1

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 152214 September 19, 2006
EQUI-ASIA PLACEMENT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DFA) represented by the HON. DOMINGO L. SIAZON, JR., SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE), represented by HON. BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision dated 4 October 2001
1
and Resolution dated 18 February 2002 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61904. The Decision denied petitioner's petition forcertiorari while the Resolution
denied its Motion for Reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts of this case in this wise:
On September 16, 2000, Manny dela Rosa Razon, a native of Lemery, Batangas and an overseas Filipino worker,
died of acute cardiac arrest while asleep at the dormitory of the Samsong Textile Processing Factory in South Korea.
Informed thereof, the Philippine Overseas Labor Office (POLO) at South Korea immediately relayed the incident to
the Philippine Embassy in South Korea. Forthwith, the [Labor] Attach of the Philippine Embassy dispatched a letter
to Eleuterio N. Gardiner, administrator of the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA). The letter reads:
"VERY URGENT, POLO has recently received a report that OFW Manny dela Rosa RAZON, an
undocumented worker, died last Saturday, 16 September, from an apparent pancreatic attack or 'bangungot.'
According to the verbal reports of Moises and Ronald Recarde, Manny's co-workers, he was found already
lifeless inside their quarters at around 11:00 in the morning of the above date. They rushed him to Uri
Hospital where the Doctor declared him dead on arrival.
Per information gathered, the deceased is single, 29 years old, from Bukal, Lemery, Batangas. His next-of-
kins are Mrs. Rowena Razon (Auntie) and Mr. Razon (Uncle) with telephone number (043)411-2308.
POLO is awaiting signed statements from the aforementioned workers who promised to send it by fax this
afternoon.
We are also coordinating with the deceased's employer for documentation requirements and financial
assistance for the repatriation of the remains.
We will highly appreciate if Home Office could advise the next-of-kins of the urgent need to issue a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) to facilitate the repatriation requirements of the subject.
In anticipation of the next-of-kins' likely move to seek financial assistance from OWWA for the repatriation of
their loved [one], please be advised in advance that we will need about US$4,000.00 to repatriate the
cadaver (to include hospital and morgue costs) to Manila. xxx"
In turn, the OWWA, through Atty. Cesar L. Chavez, indorsed the matter, for appropriate action, to Director R. Casco
of the Welfare Employment Office of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (WEO-POEA).
Upon verification by the WEO-POEA on its data base, it was discovered that Manny Razon was recruited and
deployed by petitioner Equi-Asia Placement, Inc., and was sent to South Korea on April 3, 2000 to work-train at
Yeongjin Machinery, Inc. Thereupon, POEA addressed the herein first assailed telegram-directive dated September
22, 2000 to the President/General Manager of the petitioner. We quote the telegram:
"PLEASE PROVIDE PTA [Prepaid Ticket Advice] FOR THE REPATRIATION OF REMAINS AND
BELONGINGS OF OFW MANNY DELA ROSA RAZON AS PER REQUEST OF PHILIPPINE EMBASSY,
KOREA, YOU CAN COORDINATE WITH YOUR FOREIGN EMPLOYER AND TO WAD/OWWA (MLA) AS
REGARDS TO THIS MATTER. YOU ARE GIVEN TWO (2) DAYS FROM RECEIPT HEREOF WITHIN
WHICH TO PROVIDE SAID TICKET AND ASSISTANCE, KINDLY SUBMIT YOUR REPORT TO
ASSISTANCE AND WELFARE DIVISION (AWD), 2/F POEA, FAILURE TO DO SO WILL CONSTRAIN US
TO IMPOSE APPROPRIATE SANCTION UNDER OUR RULES"
Responding thereto, petitioner, thru its President Daniel Morga, Jr., faxed on September 26, 2000 the following
message to the Assistance and Welfare Division of the POEA:
"In connection with your telegram, dated 09/22/2000, requiring us to report the circumstances surrounding
the death of OFW MANNY DELA ROSA RAZON in Korea and requesting us to issue a PTA, etc., for the
repatriation of the remains of said OFW, this is to report to your good office the following:
1. The deceased was deployed by our agency on April 3, 2000 to Yeongjin Machine Company in South
Korea;
2. He violated his employment/training/dispatching contracts on June 25, 2000 by unlawfully
escaping/running away (TNT) from his company assignment without prior KFSMB authorization and
working/staying in unknown company/place;
3. He allegedly died of 'bangungot' thereafter;
In view thereof, we cannot heed your requests as embodied in your telegram. However, his relatives can
avail of the benefits provided for by OWWA in cases involving undocumented/illegal Filipino workers abroad.
Trusting for your kind understanding"
2

On the same date September 26, 2000 Director Ricardo R. Casco of the WEO-POEA sent to the petitioner the
herein second assailed letter-directive, which pertinently reads:
"We have received a copy of your fax message dated 26 September 2000 as regards to your response to our
request for PTA for aforesaid deceased OFW. Nevertheless, may we remind you that pursuant to Sections
52, 53, 54 and 55 of the Implementing Rules Governing RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995, the repatriation of OFW, his/her remains and transport of his personal
effects is the primary responsibility of the principal or agency and to immediately advance the cost of plane
fare without prior determination of the cause of worker's repatriation. The Rules further provide for the
procedure to be followed in cases when the foreign employer/agency fails to provide for the cost of the
repatriation, compliance of which is punishable by suspension of the license of the agency or such sanction
as the Administration shall deem proper. Hence, you are required to provide the PTA for the deceased OFW
in compliance with the requirement in accordance with R.A. 8042. You are given forty-eight (48) hours upon
receipt hereof within which to provide said ticket. Failure in this regard will constrain us to impose the
appropriate sanction under our rules."
On September 27, 2000, petitioner wrote back Director Ricardo R. Casco, thus:
"In connection with your fax letter dated September 26, 2000, re: the repatriation of the remains of the
deceased, ex-trainee (OFW) MANNY DELA ROSA RAZON, please be informed that the provisions of
Section 53 as well as, and in relation to, Section 55 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 on the matters covering the following:
1. The responsibility of the agency to advance the cost of plane fare without prior determination of
the cause of the deceased worker's termination.
2. The recovery of the same costs from the estate of the dead worker before the NLRC.
3. The action to be imposed by POEA for non-compliance therewith within 48 hours are violative of
due process and/or the principle on due delegation of power.
This is so because Sec. 15 of R.A. 8042 clearly contemplates prior notice and hearing before responsibility
thereunder could be established against the agency that sets up the defense of sole fault in avoidance of
said responsibility -. Besides, the sections in question unduly grant the powers to require advance payment
of the plane fare, to impose the corresponding penalty of suspension in case of non-compliance therewith,
within 48 hours and to recover said advance payment from the dead worker's estate upon the return of his
remains to the country before the NLRC, when the law itself does not expressly provide for the grant of such
powers.
x x x x x x x x x.
Please provide us immediately with the death certificate/post mortem report/police report pertinent to above
as proof of death and cause thereof."
Nonetheless, and apprehensive of the adverse repercussions which may ensue on account of its non-compliance
with the directive, petitioner, on September 29, 2000, advanced under protest the costs for the repatriation of the
remains of the late Manny dela Rosa Razon.
Thereafter, petitioner went to this Court via the instant petition for certiorari, posing, for Our consideration, the sole
issue of
"WHETHER OR NOT SECTIONS 52, 53, 54 AND 55 OF THE OMNIBUS RULES AND REGULATIONS
IMPLEMENTING THE MIGRANT WORKERS AND OVERSEAS FILIPINOS ACT OF 1995 (R.A. 8042),
ISSUED BY DFA AND POEA, WHICH POEA SUMMARILY ORDERED THE HEREIN PETITIONER TO
COMPLY VIZ-A-VIZ THE PAYMENT IN ADVANCE OF THE EXPENSES FOR THE REPATRIATION OF
THE REMAINS OF A DECEASED WORKER-TRAINEE WHO, AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH, HAS NO
EXISTING EMPLOYMENT (DISPATCHING) CONTRACT WITH EITHER SAID PETITIONER OR HIS
FOREIGN PRINCIPAL AND NO VALID VISA OR IS NOT WORKING WITH THE FOREIGN PRINCIPAL TO
WHICH PETITIONER DEPLOYED HIM, IS ILLEGAL AND/OR VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS SUCH THAT
POEA ACTED WITHOUT [OR IN] EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION AND/OR IN GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ISSUING SAID ORDER TO PAY SAID EXPENSES."
2

On 4 October 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the Decision which is now the subject of the present petition. The
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision states:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DENIED and is accordingly DISMISSED.
3

In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals stated that petitioner was mainly accusing the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) of grave abuse of discretion when it ordered petitioner to pay, in advance, the
costs for the repatriation of the remains of the deceased Manny dela Rosa Razon.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the POEA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as its directives to petitioner were
issued pursuant to existing laws and regulations.
4
It likewise held that a petition for certiorari, which was the remedy availed
of by petitioner, is not the proper remedy as the same is only available when "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
5
Section 62 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 or Republic Act 8042 ("Omnibus Rules") states that "the Labor Arbiters of NLRC
3

shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all claims arising out of employer-employee relationship
or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral,
exemplary and other forms of damages, subject to the rules and procedures of the NLRC." There is, therefore, an adequate
remedy available to petitioner.
Lastly, the Court of Appeals declared that it could not strike down as unconstitutional Sections 52, 53, 54, and 55 of the
Omnibus Rules as the unconstitutionality of a statute or rules may not be passed upon unless the issue is directly raised in an
appropriate proceeding.
6

In the present recourse, petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in the appreciation of the issue as it mistakenly considered, in dismissing the petition
before it, that petitioner is contesting the compliance and conformity of the POEA directives with Sections 52, 53, 54,
and 55 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations implementing in particular Section 15 of RA 8042;
2. The Court of Appeals, in dismissing the petition, again erred in ruling that constitutional questions cannot be
passed upon and adjudged in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;
3. The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that, under the facts of the case that gave rise to the petition before it,
the same sections of the said rules and regulations are illegal, invalid and/or violative of the right of petitioner to due
process of law and, therefore, the POEA directives issued pursuant thereto constitute acts committed without, or in
excess of, jurisdiction and/or in grave abuse of discretion.
7

In Our Resolution of 20 November 2002, we gave due course to the present petition and directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.
8
On 28 August 2006, we resolved to dispense with the memorandum of the estate/heirs of deceased
Manny dela Rosa Razon.
At the center of this petition are the following provisions of the omnibus rules:
Section 52. Primary Responsibility for Repatriation. The repatriation of the worker, or his/her remains, and the
transport of his/her personal effects shall be the primary responsibility of the principal or agency which recruited or
deployed him/her abroad. All costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal or the agency concerned.
Section 53. Repatriation of Workers. The primary responsibility to repatriate entails the obligation on the part of
principal or agency to advance the cost of plane fare and to immediately repatriate the worker should the need for it
arise, without a prior determination of the cause of the termination of the worker's employment. However, after the
worker has returned to the country, the principal or agency may recover the cost of repatriation from the worker if the
termination of employment was due solely to his/her fault.
Every contract for overseas employment shall provide for the primary responsibility of agency to advance the cost of
plane fare, and the obligation of the worker to refund the cost thereof in case his/her fault is determined by the Labor
Arbiter.
Section 54. Repatriation Procedure. When a need for repatriation arises and the foreign employer fails to provide
for it cost, the responsible personnel at site shall simultaneously notify OWWA and the POEA of such need. The
POEA shall notify the agency concerned of the need for repatriation. The agency shall provide the plane ticket or the
prepaid ticket advice (PTA) to the Filipinos Resource Center or to the appropriate Philippine Embassy; and notify
POEA of such compliance. The POEA shall inform OWWA of the action of the agency.
Section 55. Action on Non-Compliance. If the employment agency fails to provide the ticket or PTA within 48
hours from receipt of the notice, the POEA shall suspend the license of the agency or impose such sanctions as it
may deem necessary. Upon notice from the POEA, OWWA shall advance the costs of repatriation with recourse to
the agency or principal. The administrative sanction shall not be lifted until the agency reimburses the OWWA of the
cost of repatriation with legal interest.
Said provisions, on the other hand, are supposed to implement Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042
9
which provides:
SEC. 15. Repatriation of Workers; Emergency Repatriation Fund. The repatriation of the worker and the transport
of his personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency which, recruited or deployed the worker
overseas. All costs attendant to repatriation shall be borne by or charged to the agency concerned and/or its
principal. Likewise, the repatriation of remains and transport of the personal belongings of a deceased worker and all
costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal and/or the local agency. However, in cases where the
termination of employment is due solely to the fault of the worker, the principal/employer or agency shall not in any
manner be responsible for the repatriation of the former and/or his belongings.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals misappreciated the issue it presented in its petition for certiorariwhen, instead of
resolving whether Sections 52, 53, 54, and 55 of the Omnibus Rules are illegal and violative of due process, it merely
confined itself to the question of whether or not the POEA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its directives of 22
September 2000 and 27 September 2000.
Petitioner also contends that, contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, a special civil action for certiorari is the
appropriate remedy to raise constitutional issues.
Also, petitioner insists that the subject portions of the omnibus rules are invalid on the ground that Section 15 of Republic Act
No. 8042 does not impose on a recruitment agency the primary responsibility for the repatriation of a deceased Overseas
Filipino Worker (OFW), while Section 52 of the Omnibus Rules unduly imposes such burden on a placement agency.
4

Moreover, petitioner argues that the word "likewise" at the start of the third sentence of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042
is used merely as a connective word indicating the similarity between a recruitment agency's financial obligation in the
repatriation of living and a deceased OFW. It does not, however, necessarily make a placement agency primarily responsible
for the repatriation of a deceased OFW unlike in the case of an OFW who is alive.
As for Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules, petitioner submits that the same is invalid as Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042
clearly states that a placement agency shall not in any manner be responsible for the repatriation of the deceased OFW and
his or her belongings should the termination of the OFW's employment be due to his or her fault. However, as Section 53 of
the Omnibus Rules stipulates that a placement agency or principal shall bear the primary responsibility of repatriating an
OFW and of advancing the payment for his or her plane fare, the omibus rules, as far as this section is concerned, is an
invalid exercise of legislative power by an administrative agency.
In addition, petitioner claims Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules violates the due process clause of the constitution as it
deprives the deploying agency of the right to prior notice and hearing through which it can prove that it should not bear the
burden of repatriating an OFW.
Finally, petitioner points out that it should be the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration which should advance the costs
of repatriation of the deceased Razon with the resources coming out of the emergency repatriation fund of said agency.
The Solicitor General for its part counters that Sections 52, 53, 54, and 55 of the Omnibus Rules are valid quasi-legislative
acts of respondents Department of Foreign Affairs and Department of Labor and Employment.
10
Because of this, the
requirements of prior notice and hearing are not essential. Besides, there are cases where even in the exercise of quasi-
judicial power, administrative agencies are allowed, sans prior notice and hearing, to effectuate measures affecting private
property, such as:
1) [F]or the summary abatement of nuisance per se which affects the immediate safety of persons and property, or 2)
in summary proceedings of distraint and levy upon the property of delinquent taxpayers in the collection of internal
revenue taxes, fees or charges or any increment thereto, or 3) in the preventive suspension of a public officer
pending investigation. x x x.
11

The Solicitor General also adds that since petitioner is engaged in the recruitment of Filipino workers for work abroad, the
nature of its business calls for the exercise of the state's police power in order to safeguard the rights and welfare of the
Filipino laborers. One such measure is the primary responsibility imposed upon placement agencies with regard to the
repatriation of an OFW or of his remains.
The Solicitor General also argues that the wording of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 leaves no doubt that a recruitment
agency shall bear the primary responsibility for the repatriation of an OFW whether the latter is dead or alive.
Lastly, the Solicitor General insists that actions assailing the validity of implementing rules and regulations are within the
original jurisdiction of the regional trial courts.
We shall first address the procedural question involved in the present petition.
There is no denying that regular courts have jurisdiction over cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by administrative agencies. Such jurisdiction, however, is not limited to the Court of Appeals or to this Court
alone for even the regional trial courts can take cognizance of actions assailing a specific rule or set of rules promulgated by
administrative bodies. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including
the regional trial courts.
12

Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies
of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as
provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
From this, it is clear that in order for a petition for certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must be present: (1) the writ is
directed against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or
officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
It bears emphasizing that administrative bodies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-
judicial.
13
In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission,
14
we discussed the nature of these powers to be
In exercising its quasi-judicial function, an administrative body adjudicates the rights of persons before it, in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law. The determination of facts and the applicable law, as basis for
official action and the exercise of judicial discretion, are essential for the performance of this function. On these
considerations, it is elementary that due process requirements, as enumerated in Ang Tibay, must be observed.
These requirements include prior notice and hearing.
5

On the other hand, quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules
and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of certain powers
flowing from the separation of the great branches of the government. Prior notice to and hearing of every affected
party, as elements of due process, are not required since there is no determination of past events or facts that have
to be established or ascertained. As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules or
regulations promulgated to govern future conduct.
In this case, petitioner assails certain provisions of the Omnibus Rules. However, these rules were clearly promulgated by
respondents Department of Foreign Affairs and Department of Labor and Employment in the exercise of their quasi-legislative
powers or the authority to promulgate rules and regulations. Because of this, petitioner was, thus, mistaken in availing himself
of the remedy of an original action for certiorari as obviously, only judicial or quasi-judicial acts are proper subjects thereof. If
only for these, the petition deserves outright dismissal. Be that as it may, we shall proceed to resolve the substantive issues
raised in this petition for review in order to finally remove the doubt over the validity of Sections 52, 53, 54, and 55 of the
Omnibus Rules.
It is now well-settled that delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies is allowed in the face
of increasing complexity of modern life. Given the volume and variety of interactions involving the members of today's society,
it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws dealing with the minutiae aspects of everyday life. Hence, the need to
delegate to administrative bodies, as the principal agencies tasked to execute laws with respect to their speciali zed fields, the
authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies.
15
All that is required for
the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation must be germane to the objects and purposes
of the law; and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the
law.
16
Under the first test or the so-called completeness test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.
17
The second
test or the sufficient standard test, mandates that there should be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine
the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
18

We resolve that the questioned provisions of the Omnibus Rules meet these requirements.
Basically, petitioner is impugning the subject provisions of the Omnibus Rules for allegedly expanding the scope of Section
15 of Republic Act No. 8042 by: first, imposing upon it the primary obligation to repatriate the remains of the deceased Razon
including the duty to advance the cost of the plane fare for the transport of Razon's remains; and second, by ordering it to do
so without prior determination of the existence of employer-employee relationship between itself and Razon.
Petitioner's argument that Section 15 does not provide that it shall be primarily responsible for the repatriation of a deceased
OFW is specious and plain nitpicking. While Republic Act No. 8042 does not expressly state that petitioner shall be primarily
obligated to transport back here to the Philippines the remains of the deceased Razon, nevertheless, such duty is imposed
upon him as the statute clearly dictates that "the repatriation of remains and transport of the personal belongings of a
deceased worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal and/or the local agency." The mandatory
nature of said obligation is characterized by the legislature's use of the word "shall." That the concerned government
agencies opted to demand the performance of said responsibility solely upon petitioner does not make said directives invalid
as the law plainly obliges a local placement agency such as herein petitioner to bear the burden of repatriating the remains of
a deceased OFW with or without recourse to the principal abroad. In this regard, we see no reason to invalidate Section 52 of
the omnibus rules as Republic Act No. 8042 itself permits the situation wherein a local recruitment agency can be held
exclusively responsible for the repatriation of a deceased OFW.
Nor do we see any reason to stamp Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules as invalid for allegedly contravening Section 15 of the
law which states that a placement agency shall not be responsible for a worker's repatriation should the termination of the
employer-employee relationship be due to the fault of the OFW. To our mind, the statute merely states the general principle
that in case the severance of the employment was because of the OFW's own undoing, it is only fair that he or she should
shoulder the costs of his or her homecoming. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042, however, certainly does not preclude a
placement agency from establishing the circumstances surrounding an OFW's dismissal from service in an appropriate
proceeding. As such determination would most likely take some time, it is only proper that an OFW be brought back here in
our country at the soonest possible time lest he remains stranded in a foreign land during the whole time that recruitment
agency contests its liability for repatriation. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General
Such a situation is unacceptable.
24. This is the same reason why repatriation is made by law an obligation of the agency and/or its principal without
the need of first determining the cause of the termination of the worker's employment. Repatriation is in effect an
unconditional responsibility of the agency and/or its principal that cannot be delayed by an investigation of why the
worker was terminated from employment. To be left stranded in a foreign land without the financial means to return
home and being at the mercy of unscrupulous individuals is a violation of the OFW's dignity and his human rights.
These are the same rights R.A. No. 8042 seeks to protect.
19

As for the sufficiency of standard test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the following: "public
interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience and welfare," and "simplicity, economy and welfare."
20

6

In this case, we hold that the legislature's pronouncements that Republic Act No. 8042 was enacted with the thought of
upholding the dignity of the Filipinos may they be here or abroad and that the State shall at all times afford full protection to
labor, both here and abroad, meet the requirement and provide enough guidance for the formulation of the omnibus rules.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated 4 October 2001 and Resolution
dated 18 February 2002 are hereby AFFIRMED. With costs.
SO ORDERED.
AMELIA CABRERA, G.R. No. 129098
Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
MANUEL LAPID, FERNANDO VELASCO, JR., JJ.
BALTAZAR, REYNALDO F.
CABRERA and DIONY VENTURA,
Respondents. Promulgated:

December 6, 2006

x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J.:

The instant petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the Resolution
[1]
dated 13 May 1996 and the
Order
[2]
dated 21 March 1997, both issued by the Office of the Ombudsman. The Resolution dismissed the complaint-affidavit
filed by petitioner against respondents and the Order denied her motion for reconsideration.

The instant petition originated from a Complaint-Affidavit
[3]
filed in November 1995 by petitioner Amelia M. Cabrera
with the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman). Named respondents were Manuel Lapid, Fernando Baltazar, Reynaldo F.
Cabrera and Superintendent Diony Ventura, respectively, in their capacities as Governor of Pampanga, Mayor of Sasmuan,
Pampanga, Vice-Mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga and Superintendent of the Philippine National Police (PNP)-Region 3,
Pampanga. In her three(3)-page affidavit, petitioner accused respondents of violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.

In her Complaint-Affidavit, petitioner stated that she entered into a lease agreement with
the Municipality of Sasmuan over a tract of land for the purpose of devoting it to fishpond operations. According to petitioner,
she had spent approximately P5,000,000.00 for its construction before the fishpond operations commenced in August 1995.
A month later, petitioner learned from newspaper reports of the impending demolition of her fishpond as it was purportedly
illegal and blocked the flow of the Pasak River. Thus, petitioner sent the fishpond administrator to dissuade respondents from
destroying her property.
[4]


Despite pleas from petitioner, respondents ordered the destruction of petitioners fishpond. The property was
demolished on 10 October 1995 by dynamite blasting. Petitioner alleged that the demolition was purposely carried out in the
presence of media representatives and other government officials to gain media mileage. Petitioner imputed evident bad faith
on respondents Mayor Baltazar and Vice-Mayor Cabrera in allowing the destruction of the fishpond despite their prior
knowledge of the existence of the lease agreement. She also charged respondents Governor Lapid and Senior
Superintendent Ventura with gross inexcusable negligence for ordering the destruction of the fishpond without first verifying
its legality.
[5]


At the preliminary investigation, respondents, except Senior Superintendent Ventura, submitted counter-affidavits,
denying the accusations against them. In the counter-affidavit jointly filed by Mayor Baltazar and Vice-Mayor Cabrera, they
insisted that contrary to petitioners claim, the fishpond was an illegal structure because it was erected on the seashore, at
the mouth of the Pasak River, and sat on an inalienable land. They claimed that the demolition was done by the Task
Force Bilis Daloy upon the directive of then President Fidel V. Ramos.
[6]


7

In his Counter-Affidavit,
[7]
Governor Lapid averred that the contract of lease between petitioner and
the Municipality of Sasmuan, represented by then Mayor Abelardo Panlaqui, was executed two weeks before respondent
Mayor Baltazar took his oath of office in 1995. Governor Lapid also argued that under the law, the Department of Agriculture
(DA) is the government agency authorized to enter into licensing agreements for fishpond operations, and as per certif ication
by the DA Regional Director, petitioners fishpond operation was not covered by a fishpond lease agreement or application.
Governor Lapid also referred to the certification by the Municipal Health Officer of Sasmuan issued before the actual
demolition of the fishpond, describing it as a nuisance per seand recommending its abatement.
[8]


On 13 May 1996, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Resolution, dismissing petitioners complaint. The dismissal
was based on the declaration that the fishpond was a nuisance per se and, thus, may be abated by respondents in the
exercise of the police power of the State.
[9]


Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Resolution, arguing that under Sec. 149 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges is vested in the
municipalities. Petitioner also questioned the certification by the Municipal Health Officer, alleging that the same was issued
before the ocular inspection of the property which took place only on the day of the demolition. Petitioner also contended that
a judicial proceeding was necessary to determine whether the property indeed had caused the flooding.
[10]
Respondents filed
separate oppositions to petitioners motion for reconsideration.
[11]
Petitioner filed a reply to the opposition
[12]
and respondent
Governor Lapid filed a rejoinder to the reply.
[13]


In the Order dated 21 March 1997, the Ombudsman affirmed its 13 May 1996 Resolution. It ruled that the repealing
clause of R.A. No. 7160 expressly repealed only Sec. 2, 6 and 29 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 704 so that in
harmonizing the remaining provisions of P.D. No. 704 and the provisions of R.A. No. 7160 applicable to the grant of fishery
privileges, the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) is the government agency authorized to grant fishpond
license or permit in areas not identified as municipal waters or not declared as alienable or disposable by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Since it appears from DENR records that the subject property has not been
declared disposable or included in areas devoted for fishpond development, the Ombudsman concluded that the lease
agreement entered into by petitioner was void ab initio. In view of the illegality of the lease agreement, the Ombudsman ruled
that its demolition was justified. The Ombudsman described the demolition as a valid exercise of police power and in
accordance with the provision of Sec. 28 of P.D. No. 704 directing the removal of any fishpen or fishpond that obstructed the
free navigation of a stream or lake. It also upheld the authority of the district health officer to determine the abatement of a
nuisance without need of judicial proceedings.
[14]


Petitioner elevated the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to
assail the 13 May 1996 Resolution and 21 March 1997 Order of the Ombudsman. Petitioner subsequently filed an amended
petition for review on certiorari to implead the Ombudsman as respondent, although in a petition for review on certiorari, the
tribunal whose issuance is assailed need not be impleaded as respondent.
The petition imputes the following errors on the Ombudsman:

I.

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ERRED AND EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN RULING
THAT THE LEASE CONTRACT BETWEEN THEMUNICIPALITY OF SASMUAN AND PETITIONER IS
NULL AND VOID.
II.

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEMOLITION OF THE
FISHPOND WAS VALIDLY MADE BY VIRTUE OF THE DECLARATION BY THE HEALTH OFFICER THAT
IT WAS A NUISANCE PER SE.
III.

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEMOLITION IS PART OF
THE PROPER EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE.
IV.

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER WAS GIVEN DUE
NOTICE AND HEARING BEFORE THE FISHPOND WAS BLASTED.
V.

8

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ERRED IN RULING THAT PROBABLE CAUSE DOES NOT
EXIST TO INDICT RESPONDENTS FOR VIOLATION OF THE SUBJECT OFFENSES.
[15]


Clearly, this is an appeal from the questioned issuances of the Ombudsman. However, such direct resort to this Court
from a resolution or order of the Ombudsman is not sanctioned by any rule of procedure.

Neither can petitioner avail of Sec. 27
[16]
of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989. The
provision allowed direct appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court.
The right to appeal is granted only in respect to orders or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases.
[17]
The
provision does not cover resolutions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. More importantly, Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770 insofar
as it allowed a direct appeal to this Court was declared unconstitutional in Fabian v. Hon. Desierto.
[18]


However, an aggrieved party in criminal actions is not without any recourse. Where grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction taints the findings of the Ombudsman on the existence of probable cause, the
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
[19]
The remedy from resolutions of the Ombudsman in
preliminary investigations of criminal cases is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
[20]


But in this case, petitioner has taken the position that the Ombudsman has decided questions of substance contrary
to law and the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court. That is a ground under a Rule 45 petition. Indeed, from a reading
of the assignment of errors, it is clear that petitioner does not impute grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman in issuing
the assailed Resolution and Order. Rather, she merely questions his findings and conclusions. As stated earlier, direct appeal
to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari is not sanctioned by any rule of procedure. By availing of a wrong
remedy, the petition should be dismissed outright.
Even if the Court treats the instant appeal as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, its dismissal is nevertheless
warranted because petitioner failed to present, much more substantiate, any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Ombudsman.

A careful reading of the questioned Resolution reveals that the Ombudsman dismissed petitioners criminal complaint
because respondents had validly resorted to the police power of the State when they effected the demolition of the illegal
fishpond in question following the declaration thereof as a nuisance per se. Thus, the Ombudsman was of the opinion that no
violation of Section 3(e)
[21]
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or of Article 324
[22]
of the Revised Penal Code was
committed by respondents. In the words of the Ombudsman, those who participated in the blasting of the subject fishpond
were only impelled by their desire to serve the best interest of the general public; for the good and the highest good.
[23]

By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
[24]

Grave abuse of discretion should be differentiated from an error in judgment. An error of judgment is one which the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only by an appeal. As long as the court acts
within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere
errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. An error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is
correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
[25]

The other errors raised by petitioner pertain to the Ombudsmans opinion on the lack of probable cause to indict
respondents. These are purported errors in judgment which can be corrected by an appeal, although not via a direct appeal
to this Court. Direct resort to this Court may be had only through the extraordinary writ of certiorari and upon showing that the
Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion, which petitioner failed to demonstrate.
Absent any grave abuse of discretion tainting it, the courts will not interfere with the Ombudsmans supervision and
control over the preliminary investigation conducted by him.
[26]
It is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of
discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it.
[27]
The rule is based not only upon
respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon
practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the
dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in
much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they would be compelled to review the exercise of
discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a
complaint by a private complainant.
[28]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

9


EN BANC

LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG)
ANDY TORRATO, LT. (SG) ANTONIO
TRILLANES IV, CPT. GARY ALEJANO, LT.
(SG) JAMES LAYUG, CPT. GERARDO
GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR FAELDON, LT.
(SG) MANUEL CABOCHAN, ENS. ARMAND
PONTEJOS, LT. (JG) ARTURO PASCUA, and
1LT. JONNEL SANGGALANG,
Petitioners,


- versus -


GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, and B. GEN. MARIANO M.
SARMIENTO, JR., in his capacity as the Judge
Advocate General of the Judge Advocate
Generals Office (JAGO),
Respondents.
G.R. No. 164007

Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JJ.
Promulgated
August 10, 2006

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the Petition for Prohibition (with prayer for a temporary restraining order) filed by the above-
named members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), herein petitioners, against the AFP Chief of Staff and the
Judge Advocate General, respondents.
The facts are:
10

On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports that some members of the AFP, with
high-powered weapons, had abandoned their designated places of assignment. Their aim was to destabilize the
government. The President then directed the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to track and arrest them.
On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP mostly
from the elite units of the Armys Scout Rangers and the Navys Special Warfare Group entered the premises of the
Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue, MakatiCity. They disarmed the security guards and planted
explosive devices around the building.
Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported red armbands emblazoned with the emblem of
the Magdalo faction of theKatipunan.
[1]
The troops then, through broadcast media, announced their grievances against the
administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, such as the graft and corruption in the military, the illegal sale of arms
and ammunition to the enemies of the State, and the bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more military assistance
from the US government. They declared their withdrawal of support from their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she
resign as President of the Republic. They also called for the resignation of her cabinet members and the top brass of the
AFP and PNP.
About noontime of the same day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring a state of rebellion, followed
by General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and PNP to take all necessary measures to suppress the rebellion then taking
place in Makati City. She then called the soldiers to surrender their weapons at five oclock in the afternoon of that same
day.
In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with the soldiers. The aim was to
persuade them to peacefully return to the fold of the law. After several hours of negotiation, the government panel
succeeded in convincing them to lay down their arms and defuse the explosives placed around the premises of the Oakwood
Apartments. Eventually, they returned to their barracks.
A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the authorities.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended that the military personnel
involved be charged with coup detatdefined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. On July 31, 2003, the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing of the
corresponding Information against them.
Meanwhile, on August 2, 2003, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent General Narciso Abaya, then
AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to
conduct its own separate investigation.

On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an Information for coup
detat
[2]
against those soldiers, docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and eventually raffled off to Branch 61, presided by
Judge Romeo F. Barza.
[3]
Subsequently, this case was consolidated with Criminal Case No. 03-2678, involving the other
accused, pending before Branch 148 of the RTC, Makati City, presided by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel.
On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel
tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations of the Articles of War under
Commonwealth Act No. 408,
[4]
as amended, against the same military personnel. Specifically, the charges are: (a) violation
of Article 63 for disrespect toward the President, the Secretary of National Defense, etc., (b) violation of Article 64 for
disrespect toward a superior officer, (c) violation of Article 67 for mutiny or sedition, (d) violation of Article 96 for conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and (e) violation of Article 97 for conduct prejudicial to good order and military
discipline.
Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including petitioners herein) filed with the RTC,
Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military
tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055.
[5]

11

On September 15, 2003, petitioners filed with the Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO) a motion praying for the
suspension of its proceedings until after the RTC shall have resolved their motion to assume jurisdiction.
On October 29, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Initial Report to the AFP Chief of Staff
recommending that the military personnel involved in the Oakwood incident be charged before a general court martial with
violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War.
Meanwhile, on November 11, 2003, the DOJ, after conducting a reinvestigation, found probable cause against only 31
(petitioners included) of the 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784. Accordingly, the prosecution filed with the RTC an
Amended Information.
[6]

In an Order dated November 14, 2003, the RTC admitted the Amended Information and dropped the charge of coup
detat against the 290 accused.
Subsequently, or on December 12, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial Investigation
Report
[7]
to the JAGO, recommending that, following the doctrine of absorption, those charged with coup detat before the
RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.
For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order
[8]
stating that all charges before the court martial against
the accusedare hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime
of coup detat. The trial court then proceeded to hear petitioners applications for bail.
In the meantime, Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed the findings of the
Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers involved in the Oakwood incident, including
petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman) of the Articles of War.

On June 17, 2004, Colonel Magnos recommendation was approved by the AFP top brass. The AFP Judge
Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the charge. Instead of complying, they filed with this
Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of
Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation to the Oakwood incident.
[9]

Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February 11, 2004 that the offense for
violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is
absorbed in the crime of coup detat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, counters that R.A. No. 7055 specifies which offenses covered by
the Articles of War are service-connected. These are violations of Articles 54 to 70, 72 to 92, and 95 to 97. The law
provides that violations of these Articles are properly cognizable by the court martial. As the charge against petitioners is
violation of Article 96 which, under R.A. No. 7055 is a service-connected offense, then it falls under the jurisdiction of the
court martial.
Subsequently, petitioners filed with this Court a Supplemental Petition raising the additional issue that the offense
charged before the General Court Martial has prescribed. Petitioners alleged therein that during the pendency of their
original petition, respondents proceeded with the Pre-Trial Investigation for purposes of charging them with violation of Article
96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War; that the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel then
referred the case to the General Court Martial; that almost two years since the Oakwood incident on July 27, 2003, only
petitioner Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes was arraigned, and this was done under questionable circumstances;
[10]
that in the
hearing of July 26, 2005, herein petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that they were not arraigned
within the prescribed period of two (2) years from the date of the commission of the alleged offense, in violation of Article 38
of the Articles of War;
[11]
that the offense charged prescribed on July 25, 2005;
[12]
that the General Court Martial ruled,
however, that the prescriptive period shall end only at 12:00 midnight of July 26, 2005;
[13]
that (a)s midnight of July 26,
2005 was approaching and it was becoming apparent that the accused could not be arraigned, the prosecution suddenly
changed its position and asserted that 23 of the accused have already been arraigned;
[14]
and that petitioners moved for a
reconsideration but it was denied by the general court martial in its Order dated September 14, 2005.
[15]

In his Comment, the Solicitor General prays that the Supplemental Petition be denied for lack of merit. He alleges
that contrary to petitioners pretensions, all the accused were duly arraigned on July 13 and 18, 2005.
[16]
The
12

(r)ecords show that in the hearing on July 13, 2005, all the 29 accused were present and, (o)n that day, Military Prosecutor
Captain Karen Ong Jags read the Charges and Specifications from the Charge Sheet in open court (pp. 64, TSN, July 13,
2005).
[17]


The sole question for our resolution is whether the petitioners are entitled to the writ of prohibition.

There is no dispute that petitioners, being officers of the AFP, are subject to military law. Pursuant to Article 1 (a) of
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War, the term officer is construed to refer to
a commissioned officer. Article 2 provides:

Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. The following persons are subject to these articles and
shall be understood as included in the term any person subject to military law or persons subject to
military law, whenever used in these articles:
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or of
the Philippine Constabulary, all members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call to
active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all
other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in the said
service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the
same.

Upon the other hand, Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 reads:


SEC. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military law,
including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses
penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local government ordinances,
regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties, which may be natural or
juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined
before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case, the offense shall be tried
by court-martial, Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or
direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those
defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as
amended.
In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into consideration the
penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local government ordinances.

Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous. First, it lays down the general rule that
members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup detat), other special
penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court. Next, it provides the exception to the general rule,
i.e., where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to be service-connected, then the offending
soldier shall be tried by a court martial. Lastly, the law states an exception to the exception, i.e., where the President of
the Philippines, in the interest of justice, directs before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the
proper civil court.
13

The second paragraph of the same provision further identifies the service-connected crimes or offenses as
limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War. Violations
of these specified Articles are triable by court martial. This delineates the jurisdiction between the civil courts and the court
martial over crimes or offenses committed by military personnel.

Such delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is necessary to preserve the peculiar nature of military justice
system over military personnel charged with service-connected offenses. The military justice system is disciplinary in nature,
aimed at achieving the highest form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military efficiency.
[18]
Military law is
established not merely to enforce discipline in times of war, but also to preserve the tranquility and security of the State in
time of peace; for there is nothing more dangerous to the public peace and safety than a licentious and undisciplined military
body.
[19]
The administration of military justice has been universally practiced. Since time immemorial, all the armies in
almost all countries of the world look upon the power of military law and its administration as the most effective means of
enforcing discipline. For this reason, the court martial has become invariably an indispensable part of any organized armed
forces, it being the most potent agency in enforcing discipline both in peace and in war.
[20]


Here, petitioners are charged for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the
Articles of War before the court martial, thus:
All persons subject to military law, did on or about 27 July 2003 at Oakwood Hotel, Makati City,
Metro Manila, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously violate their solemn oath as officers to defend the
Constitution, the law and the duly-constituted authorities and abused their constitutional duty to
protect the people and the State by, among others, attempting to oust the incumbent duly-elected and
legitimate President by force and violence, seriously disturbing the peace and tranquility of the people and
the nation they are sworn to protect, thereby causing dishonor and disrespect to the military
profession, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, in violation of AW 96 of the Articles of
War.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring ours)

Article 96 of the Articles of War
[21]
provides:
ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. Any officer, member of the Nurse
Corps, cadet, flying cadet, or probationary second lieutenant, who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed from the service. (Underscoring ours)

We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is expressly
provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners
concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted
authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge
has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the service-connected
nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same dismissal from the service imposable only by the military
court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to
preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.

Obviously, there is no merit in petitioners argument that they can no longer be charged before the court martial for
violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11,
2004 as not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup detat, hence, triable by
said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court
martial the jurisdiction over service-connected crimes or offenses. What the law has conferred the court should not take
away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject
14

matter or nature of an action which can do so.
[22]
And it is only through a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment
that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely toapply the law as they find it, not as they
like it to be.
[23]
Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.

In Navales v. Abaya.,
[24]
this Court, through Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., held:
We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration made by the RTC (Branch 148) in the
dispositive portion of its Order dated February 11, 2004 that all charges before the court-martial against the
accused were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup detat, cannot be
given effect. x x x, such declaration was made without or in excess of jurisdiction; hence, a nullity.
The second paragraph of the above provision (referring to Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055) explicitly
specifies what are considered service-connected crimes or offenses under Commonwealth Act No. 408,
as amended, also known as the Articles of War, to wit:
Articles 54 to 70:

Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.
Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.
Art. 56. False Muster.
Art. 57. False Returns.
Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.
Art. 59. Desertion.
Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.
Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.
Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.
Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President,
Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National
Defense.
Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.
Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.
Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.
Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.
Articles 72 to 92:
Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.
15

Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.
Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.
Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.
Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.
Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.
Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.
Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.
Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.
Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.
Art. 83. Spies.
Art. 84. Military Property.Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage
or wrongful Disposition.
Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property
Issued to Soldiers.
Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.
Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.
Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.
Art. 88-A. Unlawful Influencing Action of Court.
Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.
Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.
Art. 92. Dueling.
Articles 95 to 97:

Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.
Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
Art. 97. General Article.
Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction over the
foregoing offenses. x x x.
It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the military courts of jurisdiction
to try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of
War as these are considered service-connected crimes or offenses. In fact, it mandates that these shall
be tried by the court-martial.
16


Moreover, the observation made by Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio during the deliberation of this case is worth
quoting, thus:
The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup
detat. Firstly, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to
crimes punished by the same statute,
[25]
unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the
doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055
deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of
War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.
Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 [1975]), applicable only to military
personnel because the military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of discipline separate
from that of civilians (see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 [1953]). Military personnel carry high-powered
arms and other lethal weapons not allowed to civilians. History, experience, and the nature of a military
organization dictate that military personnel must be subjected to a separate disciplinary system not
applicable to unarmed civilians or unarmed government personnel.
A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his superior may question his
reassignment by asking a temporary restraining order or injunction from a civil court. However, a soldier
cannot go to a civil court and ask for a restraining or injunction if his military commander reassigns him to
another area of military operations. If this is allowed, military discipline will collapse.
x x x
This Court has recognized that courts-martial are instrumentalities of the Executive to enable the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, to effectively command, control, and discipline the armed forces
(see Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrops Military Law and Precedents, 2
nd
edition, p.
49). In short, courts-martial form part of the disciplinary system that ensures the Presidents control, and
thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the apex of this disciplinary system is the President who
exercises review powers over decisions of courts-martial (citing Article 50 of the Articles of War; quoted
provisions omitted).
x x x
While the Court had intervened before in courts-martial or similar proceedings, it did so sparingly
and only to release a military personnel illegally detained (Ognir v. Director of Prisons, 80 Phil. 401 [1948] or
to correct objectionable procedures (Yamashita v. Styer, 75 Phil. 563 [1945]). The Court has never
suppressed court-martial proceedings on the ground that the offense charged is absorbed and in
furtherance of another criminal charge pending with the civil courts. The Court may now do so only if the
offense charged is not one of the service-connected offenses specified in Section 1 of RA 7055. Such is not
the situation in the present case.
With respect to the issue of prescription raised by petitioners in their Supplemental Petition, suffice it to say that we
cannot entertain the same. The contending parties are at loggerheads as to (a) who among the petitioners were actually
arraigned, and (b) the dates of their arraignment. These are matters involving questions of fact, not within our power of
review, as we are not a trier of facts. In a petition for prohibition, such as the one at bar, only legal issues affecting the
jurisdiction of the tribunal, board or officer involved may be resolved on the basis of the undisputed facts.
[26]


Clearly, the instant petition for prohibition must fail. The office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and
oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.
[27]
Stated differently, prohibition is the remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons from usurping
or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law.
[28]


17

In fine, this Court holds that herein respondents have the authority in convening a court martial and in charging
petitioners with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 161739 May 4, 2006
ALFREDO BOKINGO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, the HEIRS OF CELESTINO BUSA, represented by FELICIDAD BUSA-
PANAL and ERNESTO M. CAMPOS, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J .:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by Alfredo Bokingo seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision
1
dated December 17, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 71510 which dismissed his petition for
certiorari filed therewith.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Alfredo Bokingo is one of the defendants in the complaint for injunction and damages filed by Ernesto Campos, the
Heirs of Celestino Busa,
2
the Heirs of Felicidad Busa-Panal
3
and the Heirs of Concordia Busa.
4
The complaint was filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 3 thereof, and docketed as Civil Case No. 1003. The complaint alleged
as follows:
CAUSE OF ACTION
3. Plaintiffs [herein respondents] are co-owners of the land subject matter. By virtue of the right of representation, the
heirs of FELICIDAD BUSA-PANAL and CONCORDIA S. BUSA and REYNALDO S. BUSA, respectively;
4. Defendants in this case are heirs of MIGUEL BOKINGO;
5. Defendants ALFREDO BOKINGO [herein petitioner], WENCESLAO B. AMBRAY, JR., ROSA B. AMBRAY, CELIA
A. ALMORA and JOSELITO B. AMBRAY, filed an application for titling of a parcel of land before the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Office of the CENRO, Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City;
6. The land subject matter of the application of defendants is a parcel of land located at Baan (Buhangin), Butuan
City, containing an area of 2.1600 hectares, more or less;
7. The land subject matter of the application for titling of defendants is a parcel of land inherited by plaintiffs from their
father, the late CELESTINO BUSA. This parcel of land is described particularly as:
TAX DECLARATION NO. GR.-10-002-0189-A
"A parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. GR-10-002-0189-A, situated in Buhangin, Butuan City, containing
an area of 2.1600 HAS., more or less. Bounded on the North Elisa Busa, South - Pastor Ago, East Ho. Miguel
Bokingo and on the West Baan River."
8. When plaintiffs knew of defendants application, plaintiffs filed a protest against defendants application on
February 5, 1996. Attached as Annex A is the Protest;
9. On November 24, 1998, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, HUGO I. BAOSIA, resolved
the Protest in favor of Plaintiffs-the protestant in the DENR case. Attached as Annex B is the order;
18

10. On January 6, 1999, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, HUGO T. BAOSIA, issued a
certification stating that the order dated November 24, 1998 has become final and executory. Attached as Annex C is
the machine copy of the Certification;
11. On September 9, 1999, the same DENR Officer HUGO T. BAOSIA issued an Order of Execution which states
that:
In complying herewith, the Land Management Officer III concerned should be instructed to set forth the whole proceeding in
writing signed by the parties and witnesses, if possible, submit and return to this Office within sixty (60) days from receipt
hereof, to be used as evidence should it be necessary to institute any action, criminal or otherwise, against any party who
may refuse to obey the same.
SO ORDERED, Butuan City, September 9, 1999.
12. Plaintiffs requested on June 23, 1999, for a Survey Authority to survey the land subject matter of this case before
the CENRO Office of Butuan City. Attached as Annex D is the Survey Application;
13. On July 30, 1999, A Survey Authority was issued by the CENRO of Butuan City, authorizing plaintiff ENGR.
ERNESTO M. CAMPOS, JR., to survey the land subject matter of the DENR case and the case at bar. Attached as
Annex E is the Survey Authority;
14. On November 18, 1999 at 11:00 A.M., FELICIDAD BUSA-PANAL, MILAGROS BUSA SIMOGAN, TERESITA
BUSA LINAO, JIMMY BUSA-PANAL, son of Felicidad Busa-Panal, ALFREDO BUSA-PANAL, son-in-law of
Concordia S. Busa, personnel of the Butuan PNP and the personnel of ENGR. ERNESTO M. CAMPOS went to the
area subject matter of this case to survey the land. Unfortunately, Defendant SPO3 FERDINAND B. DACILLO and
Defendant ALFREDO BOKINGO, representatives of defendants, told the survey group to stop and not to enter the
area subject matter of this case. Attached as Annex F is the report of CENRO Officer who [was] present during the
November 18, 1999 survey which was stopped by SPO3 FERDINAND B. DACILLO and ALFREDO BOKINGO;
15. Plaintiff[s] availed of the Barangay Justice System to resolve the controversy regarding the survey but to no avail,
defendants still refused to allow plaintiffs to survey the area. Thus, a Certificate to File Action was issued by the
Lupong Tagapamayapa. Copy of the same is hereto attached as Annex G;
16. The defendants did not exercise honesty and good faith in their acts which is a violation of Article 19 of the New
Civil Code, and which entitles the plaintiffs for damages;
17. The acts of defendants constrained the plaintiff[s] to litigate and to incur attorneys fees in the amount of
PhP10,000.00 plus litigation expenses estimated at PhP10,000.00.
PRAYER
Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that after hearing, this Honorable Court:
1) Enjoin permanently the illegal acts of defendants of preventing the survey of the land subject matter of this case by
ENGR. ERNESTO M. CAMPOS;
2) Order defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees, P10,000.00 as litigation expenses;
3) Order defendants to pay damages to plaintiff;
4) Such other reliefs just and reasonable under the circumstances.
5

Petitioner Bokingo, as one of the defendants in the above complaint, filed with the court a quo a motion to dismiss alleging
that the latter has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim. Specifically, petitioner Bokingo contended that it could
be gleaned from the complaint that the issue between the parties involved the possession of the land. As such, the assessed
value of the land was crucial to determine the courts jurisdiction over the subject matter in accordance with either Section
19(2)
6
or Section 33(3)
7
of Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129
8
as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. If the assessed value
19

thereof is P20,000.00 or less, then the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) has jurisdiction over the subject matter. Otherwise,
jurisdiction is with the RTC.
Petitioner Bokingo pointed out in his Motion to Dismiss that the assessed value of the land subject matter of the complaint
was not indicated. Nonetheless, he proffered that based on his fathers tax declaration covering the subject land, its assessed
value was only P14,410.00. Consequently, it was allegedly clear that the court a quo, a Regional Trial Court, had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint filed by the respondents. Rather, in view of the assessed value of the
subject land which was allegedly less than the P15,000.00, jurisdiction properly belonged to the MTC.
Petitioner Bokingo thus urged the court a quo to dismiss the complaint filed by the respondents for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter thereof.
Acting thereon, the court a quo issued the Order dated March 13, 2002 denying the motion to dismiss. It pointed out that the
complaints allegation is that the respondents, as plaintiffs, are entitled to have the subject land surveyed after petitioner
Bokingos and his co-claimants application for the titling of the subject land was dismissed by the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) and the respondents were declared to have a better right to file a public land application
covering the same. Further, the relief being sought in the complaint is injunction in order that the respondents right to survey
the subject land would not be defeated.
Based on these allegations, the court a quo held that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim under Section 2 of
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court which provides in part that "[a] preliminary injunction may be granted by the court where the
action or proceeding is pending." It accordingly denied petitioner Bokingos motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.1avvphil.net
Petitioner Bokingo forthwith filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the court a quo in denying his motion to dismiss.
On December 17, 2003, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the said petition for lack of merit, in fact and in
law. It ruled that the remedy of certiorari is unavailing to petitioner Bokingo because "an order denying a motion to dismiss is
interlocutory and cannot be the subject of the extraordinary petition for certiorari or mandamus."
9

It was noted that the records fail to disclose that petitioner Bokingo filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the court
a quo. According to the CA, such omission warranted the outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari. Finally, it was not
shown or even alleged in the petition that the court a quo, in issuing the assailed order, acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The issue raised by petitioner Bokingo, the CA held, was proper for an appeal but not a
petition for certiorari.
Aggrieved, petitioner Bokingo now comes to the Court seeking the reversal of the said decision of the CA which dismissed his
petition for certiorari filed therewith. He insists that the complaint filed by the respondents with the court a quo is a possessory
action. To determine which court, the RTC or MTC, has primary jurisdiction, petitioner Bokingo theorizes that it is necessary
that the assessed value of the land be alleged in the initiatory complaint. Absent such allegation, the court where the case
was filed should allegedly preliminarily determine the assessed value of the subject property to determine whether or not it
has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim. In the present case, according to petitioner Bokingo, the assessed value
of the subject land is only P14,410.00; hence, jurisdiction thereof properly belongs to the MTC in accordance with Section
19(2) or 33(3) of BP Blg. 129 as amended by RA 7691.
The petition is bereft of merit.
Preliminarily, the Court finds no reversible error in the dismissal by the CA of petitioner Bokingos petition for certiorari filed
therewith. As correctly held by the CA, the mere fact that he failed to move for the reconsideration of the court a quos order
denying his motion to dismiss was sufficient cause for the outright dismissal of the said petition. Certiorari as a special civil
action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent court to allow it an opportunity to
correct its errors, if any.
10
Petitioner Bokingo did not proffer any compelling reason to warrant deviation by the CA from this
salutary rule. As further observed by the CA, petitioner Bokingo failed to even allege grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the court a quo in rendering the order denying his motion to dismiss.
In any case, the present petition lacks substantive merit. It is axiomatic that the nature of the action and which court has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief
20

prayed for by the plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to
some or all of the claims asserted therein.
11
The caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action. Nor
does the jurisdiction of the court depend upon the answer of the defendant or agreement of the parties, or to the waiver or
acquiescence of the parties.
12

A careful perusal of the respondents complaint, quoted earlier, shows that it alleges that per the Order dated November 24,
1998 of PENRO of Butuan City, petitioner Bokingos and his co-claimants application for titling of the subject land was
rejected. On the other hand, in the same order it was declared that the respondents, if qualified, may file an appropriate
public land application covering the same land. It was further alleged that the said order became final and executory, and in
connection therewith, the respondents were authorized by the City Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of
Butuan City to conduct a survey on the subject land. However, petitioner Bokingo, through his representatives, unjustly
prevented the conduct of the said survey. Even when the matter regarding the survey was submitted to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa, petitioner Bokingo still allegedly refused to allow the respondents to survey the subject land. Hence, the
Complaint for Injunction filed by the respondents where the principal relief sought is to enjoin permanently the illegal acts of
the defendants therein, including petitioner Bokingo, of preventing the survey of the land subject matter of the case.
In this connection, it is well to note that the Court had the occasion to explain that "in determining whether an action is one
the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action, or remedy sought must
first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and jurisdiction over the action will depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence
of, the principal relief sought, the action is one where the subject of litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, which
is cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial Courts."
13

As gleaned from the complaint, the principal relief sought by the respondents in their complaint is for the court a quo to issue
an injunction against petitioner Bokingo and his representatives to permanently enjoin them from preventing the survey of the
subject land. For clarity, the prayer of the complaint reads:
Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that after hearing, this Honorable Court:
1) Enjoin permanently the illegal acts of defendants of preventing the survey of the land subject matter of this case by
ENGR. ERNESTO M. CAMPOS;
2) Order defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees, P10,000.00 as litigation expenses;
3) Order defendants to pay damages to plaintiff;
4) Such other reliefs just and reasonable under the circumstances.
14

Contrary to the view posited by petitioner Bokingo, the cause of action of the respondents complaint is not, as yet, to recover
the possession of the subject land. There are three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession of real property and these
are distinguished in this wise:
What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion publiciana) and from a
reinvindicatory action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. An unlawful
detainer suit (accion interdictal) together with forcible entry are the two forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover
possession of real property. Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover
the right of possession and accion reinvindicatoria or the action to recover ownership which includes recovery of possession,
make up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession.
15

Significantly, the respondents complaint has not sought to recover the possession or ownership of the subject land. Rather, it
is principally an action to enjoin petitioner Bokingo and his representatives from committing acts that would tend to prevent
the survey of the subject land. It cannot be said therefore that it is one of a possessory action. The respondents, as plaintiffs
in the court a quo, to be entitled to the injunctive relief sought, need to establish the following requirements: (1) the existence
of a right to be protected; and (2) that the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of the said ri ght. As
such, the subject matter of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation and properly cognizable exclusively by the court a
quo, a Regional Trial Court under Section 19 (1) of BP Blg. 129, as amended by RA 7691:
21

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
x x x
Hence, the court a quo did not err in denying petitioner Bokingos motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated December 17, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71510 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
ARTEMIO INIEGO,
[1]

Petitioner,


- versus -

The HONORABLE JUDGE GUILLERMO G.
PURGANAN, in his official capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 42, City of Manila, and
FOKKER C. SANTOS,
Respondents.
G. R. No. 166876

Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.
Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.


Promulgated:


March 24, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N


CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:


For this Court to grant this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner has to
persuade us on two engaging questions of law. First, he has to convince us that actions for damages based on quasi-delict
are actions that are capable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore would fall under the jurisdiction of the municipal courts if
the claim does not exceed the jurisdictional amount of P400,000.00 in Metro Manila. Second, he has to convince us that the
moral and exemplary damages claimed by the private respondent should be excluded from the computation of the above-
mentioned jurisdictional amount because they arose from a cause of action other than the negligent act of the defendant.
22


Petitioner urges us to reverse the 28 October 2004 Decision and 26 January 2005 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, Eighth Division, in CA-G.R. SP No. 76206 denying due course to the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner under
Rule 65, elevating the 21 October 2002 Omnibus Order and the 21 January 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 42, City of Manila. The dispositive portion of the 28 October 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit.
[2]



The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:

On 1 March 2002, private respondent Fokker Santos filed a complaint for quasi-delict and damages against Jimmy T.
Pinion, the driver of a truck involved in a traffic accident, and against petitioner Artemio Iniego, as owner of the said truck and
employer of Pinion. The complaint stemmed from a vehicular accident that happened on 11 December 1999, when a freight
truck allegedly being driven by Pinion hit private respondents jitney which private respondent was driving at the time of the
accident.

On 24 August 2002, private respondent filed a Motion to Declare defendant in Default allegedly for failure of the latter
to file his answer within the final extended period. On 28 August 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Admit and a Motion
to Dismiss the complaint on the ground, among other things, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the cause of action of the
case.

On 21 October 2002, public respondent Judge Guillermo G. Purganan, acting as presiding judge of the RTC, Branch
42, Manila, issued the assailed Omnibus Order denying the Motion to Dismiss of the petitioner and the Motion to Declare
Defendant in Default of the private respondent. Pertinent portions of the Omnibus Order and the dispositive portion thereof
read:

In his opposition to the motion to declare him in default and his Motion to Admit defendant IEGO
alleged that he never received the Order dated 12 August 2002. But believing in good faith, without being
presumptuous, that his 3
rd
Motion for additional Time to file or any appropriate [pleading] would be granted,
he filed the aforesaid Motion received by the Court on 23 August 2002.

The explanation of defendant IEGO has merit. The order dated 12 August 2002 was sent to a
wrong address, thus defendant IEGO did not receive it. Since it was not received, he was not aware that
the court would grant no further extension. The Motion to Admit Motion to Dismiss has to be granted and the
Motion to declare Defendant IEGO [in default] has to be DENIED.

x x x x

The plaintiff opines that this court has exclusive jurisdiction because the cause of action is the claim
for damages, which exceeds P400,000.00. The complaint prays for actual damages in the amount
of P40,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount
of P150,000.00. Excluding attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00, the total amount of damages being
claimed is P490,000.00.

Proceeding on the assumption that the cause of action is the claim of (sic) for damages in the total
amount of P490,000.00, this court has jurisdiction. But is the main cause of action the claim for damages?

23

This court is of the view that the main cause of action is not the claim for damages but quasi-delict.
Damages are being claimed only as a result of the alleged fault or negligence of both defendants under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code in the case of defendant Pinion and under Article 2180 also of the Civil Code in
the case of defendant Iniego. But since fault or negligence (quasi-delicts) could not be the subject of
pecuniary estimation, this court has exclusive jurisdiction.

x x x x

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the motion to declare defendant Iniego in default and the
said defendants motion to dismiss are denied.
[3]


On 7 November 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Omnibus Order of 21 October 2002. On 21
January 2003, public respondent issued an Order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. Pertinent portions of the 21
January 2003 Order are reproduced hereunder:

What this court referred to in its Order sought to be reconsidered as not capable of pecuniary
estimation is the CAUSE OF ACTION, which is quasi-delict and NOT the amount of damage prayed for.

x x x x

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
[4]



Petitioner elevated the 21 October 2002 and 21 January 2003 Orders of the RTC to the Court of Appeals on petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On 28 October 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed
Decision, the dispositive portion thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and dismissed for lack of merit.
[5]



On 22 November 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals on 26
January 2005. Hence, this present petition.

Petitioner claims that actions for damages based on quasi-delict are actions that are capable of pecuniary estimation;
hence, the jurisdiction in such cases falls upon either the municipal courts (the Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts In Cities, And Municipal Circuit Trial Courts), or the Regional Trial Courts, depending on the
value of the damages claimed.

Petitioner argues further that should this Court find actions for damages capable of pecuniary estimation, then the
total amount of damages claimed by the private respondent must exceed P400,000.00 in order that it may fall under the
jurisdiction of the RTC. Petitioner asserts, however, that the moral and exemplary damages claimed by private respondent be
excluded from the computation of the total amount of damages for jurisdictional purposes because the said moral and
exemplary damages arose, not from the quasi-delict, but from the petitioners refusal to pay the actual damages.

24

I

Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of
money for the damages suffered because of the defendants alleged tortious acts, and are therefore capable of
pecuniary estimation.

In a recent case,
[6]
we did affirm the jurisdiction of a Municipal Circuit Trial Court in actions for damages based on
quasi-delict, although the ground used to challenge said jurisdiction was an alleged forum shopping, and not the applicability
of Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

According to respondent Judge, what he referred to in his assailed Order as not capable of pecuniary estimation is
the cause of action, which is a quasi-delict, and not the amount of damage prayed for.
[7]
From this, respondent Judge
concluded that since fault or negligence in quasi-delicts cannot be the subject of pecuniary estimation, the RTC has
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed respondent Judge in this respect.
[8]


Respondent Judges observation is erroneous. It is crystal clear from B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No.
7691, that what must be determined to be capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation is not the cause of action, but
the subject matter of the action.
[9]
A cause of action is the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in
violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff.
[10]
On the other hand, the subject matter of the action is the physical facts, the
thing real or personal, the money, lands, chattels, and the like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted, and not the delict or
wrong committed by the defendant.
[11]


The case of Lapitan v. Scandia, Inc., et al.,
[12]
has guided this Court time and again in determining whether the subject
matter of the action is capable of pecuniary estimation. In Lapitan, the Court spoke through the eminent Mr. Justice Jose B.L.
Reyes:

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first
instance [now Regional Trial Courts] would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought like suits to have the defendant perform his part
of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to
foreclose a mortgage, this court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may
not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance [now Regional
Trial Courts].x x x.
[13]
(Emphasis supplied.)


Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money
for the damages suffered because of the defendants alleged tortious acts. The damages claimed in such actions represent
the monetary equivalent of the injury caused to the plaintiff by the defendant, which are thus sought to be recovered by the
plaintiff. This money claim is the principal relief sought, and is not merely incidental thereto or a consequence thereof. It
bears to point out that the complaint filed by private respondent before the RTC actually bears the caption for DAMAGES.

25

Fault or negligence, which the Court of Appeals claims is not capable of pecuniary estimation, is not actionable by
itself. For such fault or negligence to be actionable, there must be a resulting damage to a third person. The relief
available to the offended party in such cases is for the reparation, restitution, or payment of such damage, without which
any alleged offended party has no cause of action or relief. The fault or negligence of the defendant, therefore, is
inextricably intertwined with the claim for damages, and there can be no action based on quasi-delict without a claim for
damages.

We therefore rule that the subject matter of actions for damages based on quasi-delict is capable of pecuniary
estimation.

II

The amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for all kinds of
damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for damages arise from the
same or from different causes of action.


Despite our concurrence in petitioners claim that actions for damages based on quasi-delict are actions that
are capable of pecuniary estimation, we find that the total amount of damages claimed by the private respondent
nevertheless still exceeds the jurisdictional limit of P400,000.00 and remains under the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Petitioner argues that in actions for damages based on quasi-delict, claims for damages arising from a different
cause of action (i.e., other than the fault or negligence of the defendant) should not be included in the computation of the
jurisdictional amount. According to petitioner, the moral and exemplary damages claimed by the respondents in the case at
bar are not direct and proximate consequences of the alleged negligent act. Petitioner points out that the complaint itself
stated that such moral and exemplary damages arose from the alleged refusal of defendants to honor the demand for
damages, and therefore there is no reasonable cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
claim for moral and exemplary damages.
[14]
If the claims for moral and exemplary damages are not included in the
computation for purposes of determining jurisdiction, only the claim for actual damages in the amount ofP40,000.00 will be
considered, and the MeTC will have jurisdiction.

We cannot give credence to petitioners arguments. The distinction he made between damages arising directly from
injuries in a quasi-delict and those arising from a refusal to admit liability for a quasi-delict is more apparent than real, as the
damages sought by respondent originate from the same cause of action: the quasi-delict. The fault or negligence of the
employee and the juris tantum presumption of negligence of his employer in his selection and supervision are the seeds of
the damages claimed, without distinction.

Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the claims for moral and exemplary damages arose from a cause
of action other than the quasi-delict, their inclusion in the computation of damages for jurisdictional purposes is still proper.
All claims for damages should be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court regardless of whether they arose
from a single cause of action or several causes of action. Rule 2, Section 5, of the Rules of Court allows a party to assert
as many causes of action as he may have against the opposing party. Subsection (d) of said section provides that where
the claims in all such joined causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be
the test of jurisdiction.
[15]


Hence, whether or not the different claims for damages are based on a single cause of action or different causes of
action, it is the total amount thereof which shall govern. Jurisdiction in the case at bar remains with the RTC, considering that
the total amount claimed, inclusive of the moral and exemplary damages claimed, is P490,000.00.

26

In sum, actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are actions that are capable of pecuniary estimation. As such,
they fall within the jurisdiction of either the RTC or the municipal courts, depending on the amount of damages claimed. In
this case, the amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for all kinds of damages
that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for damages arise from the same or from different
causes of action.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated28 October 2004 and 26 January 2005, respectively, are AFFIRMED insofar as they held that
the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
JOSE A. BERNAS,
Petitioner,




- versus -




SOVEREIGN VENTURES, INC.,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 142424

Present:


*
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.


Promulgated:

July 21, 2006

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N


SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:


Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the
September 14, 1999 Decision
[1]
and the March 7, 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49466, entitled
Jose A. Bernas, petitioner versus Sovereign Ventures, Inc.,respondent.

27

Jose A. Bernas, petitioner, is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 336663 of the Registry of Deeds, same City.
Sovereign Ventures, Inc., respondent, claims that the same property is also registered in its name as shown by TCT
Nos. N-138316, N-138317, N-138318, N-14190, N-145202, N-1452208, and N-1452209, also issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City.

Since the same property is covered by conflicting titles, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
78, Quezon City a verified Petition for Quieting of Title with application for a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the Register of Deeds of Quezon City from annotating notices of lis pendens on his
titles. Respondent alleged that such notices will prejudice its plan to sell the property.

Acting on respondents petition, the RTC, on February 26, 1996, issued an Order directing the parties to maintain
the status quo before the filing of the petition; and temporarily restraining them from causing any annotation of lis pendens on
the property.

On March 5, 1996, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion assailing the said Order on the ground that he was not notified
of the raffle of the case, in violation of the Supreme Court Circular No. 20-95, now contained in Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended.

During the hearing of petitioners Omnibus Motion on March 7, 1996, petitioner orally moved for the re-raffle of the
case and pleaded for a re-hearing of the propriety of the issuance of a restraining order. The trial court denied his motion,
holding that the absence of a notice of raffle was cured by the present hearing wherein all the parties are present. Then
the trial court ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda on respondents application for a writ of preliminary
injunction.

Petitioner submitted his memorandum without prejudice to his earlier Omnibus Motion.
Subsequently, petitioner reviewed the records of the case and failed to see any notice of raffle. But when he again
examined the records after two weeks, he found among the records the notice of raffle sent to him at the
Castillo Laman Tan Pantaleon and San Jose Law Offices, where he previously worked as an associate attorney.

On March 27, 1996, the trial court, on the basis of the parties respective memoranda, issued an Order granting
respondents application for a writ or preliminary injunction, enjoining the Register of Deeds of Quezon City from annotating
any notice of lis pendens on the titles of the property in controversy.

On June 13, 1996, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 125058. He alleged
that the trial court, in issuing the Order restraining the parties from causing the annotation of lis pendens on the land titles,
committed grave abuse of discretion.

On July 1, 1996, this Court dismissed the petition for petitioners failure to attach to his petition an affidavit of service
of copies thereof to respondent.

28

On August 2, 1996, petitioner again filed with this Court a similar petition, docketed as G.R. No. 125632. This Court,
on November 20, 1996, dismissed the petition for being late; and that a similar petition (G.R. No. 125058) was dismissed in a
Resolution dated July 1, 1996 which had become final andexecutory.

Meanwhile, going back to Civil Case No. Q-96-26433, on April 8, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case
on the ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction due to lack of notice of raffle to him.

On January 20, 1998, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss and directing petitioner to file his
answer to the complaint. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied on July 27, 1998.

Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari.

On September 14, 1999, the appellate court rendered its Decision dismissing the petition, holding that the trial court
did not gravely abuse its discretion since petitioner was notified of the raffle as shown by the records of the case. Moreover,
petitioner having voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court, the latter has acquired jurisdiction over his
person.

On March 7, 2000, petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, the instant petition.

The sole issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing the Order directing the parties to maintain
the status quo prior to the filing of the complaint and restraining them from causing the annotation of lis pendens on the titles
of the subject property.

Petitioner contends that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because he was not notified of the
raffle.

Petitioners contention lacks merit.

Administrative Circular No. 20-95,
[2]
on raffle of a complaint with an application for a temporary restraining order or
writ of preliminary injunction, has been incorporated in Section 4 (c), Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules
29

of Civil Procedure, as amended. The provision now reads as follows:

(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order is
included in a complaint or any initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a multiple-sala court, shall be raffled only
after notice to and in the presence of the adverse party or the person to be enjoined. In any event, such
notice shall be preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by service of summons, together with a copy
of the complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicants affidavit and bond, upon the adverse party in
the Philippines.

However, where the summons could not be served personally or by substituted service despite
diligent efforts, or the adverse party is a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom or is non-
resident thereof, the requirement of prior or contemporaneous service of summons shall not apply.


From the foregoing, it is clear that the prerequisites for conducting a raffle when there is a prayer for temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction are: there must be a notice of the raffle to the adverse party or the person
to be enjoined; and the raffle must be conducted in the latters presence. The Rule also provides that the notice shall be
preceded or accompanied by a service of summons to the adverse party or the person to be enjoined.

The Court of Appeals found that respondent complied with the Rule above-quoted, thus:

Contrary to the contention of herein petitioner, the procedure as so provided by Circular No. 20-95
dated September 20, 1995 has been complied with by the public respondent judge considering that as clearly
shown by the records of Civil Case No. 96-26433, Volume I, particularly pages 158-159 thereof, a notice of
raffle dated February 5, 1996 was issued by the clerk of court addressed to the different defendants in that
case and one of these defendants is herein petitioner. And per Officers Return dated February 6, 1996, it is
shown that petitioners copy of the notice of raffle dated February 5, 1996 was served and acknowledged by
a certain Glenda Jamora of the petitioners address as so stated in the petition dated February 2, 1996 filed
by the private respondent corporation. In fact, as ruled by herein public respondent in his Order
dated January 20, 1998, particularly No. 5 thereof which states:

The notice of raffle and the notice of hearing as required by SC Administrative
Circular No. 20-95 are complied with. Records show that respondent Bernaswas furnished a
copy of the Notice of Raffle through Glenda Jamora as shown by the Officers Return of the
Process Server Romulo C. Sanchez from the Office of the Clerk of Court (pp. 158 and 160,
Records). The Notice of Hearing on the issuance of the preliminary injunction was likewise
duly served on the said respondent, as shown in the Sheriffs Return dated February 28,
1996 and March 4, 1996 (pp. 166; 170-171; 173; 175-177).


Indeed, petitioner has no reason to complain. The trial court sent the notice of raffle to petitioner at his previous
business address, the Castillo LamanTan Pantaleon and San Jose Law Offices, and it was received by Glenda Jamora, a
receptionist there. The trial court cannot be blamed for sending the notice to the said law firm because it was the address
stated in respondents petition for quieting of title.

30

Moreover, as held by the trial court, petitioner voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the said
court. Records show that on March 27, 1996, he filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars; on May 13, 1996, he filed a Motion to
Cite Respondent and Counsel in Contempt of Court, praying for other reliefs, just and equitable. Also, on March 5, 1996,
he filed an Omnibus Motion assailing the trial courts order restraining the annotation of lis pendens on the titles of the
property in litigation. He participated in the hearing of this motion. And lastly, he filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Civil
Case No. 96-26433.

A court generally acquires jurisdiction over a person through either a valid service of summons or the persons
voluntary appearance in court.
[3]


Let it be stressed at this point the basic rule that when a motion to dismiss is denied by the trial court, the remedy is
not to file a petition for certiorari, but to appeal after a decision has been rendered. In East Asia Traders, Inc. v.
Republic,
[4]
this Court held:

Petitioner basically contends before the Court of Appeals that the RTC acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case
No. CT-98-001.

The petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner with the Court of Appeals is not the proper
remedy to assail the denial by the RTC of the motion to dismiss. The Order of the RTC denying the motion
to dismiss is merely interlocutory. An interlocutory order does not terminate nor finally dispose of the case,
but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. It is always
under the control of the court and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time
before final judgment. This proceeds from the courts inherent power to control its process and orders so as
to make them conformable to law and justice. The only limitation is that the judge cannot act with grave
abuse of discretion, or that no injustice results thereby (Bangko Silangan Development Bank v. Court of
Appeals, 360 SCRA 322 (2001).

In Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education (356 SCRA 367 (2001), we
held:

An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, and so the proper remedy in
such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered. A writ of certiorari is not
intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling; it is resorted only to correct a
grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Its function is limited to keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to
relieve persons from arbitrary acts acts which courts or judges have no power or authority
in law to perform. It is not designed to correct erroneous findings and conclusions made by
the courts.


As shown by the records, petitioner has brought the same issue before this Court three times. He is, therefore,
warned that, henceforth, no similar petition shall be entertained.

In sum, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 49466.
31


WHEREFORE, this Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49466.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION


UNION BANK OF THE G.R. No. 165382
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,

*
AZCUNA, and
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE GARCIA, JJ.
COMMISSION, MABASA AND
COMPANY, INC., and SHERIFF
NORBERTO MAGSAJO, JR. of the
Office of the Ex-Officio Sheriff - Promulgated:
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MAKATI CITY,
Respondents. August 17, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x


D E C I S I O N

PUNO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to set aside and reverse the August 13, 2004 Decision
[1]
and September 27, 2004
Resolution
[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) which upheld the Order
[3]
and Writ of Execution,
[4]
both dated July 8, 2003, issued
by public respondent Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in SEC-AC No. 685.
First, we unfurl the facts.
In 1970, private respondent Mabasa & Company, Inc. (Mabasa) owned and held certificates of stock representing
4,532 shares in International Corporate Bank (ICB). Private respondent Mabasa also acquired from Vicente Tan certificates
of stock representing 3,098 ICB shares. Private respondent repeatedly requested ICB to allow it to inspect ICB's corporate
books and to record the transfer of the 3,098 shares it acquired from Tan. ICB, however, failed to act on private respondent's
requests.

On March 31, 1993, private respondent filed with the Prosecution and Enforcement Department (PED) of public
respondent SEC an action to compel ICB to allow it to inspect ICB's corporate books and to record the transfer of the 3,098
shares it acquired from Tan. The case was docketed as PED Case No. 93-1360. On December 15, 1993, the PED
dismissed the case without prejudice to the filing of another complaint with the Securities Investigation and Clearing
Department (SICD) of public respondent SEC where jurisdiction properly pertained.

Meanwhile, ICB merged with petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP), with the latter as the surviving
corporation. Under the terms of the merger, petitioner assumed all the liabilities and obligations of ICB so that any accrued
claims or pending actions or proceedings against ICB may be prosecuted against petitioner.

32

Accordingly, private respondent Mabasa filed a Petition
[5]
with the SICD against petitioner UBP, praying: (a) that it be
allowed to inspect petitioner's corporate books; (b) for petitioner to record the transfer to private respondent of the 3,098
shares it acquired from Tan; (c) to replace or reissue private respondent's shares and the dividends due thereon; and (d) if
replacement or reissuance is not possible, to pay the fair market value thereof plus damages. The case was docketed as
SEC Case No. 05-96-5336.

In its Decision
[6]
dated June 28, 1999, the SICD ruled in favor of private respondent Mabasa, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered in favor of
petitioner and against respondent directing respondent:
(1) To allow petitioner to inspect its corporate books;
(2) To record the transfer of the 3,098 shares petitioner acquired from Vicente Tan;
(3) To replace or to reissue petitioner's 4,532 ICB shares and 3,098 shares, or a total of 7,630 ICB
shares, with the corresponding UBP shares at the ratio of 25 UBP shares to 1 ICB share, in accordance with
paragraph 22 of the Plan of Merger between UBP and ICB, or a total of 190,750 UBP shares, plus all
dividends thereon, if any;
(4) In the event that the replacement or reissuance of 7,630 ICB shares or 190,750 UBP shares and
all dividends arising therefrom is no longer possible, to pay petitioner their fair market value reckoned from
the date of the filing of this petition;
(5) To deter those with similar propensity, to pay petitioner the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; and,
(6) To pay petitioner the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) as
attorney's fees, plus a further sum of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) for every court appearance.
[7]


Petitioner UBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration
[8]
of the SICD's decision, to no avail.
[9]
On September 6,
1999, petitioner filed an appeal with the SEC en banc,
[10]
docketed as SEC-AC No. 685.
Meantime, Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, was approved by then
President Joseph E. Estrada on July 19, 2000. The law transferred the SEC's original and exclusive jurisdiction over intra-
corporate cases to the courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC) except for "pending cases
involving intra-corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which should be resolved within one (1) year from the
enactment of [the] Code."
[11]

On June 15, 2001, the SEC en banc affirmed the decision of the SICD with respect to the 4,532 shares but reversed
it with respect to the 3,098 shares acquired from Tan, viz:
Insofar as these 4,532 shares are concerned, we rule in favor of the petitioner-
appellee. Respondent-appellant had no right to sell petitioner-appellee's shares on the afore-cited
grounds. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the hearing officer insofar as these shares are
concerned.
x x x
Accordingly, as regards the 3,098 shares acquired from Vicente Tan, we rule in favor of the
respondent-appellant and against the petitioner-appellee. Thus, the transfer of shares being not
registered in the corporate books is valid only as regards the parties to the transfer and therefore, petitioner-
appellee's right of action is against Vicente Tan, from whom the shares were acquired and who
subsequently assigned the same to innocent parties who were unaware of the earlier conveyance and
whose ownership of the shares were duly reflected in the corporate books.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
33

SO ORDERED.
[12]
(emphases supplied)

Thereafter, two separate appeals were brought to the CA. Petitioner UBP's Petition for Review
[13]
under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 70896. It questioned the decision of the SEC en banc with respect to the
4,532 shares and the awards of exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Private respondent Mabasa's appeal, on the other
hand, was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 70866 and pertained to the 3,098 shares it acquired from Tan.
[14]

On September 13, 2002, the CA rendered its decision
[15]
in CA-G.R. No. 70896, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the decision
appealed from in SEC AC No. 685 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of
attorney's fees is hereby reduced from P500,000.00 to P250,000.00.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[16]


Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.
[17]
The decision became
final and executory and was recorded in the book of entries of judgment.
[18]

On May 6, 2003, private respondent Mabasa filed a Motion for Partial Execution with public respondent SEC,
[19]
viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully prayed that the decision in this case be
partially executed and that a writ of execution be issued by this Honorable Commission ordering
respondent:
1. To allow petitioner to inspect respondent's corporate books;
2. To replace or re-issue petitioner's 4,532 ICB or International Corporate Bank shares with the
corresponding UBP or Union Bank of the Philippines shares at the ratio of 25 shares to 1 ICB share, in
accordance with paragraph 22 of the Plan of Merger between UBP and ICB or a total of 113,300 UBP
shares, plus dividends thereon, if any;
3. In the event that the replacement or reissuance of 4,532 ICB shares or 113,300 UBP shares and
all dividends arising therefrom is no longer possible, to pay petitioner their fair market value reckoned from
the date of the filing of this petition or P34.50 per UBP share;
4. To pay petitioner the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as exemplary
damages.
Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.
[20]


Petitioner UBP filed an Opposition (To Petitioner's Motion for Partial Execution)
[21]
and a Supplemental Opposition (to
Motion for Partial Execution).
[22]
It contended, among others, that under Section 5.2 of the Securities Regulation Code and
Sections 1, 3 and 6 of its implementing guidelines, the SEC has lost its jurisdiction to further act on the instant case.
On July 8, 2003, the SEC en banc issued its assailed order
[23]
in favor of private respondent, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the MOTION FOR WRIT OF PARTIAL EXECUTION filed by
petitioner Mabasa and Company, Inc. is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, let a WRIT OF EXECUTION be
ISSUED for the enforcement and complete satisfaction of the SEC AC No. 685 decision dated June 15,
2001.
SO ORDERED.
[24]


The writ of execution directed the sheriff of the RTC of Makati City to implement the decision of the SEC en
banc dated June 15, 2001 in SEC-AC No. 685.
[25]
Pursuant to Section 5.1(h) of R.A. No. 8799, the SEC requested the
RTC of Makati City, through Executive Judge Hon. Sixto Marella, Jr., for the designation of a sheriff to enforce the writ.
[26]

34


Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Defer Implementation of Writ of Execution
[27]
with public
respondent SEC. It likewise filed a Petition for Certiorari with Very Urgent Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
[28]
with the CA, assailing the SEC's Order and Writ of Execution dated July 8, 2003 for
having been issued without jurisdiction.
The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
[29]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
[30]
but was denied.
[31]

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari which raises the following issues, viz:
1. Whether or not the Hon. Court of Appeals interpreted the law correctly in ruling that the term
"resolve" includes "execution" under Sec. 5.3 (sic) of the Securities Regulation Code;
2. Whether or not the Hon. Court of Appeals interpreted the law correctly in ruling that the SEC still
has jurisdiction to order execution of its decisions within or after the lapse of one (1) year from the
enactment of the Securities Regulation Code; [and]
3. Whether or not the Hon. Court of Appeals interpreted the law correctly in ruling that the SEC can
enlist the aid of a Sheriff from the Regional Trial Court of Makati Cityto execute its decision.
[32]


The instant case falls under the category of intra-corporate cases over which public respondent SEC retained
jurisdiction pursuant to the penultimate sentence of Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799, viz:
5.2. The Commission's jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree
No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial
Court: Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial
Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. The Commission shall retain
jurisdiction over pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes submitted for final resolution
which should be resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of this Code. The Commission shall
retain jurisdiction over pending suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000 until
finally disposed. (emphasis supplied)

The issue to be resolved is whether the SEC, after its decision in a case belonging to the above category of intra-
corporate cases has become final and executory, retains the power to execute its subject decision.
Petitioner UBP posits the theory that the SEC retained jurisdiction over pending intra-corporate cases submitted for
final resolution when R.A. No. 8799 took effect but, once decided, the SEC loses jurisdiction over said cases and the same
are transferred to the RTC which shall execute the decision. Citing the rule in statutory construction that when the words of
the law are clear, there is no room for interpretation, the SEC allegedly retained jurisdiction only over "pending" intra-
corporate cases that have been submitted for resolution and not those that it had already "decided" for purposes of
execution. It contends that the term "to resolve" is not the same as "to execute" and there is nothing to suggest that the
former should include the latter. Further, the excerpt of congressional deliberations
[33]
cited in the assailed CA decision
allegedly does not support the ruling that the SEC has jurisdiction to order the execution of its decisions within or after the
lapse of one (1) year from the effectivity of R.A. No. 8799. Petitioner avers that the rationale for the retention of the SEC's
jurisdiction over pending cases submitted for final resolution for purposes of deciding them on the merits is the SEC's
familiarity with said cases. With respect to decided cases, however, there is no need for familiarity as execution is simply the
ministerial function of implementing the dispositive portion of the decision. If the RTC encounters doubts in executing the
decision of the SEC, it may refer to the body of the decision for guidance. Finally, since the SEC has no power to execute its
decisions, its enlistment of the aid of the sheriff under Section 5.1(h) of R.A. No. 8799 to execute its decision is null and void.
We find no merit in the petition.
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause or the right to act in a case. The general rule is that where
there is jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, the resolution of all questions arising in the case is but an exercise of
that jurisdiction.
[34]
The grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases,
should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments it
35

renders, unless the law otherwise provides.
[35]
This is so because the authority to decide cases is inutile unless
accompanied by the authority to see to it that what has been decided is carried out.
[36]

We do not find any good reason to depart from the foregoing general principles. Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 does
not qualify the SEC's jurisdiction when it mandates that the SEC "shall retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving intra-
corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which should be resolved within one (1) year from the enactment of this
Code." It is worthy to note that prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8799, the SEC had been exercising the power to execute its
decisions over all intra-corporate cases in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 5
[37]

36

of Presidential Decree No. 902-A.
[38]

Petitioner's contention that the SEC does not have jurisdiction to execute because once decided, the case ceases to
be a "pending" case and becomes a "decided" case deserves scant attention. In the first place, we have repeatedly held
that a case in which an execution has been issued is considered as still "pending" so that all proceedings on the execution
are proceedings in the suit.
[39]
Even assuming that a "decided" case pending execution can no longer be considered as
"pending," it is settled that the particular words, clauses and phrases in a law should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to
produce a harmonious whole.
[40]
In this case, the word "pending" defines the phrase "cases submitted for final resolution" at
the time the law took effect. Simply put, the reckoning point to determine whether a case is retained with the SEC for being
a "pending case submitted for final resolution" is R.A. No. 8799's date of effectivity. Otherwise, it would be revolting to the
common sense to direct the SEC to resolve said cases within one year from the enactment of the Code. Having retained its
jurisdiction over the instant case pursuant to Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799, the SEC must be deemed to have the power to
execute its subject decision. A long standing doctrine is that the tribunal which rendered the decision or award has a general
supervisory control over the process of its execution, and this includes the power to determine every question of fact and law
which may be involved in the execution.
[41]


Petitioner's contention that the word "resolve" does not include "execute" is likewise futile. A fair reading of the law
will show that the SEC was merely directed to render its decisions in the retained intra-corporate cases within 1 year from the
enactment of the Code. The word "should" is "[t]he past tense of shall, ordinarily implying duty or obligation, although usually
no more than an obligation of propriety or expediency, or a moral obligation, thereby distinguishing it from 'ought.'"
[42]
Said
directive cannot be stretched to mean that public respondent SEC's jurisdiction over the retained intra-corporate cases has
been limited to decision-making. We quote with approval the decision of the CA in this regard, viz:
[S]ince jurisdiction over said category of cases has been retained by the SEC, the 1-year period
from the enactment of the law within which the cases should be resolved was more of a directive to the
SEC to hasten the resolution of the cases. A contrary holding results in absurdity, for, assuming that the
cases were not resolved after the 1-year period and the effect was that the SEC would lose jurisdiction over
the cases, there would then be no court or body that could resolve the cases since jurisdiction over them
was not transferred to the RTC.
[43]


This construction is consistent with the legislative intent in the enactment of R.A. No. 8799. The excerpt of
congressional deliberations cited in the assailed CA decision reveals the unmistakable intent for said category of intra-
corporate cases to remain with the SEC.
[44]
Another excerpt of the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on
the Securities Act of 2000 confirms the intent for the SEC to finish the pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes
already submitted for final resolution.
[45]
This must be deemed as including the power to execute as "execution is the fruit and
end of the suit, and is very aptly called the life of the law."
[46]

We further take light from the presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative
measure and courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences.
[47]
As
correctly argued by private respondent Mabasa and public respondent SEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
petitioner's interpretation that the SEC retains jurisdiction over the category of intra-corporate cases under Section 5.2 of
R.A. No. 8799 for the purpose of deciding the same on the merits but, once decided, transfers said jurisdiction to the RTC for
execution would only result in needless delays. Indeed, we have emphasized that splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the
orderly administration of justice.
[48]

Since the power of the SEC to execute its decisions in intra-corporate cases over which it retained jurisdiction
pursuant to Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 is clear, petitioner's objection against public respondent SEC's enlistment of the aid
of a sheriff to execute its final and executory decision in the instant case has no leg to stand on.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The August 13, 2004 Decision and September 27, 2004 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals upholding the Order and Writ of execution dated July 8, 2003 issued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission in SEC-AC No. 685 are AFFIRMED.
Cost against petitioner.
37

SO ORDERED.
JOWETT K. GOLANGCO,
Petitioner,


- versus -


ATTY. JONE B. FUNG,
Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
Petitioner,




- versus -




HON. COURT OF APPEALSand ATTY.
JONE B. FUNG,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 147640










G.R. No. 147762

Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.
Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.


Promulgated:

October 12, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x


D E C I S I O N


CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

38


Petitioners Jowett K. Golangco (Golangco) and the Office of the Ombudsman, in this consolidated Petitions for
Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assail the Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57418 dated 24
August 2000 and its Resolution
[2]
dated 28 March 2001 setting aside the Resolution dated 13 March 1995 and the Order
dated 25 September 1996 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-93-0149. The assailed Decision also directed the
Office of the Ombudsman to cause the withdrawal of the Information it filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 38 entitled, People of the Philippines v. Atty. Jone B. Fung, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-149444. The said
Resolution and Order of the Office of the Ombudsman found Atty. Jone B. Fung (respondent) guilty of oppression, gross
inefficiency, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal from government
service.

Respondent is an employee of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and was, at that time,
assigned as Officer-In-Charge of the Operations and Surveillance Division, Anti-Illegal Recruitment Branch, Licensing and
Regulation Office, under the auspices of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).

On 1 February 1993, then DOLE Secretary Nieves Confesor received a letter from then Senator Ernesto Maceda
bringing to her attention a letter-complaint of a certain Edwin Belarmino, an applicant for overseas employment with the
Golangco and Monteverde recruitment agency [G&M (Phil.) Inc.]. In the letter-complaint, Belarmino alleged that he was
required by the recruitment agency to pay P20,000.00 as initial payment of the total recruitment fee ofP55,000.00 before his
application as factory worker in Taiwan could be processed.

The DOLE Secretary referred the letter-complaint to the POEA Administrator who instructed the POEA Licensing and
Regulation Office, headed by respondent, to conduct an on-the-spot investigation of the activities of G&M (Phil.) Inc. and to
verify in particular the placement fee being charged as alleged in the letter-complaint. Respondent was likewise directed to
conduct a discreet surveillance of the recruitment agency.

On 8 February 1993, some inspectors of the POEA Licensing and Regulation Office went to the office of G&M (Phil.)
Inc. and inquired from petitioner Golangco, the President of G&M (Phil.) Inc., about the allegation that the agency collected
excessive fees from its applicants. Petitioner Golangco denied such allegation.

On 10 February 1993, respondent dispatched SPO4 Domingo Bonita and SPO2 Alfonso Zacarias, PNP-CIS
operatives, to perform a surveillance operation on the activities of the agency and to submit a written report of their findi ngs
and recommendations.

The PNP-CIS operatives proceeded to the premises of G&M (Phil.) Inc. located at 426 J. Nepomuceno St., San
Miguel, Manila, where they posed as applicant-workers for Taiwan. They were entertained by Elizabeth Encenada
(Encenada), who introduced herself as an employee of the agency. She gave them bio-data forms to fill up and a list of
documents to prepare. The bio-data forms bore the letterhead and the control numbers of G&M (Phil.) Inc. Encenada
informed the operatives that the total job placement fee per applicant was P55,000.00 payable as follows: P7,000.00
downpayment, P20,000.00 to be paid after submission of the requirements, and P28,000.00 payable at the airport prior to
departure for Taiwan.

As a result of their surveillance, the operatives recommended that an entrapment operation be conducted on the
employees of the agency.

39

On 15 February 1993, a joint POEA-CIS team headed by respondent with eight others as members, including SPO4
Bonita and SPO2 Zacarias, proceeded to the premises of G&M (Phil.) Inc. to conduct the said operation. SPO4 Bonita was
entertained by Encenada. Thereafter, SPO4 Bonita handedP7,000.00 to Encenada as initial payment of the placement fee
of P55,000.00. When Encenada received the money, she was arrested by the team.

During the arrest of Encenada, petitioner Golangco was not around. When he arrived, he, too, was arrested by the
POEA-CIS team and was brought to the POEA Headquarters for investigation.

Petitioner Golangco left the POEA premises at around 7:30 p.m. after the termination of the investigation.

Subsequently, petitioner Golangco and Encenada were charged with violation of Articles 29, 32 and 34(a) of the
Labor Code. Thereafter, Senior StateProsecutor Romeo A. Danosos issued a Resolution finding probable cause against
Encenada for violations of Articles 32 and 34(a) of the Labor Code, and dismissing all the charges against petitioner
Golangco.

Administrative cases were also hurled against G&M (Phil.) Inc. for violations of the Labor Code. However, the cases
were dismissed based on the finding that there was no evidence adduced showing that the agency was involved in the illegal
acts of Encenada.

Aggrieved by his arrest, petitioner Golangco filed a criminal complaint against respondent before the Office of the
Ombudsman for arbitrary detention and violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The case
was docketed as OMB-0-93-0407. An administrative complaint for oppression, abuse of authority, gross inefficiency, gross
neglect of duty and grave misconduct arising from the same incident was likewise filed against respondent which was
docketed as OMB-ADM-0-93-0149.

In a Resolution dated 9 June 1993, Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) II Mothalib C. Onos (GIO Onos) recommended
the dismissal of the criminal complaint against respondent in OMB-0-93-0407. This recommendation was approved by
Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa in a Resolution dated 15 July 1993. Petitioner Golangco filed a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution of dismissal which was denied by GIO Onos in an Order dated 16 September 1993 and
approved by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa on 28 October 1993.

Unfazed by the denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner Golangco filed a Petition for Certiorari before this
Court entitled, Jowett K. Golangco v. Office of the Ombudsman, et al. docketed as G.R. No. 112857.

In a Resolution dated 24 January 1994, this Court dismissed the petition. Petitioner Golangco filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said resolution which this Court denied in a Resolution dated 16 March 1994.

In the meantime, the administrative complaint against respondent, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-93-0149, proceeded
independently of the criminal complaint. In a Resolution dated 13 March 1995, GIO II Celso R. Dao found respondent guilty
of the administrative charges against him and recommended his dismissal from the service for cause with the accessory
penalties of forfeiture of his leave credits and retirement benefits and disqualification from further re-employment in the
government. This Resolution was disapproved by Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. who recommended the
reassignment of the case to another graft investigating officer so that the administrative aspect of the case can be reconciled
with the facts found in the criminal aspect of the case. The recommendation of Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L.
40

Aportadera, Jr. was later approved by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa and the case was reassigned to GIO
Onos.

Convinced that the administrative complaint against respondent was bereft of evidence, GIO Onos, in a Resolution
dated 17 May 1995, recommended the dismissal of the same which was approved by Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo
Aportadera, Jr. by authority of then Acting Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa on 14 June 1995.

Petitioner Golangco filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 17 May 1995, which was denied by
GIO Onos in an Order dated 9 August 1995.

When Aniano A. Desierto assumed the Office of the Ombudsman, he referred the Order dated 9 August 1995 of GIO
Onos to the Office of the Special Prosecutor for further study.

Special Prosecution Officer I Lemuel M. De Guzman (De Guzman), to whom the case was assigned, issued a
Memorandum dated 22 January 1996 finding probable cause against petitioner Golangco for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019. Thus, De Guzman recommended to Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto that the Resolutions dated 9
June 1993 and 16 September 1993 in the criminal complaint docketed as OMB-0-93-0407 be set aside, and that the
information he prepared indicting respondent before the RTC for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 to be
approved. De Guzman also recommended that GIO Onos Resolution dated 9 August 1996 dismissing the administrative
complaint against respondent be disapproved; that the Resolution of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman dated 17 May 1995 be
set aside; that petitioner Golangcos motion for reconsideration be given due course; and that GIO Daos Resolution dated 13
March 1995 finding respondent guilty of the administrative charge be approved.

On 12 February 1996, Ombudsman Desierto approved the Information charging respondent with violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 as well as the Resolution dated 13 March 1995 of GIO Dao finding respondent guilty of the
administrative charges filed against him. Ombudsman Desierto disapproved GIO Onos Resolution dated 17 May
1995 recommending the dismissal of the administrative complaint against respondent, which, as earlier stated, had already
been approved by Assistant Ombudsman Aportadera by authority of then Acting Ombudsman Villa.

With the Ombudsmans approval of the Information prepared by De Guzman, said information was subsequently filed
before the RTC, Branch 38,Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-149144.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of GIO Daos Resolution dated 13 March 1995. GIO Dao denied the
motion in an Order dated 25 September 1996. The Order of Denial was later approved by Ombudsman Desierto on 24
February 1997.

Disgruntled with the actions of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-93-0149, respondent filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari with this Court impugning the validity of the foregoing Resolution and Order adjudging him guilty of oppression,
gross inefficiency, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct. The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 112857, was later
referred to the Court of Appeals based on the doctrine laid down in Fabian v. Hon. Desierto
[3]
which vested in the Court of
Appeals the appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Ombudsman pertaining to administrative disciplinary cases.

In a Decision dated 24 August 2000, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the Ombudsman. It likewise directed
the Ombudsman to cause the withdrawal of the information filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 38, in the criminal case filed
against respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-149444.
41


Petitioner Golangco and the Office of the Ombudsman separately filed motions for reconsideration of the
decision. These motions were denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 28 March 2001.

Hence, these petitions.

In G.R. No. 147640, petitioner Golangco raises the following issues:

I

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT DECLARED
THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ORDER PETITIONERS WARRANTLESS
ARREST.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND RESPECT TO THE
OPINION OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND IN CONSIDERING IT AS AN EX-
OFFICIO COUNSEL FOR THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN,
LIKEWISE, RULING ON THE CRIMINAL ASPECT OF THE CASE IN DISREGARD OF THIS HONORABLE
COURTS RESOLUTION ISSUED IN G.R. NO. 128742 DATED FEBRUARY 14 2000.


In G.R. No. 147762, the Office of the Ombudsman submits the following issues:

I

WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT A QUO HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE FINDINGS
OF PROBABLE CAUSE BY THE OMBUDSMAN IN THE CRIMINAL CASE OMB-0-93-0407, MUCH LESS
DIRECT THE LATTER TO WITHDRAW SAID CASE ALREADY FILED WITH REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT ITS APPELLATE JURISDICTION PERTAINS ONLY TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY CASE OMB-ADM-0-93-0149 WHICH IS DISTINCT AND INDEPENDENT
OF SAID CRIMINAL CASE.

42

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT EFFECTED A VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST ON A DULY-LICENSED RECRUITER
FOR ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF RECRUITMENT LICENSE OR AUTHORITY, AS DEFINED AND
PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLES 29 AND 39 (B) OF THE LABOR CODE, AS AMENDED, EVEN THOUGH
SAID RECRUITER WAS NOT ACTUALLY COMMITTING OR ATTEMPTING TO COMMIT SAID OFFENSE
AT THE TIME OF THE ARREST.


Petitioners Golangco and the Office of the Ombudsman posit that the Court of Appeals erred in annulling the
Resolution of the Ombudsman and in ruling that respondent is not guilty of oppression, gross inefficiency, gross neglect of
duty and grave misconduct for ordering the arrest and detention of petitioner Golangco. In support of this claim, petitioners
insist that respondent failed to comply with the constitutional and procedural requirement when he effected petitioner
Golangcos arrest without any valid warrant of arrest. Likewise, respondent cannot validly arrest petitioner Golangco without
warrant as the latter did not commit any crime when he was arrested. Since the arrest was not lawful, ergo, respondent
deserves the penalty of dismissal from service.

Respondent is charged with an administrative case for oppression, gross inefficiency, gross neglect of duty and grave
misconduct arising from the arrest incident of petitioner Golangco.

Oppression has been defined as an act of cruelty, severity, unlawful exaction, domination or excessive use of
authority.
[4]


Gross inefficiency is closely related to gross neglect, for both involve specific acts of omission resulting in damage to
another.
[5]


Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting
or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious
indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.
[6]
It is the omission of that care which even
inattentive and thoughtless persons never fail to take on their own property.
[7]
In cases involving public officials, there is
gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.
[8]


The Court defined misconduct as an intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior, especially by a government official.
[9]
As differentiated from simple misconduct, in grave misconduct the elements
of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest.
[10]


No such acts or omissions as defined has been committed by respondent.

The attendant circumstances leading to the arrest of Encenada and petitioner Golangco was a result of the
surveillance and entrapment operations efficiently planned and carried out by POEA-CIS team headed by respondent. It will
be recalled that the arrest incident started with the letter complaint against G&M (Phil.) Inc. of then Senator Ernesto Maceda
to then Labor Secretary Confessor which the latter referred to the POEA. In turn, the POEA Administrator ordered a
surveillance and investigation of G&M (Phil.) Inc. to be conducted by a joint POEA-CIS team headed by respondent. The
43

surveillance and investigation operations established the following facts: that Encenada permanently occupied a table of her
own at G&M (Phil.) Inc.; and that she conducted recruitment activities thereat by interviewing, screening and collecting
payments and documents from the prospective applicants of G&M (Phil.) Inc.; and that Encenada was closely associating
with the other employees of the agency and was discussing with the wife of petitioner Golangco matters relating to the
employment status of applicants. These attendant circumstances and the fact that Encenada was not an employee included
in the list of personnel submitted by the agency to the POEA to conduct recruitment activities, gave respondent and the
POEA-CIS operatives more than reasonable ground to sustain the belief that petitioner Golangco authorized and allowed the
illegal activities of Encenada inside the agency thereby violating Article 29 of the Labor Code which provides:

Article 29. Non-transferability of licence or authority-

No license or authority shall be used directly or indirectly by any person other than the one in whose
favor it was issued or at any place other than that stated in the license or authority, nor may such license or
authority be transferred, conveyed or assigned to any other person or entity. Any transfer of business
address, appointment or designation of any agent or representative including the establishment of additional
offices anywhere shall be subject to the prior approval of the Department of Labor.


That respondent honestly believed that petitioner Golangco was violating Article 29 of the Labor Code when the
arrest was made can be gleaned from respondents opinion on the applicability of the said provision embodied in his
Memorandum dated 10 May 1995 sent to his superior, the Officer-In-Charge of the Licensing and Regulation Office,
POEA, viz:

This Office could not close its eyes (from) the prevalent malpractices committed by the licensed
agencies of simply engaging unregistered employees in their recruitment business for purposes of collecting
money from unwary job seekers and then later, deny them as its employees in order to escape from liability.
This is exactly what was envisioned under Article 29 of the Labor Code. Otherwise, said provision is just a
useless provision.
[11]



Verily, from the foregoing disquisition, the conduct of respondent in arresting petitioner Golangco was far from being
oppressive, malicious, grossly negligent, inefficient or abusive. On the contrary, respondent was just doing his legal duty as a
government official tasked with enforcing the law. On this score, Sanders v. Veridiano II
[12]
is quite relevant:

[E]ven under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good
faith, which has not been overturned by the private respondents. Even mistakes concededly committed by
such public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown that they were motivated by malice or gross
negligence amounting to bad faith.


Perforce, the Court of Appeals did not err when it held that respondent is not liable for the administrative charge
hurled against him.

44

Likewise, petitioners Golangco and the Office of the Ombudsman assail the actuation of the Court of Appeals in
taking cognizance of the criminal case against respondent and directing the Office of the Ombudsman to withdraw Criminal
Case No. 96-149144. This, according to petitioners, is in violation of established jurisprudence stating that the Court of
Appeals has no authority to review the finding of probable cause by the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Court agrees with the petitioners.

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases only.
[13]
It cannot, therefore, review the orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases.

In Kuizon v. Desierto,
[14]
this Court clarified:

The appellate court correctly ruled that its jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases. In the Fabian case, we ruled that appeals from decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule
43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It bears stressing that when we declared Section 27 of Republic Act
No. 6770 as unconstitutional, we categorically stated that said provision is involved only whenever an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be
taken into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial
review, such as from an incident in a criminal action.


In the case under consideration, the Court of Appeals, instead of confining itself to the administrative case appealed
before it, reviewed the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-93-0407 finding probable cause against
respondent. The Court of Appeals further ordered the Office of the Ombudsman to withdraw the criminal information filed by
the same with the RTC of Manila docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-149144. Such act by the Court of Appeals cannot be
countenanced. It is settled that a judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void.
[15]
Since
the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over decisions and orders of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, its ruling on the
same is void.

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

(1) The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 24 August 2000 and its Resolution dated 28 March
2001 insofar as it ruled that respondent Jose B. Fung is not liable for the administrative charge in OMB-ADM-
0-93-0149 is AFFIRMED; and

(2) The same Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals directing the withdrawal of Criminal
Case No. 96-149144 pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Manila, is VOID.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 82586. September 11, 1992.]

45

HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, Commissioner of Customs, and CARLOS L. RAZO, Collector of Customs of the Subport
of Clark, Petitioners, v. HON. ELI G.C. NATIVIDAD, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XLVIII, San
Fernando, Pampanga, and CESAR SONNY CARLOS/CVC TRADING, Respondents.

Cruz, Durian, Agabin, Atienza, Alday & Tuason for Private Respondent.


SYLLABUS


1. TAXATION; TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE; COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS HAS EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
OVER THE RES SUBJECT OF THE WARRANT OF SEIZURE AND DETENTION TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. The court a quo has no jurisdiction over the res subject of the warrant of seizure and
detention. The respondent Judge, therefore, acted arbitrarily and despotically in issuing the temporary restraining order,
granting the writ of preliminary injunction and denying the motion to dismiss, thereby removing the res from the control of the
Collector of Customs and depriving him of his exclusive original jurisdiction over the controversy. Respondent Judge
exercised a power he never had and encroached upon the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs. By
express provision of law, amply supported by well-settled jurisprudence, the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction
over seizure and forfeiture proceedings and regular courts cannot interfere with his exercise thereof or stifle or put it to
naught.

2. ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OF SEIZURE AND DETENTION PRECLUDES INTERFERENCE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT; ILLEGALITY OF THE WARRANT CANNOT JUSTIFY REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS INTERFERENCE;
OWNERSHIP OF GOODS OR LEGALITY OF THEIR ACQUISITION CAN BE RAISED IN SEIZURE PROCEEDINGS. A
warrant of seizure and detention having already been issued, presumably in the regular course of official duty, the Regional
Trial Court of Pampanga was indisputably precluded from interfering in the said proceedings. That in his complaint in Civil
Case No. 8109 private respondent alleges ownership over several vehicles which are legally registered in his name, having
paid all the taxes and corresponding licenses incident thereto, neither divests the Collector of Customs of such jurisdiction nor
confers upon the said trial court regular jurisdiction over the case. Ownership of goods or the legality of its acquisition can be
raised as defenses in a seizure proceeding; if this were not so, the procedure carefully delineated by law for seizure and
forfeiture cases may easily be thwarted and set to naught by scheming parties. Even the illegality of the warrant of seizure
and detention cannot justify the trial courts interference with the Collectors jurisdiction. In the first place, there is a distinction
between the existence of the Collectors power to issue it and the regularity of the proceeding taken under such power. In the
second place, even if there be such an irregularity in the latter, the Regional Trial Court does not have the competence to
review, modify or reverse whatever conclusions may result therefrom.


D E C I S I O N


DAVIDE, JR., J .:


This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed on 6 April 1988 to annul, for having been issued without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion, the 26 February 1988 Resolution of respondent Judge denying petitioners motion to dismiss
Civil Case No. 8109 pending before Branch 48 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pampanga and granting private
respondents motion therein for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and to enjoin respondent Judge from
proceeding further in said case. It resurrects a long-settled issue of the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over actions
involving articles subject to seizure proceedings under the Tariff and Customs Code.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

In the Resolution of 18 April 1988, this Court required the respondents to comment on the petition and issued a Temporary
Restraining Order restraining the respondent Judge from further proceeding with the aforementioned Civil Case No. 8109 or
from enforcing and/or carrying out his Resolution of 26 February 1988. 1

Private respondent subsequently filed his Comment 2 to the petition, to which petitioners filed a Reply. 3 Private respondent
then filed a Rejoinder 4 to the latter.

This Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. 5 Both manifested
that they have sufficiently expounded on the relevant issues in their respective Memoranda, which the Court noted and
granted.
46


The factual antecedents disclosed in the petition are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In a sworn letter 6 dated 7 February 1988 and addressed to the Commissioner of Customs, one Butch Martinez informed the
former of the existence of both "assembled and disassembled" knocked-down vehicles, particularly Toyota Lite Aces, at the
compound CVC Trading, which is owned by a certain Mr. Castro and located at St. Jude Avenue, St. Jude Village, San
Fernando, Pampanga. Martinez requested for an immediate investigation thereon and prosecution for the violation of
customs laws.

On the basis thereof, Gen. Benjamin C. Cruz, Acting Director of the National Customs Police, formed a team composed of
National Customs Police (NCP) and Customs Intelligence and Investigation Division (CIID) members, issuing the same a
Mission Order 7 on 11 February 1988. The team proceeded to San Fernando, Pampanga on the same day, giving due notice
of their presence to the PC Region III Command and the PC-INP Station at San Fernando, Pampanga.

Upon arrival at the place pinpointed by Mr. Martinez at around 11:00 p.m., the team found a fenced area containing twenty
(20) units of fully and partly assembled Toyota Lite Ace vans. It immediately took possession and control of the motor
vehicles by cordoning off the enclosure. Thereafter, at about 11:30 p m., two (2) members of the team were designated to
secure a warrant of seizure and detention from the Collector of Customs of the Subport of Clark, 8 herein petitioner Carlos L.
Razo. The latter instituted seizure proceedings against the abovementioned vehicles (Seizure Identification No. CAB-01-88),
entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus Twenty (20) units Toyota Lite-Ace, CVC Trading St. Jude Ave., Dolores Homesite,
San Fernando, Pampanga, OWNER/CLAIMANT", for the violation of "Section 2530 (f) and (1)-1 & 5" of the Tariff and
Customs Code, in relation to Central Bank regulations. Accordingly, at about 8:00 a.m. on 12 February 1988, he issued a
Warrant of Seizure and Detention. 9

Since receipt of the warrant was refused by the owner/claimant or any of his representatives, the same was served by
substituted service through the posting of a copy thereof on one of the subject motor vehicles found near the gate of the
stockyard. An inventory of the vehicles was conducted and a copy thereof was attached to the return of the warrant made to
the issuing authority.

At about 11:00 a.m. on 12 February 1988, when the team was about to haul the motor vehicles away, two (2) Regional Trial
Court sheriffs arrived with a temporary restraining order issued on that date by the respondent Judge, as Executive Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga; the order was issued in connection with Civil Case No. 8109, entitled
"Sonny Carlos, plaintiff, versus Bureau of Customs and/or Customs Police from seizing or confiscating the vehicles until
further ordered, and directed the defendants to attend the raffle of the case on 26 February 1988 at 9:00 oclock in the
morning and show cause why a writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued against them. It further required plaintiff to
submit within twenty four (24) hours from that date the list of vehicles in question and "not to dispose any (sic) of them
pending further order of the court." 10

In his Complaint 11 in the above-entitled case, private respondent alleges that he is the owner of several vehicles which are
legally registered in his name and that he has paid all the taxes and "corresponding licenses" therefor; he further avers that
elements of the defendant Bureau of Customs and/or Customs Police have surrounded his residence threatening to take
possession of the vehicles. He finally prays that the latter be enjoined from doing so and that they be ordered to pay
damages in the sum of P50,000.00.

By virtue of the restraining order, the physical transfer of the vehicles was deferred, however, elements of the National
Customs Police and the PC Regional Command remained deployed in the area to assert possession and control over the
seized motor vehicles by the Bureau of Customs.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

On 16 February 1988, lawyers of the Bureau of Customs filed a Motion to Dismiss 12 Civil Case No. 8109 alleging therein (a)
the lack of jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the subject vehicles in view of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector
of Customs over seizure and forfeiture cases, and (b) the failure of the plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies.

On 17 February 1988, the private respondent filed an Oppositions/Comment on the Motion to Dismiss 13 alleging, among
others, that the Warrant of Seizure and Detention did not comply with the requirements for a valid search warrant under the
Constitution, and that taxes for the vehicles have been paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).

The Motion to Dismiss was heard on 19 February 1988 by the respondent Judge, to whose branch the case was raffled off.
After said hearing, the private respondents motion and application for preliminary injunction were deemed submitted for
resolution.

47

On 22 February 1988, private respondent filed an Amended Complaint 14 changing his name from "Sonny Carlos" to
"CESAR SONNY CARLOS" and naming as defendants, in place of the "BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND/OR CUSTOMS
POLICE", "ATTY. CARLOS L. RAZO, in his capacity as Collector of Customs; LOUIE ROMERO, BILLY BIBIT, their
authorized deputies and JOHN DOES." In this Amended Complaint, private respondent assails the subject warrant for being
patently "illegal and fatally defective" and void of any virtue; reiterates his willingness to post a bond "in an amount the Court
may fix conditioned upon the damages that the defendants may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of the injunction;"
and asks for P500,000.00 as actual damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary and corrective damages, P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P50,000.00 as attorneys fees.

In the meantime, the hearing of Seizure Identification No. CAB-01-88 was set for 18 and 19 February 1988, per Notice of
Hearing dated 15 February 1988 and issued by petitioner Collector of Customs. Since the owner/claimant CVC Trading
refused to accept a copy of the said notice, a follow-up notice of hearing was transmitted to it thru a telegram; the latter
replied also by telegram,15 declaring that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We are the legal possessors/owners (sic) of the vehicles in our compound there can be no forfeiture since a case has been
lodged before the civil courts hearing on Feb. 19, 1988 the courts have assumed jurisdiction to your exclusion.

Moreover elementary due process requires service of documents complaint. There can be no service of summons (sic) or
notice of hearing thru telegrams."cralaw virtua1aw library

At the hearing on 18 February 1988, Attys. Napoleon Gatmaitan and Conrado Unlayao, CIID, Bureau of Customs, appeared
for the Government. No appearance was entered for the owner/claimant. Thus, the Government was allowed to present
evidence ex-parte.

On 26 February 1988, petitioner Collector of Customs rendered a Decision 16 in the said seizure proceedings, the dispositive
portion of which reads:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"WHEREOF, by authority of law vested in the undersigned, it is hereby ordered that the Twenty (20) Units Toyota Lite Ace
covered by this seizure case be, as they are hereby, declared forfeited in favor of the Government to be disposed of in the
manner provided for by law.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all parties and office (sic) concerned, with a copy thereof posted in the Bulletin Board
of this Customhouse, for their information guidance and appropriate action."cralaw virtua1aw library

On the same date, the respondent Judge issued a Resolution 17 in Civil Case No. 8109 denying the motion to dismiss and
granting the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. The pertinent portions thereof read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"I. Resolution on the Motion to Dismiss with Prayer to Lift Restraining Order
x x x


A reading of the complaint will show that it was alleged that the plaintiff is the owner of the subject vehicles. He is in actual
and physical possession of the same. Plaintiff enjoys the presumption of ownership, to (sic) which he has to protect.
x x x


It is to be noted that the subject matter of the complaint is the legal ownership of the vehicles and damages being asked by
plaintiff, thus, this Court can assume jurisdiction over the case. The mere allegation of the defendants that the subject
vehicles were smuggled based on reliable information will not divest this Court of jurisdiction.
x x x


In this particular case, there is no showing that plaintiff is an importer who imported dutiable goods, in entering the port of
Clark Air Base, imported thru that port. The goods are in private (sic) place owned by plaintiff, and not in the possession of
the collector of customs.
x x x
48



The numerous Supreme Court decisions cited by movant in his motion to dismiss have very remote pertinence at the case at
car. In the cited cases, dutiable imported goods or articles were seized while on vessels and/or customs zone (sic), and the
alleged owners filed cases of replevin or recovery of personal properties.

II. Resolution in the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction
x x x


Having substantiated the said allegations, in his complaint with Annexes and considering the oral arguments of the parties, it
is hereby ordered and directed that after the plaintiff filed (sic) the bond in the amount of P100,000.00 as fixed by this Court,
all the defendants and any other persons acting under their command, or for (sic) in their behalf, to (sic) desist and refrain
from guarding the area of the plaintiff and from seizing or confiscating the vehicles involved in this case pending termination
of this litigation and/or unless a contrary order is issued by this Court. Thus, the defendants is (sic) hereby inhibited for the
meantime to guard the area or commit trespass of plaintiffs premises in any manner restrain (sic) the movement of herein
plaintiff and his representatives or employees, considering that there is standing (sic) of this Court that pending the
termination of this case, the said vehicles should not be disposed of."cralaw virtua1aw library

Hence, this petition which We find to be meritorious. It should be granted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The court a quo jurisdiction over the res subject of the warrant of seizure and detention. The respondent Judge, therefore,
acted arbitrarily and despotically in issuing the temporary restraining order, granting the writ of preliminary injunction and
denying the motion to dismiss, thereby removing the res from the control of the Collector of Customs and depriving him of his
exclusive original jurisdiction over the controversy. Respondent Judge exercised a power he never had and encroached upon
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs. By express provision of law, amply supported by well-settled
jurisprudence, the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings and regular courts
cannot interfere with his exercise thereof or stifle or put it to naught.

In the 1966 case of Pacis v. Averia, 18 this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.P. Bengzon, held
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Tariff and Customs Code, in Section 2530 thereof, lists the kinds of property subject to forfeiture. At the same time, in
Part 2 of Title VI thereof, it provides for the procedure in seizure and forfeiture cases and vests in the Collector of Customs
the authority to hear and decide said cases. [Section 2312, R.A. 1937] The Collectors decision is appealable to the
Commissioner of Customs Section 2313, R.A. 1937] whose decision is in turn appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals.
[Section 2402, R.A. 1937, Sections 7 and 11, R.A. 1125]. An aggrieved party may appeal from a judgment of the Court of Tax
Appeals directly to this Court [Section 18, R.A. 1125; Rule 44, Rules of Court]. On the other hand, Section 44(c) of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 [As amended by R.A. 3828] lodges in the Court of First Instance original jurisdiction in all cases in which
the value of the property in controversy amounts to more than ten thousand pesos. This original jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance, when exercised in an action for recovery of personal property which is a subject of a forfeiture proceeding in
the Bureau of Customs, tends to encroach upon, and to render futile, the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs in seizure
and forfeiture proceedings. This is precisely what took place in this case. The seizure and forfeiture proceedings against the
M/B Bukang Liwayway before the Collector of Customs of Manila, was stifled by the issuance of a writ of replevin by the
Court of First Instance of Cavite.

Should Section 44(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 give way to the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code. or vice versa? In
Our opinion, in this particular case, the Court of First Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs. The
jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs is provided for in Republic Act 1937 which took effect on July 1, 1957, much later than
the Judiciary Act of 1948. It is axiomatic that a later law prevails over a prior statute [Herman v. Radio Corporation of the
Philippines, 50 Phil. 490; Pampanga Sugar Mills v. Trinidad, 279 U.S. 211, 73 L. ed. 665]. Moreover, on grounds of public
policy, it is more reasonable to conclude that the legislators intended to divest the Court of First Instance of the prerogative to
replevin a property which is a subject of a seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Otherwise, actions for forfeiture of property for violation of Customs laws could easily be undermined by the simple device of
replevin.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

Furthermore, Section 2303 of the Tariff and Customs Code requires the Collector of Customs to give to the owner of the
property sought to be forfeited written notice of the seizure and to give him the opportunity to be heard in his defense. This
provision clearly indicates the intention of the law to confine in the Bureau of Customs the determination of all questions
49

affecting the disposal of property proceeded against in a seizure and forfeiture case. The judicial recourse of the property
owner is not in the Court of First Instance but in the Court of Tax Appeals, and only after exhausting administrative remedies
in the Bureau of Customs."cralaw virtua1aw library

In De Joya v. Lantin, 19 this Court, speaking again through Mr. Justice J.P. Bengzon, declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu. Should they be found to have been released
irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City, they are subject to seizure and forfeiture, the proceedings for which comes
within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs pursuant, to Republic Act 1937.

Said proceedings should be followed; the owner of the goods may set up defenses therein (Pacis v. Averia, L-22526, Nov.
29, 1966). From the decision of the Commissioner of Customs appeal lies to the Court of Tax Appeals, as provided in Sec.
2402 of Republic Act 1937 and Sec. 11 of Republic Act 1125. To permit recourse to the Court of First Instance in cases of
seizure of imported goods would in effect render ineffective the power of the Customs authorities under the Tariff Code and
deprive the Court of Tax Appeals of one of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. As this Court has ruled in Pacis v. Averia,
supra, Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings exclusively upon the Bureau of
Customs and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such law being special in nature, while the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of
Courts of First Instance is a general legislation, not to mention that the former are later enactments, the Court of First
Instance should yield to the jurisdiction of the Customs authorities."cralaw virtua1aw library

This rule was subsequently reiterated in Romualdez v. Arca, 20 De Joya v. David, 21 Diosamito v. Balanque, 22 Lopez v.
Commissioner of Customs,23 Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya, 24 Collector of Customs v. Torres, 25 Pacis v. Geronimo 26 and De la
Fuente v. De Veyra. 27

The language of the foregoing rule is simple, clear and leaves no doubt as to the Regional Trial Courts lack of jurisdiction
over the res which has already been made the subject of seizure and forfeiture proceedings. Frankly, this Court is unable to
understand why the respondent Judge misread the same; perhaps, he simply chose to ignore it. At any rate, such behavior is
highly condemnable.cralawnad

A warrant of seizure and detention having already been issued, presumably in the regular course of official duty, 28 the
Regional Trial Court of Pampanga was indisputably precluded from interfering in the said proceedings. That in his complaint
in Civil Case No. 8109 private respondent alleges ownership over several vehicles which are legally registered in his name,
having paid all the taxes and corresponding licenses incident thereto, neither divests the Collector of Customs of such
jurisdiction nor confers upon the said trial court regular jurisdiction over the case. Ownership of goods or the legality of its
acquisition can be raised as defenses in a seizure proceeding; 29 if this were not so, the procedure carefully delineated by
law for seizure and forfeiture cases may easily be thwarted and set to naught 30 by scheming parties. Even the illegality of
the warrant of seizure and detention cannot justify the trial courts interference with the Collectors jurisdiction. In the first
place, there is a distinction between the existence of the Collectors power to issue it and the regularity of the proceeding
taken under such power. In the second place, even if there be such an irregularity in the latter, the Regional Trial Court does
not have the competence to review, modify or reverse whatever conclusions may result therefrom. In Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya,
31 this Court had the occasion to state:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"2. Respondents, however, notwithstanding the compelling force of the above doctrines, would assert that respondent Judge
could entertain the replevin suit as the seizure is illegal, allegedly because the warrant issued is invalid and the seizing officer
likewise was devoid of authority. This is to lose sight of the distinction, as earlier made mention of, between the existence of
the power and the regularity of the proceeding taken under it. The governmental agency concerned, the Bureau of Customs,
is vested with exclusive authority. Even if it be assumed that in the exercise of such exclusive competence a taint of illegality
may be correctly imputed, the most that can be said is that under certain circumstances the grave abuse of discretion
conferred may oust it of such jurisdiction. It does not mean however that correspondingly a court of first instance is vested
with competence when clearly in the light of the above decisions the law has not seen fit to do so. The proceeding before the
Collector of Customs is not final. An appeal lies to the Commissioner of Customs and thereafter to the Court of Tax Appeals.
It may even reach this Court through the appropriate petition for review. The proper ventilation of the legal issues raised is
thus indicated. Certainly a court of first instance is not therein included. It is devoid of jurisdiction."cralaw virtua1aw l ibrary

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of respondent Judge of 26 February 1988 in Civil Case No. 8109 before Branch 48 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, and all proceedings had therein, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE and the said case is
hereby ordered DISMISSED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on 18 April 1988 is hereby made permanent.
50


SO ORDERED.

DANILO G. PUNONGBAYAN,
Petitioner,



- versus -




PERFECTO G. PUNONGBAYAN, JR.,
MARILOU P. VISITACION, and SOTERO A.
PUNONGBAYAN,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 157671

Present:

PUNO, J., Chairman,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:

June 20, 2006
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION


SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision
[1]
dated March 17, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 65420, entitled Perfecto G. Punongbayan, Jr. and Marilou P. Visitacion vs. Hon. Maximo Magno-Libre (in
his official capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Lanao Del Norte, Branch 5 of Iligan City), Danilo
Punongbayan, Rico Quilab, Luis Lacar and Adelfa Silor (in their official capacity as members of the management committee
of St. Peters College).
The facts are:
St. Peters College is a non-stock, non-profit educational corporation in Iligan City. It is administered by its Board of
Trustees composed of five members. As of 1995, the members of the Board were Leonila, Leonora, Danilo, Perfecto, Jr.,
sisters and brothers, all surnamed Punongbayan, and Sotero Punongbayan, their uncle.
In 1995, Leonila and Leonora died, leaving as members of the Board Danilo, petitioner, Perfecto, Jr., respondent, and
Sotero, respondent-intervenor.
Danilo was then the President, while Perfecto, Jr. acted as Treasurer. Marilou Visitacion, another respondent, acted
as the Corporate Secretary. However, there has been no Board meeting.
51

In 1998, Sotero filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a Petition for Disqualification of
Members/Trustees/Officers; Production of Corporate and Financial Records; Examination and Accounting of Corporate
Assets; and Damages with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Danilo,
Perfecto, Jr., and Marilou, docketed as SEC Case No. 10-96-5471. The petition prays for the immediate creation of a
management committee on the ground of lack of quorum among the members of the Board resulting in an impending halt of
the schools operation.
In an Order
[2]
dated November 10, 1998, the SEC granted the prayer for the creation of a management committee.
On February 24, 1999, the SEC appointed the following as members of the management committee: Carmen V.
Dormitorio, as chairperson, representing the Commission on Higher Education; Jose L. Zalsos, representing the Faculty Club
of St. Peters College, Inc.; Henie Natuel Punongbayan, representing Sotero; Carmelita Punzalan-Punongbayan,
representing Danilo; and Perfecto, Jr.
[3]

Subsequently, Carmen Dormitorio inhibited herself as a member and chairperson of the committee. This resulted in
a deadlock among the remaining members.
Meanwhile, SEC Case No. 10-96-5471 was transferred to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5, Iligan City,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799.
[4]
The case was docketed therein as Corporation Case No. 006.
Sotero then filed with the RTC a Motion to Abolish the Management Committee, assailing the Orders of the SEC
creating and appointing the members of the management committee. He prayed that the original members of the Board
(himself, Danilo, and Perfecto, Jr.) be required to reconvene and run the affairs of the school.
On June 5, 2001, the RTC issued an Order
[5]
denying Soteros motion, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion to abolish the management committee is
ordered denied. Instead, the Mancom will have to be revamped to be composed only of three members as
mandated by the aforequoted interim rules of procedure, but before the three members to be appointed by
the court to constitute the new Mancom will be made, the parties-movants are directed to jointly nominate
three members they wish to be appointed to the Mancom, and the oppositor to do likewise.
x x x.

On June 20, 2001, the RTC issued an Order appointing Luis Lacar, Adelfa Silor, and Rico Quilab as members of the
new management committee. Lacar and Silor were the nominees of Danilo, while Quilab was the nominee of Perfecto, Jr.
[6]

Sotero filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was not acted upon being a prohibited pleading under the
Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies.
On June 23, 2001, Perfecto, Jr. and Marilou Visitacion, Acting Corporate Secretary, filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari with Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against RTC Presiding Judge
Maximo Magno-Libre, the members of the new management committee, and Danilo. Petitioners therein alleged that in
issuing his June 5 and 20, 2001 Orders, respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion. In a Resolution dated July 9,
2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for petitioners failure to comply with the Rule against forum shopping.
On July 17, 2001, Perfecto, Jr. and Visitacion filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Later, or on July 20, 2001, they filed
a Motion to Amend Petition.
In the meantime, Sotero filed with the Appellate Court his petition-in-intervention.
52

On July 26, 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution reconsidering its previous Resolution dismissing the
petition and admitting the amended petition as well as the petition-in-intervention.
In a Resolution dated March 13, 2002, the Appellate Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
implementation of the Orders dated June 5, 2001 and June 20, 2001 issued by the RTC.
Danilo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied in a Resolution dated October 8, 2002.
On March 17, 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision setting aside the RTC Orders dated June 5 and
20, 2001, holding that:
The Decision of the SEC that created MANCOM 1 was contained in the Order of November 10,
1998 (Rollo, pp. 523-528), while the appointment of intervenors representative, Henie N. Punongbayan, and
petitioner Perfecto Punongbayan, Jr. to MANCOM 1 was set forth in the Order of February 24, 1999 (Rollo,
pp. 532-533). There was no appeal taken from both Orders of the SEC, thus, the said Orders had become
final and executory and they could no longer be amended, altered, or set aside. In fact, they were already
implemented before the respondent Court assumed jurisdiction over the case. Intervenors representative
and petitioner Perfecto Punongbayan, Jr. had already assumed their office as members of MANCOM 1 and
commenced to discharge their duties long before the case was transferred to respondent Judges court.
It is a well-established rule that a judgment which had become final and executory can no longer be
amended or modified by the courts (Cardoza vs. Singson, 181 SCRA 53) as it thereby becomes immutable
and unalterable (Mining International Corp. vs. NLRC, 195 SCRA 155). x x x Clearly, then, the respondent
Judge acted capriciously, arbitrarily and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when he issued the assailed Orders on June 5, 2001 abolishing MANCOM 1 and creating
MANCOM 2, and on June 20, 2001 appointing the members of MANCOM 2. Public respondent had no legal
authority to abolish MANCOM 1 which was formed, duly constituted, and its members chosen by SEC, which
is the government agency tasked with the supervision of corporations.
x x x what public respondent should have done was to convene the Board of Trustees of the
corporation composed of Sotero, Danilo, and Perfecto, Jr., which, under its Charter and By-Laws, is tasked
with its management and operation, and only after there shall have been no quorum should he have ordered
the revamp of the old MANCOM. There appeared to be no legal impediment to the exercise by the Board of
Trustees of the School of its corporate powers. Under the By-Laws of the School, a majority of the trustees
shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of the corporate business. Since there were only three surviving
members, then at least two of the surviving members could constitute a quorum.
The situation now obtaining being different from that prevailing during the filing of the instant petition
in that the Board of Trustees had convened on July 4, 2001 and new members in the persons of Henie N.
Punongbayan, Marilou P. Visitacion and Restituto Punongbayan had been elected to the Board, and a new
By-Laws of the School had been adopted and approved by the SEC on August 21, 2001, the necessity of
creating a MANCOM is rendered already moot and academic. x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is given DUE COURSE. The assailed Orders of
public respondent Judge dated June 5, 2001 and June 20, 2001 in Corporation Case No. 006 of Branch 5 of
the Regional Trial Court in Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and another one is
issued convening the Board of Trustees of St. Peters College, Inc. in Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, and
making permanent the injunction issued by this Court in this case.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the following issues:
53

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR THROUGH GROSS
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AS IT RULED THAT THELOWER COURT REVOKED,
VACATED, AMENDED OR MODIFIED THE ORDER CREATING A MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
WHEN IT ISSUED THE ORDER OF JUNE 5, 2001.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR THROUGH GRAVE
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS WHEN IT RULED THAT THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY APPOINTING CARMELITA P. PUNONGBAYAN AS CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE CORPORATION, WHEN THERE IS NO SUCH ORDER OF
APPOINTMENT.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING TO THE EFFECT THAT
UNDER THE BY-LAWS OF THE SCHOOL, A MAJORITY OF THE TRUSTEES SHALL
CONSTITUTE A QUORUM FOR THE TRANSACTION OF THE CORPORATE BUSINESS. SINCE
THERE WERE ONLY THREE SURVIVING MEMBERS, THAT AT LEAST TWO OF THE
SURVIVING MEMBERS COULD CONSTITUTE A QUORUM. THE APPELLATE COURT HAS
THUS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND THE
APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN MAKING A FINDING THAT THERE IS
NOW A FUNCTIONING BOARD OF TRUSTEES AND IT MUST BE ALLOWED TO FUNCTION AND
TO EXERCISE ITS POWER AND DUTIES, AS IN DOING SO THE APPELLATE COURT WENT
BEYOND THE ISSUES OF THE CASE.
5. A QUESTION OF LAW IS ALSO BEING POSED AS TO WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT CAN
RULE THAT THERE IS NOW A FUNCTIONING BOARD OF TRUSTEES AND THAT THE
NECESSITY OF CREATING A MANCOM IS RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC IN THE LIGHT
OF THE PROVISION OF SEC. 12, RULE 9 OF THE INTERIM RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR
INTRA-CORPORATE CONTROVERSIES.


Petitioner Danilo Punongbayan contends that the management committee created by the SEC was not abolished by
the RTC. Its composition was only reorganized because of the existence of a deadlock among the members.
Respondents maintain that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the creation of a new management
committee in lieu of the one created by the SEC. Instead, it should have directed the remaining three members to
reconvene.
The main issue for our consideration is whether the RTC could reorganize the management committee created by the
SEC.
We rule in the affirmative.
Under Section 5
[7]
of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the SEC has jurisdiction, among others, to hear and decide
controversies in the appointments of directors, trustees, officers or managers of corporations.
54

Section 6 provides:
SECTION 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the
following powers:
x x x
d) To create a management committee x x x
The management committee x x x shall have the power to take custody of, and control over, all the
existing assets and property of such entities under management; to evaluate the existing assets and
liabilities, earnings and operations of such corporations, partnerships or other associations; to determine the
best way to salvage and protect the interest of the investors and creditors; to study, review and evaluate the
feasibility of continuing operations and restructure and rehabilitate such entities if determined to be feasible
by the Commission. It shall report and be responsible to the Commission until dissolved by order of the
Commission: Provided, however, That the Commission may, on the basis of the findings and
recommendation of the management committee x x x or on its own findings, determine that the continuance
in business of such corporation or entity would not be feasible or profitable nor work to the best interest of the
stockholders, parties-litigants, creditors, or the general public, order the dissolution of such corporation entity
and its remaining assets liquidated accordingly. The management committee x x x may overrule or revoke
the actions of the previous management and board of directors of the entity or entities under management
notwithstanding any provision of law, articles of incorporation or by-laws to the contrary.
x x x
A management committee is tasked to manage, take custody of and control all existing assets, funds and records of
the corporation, and to determine the best way to protect the interest of its stockholders and creditors.
In this case, the SEC created a management committee, upon Soteros application, and appointed its five
members. However, one member, Carmen Dormitorio (representing the CHED), inhibited herself from sitting in the
committee, resulting in a deadlock among the remaining members. The committee became so divided, hence, the schools
business and affairs could no longer be conducted effectively to the prejudice of the stockholders and the students. In the
meantime, the SECs jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies was transferred to the RTC. This prompted Sotero to file
with the RTC, Branch 5,Iligan City, a motion to abolish the management committee created by the SEC. The RTC denied his
motion and instead, ordered the reorganization of the management committee. Sotero challenged the RTC Orders before
the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. The Appellate Court ruled that the RTC should have directed the remaining
members of the Board to reconvene instead of ordering the reorganization of the management committee.
Republic Act No. 8799, which became effective on August 8, 2000, transferred the jurisdiction of the SEC over cases
involving intra-corporate disputes to the Regional Trial Courts.
[8]
Thus, the RTC assumed powers provided under Sections 5
and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A quoted earlier. As such, it has the discretion to grant or deny an application for the
creation of a management committee. This discretion, however, must be exercised with great caution and circumspection.
Having the power to create a management committee, it follows that the RTC can order the reorganization of the
existing management committee. Here, knowing that the deadlock among the members of the committee (appointed by the
SEC) may lead to the paralyzation of the schools business operations, the RTC removed the said members and appointed
new members. This is pursuant to Section 11, Rule 9 of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate
Controversies which provides:
A member of the management committee is deemed removed upon appointment by the court of his
replacement chosen in accordance with Section 4 of this Rule.

Such appointment of new members does not mean the creation of a new management committee. The existing
management committee was not abolished. The RTC merely reorganized it by appointing new members. The management
55

committee created by the SEC continues to exist. However, when it failed to function due to the division among the
members, the RTC replaced them. Clearly, there was no revocation of the final Order of the SEC.
Significantly, in appointing new members of the management committee, chosen from the lists of nominees
submitted by both petitioner and respondents, the RTC did not deprive respondents herein of their representation in the
committee.
In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, G.R. Nos. 111202-05
Petitioner,

Present:
- versus -

PUNO, J., Chairperson,
THE COURT OF APPEALS; SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
Honorable ARSENIO M. GONONG, CORONA,
Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court, AZCUNA, and
Manila, Branch 8; Honorable GARCIA, JJ.
MAURO T. ALLARDE, Presiding
Judge, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT Promulgated:
Kalookan City, Branch 123; AMADO
SEVILLA and ANTONIO VELASCO, January 31, 2006
Special Sheriffs of Manila;
JOVENAL SALAYON, Special Sheriff
of Kalookan City, DIONISIO J.
CAMANGON, Ex-Deputy Sheriff
of Manila and CESAR S. URBINO, SR.,
doing business under the name
and style Duraproof Services,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x


DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:

These Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition, with Prayers for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order, are the culmination of several court cases wherein several resolutions and decisions are sought to be
annulled. Petitioner Commissioner of Customs specifically assails the following:

A) Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila dated February 18, 1991 in Civil Case No. 89-
51451;

B) Order of the RTC of Kalookan dated May 28, 1991 in Special Civil Case No. C-234;

C) Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 6, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 24669;

D) Resolution of the CA dated August 6, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 28387;

E) Resolution of the CA dated November 10, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 29317;

F) Resolution of the CA dated May 31, 1993 in CA-G.R. No. CV-32746; and
56


G) Decision of the CA dated July 19, 1993 in the consolidated petitions of CA-G.R. SP Nos. 24669, 28387
and 29317.

Petitioner also seeks to prohibit the CA and the RTC of Kalookan
[1]
from further acting in CA-G.R. CV No. 32746 and
Civil Case No. 234, respectively.

The whole controversy revolves around a vessel and its cargo. On January 7, 1989, the vessel M/V Star Ace,
coming from Singapore laden with cargo, entered the Port of San Fernando, La Union (SFLU) for needed repairs. The vessel
and the cargo had an appraised value, at that time, of more or less Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000). When the
Bureau of Customs later became suspicious that the vessels real purpose in docking was to smuggle its cargo into the
country, seizure proceedings were instituted under S.I. Nos. 02-89 and 03-89 and, subsequently, two Warrants of Seizure
and Detention were issued for the vessel and its cargo.

Respondent Cesar S. Urbino, Sr., does not own the vessel or any of its cargo but claimed a preferred maritime lien
under a Salvage Agreement dated June 8, 1989. To protect his claim, Urbino initially filed two motions in the seizure and
detention cases: a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion to Lift Warrant of Seizure and Detention.
[2]
Apparently not content with his
administrative remedies, Urbino sought relief with the regular courts by filing a case for Prohibition, Mandamus and Damages
before the RTC of SFLU
[3]
on July 26, 1989, seeking to restrain the District Collector of Customs from interfering with his
salvage operation. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 89-4267. On January 31, 1991 the RTC of SFLU dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction because of the pending seizure and detention cases. Urbinothen elevated the matter to the CA
where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 32746. The Commissioner of Customs, in response, filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings, advising the CA that it intends to question the jurisdiction of the CA before this Court. The motion was denied
on May 31, 1993. Hence, in this petition the Commissioner of Customs assails the Resolution F recited above and seeks to
prohibit the CA from continuing to hear the case.

On January 9, 1990, while Civil Case No. 89-4267 was pending, Urbino filed another case for Certiorari and
Mandamus with the RTC of Manila, presided by Judge Arsenio M. Gonong,
[4]
this time to enforce his maritime lien. Impleaded
as defendants were the Commissioner of Customs, the District Collector of Customs, the owners of the vessel and
cargo, Vlason Enterprises, Singkong Trading Company, Banco do Brazil, Dusit International Company Incorporated, Thai-
Nam Enterprises Limited, Thai-United Trading Company Incorporated and Omega Sea Transport Company, and the vessel
M/V Star Ace. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 89-51451. The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that a similar case was pending with the RTC of SFLU. The Motion to Dismiss was granted on July 2,
1990, but only insofar as the Commissioner of Customs and the District Collector were concerned. The RTC of Manila
proceeded to hear the case against the other parties and received evidence ex parte. The RTC of Manila later rendered a
decision on February 18, 1991 finding in favor of Urbino (assailed Decision A recited above).

Thereafter, on March 13, 1991, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC of Manila. Respondent Camangon was
appointed as Special Sheriff to execute the decision and he issued a notice of levy and sale against the vessel and its cargo.
The Commissioner of Customs, upon learning of the notice of levy and sale, filed with the RTC of Manila a motion to recall
the writ, but before it could be acted upon,Camangon had auctioned off the vessel and the cargo to Urbino for One Hundred
and Twenty Million Pesos (P120,000,000). The following day, Judge Gonong issued an order commanding
Sheriff Camangon to cease and desist from implementing the writ. Despite the order,Camangon issued a Certificate of Sale
in favor of Urbino. A week later, Judge Gonong issued another order recalling the writ of execution. Both cease and desist
and recall orders of Judge Gonong were elevated by Urbino to the CA on April 12, 1991 where it was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 24669. On April 26, 1991, the CA issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining the RTC of Manila from
enforcing its cease and desist and recall orders. The TRO was eventually substituted by a writ of preliminary injunction. A
motion to lift the injunction was filed by the Commissioner of Customs but it was denied. Hence, in this petition the
Commissioner of Customs assails Resolution C recited above.

On May 8, 1991, Urbino attempted to enforce the RTC of Manilas decision and the Certificate of Sale against the
Bureau of Customs by filing a third case, a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with the RTC
of Kaloocan.
[5]
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 234. On May 28, 1991, the RTC of Kaloocan ordered the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the Philippine Ports Authority and the Bureau of Customs from interfering with the
relocation of the vessel and its cargo by Urbino (assailed Order B recited above).

Meanwhile, on June 5, 1992, Camangon filed his Sheriffs Return with the Clerk of Court. On June 26, 1992, the
Executive Judge for the RTC of Manila, Judge Bernardo P. Pardo,
[6]
having been informed of the circumstances of the sale,
issued an order nullifying the report and all proceedings taken in connection therewith. With this order Urbino filed his fourth
case with the CA on July 15, 1992, a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus against Judge Pardo. This became
57

CA-G.R. SP No. 28387. The CA issued a Resolution on August 6, 1992 granting the TRO against the Executive Judge to
enjoin the implementation of his June 26, 1992 Order. Hence, in this petition the Commissioner of Customs assails
Resolution D recited above.

Going back to the seizure and detention proceedings, the decision of the District Collector of Customs was to forfeit
the vessel and cargo in favor of the Government. This decision was affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs. Three
appeals were then filed with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) by different parties, excluding Urbino, who claimed an interest in
the vessel and cargo. These three cases were docketed as CTA Case No. 4492, CTA Case No. 4494 and CTA Case No.
4500. Urbino filed his own case, CTA Case No. 4497, but it was dismissed for want of capacity to sue. He, however, was
allowed to intervene in CTA Case No. 4500. On October 5, 1992, the CTA issued an order authorizing the Commissioner of
Customs to assign customs police and guards around the vessel and to conduct an inventory of the cargo. In response,
on November 3, 1992, Urbino filed a fifth Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA to assail the order as well as the
jurisdiction of the Presiding Judge and Associate Judges of the CTA in the three cases. That case was docketed as CA G.R.
SP No. 29317. On November 10, 1992, the CA issued a Resolution reminding the parties that the vessel is under the control
of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 24669 (assailed Resolution E recited above).

CA-G.R. SP Nos. 24669, 28387 and 29317 were later consolidated and the CA issued a joint Decision in July 19,
1993 nullifying and setting aside: 1) the Order recalling the writ of execution by Judge Gonong of the the RTC of Manila; 2)
the Order of Executive Judge Pardoof the RTC of Manila nullifying the Sheriffs Report and all proceedings connected
therewith; and 3) the October 19, 1993 Order of the CTA, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Hence, in these petitions,
which have been consolidated, the Commissioner of Customs assails Decision G recited above.

For purposes of deciding these petitions, the assailed Decisions and Resolutions will be divided into three groups:

1. The Resolution of the CA dated May 31, 1993 in CA-G.R. No. CV-32746 with the additional prayer to
enjoin the CA from deciding the said case.

2. The Order of the RTC of Kalookan dated May 28, 1991 in Special Civil Case No. C-234 with the
additional prayer to enjoin the RTC of Kalookan from proceeding with said case.

3. The Decision of the RTC of Manila dated February 18, 1991 in Civil Case No. 89-51451, the Resolutions
of the CA dated March 6, 1992, August 6, 1992, November 10, 1992 and the Decision of the CA dated July
19, 1993 in the consolidated petitions CA-G.R. SP Nos. 24669, 28387 and 29317.

First Group

The Commissioner of Customs seeks to nullify the Resolution of the CA dated May 31, 1993 denying the Motion to
Suspend Proceedings and to prohibit the CA from further proceeding in CA-G.R. No. CV-32746 for lack of jurisdiction. This
issue can be easily disposed of as it appears that the petition has become moot and academic, with the CA having
terminated CA-G.R. No. CV-32746 by rendering its Decision on May 13, 2002 upholding the dismissal of the case by the RTC
of SFLU for lack of jurisdiction, a finding that sustains the position of the Commissioner of Customs. This decision became
final and entry of judgment was made on June 14, 2002.
[7]


Second Group

The Court now proceeds to consider the Order granting an injunction dated May 28, 1991 in Civil Case No. C-234
issued by the RTC of Kalookan. The Commissioner of Customs seeks its nullification and to prohibit the RTC
of Kalookan from further proceeding with the case.

The RTC of Kalookan issued the Order against the Philippine Ports Authority and Bureau of Customs solely on the
basis of Urbinosalleged ownership over the vessel by virtue of his certificate of sale. By this the RTC of Kalookan committed
a serious and reversible error in interfering with the jurisdiction of customs authorities and should have dismissed the petition
outright. In Mison v. Natividad,
[8]
this Court held that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs cannot be
interfered with by regular courts even upon allegations of ownership.

To summarize the facts in that case, a warrant of seizure and detention was issued against therein plaintiff over a
number of
vehicles found in his residence for violation of customs laws. Plaintiff then filed a complaint before the RTC
of Pampanga alleging that he is the registered owner of certain vehicles which the Bureau of Customs are threatening to
seize and praying that the latter be enjoined from doing so. The RTC of Pampanga issued a TRO and eventually, thereafter,
58

substituted it with a writ of preliminary injunction. This Court found that the proceedings conducted by the trial court were null
and void as it had no jurisdiction over the res subject of the warrant of seizure and detention, holding that:

A warrant of seizure and detention having already been issued, presumably in the regular course of
official duty, the Regional Trial Court ofPampanga was indisputably precluded from interfering in said
proceedings. That in his complaint in Civil Case No. 8109 private respondent alleges ownership over several
vehicles which are legally registered in his name, having paid all the taxes and corresponding licenses
incident thereto, neither divests the Collector of Customs of such jurisdiction nor confers upon said trial court
regular jurisdiction over the case. Ownership of goods or the legality of its acquisition can be raised as
defenses in a seizure proceeding; if this were not so, the procedure carefully delineated by law for seizure
and forfeiture cases may easily be thwarted and set to naught by scheming parties. Even the illegality of the
warrant of seizure and detention cannot justify the trial courts interference with the Collectors jurisdiction. In
the first place, there is a distinction between the existence of the Collectors power to issue it and the
regularity of the proceeding taken under such power. In the second place, even if there be such an
irregularity in the latter, the Regional Trial Court does not have the competence to review, modify or reverse
whatever conclusions may result therefrom x x x.


The facts in this case are like those in that case. Urbino claimed to be the owner of the vessel and he sought to
restrain the PPA and the Bureau of Customs from interfering with his rights as owner. His
remedy, therefore, was not with the RTC but with the CTA where the seizure and detention cases are now pending and
where he was already allowed to intervene.

Moreover, this Court, on numerous occasions, cautioned judges in their issuance of temporary restraining orders and
writs of preliminary injunction against the Collector of Customs based on the principle enunciated in Mison v. Natividad and
has issued Administrative Circular No. 7-99 to carry out this policy.
[9]
This Court again reminds all concerned that the rule is
clear: the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings and trial courts are
precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.

Third Group

The Decision of the RTC of Manila dated February 18, 1991 has the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, based on the allegations, prayer and evidence
adduced, both testimonial and documentary, the Court is convinced, that, indeed, defendants/respondents
are liable to plaintiff/petitioner in the amount prayed for in the petition for which [it] renders judgment as
follows:

1. Respondent M/V Star Ace, represented by Capt. Nahum Rada, Relief Captain of the
vessel and Omega Sea Transport Company, Inc., represented by Frank Cadacio is ordered to refrain from
alienating or transfer[r]ing the vessel M/V Star Ace to any third parties;

2. Singko Trading Company to pay the following:

a. Taxes due the Government;

b. Salvage fees on the vessel in the amount of $1,000,000.00 based on the
Lloyds Standard Form of Salvage Agreement;

c. Preservation, securing and guarding fees on the vessel in the amount of
$225,000.00;

d. Salaries of the crew from August 16, 1989 to December, in the amount of
$43,000.00 and unpaid salaries from January 1990 up to the present;

e. Attorneys fees in the amount of P656,000.00;

3. Vlazon Enterprises to pay plaintiff in the amount of P3,000,000.00 for damages;

4. Banco do Brazil to pay plaintiff in the amount of $300,000.00 in damages; and finally,
59


5. Costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.


On the other hand, the CA Resolutions are similar orders for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
Judge Gonongand Judge Pardo from enforcing their recall and nullification orders and the CTA from exercising jurisdiction
over the case, to preserve the status quo pending resolution of the three petitions.

Finally, the Decision of the CA dated July 19, 1993 disposed of all three petitions in favor of Urbino, and has the
following dispositive portion:

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, all the three (3) consolidated petitions for
certiorari are hereby GRANTED.

THE assailed Order of respondent Judge Arsenio Gonong of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 8, dated, April 5, 1991, in the first assailed petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 24669); the assailed
Order of Judge Bernardo Pardo, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8, dated July
6, 1992, in the second petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 28387); and Finally, the assailed order or
Resolution en banc of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals[,] Judges Ernesto Acosta, Ramon de Veyra and
Manuel Gruba, under date of October 5, 1992, in the third petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 29317) are
all hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE thereby giving way to the entire decision dated February 18, 1991 of
the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. 89-51451 which
remains valid, final and executory, if not yet wholly executed.

THE writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Court on March 6, 1992 and reiterated on
July 22, 1992 and this date against the named respondents specified in the dispositive portion of the
judgment of the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8, in the first petition for certiorari,
which remains valid, existing and enforceable, is hereby MADE PERMANENT without prejudice (1) to the
petitioners remaining unpaid obligations to herein party-intervenor in accordance with the Compromise
Agreement or in connection with the decision of the respondent lower court in CA-G.R. SP No. 24669 and (2)
to the government, in relation to the forthcoming decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals on the
amount of taxes, charges, assessments or obligations that are due, as totally secured and fully guaranteed
payment by petitioners bond, subject to relevant rulings of the Department of Finance and other prevailing
laws and jurisprudence.

We make no pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

The Court rules in favor of the Commissioner of Customs.

First of all, the Court finds the decision of the RTC of Manila, in so far as it relates to the vessel M/V Star Ace, to be
void as jurisdiction was never acquired over the vessel.
[10]
In filing the case, Urbino had impleaded the vessel as a defendant
to enforce his
alleged maritime lien. This meant that he brought an action in rem under the Code of Commerce under which the vessel may
be attached and sold.
[11]
However, the basic operative fact for the institution and perfection of proceedings in rem is the actual
or constructive possession of the res by the tribunal empowered by law to conduct the proceedings.
[12]
This means that to
acquire jurisdiction over the vessel, as a defendant, the trial court must have obtained either actual or constructive
possession over it. Neither was accomplished by the RTC of Manila.

In his comment to the petition, Urbino plainly stated that petitioner has actual[sic] physical custody not only of the
goods and/or cargo but the subject vessel, M/V Star Ace, as well.
[13]
This is clearly an admission that the RTC of Manila did
not have jurisdiction over the res. While Urbino contends that the Commissioner of Customs custody was illegal, such fact,
even if true, does not deprive the Commissioner of Customs of jurisdiction thereon. This is a question that ought to be
resolved in the seizure and forfeiture cases, which are now pending with the CTA, and not by the regular courts as a
collateral matter to enforce his lien. By simply filing a case in rem against the vessel, despite its being in the custody of
customs officials, Urbino has circumvented the rule that regular trial courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the
60

validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted in the Bureau of Customs, on his mere assertion that the
administrative proceedings were a nullity.
[14]


On the other hand, the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the res ahead and to the exclusion of the
RTC of Manila. The forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Bureau of Customs are in the nature of
proceedings in rem
[15]
and jurisdiction was obtained from the moment the vessel entered the SFLU port. Moreover, there is no
question that forfeiture proceedings were instituted and the vessel was seized even before the filing of the RTC of Manila
case.

The Court is aware that Urbino seeks to enforce a maritime lien and, because of its nature, it is equivalent to an
attachment from the time of its existence.
[16]
Nevertheless, despite his liens constructive attachment, Urbino still cannot claim
an advantage as his lien only came about after the warrant of seizure and detention was issued and implemented. The
Salvage Agreement, upon which Urbino based his lien, was entered into on June 8, 1989. The warrants of seizure and
detention, on the other hand, were issued on January 19 and 20, 1989. And to remove further doubts that the forfeiture case
takes precedence over the RTC of Manila case, it should be noted that forfeiture retroacts to the date of the commission of
the offense, in this case the day the vessel entered the country.
[17]
A maritime lien, in contrast, relates back to the period
when it first attached,
[18]
in this case the earliest retroactive date can only be the date of the Salvage Agreement. Thus, when
the vessel and its cargo are ordered forfeited, the effect will retroact to the moment the vessel entered Philippine waters.

Accordingly, the RTC of Manila decision never attained finality as to the defendant vessel, inasmuch as no jurisdiction
was acquired over it, and the decision cannot be binding and the writ of execution issued in connection therewith is null and
void.

Moreover, even assuming that execution can be made against the vessel and its cargo, as goods and chattels to
satisfy the liabilities of the other defendants who have an interest therein, the RTC of Manila may not execute its decision
against them while, as found by this Court, these are under the proper and lawful custody of the Bureau of Customs.
[19]
This
is especially true when, in case of finality of the order of forfeiture, the execution cannot anymore cover the vessel and cargo
as ownership of the Government will retroact to the date of entry of the vessel into Philippine waters.

As regards the jurisdiction of the CTA, the CA was clearly in error when it issued an injunction against it from deciding
the forfeiture case on the basis that it interfered with the subject of ownership over the vessel which was, according to the CA,
beyond the jurisdiction of the CTA. Firstly, the execution of the Decision against the vessel and cargo, as aforesaid, was a
nullity and therefore the sale of the vessel was invalid. Without a valid certificate of sale, there can be no claim of ownership
which Urbino can present against the Government. Secondly, as previously stated, allegations of ownership neither divest the
Collector of Customs of such jurisdiction nor confer upon the trial court jurisdiction over the case. Ownership of goods or the
legality of its acquisition can be raised as defenses in a seizure proceeding.
[20]
The actions of the Collectors of Customs
are appealable to the Commissioner of Customs, whose decision, in turn, is subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of
the CTA.
[21]
Clearly, issues of ownership over goods in the custody of custom officials are within the power of the CTA to
determine.

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
dated February 18, 1991 in Civil Case No. 89-51451, insofar as it affects the vessel M/V Star Ace, the Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Kalookan datedMay 28, 1991 in Special Civil Case No. C-234, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
March 6, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 24669, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated August 6, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No.
28387, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated November 10, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 29317 and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated July 19, 1993 in the consolidated petitions in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 24669, 28387 and 29317 are all SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Kalookan is enjoined from further acting in Special Civil Case No. C-234. The Order of
respondent Judge Arsenio M. Gonong dated April 5, 1991 and the Order of then Judge Bernardo P. Pardodated June 26,
1992 are REINSTATED. The Court of Tax Appeals is ordered to proceed with CTA Case No. 4492, CTA Case No. 4494 and
CTA Case No. 4500. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

SPOUSES EDMUNDO T. OSEA AND
LIGAYA R. OSEA,
Petitioners,


G.R. No. 162774

Present:

QUISUMBING, Chairperson,
61


-versus-



ANTONIO G. AMBROSIO AND RODOLFO
C. PEREZ,
Respondents.

CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, and
TINGA, JJ.


Promulgated:

April 7, 2006

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J .:

The issue raised in the present case is one of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

On June 8, 1991, petitioner Edmundo T. Osea and respondent Antonio G. Ambrosio (Ambrosio) who is the owner
and developer of the Villa San Agustin Subdivision located at Novaliches, Quezon City entered into a Contract to Sell
[1]
a
House and Lot Unit in the said subdivision. The lot subject of the contract was identified as Lot 6, Block 4 with an area of
146 sq. m. and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-18303. The house also subject of the contract was particularly
described therein.

In November 1991, petitioner Edmundo Osea and Ambrosio forged a Deed of Sale whereby the former agreed to buy
through the Unified Lending Program a lot identified as Lot 6, Block 4 of the Villa San Agustin Subdivision, containing 146
sq. m. covered by another title (the lot).

In accordance with the package deal under the above-stated Contract to Sell, Ambrosio contracted his co-
respondent Rodolfo C. Perez (Perez) to construct, as the latter did, petitioners spouses house in accordance with the
Specifications in the Contract to Sell, the Bill of Materials, and Approved Building Plan by the Building Official of Quezon City.

Upon completion of the house or on August 5, 1991, petitioner Ligaya Osea executed a Certificate of Lot and House
Acceptance and she and her co-petitioner spouse occupied it.

A month after occupying the house, its front and back walls cracked. Ambrosio, claiming that the cracks were mere
hairline defects in the palitada, filled them up with cement.

Ligaya just the same lodged a complaint against respondents with the Office of the Building Official of Quezon City
for violation of the National Building Code.

Petitioners subsequently filed on July 16, 1993 a complaint for damages against respondents before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.

Respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint for damages, contending that it is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
[2]




In the meantime, the Office of the Building Official of Quezon City, by Resolution of November 15, 1993,
[3]
found that
the building and occupancy permits were validly issued and that minor and insignificant deviation [sic] pertaining to installed
girt and rafters at the roof framing of subject unit-house would not in any way affect the structural strength of the one-storey
residence in question and substantial compliance with the approved plans and specifications are allowable under the code,
as long as the safety of the occupants are assured. Accordingly, the said office dismissed the complaint of petitioners
lodged with it.
62


On April 8, 1999,
[4]
Branch 79 of the Quezon City RTC promulgated its decision in petitioners complaint for damages,
finding for petitioners and granting their prayer for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorneys fees, it holding that
respondents deviated from the approved plan and committed serious violations of the construction contract as well as the
laws and regulations required by the State.

On respondents appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of September 30, 2003
[5]
which is being challenged in the
present petition for review on certiorari, declared null and void the trial courts Decision of April 8, 1999 for lack of jurisdiction
as it is the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) which has jurisdiction over the complaint.

x x x [A]ppellees action for damages is based on the alleged violation or deviation of appellants
from the approved subdivision plan which, as correctly pointed out by appellants is under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. The case for Damages before the RTC initiated by plaintiffs is
therefore just a necessary offshoot of the alleged violation. x x x The mere fact that plaintiffs have chosen to
institute a separate and independent action for damages rather than simply including it as an ancillary claim
does not divest the HLURB of its jurisdiction and bring it within the province of the regular courts. To do so is
to indirectly permit what could not be done directly. It would likewise encourage splitting a cause of action.

x x x x

Before us is not a simple violation of the Civil Code which would consequently arise to a right to
damages. This is a case which in its disposal necessarily needs a determination of facts, circumstances and
incidental matters which the law has specifically bestowed to the HLURB.
[6]
(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)


Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
[7]
of the Court of Appeals decision having been denied by Resolution
of March 10, 2004,
[8]
the present petition was filed raising the sole issue of jurisdiction.

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that their action for damages is based on the violation
or deviation by respondents from the approved subdivision plan to thus fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
HLURB; the complaint before the trial court clearly alleged a breach of contract in view of respondents failure to comply with
the building plans and technical specifications of the residential dwelling; and the breach involves a violation of the Civil
Code which is within the jurisdiction of regular courts, and not with the HLURB whose jurisdiction covers only cases of
unsound real estate business practice and those that may be included within, or is incidental to, or is a necessary
consequence of its jurisdiction.

Respondents argue, on the other hand, that the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over the present controversy, it
arising from contracts between the subdivision developer and the house and lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the
subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations. They stress that even if the issue of jurisdiction
was not among the issues introduced at the pre-trial, it was later raised in their memorandum and subsequently in their
motion for reconsideration in the trial court, hence, seasonably raised. They thus conclude that since the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the nullification by the Court of Appeals of its decision was in order.

The petition fails.

Generally, the extent to which an administrative agency may exercise its powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the
provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency.
[9]
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1344, EMPOWERING THE
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY TO ISSUE WRIT OF EXECUTION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF ITS DECISION
UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 957, clarifies and spells out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of jurisdiction
to the HLURB
[10]
in the following specific terms:

SEC. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition
to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer
against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
63


C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman. (Emphasis supplied)


The extent to which the HLURB has been vested with quasi-judicial authority must also be determined by referring to
the terms of P.D. No. 957, THE SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM BUYERS' PROTECTIVE DECREE.
[11]
Section 3 of
this statute provides:
x x x National Housing Authority [now HLURB]. - The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree.
(Emphasis and supplement supplied)


The need for the scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged in the HLURB is indicated in the second, third and
fourth preambular paragraphs of P.D. 957 which provide:

WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers,
operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain
properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and other similar
basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent
manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such
as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate
taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers for value;
x x x x
WHEREAS, this state of affairs has rendered it imperative that the real estate subdivision and
condominium businesses be closely supervised and regulated, and that penalties be imposed on
fraudulent practices and manipulations committed in connection therewith. (Emphasis supplied)


The provisions of P.D No. 957 were intended to encompass all questions regarding subdivisions and
condominiums. The intention was aimed at providing for an appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to which all parties
aggrieved in the implementation of provisions and the enforcement of contractual rights with respect to said category of real
estate may take recourse. The business of developing subdivisions and corporations being imbued with public interest and
welfare, any question arising from the exercise of that prerogative should be brought to the HLURB which has the technical
know-how on the matter.
[12]
In the exercise of its powers, the HLURB must commonly interpret and apply contracts and
determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. This ancillary power is no longer a uniquely judicial function,
exercisable only by the regular courts.
[13]


As observed in C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Hibionada:
[14]


The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of the
Civil Code is out of step with the fast-changing times. There are hundreds of administrative bodies now
performing this function by virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial function, as it
is called, is exercised by them as an incident of the principal power entrusted to them of regulating certain
activities falling under their particular expertise.

In the Solid Homes case for example the Court affirmed the competence of the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board to award damages although this is an essentially judicial power exercisable
ordinarily only by the courts of justice. This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental
powers is justified by expediency, or the need of the government to respond swiftly and competently to the
pressing problems of the modern world. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)


64

Furthermore, Executive Order (EO) No. 90 series of 1986, IDENTIFYING THE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
ESSENTIAL FOR THE NATIONAL SHELTER PROGRAM AND DEFINING THEIR MANDATES, CREATING THE HOUSING
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT COORDINATING COUNCIL, RATIONALIZING FUNDING SOURCES AND LENDING
MECHANISMS FOR HOME MORTGAGES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, so named the HLURB to recognize its mandate
and authority over the development of housing in general and low-cost housing in particular. Thus Section 1 (c) of said EO
provides:

Human Settlements Regulatory Commission The Human Settlements Regulatory Commission;
renamed as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, shall be the sole regulatory body
for housing and land development. It is charged with encouraging greater private sector participation in low-
cost housing through liberalization of development standards, simplification of regulations and
decentralization of approvals for permits and licenses. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)


This Court has thus consistently held that complaints for breach of contract or specific performance with damages
filed by a subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
HLURB
[15]


Moreover, under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy
where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
[16]


Under the circumstances attendant to the case, the HLURB has the expertise to determine the basic technical issue
of whether the alleged deviations from the building plans and the technical specifications affect the soundness and structural
strength of the house.

Petitioners position that an action for damages is not incidental to or a necessary consequence of the cases within
the purview of the HLURBs jurisdiction does not lie. Being the sole regulatory body for housing and land development, the
HLURB will be reduced to a functionally sterile entity if, as petitioners contend, it lacks the power to settle disputes concerning
land use and housing development and acquisition, including the imposition of damages if the evidence so warrants.

The appellate court did not thus err when it characterized petitioners complaint for damages as based on the
violation or deviation from the approved subdivision plan. Sale and purchase of subdivision lots under P.D. 957 explicitly
include the sale and purchase of buildings and other improvements thereon which form an integral part of the approved
subdivision plan. Section 2 of said P.D. provides:

b) Sale or sell. "Sale" or "sell" shall include every disposition, or attempt to dispose, for a valuable
consideration, of a subdivision lot, including the building and other improvements thereof, if any, in a
subdivision project or a condominium unit in a condominium project. "Sale" and "sell" shall also include a
contract to sell, a contract of purchase and sale, an exchange, an attempt to sell, an option of sale or
purchase, a solicitation of a sale, or an offer to sell, directly or by an agent, or by a circular, letter,
advertisement or otherwise.
x x x x
c) Buy and purchase. The "buy" and "purchase" shall include any contract to buy, purchase, or
otherwise acquire for a valuable consideration a subdivision lot, including the building and other
improvements, if any, in a subdivision project or a condominium unit in a condominium project.

d) Subdivision project. "Subdivision project" shall mean a tract or a parcel of land registered under
Act No. 496 which is partitioned primarily for residential purposesinto individual lots with or without
improvements thereon, and offered to the public for sale, in cash or in installment terms. It shall include all
residential, commercial, industrial and recreational areas as well as open spaces and other community and
public areas in the project. (Emphasis supplied)


65

The Contract to Sell executed by petitioners and Ambrosio, it must be emphasized, involves the sale and purchase of
a house and lot unit in Villa San Agustin Subdivision, a low-cost housing and lot project. In fact, even after signing the Deed
of Sale on the lot, petitioners stipulated that the house would beconstructed in accordance with, inter alia, the terms of the
Contract to Sell. These documents show a clear intent by the parties to treat the lot and the house as the single object of
their contract.



The Court thus finds lacking in substance petitioners attempt to separate their rights to the lot, which they admit to be
under the jurisdiction of the HLURB,
[17]
and their rights to the house built thereon which they allege to be enforceable only in
the regular courts. To allow this unwarranted posturing would only result in duplicity of suits, splitting of a single cause of
action and possible conflicting findings and conclusions by two tribunals on one and the same claim. These are precisely
what P.D. 1344 and P.D. 957 seek to avoid.

Finally, the Court sustains the appellate courts finding that respondents seasonably raised the issue of want of
jurisdiction in their Memorandum datedJuly 23, 1997 filed before the trial court when no judgment had yet been rendered,
which issue they reiterated in their Motion for Reconsideration dated April 23, 1999.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision of September 30, 2003 and
Resolution dated March 10, 2004 areAFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164715 September 20, 2006
ARNEL C. ALCARAZ, petitioner,
vs.
RAMON C. GONZALEZ, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J .:
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75589, granting the petition
for review of the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice in I.S. No. H-03484 for attempted homicide, as well as the Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
At around 10:05 a.m. of August 11, 2000, 61-year-old Ramon C. Gonzalez was driving his Nissan Cefiro car with plate no.
UPW-298 along the right outermost lane of the South-Luzon Expressway. He was on his way to Makati City and had just
passed the Sucat toll gate.
2

Atty. Arnel C. Alcaraz, a Customs Collector of the Bureau of Customs, Batangas Port, was driving his Nissan Infiniti car with
plate no. CNH-338. He was in the middle lane of the South-Luzon Expressway, between the Sucat and Bicutan Interchange,
on his way to Manila from Batangas City. He was armed with a .38 caliber pistol and had with him Mission Order No. 699-
2000, to expire on August 21, 2000. Since Alcaraz intended to use the Skyway, he signaled, and proceeded to the right-most
lane which was reserved for vehicles taking the Skyway.
Gonzalez, who was on the right-most lane, was forced to swerve his car to the right to avoid colliding with Alcaraz's vehicle
and nearly hit the concrete island. Nonplussed, Gonzalez chased after Alcaraz, opened his windows and shouted at Alcaraz,
demanding to know why the latter suddenly cut into his lane. Alcaraz retorted that he had signaled that he was swerving to
the right. Gonzalez reproved Alcaraz and drove on.
Alcaraz drove his car to Gonzalez's right. Upon nearing an island, Alcaraz raised his pistol towards Gonzalez and fired twice:
the first bullet hit the right front window of the vehicle and exited at the left rear door; the second bullet hit the left rear window
66

of Gonzalez's car.
3
Alcaraz hurriedly drove away from the scene, but was intercepted by the PNCC guards at the Skyway toll
gate. The guards confiscated from Alcaraz the .38 pistol with 7 live bullets and 3 empty shells.
4

Gonzalez reported the matter to the Paraaque City Police Station where he gave a statement to the police investigator, and
filed a criminal complaint for attempted homicide against Alcaraz.
5

The PNP Crime Laboratory examined Gonzalez's car to determine the trajectory of the bullets. Report No. PI-46-2000 was
prepared in connection with the investigation, with the following findings:
Macro-physical examination conducted on the above-stated car "A" revealed the following results:
1. Entrance bullet hole ENT-1 found on the right front door, fired from right front with approximate diameter of 1.25
cms.;
2. Entrance bullet hole ENT-2 found at the rear left door, fired from right front measuring 0.5 cm by 1.0 cm.;
3. Exit bullet hole Ext-1 with an approximate diameter of 1.1 cm, found on the rear left door fired from right front. xxx
CONCLUSION:
The entrance bullet holes and the exit bullet hole were caused by bullets fired from right, front side of the vehicle.
xxx
6

On August 11, 2000, Alfredo Tan Buraga, Officer-in-Charge of the Paraaque Police Station, filed a criminal complaint for
attempted homicide against Alcaraz in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Paraaque City.
7

After the Office of the City Prosecutor conducted an inquest, an Information for attempted homicide against Alcaraz was filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Paraaque City. The inculpatory portion reads:
That on or about the 11th day of August 2000 in the City of Paraaque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court the above-named accused, with intent to kill and without justifiable cause, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot one Ramon Gonzalez, thus commencing the commission
of the crime of Homicide directly by overt acts but nevertheless did not perform all the acts of execution which should
have produced the crime of Homicide by reason of cause or causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that
is due to the timely evasion made by the complainant.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
8

On motion of Alcaraz, the MeTC ordered the City Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation.
9

In his counter-affidavit, Alcaraz admitted having fired his gun towards the car of Gonzalez. However, he alleged that
Gonzalez opened his car window, uttered invectives and waived a dirty finger at him. Gonzalez then proceeded to throw
coins at him, hitting him on the chest, and again uttered invectives. He saw Gonzalez reach for a short firearm and aim it at
him. This prompted him to take his firearm which was on the passenger seat, and fire it downwards twice onto the right
passenger door of Gonzalez's vehicle. Alcaraz claimed that he did not aim his gun at Gonzalez; he had no intention of hitting
Gonzalez, and only wanted to scare him.
10
At the police station, Gonzalez identified himself as the brother of Congressman
Jose Mari Gonzalez.
11

In his reply-affidavit,
12
Gonzalez insisted that Alcaraz attempted to kill him. He denied having thrown coins at Alcaraz and that
he had a gun at the time. Gonzalez pointed out that Alcaraz's allegation that he was defending himself when he fired his gun
was in effect an admission of intent to kill.
The Investigating Prosecutor resolved to maintain his finding of probable cause of attempted homicide against Alcaraz and to
retain the Information. Alcaraz filed a motion for reconsideration, and when it was denied, filed a petition for review with the
City Prosecutor's Office, Department of Justice. He alleged the following:
67

(a) The Honorable Investigating Prosecutor erred in giving serious considerations on complainant's theory on the
trajectory of the bullet, as illustrated in his Reply-Affidavit dated 17 January 2001;
(b) The Honorable Investigating Prosecutor erred in holding that respondent-appellant had the intent to kill the
complainant; and
(c) The Honorable Investigating Prosecutor erred in giving weight and credence on the allegations of complainant
relative to the material points of the incident subject of the preliminary investigation.
13

On November 26, 2001, then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez issued a Resolution
14
granting the petition and ordering
the City Prosecutor to withdraw the Information. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The City Prosecutor of Paraaque City is hereby directed to move
for the withdrawal of the information for attempted homicide filed against respondent and to report to this Office the
action taken within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
SO ORDERED.
According to the Justice Secretary, Gonzalez failed to prove beyond reasonable that Alcaraz had intended to kill him, thus:
Evidence shows that respondent was provoked by complainant's acts of repeatedly hurling, not only invectives like
"putang ina mo" with a dirty finger sign, but also the throwing of coins that hit respondent's face and his lady
passenger. The natural consequence was for respondent to retaliate as what had transpired in the instant case.
There is no dispute that respondent fired his gun. But as to whether or not he had the intention to kill complainant is a
different issue. Respondent's argument that he had no intention of hitting complainant and that his objective was only
to scare him finds merit.
As borne by the records, complainant himself was not hit. The gunfire was rather aimed at the passenger side of his
car. Neither is there an indication that respondent continued firing his gun. These circumstances tend to negate the
presumption that respondent had the intention to kill complainant. It has been held that intent to kill, being an
essential element of the offense of frustrated or attempted homicide, must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence and with the same degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of the crime. The element of
intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable
doubt (Mondragon v. People, 17 SCRA 476). Further, acts susceptible of double interpretation, that is, in favor as
well as against the culprit, and which show an innocent as well as a punishable act, must not and cannot furnish
grounds by themselves for attempted or frustrated crimes (Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1997 ed., p. 103).
Viewed from the foregoing pronouncements, the circumstance of trajectory of the bullet, from whence inference was
made in the assailed resolution, is not well taken.
The element of intent to kill not having been satisfactorily established, and considering that complainant was
unscathed, a finding of probable cause against respondent for attempted homicide is difficult to sustain.
15

Gonzalez filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Undersecretary of Justice denied on January 29, 2003.
Gonzalez then filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the CA, seeking the
reversal of the Justice Secretary's Resolution. He claimed that the Secretary acted beyond his authority in finding no probable
cause to charge Alcaraz with attempted homicide and for ordering the City Prosecutor to withdraw the Information. He
insisted that by invoking self-defense, Alcaraz thereby admitted his intention to kill him (Gonzalez). He claimed that Alcaraz's
claim of self-defense should be ventilated during trial on the merits.
In his comment on the petition, Alcaraz averred that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction over the petition, and that Gonzalez
had no legal standing to file the petition. He insisted that the remedy from an adverse resolution of the Justice Secretary is to
file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, grounded on grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, not one under Rule 43 of said Rule. He averred that the Justice Secretary is not a quasi-
judicial officer under Rule 43 whose resolutions may thus be reviewed by the CA. Alcaraz likewise pointed out that the CA
was without power to substitute its own judgment for that of the Justice Secretary regarding the existence or non-existence of
probable cause to charge him with attempted homicide.
68

On March 22, 2004, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition and reversing the assailed resolutions of the Secretary of
Justice. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolutions promulgated on November 26, 2001 and January 29, 2003 by
the Department of Justice, in I.S. No. H-03484, Criminal Case No. 105593, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
16

The CA ruled that the petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as amended, was meritorious. The appellate
court declared that, based on the evidence on record, there was probable cause to file an Information for attempted homicide
against Alcaraz. However, the CA failed to resolve the issue of whether it had appellate jurisdiction over the petition under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
Alcaraz filed a motion for the reconsideration on the following grounds:
1.1 The petitioner has no legal standing to file the present petition for review.
1.2 The present petition for review filed under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court is an erroneous appeal.
1.3 The Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 77 where the Information for Attempted Homicide against
respondent was filed has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present petition for review.
17

On July 19, 2004, the CA resolved to deny Alcaraz's motion,
18
holding that his grounds and objections had already been
considered and passed upon by it in its decision.
19

Alcaraz, now petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, alleging that
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NO JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE IN AN APPEAL BY WAY OF A PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 43 OF THE
1997 REVISED RULES OF COURT.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF
PROBABLE CAUSE AND/OR TO SUBSTITUTE ITS OWN FINDINGS OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO THAT OF THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE IN AN APPEAL BY WAY OF A PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 43 OF THE
1997 REVISED RULES OF COURT.
III.
THE RESPONDENT HAS NO LEGAL STANDING TO APPEAL BY WAY OF A PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER
RULE 43 OF THE 1997 REVISED RULES OF COURT THE RESOLUTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS.
20

Petitioner avers that respondent, as petitioner in the CA, had no legal standing to appeal the resolutions of the Justice
Secretary by way of a petition for review. Moreover, as the private complainant, private respondent was merely a witness in
the criminal case in the MeTC. It is only the State through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that has legal standing to
appeal or assail the resolutions of the Secretary of Justice.
Petitioner further avers that the Justice Secretary is not a quasi-judicial officer within the context of Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court. He reiterates his claim that the CA has no appellate jurisdiction to review the assailed resolutions of the Secretary of
Justice by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the proper remedy being a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65. Petitioner cites the rulings of this Court in Filadams Pharma, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
21
and Public Utilities
Department of Olongapo City v. Guingona, Jr.
22
to support his contention. He further insists that the determination of probable
69

cause for the filing of an Information in court is not a judicial function, but an executive function; hence, the findings and
resolutions of the Justice Secretary should prevail over the CA ruling.
In its Comment on the petition, the OSG avers that the CA erred in granting the petition of respondent, since the proper
remedy from an adverse resolution issued by the Secretary of Justice is to file a petition for certiorari under Ruler 65 of the
Rules of Court, not a petition under Rule 43.
By way of Comment, respondent maintains that he had the legal standing to file the petition with the CA and that the State is
merely a nominal party. He avers that the Secretary of Justice acted as a quasi-judicial officer when he reviewed the
resolutions of the City Prosecutor; hence, the same may be reviewed by the CA via petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. In any event, respondent asserts, technicalities should be ignored, and the CA should not be faulted for taking
cognizance of and resolving his petition on its merits.
In reply, petitioner avers that conformably with the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the City Prosecutor had filed a
motion to withdraw the information in the MeTC, and the court had granted the motion per its Order dated March 7, 2003. He
points out that respondent had not appealed the said order of the trial court.
23

The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
The threshold issue is whether the petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court was the proper remedy of
respondent.
We agree with petitioner's contention that respondent resorted to an improper remedy when he filed a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, instead of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
It bears stressing that in the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation, the executive branch of
government has full discretionary authority. Thus, the decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against the
private respondent is necessarily dependent on the sound discretion of the Investigating Prosecutor and ultimately, that of the
Secretary of Justice. Courts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch.
24

The resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is subject to appeal to the Justice Secretary who, under the Revised
Administrative Code, exercises the power of control and supervision over said Investigating Prosecutor; and who may affirm,
nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of such prosecutor.
25
Thus, while the CA may review the resolution of the Justice
Secretary, it may do so only in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, solely on the ground that the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
26

It bears stressing that the Resolution of the Justice Secretary affirming, modifying or reversing the resolution of the
Investigating Prosecutor is final. Under the 1993 Revised Rules on Appeals (now the 2000 National Prosecution Service
Rules on Appeals), resolutions in preliminary investigations or reinvestigations from the Justice Secretary's resolution, except
the aggrieved party, has no more remedy of appeal to file a motion for reconsideration of the said resolution of such motion if
it is denied by the said Secretary. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court since there is no more appeal or other remedy available in the ordinary course of law.
27

In the present case, respondent filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, assailing the resolutions of the
Justice Secretary. Instead of dismissing the petition, however, the CA gave due course to it and thereafter granted the
petition, on its finding that the Justice Secretary erred in reversing the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor which found
probable cause against petitioner for attempted homicide. Patently, the ruling of the CA is incorrect.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75589 are NULLIFIED.
SO ORDERED.
IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDO SANTE, G.R. No. 173915

70

Petitioners,


- versus -


HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of Branch 60, Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City, and VITA N. KALASHIAN,
Respondents.
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

February 22, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J .:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari
[1]
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, filed by
petitioners Irene and Reynaldo Sante assailing the Decision
[2]
dated January 31, 2006 and the Resolution
[3]
dated June 23,
2006 of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87563. The assailed decision affirmed the orders of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 60, denying their motion to dismiss the complaint for damages filed by
respondent Vita Kalashian against them.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
On April 5, 2004, respondent filed before the RTC of Baguio City a complaint for damages
[4]
against petitioners. In her
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5794-R, respondent alleged that while she was inside the Police Station of Natividad,
Pangasinan, and in the presence of other persons and police officers, petitioner Irene Sante uttered words, which when
translated in English are as follows, How many rounds of sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert? You fuckin bitch!
Bert refers to Albert Gacusan, respondents friend and one (1) of her hired personal security guards detained at the said
station and who is a suspect in the killing of petitioners close relative. Petitioners also allegedly went around Natividad,
Pangasinan telling people that she is protecting and cuddling the suspects in the aforesaid killing. Thus, respondent prayed
that petitioners be held liable to pay moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00;P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages; P50,000.00 attorneys fees; P20,000.00 litigation expenses; and costs of suit.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss
[5]
on the ground that it was the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and not the
RTC of Baguio, that had jurisdiction over the case. They argued that the amount of the claim for moral damages was not
more than the jurisdictional amount of P300,000.00, because the claim for exemplary damages should be excluded in
computing the total claim.
On June 24, 2004,
[6]
the trial court denied the motion to dismiss citing our ruling in Movers-Baseco Integrated Port
Services, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing Corporation.
[7]
The trial court held that the total claim of respondent amounted
to P420,000.00 which was above the jurisdictional amount for MTCCs outside Metro Manila. The trial court also later issued
Orders on July 7, 2004
[8]
and July 19, 2004,
[9]
respectively reiterating its denial of the motion to dismiss and denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed on August 2, 2004, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
[10]
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
85465, before the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, on July 14, 2004, respondent and her husband filed an Amended
Complaint
[11]
increasing the claim for moral damages fromP300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00. Petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss with Answer Ad Cautelam and Counterclaim, but the trial court denied their motion in an Order
[12]
dated September
17, 2004.
71

Hence, petitioners again filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
[13]
before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 87563, claiming that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment of the
complaint to increase the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00. The case was raffled to the
Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals.
On January 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division, promulgated a decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 85465, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of [the] Regional Trial Court of Baguio,
Branch 60, in rendering the assailed Orders dated June 24, 2004 and July [19], 2004 in Civil Case No. 5794-
R the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Orders are hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 5794-R for damages is ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.
[14]

The Court of Appeals held that the case clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the MTCC as the allegations show that plaintiff
was seeking to recover moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00, which amount was well within the jurisdictional amount of
the MTCC. The Court of Appeals added that the totality of claim rule used for determining which court had jurisdiction could not be
applied to the instant case because plaintiffs claim for exemplary damages was not a separate and distinct cause of action from
her claim of moral damages, but merely incidental to it. Thus, the prayer for exemplary damages should be excluded in computing
the total amount of the claim.
On January 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals, this time in CA-G.R. SP No. 87563, rendered a decision affirming the
September 17, 2004 Order of the RTC denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss Ad Cautelam. In the said decision, the
appellate court held that the total or aggregate amount demanded in the complaint constitutes the basis of jurisdiction. The
Court of Appeals did not find merit in petitioners posture that the claims for exemplary damages and attorneys fees are
merely incidental to the main cause and should not be included in the computation of the total claim.
The Court of Appeals additionally ruled that respondent can amend her complaint by increasing the amount of moral
damages from P300,000.00 toP1,000,000.00, on the ground that the trial court has jurisdiction over the original complaint and
respondent is entitled to amend her complaint as a matter of right under the Rules.
Unable to accept the decision, petitioners are now before us raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF THE (FORMER) SEVENTEENTH DIVISION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WHEN IT RESOLVED THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
BAGUIO CITY BRANCH 60 HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE FOR
DAMAGES AMOUNTING TO P300,000.00;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE
HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BAGUIO BRANCH 60 FOR
ALLOWING THE COMPLAINANT TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT (INCREASING THE AMOUNT OF
DAMAGES TO 1,000,000.00 TO CONFER JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED AT THE COURT OF APPEALS,
SEVENTH DIVISION, DOCKETED AS CA G.R. NO. 85465.
[15]

In essence, the basic issues for our resolution are:
1) Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the case? and
2) Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment of the complaint?
72

Petitioners insist that the complaint falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTCC. They maintain that the claim for
moral damages, in the amount ofP300,000.00 in the original complaint, is the main action. The exemplary damages being
discretionary should not be included in the computation of the jurisdictional amount. And having no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case, the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it allowed the amendment of the complaint to
increase the claim for moral damages in order to confer jurisdiction.
In her Comment,
[16]
respondent averred that the nature of her complaint is for recovery of damages. As such, the
totality of the claim for damages, including the exemplary damages as well as the other damages alleged and prayed in the
complaint, such as attorneys fees and litigation expenses, should be included in determining jurisdiction. The total claim
being P420,000.00, the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint.
We deny the petition, which although denominated as a petition for certiorari, we treat as a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 in view of the issues raised.
Section 19(8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
[17]
as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,
[18]
states:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
x x x x
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys
fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the
abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7691 further provides:
SEC. 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts mentioned in
Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be
adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such
jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided,
however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be
adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).
Relatedly, Supreme Court Circular No. 21-99 was issued declaring that the first adjustment in jurisdictional amount of
first level courts outside of Metro Manila from P100,000.00 to P200,000.00 took effect on March 20, 1999. Meanwhile, the
second adjustment from P200,000.00 to P300,000.00 became effective on February 22, 2004 in accordance with OCA
Circular No. 65-2004 issued by the Office of the Court Administrator on May 13, 2004.
Based on the foregoing, there is no question that at the time of the filing of the complaint on April 5, 2004, the MTCCs
jurisdictional amount has been adjusted to P300,000.00.
But where damages is the main cause of action, should the amount of moral damages prayed for in the complaint be
the sole basis for determining which court has jurisdiction or should the total amount of all the damages claimed regardless of
kind and nature, such as exemplary damages, nominal damages, and attorneys fees, etc., be used?
In this regard, Administrative Circular No. 09-94
[19]
is instructive:
x x x x
2. The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount
under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases
where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in
cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the
amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. (Emphasis
ours.)
73

In the instant case, the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 5794-R is for the recovery of damages for the alleged malicious acts
of petitioners. The complaint principally sought an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees and litigation
expenses, for the alleged shame and injury suffered by respondent by reason of petitioners utterance while they were at a police
station in Pangasinan. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint

since the latter
comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs causes of action.
[20]
It is clear, based on the
allegations of the complaint, that respondents main action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of damages being claimed by
respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the
main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint.
In Mendoza v. Soriano,
[21]
it was held that in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of
the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. In the said
case, the respondents claim of P929,000.06 in damages and P25,000 attorneys fees plus P500 per court appearance was
held to represent the monetary equivalent for compensation of the alleged injury. The Court therein held that the total
amount of monetary claims including the claims for damages was the basis to determine the jurisdictional amount.
Also, in Iniego v. Purganan,
[22]
the Court has held:
The amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for all
kinds of damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for damages
arise from the same or from different causes of action.
x x x x
Considering that the total amount of damages claimed was P420,000.00, the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling
that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.
Lastly, we find no error, much less grave abuse of discretion, on the part of the Court of Appeals in affirming the RTCs
order allowing the amendment of the original complaint from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 despite the pendency of a
petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals. While it is a basic jurisprudential principle that an amendment cannot
be allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer
jurisdiction on the court,
[23]
here, the RTC clearly had jurisdiction over the original complaint and amendment of the complaint
was then still a matter of right.
[24]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, for lack of merit. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated January 31, 2006 and June 23, 2006, respectively, are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch
60 is DIRECTED to continue with the trial proceedings in Civil Case No. 5794-R with deliberate dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
VICTORINO QUINAGORAN, G.R. NO. 155179
Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, J J .


COURT OF APPEALS and
THE HEIRS OF JUAN DE LA
CRUZ, Promulgated:
Respondents. August 24, 2007
74

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x


D E C I S I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision
[1]
of
the Court Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 60443 dated May 27, 2002 and its Resolution
[2]
dated August 28, 2002, which
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.


The factual antecedents.

The heirs of Juan dela Cruz, represented by Senen dela Cruz (respondents), filed on October 27, 1994 a Complaint for
Recovery of Portion of Registered Land with Compensation and Damages against Victorino Quinagoran (petitioner) before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch XI of Tuao,Cagayan, docketed as Civil Case No. 240-T.
[3]
They alleged that they are
the co-owners of a a parcel of land containing 13,100 sq m located at Centro, Piat,Cagayan, which they inherited from the
late Juan dela Cruz;
[4]
that in the mid-70s, petitioner started occupying a house on the north-west portion of the property,
covering 400 sq m, by tolerance of respondents; that in 1993, they asked petitioner to remove the house as they planned to
construct a commercial building on the property; that petitioner refused, claiming ownership over the lot; and that they
suffered damages for their failure to use the same.
[5]
Respondents prayed for the reconveyance and surrender of the
disputed 400 sq m, more or less, and to be paid the amount of P5,000.00 monthly until the property is vacated, attorney's
fees in the amount of P20,000.00, costs of suit and other reliefs and remedies just and equitable.
[6]


Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7691, which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) to include all civil
actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein which does not exceed P20,000.00.

He
argued that since the 346 sq m lot which he owns adjacent to the contested property has an assessed value of P1,730.00,
the assessed value of the lot under controversy would not be more than the said amount.
[7]


The RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss in an Order dated November 11, 1999, thus:

The Court finds the said motion to be without merit. The present action on the basis of the
allegation of the complaint partakes of the nature of action publicciana (sic) and jurisdiction over said action lies
with the Regional Trial Court, regardless of the value of the property. This is so because in paragraph 8 of the
complaint, it is alleged that the plaintiff demanded from the defendant the removal of the house occupied by the
defendant and the possession of which is Only due to Tolerance (sic) of herein plaintiffs.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the motion to dismiss is hereby denied.
[8]


Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was also denied by the RTC.
[9]


Petitioner then went to the CA on a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking the annulment of the Orders of the
RTC.
[10]


On May 27, 2002, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision dismissing petitioner's action and affirming in toto the
RTC.
[11]
Pertinent portions of said Decision, read:

At the onset, we find that the complaint filed by the Heirs of Juan dela Cruz, represented by Senen dela Cruz
adequately set forth the jurisdictional requirements for a case to be cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court. The Complaint is captioned recovery of portion of registered land and it contains the following
allegations:


7. That since plaintiffs and defendant were neighbors, the latter being the admitted
owner of the adjoining lot, the former's occupancy of said house by defendant was only due to
the tolerance of herein plaintiffs;

75

8. That plaintiffs, in the latter period of 1993, then demanded the removal of the
subject house for the purpose of constructing a commercial building and which herein defendant
refused and in fact now claims ownership of the portion in which said house stands;

9. That repeated demands relative to the removal of the subject house were hence
made but which landed on deaf ears;

10. That a survey of the property as owned by herein plaintiffs clearly establishes that
the subject house is occupying Four Hundred (400) square meters thereof at the north-west
portion thereof, as per the approved survey plan in the records of the Bureau of Lands.

x x x x

It is settled that when the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started,
the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reinvindicatoria in the proper regional trial
court. In the latter instances, jurisdiction pertains to the Regional Trial Court.

As another legal recourse from a simple ejectment case governed by the Revised Rules of
Summary Procedure, an accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession when
dispossession has lasted more than one year or when dispossession was effected by means other than
those mentioned in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Where there is no allegation that there was denial of
possession through any of the methods stated in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, or where there is
no lease contract between the parties, the proper remedy is the plenary action of recovery of
possession. Necessarily, the action falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Thus, we find that
the private respondents [heirs of dela Cruz] availed of the proper remedy when they filed the action before
the court a quo.

Undoubtedly, the respondent court therefore did not act with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to or in excess of jurisdiction in denying Quinagoran's Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for
Reconsideration, thereof, because it has jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant case.

x x x x

It would not be amiss to point out that the nature of the action and jurisdiction of courts are
determined by the allegations in the complaint. As correctly held by the Regional Trial Court, the present
action on the basis of the allegation of the complaint partakes of the nature of action publiciana and
jurisdiction over said action lies with the Regional Trial Court regardless of the value of the
property. Therefore, we completely agree with the court a quo's conclusion that the complaint filed by the
Heirs of Juan dela Cruz, represented by Senen dela Cruz, is in the nature of an accion publiciana and hence
it is the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the action, regardless of the assessed value of the
property subject of present controversy.
[12]


Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on August 28, 2002 for lack of merit.
[13]


Petitioner now comes before this Court on a petition for review claiming that under R.A. No. 7691 the jurisdiction of the
MTC, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), and Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) was expanded to include exclusive original
jurisdiction over civil actions when the assessed value of the property does not exceed P20,000.00 outside Metro Manila
and P50,000.00 within Metro Manila.
[14]
He likewise avers that it is an indispensable requirement that the complaint should
allege the assessed value of the property involved.
[15]
In this case, the complaint does not allege that the assessed value of
the land in question is more than P20,000.00. There was also no tax declaration attached to the complaint to show the
assessed value of the property. Respondents therefore failed to allege that the RTC has jurisdiction over the instant
case.
[16]
The tax declaration covering Lot No. 1807 owned by respondents and where the herein disputed property is
purportedly part -- a copy of which petitioner submitted to the CA -- also shows that the value of the property is
only P551.00.
[17]
Petitioner then prays that the CA Decision and Resolution be annulled and set aside and that the complaint
of herein respondents before the trial court be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
[18]


Respondents contend that: the petition is without factual and legal bases, and the contested decision of the CA is
entirely in accordance with law;
[19]
nowhere in the body of their complaint before the RTC does it state that the assessed
value of the property is below P20,000.00;
[20]
the contention of petitioner in his Motion to Dismiss before the RTC that the
76

assessed value of the disputed lot is below P20,000.00 is based on the assessed value of an adjacent property and no
documentary proof was shown to support the said allegation;
[21]
the tax declaration which petitioner presented, together with
his Supplemental Reply before the CA, and on the basis of which he claims that the disputed property's assessed value is
only P551.00, should also not be given credence as the said tax declaration reflects the amount of P56,100.00 for the entire
property.
[22]




The question posed in the present petition is not complicated, i.e., does the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of
recovery of possession regardless of the value of the property involved?

The answer is no. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as affirmed
by the CA -- that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the regional trial courts regardless of the
value of the property -- no longer holds true. As things now stand, a distinction must be made between those properties the
assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.

Republic Act No. 7691
[23]
which amended Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
[24]
and which was already in effect
[25]
when
respondents filed their complaint with the RTC on October 27, 1994,
[26]
expressly provides:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:

x x x x

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) except for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over
which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts.

x x x x

SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Civil Cases. --- Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:

x x x x

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of ,
real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein
does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages or
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided That in cases of land not declared for
taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent
lots.(Emphasis supplied)

The Court has also declared that all cases involving title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less
than P20,000.00 if outside Metro Manila, falls under the original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court.
[27]


In Atuel v. Valdez
[28]
the Court likewise expressly stated that:

Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general jurisdiction. Specifically, the
regional trial court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve x x x possession of
real property. However, if the assessed value of the real property involved does not
exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, andP20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila, the municipal trial court
exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real property.
[29]


That settled, the next point of contention is whether the complaint must allege the assessed value of the property
involved. Petitioner maintains that there should be such an allegation, while respondents claim the opposite.

77

In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property
subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action.
[30]
This is because
the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material
allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed,
irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.
[31]


In this case, the complaint denominated as Recovery of Portion of Registered Land with Compensation and
Damages, reads:

1. That plaintiffs are the only direct and legitimate heirs of the late Juan dela Cruz, who died
intestate on February 3, 1977, and are all residents of Centro, Piat, Cagayan;

x x x x

4. That plaintiffs inherited from x x x Juan dela Cruz x x x a certain parcel of land x x x containing
an area of 13,111 square meters.

5. That sometime in the mid-1960's, a house was erected on the north-west portion of
the aforedescribed lot x x x.

x x x x

7. That since plaintiffs and defendant were neighbors, the latter being the admitted owner of the
adjoining lot, the former's occupancy of said house by defendant was only due to the tolerance of herein
plaintiffs;

8. That plaintiffs, in the latter period of 1993, then demanded the removal of the subject house for
the purpose of constructing a commercial building and which herein defendant refused and in fact now claims
ownership of the portion in which said house stands;

9. That repeated demands relative to the removal of the subject house were hence made but which
landed on deaf ears;

10. That a survey of the property as owned by herein plaintiffs clearly establishes that the subject
house is occupying Four Hundred (400) square meters thereof at the north-west portion thereof, as per the
approved survey plan in the records of the Bureau of Lands.
[32]



Nowhere in said complaint was the assessed value of the subject property ever mentioned. There is therefore no
showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondents.
[33]
Indeed,
absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the
MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's action.
[34]
The courts cannot take judicial notice of the
assessed or market value of the land.
[35]


Jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the answer of the defendant or even upon agreement, waiver or
acquiescence of the parties.
[36]
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action and the subject matter
thereof cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss for, otherwise, the
question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant.
[37]


Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their complaint the assessed value of the subject property, the
RTC seriously erred in denying the motion to dismiss. Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void,
[38]
and the
CA erred in affirming the RTC.
[39]


WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals's Decision in CA-GR SP No. 60443 dated May 27,
2002 and its Resolution dated August 28, 2002, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Courts Orders
dated November 11, 1999 and May 11, 2000, and all proceedings therein are declared NULL and VOID. The complaint in
Civil Case No. 240-T is dismissed without prejudice.

No costs.

78

SO ORDERED.
RIDGEWOOD ESTATE, INC. G.R. No. 166751
(Erroneously sued as Camella
Homes), Present:
Petitioner,
PUNO, J., Chairman,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
- versus - AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:
EXPEDITO BELAOS,
Respondent. June 8, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x


D E C I S I O N

PUNO, J .:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 28, 2004 and its resolution dated January
19, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 77836. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil
Case No. 02-103764 denying the motion to dismiss filed by herein petitioner Ridgewood Estate, Inc.

Petitioner is a subdivision developer that sells properties under the trade name
Camella Homes. Respondent Expedito Belaos entered into a contract to sell with petitioner for the purchase of a house and
lot at Tierra Nevada, Gen. Trias, Cavite. Pursuant thereto, respondent issued several postdated checks in favor of petitioner
as amortization for the property. Petitioner, however, failed to construct the house. Thus, respondent, in a letter dated April
16, 2000, rescinded the contract to sell and demanded the return of the amounts he had paid to petitioner, as well as the
postdated checks. Petitioner remitted to respondent the sum of P299,908.00, equivalent to the down payment and six
monthly amortizations previously paid by respondent, but it nonetheless continued to encash the other postdated checks, to
the prejudice of respondent.

Respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for damages against Camella Homes
for encashing the postdated checks despite repeated demands to return them and refrain from encashing them in view of
the recission of the contract to sell.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. It argued that Camella Homes is not a real party-in-interest and the complaint
states no cause of action as the contract to sell was entered into by and between Expedito L. Belaos and Ridgewood Estate,
Inc. It further argued that the complaint was defective sinceCamella Homes is not a natural or juridical person, hence, it is not
an entity authorized by law to be a party to a civil suit.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. It applied the doctrine on corporation by estoppel under Section 21 of the
Corporation Code which states:
Section 21. Corporation by estoppel.All persons who assume to act as a corporation knowing it to
be without authority to do so shall be liable as general partners for all debts, liabilities and damages incurred
or arising as a result thereof: Provided, however, That when any such ostensible corporation is sued on any
transaction entered by it as a corporation or on any tort committed by it as such, it shall not be allowed to use
as a defense its lack of corporate personality.

One who assumes an obligation to an ostensible corporation as such, cannot resist performance
thereof on the ground that there was in fact no corporation.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. In addition to its contention that Camella Homes
was not a real party-in-interest, petitioner also raised the argument that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the suit,
as the subject matter of the complaint was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB).
79


In its decision dated July 28, 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It held:
Private respondents complaint contains allegations that Ridgewood Estates (sic) deliberately and
intentionally encashed the postdated checks despite knowledge of the contracts recission. Respondent
prayed for the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages due to his humiliation and loss of credibility
with the banking community and among his colleagues caused by petitioners alleged malicious acts.

Respondent Belaos is not claiming refund or any other claim from a subdivision developer. He does
not demand for specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations of delivering the property to
him. In the cases that reached the Supreme Court, the ruling has consistently been that the NHA or the
HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot
buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory
obligations to make the subdivision a better place to live in. It has already been admitted by both parties that
the contract has already been rescinded and that Ridgewoodreturned the downpayment [sic] and some of
the postdated checks. Hence, the Court a quo has jurisdiction over the action for damages.
[1]


Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated January
19, 2005.

Petitioner raises the following arguments in the case at bar:
1. That the honorable court failed to consider that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion when
the latter assumed jurisdiction over a matter which the law already vests with the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board.

2. That a perusal of the order of the lower court reveals that it committed grave abuse of discretion when it
anchored itself on an erroneous finding that Camella Homes allegedly is a corporation by estoppel.

3. That the Honorable Court of Appeals failed to consider that the lower court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it failed to consider that the complaint filed by private respondent has no cause of action
for failure to implead the real party in interest.

4. That the Honorable Court of Appeals failed to consider that the lower court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it ordered Camella Homes, which has no legal capacity to be sued[,] to submit an
answer.
[2]


We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

First, the trial court correctly assumed jurisdiction over the complaint filed by respondent against petitioner.

Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1344 provides for the jurisdiction of HLURB (then National Housing Authority),
thus:
Sec. 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to
its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases of the following nature:

a. Unsound real estate business practices;

b. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer
against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

c. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

The Court held in Roxas v. Court of Appeals
[3]
that the mere relationship between the parties, i.e., that of being
subdivision owner/developer and subdivision lot buyer, does not automatically vest jurisdiction in the HLURB. For an action
to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB, the decisive element is the nature of the action as enumerated in Section
80

1 of P.D. No. 1344. The HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply
with its contractual and statutory obligations.

The complaint filed by respondent against petitioner was one for damages. It prayed for the payment of moral, actual
and exemplary damages by reason of petitioners malicious encashment of the checks even after the rescission of the
contract to sell between them. Respondent claimed that because of petitioners malicious and fraudulent acts, he suffered
humiliation and embarrassment in several banks, causing him to lose his credibility and good standing among his
colleagues.
[4]
Such action falls within the jurisdiction of regular courts, not the HLURB.

Second, we observe that respondents complaint was actually directed against herein petitioner, Ridgewood Estate,
Inc., although it named CamellaHomes as respondent therein. The complaint itself referred to Ridgewood Estate, Inc. as the
authorized representative of Camella Homes. Petitioner cannot use the lack of juridical personality by Camella Homes as
reason to evade its liability, if any, to petitioner. Petitioner admittedly uses the name CamellaHomes as its business
name. Hence, to the buyers, Camella Homes and Ridgewood Estate, Inc. are one and the same. A reading of the complaint
would show that respondent was essentially suing petitioner, it being the seller of the house and lot he intended to
purchase. We agree with the Court of Appeals ruling that the remedy in this case is not the dismissal of the case but
the joinder of the proper party.
[5]
The appellate court correctly explained:
Dismissal of the complaint is not the remedy since the Court a quo properly acquired jurisdiction
[over] the action for damages. In its pleadings before the trial court, defendant Camella Homes alleges that it
is not a juridical entity, not the real party in interest and pointed to Ridgewood Estates [sic], Inc. as the party
liable to Belaos. In its petition before [u]s, Ridgewood Estates [sic], Inc. erroneously sued
as Camella Homes presented itself as one of the developers of Camella Homes, specifically that of Tierra
Nevada Subdivision of which respondent Belaos is a buyer, then it claims to be the real party in interest in
the controversy by admitting it entered into a Contract to Sell with Belaos, [then] tries to
exculpate Camella Homes by alleging that the latter is not a juridical entity and alleges that it is the HLURB
which has jurisdiction over the controversy.

The Regional Trial Court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss
and ordering defendant Camella Homes to file an answer. Assumingarguendo that petitioner Ridgewood is a
separate entity from Camella Homes, defendant Camella Homes may implead the former. Private
respondent Belaos may file a motion to amend his complaint so as to implead the real party in
interest. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative
at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. (Sec. 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure)
[6]


We, therefore, find that the trial court did not err in denying petitioners motion to dismiss.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.