Kantian Constructive, Reflective Equilibrium and Reciprocity

The purpose of this paper is two-fold: firstly I will seek to rehabilitate Kantian
constructivism as a meta-ethic and reflective equilibrium as a methodological tool; and will
then consider the global justice debate in light of a renewed emphasis on both the rationalist
and intuitionist aspects of this approach. Centrally, I will argue that Singers claims in Ethics
and Intuitions, that evidence from cognitive neuroscience and evolutionary psychology
indicts the intuitionist approaches to ethics, are not borne out in light of further evidence; it is
a purely rationalist approach which is undermined by our emerging understanding of moral
decision-making.
After briefly laying out Singers argument, I will proceed to discuss evidence on
patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC patients) and psychopaths
in order to offer a tentative portrait of moral decision-making devoid of our prepotent
intuitions. I will argue that to adhere to rules or conventions, irrespective of the harm caused,
can be seen to be paradigmatic of the moral decision-making of impaired persons. I will also
suggest that if the rationalist manipulates their moral rules to cover intuitions which we do
not wish to give up, then they may be engaging in post hoc justification. The Argumentation
Theory of Mercier and Sperber will be discussed here to suggest the possibility that this
manipulation may represent the adaptive function for which controlled cognition evolved;
intuitions may come first in moral decision-making, with controlled cognition being
marshalled to provide justification. The final piece of evidence that will be offered against the
rationalist approach is the dual-process theory of Greene. This theory posits that controlled
cognition and prepotent intuitions fulfil a complimentary and competitive role in moral
decision-making. I will suggest that the burden of proof is on the rationalist to show that
controlled cognition does fulfil the function that they believe it does; in the absence of such
proof, we find that Kantian constructivism is vindicated as it treats both prepotent intuitions
and controlled cognition as sources of moral data in the process of reflective equilibrium. I
will conclude the meta-ethical and methodological half of this paper by arguing that the our
lack of understanding of the precise processes of moral decision-making and cognition should
provide us with a further reason for accepting Kantian constructivism and the fact of
reasonable pluralism; the findings of the cognitive sciences suggest to us a further source of
disagreement between reasonable persons.
The second half of this paper will focus on the issue of global justice by bringing to
bear the above considerations. I will argue that the principles selected behind the veil of
ignorance, those derived through controlled cognition, should be checked against our
prepotent intuitions, or considered judgements, in a process of reflective equilibrium; both
sources of data are equally valuable. I will suggest a principle of reciprocity, an aspect of
common morality which we find permeating a diverse array of subjects and issues, as a
considered judgement against which to test principles selected behind either a domestic or
global veil. I will argue that the principles offered by domestic justice as fairness, global
justice as fairness, and Reciprocity-Based Internationalism (RBI), all fail to achieve
equilibrium with a principle of reciprocity.

Singer Ethics and Intuitions
Singer argues that Rawls fusing of intuitionism to an ethical methodology, the
attempt to achieve reflective equilibrium between our considered moral judgements and the
theories we construct, in which the theories or judgements are modified until equilibrium is
reached, is dubious.
1
He claims that,

1
Peter Singer, Ethics and Intuitions, Journal of Ethics 9 (2005), pp. 331-352 (pp. 344-345).
In the case of a normative theory of ethics, Rawls assumes, the raw data is our prior
moral judgments. We try to match them with a plausible theory, but if we cannot, we
reject some of the judgments, and modify the theory so that it matches others.
Eventually the plausibility of the theory and of the surviving judgments reach an
equilibrium, and we then have the best possible theory. On this view the acceptability
of a moral theory is not determined by the internal coherence and plausibility of the
theory itself, but, to a significant extent, by its agreement with those of our prior
moral judgments that we are unwilling to revise or abandon.
2

Singer criticises Rawls methodology for treating our moral intuitions as an
appropriate source of data, rejecting the search for a justice-guiding moral truth, and instead
utilising concepts and ideas that we already have, thereby resulting in cultural relativism
rather than the universalism which ethics usually seeks.
3
He states that, A normative ethical
theory, however, is not trying to explain our common moral intuitions. It might reject all of
them, and still be superior to other normative theories that better matched our moral
judgments.
4

The concern for Singer is that attempting to achieve equilibrium with the existing
judgements that we are unwilling to revise treats these intuitions as action-guiding, when in
fact the evidence from the cognitive sciences shows that prepotent emotional intuitions are an
evolutionary adaptation and therefore an inappropriate source of data, at least on Singers
analysis. He concludes, that reflective equilibrium no longer appeals as a way of testing a
moral theory, [and] so Kantian constructivism ceases to be an attractive metaethic.
5
Rawls
methodology is, too respectful of our intuitions.
6
He believes that we are left with a choice

2
Singer, Ethics and Intuitions, pp. 344-345.
3
Singer, Ethics and Intuitions, p. 346.
4
Singer, Ethics and Intuitions, p. 345.
5
Singer, Ethics and Intuitions, p. 349.
6
Singer, Ethics and Intuitions, p. 349.
between scepticism and attempting, the ambitious task of separating those moral judgments
that we owe to our evolutionary and cultural history, from those that have a rational basis.
7

Whilst this argument appears to offer a decisive critique of Rawls methodology, and
has important implications for the rationalist and intuitionist approaches to ethics,
8
I believe
that it can be shown that much of its force derives from the view that rationality and cognitive
reasoning are either free from the evolutionary taint or are a more reliable guide to ethical
constructivism. Singer seems to treat the first option as likely refutable, since he
acknowledges that, In the light of the best scientific understanding of ethics...We can take
the view that our moral intuitions and judgments are and always will be emotionally based
intuitive responses, and reason can do no more than build the best possible case for a decision
already made on nonrational grounds.
9
The purpose of the next section will be to show that
Singers other suggestion, that we instil faith in controlled-cognition as the sole guide to
moral decision-making, may also be misguided.

VMPC Patients and Psychopathy

In 1848 Phineas P. Gage suffered an accident in which a tamping iron was hurled
through his face, skull and brain. Gage survived the incident and seemingly recovered well,
suffering no impairment of speech, movement or intelligence; he was able to learn new things
and his memory was unaffected. Nonetheless, his personality had undergone a significant
change; he no longer respected social conventions, used profanities excessively and failed to
honour his commitments. After his death, his physician hypothesised that perhaps there are

7
Singer, Ethics and Intuitions, p. 351.
8

9
Singer, Ethics and Intuitions, p. 351.
structures in the brain which constitute rational decision-making for personally and socially
suitable behaviour.
10

Damasio et al have since reconstructed Gages brain in order to show that the likely
damage was, in the left hemisphere, to the anterior half of the orbital frontal cortex, the polar
and anterior mesial frontal cortices, and the anterior-most sector of the anterior cingulate
gyrus. In the right hemisphere the lesion affected the anterior and mesial orbital region, the
mesial and polar frontal cortices, and the anterior segment of the anterior cingulate gyrus.
They claim that Gage matches the neuroanatomical pattern that they have identified in other
patients with frontal damage. Their capacity to make rational decisions in personal and social
situations is impaired, as is their ability to process emotions. They do retain, however, the
capacity for logical problem-solving, abstract thought, and memory and other calculative
tasks. They go on to suggest, the hypothesis that emotion and its underlying neural
machinery participate in decision-making within the social domain and has raised the
possibility that the participation depends on the ventromedial frontal region, which is
connected to the, subcortical nuclei that control basic biological regulation, emotional
processing and social cognition and behaviour.
11
In contrast, the dorsolateral region is
involved in the cognition of extrapersonal space, objects, language and arithmetic. These
processes remain unaffected in frontal-damage patients.
12

Koenigs et al. have also examined whether emotional processes are necessary for
normal moral judgements. They have tested VMPC patients, as in Damasio et als study,
who exhibit decreased emotional responsivity, reduced social emotions, and who are more
prone to anger and frustration. These patients retain their capacity for general intelligence and
logical reasoning, and are aware of the appropriate social norms. They hypothesised that if

10
Hanna Damasio, Thomas Grabowski, Randall Frank, Albert M. Galaburda, and Antonio R. Damasio, The
Return of Phineas Gage: Clues About the Brain from the Skull of a Famous Patient, Science 264 (1994), pp.
1102-1105 (p. 1102).
11
Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaburda, and Damasio, The Return of Phineas Gage, p. 1104.
12
Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaburda, and Damasio, The Return of Phineas Gage, pp. 1104-1105.
the VMPC plays an integral role in moral judgements, those with damage to this area should
exhibit an abnormally high rate of utilitarian judgements in personal moral scenarios, i.e.
Thompsons large man dilemma,
13
but if the emotions do not play a causal role in
judgement generation, and are instead a product of judgements, then the VMPC patients
should respond normally.
14
Importantly, they found that,
In the absence of an emotional reaction to harm of others in personal moral dilemmas,
VMPC patients may rely on explicit norms endorsing the maximisation of aggregate
welfare and prohibiting the harming of others. This strategy would lead VMPC
patients to a normal pattern of judgements on low conflict personal dilemmas but an
abnormal pattern of judgements on high-conflict personal dilemmas, precisely as was
observed...VMPC seems to be critical only for moral dilemmas in which social
emotions play a pivotal role in resolving moral conflict.
15

Finally, Blair has explored the functional contributions of the amygdala and VMPC to
care-based morality and posits that dysfunctions in these areas are co-existent with
psychopathy.
16
He argues that psycopathy is a developmental disorder which is characterised
by reduced guilt, empathy, and attachment to others, anti-social behaviour and poor
behavioural control, and states that psychopaths exhibit less of a convention-moral
distinction; moral rules are seen as akin to conventional rules. It is posited that in normal
persons, moral rules and conventions are distinguished between by the distress caused to
others; moral rules against transgressions which cause distress to others retain their force
whether or not there is a rule against them. In psychopaths this distinction is not maintained

13
Judith Jarvis Thompson, The Trolley Problem, Yale Law Journal 94 (1985), pp. 1395-1415 (pp. 1409-1410).
14
Michael Koenigs, Liane Young, Ralph Adolphs, Daniel Tranel, Fiery Cushman, Marc
Hauser, and Antonio Damasio, Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex Increases Utilitarian Moral
Judgements, Nature 446 (2007), pp. 908-911 (p. 908-910).
15
Koenigs, Young, Adolphs, Tranel, Cushman, Marc, and Damasio, Damage to the
Prefrontal Cortex Increases Utilitarian Moral Judgements, p. 910.
16
R. J. R. Blair, The Amygdala and Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex in Morality and Psychopathy, Trends in
Cognitive Sciences 11 (2007), pp. 387-392 (p. 391).
and it is argued that VMPC and amygdala impairments are responsible for this.
17
It is claimed
that the amygdala is responsible for an individual learning the goodness and badness of
actions and objects, and that, the amygdala provides reinforcement expectancy information
to the OFC and vmPFC; the latter then represents this information.
18
He concludes that the
amygdala enables a social, care-based morality, which is then utilised by the VMPC to
inform moral decision-making.
19

Importantly, Blair has also conducted an experiment in which children with
psychopathic tendencies were shown five images depicting distress cues, such as crying
children, and five threatening images, such as a sharks open mouth, and skin conductance
activity was measured. It was found that those with psychopathic tendencies responded
normally to threatening images but were hyporesponsive to distress cues, much as has been
shown in similar studies with adult psychopaths.
20

This evidence, though brief and open to refutation, seems to suggest that normal
moral decision-making is impaired if it is a product of controlled cognition alone, or where
the convention/distress distinction is not maintained. Frontal-damage patients and
psychopaths are more likely to offer utilitarian judgements because they lack the care-based
or prepotent emotional responses to dilemmas. It appears that Psychopaths reason but dont
feel...They feel no compassion, guilt, shame, or even embarrassment, which makes it easy for
them to lie, and to hurt family, friends, and animals;
21
The argument here is that learning
the basics of care-based morality learning that some actions harm others and because of this
are to be avoided relies on this crucial role of the amygdala in stimulus-reinforcement

17
Blair, The Amygdala and Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex in Morality and Psychopathy, pp. 387-388.
18
Blair, The Amygdala and Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex in Morality and Psychopathy, p. 390.
19
Blair, The Amygdala and Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex in Morality and Psychopathy, p. 391.
20
R. J. R. Blair, Responsiveness to Distress Cues in the Child with Psychopathic Tendencies, Personality and
Individual Differences 27 (1999), pp. 135-145.
21
Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion (London:
Penguin Books, 2013), p. 71.
learning.
22
It is precisely this process that the rationalist advocates; the rejection of moral
judgements based upon our evolutionary and cultural history in favour of those that can be
produced by reason alone.

An Objection
It would likely be objected that I have been uncharitable in my characterisation of
how rationalist ethical thought is to be understood. But, it seems difficult to conceive of the
fully rational individual, capable of constructing a moral conception, free of emotional
intuitions, which wouldnt in some way appear akin to these individuals. Take for example a
variant on the Drowning Child example.
23
Let us assume that a father has come across two
children drowning; one is his son and the other is an unknown child. He has time to only save
one. In Practical Ethics Singer seems to suggest that special obligations to children and close
family members can be explained as advantageous for all; it forms a component of a
recognised system of delegated responsibilities in which families and small communities
perform the tasks that could be enacted be a large bureaucracy. This explains a small amount
of preference for ones own.
24

Which child should the father save? Let us take for now the intuition that many would
share that he should save his own child. It seems unlikely that a principle of devolved
responsibility does the work that Singer would require of it; the man is responsible for saving
either life. It may be suggested that as long as he saves one life he has discharged any duties
he may have. But this does not explain why many would believe that he should save his own
child. What if he chose to save the other child? Why would many likely find his behaviour
morally blame-worthy? Singer manages to not deal with this issue, instead stating,

22
Blair, The Amygdala and Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex in Morality and Psychopathy, p. 389.
23
Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Morality, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972), pp. 229-243 (p.
231).
24
Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1993), pp. 233-234.
We feel obligations of kinship more strongly than those of citizenship. Which parents
could give away their last bowl of rice if their own children were starving? To do so
would seem unnatural, contrary to our nature as biologically evolved beings -
although whether it would be wrong is another question altogether. In any case, we
are not faced with that situation, but with one in which our own children are well-fed,
wellclothed, well-educated, and would now like new bikes, a stereo set, or their own
car. In these circumstances any special obligations we might have to our children have
been fulfilled.
25

But the Drowning Child is not a case in which the fathers own child is suitably
content, allowing him to turn his attention elsewhere. To address this issue adequately the
utilitarian would have to assert that the fathers child matters no more than the other child;
from the point of view of the universe, all that matters is saving one. This seems reminiscent
of VMPC patients and psychopaths; adhering to convention but without the appropriate
emotional responses. To try and extend the duty of devolved responsibility to this case, to say
that it is to everyones advantage if the father were to save his own child because its his
responsibility, seems to be an example of post hoc reasoning, utilising controlled cognition to
account for an intuition that we do not wish to discard. If the former, it does indeed provide a
hint of an ethical theory devoid of prepotent intuitions and resembling psychopaths and
VMPC patients. If the latter, it lends support to the idea that controlled cognition may not
fulfil the role that rationalists believe it does, and it is to this issue that this paper now turns.

Argumentation Theory
Singer claims, in reference to the rational intuition that five deaths are worse than one,
that, if this is an intuition, it is different from [prepotent] intuitions...It does not seem to be

25
Singer, Practical Ethics, p. 233.
one that is the outcome of our evolutionary past.
26
Nonetheless, recent work on
Argumentation Theory, and other intuitionist models which are beyond the scope of this
paper,
27
may cast doubt on this understanding of the function of rational intuition and
reasoning. Whilst I will not lay out the theory in its entirety, there are a number of claims
which are relevant to this paper.
After acknowledging that philosophy has traditionally considered reasoning and
rationality to allow the human mind to go beyond perception, habit and instinct, Mercier and
Sperber proceed to argue that reasoning primarily evolved for, the production and evaluation
of arguments in communication.
28
Reasoning, on their view, has evolved because it makes
communication more reliable and advantageous. They offer evidence from a number of
studies that point to people failing at logical tasks, committing mistakes in probabilistic
reasoning, and being subject to irrational biases in decision making.
29
. They claim that people
typically perform badly in decontextualised reasoning experiments, but once these same
experiments are conducted in an argumentative context, performance improves.
30

Importantly, people can be skilled arguers, producing and evaluating arguments felicitously.
This good performance stands in sharp contrast with the abysmal results found in other,
nonargumentative, settings.
31
People usually perform poorly in abstract reasoning tasks.
They argue that a separate study by Lord et al has shown that often participants already have
an opinion and that reasoning is an argumentative, rather than epistemic, process. Participants

26
Singer, Ethics and Intuitions, p. 350.
27

28
Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber, Why do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentation Theory,
Behavioural and Brain Sciences 34 (2011), pp. 57-111 (p. 58).
29
Mercier and Sperber, Why do Humans Reason?, p. 58.
30
Mercier and Sperber, Why do Humans Reason?, pp. 60-62.
31
Mercier and Sperber, Why do Humans Reason?, p. 62.
do not seek the truth; they seek to construct an argument to defend their intuitions.
32
Mercier
and Sperber conclude that,
Reasoning contributes to the effectiveness and reliability of communication by
enabling communicators to argue for their claim and by enabling addressees to assess
these arguments. It thus increases both in quantity and in epistemic quality the
information humans are able to share. We view the evolution of reasoning as linked to
that of human communication. Reasoning...enables communicators to produce
arguments to convince addressees who would not accept what they say on trust; it
enables addressees to evaluate the soundness of these arguments and to accept
valuable information that they would be suspicious of otherwise.
33

Argumentation Theory is by no means conclusive but it does offer us one way to
understand the second move I highlighted in the previous section; the function of reasoning
may be to justify intuitions and to aid in argument production and evaluation. These
comments accord well with Singers acknowledgement that reason may only support
decisions already made on nonrational grounds. Although these suggestions are obviously
tentative, it seems plausible to suggest that the rationalist, in the Drowning Child case, is left
with a choice: they can assert the primacy of their moral conventions over emotional
intuition, ignoring a care-based morality or distress/convention distinction, and thereby
resembling VMPC patients and psychopaths in their ethical behaviour; or they can adjust
their theory, extending it to cover intuitions that we do not wish to discard, and thereby
engaging in post hoc justification. As an alternative to these intuitive models, which accord
controlled-cognition a secondary role in moral decision-making, the final piece of evidence

32
Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross, and Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects
of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37
(1979), pp. 2098-2109 (p. 2108).
33
Mercier and Sperber, Why do Humans Reason?, pp. 71-72.
that this paper will consider against a purely rationalist approach is Greenes dual-process
theory.

The Dual-Process Theory of Moral Judgement
In response to theories which emphasise either the role of intuition in moral
judgement, such as Haidts Social-Intuitionist model or the Argumentation Theory detailed
above,
34
or the more traditional controlled-cognition models,
35
Greene et al have developed a
dual-process theory. The theory posits that both emotions and controlled-cognition play
crucial and occasionally competitive roles, arguing that utilitarian moral judgements arise
from the cognitive areas of the brain, whilst deontological judgements are associated with
intuitive emotional responses. To test this theory, Greene and his colleagues have devised a
number of thought experiments, two of which I include below, in which participants are
subjected to neuroimaging scans during deliberation:
Footbridge - A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who
will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course. You are on a footbridge
over the tracks, in between the approaching trolley and the five workmen. Next to you
on this footbridge is a stranger who happens to be very large. The only way to save
the lives of the five workmen is to push this stranger off the bridge and onto the tracks
below where his large body will stop the trolley. The stranger will die if you do this,
but the five workmen will be saved. Is it appropriate for you to push the stranger on to
the tracks in order to save the five workmen?
36

Crying Baby - Enemy soldiers have taken over your village. They have orders to kill
all remaining civilians. You and some of your townspeople have sought refuge in the

34
Joshua D. Greene, The Cognitive Neuroscience of Moral Judgement, in Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.) The
Cognitive Neurosciences (MIT Press: London, 2009), pp. 987-999 (p. 991).
35
Kohlberg, Turiel
36

cellar of a large house. Outside you hear the voices of soldiers who have come to
search the house for valuables. Your baby begins to cry loudly. You cover his mouth
to block the sound. If you remove your hand from his mouth his crying will summon
the attention of the soldiers who will kill you, your child, and the others hiding out in
the cellar. To save yourself and the others you must smother your child to death. Is it
appropriate for you to smother your child in order to save yourself and the other
townspeople?
37

According to the theory, Footbridge elicits a conflict between utilitarian reasoning and
emotional intuition but, for the majority of participants, the latter response dominates. In
Crying Baby, however, people are slower in their responses and exhibit no significant
consensus in their responses. This is claimed to be a result of a serious conflict between
controlled cognition and emotional intuition. They predict that if the theory is correct, and
this case is one in which there is a genuine conflict between rival modules in the brain there
will be: increased activity in the anterior cingulated cortex (ACC), a region known for
activation during response conflict; and increased activity observed in the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), an area associated with cognitive control, if the controlled-
cognitive reasoning is able to override the prepotent emotional response to the dilemma. Both
predictions were proved accurate.
38
Other studies, both behavioural and utilising
neuroimaging, support the link between utilitarian judgements and controlled cognition. One
included cognitive load manipulation; utilitarian responses were slowed by an increased
cognitive load, whereas prepotent, deontological judgements were not.
39
Bartels found that
those who had low faith in intuition responded in a more utilitarian fashion.
40
Hardmans

37

38
Greene 992
39

40

experiment, utilising Fredericks Cognitive Reflection Test,
41
found that those who did better
in the Test were about twice as likely to give utilitarian responses to the above dilemmas.
42

Importantly, Green claims that, Morality, broadly construed, may be viewed as a set
of psychological adaptations that allow individuals to reap the benefits of cooperation,
43
and
concludes that,
moral judgment emerges from a complex interaction among multiple neural systems
whose functions are typically not (and might not ever be) specific to moral
judgment...The bulk of the research...rightly emphasises the role of emotion, in all of
its functional and anatomical variety. At the same time, it is clear that controlled
cognitive processing plays an important role in moral judgment, particularly in
supporting judgments that run counter to prepotent emotional responses... Our current
neuroscientific understanding of moral judgment is rather crude.
44

As Greene acknowledges, the suppositions of neuroimaging, and particularly a
neuroscientific explanation of moral judgements, are in their infancy. The dual-process
theory is speculative, but would nonetheless undermine the rationalist approach to ethics;
controlled-cognition seems to fulfil no more a specialised or epistemic function than
emotional intuition. The theory is also compatible with the findings noted above; those with
VMPC damage or impairment in the amygdala will offer more utilitarian judgements since
there will be less conflict with the controlled cognition components of the brain. It also seems
that the dual-process theory is likely to be compatible with argumentation theory: Greene
suggests that rationality is capable of overriding prepotent responses by supporting and
justifying counter-intuitions whilst in a similar way, Mercier and Sperber emphasise the post
hoc justificatory function of rationality. Importantly, both theories conceive of morality as a

41

42

43
Greene 994
44
Greene 995
social adaptation: the argumentation theory emphasises that rationality and rational intuition
contributes to the formulation and assessment of arguments produced socially; whilst the
dual-process theory posits moralitys function as an adaptation designed for social
cooperation.

Importance?
The evidence canvassed in the preceding sections is limited; it does not explain how
or why some people are more likely to reach utilitarian judgements. For example, is there
something that predisposes someone to utilising controlled cognition to overcome their
prepotent intuitions? The abnormalities in the VMPC and amygdala point some way towards
an answer but this does not admit of degrees; it is at least conceivable that there are different
thresholds at which controlled cognition becomes sufficiently weighted to overcome
prepotent intuitions. Consider again the Footbridge dilemma. If the experiment were
conducted with a number of variables, perhaps by granting some information about the
different victims which would be relevant to deciding how to proceed, it seems likely that
there would be different responses. Would controlled cognition be activated if the dilemma
were to push the large man to save one Nobel Peace Prize winner or scientist close to curing
AIDs or cancer?
The evidence therefore supports the claim that Advances in our understanding of
ethics do not themselves directly imply any normative conclusions, but they undermine some
conceptions of doing ethics which themselves have normative conclusions.
45
It is, however,
the purely rationalist approach to ethics which has been called into question here. To
maintain a rationalist approach requires that controlled cognition: be free of evolutionary
taint, which seems unlikely according to the dual-process theory; fulfils an epistemic

45
Singer 349
function, which according to argumentation theory it may not; or should be able to fulfil its
reasoned construction of a moral theory without the input of prepotent intuitions, which the
evidence from VMPC patients and psychopaths suggests it does not.
Both prepotent intuitions and controlled cognition are therefore equally implicated by
the findings; we are left with acknowledging the mutually supportive role of these sources of
moral decision-making or accepting a measure of scepticism about the origins of all of our
moral beliefs.
46
Importantly, by undermining the purely rationalist approach to ethics,
Kantian constructivism emerges vindicated; it treats controlled cognition and prepotent
intuitions as complimentary, and equally valid, sources of data. It is commensurable with the
evidence from the cognitive sciences, and is, compatible with advocating our emotionally
based moral values and encouraging clear thinking about them, through the process of
reflective equilibrium. The next section will therefore evidence the compatibility of Kantian
constructivism and the evidence discussed above.

Kantian Constructivism and Reflective Equilibrium
Rawls states that, What distinguishes the Kantian form of constructivism is
essentially this: it specifies a particular conception of the person as an element in a reasonable
procedure of construction, the outcome of which determines the content of the first principles
of justice.
47
Centrally, Apart from the procedure of constructing the principles of justice,
there are no moral facts. Whether certain facts are to be recognized as reasons of right and
justice, or how much they are to count, can be ascertained only from within the constructive
procedure.
48

Kantian constructivism is premised on three model-conceptions: the moral person; the
well-ordered society; and the mediating construct of the original position. The moral person

46
Singer 349
47
KC 516
48
KC 519
is conceived of as: a free and equal rational being; viewing themselves and one another as
having an effective sense of justice and a conception of the good (to which they are not tied
and are capable of revising); possessing an equal right to determine and assess the principles
of justice; and entitled to make claims on the design of the basic structure to achieve their
own aims or further their higher-order interests. The well ordered society is conceived of as
one which: is regulated by a public conception of justice in which each knows that they and
all others accept the same principles of right and justice; has arranged its basic structure to
satisfy these principles; has established its principles of justice in accordance with the
reasonable beliefs established by the societys methods of inquiry.
49
The original position is a
construct to deprive participants of the capacity to select heteronomous principles. By
depriving parties of specific information behind the veil of ignorance, they are forced to
select principles of justice which express everyones moral status as free and equal rational
beings.
50
Within the original position, and behind the veil of ignorance, parties are denied
access to knowledge of: their place in society; their natural endowments; their conception of
the good; and their particular psychological disposition. They do not know the particular
circumstances of their own society, but they do know the general facts about human society;
As far as possible, then, the only particular facts which the parties know is that their society
is subject to the circumstances of justice and whatever this implies.
51

Reflective equilibrium is the process of attempting to achieve equilibrium between the
judgements arising from this initial bargaining situation, those that are a product of rational
thought, and those existing judgements which we take as provisional fixed points, such as
racial discrimination and religious intolerance being unjust. We revise either our existing
judgements, or the contractual circumstances, until we reach a reflective equilibrium between
the two so, that eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that both

49
KC 520-522
50
TOJ 221-222
51
118-119
expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgments
duly pruned and adjusted.
52

It is this process of matching a theory to our existing judgements which Singers
article attempts to dispute. Indeed, Singers central claim, is that, reflective
equilibrium...assumes that our moral intuitions are some kind of data from which we can
learn what we ought to do.
53
The veil of ignorance is designed so as to force rational
principles; the rationalist objects to these principles being checked against our existing
intuitions. If it were true that our prepotent emotional responses, such as refusing to kill the
baby in Crying Baby or refusing to push the large stranger in Footbridge, were the only
intuitions which were undermined by the cognitive sciences, then rationalists may well be
right to assert that the normative significance of this evidence is to undermine Kantian
constructivism and reflective equilibrium.
Nonetheless, as I have argued above, it is both reasoned principles, derived from the
original position, and prepotent intuitions, which we are unwilling to revise, which are called
into question by the evidence of the cognitive sciences. Since neither has been shown to
enjoy a privileged status in moral decision-making, Kantian constructivism is rehabilitated.
Importantly, this is not the only normative significance of these findings; they can also be
accommodated within Kantian constructivism, rather just vindicating it as a metaethic. I
therefore turn now to the circumstances of justice and the burdens of judgement to argue that
the evidence from the cognitive sciences has an important role to play as a source of
reasonable disagreement.

The Circumstances of Justice and the Burdens of Judgement


52
17-18
53
Singer 345-346
As noted above, Rawls emphasises that the only information available to the parties
within the original position is that their society is subject to the circumstances of justice,
which he describes in A Theory of Justice as,

the normal conditions under which human cooperation is both possible and
necessary...although a society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, it is
typically marked by a conflict as well as an identity of interests...individuals are
roughly similar in physical and mental powers...Finally, there is the condition of
moderate scarcity understood to cover a wide range of situations...I also suppose that
men suffer from various shortcomings of knowledge, thought, and judgment. Their
knowledge is necessarily incomplete, their powers of reasoning, memory, and
attention are always limited, and their judgment is likely to be distorted by anxiety,
bias, and a preoccupation with their own affairs. Some of these defects spring from
moral faults, from selfishness and negligence; but to a large degree, they are simply
part of mens natural situation.
54


In his later work Rawls develops this idea of reasonable disagreement (italicised), into
an explanation of the potential sources of conflict which arise among reasonable persons.
Centrally, he claims that although it may be possible to overcome moderate scarcity, and thus
reduce this source of competition, there will nonetheless remain deep differences in religious,
philosophical and ethical perspectives.
55
These differences arise as a product of free and
equal, reasonable and rational, persons exercising the same powers of thought and judgement.
The burdens of judgement are the sources, or causes, of reasonable disagreement and are
comprised of, but not exhausted by: the evidence, both empirical and scientific can be

54
TOJ 109-110
55
KC 539
conflicting; even if evidence is generally accepted, persons may disagree about its relative
weight; to an extent, all of our concepts are vague and indeterminate, and therefore subject to
hard cases; the way persons assess and weigh evidence is shaped by their total, personal, life
experience; there are different kinds of normative considerations for each issue, making
overall assessment difficult; and social institutions are limited in the values they can admit,
leading to a requirement to set priorities and making adjustments between different cherished
values.
56

It seems plausible to suggest that our lack of understanding of the precise processes of
moral thought, cognition and conflict with intuitions may represent a further source of
reasonable disagreement between persons. As noted previously, we do not know why some
people may utilise controlled cognition to a greater degree or whether some people may be
predisposed to rely on their prepotent intuitive responses (Indeed, there are other theories
such as Haidts Social Intuitionist Model which suggests that the majority of persons do rely
on these prepotent intuitions and then use cognition to justify their responses, much as
suggested by Sperber and Merciers argumentation theory).
57
That the evidence is disputable,
that there are different interpretations of its significance and of where this significance should
be located, that there are theories that dispute the inclusion of these findings at all,
58
and that
our understanding of these processes is crude, all point to this evidence as an important
source of reasonable disagreement. I would therefore like to conclude the methodological
part of the paper with the suggestion that these findings be considered as an independent
source of disagreement:


56
PL 54-58
57
Haidt
58

Our ignorance of the precise processes of moral decision-making, cognition and
intuition, and how these conflict and are resolved in the individual mind, suggests that
persons will arrive at different ethical conclusions.

This is an acknowledgement that, Our individual and associative points of view,
intellectual affinities and affective attachments, are too diverse...Many conceptions of the
world can plausibly be constructed from different standpoints...[and] arises from our limited
powers and distinct perspectives; it is unrealistic to suppose that all our differences are rooted
solely in ignorance and perversity.
59
This additional burden of judgement provides a further
reason for us to support the fact of reasonable pluralism and to eschew the oppressive use of
state power to enforce monist theories.

Scientific Evidence and Kantian Constructivism

It has been my purpose in this part of the paper to offer an argument against
constructing an ethical theory solely in accordance with rational intuition, thereby vindicating
Kantian constructivism and evidencing its compatibility with the findings of the cognitive
sciences. I have briefly noted some evidence on patients with impaired VMPC or amygdala
function, and psychopaths. I have suggested that these people can be seen to portray, albeit
loosely, the ideal rational individual, reasoning free from their prepotent intuitions. Having
considered that I may be unfairly misrepresenting the rationalist ideal, I have suggested that
maintaining adherence to moral rules, without drawing a moral/convention distinction or
having concern for the distress caused, is seemingly paradigmatic of the adherence to
convention exhibited by impaired individuals. To attempt to alter a rationalist theory to avoid

59
542
this conclusion evidences an example of post hoc reasoning to justify a prepotent intuition.
Argumentation Theory, as an example of an intuitionist model, has then been briefly
discussed to show that the move to extend the theory to cover an intuition that we do not want
to give up may actually represent the function for which rationality adapted; it may be an
adaptation to increase humanitys capacity to offer and analyse arguments socially, and
thereby offer justifications for our intuitions. I have suggested that these findings, along with
Greenes dual-process theory, which posits a mutually supportive role for prepotent intuitions
and controlled cognition, should impel us away from a purely rationalist approach, but not
Kantian constructivism, once we acknowledge that neither controlled cognition nor prepotent
intuitions are superior in providing a foundation for an ethical theory. I have finally suggested
that this vindicates reflective equilibrium; the principles that arise from controlled cognition,
those selected behind the veil of ignorance, and prepotent responses, the intuitions against
which we check these principles, are equally valid sources of data. As a final suggestion, I
have claimed that this evidence also has a role to play as a further source of reasonable
disagreement, and provides us with an additional reason for accepting the fact of reasonable
pluralism and the attempt to construct an overlapping consensus.
This completes my methodological claim; the advances in the cognitive sciences do
have significant normative implications, and at two levels. They vindicate Kantian
constructivism as a metaethic and they are included within the metaethic as a source of
reasonable disagreement. It would appear that the burden of proof is on the rationalist to
show that controlled cognition does fulfil the role that they believe it does, that it is free from
evolutionary taint and that their theory can be constructed without the input of considered
judgements or prepotent intuitions. The rest of this paper will explore an implication of these
claims by considering the principle of reciprocity as a provisional fixed point in Kantian
constructivism, an intuition we may not wish to revise, and applying it to the global justice
debate.

Rehabilitating Reciprocity
We find reciprocity across a wide range of discipline, including: law;
60
social
psychology;
61
interpersonal relationships;
62
economic and game theory;
63
anthropology and
theoretical biology;
64
biology;
65
evolutionary theory;
66
and in political theory.
67
Whilst I will
not consider the precise role that reciprocity plays in each of these areas, I have highlighted
them here to suggest the frequency at which reciprocity appears across a range of diverse
issues; reciprocity will be argued to be a prevalent and recurring feature of our social life and
should be conceived of as a considered judgement that we may not wish to revise.
Returning to Singers anti-intuitionist argument, he suggests that reciprocity can be
seen to underpin the origins of morality. He provides a stylised example in which non-
humans, particularly monkeys, also engage in reciprocal behaviour, such as picking parasites
from one another. A monkey that fails to return the favour may be attacked or excluded from
the practice in the future. Cognition is necessary to recognise and remember co-operators and
defectors and is only possibly in relatively small, stable groups. Therefore a basic form of
reciprocal altruism, and punishment and desert, arise naturally, possibly providing the origins
of a morality which extends these concepts into those of good and bad.
68
Whether this
account is true or false is debateable;
69
it nonetheless provides an explanation for why we

60

61
John Jung, The Role of Reciprocity in Social Psychology
62
The Role of Reciprocity in Romantic Relationships in Middle Childhood and Early Adolescence; Perceived
Similarity among Adolescent Friends: The Role of Reciprocity, Friendship Quality, and Gender;
63
Understanding Reciprocity Sethi;
64

65

66

67
Sangiovanni, Becker
68
Singer 335-337
69
Strong/weak/group selection
may intuitively believe that reciprocity matters. Those who provide us with something are
owed something in return. Non-reciprocators are not. Whilst he advocates an evolutionary
approach to ethics, that is using scientific theories to understand the origins of morality,
Singer does not believe in an evolutionary ethic; duties to kin and duties of reciprocity can be
partly explained by evolutionary theory but this does not provide a normative justification for
these elements of common morality.
70
But, as I have argued above, the origins of reciprocity
do not undermine its potential value as a source of data in an ethical theory.
Let us return to the Drowning Child example. If we do intuitively believe that the
father should save his own child, a possible explanation may be that we think he has an
obligation to ensure the childs well-being, having brought him into the world. Alternatively,
we might take a more evolutionary perspective, such as Dawkins, and suggest that the
fathers behaviour is conditioned by natural selection and the selfish gene; he is acting to
ensure the continuation of his genetic material.
71
Both of these provide a more appealing
explanation for why the father should save his son than believing he is fulfilling a devolved
global duty. Both are premised on reciprocity; the father is implicated in an important
relationship with his son, or he may possess an altruistic allele, being able to discriminate
between those who share this allele with him and those who dont, leading to kin
favouritism.
72

If we do believe the father is entitled to save his son, failing at moral impartiality and
yet remaining morally blameless, this may be because we construe this as an example of an
agent-centred prerogative, whether freely chosen or biologically determined.
73
As Scheffler
persuasively argues against consequentialist theories, each person has, a prerogative to

70
Singer, Ethics and Intuitions, Journal of Ethics 9 (2005), pp. 331-352 (p. 343).
71

72
Robert L. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, Quarterly Review of Biology 46 (1971), pp. 35-57
(pp. 36-37).
73
The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation
of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions chapter The Defence of AgentCentred Restrictions:
Intuitions in Search of a Foundation
devote attention to one's projects out of proportion to the weight in the impersonal calculus of
one's doing so.
74
Here we find that even strict egalitarians, such as G.A. Cohen, are prepared
to permit a modest amount of personal preference, suggesting that, every person has a right
to pursue self-interest to some reasonable extent.
75
Estlund offers an additional example,
Suppose I negligently drive over my wealthy neighbours prize garden. I could work extra
hours at my job producing, say, free educational software, but my neighbour is entitled to
have me spend some of my available time fixing his garden instead, and I would be wrong to
refuse.
76
We therefore have two ways in which reciprocal relationships can supersede the
dictates of moral impartiality:
1. The motive of affection Acting to the benefit of significant others without concern
for moral impartiality (The father in the Drowning Child case).
2. Inequality producing moral requirements A moral demand may conflict with a prior
obligation that has been generated by the agents actions (The Negligent Driver).
77

Both of these prerogatives can be construed as normatively significant reciprocal
considerations. The motive of affection acknowledges that we have obligations to certain
significant others by virtue of the relationship we enjoy with them, whether chosen or not.
The second prerogative points to how a reciprocal obligation can arise in addition to whatever
obligations we may have to others pursuant to an ethical theory or theory of justice.
We find a similar approach in Sangiovannis Reciprcoity-Based Internationalism
(RBI); all people are accorded the same moral status but the institutionally mediated relations
in which persons are implicated, are normatively significant for assessing distributive justice.
Sangiovanni claims that, equality is a demand of justice only among citizens (and, indeed,

74
Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations
Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1994), p. 41.
75
Incentives, Inequality, and Community
G. A . COHEN302
76
Estlund 102
77
Estlund Liberalism, Equality 101-103
residents) of a state.
78
Persons who are citizens of a state enter into reciprocal relationships
via the mutual provision of social and legal goods necessary for each to pursue their own
conception of the good.
79
He notes that coercion, taxation, private law, and political activity
contribute to the maintenance of a system which secures the basic structure and conditions
required for each individual to develop and pursue a conception of the good. In a direct
parallel of the Negligent Driver, the actions that persons engage in, obeying laws, paying
taxes and maintaining the basic structure of their society, enter them into reciprocal
relationships. Sangiovanni contends that non-citizens do not participate in this shared project
and are excluded from egalitarian principles of justice.
80

The important point for the purposes of this paper is that members of a community, of
whatever size, interact in webs of indirect reciprocity and thereby owe one another more than
to those who do not participate in these networks of relations. This is not to imply that others
are not of concern, but, as with the Negligent Driver or the Drowning Child, there are
considerations of reciprocity which are normatively significant. Even if we assume a baseline
of equal moral status for all persons across the globe, we can nonetheless derive more
stringent obligations for those who engage in the mutual provision of collective goods. It is
also possible to argue that as the nature of collective goods changes, so do the reciprocal
relationships; participation in a states maintenance and reproduction provides a different
kind of collective good to those provided by mutual compliance with transnational bodies or
international laws. Sangiovanni, however, does not opt for this expansion of his thesis,
contending that the institutionally mediated relationships which matter currently do not

78
Sangiovanni, Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State, pp. 3-4.
79
Sangiovanni, Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State, p. 4.
80
Sangiovanni, Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State, pp. 19-21.
extend outwards to supra- and transnational bodies, since they rely on states to fulfil an
intermediary role.
81

Beitz and Pogge do not utilise an institutionalist approach, instead emphasising global
interdependence and the absence of institutions. Pogge moves to a global original position
following Rawls own arguments: against arbitrary inequalities from birth, in this case
nationality; that individuals are the units of concern, rather than states; and that there is a
level of global interconnectedness that affects persons life chances.
82
He goes on to suggest
a global original position, with the world taken to encompass the reciprocal relationships;
implication in global institutions, trade, and politics generates obligations between persons.
Beitz similarly argues that,
If the societies of the world are now to be conceived as open, fully interdependent
systems, the world as a whole would fit the description of a scheme of social
cooperation and the arguments for the two principles would apply, a fortiori, at the
global level. The principles of justice for international politics would be the two
principles for domestic society writ large, and their application would have a very
radical result, given the tendency to equality of the difference principle.
83

It is therefore ties of reciprocity, or interdependence, viewed from a global vantage
point, which justifies the move to a global original position. Beitz goes on to state that, if
evidence of global economic and political interdependence shows the existence of a global
scheme of social cooperation, we should not view national boundaries as having fundamental
moral significance...The veil of ignorance must extend to all matters of national
citizenship.
84


81
20-22
82
Pogge 237-241
83
Beitz 363
84
376
On Sangiovanni, Pogge and Betizs views it is therefore the relations of reciprocity
which justify each of their central arguments, although in different ways. Sangiovanni
restricts principles of egalitarian justice to those whose reciprocal relationships are mediated
institutionally whilst Pogge and Beitz suggest that the reciprocal relationships that are extant
justify the creation of institutions to mediate the obligations that persons have. We therefore
see a range of reciprocal relationships, at a local level as in the Drowning Child and
Negligent Driver cases, at a community level in Sangivannis relationalist account, and at a
global level in the interconnectedness thesis. The final purpose of this paper is to test the idea
of reciprocity, which seemingly underlies each of these accounts, against the principles
derived behind the veil; I will suggest that RBI and domestic and global justice as fairness do
not achieve equilibrium with the principle of reciprocity.

Global Justice and Reciprocity
In order to test the principles derived behind the veil it will be useful to formulate a
principle of reciprocity that encompasses the key ideas that emerge from Rawls project, the
comments on agent-centred prerogatives noted above, RBI, and the interconnectedness thesis
that underlies Beitz and Pogges global original position. From these, we have three key
aspects of reciprocity:
1. Persons who engage in reciprocal behaviour generate normatively significant
relationships; people are owed a fair return for their cooperation.
2. Persons are implicated in reciprocal relationships that arise through unchosen means
and through self-willed actions.
3. Reciprocity is a scaled concept; we are implicated in different reciprocal obligations
with family, friends, voluntary associations and larger communities.
Interestingly, we find similar suggestions in Henry Sidgwicks analysis of common
sense morality, where: Good done to any individual ought to be requited by him,...Good
deeds ought to be requited,...[and], Men ought to be rewarded in proportion to their
deserts.
85

For expositional purposes, we can therefore collate the preceding considerations and
suggest:
The Principle of Reciprocity: Our own actions can give rise to obligations which it is
right to fulfil. What will be owed, and to whom, will depend on the extent and scope
of the relationship of reciprocity.
This principle is deliberately loose in formulation, and should encompass many of the
obligations that we believe we should fulfil, from the father saving his drowning child to
obligations owed to those who participate in the global marketplace and maintenance of
trans- and supra-national bodies, and ties in with common sense morality.
Let us further assume that whether we proceed to a domestic or global original
position, the parties, as individuals and not as representatives of states as in the Law of
Peoples,
86
would follow Rawls strategy of maximin.
87
(For simplicity I leave aside the
further issue of whether or not parties might rationally adopt another strategy such as
Harsanyis principle of average utility).
88
Parties therefore, rank alternatives by their worst
possible outcomes: we are to adopt the alternative the worst outcome of which is superior to
the worst outcomes of the others.
89

Starting with the domestic original position, we can suppose that the parties behind
the veil have chosen the two principles of justice, and the priority rules, to govern their

85
Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (MacMillan and Co: London, 1877), pp. 250-251.
86
Law of Peoples
87

88
John Harsanyi, Can the Maximin Principle Serve as the Basis for Morality? A Critique of John
Rawls's Theory, American Political Science Review, 69 (1975), pp. 594606 (p. 598).
89
TOJ 133
interactions.
90
We then proceed to check domestic justice as fairness against the Principle of
Reciprocity. We immediately realise that they do not adequately account for our considered
judgement that we may owe obligations to persons outside of our society; we know that our
interactions with non-nationals implicate us in a reciprocal relationship for which they are
owed consideration.
91
The closed system assumption is too limiting in our attempt to derive
principles behind the veil, and should be revised.
RBI, although not utilising Kantian constructivism, would nonetheless fail to reach
equilibrium with the Principle; we may have obligations outside of our nation-state, whether
theyre mediated by intuitional structures or not. To assert that, While it is true that the
global order and, more plausibly, less extensive regional orders such as the European Union
could acquire autonomous distributive, extractive, and regulative capacities, RBI says that,
until they do so, equality as a demand of justice does not apply to them,
92
runs counter to our
considered judgement. Significant obligations can arise without institutional structures. For
example, Child persuasively argues that, willing compliance with rules that are there to
guarantee the stability and continuity of the conditions necessary for wealth creation is
sufficient to qualify individuals for inclusion in a scheme of reciprocal justice with the well-
off.
93
Even though these relationships are not institutionally mediated, compliance with
immigration laws is necessary to guarantee stability and wealth creation; willing compliance
with these laws qualifies outsiders as parties to a reciprocal relationship.
94

If we approach the issue from a global original position we find that Beitz and
Pogges accounts are too focused on the principles derived behind the veil. Assuming that we
do arrive at the two principles again, we have the converse problem to that of Sangiovanni.
We require global redistribution, all policies are to be viewed in the light of the global worst

90
PL 5-7
91
Beitz and Pogge
92
Sangiovanni 20-22
93
Child, Global Migratory Potential and the Scope of Justice, p. 292.
94
Child, Global Migratory Potential and the Scope of Justice, p. 292.
off and the global basic structure should be designed, implemented and geared towards
improving the position of the least advantaged. But, this ignores that the reciprocal
relationships that bind people at this level are very different to those at a more local level.
Sangiovannis thesis shows us why we need to differentiate between the extent of reciprocal
relationships and the obligations that they generate:
Take, for example, an Italian textile worker. Whether she loses or keeps her job may
depend more on decisions affecting labor costs taken by the Slovenian government
and Slovenian textile manufacturers than it does on the Italian state...Consider,
furthermore, which set of institutions is able to maintain her capabilities...it would be
the Italian state that would provide or guarantee some form of unemployment
compensation, retraining, housing, and so on.
95

These comments are tentative but do suggest that the global justice debate might
benefit from a concerted effort to utilise reflective equilibrium rather than the veil of
ignorance alone. At the domestic level we find theories which are too conservative in their
scope; they exclude persons that we may intuitively believe are owed consideration. At the
global level, we find that our principles may be too demanding and ignore that we do have
stronger reciprocal ties to those who provide us with more, or a different class of, goods.

The Importance of our Considered Judgements

This argument is not an attempt to deny that we have obligations to all persons as free
and equal moral persons; from a global original position we can derive principles which
would be acceptable to all and would likely contain a significant element of global
redistribution. But, we can suppose that when we test these principles against the considered

95
Sangiovanni 34-35
judgement that we are implicated in reciprocal relationships, which cannot be accounted for
behind the veil of ignorance, then our initial contracting situation may require revision.
Kantian constructivism as a meta-ethic is not designed to merely produce abstract principles
which are relevant for all peoples at all times; reflective equilibrium ensures that a conception
of justices, justification is a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of
everything fitting together into one coherent view.
96
Our considered judgements matter. I
have suggested that a principle of reciprocity is one such intuition, which should be imposed
on the contractual situation,
97
and should be tested against the principles we derive through
the enforced controlled cognition of the original position.
For reflective equilibrium to be indicted as a methodological tool it needs to be shown
that controlled cognition is free from whatever taint our considered judgements are possessed
of, and is capable of truly constructing a moral theory without the input of considered
judgements. For reciprocity to be discarded as a considered judgement, it would need to be
shown that people do not believe that their activities generate normatively relevant
relationships which produce obligations that they should fulfil. The burden of proof would
appear to be on the rationalist to evidence this, and the findings of the cognitive sciences and
evolutionary psychology, to date, are not sufficient for this purpose. Until further evidence is
forthcoming, it seems pertinent to reaffirm that, What justifies a conception of justice is not
its being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper
understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and
the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us. We can
find no better basic charter for our social world.
98
We are reciprocators; to discard this aspect
of our ethical life may be asking us to fundamentally change who we are.


96
TOJ 19
97
TOJ 18
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KC519