SALVADOR H. LAUREL vs.

RAMON GARCIA
G. R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990
AC!S" This is a petition for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and
agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 30
!oppongi" #$chome %inato$ku Tok&o, 'apan scheduled on (ebruar& )1, 1990*
The subject propert& in this case is one of the four +,- properties in 'apan acquired b& the
.hilippine government under the !eparations /greement entered into with 'apan on 9 %a& 19#*
The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the 'apanese government for
national development projects are part of the indemnification to the (ilipino people for their
losses in life and propert& and their suffering during 0orld 0ar 11*
ISSUES"
1* 0hether or not the !oppongi propert& and others of its kind can be alienated b& the .hilippine
government*
)* 0hether or not the 2hief 34ecutive, her officers and agents have the authorit&, and jurisdiction
to sell the !oppongi propert&*
RULING"
The 2ourt ruled in the negative* The nature of the !oppongi lot as propert& for public service is
e4pressl& spelled out* 1t is dictated b& the terms of the !eparations /greement and the
corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the .hilippine government and the
'apanese government* There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion and is outside the
commerce of man* /nd the propert& continues to be part of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such +1gnacio vs* 5irector of 6ands, 107 .hil 33#-* 1t is
not for the .resident to conve& valuable real propert& of the government on his or her own sole
will* /n& such conve&ances must be authori8ed and approved b& a law enacted b& the 2ongress*
1t requires e4ecutive and legislative concurrence* .etition is granted*
G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Before determining whether it is domestic or foreign
law that should e a!!lied" one must #rst determine whether a con$ict of laws
situation e%ists&
FACTS:
The Ro!!ongi Pro!ert' is one of the four !ro!erties in (a!an ac)uired ' the Phili!!ine
go*ernment under the Re!arations Agreement" as !art of the indemni#cation to the +ili!ino
!eo!le for their losses in life and !ro!ert' and their su,ering during WWII& The Ro!!ongi
!ro!ert' ecame the site of the Phili!!ine Emass' until the latter was transferred to
another site when the Ro!!ongi uilding needed ma-or re!airs& .ue to the failure of our
go*ernment to !ro*ide necessar' funds" the Ro!!ongi !ro!ert' has remained unde*elo!ed
since that time& After man' 'ears" the A)uino administration ad*anced the sale of the
re!aration !ro!erties" which included the Ro!!ongi lot& This mo*e was o!!osed on the
ground that the Ro!!ongi !ro!ert' is !ulic in character& +or their !art" the !ro!onents of
the sale raised that (a!anese law should a!!l'" following the doctrine of le% loci rei sitae&
ISSUE: Whether or ot the !o"#!t o$ l%& rule o le' lo!# re# (#t%e (houl) %**ly
+E,-:
We see no reason wh' a con$ict of law rule should a!!l' when no con$ict of law situation
e%ists& A con$ict of law situation arises onl' when: /01 There is a dis!ute o*er the title or
ownershi! of an immo*ale" such that the ca!acit' to ta2e and transfer immo*ales" the
formalities of con*e'ance" the essential *alidit' and e,ect of the transfer" or the
inter!retation and e,ect of a con*e'ance" are to e determined /3ee 3alonga" Pri*ate
International Law" 0450 ed&" !!& 677865619 and /:1 A foreign law on land ownershi! and its
con*e'ance is asserted to con$ict with a domestic law on the same matters& ;ence" the
need to determine which law should a!!l'&
In the instant case" none of the ao*e elements e%ists&
The issues are not concerned with *alidit' of ownershi! or title& There is no )uestion that the
!ro!ert' elongs to the Phili!!ines& The issue is the authorit' of the res!ondent o<cials to
*alidl' dis!ose of !ro!ert' elonging to the 3tate& And the *alidit' of the !rocedures
ado!ted to e,ect its sale& This is go*erned ' Phili!!ine Law& The rule of le% situs does not
a!!l'&
The assertion that the o!inion of the 3ecretar' of (ustice sheds light on the rele*ance of the
le% situs rule is mis!laced& The o!inion does not tac2le the alienailit' of the real !ro!erties
!rocured through re!arations nor the e%istence in what od' of the authorit' to sell them& In
discussing who are ca!ale of ac)uiring the lots" the 3ecretar' merel' e%!lains that it is the
foreign law which should determine who can ac)uire the !ro!erties so that the constitutional
limitation on ac)uisition of lands of the !ulic domain to +ili!ino citi=ens and entities wholl'
owned ' +ili!inos is ina!!licale& We see no !oint in elaoring whether or not this o!inion
is correct& Wh' should we discuss who can ac)uire the Ro!!ongi lot when there is no
showing that it can e sold>
LAUREL V. GARCIA
1#$ SCRA $9$
AC!S"
The subject !oppongi propert& is one of the properties acquired b& the .hilippines from 'apan
pursuant to a !eparations /greement* The propert& is where the .hilippine 3mbass& was once
located, before it transferred to the 9ampeidai propert&* 1t was decided that the properties would
be
available to sale or disposition* :ne of the first properties opened up for public auction was the
!oppongi propert&, despite numerous oppositions from different sectors*
HELD"
The !oppongi propert& was acquired together with the other properties through reparation
agreements* The& were assigned to the government sector and that the !oppongi propert& was
specificall& designated under the agreement to house the .hilippine embass&*
1t is of public dominion unless it is convincingl& shown that the propert& has become
patrimonial* The respondents have failed to do so*
/s propert& of public dominion, the !oppongi lot is outside the commerce of man* 1t cannot be
alienated* 1ts ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and pa&ment, in
application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group* The purpose is
not to serve the ;tate as the juridical person but the citi8ens" it is intended for the common and
public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation*
The fact that the !oppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual 3mbass& service
doesn<t automaticall& convert it to patrimonial propert&* /n& such conversion happens onl& if the
propert& is withdrawn from public use* / propert& continues to be part of the public domain, not
available for
private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such*
Haystack: Laurel v. Garcia (GRs 92013 & 92047, 25 July 1990)
Laurel v. Garcia
[G.R. No. 92013 & 92047. July 25, 1990.], Ojeda v. Macaraig [G.R. No. 92047. July 25, 1990.]
En Banc, Gutierrez, Jr. (J): 5 concur
Facts: The subject Roppongi property is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on 9 May 1956, the other lots being the
Nampeidai Property (site of Philippine Embassy Chancery), the Kobe Commercial Property (Commercial lot
used as warehouse and parking lot of consulate staf), and the Kobe Residential Property (a vacant residential
lot). The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for national
development projects are part of the indemnifcation to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property
and their sufering during World War II. The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550
million would be payable in 20 years in accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fxed by the
Philippine and Japanese governments (Article 2, Reparations Agreement). RA 1789, the Reparations Law,
prescribes the national policy on procurement and utilization of reparations and development loans; those
which belong to the government and which may be availed of by private entities. The Roppongi property was
acquired from the Japanese government under the Second Year Schedule and listed under the heading
"Government Sector", through Reparations Contract 300 dated 27 June 1958. The Roponggi property consists
of the land and building "for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy." As intended, it became the site of the
Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on 22 July 1976 when the Roppongi building
needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property
has remained undeveloped since that time.
During the incumbency of President Aquino, a proposal was made by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan,
Carlos J. Valdez, to lease the subject property to Kajima Corporation, a Japanese frm, in exchange of the
construction of 2 buildings in Roppongi, 1 building in Nampeidai, and the renovation of the Philippine Chancery
in Nampeidai. The Government did not act favorably to said proposal, but instead, on 11 August 1986,
President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition or utilization of Philippine government properties
in Tokyo and Kobe though AO-3, and AO 3-A to 3-D. On 25 July 1987, the President issued EO 296 entitling
non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or
disposition. The four properties in Japan including the Roppongi were specifcally mentioned in the frst
"Whereas" clause. Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been
pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot.
Two petitions for prohibition were fled seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and agents from
proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 sq. m. of land at 306 Ropponggi, 5-Chome Minato-ku,
Tokyo, Japan scheduled on 21 February 1990; the temporary restaining order of which was granted by the
court on 20 February 1990. In G.R. No. 92047, a writ of mandamus was prayed for to compel the respondents
to fully disclose to the public the basis of their decision to push through with the sale of the Roppongi property
inspite of strong public opposition and to explain the proceedings which efectively prevent the participation of
Filipino citizens and entities in the bidding process.
After multiple motions for extension to fle comment by the respondents, the Supreme Court resolved to decide
the 2 cases; thereby granting the petitions and enjoining the respondents from proceeding with the sale of the
Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan. The Court also made permanent the 20 February 1990 temporary
restaining order.
1. Roponggi lot is a property of public dominion
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms
of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine
government and the Japanese government, that these were assigned to the government sector and that the
Roppongi property itself was specifcally designated under the Reparations Agreement to house the Philippine
Embassy. There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property
has become patrimonial; which respondents have failed to show.
2. Property of public dominion outside the commerce of man
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its
ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of
collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but
the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.
3. Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code
Article 419 provides that property is either of public dominion or of private ownership. Article 420 provides that
property of public dominion includes (1) those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2)
those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth. Article 421 provides that all other property of the State, which is not of
the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property." In the present case, the Roppongi
property is correctly classifed under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the
State and intended for some public service.
4. Conversion to patrimonial property happen if property is withdrawn from public use; Abandonment
must be certain and positive act based on correct legal premises
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not
automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn
from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A property continues to be
part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership "until there is a formal declaration
on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960])
An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial
property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be defnite. Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-
use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will
but to a lack of fnancial support to repair and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v. Lazarao,
166 SCRA 368 [1988]). Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises. In
the present case, the recent Administrative Orders authorizing a study of the status and conditions of
government properties in Japan were merely directives for investigation but did not in any way signify a clear
intention to dispose of the properties. Further EO 296 does not declare that the properties lost their public
character, but merely intends to make the properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of
a sale, lease or other disposition.
5. RA 6657 does not authorize the disposition of Roppongi property as it is outside the commerce of
man; EO 296 amended nationality provision for the sale of procurements for the private sector, not the
procurements for the government (the latter which includes Roppongi property)
EO 296 is based on the wrong premise or assumption that the Roppongi and the three other properties were
earlier converted into alienable real properties. RA 1789 diferentiates the procurements for the government
sector and the private sector (Sections 2 and 12, RA 1789). Only the private sector properties can be sold to
end-users who must be Filipinos or entities owned by Filipinos. It is this nationality provision which was
amended by EO 296. Further, Section 63 (c) of RA 6657 (the CARP Law) which provides as one of the sources
of funds for its implementation, the proceeds of the disposition of the properties of the Government in foreign
countries, did not withdraw the Roppongi property from being classifed as one of public dominion when it
mentions Philippine properties abroad. Section 63 (c) refers to properties which are alienable and not to those
reserved for public use or service. RA 6657, therefore, does not authorize the Executive Department to sell the
Roppongi property. It merely enumerates possible sources of future funding to augment (as and when needed)
the Agrarian Reform Fund created under EO 299. Obviously any property outside of the commerce of man
cannot be tapped as a source of funds.
6. Confict of law rule does not apply when confict of law situation does not exist
A confict of law rule cannot apply when no confict of law situation exists. A confict of law situation arises only
when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and
transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and efect of the transfer, or the
interpretation and efect of a conveyance, are to be determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its
conveyance is asserted to confict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine
which law should apply. In the present case, none of the above elements exists.
7. Issue on the authority of ofcials to dispose property belonging to state, and not validity of
ownership or title, in question; governed by Philippine law
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs
to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent ofcials to validly dispose of property belonging
to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to efect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law.
The rule of lex situs does not apply.
8. Opinion of Secretary of Justice irrelevant; Issue of whether the property can be sold precedes the
issue of who can acquire
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule is
misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor
the existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the
Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties so
that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities
wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable. There is no need to discuss who can acquire the Roppongi lot when
there is no showing that it can be sold.
9. Approval of the President of the recommendation of the committee to sell the Roppongi property
premature, and without force and efect of law
The subsequent approval on 4 October 1988 by President Aquino of the recommendation by the investigating
committee to sell the Roppongi property was premature or, at the very least, conditioned on a valid change in
the public character of the Roppongi property. Moreover, the approval does not have the force and efect of law
since the President already lost her legislative powers. The Congress had already convened for more than a
year.
10. There is no law authorizing the conveyance of the Roppongi property; Conveyance must be
authorized by law enacted by Congress and requires executive and legislative concurrence
Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (Conveyances and contracts to which the
Government is a party) provides that in cases in which the Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a
party to any deed or other instrument conveying the title to real estate or to any other property the value of
which is in excess of P100,000, the respective Department Secretary shall prepare the necessary papers
which, together with the proper recommendations, shall be submitted to the Congress of the Philippines for
approval by the same. Such deed, instrument, or contract shall be executed and signed by the President of the
Philippines on behalf of the Government of the Philippines unless the Government of the Philippines unless the
authority therefor be expressly vested by law in another ofcer." The requirement has been retained in Section
48, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292; Ofcial authorized to convey real property), which
provides that Whenever real property of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following: (1) for property belonging to and
titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, by the President, unless the authority therefor is expressly
vested by law in another ofcer; (2) for property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but titled in the
name of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the
agency or instrumentality." Thus, it is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government
on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the
Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence.
11. 1989 case on the Roppongi property: Ojeda v. Bidding Committee; Issue diferent
The resolution of the Supreme Court in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et al., did not pass upon the
constitutionality of EO 296 nor did it uphold the authority of the President to sell the Roppongi property. The
Court stated that the constitutionality of the executive order was not the real issue and that resolving the
constitutional question was "neither necessary nor fnally determinative of the case." The Court noted that
"[W]hat petitioner ultimately questions is the use of the proceeds of the disposition of the Roppongi property." In
emphasizing that "the decision of the Executive to dispose of the Roppongi property to fnance the CARP
cannot be questioned" in view of Section 63 (c) of RA 6657, the Court did not acknowledge the fact that the
property became alienable nor did it indicate that the President was authorized to dispose of the Roppongi
property. The resolution should be read to mean that in case the Roppongi property is re-classifed to be
patrimonial and alienable by authority of law, the proceeds of a sale may be used for national economic
development projects including the CARP.
12. Constitutional questions raised in the Supreme Court
The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless these questions are properly raised in
appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for the determination of the case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil.
56 [1937]). The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if
the case can be disposed of on some other ground such as the application of a statute or general law (Siler v.
Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, [1909], Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496
[1941]).
13. Value of the Roppongi property; besides economic and fnancial benefts
The Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the infated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo
but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos veterans and civilians alike. The Roppongi property
is not just like any piece of property. It was given to the Filipino people in reparation for the lives and blood of
Filipinos who died and sufered during the Japanese military occupation, for the sufering of widows and
orphans who lost their loved ones and kindred, for the homes and other properties lost by countless Filipinos
during the war. The Tokyo properties are a monument to the bravery and sacrifce of the Filipino people in the
face of an invader. Roppongi is a reminder that cannot should not be dissipated.