Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 103882. November 25, 1998
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE
CORPORATION, respondents. CULTURAL CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES,
intervenor.

Facts:

Republic Act No. 1899 (RA 1899), which was approved on June 22, 1957, authorized
the reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered cities and municipalities.
On May 6, 1958, invoking the aforecited provision of RA 1899, the Pasay City Council
passed Ordinance No. 121, for the reclamation of Three Hundred (300) hectares of foreshore
lands in Pasay City, empowering the City Mayor to award and enter into reclamation contracts,
and prescribing terms and conditions therefor. The said Ordinance was amended on April 21,
1959 by Ordinance No. 158, which authorized the Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC)
to reclaim foreshore lands of Pasay City under certain terms and conditions.
On April 24, 1959, Pasay City and RREC entered into an Agreement for the reclamation
of the foreshore lands in Pasay City.
On March 5, 1962, the Republic of the Philippines filed an Amended Complaint questioning
subject Agreement between Pasay City and RREC (Exhibit P) on the grounds that the subject-
matter of such Agreement is outside the commerce of man, that its terms and conditions are
violative of RA 1899, and that the said Agreement was executed without any public bidding.
And the trial court rendered a decision enjoining Pasay City and RREC from reclaiming or
committing acts of dispossession or dispoilation over any area within the Manila Bay or the
Manila Bay Beach Resort.

Thereafter, a motion to intervene file by several intervenors contended that they were
buyers of lots in the Manila Bay area being reclaimed by RREC, whose rights would be affected
by whatever decision to be rendered in the case. The Motion was granted by the trial court and
the Answer attached thereto admitted.
On October 11, 1997, the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) filed a Petition in
Intervention, theorizing that it has a direct interest in the case being the owner of subject nine (9)
lots titled in its (CCP) name, which the respondent Court of Appeals ordered to be turned over to
Pasay City. The CCP, as such intervenor, was allowed to present its evidence, as it did, before
the Court of Appeals, which evidence has been considered in the formulation of this disposition.
The Answers of RREC and Pasay City, dated March 10 and March 14, 1962,
respectively, averred that the subject-matter of said Agreement is within the commerce of man,
that the phrase foreshore lands within the contemplation of RA 1899 has a broader meaning
than the cited definition of the term in the Words and Phrases and in the Websters Third New
International Dictionary and the plans and specifications of the reclamation involved were
approved by the authorities concerned.
Issues:

Whether or not the under RA 1899, the term foreshore lands includes submerged areas and can
be subject to the commerce of man?

Ruling:

It is the submission of the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, that there are no
foreshore lands along the seaside of Pasay City[15]; that what Pasay City has are submerged or
offshore areas outside the commerce of man which could not be a proper subject matter of the
Agreement between Pasay City and RREC in question as the area affected is within the National
Park, known as Manila Bay Beach Resort, established under Proclamation No. 41, dated July 5,
1954, pursuant to Act No. 3915, of which area it (Republic) has been in open, continuous and
peaceful possession since time immemorial.

As can be gleaned from its disquisition and rationalization aforequoted, the respondent
court unduly stretched and broadened the meaning of foreshore lands, beyond the intentment
of the law, and against the recognized legal connotation of foreshore lands. Well entrenched,
to the point of being elementary, is the rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. So also,
resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, is unwarranted, the
language of the law being plain and unambiguous
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot
broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to
include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide
could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term foreshore lands.

It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by
Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the
intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void. What is worse,
the same Agreement was vitiated by the glaring absence of a public bidding.