seventh day of the 'talian attack <arch 1), %as decisive, since its Anal Oat failure, convinced the 'talian ?eadership that the BSprin" AttackC, on %hich it had placed so many hopes and %hich had been prepared in every detail, supported by numerous troops, %as an unmiti"ated disaster. $n the previous day, <arch l, in a discussion bet%een <ussolini and <arshal 4avallero, the latter had supported that if the attack of the ne&t day %as to fail, the action %ould have to be suspended and stren"th %ould have to be saved so as to resume action at a later date. #hus, after the failure of the attack on <arch l), the 'talian ?eadership decided the "radual suspension of operations, a%aitin" more advanta"eous conditions, yet %ith the A&ed perspective of <ussolini, to secure even a small success before the !erman attack a"ainst !reece. %(), #he !reek 4ommander in chief, in appreciation of the "lorious feat of the +3 Army 4orps units and, above all, the self-sacriAce and heroism of the men of the ' 6ivision, that had taken on the %ei"ht of the 'talian attack and had repulsed it successfully, communicated his follo%in" $rder of the 6ay, on the ni"ht of <arch 1) 2 ,The seven$"ay efort that the enemy is ma7ing against you* has not sha7en you* it has given you a ne! o..asion to prove yet on.e again your glorious virtues an" above all your faith as to the righteousness of your struggle2 The struggle of over four months !hi.h you are vi.toriously .on"u.ting has .overe" you !ith laurels of unsurpassable glory2 The efort of the enemy is .rushe"* your !ill remains unbo!e" an" your .onvi.tion as to the vi.tory un"iminishe"2 173 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
Our 6ntire Army that Dou of the entral <ront so gloriously represent an" to the history of !hi.h you have a""e" ne! glorious pages* is !at.hing you an" a"miring you2 / a""ress the !armest of .ongratulations2 ;ong ;ive the Gree7 Army Al2 5apagos2 omman"er in .hief C Gra"ual Sla.7ening of an" Suspension of the /talian Ofensive % Mar.h 18$(8* 1941 + ( Sketch-map no. 11 ) %%., @rom the mornin" of <arch 10 and until <arch lG, the front of the +3 Army 4orps presented the usual picture before the attack, i.e. the e&chan"e of artillery Are, patrol activity and limited action of the 'talian Airforce. #he !reek 4ommand, estimatin" that the 'talians had e&hausted the possibilities of repeatin" their o8ensive actions on a lar"e scale, decided to redeploy the forces in the 4entral Sector, in order to relieve those units %hich had been sorely tried. #hus, on <arch l0, the ;@AS, by approval of the !eneral *eadEuarters, ordered the follo%in" redistribution of the divisions %ithin the sector of the +3 Army 4orps2 $n the Arst echelon, 6ivisions '7, 7, 7' and 97'', %ere placed, the 7' bet%een the rivers Apsos and 6esnitsa, the 97'' bet%een 6esnitsa and the eastern slopes of #rebessina, the 7 from the villa"e of Art.a di <e..o and as far as -unta Nord-saddle of <ed."orani and the '7 (movin" from the area of Ar"yrokastro) astride Aoos, from the saddle of <ed."orani to !oliko. $n the second echelon, the ' and 97 6ivisions east of ,lissoura %ould remain as reserves of the ;@AS* and the 9' 6ivision in the area :oden--sari as a reserve of the #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 174 !eneral *eadEuarters. #he replacement of the ' 6ivision by the 97'' 6ivision %ould take place by <arch D3, %hile the re-arran"ements of the other divisions %ould have to be completed by the end of <arch. %%(, After a three day respite, on <arch l1, the 'talians launched a ne% attack, the ei"hteenth in succession, a"ainst the hei"ht F3l, that stood like an impre"nable rock, on %hich all ra"in" attacks of the enemy %ere shattered. #he attack %as launched at (03( hrs, after intense shellin" of the F31-,iafe ?ou.it hei"hts and #rebessina, by elite troops of the BSiennaC 6ivision, that had been specially trained for this operation and %ere supported by li"ht combat tanks. #he infantry troops, takin" advanta"e of the sustained shellin", mana"ed to approach the southern shoulders of the hei"ht F3l. *o%ever, there they %ere encircled by the counter-attackin" !reek troops and after bein" depleted, they %ere pushed back at appro&imately (F( hrs, abandonin" more than 1(( killed in action. As for the tanks, t%o of them fell into the -roi <ath ravine, one %as destroyed before hei"ht F31 and the others retreated to their base of departure. #he repulsion of the attack %as follo%ed by an e&tremely heavy shellin" by the 'talian artillery, due to %hich most of the Aeld defences at F31 hei"ht %ere s%ept a%ay. 'n the remainin" sectors of the +3 Army 4orps, no note%orthy activity %as recorded. %%%, 'n the area of the 97'' 6ivision, at DD(( hrs, on <arch D(, the 'talians launched a po%erful attack from Aoos to the hei"ht 13F, %est of <ed."orani. ;ven thou"h the attack %as supported by a volume of artillery and mortars, it %as repulsed at appro&imately D(( hrs. As of the evenin" of <arch Dl, the 97'' 6ivision troops at Sendeli be"an to be replaced by troops from the '7 6ivision. #he 97'' 6ivision, concentrated in the area -anariti, :iba, !oritsa. #here, it attended to the re-or"anisation and 175 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
repose of its units until the evenin" of <arch D, %hereupon it commenced, %ith delay, the "radual replacement of the ' 6ivision troops and parts of the 97 6ivision, terminatin" its task on April D. #he delay in the commencement of this replacement %as due to the abovementioned 'talian attack a"ainst the 97'' 6ivision. 'n the sector of the 7 6ivision there %as no important activity recorded from <arch D( to DG. 'n the sector of the ' 6ivision, <arch D1 %ent by %ithout any note%orthy events. At (13( hrs on <arch DD, a "roup of 'talian messen"ers, comprisin" three army priests and a number of litter bearers, appeared before the !reek lines on the hei"ht F3l. :epresentin" the 'talian 4ommand, they proposed a cease-Are of to 0 hours, to bury the dead. #he !reek 4ommand, after a communication bet%een the ' 6ivision and the +3 Army 4orps, accepted the 'talian proposal. 'n parallel, it set terms of %hich the most basic one %as that, the cease-Are had been reEuested by the 'talians, and that, the burial of the dead from the hei"ht F1F and further east as far as the -roi <ath ravine south%ards, %ould be conducted by !reek troops in the presence of unarmed 'talians from their medical corps. #he proposals of the !reeks %ere not accepted by the 'talians and the A"ht re-commenced. Nevertheless, the representative of the !reek 4ommand, 4ommander of the 1Q0F battalion of the 97'' 6ivision, had the opportunity to traverse the terrain in front of the !reek lines and ascertain the terrible massacre su8ered by the 'talians in their attacks a"ainst the hei"ht F3l. #he same oIcer, in a report %ith re"ard to the situation, related that, even thou"h he had %itnessed pictures of massacre in the battleAelds of <acedonia and Asia <inor, the macabre and horrifyin" spectacle that he %as faced %ith, in the area bet%een the hei"hts F31 and F1F, %ent beyond all bounds of his ima"ination. #he entire visible .one (appro&imately 1)( meters %ide) of the rid"eline bet%een the t%o hei"hts %as covered %ith corpses stre%n in #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 176 heaps, amon"st %hich mutilated members of the slau"htered A"hters protruded. #he macabre picture %as hei"htened by the vie% of the deadly embrace of adversaries, many of %hich %ere !reek. A similar si"ht %as also bound to be encountered on the slopes to%ards the -roi <ath and -roi 7eles ravines. #he terrible losses su8ered by the 'talians before the hei"ht F3l, Kustify their decision to build the monument to honor their men %ho fell A"htin" in Albania, on that hei"ht, %hich they named Bthe Sacred !roundC. %%/, $n the ni"ht of <arch DD to D3, the 'talians shelled the .one of the ' 6ivision %ith intensity, in retaliation for the !reek refusal to accept the cease-Are to bury their dead on their o%n terms. #he shellin" continued durin" the entire day and %as particularly heavy a"ainst the hei"ht F31. At ((D( hrs on <arch D, they launched another surprise attack a"ainst the hei"ht F3l, %here they %e repulsed once a"ain at (1D( hrs by its brave defenders. #he attack %as repeated at (33( hrs, but it %as also repulsed %ith heavy losses for the attackin" side. <arch D) and D0 %ent by %ith limited activity and the 6ivision troops dealt %ith the terrain or"anisation and strove to increase the stren"th of their position. 'n the sector of the 97 6ivision, no note%orthy events took place from <arch D( to D0, e&cept for artillery and patrol activity, terrain or"anisation and the preparation for the relief that %ould occur at the end of the month. 'n the sector of the 9' 6ivision, there %ere no note%orthy actions durin" the same period. @rom the evenin" of <arch D0, its relief by the 7' 6ivision commenced. #he 9' 6ivision %as to complete its concentration in the area :oden-+ali--sari, by the ni"ht of April 3 to , as a reserve of the !eneral *eadEuarters, leavin" one detachment ( 4olonel =iannakopoulos) north of Apsos under the command of the ><@AS. 177 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
%%*, #he casualties of the !reek units that had participated in the A"ht to repulse the 'talian BSprin"C attack, %ere F oIcers and 1,110 soldiers killed in action, l oIcers and 3,GFD soldiers %ounded and D soldiers missin" in action. #he ' 6ivision, %hich had taken on the principal load of the 'talian attack, su8ered the heaviest casualties. #he casualties of the 'talians durin" the same period, accordin" to the records of oIcial 'talian sources, e&ceeded 11,G(( killed in action and %ounded. @urthermore, the number of the 'talian prisoners, from /anuary F to the end of <arch 111, %ere 1G1 oIcers and F,0) soldiers. %%+, #he 'talian BSprin"C attack did not have any serious e8ect on the other sectors of the front, nor did it ne"atively a8ect the morale of the forces. 'n fact, in reply to a relevant soundin" by the !eneral *eadEuarters %ith re"ard to the assumption of diversionary o8ensive operations in the sector of ,amia--o"radet., the ><@AS reported that it %as ready and fully convinced of the success of its actions. 'n the end, the !eneral *eadEuarters did not undertake to implement the abovementioned action, in order to economise mainly on artillery ammunitions. #hus, its activity in both the Southern and Northern Sectors %as limited to artillery and patrol action. Attacks %ere launched only a"ainst troops of the '' 6ivision in the Southern Sector and troops of the 97' in the Northern sector, that %ere adKoinin" the area of the +3 Army 4orps. *o%ever, all these attacks %ere repulsed successfully and %ith "reat losses for the 'talians. #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 178 The /nglorious 6n" of the /talian Atta.7 %%&, All the above is a detailed account of the development of the 'talian BSprin"C attack, %hich constituted the most serious e8ort of the 'talians since the be"innin" of the %ar. #he momentum of the attackers be"an to "radually slacken o8 since <arch l. $ne last e8ort made by the 'talians in order to sei.e the fou"ht-for F31 hei"ht, %ith the use of tanks, %as an unmiti"ated disaster and convinced <ussolini of the inability of the 'talian army to resolve the situation, despite the "reat sacriAces and the heroic attitude of its troops. 'n the mornin" of <arch D1, <ussoli humiliated and disheartened, departed from the airport of #irana to :ome. 'n his report submitted to ,in" Hmberto, an attitude of resentment approachin" hostility to%ards the military leadership is prevalent, as underlined by !eneral 4avallero and conArmed by the 4hief of the Airforce !eneral Sta8 and trusted collea"ue of <ussolini, !eneral -riccolo, to %hom he stated on the eve of his departure for :ome2 B' have summoned you, for ' have decided to return to :ome %ithin the follo%in" day. ' have been dis"usted by this environment. >e have not moved one step for%ard. So far ' have been deceived. ' have deep contempt for all these peopleC. *e refered to his military leaders. $n his return to 'taly, <ussolini %as still nourishin" a small hope that, the repetition of the attack a"ainst the !reeks, prepared for the end of <arch, %ould "ive him at least a small success in order to be able to face his !erman allies %ithout shame. *e %as once a"ain disillusioned, ho%ever, for in the meantime, a coup d3 etat in +erl"rade, overthre% the pro-a&is !overnment of 4vetkovitch %hich, on <arch D), had ali"ned =u"oslavia %ith the #ripartite -act. 179 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
#he coup d3 etat brou"ht the !overnment of Simovich into po%er, %hich sided %ith the %estern allies. #hus, the ne% situation created in =u"oslavia forced the 'talians to take measures in the direction of the =u"oslavian borders on Albania, and to cancel the ne% attack planned a"ainst the !reek front, a%aitin" the !erman assault a"ainst !reece that %ould relieve them from the dead-end situation to %hich they had been led by the heroic resistance of the !reek Army and the national solidarity of the !reeks. A General :evie! of the Operations "uring the (n" an" 9r" 5erio" of the Gree7 $ /talian Aar % 3ovember 14* 194E to Mar.h (8* 1941 + %%7, #he operations conducted from November 1, 11( until <arch D0, 111, constitute the second and third periods of the !reek-'talian %ar. 6urin" the second period, from November 1, 11( to /anuary 0, 111, the !reek Army, after havin" contained the advance of the intruders, assumed a "eneral counter-attack, in order to restore in full the inte"rity of the national territory. 4onfronted %ith adverse conditions, due to the superiority of the adversary in armament and airforce, the rou"hness of the terrain, the "reat diIculties in the re-supply and the severity of the untimely %inter, the Army made superhuman e8orts, that bore results beyond any e&pectation. 'n the Southern Sector, the A3 Army 4orps, after occupyin" the harbour of A"ii Saranda on 6ecember 0 and the to%n of Ar"yrokastro on 6ecember G, continued its o8ensive operations and by /anuary 0 had taken the line *imara-7ranitsa-+oliena, thus creatin" favourable conditions for the full-scale breakthrou"h of the Siousitsa #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 180 river valley and the continuation of the advance to%ards Avlonas. 'n the 4entral Sector , the +3 Army 4orps, after occupyin" -remeti on 6ecember ) and securin" in full the free use of the carria"e road ?eskoviki-,oritsa, mana"ed to reach, by the end of 6ecember and despite the stubborn resistance of the enemy, appro&imately 1) kilometres east of the road ,lissoura-*ani +alaban and %as ready to sei.e the Kunction of ,lissoura. 'n the Northern Sector, the ><@AS (43 and ;3 Army 4orps), after occupyin" the mountain bulk of <orova-'van on November D1 and the Kunction of ,oritsa on the follo%in" day, advanced %est of the Kunction to a depth of appro&imately ( kilometres alon" the line $uyianikou- mount Souka"ora-!rambova-mount ,amia--o"radet., securin" the hi"h plateau of ,oritsa from the %est and north-%est. 6urin" the operations of the second period, the 'talian 4ommand committed ei"ht ne% 'nfantry 6ivisions to the action, the Dnd Alpine B#ridentinaC, the th Alpine B,ouneenseC, the 11th B+renneroC, the 33rd BAEuiC, the 3Fth B<odenaC, the Gth B#aroC, the )(th Alpine B-ousteriaC, the )3rd BAre..oC, as %ell as a lar"e number of various other units, of re"iment or battalion stren"th. 6urin" the same period, the !reek 4ommand committed seven ne% 'nfantry 6ivisions, to the action, namely the '', ''', '7, 9, 9', 9''', and 97'' 6ivisions. 'n total, the 'talian forces in the Albanian #heatre of $perations amounted to 1) 'nfantry 6ivisions and one Armoured 6ivision, a"ainst 11 'nfantry 6ivisions, one 'nfantry +ri"ade and one 4avalry 6ivision of the !reek forces. @urthermore, %hat must be taken into consideration is that the 'talian Airforce had total numerical supremacy and that the !reek Army %as completely lackin" tanks. Nevertheless, the o8ensive operations of the !reek forces %ere cro%ned %ith success. #he !reek Army, ho%ever, lacked in armoured and motorised vehicles, thus 181 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
there %as no possibility to take advanta"e of the o8ensive actions, even if there had been opportunities %hich could have borne important results. #his %eakness compelled the !reek forces to avoid the .ones of the plains and to conduct their moves and manoeuvres from mountainous directions mainly. #his resulted in the e&tension of the columns, added to the fati"ue of troops, and pack animals and created diIculties in the re-supply. $n the contrary, by virtue of the means available to the enemy forces, in the .ones of the plains, %ith the use of motor vehicles, the adversary %as able to %ithdra% in haste and establish its troops else%here at relative ease. 'n the mountainous areas, the enemy %as able to delay the !reek advance %ith a relatively small number of forces. <oreover, the 'talian units that %ere ne%ly committed to the action, %ere Euickly transferred to the front %ith motor vehicles, %hereas the !reek ones lacked such means of transportation and arrived at the front after lon" ni"ht marches unable to Koin the action. #he !reek troops, preservin" a hi"h morale and emanatin" a spirit of self-sacriAce defyin" the hardships and their disadvanta"eous position a"ainst the adversary, had mana"ed, %ithin, a month and a half not only to chase a%ay the intruder but also to repulse him into the Northern ;pirus territory, to a depth ran"in" from 3( to G( kms, addin" ne% pa"es of "lory to the a"e-lon" !reek *istory. %%-, #he third period, from /anuary F to <arch D0, 111, covers the o8ensive operations of the +3 Army 4orps to%ards ,lissoura-7erati, the local 'talian attack to recapture ,lissoura and the "reat BSprin"C attack of the 'talians. #he +3 Army 4orps, seekin" to take possession of the road Kunction of ,lissoura and to advance its forces in the direction of 7erati, sei.ed ,lissoura on /anuary l(, after a series of hard stru""les, and by /anuary D), had advanced to the "eneral line of the hei"ht 13(G (of #rebessina)- #*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 182 +oubessi- <ali Spandarit. #here, it suspended its further operations, on account of adverse %eather conditions and diIculties in the re-supply of its troops. $n /anuary D0, after stabilisin" their positions to a certain de"ree, the 'talians attempted to recapture the road Kunction of ,lissoura, to %hich they attached "reat importance. #he 'talian attack %as launched by the B?enianoC 6ivision, %hich %as reinforced %ith an Alpine battalion alon" %ith troops from the semi-armoured B4entaursC 6ivision and %as supported by a stron" air force. 6urin" its Arst day, the attack recorded only small local successes. #he +3 Army 4orps, realisin" the dan"er that a possible loss of ,lissoura %ould entail, hastened to advance stron" forces in that direction and to repulse the 'talians %ith relentless A"hts, that lasted until /anuary 3(. #hereafter, the 'talians terminated their e8ort, %hich had caused them heavy losses in both manpo%er and supplies. %%), *o%ever, the most important event of that period of the !reek-'talian %ar, %as the third phase, the "reat BSprin"C attack of the 'talian Army. #he 'talian *i"h 4ommand, after the stabilisation and the actual suspension of the operations due to the e&tremely severe %inter, %as seekin" to inOict a serious blo% a"ainst the !reeks, in order to propitiate the 'talian people and its !erman allies and to atone for its failures up to that point. <ussolini, a%are of the fact that the !ermans %ere ready to invade !reece but uninformed as to the actual time of the attack, %as a"onisin" over the possibility that his ally %ould forestall him and that 'taly %ould thus And itself in the e&tremely humiliatin" position to o%e the !ermans its relief from the dead-end situation to %hich it had been driven by its deplorable failure in the Albanian front. #he e&pected 'talian attack %as launched in the mornin" of <arch 1. 'n total and only on a fronta"e of 183 !:;;, A:<= >'N#;: $-;:A#'$NS-'#A?'AN -:'<A7;:A A##A4,
appro&imately si& kilometres, Ave divisions and one +lackshirt battalion had been deployed on a Arst echelon and Ave divisions operatin" as reserves. <ussolini, full of hope, had positioned himself on the ,omarit hei"ht (!lava) as of that mornin", and from there he observed the development of the attack to"ether %ith the 4ommander-in-4hief and the ?eaders of the attackin" forces. #he attack continued %ith undiminished momentum until <arch l, yet failed to record any success, due to the indomitable coura"e and self-sacriAce of the !reek soldiers, %ho did not surrender not even one inch of their land to the attackin" 'talians. +y <arch 1), the 'talian e8ort had be"un to lose momentum and it %as abandoned completely after the D)th of the same month. <ussolini disappointed, departed from #irana on <arch D1, for 'taly, plannin" to repeat the attack at the end of the month. *o%ever, the sidin" of =u"oslavia %ith the Allies, %hich had occurred in the meantime, did not permit for this ne% attempt to be carried out. #he !erman attack a"ainst !reece that follo%ed, Anally shattered the hope of the 'talians for any success.
#*; !;N;:A? <'?'#A:= S'#HA#'$N 'N #*; +;!'NN'N! $@ 111 184