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FLORDELIZA L. VALISNO and HONORIO D. VALISNO, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE ANDRES B.

PLAN, Presiding Judge of


the Court of First Instance of Isabela, Second Branch, and VICENCIO CAYABA, respondents.
Francisco A. Lava, Jr. for petitioners.
Diosdado B. Ramirez for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; RULES OF COURT; APPLICATION IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS IN A SUPPLETORY
CHARACTER OR WHENEVER PRACTICABLE OR CONVENIENT ALLOWED. The Land Registration Act (Act 496) does not provide for a pleading
similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, however, allows the application of the rules contained therein in land
registration proceedings in a suppletory character or whenever practicable and convenient. Thus, for the expeditious termination of the land registration
case, this Court in Duran vs. Oliva, 3 SCRA 154, sustained the dismissal of the application for registration of therein appellants upon a motion to dismiss
filed by five (5) oppositors, it having been indubitably shown that the court a quo did not have jurisdiction over the res as the lands sought to be
registered in appellant's name had previously been registered in the names of the oppositors. To have allowed the registration proceeding to run its
usual course would have been a mere exercise in futility.
2.ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA; REQUISITES. There is no doubt that the principle of res judicata operates in the case at bar. For said
principle to apply: (a) the former judgment must be final, (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the
parties, (c) it must be a judgment on the merits and (d) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of part ies, of subject matter and of
cause of action. There is, between the registration case under consideration and the previous civil action for recovery of property, identity of parties,
subject matter and cause of action.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INCLUSION OF A CO-OWNER DOES NOT RESULT IN A DIFFERENCE OF PARTIES; CASE AT BAR. The inclusion of private
respondent Cayaba's co-owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not result in a difference in parties between the two
cases. One right of a co-owner is to defend in court the interests of the co-ownership. (Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Vol. II, 7th
Edition, p. 258) Thus, when private respondent Cayaba defended his ownership over the land in question, he was doing so in behalf of the co-
ownership. This is evident from the fact that one of the evidence he presented to prove ownership was the deed of sale execut ed by the heirs of Dr.
Epifanio Q. Verano in his and Bienvenido Noriega's favor.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ONE AND THE SAME CAUSE SHOULD NOT BE TWICE LITIGATED ALTHOUGH TWO DIFFERENT FORMS OF ACTION ARE
EMPLOYED; CASE AT BAR. While the complaint in the first action is captioned for recovery of possession, the allegations and the prayer for relief
therein raise the issue of ownership. In effect, it is in the nature of an action reinvidicatoria. The second case is for registration of title. Consequently,
between the two cases there is identity of causes of action because in accion reinvidicatoria, possession is sought on the basis of ownership and the
same is true in registration cases. Registration of title in one's name is based on ownership. In both cases, the plaintiff and the applicant seek to exclude
other persons from ownership of the land in question. The only difference is that in the former case, the exclusion is directed against particular persons,
while in the latter proceedings, the exclusion is directed against the whole world. Nonetheless, the cause of action remains the same. In fact, this Court
held in Dais v. Court of First Instance of Capiz, (51 Phil. 896) that the answer in a cadastral proceedings partake of an action to recover title, as real
rights are involved therein. It is only the form of action which is different. "But the employment of two different forms of action, does not enable one to
escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated."
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT WHICH DECIDED THE FIRST CASE DOES NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE OF EQUAL JURISDICTION WITH COURT
WHICH DECIDED THE SECOND CASE. It does not matter that the first case was decided by a court of general jurisdiction, while the second case is
being heard by one of a limited jurisdiction, such as a registration court. It is enough that the court which decided the first case on the merits had validly
acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. That both courts should have equal jurisdiction is not a requisite of res judicata.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULING IN THE ABELLERA CASE; ABANDONED. If, as the Abellera case, 74 Phil. 284, held that res judicata can be set up
by a claimant to defeat the alleged right of another claimant, what useful purpose would be served by allowing a party to present evidence of ownership
over the land sought to be registered when the final result would necessarily be in favor of the claimant who had set up the defense of res judicata? And
supposing the land registration court finds that the party against whom the principle of res judicata operates does have a better right or title to the land,
what happens to the principle ofres judicata? Can a court sitting as a land registration court in effect, annul a final judgment of another court of general
jurisdiction? To our mind, therefore, the better policy, both for practicality and convenience, is to grant the dismissal of either the application for
registration or the opposition thereto, once it has been indubitably shown, as in the case at bar, that one or another is barred by a prior judgment. The
ruling in the Abellera case, should therefore be, as it is, hereby abandoned.
D E C I S I O N
FERNAN, J p:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order are two [2] orders issued by respondent judge in Land Registration
Case No. Branch II-N204 of the then Court of First Instance of Isabela, Second Branch, entitled, "Application for Registration of Title, Vicencio Q.
Cayaba, Applicant, versus Flordeliza Valisno and Honorio D. Valisno, Oppositors," the order dated July 2,1980, dismissing the opposition filed by
petitioners on the ground of res judicata, and the order dated September 19, 1980, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are as follows:
On August 21, 1964, petitioners-spouses Flordeliza and Honorio Valisno purchased from the legal heirs of Agapita V. Blanco, namely, Guillermo,
Guillermo, Jr., Manuel and Rosario, all surnamed Blanco, two parcels of land, particularly described as follows:
[a]"a tract of land situated at Sitio Sisim, Barangay Cabaruan, Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela, having an area of
Five Thousand (5,000) square meters or fifty (50) meters facing the Provincial Road by one hundred (100) meters long; bounded
on the North by Pedro del Rosario, on the South by Alberto Tungangui, on the East by the Provincial Road; and on the West, by
Terreno del Estado, now Matias del Rosario;"
and,
[b]"a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela, having an area of Six Thousand Two Hundred
Fifty (6,250) square meters or fifty (50) meters at the east side by one hundred twenty-five (125) meters at the North and South;
bounded on the north by Matias del Rosario, on the south by Alberto Tungangui, on the east by Agapita Blanco and on the west
by Cauayan Diversion Road and Matias del Rosario. " [Annex "B", Petition, pp. 41-42, Rollo.]
Thereafter, petitioners declared the above-described parcels of land in their name for taxation purposes and exercised exclusive possession thereof in
the concept of owners by installing as caretaker one Fermin Lozano, who had his house built thereon.
On August 12, 1968, private respondent Vicencio Q. Cayaba, claiming to be the owner of the land in question by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his
and one Bienvenido G. Noriega's favor on June 30, 1967 by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano, ousted Fermin Lozano from possession of the land. He
subsequently erected a six-door apartment on said land.
On January 22, 1970, petitioners instituted before the then Court of First Instance of Isabela a complaint against private respondent for recovery of
possession of said parcels of land. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. Branch II-895, was in due time resolved in favor of petitioners who were
declared owners thereof, On appeal, however, by private respondent to the then Court of Appeals, the appeal being docketed as CA-G.R. No. 60142-R,
the appellate court in a decision promulgated on January 19,1978, reversed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the complaint of petitioners on
a finding that:
"Firstly, the 'land in question described in the complaint and sketched in Exhibit C . . . by Dr. Guillermo Blanco,' is completely
different from the land appearing in the Subdivision Plan of the appellant, their respective area and boundaries being completely
dissimilar.
"Clearly, we fail to see anything in the evidence of the appellees showing that their property encroaches, much less covers that of
the property presently occupied by the appellant, except the self-serving sketch prepared by the appellees' own witness, Dr.
Blanco, We refuse to give any weight to this piece of evidence because it was prepared by someone who 'has an incentive to
exaggerate or give false color to his statement or to suppress or prevent the truth or to state what is false. [Deering v. Wisona
Harvester Workers, 155 U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 238].
"Therefore, as the land occupied by the appellant has not been successfully identified with that described in the complaint, the
instant action should have been dismissed outright, in view of the provision of Article 434 of the New Civil Code which reads.

'Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on
the weakness of the defendant's claim.'
as well as the doctrine enunciated in a long time of decision [sic] starting from Lim Director of Lands, 64 Phil. 343.
"Secondly, it is undisputed that the appellant is the present occupant of the land since he purchased the same from Tomasita F.
Verano on June 30, 1967, having constructed a six-door apartment in the premises which he lets to both transients and residents
of the locality. Being the actual possessor of the property, he, therefore, possesses it with a just title and he need not show or
prove why he is possessing the same. [Arts. 433 and 541 of the New Civil Code].
"Finally, between the evidence of the appellees and that of the appellant, We unhesitatingly choose the latter in the matter of
identifying the property in question because it is a vicinity plan [Exhibit "8"] showing the position of the land in relation not only to
the properties adjoining the same but also with known boundaries and landmarks in the area. On the other hand, the appellees'
evidence, particularly the description in Tax Declaration No. 17009, is unreliable, since the area and boundaries of the property
are mere estimations, reached thru pure quess-work. [Smith Bell & Co. vs. Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 879]. Expressing the same
sentiment, one noted authority states:
'The proposition that in identifying a particular piece of land its boundaries and not the area are the main factors to be considered
holds true only when the boundaries given are sufficiently certain and the identity of the land proved by the boundaries clearly
indicates that an erroneous statement concerning the area can be disregarded.' [Bilog, Effective Judicial Implementation of Land
and Forestry Laws, Fourth Advanced Course for Municipal Courts (1971), cit. Paterno v. Salud, L-15620, September 30, 1963]."
(Annex "C-1," Petition, pp. 5355, Rollo.]
A petition for review on certiorari of said decision filed by petitioners before this Court was denied due course.
Subsequently, on September 25, 1979, private respondent filed before the Court of First Instance of Isabela an application for registration in his name of
the title of the lands in question, basing his entitlement thereto on the aforementioned deed of sale as well as the decision of the appellate court in CA-
G.R. No. 60142-R, [Annex "A", Petition, pp. 32-40, Rollo).
On April 26, 1980, petitioners filed an opposition to the application. [Annex "B", Petition, p. 41, Rollo] Private respondent, however, moved for the
dismissal of said opposition on the ground that the same is barred by a prior judgment, i.e., the appellate court's decision in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R.
Despite the opposition of petitioners to said motion to dismiss, the lower court issued the first of the assailed orders dismissing the petitioner's opposition
on the ground of res judicata [Annex "E", Petition, p. 83, Rollo] When their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners filed the instant petition,
raising as grounds therefor the following:
"RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS' OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENTS'
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE, WHICH IS HIGHLY IRREGULAR IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DISREGARDING THE PRECEDENT OF ABELLERA VS. FAROL THAT RES
JUDICATACANNOT BE SET UP IN A LAND REGISTRATION CASE.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN HOLDING THAT THE REQUISITES FOR RES JUDICATA EXIST IN THE CASE
AT BAR, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT A MOTION TO DISMISS OPPOSITION IS PROPER IN A LAND REGISTRATION
CASE, AND THATRES JUDICATA MAY BE RAISED IN SAID MOTION TO DISMISS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN DEPRIVING PETITIONERS HEREIN OF THEIR DAY IN COURT, SPECIALLY IN
THE FACE OF STRONG INDICATIONS, ALREADY IN THE RECORD, THAT RESPONDENT CAYABA IS ACTUALLY TRYING
TO SECURE TITLE TO WHAT REALLY IN THE LAND OF THE PETITIONERS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY, WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ISSUING HIS ORDERS OF JULY 2, 1980 [ANNEX "E"] AND SEPTEMBER 19, 1980 [ANNEX "H"]. (pp. 18-19, Rollo)
On April 1, 1981, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their briefs. Petitioners did so on August 26, 1981. Private
respondent, on the other hand, failed to file his brief within the given period which expired on October 9,1981. Thus, the case was considered submitted
for decision without the brief of private respondent.
On July 8, 1985, this Court received a copy of the motion to amend application filed by Bienvenido G. Noriega, Sr., thru counsel, in LRC Case No. Br. II-
N-204, praying that he be included as co-applicant to the land sought to be registered.
In the course of our study of pertinent jurisprudence, We observe that the situation obtaining in the case at bar, i,e., a motion to dismiss the opposition
having been filed and more importantly, granted, is indeed unique and peculiar. But while this may be so, it is not highly irregular as petitioners would
characterize it.
Verily, the Land Registration Act [Act 496] does not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, however, allows the application of the rules contained therein in land registration proceedings in a suppletory character or whenever practicable
and convenient. Thus, for the expeditious termination of the land registration case, this Court in Duran v. Oliva, 3 SCRA 154, sustained the dismissal of
the application far registration of therein appellants upon a motion to dismiss filed by five [5] oppositors, it having been indubitably shown that the court a
quo did not have jurisdiction over the res as the lands sought to be registered in appellants' name had previously been registered in the names of the
oppositors. To have allowed the registration proceeding to run its usual course would have been a mere exercise in futility. The same consideration
applies to the case at bar.
It must be noted that the opposition partakes of the nature of an answer with a counterclaim. In ordinary civil cases, the counterclaim would be
considered a complaint, this time with the original defendant becoming the plaintiff. The original plaintiff, who becomes defendant in the counterclaim
may either then answer the counterclaim or be declared in default, or may file a motion to dismiss the same. The latter choice was what respondent
Cayaba opted for. Although as We have earlier said, such situation rarely, if ever, happens in land registration cases, the irregularity that petitioners
complain of stems basically from the infrequent use of a motion to dismiss in land registration cases, and not from it being unauthorized.
The case of Abellera vs. Farol 74 Phil. 284, heavily relied upon by petitioners needs re-evaluation. In said case, Mr. Justice Bocobo, speaking for the
Court, ruled that "while in a cadastral case, res judicata is available to a claimant in order to defeat the alleged rights of another claimant, nevertheless,
prior judgment can not be set up in a motion to dismiss." Concurring in said opinion were then Chief Justice Yulo and Associate Justices Moran and
Ozaeta. Mr. Justice Paras dissented, saying "in my opinion, Rule 132 in connection with Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, instead of prohibiting expressly
authorizes the lower court in land registration or cadastral proceedings to entertain a motion for dismissal on the ground of res judicata or prescription,
Of course, the dismissal of petitioner's claim will not necessarily or automatically mean adjudication of title to the individual respondents but it will
certainly facilitate the consideration of their claims which cease to be contested. Prompt disposal of cases or such claims i s the main purpose of said
rules. Let there be no retrogression in the application of sound rules and doctrines." (Ibid, pp. 286-287) In support of his opinion, Justice Paras cited the
cases of Menor v. Quintana, 56 Phil, 657, Versoza v. Nicolas, 29 Phil. 425 and Santiago v. Santos, 54 Phil. 619, wherein the Court invariably ruled that a
"final judgment in an ordinary civil case determining the ownership of certain land is res judicata in a registration case when the parties and the property
are the same as in the former case. " [Menor v. Quintana, supra.]
There is no doubt that the principle of res judicata operates in the case at bar. For said principle to apply: [a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a judgment on the merits and [d] there must
be between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. [Carandang v, Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344] The
decision in C.A. G.R. No. 60142-R is a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
There is, between the registration case under consideration and the previous civil action for recovery of property, identity of parties, subject matter and
cause of action. The inclusion of private respondent Cayaba's co-owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not result in a
difference in parties between the two cases, One right of a co-owner is to defend in court the interests of the co-ownership, [Paras, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Annotated, Vol. II, 7th Edition, p. 258] Thus, when private respondent Cayaba defended his ownership over the land in question, he was
doing so in behalf of the co-ownership. This is evident from the fact that one of the evidence he presented to prove ownership was the deed of sale
executed by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano is his and Bienvenido Noriega's favor.
With respect to the subject matter, there can be no question that the land sought to be recovered by petitioners are the very same parcels of land being
sought to be registered in Cayaba's and Noriega's names.

While the complaint in the first action is captioned for recovery of possession, the allegations and the prayer for relief therein raise the issue of
ownership, In effect, it is in the nature of an action reinvidicatoria. The second case is for registration of title. Consequently, between the two cases there
is identity of causes of action because in action reinvidicatoria, possession is sought on the basis of ownership and the same is true in registration
cases. Registration of title in one's name is based on ownership. In both cases, the plaintiff and the applicant seek to excl ude other persons from
ownership of the land in question. The only difference is that in the former case, the exclusion is directed against particul ar persons, while in the latter
proceedings, the exclusion is directed against the whole world. Nonetheless, the cause of action remains the same. In fact, this Court held in Dais v.
Court of First instance of Capiz, [51 Phil. 896] that the answers in a cadastral proceedings partake of an action to recover title, as real rights are involved
therein. It is only the form of action which is different. "But the employment of two different forms of action, does not enable one to escape the operation
of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated." [Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, 42 SCRA 590 and the cases cited
therein, Gonzales v. Gonzales, 26 SCRA 76; Aguilar v. Tuason Co., 22 SCRA 690; Albano v. Coloma, 21 SCRA 411; Sumarariz v. Development Bank of
the Phil., 21 SCRA 1378; Abes, et al. v. Rodil, et al., 17 SCRA 824; Cayco, et al. v. Cruz et al., 106 Phil. 68; Ma. Garcia de Lim Toco v. Go Pay, 81 Phil.
258; San Diego v. Cardona, et al., 70 Phil. 281].
It does not matter that the first case was decided by a court of general jurisdiction, while the second case is being heard by one of a limited jurisdiction,
such as a registration court, It is enough that the court which decided the first case on the merits had validly acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties. That both courts should have equal jurisdiction is not a requisite ofres judicata.
If, as the Abellera case, supra, held that res judicata can be set up by a claimant to defeat the alleged right of another claimant, what useful purpose
would be served by allowing a party to present evidence of ownership over the land sought to be registered when the final result would necessarily be in
favor of the claimant who had set up the defense of res judicata? And supposing the land registration court finds that the party against whom the
principle of res judicata operates does have a better right or title to the land, what happens to the principle of res judicata? Can a court sitting as a land
registration court in effect, annul a final judgment of another court of general jurisdiction?
To our mind, therefore, the better policy, both for practicality and convenience, is to grant the dismissal of either the application for registration or the
opposition thereto, once it has been indubitably shown, as in the case at bar, that one or the other is barred by a prior judgment. The ruling in the
Abellera case, should therefore be, as it is, hereby abandoned.
Petitioners complain that by dismissing their opposition, respondent court had denied them their day in court. It is well to remind petitioners that they had
their day in court in Civil Case No. Branch II-895 as well as C.A. G.R. No. 60142-R, where their claim over the land in question was fully aired and
ventilated.
The conflicting claims of petitioners and respondent Cayaba [in behalf of the co-ownership] with respect to the land under consideration had been put to
rest in C.A. G.R. No. 60142-R. Said decision having attained finality, the same remains the law of the case between the parties.
Finding no error to have been committed by respondent judge in dismissing petitioners' opposition, such dismissal must be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. Cost against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

DOROTEA DAIS, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAPIZ, ET AL., respondents.
Jose Y. Torres, for petitioners.
Jose Altavas, for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. HEIRS; RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN AN ACTION INVOLVING INHERITANCE. The heirs have the right to intervene in an action
involving some of the property of the hareditas jacens of a decedent when they believe that the acts of the judicial administrator are prejudicial to
their interests.
2. CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS; CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. Act No. 496, known as the Land Registration Act, contains no
special rule as to the procedure to be followed in contesting the sufficiency of answers in cadastral registration proceedings, or in determining
whether their dismissal will lie; therefore the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable.
3. ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL OF ANSWERS IN CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS; GROUNDS. When two persons claim the ownership of one
and the same cadastral lot, both of them are claimants and opponents at the same time, and their respective answers cannot be dismissed by the
court except upon the grounds mentioned in sections 101 and 127 of Act No. 190, to wit, default at the trial, failure to prosecute, or defects provided
by the law as grounds for demurrer.
4. ID.; ANSWERS; DISMISSAL; JURISDICTION. In ordering that the answer presented by the judicial administrator of an intestate
estate in the name of the heirs be stricken out, notwithstanding the latters' objection and for a cause not provided by law as a ground for dismissal,
the respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction, for it is necessary not only that it have jurisdiction over the subject matter in litigation and the parties
but that it have authority over each and every one of the essential particulars of the action.
D E C I S I O N
VILLA-REAL, J p:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by Dorotea Dais et al., against the Court of First Instance of Capiz, Seventeenth Judicial
District, Jose Altavas and Jose Morente, in which it is prayed that an order be issued to the respondent judge requiring him to certify and transmit to
this court an exact and complete transcription of the record, decision and proceedings in cadastral proceeding No. 18 (G. L. R. O. Record No. 714),
entitled the Director of Lands vs. Justo Abiertas et al., concerning the portion referring to lots Nos. 626, 1132 and 1136, for review by this Supreme
Court; and that after hearing both parties, judgment be rendered declaring the judicial orders of the Court of First Instance of Capiz dated July 25,
1927, August 8, 1927, and September 22, 1927, as well as the judgment-rendered by the same court on September 29, 1927, and all other
proceedings had in connection therewith, void and of no effect.
The facts appearing from the pleadings and documentary evidence attached thereto, presented in this case, are hereinafter set forth in
the order of their occurrence.
In the course of the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Serapion Dais, civil case No. 988 of the Court
of First Instance of Capiz, Manuel Arnaldo was appointed administrator of the estate. For the payment of some of the debts of the deceased, said
administrator was authorized to sell certain parcels of land of said estate; whereupon he sold lots Nos. 1132 and 1136 in the form prescribed by the
law, to Antonio Habana, which sale was approved by the court on February 15, 1926. The herein petitioners or some of them objected to such
approval and filed a motion for reconsideration on March 6, 1926, which was denied on March 10,1926. They appealed accordingl y on April 6,
1927, and the same was denied on August 1, 1927, on the ground that it was not presented within the time prescribed by section 783 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, because more than twenty days had elapsed since the orders appealed from had been entered. It appears from the order
denying said appeal that the appellants contend that the time within which said appeal should be taken must be counted from the date of the
notification of said orders and not from the date on which they were entered.
On May 20, 1926, Manuel Arnaldo filed an answer in the cadastral proceeding No. 18 (G. L. R. O. Record No. 714), in the name of
Serapion Dais's heirs, claiming title to lots Nos. 626, 1132 and 1136 of said proceeding. Jose Morente also filed an answer claiming title to lots Nos.
1132 and 1136. Jose Altavas also filed an answer claiming title to lot No. 626.
Before the hearing of the case, and in pursuant of a motion of the claimants Jose Altavas and Jose Morente, respectively, with the
consent of Manuel Arnaldo, as judicial administrator of Serapion Dais's intestate estate, the respondent court ordered the answers presented by
said administrator in the name of Serapion Dais's heirs with respect to lots Nos. 626, 1132 and 1136 stricken out.
Dissatisfied with this order striking out their answer, the heirs of Serapion Dais presented a motion for reconsideration, objecting to the
motions to strike out their answer and praying that the order of July 25, 1927, granting said motions, be annulled. The motion for reconsideration
being denied, the movants, heirs to Serapion Dais, took formal exception to said order, and gave notice of their intention to appeal to this court,
and, to perfect their appeal, filed the proper bill of exceptions, which was disapproved by the court on the motion of claimants Jose Altavas and
Jose Morente.
After the afore-mentioned answers presented by the Judicial administrator Manuel Arnaldo on behalf of the heirs of Serapion Dais anent
lots Nos. 626, 1132 and 1136, had been stricken from the record of the cadastral proceeding, the court proceeded to the hearing of the answers of
Jose Altavas and Jose Morente in regard to the said lots, after which the respondent court rendered a judgment on September 29, 1927,
adjudicating lot No. 626 to the spouses Jose Altavas and Socorro Laserna, and lots Nos. 1132 and 1136 to Jose Morente and Patria Altavas.
There are two principal questions to be determined in the present instance, to wit:
1. Have the petitioners the right to intervene in a cadastral proceeding for the purpose of objecting to the striking out of an answer filed by
the judicial administrator of the intestacy of the petitioners' predecessor in interest, claiming several parcels of land as the property of said estate,
when the aforementioned administrator consents to its being stricken out?
2. And in case they have, has the respondent judge exceeded his powers in ordering that the answer be stricken from the record, over
the objection of the said petitioners?
In relation to the first question, article 657 of the Civil Code provides:
"ART. 657. The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death."
And article 661 of the same Code says:
"ART. 661. Heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of his death."
Interpreting the above quoted legal provisions, this court has held in various decisions that the rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs immediately succeed to the dominion, ownership and possession of the
property of their predecessor. (Quison vs. Salud, 12 Phil., 109; Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434;
Beltran vs. Doriano, 32 Phil., 66; Bondad vs Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Velazco vs. Vizmanos, 45 Phil., 675; vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317.) The fact that the
law provides for the appointment of a legal administrator for the liquidation of the deceased's property, and the partition of his hareditas
jacens among his heirs, does not deprive the heirs of the right to intervene in the administration of said property for the protection of their interests.
On the contrary section 714 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in connection with section 722 of the same Code, requires that the written consent and
approval of the heirs be obtained for the sale of the deceased's property in order to pay his debts and the costs of administration. This provision
shows that, notwithstanding the appointment of a judicial administrator, the heirs have a right to intervene when they believe the administrator's
acts are prejudicial to their interest. And it cannot be said that the administrator answers with his bond for any damage he may cause to the
interests of the estate, since such bond might not be sufficient to cover said damages.
For the reasons above stated, we are of opinion that the heirs have a right to intervene in a cause involving certain property of the
decedent's hareditas jacens whenever they believe the legal administrator's acts are prejudicial to their interests. The second question to determine
is whether or not the respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering that the answers filed by the legal administrator in the name of the heirs
be stricken out, said administrator having consented against the opposition of said heirs.
In determining the first question, we have seen that the heirs have a right to intervene when they believe that the acts of the judicial
administrator of the property of the hareditas jacens of their predecessor in interest are prejudicial to their interests. The petitioners have made use
of this right in the present proceedings, opposing the dismissal and taking exception to the order granting the motion filed to that end.
The answers in cadastral proceedings partake of the character of an action to recover title, as real rights are claimed therein. According
to section 10 of Act No. 2347, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are of a suppletory nature in land registration cases. Since Act No. 496,
known as Land Registration Act, contains no special rule as to the procedure to be followed in impugning the sufficiency of the answers in cadastral
proceedings nor in determining whether or not they must be dismissed, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are appli cable. According to
the said Code, complaints can only be dismissed by a failure to prosecute, by default, by abandonment, or by defects provided by the law as
grounds for a demurrer (Secs. 101 and 127, Act No. 190). When two persons claim the ownership of one and the same cadastral lot, both of them
are claimants and opponents at the same time, and their respective answers cannot be dismissed by the court without the presence of any of said
circumstances; and a motion for dismissal that is not based on any of said grounds does not confer jurisdiction on the court to dismiss the
complaint, and if it does so, it exceeds its powers.

In this case, the motion presented by Jose Altavas, claimant of lot No. 626, praying for the dismissal of the answer filed by the judicial
administrator, Manuel Arnaldo, on behalf of the heirs of the deceased Serapion Dais, with reference to the same lot, is based on the allegation that
said lot never pertained to the mass of property of said decedent, and that it had never been in the possession of said administrator. The motion
presented by Jose Morente for the dismissal of the answers presented by the judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Serapion Dais on
behalf of the latter's heirs, with reference to lots Nos. 1132 and 1136, is based on the claim that said lots were sold by the said administrator with
the approval and authority of the court. Neither of these grounds is found among those mentioned by the present law of civil procedure as causes
for dismissal. It is true that the judicial administrator agreed to the dismissal asked for, but the heirs, in whose name he had presented said
answers, objected to it, and presented a motion for reconsideration in time, which was denied by the respondent court. In view of such opposition of
the heirs, who are interested parties in the case, the court should not have ordered the dismissal of the said answers, but should have proceeded to
the trial on the merits of the lots in question with the intervention of said heirs.
In ordering the dismissal of the answers presented by the judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Serapion Dais, in the name of
the latter's heirs, notwithstanding their opposition and for a cause not provided by law as a ground for dismissal, the respondent court did really
exceed its jurisdiction; because it is not enough that a court have jurisdiction over the subject matter in litigation and the parties, but it is necessary
that it have authority in and over each and every one of the essential particulars of the case.
In the case of Larrobis vs. Wislizenus and Smith, Bell & Co. (42 Phil., 401), this court laid down the doctrine that the erroneous exercise
of interlocutory powers is irregular and justifies the institution of certiorari proceedings. And on page 104 of volume 11 of Corpus Juris, the following
rule may be found:
". . . But it has been held that 'any departure from the recognized and established requirements of law, however close
the apparent adherence to mere form in method of procedure, which has the effect to deprive one of a constitutional right is as
much an excess of jurisdiction as where there is an inceptive lack of power.' "
In dismissing the answer presented by the judicial administrator, Manuel Arnaldo in the name of the heirs of the deceased Serapion Dais,
over their objection, and in finally deciding the case on the merits awarding the controverted lots to their adversaries, without hearing said heirs, the
court not only exceeded its jurisdiction, but also deprived them of their constitutional right to be heard before being deprived of their property rights,
and its proceedings were in this sense, void and of no effect.
The appeals taken by the petitioners from the orders which are the subject of this proceeding were denied by the respondent j udge;
hence, said petitioners have no other adequate and speedy remedy in law to protect their rights other than a writ of certiorari.
It is, therefore, proper to grant, as we do hereby grant, the remedy sought, and the decree of the Court of First Instance of Capiz of July
25,1927, ordering the dismissal of the answers concerning lots Nos. 626, 1132 and 1136 filed on behalf of the petitioners in cadastral proceeding
No. 18 (G. L. R. O. Record No. 714) is set aside, as well as the orders dated August 8, 1927, and September 22, 1927, denying the motion for
reconsideration and the appeal respectively, and the judgment of the same court dated September 29, 1927, awarding lot No. 626 to the spouses
Jose Altavas and Socorro Laserna and the lots Nos. 1132 and 1136 to the spouses Jose Morente and Patria Altavas, with all the orders rendered
in connection with said decision, without costs. So ordered.

JOSE O. DURAN and TERESA DIAZ VDA. DE DURAN, applicants-appellants, vs. BERNABE OLIVIA, FE ALMAZAN, HEIRS
OF VICENTE GODESANO, MANUEL ARCE and ESPERANZA SALUD, oppositors-appellees.
Reyes & Dy-Liacco for applicants-appellants.
German G. Vilgera for oppositors-appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS SYSTEM; RULES OF COURT APPLICABLE TO LAND AND CADASTRAL CASES IN A SUPPLETORY
CHARACTER. By express provision of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the rules contained therein apply to land registration and cadastral cases in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient (Dulay vs. The Director of Lands, 53 Off. Gaz., p. 161). The Land Registration Act does
not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. As a motion to dismiss is necessary for the expeditious termination of land
registration cases, said motion contained in the Rules of Court can be availed of by the parties.
2. ID.; ID.; FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE; HOMESTEAD PATENT AND SALES PATENT; EFFECT OF REGISTRATION UNDER THE LAND
REGISTRATION ACT. The primary and fundamental purpose of the Torrens System of registration is to finally settle the titles to land and put to stop
any question of legality of title thereto. That being the purpose of the law, there would be no end to litigation if every property covered by torrens title may
still be relitigated in a subsequent land registration proceedings. Pursuant to this purpose, a homestead patent once registered under the Land
Registration Act, can no be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, and any title issued thereon is null and void. The same may be said of a sales
patent. Once a certificate of title is issued under the Land Registration Act in lieu of a sales patent, the land is considered registered under the Torrens
system and the title of the patentee become indefeasible.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE WITHOUT POWER TO DECREE AGAIN REGISTRATION OF LAND ALREADY DECREED. A Court
of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for
the same land is null and void. This is so, because when once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the title to the land thus determined is
already a res judicata binding on the whole world, the proceeding being in rem. The court has no power in a subsequent proceeding (not based on fraud
and within the statutory period) to adjudicate the same title in favor of another person. Furthermore, the registration of the property in the name of the
first registered owner in the Registration Book is a standing notice to the world that said property is already registered in his name. Hence, the latter
applicant is chargeable with notice that the land he applied for is already covered by a title so that he has no right whatsoever to apply for it. To declare
the later title valid would defeat the very purpose of the Torrens system which is to quiet title to the property and guarantee its indefeasibility. It would
undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the efficacy of the registration law. (Rojas et al., vs. The City of Tagaytay, et al. 106 Phil., 512; 60
Off. Gaz., 820.)
D E C I S I O N
LABRADOR, J p:
This is an appeal from two orders dated July 31, 1959 and September 12, 1959, both of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
Hon. Perfecto R. Palacio, presiding, rendered in Land Registration Case No. N-564; G.L.R. Rec. No. N-7544, entitled "Jose O. Duran and Teresa
Diaz vda. de Duran, applicants, versus Bernabe Olivia, Fe Almazan, Heirs of Vicente Godesano, Manuel Arce and Esperanza Salud, oppositors."
The order of July 31, 1959 is for the dismissal of the land registration case for lack of jurisdiction of the lower court with respect to Lots Nos. 3, 6, 7,
9 and 15, and that dated September 12, 1959 with respect to Lots Nos. 12 and 16.
On December 3, 1953, Jose O. Duran and Teresa Diaz vda. de Duran filed an application for the registration in their names of sixteen lots (denominated
in said application as Lots Nos. 1 to 16, inclusive) under Plan PSU-128386 in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. On April 20, 1954, the case
was heard initially and on May 5, 1954, the oppositors filed their opposition to the application. On August 27, 1958, the oppositors filed a motion to
dismiss the application on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction to decree registration of the lots respectively claimed by them, because said lots
are already registered and certificates of title have been issued thereon in their names. They attached to the motion to dismiss the following: Original
Certificate of Title No. 2342, in the name of Bernabe Olivia (covering Lot 6); Original Certificate of Title No. 2343, in the name of Fe Almazan (covering
Lot 7); Original Certificate of Title No. 514, in the name of Manuel Arce (covering Lots Nos. 9 and 15); Original Certificate of Title No. 433, in the name of
Esperanza Salud (covering Lot No. 16); and Original Certificate of Title No. 7439, in the name of Heirs of Florencio Godesano (covering Lots Nos. 3 and
12). The applicants filed their objection to said motion, alleging that the reasons for the motion to dismiss do not appear i n the application but are mere
assertions of the parties and that the trial court has jurisdiction to consider the application even though the lots subject matter thereof are already
covered by certificates of title. After a reply to the opposition was filed by the oppositors, the lower court resolved the motion to dismiss and rendered
successively the two orders of dismissal appealed from. Hence this appeal.
The applicants-appellants assign two errors of the lower court, to wit:
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AND GRANTING THE OBJECTORS-APPELLEES'
MOTION TO DISMISS THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION WITH RESPECT TO LOTS 3, 6, 7, 9, 12, 15 and 16
ALTHOUGH IT WAS BASED MERELY ON THE SUPPOSED FACTS ALLEGED IN THE SAID ITSELF; AND
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPLICATION WITH RESPECT TO LOTS 3, 6, 7, 9, 12,
15 and 16 FOR ALLEGED LACK OF JURISDICTION UPON PUBLIC LAND PATENTS GRANTED TO THEM."
In support of their first assignment of error, appellants claim that oppositors-appellees can not avail of a motion to dismiss in a land registration case and
that the application and the titles do not show similar identities between the lots covered by said titles and those applied for in these proceedings.
The first assignment of error can not be sustained. By express provision of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the rules contained therein apply to land
registration and cadastral cases in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient (Dulay v. The Director of Lands, Vol. 53 O.G. p.
161). The Land Registration Act does not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. As a motion to dismiss is necessary for
the expeditious termination of land registration cases, said motion contained in the Rules of Court can be availed of by the parties in this case.
With respect to the alleged failure of the oppositors-appellees to prove similar identities of the lots covered by the titles and those applied for, We have
examined the certificates of title and the application, and We concur with the finding of the trial court that the lots covered by said titles are the same as
some of those applied for by the appellants. We, therefore, find no justification for reversing the orders appealed from based only upon the first
assignment of error.
Appellants argue in support of their second assignment of error that a certificate of title based upon a mere homestead, sales or free patent covering
private land is null and void; that it is the decree of registration, not the certificate of title which confers the character of incontestability of title; that the
appellants have been deprived of their property without hearing; and that the cases cited in the order of the lower court do not apply to the case at bar.
Consequently, they claim that the lower court possesses jurisdiction to try and decide the instant land registration proceedi ngs even with respect to the
lots already covered by certificates of title.
Appellants' claim is without merit, if we have to consider that a patent once registered under Act No. 496 becomes indefeasible as a torrens title (Manalo
v. Lukban, et al., 48 Phil., 973).
"Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the United States
or to the Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private
corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands . . .
After due registration and issue of the certificate and owner's duplicate, such land shall be registered land for all purposes
under this Act." (Act 496)
The primary and fundamental purpose of the Torrens System of registration is to finally settle the titles to land; to put to stop any question of legality of
title thereto. That being the purpose of the law, there would be no end to litigation if every property covered by Torrens title may still be relitigated in a
subsequent land registration proceedings. Pursuant to the above purpose, we have held in a long line of decisions that a homestead patent once
registered under the Land Registration Act can not be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding and that any title issued thereon is null and void.
"A homestead patent, once registered under the Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens
title, and cannot thereafter be the subject of an investigation for determination or judgment in a cadastral case. Any new
title which the cadastral court may order to be issued is null and void and should be cancelled. All that the cadastral court
may do is to make correction of technical errors in the description of the property contained in its title, or to proceed to the
partition thereof if it is owned by two or more co-owners." (Ramoso v. Obligado, et al., 70 Phil., 86; See also
Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil., 558; El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60 Phil., 17; Republic v. Carle, et al., G.R. No. L-
12485, July 31, 1959; Samonte et al., v. Descallar, et al., G.R. No. L-12964, Feb. 29, 1960).

The same may be said of a sales patent. Once a certificate of title is issued under the Land Registration Act in lieu of a sales patent, the land is
considered registered under the Torrens system and the title of the patentee becomes indefeasible.
As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of title under the Land Registration Act becomes indefeasible, it foll ows that the Court of First
Instance has no power or jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the registration of the same parcels of land covered by the certificates of title of the
respondents. Such has been our express ruling in the case of Rojas, et al. v. The City of Tagaytay, et al., G.R. No. L-13333, prom. November 24, 1959,
in which this Court, through Mr. Justice Barrera, said:
"As thus, viewed, the pivotal issue is one of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court. All the other contentions
of respondent regarding possession in good faith, laches or claims of better right, while perhaps valid in an appropriate
ordinary action, as to which we here express no opinion, can not avail in the case at bar if the court a quo, sitting as land
registration court, had no jurisdiction over the subject matter in decreeing on June 30, 1957, the registration, in favor of
respondent city, of a lot already previously decreed and registered in favor of the petitioners.
"In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been well-settled that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction
to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the
same land is null and void. 1 This is so, because when once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the title to the
land thus determined is already a res judicata binding on the whole world, the proceedings being in rem. The court has no
power in a subsequent proceeding (not based on fraud and within the statutory period) to adjudicate the same title in
favor of another person. Furthermore, the registration of the property in the name of first registered owner in the
Registration Book is a standing notice to the world that said property is already registered in his name. Hence, the later
applicant is chargeable with notice that the land he applied for is already covered by a title so that he has no right
whatsoever to apply for it. To declare the later title valid would defeat the very purpose of the Torrens system which is to
quiet title to the property and guarantee its indefeasibility. It would undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the
efficacy of the registration law. 2
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. With costs against appellants.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J.,
took no part.

MAMERTA DE LA MERCED, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, EZEQUIEL M. SANTOS and AMPARO
MACAPAGAL, respondents.
Meliton Pajarillaga for petitioner.
Esteban C. Manuel for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LAND TITLES, REGISTRATION OF; VOLUNTARY REGISTRATION UNDER ACT 496; WHAT DECREE QUIETS TITLE TO AND BINDS THE
LAND. In voluntary registrations under Act 496, it is the decree of registration to be issued by the Land Registration Commissioner, which shall be the
basis of the certificate of title to be issued subsequently by the corresponding register of deeds, that quiets title to, and binds the land.
2. ID.; PUBLIC LANDS; ENTRY IN REGISTRATION BOOK NECESSARY TO EFFECT REGISTRATION. In cases of public land, the property is not
considered registered, until the final act or the entry in the registration book of the registry of deeds has been accomplished.
3. ID.; ID.; CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS; WHEN TITLE BECOMES VESTED ONCE REGISTERED, LAND NOT LOST BY ADVERSE POSSESSION.
In the absence of fraud, title to land in a cadastral proceeding is vested on the owner, upon the expiration of the period to appeal from the decision or
adjudication by the cadastral court, without such appeal being perfected; and from that time the land becomes registered property which cannot be lost
by adverse possession.
D E C I S I O N
BARRERA, J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the original decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija (in Civil Case No.
946), upholding the right of ownership of Ezequiel Santos over Lot No. 395 of the Rizal (Nueva Ecija) Cadastre.
As may be gathered from the extant records, the facts of the case are:
In a complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija dated May 3, 1952, which was later amended, Ezequiel Santos (and his wife) claiming
ownership of Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre by virtue of an adjudication of the cadastral court denied December 26, 1923 in favor of his father, sought
recovery of ownership and possession thereof from the named defendants, andof the landlord's share in the harvests for the agricultural years 1950-
1956.
Defendants, in their answer, resisted plaintiffs' claim and asserted their ownership over said property as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No.
3462 issued to their predecessor Juan de la Merced on October 10, 1931 and their continuous possession ofthe land for more than 30 years.
In the course of the proceedings, Mamerta de la Merced, a legitimate daughter of Juan de la Merced, was allowed to intervene and make common
cause with the defendants.
On January 16, 1957, the court rendered a decision for the plaintiffs after making a finding that Lot No. 395 was part of the Original Certificate of Title
No. 425, issued on May 30, 1916 in the name of the spouses Inocencio de los Santos and Victorina Macapagal, parents of plaintiff Ezequiel Santos; that
in a decision rendered by the cadastral court on December 26, 1923 (Cad. Case No. 14, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 281), the said lot was also adjudicated in
favor of the conjugal partnership of Inocencio de los Santos and Victorina Macapagal; that pursuant to said decision, the cadastral court issued on
December 17, 1925 an order for the issuance of a certificate of title for the said property; that on December 8, 1926, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
1971 was issued in the name ofEzequiel Santos in lieu of Original Certificate of Title No. 425 which was cancelled; that on December 28, 1926, the
cadastral courtdeclared lot 395 public land, as a consequence of which Juan de la Merced, after filing a homestead application therefor, was able to
obtain Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 on October 10, 1931. Holding that the cadastral court had no jurisdiction to issue the order declaring the lot
public land, and, therefore, the same as well as the certificate of title issued thereafter was null and void, thecourt ordered the cancellation of OCT No.
3462 in the name of Juan de la Merced; directed defendants to vacate Lot No. 395 ofthe Rizal Cadastre and surrender possession thereof to plaintiffs;
and to pay the latter as the landlord's share, 50 cavans of palay yearly for the agricultural years 1950 to 1956 or their equivalent, and costs of the suit;
and the receiver to deliver to plaintiffs the palay in his custody representing the harvest for the agricultural years 1953-1955.
Upon defendants' motion for reconsideration, however, the promulgation of the decision was ordered suspended and the case was re-set for hearing for
reception of additional evidence.
On August 6, 1957, the court amended its original decision, thus:
"The plaintiffs now admit that the litigated 'Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre, Nueva Ecija, is outside the parcel of land described
in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1971 and Original Certificate of Title No. 425, both of which cover Lot 396'. They, however,
claim ownership over said Lot 395 by virtue of the decision rendered on December 26, 1923 in Cadastral Case No. 14, G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. 21, entitled 'Government of the Philippines versus Justo Abacan, et al.,' (Exh. A-1), and the other dated December 17,
1925 directing the issuance of a decree pursuant to said decision (Exh. V-2, p. 10, rec. ofexhibits).
"No decree has yet been issued pursuant to the said order, Exhibit B-2, much less was there a title issued in the name ofthe
plaintiffs over the said lot.
"The defendants, on the other hand, predicate their claim of ownership over the said lot of Original Certificate of Title No. 3462
issued on October 10, 1931 in favor of Juan de la Merced, their predecessor-in-interest, pursuant to a homestead patent issued
on September 15, 1931 (Exh. 1, for the defendants and intervenor), contending that the decision of December 26, 1923,
adjudicating the lot to the plaintiffs, was still subject to review since there was no decree issued pursuant thereto.
"The position of the defendants and intervenor would have been correct if there was actually a petition for review of the
decision of December 26, 1923, or a new trial or a reopening of the case concerning Lot No. 395. The fact of the matter is that
Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 was issued pursuant to a homestead patent long after Lot No. 395 was declared a public
land in a decision dated March 29, 1926 at Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and December 28, 1926 at Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and December 28,
1926 at Manila for Cabanatuan City (Exh. 4) states that Lot No. 395, together with Lots Nos. 394 and 2044, was declared a public
land and was the object of a homestead application by the respective concessionaires (p. 21, rec.of exhibits). . . .
"It would seem that the cadastral court in the same cadastral cases No. 14, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 281, entitled Government ofthe
Philippines vs. Justo Abacan, et al. erroneously re-opened the hearing of Lot 395 which was already adjudicated in favor of the
plaintiff by the decision dated December 26, 1923 (Exh. A-1, and A-2, pp. 2 and 5, rec. of exhibits) and decreed that lot 395 is
public land. The same cadastral court should have taken judicial notice of the said decision and the other promulgated therein for
the issuance of a decree in favor of the plaintiffs over Lot 395 (Exh. B-2)."
While the court held that the land having ceased to be part of the public domain, the Director of Lands no longer had authority to grant the
homestead patent over the same to Juan de la Merced, it declared nevertheless that, inasmuch as no title was actually issued therefor, the said lot
may be acquired by adverse possession. And, as defendants had been in possession of the property for over 20 years, they were declared to have
acquired the right over the same by prescription. The complaint was consequently ordered dismissed; OCT No. 3462 cancelled and a new one
issued to defendants in lieu thereof; and plaintiffs were directed to vacate the one-third portion of Lot No. 395 occupied by them, and to pay the
costs.
Plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, in its decision of July 20, 1960, sustained the contention of appellants on the
basis of the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abural (39 Phil. 997), that upon the finality of the
decree by the cadastral court, adjudicating ownership of the land, the title thereto becomes incontrovertible and may no longer be acquired by
prescription. And, as the land was no longer part of the public domain when the homestead patent was obtained by Juan de la Merced, the same can
not prevail over the cadastral court's decree ofregistration of Lot No. 395 in favor of appellant Santos' predecessor.
Hence, the filing of the instant petition for review of the aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals.
The questions actually raised by the present appeal are: What is the effect of the order of the cadastral court of December 26, 1923 adjudicating the lot
in favor of Santos, and the subsequent order dated December 17, 1925, directing the issuance of a certificate of title to Inocencio Santos? Did those
orders constitute registration under the law even though the corresponding certificate of title has not been issued? In the affirmative, could the property
thereby affected still be lost by adverse possession?
For purposes of resolving the above questions, these salient facts must be considered:
By virtue of the final decision rendered in Cadastral Case No. 14, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 21, dated December 26, 1923, Santos' title to Lot No. 395 was
definitely confirmed as against the whole world, including the Government;
That the same cadastral court issued a decree dated December 19, 1925 declaring its decision of December 26, 1923 final and directing the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office to issue the certificate of title to Inocencio de los Santos, although no such certificate was actually issued;

That under date of December 28, 1926, the cadastral court, without reopening the case, declared the same Lot 395 public land as a result of which Juan
de la Merced, after due application, was able to obtain therefor a homestead patent and OCT No. 3462 on October 10, 1931;
That as found by the Court of Appeals, Juan de la Merced, until his death in 1931, was the overseer of Inocencio de los Santos for a big portion of land
which included Lot 395 in question and was, therefore, a trustee for said lot at the time he applied for it as a homestead;
That the complaint for recovery of ownership and possession was filed in 1952.
There is no doubt that had the land involved herein been public, by specific provision of Act 496, the act of registration shall be the operative act to
convey and affect the same, and such registration shall be made in the office of the register of deeds for the province where the land lies. (Sec. 122, Act
496). In other words, in cases of public lands, the property is not considered registered until the final act or the entry in the registration book of the
registry of deeds had been accomplished.
With respect to private lands, however, the pertinent provisions of Act 496 are:
"SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse
claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every decree ofregistration shall bind
the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exception stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and
against all persons including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application,
notice or citation, or included in the general description 'To all whom it may concern'. Such decree shall not be opened by
reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgment or decrees; subject, however, to the rightof any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by
decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after
entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one
year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. . . ."(Emphasis supplied.)
"SEC. 40. Every decree of registration shall bear the day of the year, hour, and minute of its entry, and shall be signed by the
Chief of the General Land Registration Office (now Land Registration Commissioner). . . . The decree shall be stated in a
convenient form for transcription upon the certificates of titles hereinafter mentioned." (Emphasis supplied.)
It is apparent from the foregoing provisions that a decree of registration and a certificate of title, under Act 496, are two different things. And it is the
decree of registration, to be issued by the Land Registration Commissioner, which shall be the basis of the certificate of title to be issued subsequently
by the corresponding register of deeds, that quiets title to and binds the land.
But, it must be remembered that the abovementioned provisions apply only to voluntary registration under the Land Registration Act. With respect to
lands titled through compulsory proceedings, the Cadastral Act prescribes:
"SEC. 11. The trial of the case may occur at any convenient place within the province in which the lands are situated or at such
other place as the court, for reasons stated in writing and filed with the record of the case, may designate, and shall be conducted
in the same manner as ordinary trials and proceedings in the Court of First Instance and shall be governed by the same rules.
Orders of default and confession shall also be entered in the same manner as in ordinary cases in the same court and shall have
the same effect. All conflicting interests shall be adjudicated by thecourt and decrees awarded in favor of the persons entitled to
the lands or the various parts thereof, and such decrees, when final, shall be the basis for original certificates of title in
favor of said persons which shall have the same effect as certificates of title granted on application for registration of land under
the Land Registration Act. . . . " (Emphasis supplied.)
Confronted with the question of when title to the land in a cadastral proceeding is vested, this Court, in the case of Government ofthe Philippine
Islands vs. Abural, 1 said:
"After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The first adjudicates ownership in favor of one of the claimants. This
constitutes the decision the judgment the decree of the court, and speaks in a judicial manner. The second action is the
declaration by the court that the decree is final and its order for the issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the Land
Registration Office. Such order is made if within thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of the decision no appeal is taken
from the decision. This again is judicial action, although to a less degree than the first.
"The third and last action devolves upon the General Land Registration Office. This office has been instituted 'for the due
effectuation and accomplishment of the laws relative to the registration of land.' (Administrative Code of 1917, sec. 174.) . . . .
"The judgment in a cadastral survey, including the rendition of the decree, is a judicial act. As the law says, the judicial decree
when final is the base of the certificate of title. The issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Office is a ministerial act. The
date of the title prepared by the Chief Surveyor is unimportant, for the adjudication has taken place and all that is left to be
performed is the mere formulation of the technical description. . . . .
"As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final, conclusive, and indisputable, after the passageof the
thirty-day period allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the judgment of thecourt adjudicating
ownership without any step having been taken to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may then have execution of the
judgment as of right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by the Chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is
the special provision providing for fraud."
Under the foregoing pronouncement, the title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to appeal from the
decision or adjudication by the cadastral court, without such an appeal having been perfected. The certificate of title would then be necessary for
purposes of effecting registration of subsequent disposition of the land where courtproceedings would no longer be necessary.
As we have here a decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering the issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of the certificate of title over Lot No. 395 after
the decision adjudicating ownership to him of the said property had already become final, and there being no imputation of irregularity in the said
cadastral proceedings, title of ownership on the said adjudicatee was vested as of the dateof the issuance of such judicial decree. The land, for all
intents and purposes, had become, from that time, registered property which could not be acquired by adverse possession.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner Mamerta de la Merced. So ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-35778. January 27, 1983.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioners, vs. HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, Judge, CFI,
Bataan I, and LUISITO MARTINEZ, respondents.
[G.R. No. L-35779. January 27, 1983.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioners, vs. HON. ABRAHAM P. VERA, Judge, CFI,
Bataan, Branch I, and THELMA TANALEGA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Benjamin M. Reyes for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES; CADASTRAL ACT; ABSENCE OF SUCCESSFUL CLAIMANTS; PROPERTY DECLARED PUBLIC LAND; CASE AT
BAR. In a cadastral proceeding any person claiming any interest in any part of the lands object of the petition ss required by Section 9 of Act No.
2259 to file an answer on or before the return day or within such further time as may be allowed by the court. In the absence of successful claimants, the
property is declared public land. In the case at bar, private respondents apparently either did not file their answers in the aforesaid cadastral proceedings
or failed to substantiate their claims over the portions they were then occupying. The Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in question public
lands, and its decision had already become final and conclusive.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENT; RES JUDICATA; CADASTRAL PROCEEDING; PARTIES PRECLUDED FROM RE-LITIGATING FINALLY DECIDED
ISSUES. A cadastral proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole world. Under the doctrine of res judicata, parties are precluded from re-litigating
the same issues already determined by final judgment. (Yusingco vs. Ong Hing Lian, 42 SCRA 589, 602).
3. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES; JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES; CASUAL CULTIVATION OF THE LAND DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE POSSESSION UNDER CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP. The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have extended,
never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the
occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constit ute a grant from the
State. (Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, 195.) A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession
under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.
4. ID.; ID.; APPROVAL OF SURVEY PLANS BY THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS; A STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF MANDATORY CHARACTER.
Section 34-A of R.A. No. 6389 relied upon by respondents applies only to lands subject of tenancy relation which are expropriated and sub-divided in
favor of new amortizing-owner- beneficiaries. The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless the plan and its
technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value. (Director of Lands vs. Reyes. supra).
D E C I S I O N
DE CASTRO, J p:
The two (2) above-entitled petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions dated October 9, 1972 and October 16, 1972 issued by the CFI of Bataan,
Branch I, in LRC No. N-210, and in LRC No. N-206, respectively, involve a common issue. For convenience, they are hereby decided jointly.
G.R No. L-35778
On May 4, 1972, respondent Luisito Martinez filed with the lower court an application for registration of title under Act 496 of one (1) parcel of land,
situated in the Municipality of Mariveles, Bataan, containing an area of 323,093 square meters, more or less.
On July 7, 1972 the lower court issued an order of general default except as to the Republic of the Philippines and the Province of Bataan.
On July 24, 1972, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the lower court an opposition to the application stating that the parcel of land applied for is a
portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic, not subject to private appropriation.
On September 16, 1972, the lower court issued an order reading:
"Considering the testimony of the Provincial Forester Leonides B. Rodriguez during the hearing of August 8, 1972 that this land,
subject matter of this application, was a subject of cadastral proceeding and that this land was assigned as Lot No. 626 (Tsn,
August 3, 1972, page 41), this case is ordered re-opened and the Land Registration Commissioner is directed to submit his report
and/or comment as to whether this lot is covered by the Mariveles Cadastre within five (5) days from receipt hereof."
xxx xxx xxx
On October 5, 1972, the Commissioner of Land Registration submitted to the lower court a report stating:
"That the parcel of land applied for registration in the above-entitled case is entirely inside Lot No. 626 of the Cadastral Survey of
Mariveles, Province of Bataan, Cad. Case no. 19, LTC Cad. Record No. 1097."
xxx xxx xxx
Records show that in the hearing of this case in the lower court, applicant Luisito Martinez, 62 years old, testified that he is the owner of the land applied
for, having inherited the same from his parents, consisting of 32 hectares, more or less; that he started possessing the land in 1938; that about 8
hectares of the land is planted to palay, and there are about 42 mango trees; that kamoteng kahoy is also planted thereon; that he declared the land for
taxation purposes only in 1969 because all the records were lost during the war, and that possession was continuous, open, undisturbed and in the
concept of owner.
Another witness, Antonio Reyes, 67 years old, testified that he is the overseer of Luisito Martinez; that the area of his land is 32 hectares, more or
less; that since 1938, applicant has possessed this land; that eight (8) hectares of land is devoted to palay, and his son Manuel Reyes and Silvestre
Garcia are the ones tilling the land, and the harvest is shared alike between applicant, on one hand, and Manuel Reyes and Silvestre Garcia, on the
other; that eighteen (18) hectares, more or less, is planted to vegetables.
While another witness, Silvestre Garcia, 60 years old, testified that he worked on the land of the applicant since 1932 which is 32 hectares, more or less;
that said Luisito Martinez inherited the land from his parents; that he plants palay only on four (4) hectares; that there are 42 mango trees on the land.
G.R. No. L-35779:
On March 21, 1972, respondent Thelma Tanalega filed an application for registration under Act No. 496 in the Court of First Instance of Bataan,
docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-206, L.R.C. Rec. No. N-41884, of two (2) parcels of land located in the barrio of Camaya, municipality of
Mariveles, province of Bataan, containing an area of 443,297 square meters, more or less, and 378,506 square meters, more or less, respectively, and
more particularly described and identified as portions of Lot 626, Mariveles Cadastre, covered by Plans (LRC) SWO-13430 and (LRC) SWO-13431,
respectively.
On March 21, 1972, the corresponding notice of initial hearing was duly issued by the Commissioner of Land Registration.
On March 21, 1972, the lower court ordered the Bureau of Lands to submit a report within ten (10) days if the land subject of the application has been
issued patents or is the subject of any pending application for the issuance of patents. Likewise, the lower court directed the Commissioner of Land
Registration to submit within the same period his report if the land applied for has been issued a title or is the subject of a pending decree.
On May 23, 1972, the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Commission filed a report in the lower court, stating that the parcels of land applied for
registration "do not appear to have been passed upon and approved by the Director of Lands as required by Section 1858 of the Revised Administrative
Code." Later, on July 24, 1972, the Chief Surveyor of the Land Registration Commission filed in the lower court another report or manifestation stating
"that Plans (LRC) SWO-13430 and 13431, LRC Case No. N-206, LRC Record No. N-41884, when plotted on the Municipal Index Map on file in the
Commission does not appear to overlap with any previously titled property under Act 496; that the plan and records of said Land Registration application
will be subjected to further examination as soon as the decision to be rendered by this Honorable Court is received in this Commission to determine
whether or not a patent or title has in the meantime been issued in order to avoid duplication or overlapping of titles."
At the hearing on June 21, 1972, on motion of the applicant's counsel, the lower court issued an Order of General Default against all persons, with the
exception of the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, represented by the Office of the provincial fiscal, and the oppositor Eliseo Martinez
represented by Atty. Angelino Banzon, who were directed to file their respective oppositions.
On July 7, 1972, the provincial fiscal filed his opposition in behalf of the Directors of Lands and of Forestry, alleging that the parcels of land applied for
are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private appropriation.
Thereafter, the case was tried. The applicant, Thelma Tanalega (respondent herein), testified in her behalf, and presented two (2) witnesses, namely,
Miguel Ocampo, 57 years old, and Agapito del Rosario, 50 years old, as well as her documentary evidence in support of her application for registration.
On the other hand, Fiscal Arsenio Roman appeared for the government, and submitted documentary proof in support of the opposition filed by the
provincial fiscal's office in this case.
At the hearing of this case in the lower court, applicant Thelma Tanalega, 27 years old, testified that she had possessed the land "openly, adversely,
notoriously and in the concept of owner since February 2, 1970 when the said land was sold to her by Elisa Llamas who allegedly possessed this land"
in the same manner since 1935; that the applicant had paid for the taxes of the land for the years 1970-1972.

Another witness, Miguel Ocampo, 57 years old, testified that his parents were the ones working on the land before 1935 and due to the illness of his
parents, on their request to owner Elisa Llamas, he became overseer up to 1970 when the same was sold to applicant; that 16 hectares of these lands
were planted to palay while others were devoted to pasture land and planting vegetables.
Witness Agapito del Rosario, 50 years old, who testified that since childhood, he had known Elisa Llamas to be the owner of t he land applied for; that
she was the one managing the planting and improving of the land; that he used to see Leopoldo de Guzman and another one also named Agapito del
Rosario worked on the 16 hectares portion of the land; that Elisa Llamas informed him that in 1970 she sold the land to Thelma Tanalega.
At the hearing on August 24, 1972, Fiscal Arsenio Guzman who is appearing for the government, submitted a certification dated July 3, 1972 of
Leonidas B. Rodriguez, District Forester of Balanga, Bataan (Exhibit 3) which states "that the tract of land situated at Barrio Camaya, Mariveles, Bataan
containing an approximate area of EIGHTY TWO HECTARES more or less, as shown and described in the attached photostat copy of Plans in two
sheets, as surveyed for Thelma Tanalega, et al., was found to be within the Alienable and Disposable Block, Project 4-B, Mariveles, Bataan, certified by
the Director of Forestry as such on February 16, 1972."
The applicant did not present as witness her predecessor-in-interest, Elisa Llamas, to testify on the alleged possession of the land. The applicant also
failed to present Guillermo Ramirez, who was hired by her as overseer and her alleged tenants. Not a single tenant was presented as witness to prove
that the applicant had possessed the land as owners.
In both cases, the Court of First Instance of Bataan in two separate decisions, dated October 9, 1972 and October 16, 1972, confirmed the titles to
subject parcels of land and adjudicated them in favor of applicants Luisito Martinez and Thelma Tanalega, now respondents herein.
In the instant petitions for review, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, argued that Lot 626, Mariveles Cadastre was declared
public land by the decision of the Cadastral Court dated October 11, 1937 and such being the case, the lower court is without jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the application for voluntary registration under Act 496. Petitioner likewise stressed that the lands in question can no longer be subject
to registration by voluntary proceedings, for they have already been subjected to compulsory registration proceedings under the Cadastral Act.
The petitions are meritorious and reversal of the questioned decisions is in order.
It is noteworthy that as per the report of the Commissioner of Land Registration, 1 the land subject matter of the instant proceedings "is entirely inside
Lot No. 626 of the Cadastral Survey of Mariveles, Province of Bataan, Cad. Case No. 19, LRC Cad. Record No. 1097"; that some portions of Lot No.
626 were decreed and titles were issued therefor; and that "portion declared Public Land as per decision dated October 11, 1937."
In a cadastral proceedings any person claiming any interest in any part of the lands object of the petition is required by Section 9 ofAct No. 2259 to file
an answer on or before the return day or within such further time as may be allowed by the court, giving the details required by law, such as: (1) Age of
the claimant; (2) Cadastral number of lot or lots claimed, or the block and lot numbers, as the case may be; (3) Name of the barrio and municipality,
township or settlement in which the lots are situated; (4) Names of the owners of adjoining lots; (5) If claimant is in possession of the lots claims and can
show no express grant of the land by the Government to him or to his predecessors-in-interest, the answer need state the length of time property was
held in possession and the manner it was acquired, giving the length of time, as far as known, during which his predecessors, if any, held possession;
(6) If claimant is not in possession or occupation of the land, the answer shall set forth the interest claimed by him and the time and manner of its
acquisition; (7) If the lots have been assessed for taxation, their last assessed value; and (8) Encumbrance, if any, affecti ng the lots and the names of
adverse claimants as far as known. In the absence of successful claimants, the property is declared public land.
In the instant cases, private respondents apparently either did not file their answers in the aforesaid cadastral proceedings or failed to substantiate their
claims over the portions they were then occupying, otherwise, titles over the portions subject of their respective claims would have been issued to them.
The Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in question public lands, and its decision had already become final and conclusive.
Respondents are now barred by prior judgment to assert their rights over the subject land, under the doctrine of res judicata. A cadastral proceeding is
one in rem and binds the whole world. Under this doctrine, parties are precluded from re-litigating the same issues already determined by final
judgment. 2
Even granting that respondents can still petition for judicial confirmation of imperfect title over the lands subject matter of the instant cases, the same
must necessarily fail. It is to be noted that in the instant cases evidence for the respondents themselves tend to show that only portions of the entire area
applied for are cultivated. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In
that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. The possession of public land however
long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land
does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant from the State. 3 Applicants, therefore, have failed to submit convincing proof actual, peaceful and adverse
possession in the concept of owners of the entire area in question during the period required by law.LLjur
Apart from the foregoing, the survey plans submitted by petitioners were not approved by the Director of Lands but by the Land Registration
Commission. The Land Registration Commission has no authority to approve original survey plans in this particular case. Section 34-A of R.A. No.
6389 relied upon by respondents applies only to lands subject of tenancy relation which are expropriated and sub-divided in favor of new amortizing-
owner-beneficiaries. The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character and unless the plan and its technical description are
duly approved by the Director of Lands, the same are not of much value. 4
WHEREFORE, the decisions dated October 9, 1972 and October 16, 1972 of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch I should be, as they are
hereby reversed. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., concurs in the result.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 91797. August 28, 1991.]
WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ORTIGAS & COMPANY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, respondents.
Quijano & Padilla for petitioner.
Jose Teodorico V. Molina for intervenor-oppositor.
Santiago & Santiago for private respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BIDIN, J p:
From the decision rendered by respondent court dated November 27, 1989, declaring respondent Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership (Ortigas) as
the registered owner of the disputed parcel of land, petitioner Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (Widora), interposes this petition for review seeking
to annul the aforesaid judgment and prays that the case be remanded to the trial court and there be tried on the merits.
The facts, as found by respondent court, are as follows:
"On August 27, 1974, respondent Widora filed LRC Case No. Q-336 before the respondent (trial) court an application for
registration of title of a parcel of land as shown in Plan LRC (SWO)-15352. Widora alleged that the parcel of land is covered by
Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136, dated April 25, 1894, issued in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
Later, on June 14, 1978, Widora filed an amended application for registration of the said parcel of land. It alleged that the
parcel of land is situated at Malitlit-Uoogong, Quezon City, with an area of 156 hectares, more or less, described in plan No. LRC
(SWO)-15352; and that the applicant acquired said property from the heirs of Don Mariano San Pedro on December 12, 1954.
The amended application prayed that said parcel of land be ordered registered in the name of Widora.
"On August 25, 1978, respondent Dolores Molina filed an opposition, claiming ownership over 12 to 14 hectares of Lot 8 (LRC)
SWO-15352, and praying for a decree of registration over said portions of Lot 8.
"On October 24, 1978, petitioner Ortigas filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging, among others, that respondentcourt had no
jurisdiction over the case, the land being applied for having been already registered under the Torrens System and in the
name of Ortigas under TCT 77652 and TCT 77653.
"On April 20, 1979, the respondent (trial) court issued an order directing the applicant to prove its contention that TCT 77652 and
TCT 77653 are not proper derivatives of the original certificates of titles from which they were purportedly issued, and setting the
case for hearing on June 28, 1979, at 8:30 a.m.
"On June 27, 1979, petitioner Ortigas filed a motion for reconsideration of said order of April 20, 1979, alleging that a Torrens title
becomes indefeasible after a year and that the same becomes conclusive upon the entire world; that the Land Registration
Commission itself has advised the court that the 156 hectare property sought to be registered is covered by valid and subsisting
titles in the name of Ortigas; that Courts of First Instance and the appellate courts in previous cases had sustained the Ortigas
titles over the land in question.
"On October 3, 1979, the motion for reconsideration of petitioner Ortigas was denied by the respondent (trial) court, but the latter
set the motion to dismiss for hearing on October 18 and 19, 1979 at 8:30 a.m., for the purpose of enabling the applicant to prove
its contention that TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 are not proper derivatives of the original certificates of title from which they were
purportedly issued.
"The parties presented their testimonial and documentary evidence before the respondent (trial) court in support oftheir respective
positions.
"On March 30, 1988, the respondent (trial) court denied the motion to dismiss of petitioner Ortigas, holding, among others, that
TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 on their face show that they were derived from OCT 337,19,336,334, pursuant to Decree 1425; that if
there was error in the correct number of OCT on said titles, no step or measure to rectify the same was taken; that Decree No.
1425 shows that it covers a total area of only 17 hectares, more or less, located in Sta. Ana, Manila, which was four kilometers
away from the land subject of the application for registration which covers an area of156 hectares, more or less, described in plan
No. LRC SWO-15352 situated at Malitlit-Uoogong, Quezon City; that the contention of Ortigas that Decree No. 1425 covers an
area in Manila and also a part of Rizal is not credible, or if this were true then the area of said Rizal portion should appear on the
face of said decree of registration, which is not the case; that TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 were not derived from any
decree of registration, and that the said TCTs, being null and void, cannot be used as basis to contest the right of the applicant to
apply for registration over the subject land. The order of March 30, 1988, in its dispositive portion stated:
'WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Omnibus Motion dated October 4, 1978 and Motion to Dismiss,
dated, October 23, 1978 filed by oppositor Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership are both DENIED for lack ofmerit;
while this Court's order of September 15, 1978 directing the City Assessor of Quezon City to issue a separate tax
declaration corresponding to the 12 or 14 hectares which is an undivided portion of the land applied for registration and
now belonging to the said Dolores V. Molina; further, authorizing the City Treasurer ofQuezon City to accept the
corresponding realty taxes due thereon; and further the said Dolores V. Molina is a]lowed to intervene in this
proceedings, is hereby affirmed; likewise, the City Treasurer is directed to accept the whole of the taxes due on the
property subject of the instant petition from applicants Widows & OrphansAssociation, Inc., as prayed for in its
Manifestation With Motion subject to the right of the oppositor Dolores V. Molina as contained in this Court's
order of September 15, 1978.
"On April 26, 1988, petitioner Ortigas filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order of March 30, 1988, taking exception to
the ruling that TCT No. 77652 AND 77653 are null and void, and alleging, among others, that respondent (trial) court had no
jurisdiction to hear an application for registration of a previously registered land; that the parcels ofland applied for are covered by
TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 in the name of Ortigas; that the parcels of land covered by TCT 77652 and 77653 are within the
parcel of land covered by OCT 351; and that OCT 351 is a copy of Decree No. 1425 issued on April 26, 1905. The motion for
reconsideration prayed the respondent court to reconsider its order of March 30, 1988 on the ground that it had no jurisdiction
over the application for registration, the parcels of land subject thereof being already covered by Torrens Certificates of Title.
"On May 19, 1989, the respondent (trial) court issued an order, denying the motion for reconsideration of Ortigas, and setting the
hearing on the merits on July 26, 1989, . . . for the 'eventual presentation of the parties' respective evidence respecting their
alleged ownership of the property subject of this petition." (Rollo, pp. 24-26).
Not satisfied, respondent Ortigas instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before respondent court praying for the annulment of the
March 30, 1988 and May 19, 1989 orders of the trial court. It also prayed that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the land registration case.
On November 27, 1989, respondent court rendered the decision sought to be reviewed, the decretal portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus of petitioner Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership is
GRANTED. The orders of March 30, 1988 and May 19, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, in LRC Case
No. Q-336, are REVERSED and ANNULLED, and said LRC Case No. Q-336 is DISMISSED. The injunction issued by the Court,
per Resolution of August 8, 1989, is made permanent." (Rollo, p. 35)
Based on the plan and other evidence submitted by respondent Ortigas at the hearing of its application for preliminary injunction to enjoin the
trial court from proceeding with the hearing of LRC Case No. Q-336, respondent court held that TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653, albeit reflecting their origins
as OCT Nos. 337,19, 336, and 334, are actually derivatives of OCT No. 351, the latter having been issued pursuant to Decree 1425 and that since OCT
351 is allegedly a copy of Decree 1425, the mere fact that the original copy of Decree 1425, or a certified copy thereof, can no longer be located or
produced, does not mean that Decree 1425 covering the lots embraced in TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 was not issued. Concluding,
respondent court said: cdll
"It may be that TCT 77652 and 77653 do not show on their face (sic) that they were derived from OCT 351. But the fact remains,
as shown above, that the parcel of land covered by OCT 351 embraced the parcels of land, Lots 7 and 8, of TCT 77652 and
77653. There was, therefore, a mistake in the entries in TCT 77652 and 77653 when the same referred to OCTs 337,19, 336, 337
(sic) and 334, as their source, for the correct OCT, insofar as Lots 7 and 8 are concerned, should be OCT 351." (Rollo, p. 27)
In this petition, petitioner WIDORA avers that the respondent Court of Appeals has decided question of substance contrary to law and the applicable
decisions of this Court because:
I
"THE COURT OF APPEALS INSISTED IN UPHOLDING THE EXISTENCE OR VALIDITY OF TCTs 77652 and 77653 DESPITE
THE ABSENCE OF A SUPPORTING DECREE OF REGISTRATION.
II
"THE QUESTIONED DECISION UTILIZED SECONDARY EVIDENCE DESPITE THE EXISTENCE AND AVAILABILITY OF THE
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT.
III
"THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY TO ENJOIN THE TRIAL ON THE MERITS OF LRC NO. Q-
336 SINCE JURISDICTION RESIDES WITH THE RTC ACTING AS A LAND REGISTRATION COURT."
In essence, it is the contention of petitioner that respondent court's grounds and reasoning in support of its findings that respondent Ortigas is the
registered owner of the disputed property are baseless in law and fact. Petitioner argues that respondent court erred in sustaining the validity of TCTs
Nos. 77652 and 77653 despite the absence of a supporting decree ofregistration and instead utilized secondary evidence, OCT 351 which is supposedly
a copy of decree 1425. Petitioner maintains that Decree 1425 is itself existing and available at the Register of Deeds of Manila and on its face shows
that it covers a parcel ofland with an area of only 17 hectares in Sta. Ana, Manila while the parcel of land applied for contains an area of 156 hectares,
located at Malitlit-Uoogong, Quezon City, four (4) kilometers away from Sta. Ana, Manila and is certified by the Bureau of Lands and the
Bureau of Forestry as alienable and disposable.

Respondent Ortigas claims that respondent court committed no error in rectifying the mistake in the entries in TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 as regards
their sources and or origins arguing that the correction was justified by the fact that the plan of OCT 351 coincides with the parcels of land covered by
TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653; that OCT 351 was issued pursuant to Decree 1425 and that OCT 351 is a copy of the Decree itself. Cdpr
We find the petition impressed with merit.
Undoubtedly, the evidence (i.e., plan submitted by respondent Ortigas, testimony of its surveyor and OCT 351) adduced by private respondent to prove
the contents of Decree 1425 and admitted by respondent court is merely secondary and should not have been admitted in the first place.
Before secondary evidence may be admitted, there must be 1) proof of the execution of the original writing and 2) that it has been lost or destroyed or
cannot be produced in court or that it is in the possession of the adverse party who has failed to produce it after reasonable notice (Michael and Co. v.
Enriquez, 33 Phil. 87 [1915]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 146 [1976]). Private respondent has not shown compliance with the above
requisites which would justify the admission of the secondary evidence used and erroneously relied upon by respondent court.
Furthermore, the unilateral action of respondent court in substituting its own findings regarding the extent of the coverage of the land included in TCT
Nos. 77652 and 77653, ostensibly to correct the error in, and conform with, the technical description found in OCT 351 based on the plan and other
evidence submitted by respondent Ortigas cannot be sustained. That function is properly lodged with the office of the trial court sitting as a land
registration court and only after a full-dress investigation of the matter on the merits. It is before the land registration court that private respondent must
adduce the proof that the disputed parcels of land is legally registered in its favor.
In Dioquino v. Intermediate Appellate Court (179 SCRA 163 [1989], this Court held that "(w)hile it is true that the Court of Appealsis vested with the
'power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised . . .' (Sec. 9 [3], BP
129), there was not even a request for evidentiary hearing filed in this case. The Court ofAppeals therefore should not have admitted said evidence
without giving the adverse party opportunity to present counter evidence, if any. Besides, "evidence necessary in regards to factual issues raised in
cases falling within the Appellate Court's original and appellate jurisdiction contemplates incidental facts which were not touched upon, or fully heard by
the trial or respondent Court. The law could not have intended that the Appellate Court would hold an original and full trial of a main factual issue in a
case, which properly pertains to trial courts" (citing Lingner & Fisher GMBH v. IAC, 125 SCRA 522 [1983]). In the case at bar, it appears that the parties
have yet to fully present their respective evidence in support of their claims before the trial court. As a matter of fact, the trial court had set the case for
hearing on the merits in its order dated May 19, 1989. What is more, the case involves a vast tract of land consisting of 156 hectares, separately situated
in two outlaying localities (i.e., Quezon City and Sta. Ana, Manila). The resolution of this controversy calls for a full-blown trial on the merits if only to
afford the contending parties their respective days in court. Further, a ground for dismissal based on disputed facts, as in this case is not proper in a
motion to dismiss (Spouses Jayme and Solidarios v. Alampay, 62 SCRA 131 [1975]).
In the case at bar, respondent Ortigas alleges that Decree 1425 embraces the lots covered by its TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 whi ch are identical to the
lots applied for by petitioner. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that Decree 1425 covers a 17-hectare lot located at Sta. Ana, Manila while the lot
applied for is alienable and disposable as certified by the Bureau of Lands and by the Bureau of Forestry and has an area of 156 hectares located in
Quezon City four (4) kilometers away from Sta. Ana, Manila. Hence, the necessity of a trial on the merits to ascertain the disputed facts, i.e., whether the
lot applied for is covered by Decree No. 1425 or is alienable and disposable. Under Act 496, it is the decree of registration issued by the Land
Registration Commission which is the basis for the subsequent issuance of the certificate of title by the corresponding Register of Deeds that quiets the
title to and binds the land (De la Merced v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 240 [1962]). Consequently, if no decree of registration had been issued covering
the parcel of land applied for, then the certificate of title issued over the said parcel of land does not quiet the title to nor bind the land and is null and
void.
Besides, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and, unless it constitutes clearly a grave abuse of discretion or was issued without
or in excess of jurisdiction, the error, if any, should be corrected by appeal in due time, after trial and judgment on the merits and not by the extraordinary
writ of prohibition (Moreno v. Macadaeg, 7 SCRA 700 [1963]; National Investment and Development Corporation v. Aquino, 163 SCRA 53 [1988]).
Furthermore, on grounds of pre-maturity, interlocutory orders cannot be decided by the appellate courts until the lower courtshall have decided the
merit of the case. Thus, in Villegas v. Fernando (27 SCRA 1119 [1969]), this Court held:
"This first assigned error (assailing the personality of the appellees to ask for a review of the decision and decree in the
registration case) is actually directed at an earlier order dated 26 April 1961 denying appellants heirs' motion to dismiss the
petitions for review filed by the present appellees. And inasmuch as said order of 26 April 1961 is interlocutory, there being as yet
no trial and decision on the merits of the petition for review, it is premature to raise said assigned error in appellants heirs' instant
appeal. We shall rule thereon only when the proper time comes, i.e., after the lowercourt shall have settled not only the still
unresolved status and rights of the parties, particularly those of petitioners (sic) for review, now appellees herein, almost
all of whom are claiming that they are not mere homestead or free patent applicants but patent or title holders, but also whether
the original decision should be maintained or not. For the courtbelow, after receiving and hearing the parties, may still conclude in
favor of appellants herein. (Emphasis supplied). LibLex
But not only that. Respondent court committed a procedural lapse in correcting the alleged error in the questioned TCTs. A certificate of title cannot be
altered, amended or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law (Sec. 48, PD 1529; Natalia Realty Corp. v. Vallez, 173 SCRA 534
[1989]; Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 [1915]). Also, no correction of certificate oftitle shall be made except by order of the court in a petition filed for
the purpose and entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was entered (Sec. 112, Act 496; now Sec. 108, PD 1529). While the law
fixes no prescriptive period therefor, the court, however, is not authorized to alter or correct the certificate of title if it would mean the reopening of the
decree ofregistration beyond the period allowed by law (Rodriguez, v. Tirona, 68 Phil. 264 [1939]).
Respondent Ortigas, on the other hand, argues that this Court has already recognized the fact that the parcel of land under TCT No. 227758 from which
TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 were issued, are covered by, among others, Decree 1425 issued in GLRO Record No. 917 (Rollo, p. 94).
The argument is without merit. True this Court declared in Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership v. Ruiz (148 SCRA 326 [1987] that "petitioner is the
duly registered owner of the land * (then) in dispute as evidenced by OCT Nos. 13, 33, 334, and 337 by virtueof Decrees Nos. 240, 1942 and 1925
issued in GLRO Record Nos. 699, 875 and 917 . . . ." Nowhere in said decision, however, is a pronouncement that TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 were
issued from TCT No. 227758. On the contrary, it is not disputed by the parties that TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 themselves show that they were derived
from OCT No. 337, 19, 336 and 334 and not from OCT 351 or TCT 227758. If indeed, the real origin thereof is OCT No. 351, what respondent Ortigas
should have done was to file a petition for the correction of the TCTs in question as stated earlier.
While it may be true, as respondent Ortigas argues, that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a
certificate of title, it is nevertheless true that the aforesaid rule only applies where there exists no serious controversy as to the certificate's authenticity
vis-a-vis the land covered therein. In the case at bar, the claimed origin of the questioned TCTs evidently appear to be different from what is stated
therein. It does not appear indubitable that the disputed parcels of land are properly reflected in the TCTs relied upon by private respondent. Off-hand,
and as the parties admit, the TCTs do not show that they are actually derivatives of OCT 351. Such being the case, the rule relied upon cannot therefore
apply. One who relies on a document evidencing his title to the property must prove not only the genuineness thereof but also the identity ofthe land
therein referred to (Cf. Lasam v. Director of lands, 65 Phil. 637 [1938]). In the case at bar, private respondent's TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 trace their
origins from OCT Nos. 337, 19, 336 and 334 and not from OCT 351 as it is now claimed by respondent Ortigas.
The trial court cannot be faulted for not having granted respondent Ortigas' motion to dismiss simply because the TCTs relied upon by the latter do not
accurately reflect their supposed origin. Thus, in Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo (49 Phil. 769 [1926]) thisCourt held that the "simple possession of a
certificate of title, under the Torrens System, does not make the possessor the true owner of all the property described therein. If a person obtains a title,
under the Torrens System, which includes by mistake or oversight land which cannot be registered under the Torrens System, he does not, by
virtue of said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included (citing Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 [1915])." This
pronouncement was reiterated by the Court in Caragay-Layno v. Court of Appeals (133 SCRA 718 [1984]; Coronel v. Intermediate Appellate Court (155
SCRA 270 [1987]; Goloy v. Court of Appeals (173 SCRA 26 [1989]; and Miranda v. Court of Appeals (177 SCRA 303 [1989]). As it is in this case, a
certificate of title cannot be considered conclusive evidence of ownership where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin.

Further, the fact that respondent Ortigas' motion to dismiss was denied does not mean that it could no longer participate in the resolution of the case and
factual determination of the parties' allegations. As correctly stated by the trial court, "(i)t is to be stressed, however, that the denial of oppositor Ortigas'
instant motion for reconsideration does not necessarily mean that it is deprived of any participation in the instant petition. For as already stated, what
follows after its denial is the eventual presentationof all the parties' respective evidence respecting their alleged ownership of the property subject of this
petition." (Rollo, p. 65).
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of respondent court is SET ASIDE and the orders of the trial court in LRC Case No. Q-336 entitled, "In Re-
Application for Registration of Title, WIDOWS and ORPHANS ASSOCIATION, Inc., Applicant, ORTIGAS & COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP and
DOLORES V. MOLINA, Oppositors", dated March 30, 1988 and May 19, 1989 are hereby REINSTATED insofar as the denial of oppositor Ortigas'
motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration, respectively, are concerned and the case remanded to the trial court for trial and adjudication on the
merits.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., I concur and also in the separate concurring opinion of J. Gutierrez, Jr.
Davide, Jr., J., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., concurring:
Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136 purports to cover extensive portions of several provinces and cities in Luzon and Metro Manila from Dingalan Bay in
the north to Tayabas Bay in the south. It is the most fantastic land claim in the history of the country and has spawned countless land swindles and
rackets not to mention tedious litigation in so many trial courts, the Court of Appeals and thisCourt. LibLex
I fail to understand why the appropriate government authorities do not take determined efforts to slay the dragon once and for all. Cases involving lots
sold or conveyed by the Mariano San Pedro y Esteban estate, which incidentally claims all land on which government buildings are constructed in
Quezon City including the sprawling University of the Philippines campus, the Batasan and Commission on Audit complex, the areas around and
including the Quezon Memorial Circle all the way to and beyond EDSA, etc., are periodically taken to court and just as periodically disposed of after
years of litigation. To avoid having the Government as an adversary, the Estate has reportedly in a spirit of "magnanimity" waived its rights to lots on
which government buildings are located. I understand that certain Torrens Title owners have been "awarded" similar assurances in the past. However,
squatters and innocent buyers have been given lease rights or outright deeds of sale over land possessed and owned by other persons resulting in
litigation.
I concur in the decision because the Court has to accord due process to all litigants and apply basic rules of procedure fairly and evenly. While I have
background knowledge of so many scams arising from the dubious Titulo de Propriedad, we are bound to act only on evidence found in the records. The
association's name of Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. is a heart tugging appellation. Who are the members? Are they victims of a scam? Or are
they being used by smart operators? Since Ortigas and Company admits to an error in its title, the extent and import of the error have to be ascertained.
These call for presentation ofevidence which will be to everybody's interest if adduced.
I believe the Department of Justice should look more carefully into the Titulo de Propriedad situation. Instead of running after individual termites gnawing
away in all directions, the Government should ferret out the mother of the termites and dispose of it once and for all, if indeed it is a termite and not the
legitimate and aggrieved owner it claims to be. prLL
Footnotes
*Situated in Ugong Sur, Pasig, Rizal, bounded by Ortigas Ave., E. Rodriguez, Jr. Ave. and Escarpment Road, containing an area of162 hectares,
more or less, consolidated into one parcel, under TCT No. 227758 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-26348. March 30, 1988.]
TRINIDAD GABRIEL, ANDREA GABRIEL, ISABEL GABRIEL, ESTER GABRIEL, BENJAMIN GABRIEL, SALUD GABRIEL,
VICTORIA GABRIEL, RIZALINA GABRIEL and ANDRES GABRIEL, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PETRITA
PASCUAL and RUDYARDO SANTIAGO, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CADASTRAL COURT; JURISDICTION; LIMITED TO NECESSARY CORRECTION OF TECHNICAL ERRORS. It has long been
settled that in cadastral cases the jurisdiction of the court over lands already registered is limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in the
description of the lands, provided such corrections do not impair the substantial rights of the registered owner, and that such jurisdiction cannot operate
to deprive a registered owner of his title. (Pamintuan v. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 561 [1922]).
2. ID.; ID.; MAY DETERMINE PRIORITY OF OVER-LAPPING OR OVER-LYING REGISTERED TITLES. In a later case, such power ofthe court was
further clarified and amplified to the effect that the above proposition does not exclude from the jurisdiction of thecourt the power to determine the
priority of over-lapping or over-lying registered titles. There is nothing in this proposition which militates against allowing the court in a cadastral case to
determine which one of several conflicting registered titles shall prevail. This power is necessary for a complete settlement of the title to the land, which
is the express purpose of cadastral proceedings and must therefore, be considered as within the jurisdiction of the courts in such proceedings.
Furthermore, it was stressed that in such proceedings no final decree or registration was reopened or set aside (Timbol v. Diaz, 44 Phil. 589-590 [1932]).
3. ID.; ID.; CORRECTION IN THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION; WELL TAKEN. The Court of Appeals found that the lower courtmerely corrected the
error in the technical description appearing in Plan Psu-9742 Amd. so as to make it conform to the areas and technical description of Lot No. 557 of the
Hermosa Cadastre and Lot No. 363 of Orani Cadastre which lots embody the correct technical description thereof. Thus, the respondent
appellate court stressed that this is not a reopening of the decree ofregistration for the land covered by the
certificate of title of Potenciano Gabriel because that title stands and its existence remains unaffected. The action therefore of the trial court is well within
its jurisdiction.
4. ID.; EVIDENCE; TITLE OF REGISTERED OWNERS CANNOT BE DEFEATED BY ORAL EVIDENCE. There is no dispute that Eligio Naval and
his successors-in-interest have always been in possession of said property since that date. As previously stated, petitioners' claim that such occupation
was by virtue of a loan or accommodation, was not supported by evidence. As held by thiscourt, title and possession of registered owners, cannot be
defeated by oral evidence which can easily be fabricated and contradicted (Sinoan v. Sorongan, 136 SCRA 407 [1985]).
5. ID.; LACHES; FAILURE TO PROSECUTE CLAIM FOR TWENTY YEARS, FATAL TO CAUSE OF ACTION. As correctly ruled by
theCourt of Appeals, petitioners for failing to prosecute their claims for twenty (20) years have lost by laches their right to recover their property. In a
similar case, this Court ruled that failure of the deceased or his predecessors-in-interest to take steps to assert any rights over the disputed land for 20
years from date of registration of title is fatal to their cause of action ground of laches (Layno v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 718 [1984]).
D E C I S I O N
PARAS, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse: (a) the Decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on May 31, 1966 in CA-G.R.
No. 25418-R affirming the Decision 2 of the then Court of First Instance of Bataan in Civil Case No. 2283 which dismissed the complaint for
recovery of land due to laches and prescription and required complainants (herein petitioners) to surrender their certificates of title, and (b) the
Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals dated July 7, 1966 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
As found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court, the factual background of this case is as follows:
On April 12, 1909, a survey was made for Santiago Quimson of a parcel of land located in Barrio Totopiac, Orani, Bataan, containing an area of 687,360
square meters, more or less, the survey plan being designated as I-1054. This parcel of land was registered on September 18, 1909, and Original
Certificate of Title No. 46 of the Registry of Deeds of Bataan was issued in favor of Quimson. Subsequently, a cadastral survey was made from
February, 1919 to March, 1920 which resulted in the increase of the area of the land by 17,053 square meters and the designation of the land as Lot No.
363 of Orani Cadastre with an area of 704,413 square meters. After hearing, the Cadastral Court confirmed the title of Quimson and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 723 was issued in lieu of Original Certificate of Title No. 46. The lot was subdivided into Lot No. 363-A with an area of 209,250
square meters for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 760 was issued, and Lot No. 363-B with an area of 495,163 square meters for which Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 759 was issued. Lot No. 363-B was subsequently acquired by Eligio Naval and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 787 was issued in
his name on July 6, 1926.
In December, 1916, a parcel of land located in Barrio Bagumbayan, Hermosa, Bataan was surveyed for Potenciano Gabriel. Survey Plan Psu-9742 was
prepared and approved by the Director of Lands, with an area of 2,729,712 square meters. This plan was subsequently amended because it was found
that certain portions of the land covered by Plan I-1054 in the name of Quimson and later transferred to Naval were included. The undivided portions
were excluded by order of the Court and so Plan Psu-9742 was amended (Plan Psu-9742-Amd) with an area of 2,436,280 or a reduction of 293,432
square meters. The Original Certificate of Title No. 1264 issued in the name of Potenciano Gabriel on November 1, 1918 contained the reduced area.
A cadastral survey was also made of the Municipality of Hermosa, Bataan and the land of Potenciano Gabriel, covered by Plan Psu-9742 Amd. became
Lot No. 557 with a reduced area of 2,096,433 square meters, or a further reduction by 339,847 square meters. No new certificate of title was issued for
Cadastral Lot No. 557 showing the reduced area so that Original Certificate ofTitle No. 1264 subsisted with an area of 2,436,280 square meters under
Plan Psu-9742 Amd. Accordingly the partition of the estate of Potenciano Gabriel by his heirs on August 28, 1947 was based on plan Psu-9742 Amd.
under Original Certificate of Title No. 1264 with an area of 2,436,280 square meters, instead of Lot No. 557 with a smaller area of 2,096,433 square
meters. cdrep
Petitioners who are the heirs of the late Potenciano Gabriel and alleged joint co-owners of 1196 square meters of a fishpond situated in Hermosa,
Bataan by virtue of an agreement of partition of the estate of Don Potenciano, filed a complaint, Civil Case No. 2283 at the Court of First
Instance of Bataan against Petrita Pascual and Rudyardo Santiago, joint administratrix and administrator of the estate of Eligio Naval, a son-in-
law of Don Potenciano.
They claim that said land was usurped by the late Eligio Naval who was also an adjoining owner; that said land was only loaned to the latter for dike and
water control purposes of the latter's fishpond and that after the death of Don Potenciano on February 17, 1943, private respondents continued to
possess, occupy and use said property and notwithstanding repeated demands refused to vacate and to return the possession thereof, to the
petitioners.
Hence, it was prayed that the defendants, private respondents herein, be ordered to vacate the premises described in the complaint and to pay
damages (Rollo, pp. 18-20; Record on Appeal, p. 96).
The records show that the portion of 1,196 square meters sought to be recovered by petitioners is included in Lot No. 363-B of the Orani Cadastre and
in amended plan Psu-9742, mentioned above, which shall hereafter be referred to as Psu-9742 Amd. After the cadastral survey of Orani, said portion
always remained in the possession of the late Eligio Naval because as above stated, it was included in Lot 363, which was subdivided into Lot 363-A
and Lot 363-B. The latter, acquired by Naval with TCT No. 787 in his name, embraces the portion in question (Rollo, pp. 22-23).
There appears to be no controversy that aforesaid lot had always been in the possession of Naval in the concept of owner, as petitioners' claim that the
same was merely loaned to Naval, was not properly supported by evidence, as found both by the trialcourt and the Court of Appeals.
After trial, the court rendered its decision on August 29, 1958 dismissing the complaint on the ground that the right of the plaintiffs to the land in question,
if any, was lost by prescription, and that the plaintiffs are also guilty of laches in failing to prosecute their claim within a reasonable time. prLL
Specifically, the dispositive portion of said judgment reads:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby renders judgment:
(1) Dismissing the complaint of the plaintiffs;
(2) Ordering the plaintiffs to surrender the owners' copies of the certificates of title issued pursuant to the subdivision of Plan Psu-
9742-Amd. to the Register of Deeds for safekeeping until the plaintiffs could submit a new subdivision plan based on the technical
description of Lot No. 557 of the Hermosa Cadastre; and
(3) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the costs.
"SO ORDERED.
"Balanga, Bataan, August 29, 1958."
(Record on Appeal, pp. 127-128; Rollo, p. 113)
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court in its Decision promulgated on May 31, 1966, the dispositive portionof which states:

"WHEREFORE, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellants."
(Rollo, pp. 18-31).
The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied on July 7, 1966.
Hence, this petition.
In the resolution of December 19, 1966, the petition for review on certiorari was given due course (Rollo, p. 166). In the notice ofJanuary 5, 1967 (Rollo,
p. 169) petitioners were required to file brief. Meanwhile, private respondent Petrita Pascual in a manifestation and motion dated January 10, 1967
(Rollo, p. 170) informed this Court that the property in litigation was transferred by absolute sale to the spouses Florencio Lucio and Conchita Gandan
and she prayed that said spouses be substituted in this action in lieu of Petrita Pascual in her capacity as co-administratrix.
In the resolution of January 23, 1967 (Rollo, p. 172), petitioners were required to comment on aforesaid motion for substitution ofparties. Said comment
was filed by the petitioners on February 8, 1967 (Rollo, p. 176) opposing said motion as improper and praying instead that said parties be joined as
additional respondents. Thus in the resolution of March 7, 1967 (Rollo, p. 184), thiscourt authorized the inclusion of new parties, Florencio Lucio and
Constancio Lucio. Petitioners submitted their Brief (Rollo, p. 177) on February 9, 1967 while respondents Petrita Pascual, Florencio Lucio and
Constancio Lucio submitted their Brief on May 2, 1967 (Rollo, p. 195). For failure to file petitioner's Reply Brief, the court considered the case submitted
for decision without the Reply Brief on November 8, 1968 (Rollo, p. 211). cdll
The grounds relied upon for the petition are as follows:
1. PLAN PSU-9742-AMD. COVERED BY ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 1264 WITH AN AREA OF 2,436,280
SQUARE METERS, WHICH AREA WAS REDUCED BY THE CADASTRAL SURVEY OF ORANI AND FURTHER REDUCED BY
THE CADASTRAL SURVEY OF HERMOSA OR A LOSS OF 336,901 SQUARE METERS TO CONFORM WITH LOT
557 OF THE CADASTRAL SURVEY OF HERMOSA IMPAIRS GRAVELY THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF THE REGISTERED
OWNER AND IS IN CONFLICT WITH AND CONTRARY TO THE APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES AND DECISION OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT, NOTABLY THE DECISIONS IN THE CASES ENTITLED "P.I. VS. ARIAS, CABALLERO, 34 PHIL. 541.
2. THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED IN THE LOWER COURT, AN ACTION PUBLICIANA OR TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF A
CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND WITHHELD FROM PLAINTIFFS' POSSESSION, IS IT NOT A GRAVE ERROR FOR
THE COURT OFFIRST INSTANCE TO HAVE THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE REGISTERED PROPERTY
CORRECTED SO AS TO CONFORM TO CADASTRAL LOT AND, THEREFORE, A COMPOUNDED GRAVE ERROR FOR THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS TO SUSTAIN SUCH CORRECTION?
3. IS IT NOT THAT PROPERTY RIGHTS AND POSSESSION OF A REGISTERED OWNER UNDER THE PROVISION OF THE
LAND REGISTRATION ACT ARE IMPRESCRIPTIBLE UNDER THE PROVISION OF SECTION 46 OF ACT NO. 496 AS
AMENDED? (Rollo, pp. 8-9).
The main issue in this case is whether or not courts have the authority to order the necessary correction of an erroneous technical description and make
it conform to the correct area.
Petitioners contend that in ordering that OCT No. 1264 made to conform with the land covered by Cadastral Lot No. 557 which contains an area very
much less than that covered by said title, the trial court and later the Court of Appeals deprived them of their property as registered owners. Such act,
petitioners insist, would amount to a reopening of a decree of title after the lapse of the one-year statutory period, or the granting of an entirely new
decree to a land already registered under act 496, now P.D. 1529. Furthermore, such procedure is tantamount to a collateral attack on the title.
This contention is untenable.
It has long been settled that in cadastral cases the jurisdiction of the court over lands already registered is limited to the necessary correction of technical
errors in the description of the lands, provided such corrections do not impair the substantial rights of the registered owner, and that such jurisdiction
cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his title. (Pamintuan v. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 561 [1922]). cdphil
In a later case, such power of the court was further clarified and amplified to the effect that the above proposition does not exclude from the
jurisdiction of the court the power to determine the priority of over-lapping or over-lying registered titles. There is nothing in this proposition which
militates against allowing the court in a cadastral case to determine which one of several conflicting registered titles shall prevail. This power is
necessary for a complete settlement of the title to the land, which is the express purpose of cadastral proceedings and must therefore, be considered as
within the jurisdiction of the courts in such proceedings. Furthermore, it was stressed that in such proceedings no final decree or registration was
reopened or set aside (Timbol v. Diaz, 44 Phil. 589-590 [1932]).
In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals found that the lower court did not order the reopening of the decree of registration for the land covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 1264 in the name of Potenciano Gabriel. Neither did the lower court decree a new registration in favor of the
estate of Eligio Naval because said estate has a title that embraces actually the portion in dispute, although it is also included in the Original
Certificate of Title No. 1264 of Potenciano Gabriel. What the lower court did was merely to correct the error in the technical description appearing in Plan
Psu-9742 Amd. so as to make it conform to the areas and technical description of Lot No. 557 of the Hermosa Cadastre and Lot No. 363 of Orani
Cadastre which lots embody the correct technical description thereof. Thus, the respondent appellate court stressed that thus is not a reopening of the
decree ofregistration for the land covered by the certificate of title of Potenciano Gabriel because that title stands and its existence remains unaffected.
The action therefore of the trial court is well within its jurisdiction (Rollo, pp. 40-41).
The fact that the portion of land in question is not a part of the property of the late Potenciano Gabriel, is established not only by the Hermosa and Orani
Cadastre but by the behavior of Potenciano Gabriel himself, who is the original owner. He did not take the necessary action to recover said lot during his
lifetime but after the discovery of its occupation in March, 1933, by the late Eligio Naval, he allowed instead the continued use and occupation of the
same. In fact, there is no dispute that Eligio Naval and his successors-in-interest have always been in possession of said property since that date. As
previously stated, petitioners' claim that such occupation was by virtue of a loan or accommodation, was not supported by evidence. As held by
this court, title and possession of registered owners, cannot be defeated by oral evidence which can easily be fabricated and contradicted (Simoan v.
Sorongan, 136 SCRA 407 [1985]).
As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, both parties were in occupation of their respective properties within the correct areas and
boundaries sought to be adjusted in this case. More than that, it was also found that there is no impairment ofsubstantial right or the deprivation of the
title of a registered owner, sought to be guarded against. The heirs of Potenciano Gabrielare not deprived of the land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 1264, nor are they unjustly deprived of the portion in question because on the basis of the correct technical description, that
portion is not a part of their property but a part of the property of the late Eligio Naval under TCT No. 797. Hence, this Court has held that the Land
Registration Act and the Cadastral Act do not give anybody who resorts to the provisions thereof a better title than what he really and lawfully has. More
specifically the decision reads: Cdpr
". . . The Land Registration Act as well as the Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title in good faith and does not permit its
provisions to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or that one should enrich himself at the expense of another
(Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil., 442; Angelo vs. Director of Lands, 49 Phil. 838). The above-stated Acts do not give anybody, who
resorts to the provisions thereof, a better title than he really and lawfully has. If he happened to obtain it by mistake or to secure,
to the prejudice of his neighbor, more land than he really owns, with or without bad faith on his part, the certificate of title, which
may have been issued to him under the circumstances, may and should be cancelled or corrected (Legarda and Prieto vs.
Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590). This is permitted by section 112 of Act. No. 496, which is applicable to the Cadastral Act because it is so
provided expressly by the provisions of Section 11 of the latter Act. It cannot be otherwise because, as stated in the
case of Domingo vs. Santos, Ongsiako, Lim y Cia. (55 Phil., 361), errors in the plans of lands sought to be registered in the
registry and reproduced in the certificate of title issued later, do not annul the decree of registration on the ground that it is not the
plan but the land itself which is registered in the registry . . ." (Angeles v. Samia, 66 Phil. pp. 449-450 [1938]).
Finally as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, petitioners for failing to prosecute their claims for twenty (20) years have lost by laches their right to
recover their property. In a similar case, this Court ruled that failure of the deceased or his predecessors-in-interest to take steps to assert any rights
over the disputed land for 20 years from date of registration of title is fatal to their causeof action on ground of laches (Layno v. Court of Appeals, 133
SCRA 718 [1984]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Yap, Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-15415. April 26, 1961.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, applicant, vs. PEDRO ABACITE, ET AL., claimants. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellant.
Solicitor General for applicant.
Lualhati Estrella-Hilario for claimant.
Jesus Avancea for petitioner-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS; SUBSTITUTION OF TITLE; JURISDICTION OF CADASTRAL COURT TO DIMINISH OR ENLARGE AREA OF
PROPERTY. Where the purpose of the cadastral proceedings was not to adjudicate ownership of the land to its claimant, but merely to substitute the
old certificate of title issued in a prior proceeding with a new one, the cadastral court would have no jurisdiction to diminish or enlarge the area of the
property thus already decreed.
2. ID.; ID.; AMENDMENT IN AREA THAT WILL NOT AMOUNT TO REOPENING OF DECREE. A petition for the correction of the area and
description in the new certificate, of the land belonging to petitioner and previously registered in his name, does not invol ve a reopening of the original
decree.
D E C I S I O N
BARRERA, J p:
On December 16, 1958, the Development Bank of the Philippines (formerly Rehabilitation Finance Corporation), filed with the Court of First Instance of
Davao, sitting as a cadastral court (in Cad. Case No. N-2, LRC Cad. Rec. No. L-14), a petition for amendment of OCT No. O-117 issued by the Register
of Deeds in its name, pursuant to the decree of said court of February 18, 1958.
It was alleged that petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land situated in barrio Malagos, Davao City, with an area of 15.6882 hectares and previously
covered by TCT No. T-4629; that when the State started cadastral proceedings, which included the said parcel of land, petitioner filed its answer
claiming ownership over the same, which was referred to as Lot No. 1676, specifying the area of said land to be 15.6882 hectares; that in support of
such allegation, TCT No. T- 4629 was submitted in court and presented as exhibit, and that nobody opposed the same. When the certificate of title was
issued by the Register of Deeds, petitioner found out that Lot No. 1676 merely contains 93,052 square meters and not 15.6882 hectares as claimed by it
in its answer and as embraced in TCT No. T-4629 presented as evidence of such ownership. Petitioner, therefore, prayed that OCT No. O-117 be
amended to include the remaining portion of 63,830 square meters designated in the new cadastral plan as part of Lot No. 1674.
After hearing the petition, the court issued an order denying the same, on the ground that since in its answer petitioner merely claimed ownership of Lot
No. 1676 and did not include a portion of Lot No. 1674, the cadastral court could not have decreed more, nor could it now amend such decree. Its
motion for reconsideration of the order having been denied, petitioner interposed the instant appeal.
The property originally covered by TCT No. T-4629 and admittedly belonging to petitioner was described in said certificate as follows:
"A parcel of land situated in the District of Gianga, Davao City, more particularly bounded and described as follows: Beginning at
point marked 1 on plan H-216582, N. 7-21' W., 1,401.87 m. more or less from B.L.L.M. No. 28, Gianga Cad. No. 174 (now within
the City of Davao), thence S. 51-43' W., 20.112 m. to point 2; N. 33-34' W., 46.56 m. to point 3; N. 46-38' W., 491.71 m. to point
4; N. 82-30' E., 490.43 m. to point 5; S. 48-47' E., 300.69 m. to point 6; S. 56-03' W., 199.55 m. to point 1, point of beginning. . . .
Containing an area of 15.6882 hectares. . . . Bounded on the North, by property of Mariano Balbuena; on the Northeast, by
property of Heirs of Walan (Bagobo); on the Southeast by properties of Molo (Ata) and Heirs of Lemondang (Bagobo); and on the
Southeast, by public land. . . ."
It appears, however, that for purposes of the cadastral proceedings, the aforementioned parcel of land was subdivided into two lots, one of 93,052
square meters, designated as Lot No. 1676 and another of 63,830 square meters which was included in Lot No. 1674. When required to file its
answer, petitioner mentioned only Lot No. 1676, although in specifying the boundaries and area thereof, it stated:
"2. Area and boundaries. That said lot is situated in the barrio of District of Guianga, Davao City of said municipality, contains
an area of 156,882 square meters, more or less, according to the cadastral plan, and is bounded:
On the North by property of Mariano Balbuena;
On the Northeast by property of Heirs of Walan (Bagobo);
On the Southeast by properties of Molo (Ata) and Heirs of Lemondang (Bagobo), and
On the Southwest by Public Land."
Patently, this is exactly the same parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-4629. These data notwithstanding, the cadastral court decreed in favor of
petitioner only Lot No. 1676, and declared the whole of Lot No. 1674, including the portion of 63,830 square meters, as public land. 1
Under Section 112 of Act 496, alteration, amendment or correction of a certificate of title may be allowed where there has been, among others, error,
omission, or mistake in the issuance thereof, provided that the amendment, alteration, or erasure would not amount to a reopening of the original decree
of registration and the "title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith" be not thereby impaired.
In the instant case, prior to the institution of the cadastral proceedings, the whole of 15.6882 hectares was already covered by a Torrens certificate of
title. It is true that the original certificate of title was issued pursuant to a homestead patent, but such a patent once registered under the Land
Registration Act becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens title 2 especially in the absence of any private third party claiming the land against the
Government. As far as said lot is concerned, therefore, the cadastral proceeding would no longer be for the purpose of adjudicating ownership thereof to
its claimant (herein appellant), because that was already accomplished in a previous appropriate proceeding, but merely to substitute the old certificate
of title issued in said prior proceeding with a new one. The cadastral court, certainly, would have no jurisdiction to diminish nor enlarge the area of the
property thus already decreed. (Govt. of the Phils., vs. Arias, 36 Phil., 194).
True it is that petitioner-appellant erroneously referred to its property as Lot No. 1676, yet it has sufficiently identified the same to be the lot covered
already by TCT No. T-4629. For this reason, even the State, through the Solicitor General, acknowledged appellant's right over a portion of Lot No. 1674
(the cadastral court decreed the whole of said lot to be public land), and manifested its conformity to the amendment prayed for by
petitioner appellant. (See Manifestation dated March 1, 1960.) Under the circumstances, the amendment of OCT No. O-117, so as to include thereunder
all the land covered by a prior title (TCT No. T-4629), is in order.
In the first place, such correction sought by appellant will not amount to a reopening of the original decree. On the contrary, the petition to include in the
new certificate of title that portion of Lot No. 1674 originally covered by TCT No. T-4629, would even give effect to and make the later decree conform
with the original adjudication. As held by this Court, a petition, as the one presented in this case, for the correction of the area and description in the new
certificate, of the land lawfully belonging to petitioner and previously registered in his name, does not involve a reopening of the original decree. 3
Secondly, the amendment of the new certificate will cause no prejudice to any third party. As stated above, the Government, i n whose favor the entire
Lot No. 1674 has been decreed, recognizes the right of appellant over the portion in question and agrees to the amendment prayed for by said
appellant.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and another hereby entered directing the Register of Deeds of Davao to amend OCT No. O-
117 of his office, to include therein all the land embraced in TCT No. T-629. Without costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, Actg. C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-22538. October 31, 1967.]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner-appellee, vs. PRIMITIVA MALLORCA, oppositor-appellant.
Ramon B. de los Reyes for petitioner-appellee.
Eugenio G. Gemarino for oppositor-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. MORTGAGES; NATURE OF RECORDED MORTGAGE; EFFECT OF CHANGES IN OWNERSHIP. A recorded real estate mortgage is a right in
rem, a lien inseparable from the property mortgaged. Until discharged, it follows the property. It subsists notwithstanding changes of ownership; all
subsequent purchasers of the property must respect the mortgage, whether the transfer to them be with or without the consent of the mortgagee.
2. ID.; ID.; INDIVISIBILITY OF MORTGAGE. A real estate mortgage is indivisible. Each and every parcel of land under mortgage answers for the
totality of the debt.
3. ID.; EFFECT OF REGISTRATION. Registration of the mortgage in the Register of Deeds is notice to all persons of the existence thereof.
4. ID.; RIGHT OF REDEMPTION; FAILURE TO EXERCISE. Failure of the owner of a parcel of land mortgaged to exercise his right of redemption
ends his interest in the land and estops him from denying the mortgage lien thereon.
5. JURISDICTION; CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATES OF TITLE; WHEN CADASTRAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION. A cadastral court has
jurisdiction to entertain a petition for the cancellation of a certificate of title where the registered owner has been lawfully divested of his title to the
property and there is no substantial controversy in regard thereto between the petitioner and any other interested party.
D E C I S I O N
SANCHEZ, J p:
Disputed by appellant Primitiva Mallorca is the correctness of the order of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, sitting as a Cadastral Court, 1 directing her
to surrender to the Register of Deeds her co-owner's copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-24256. This is necessary to enable the Philippine
National Bank 2 to secure in its name Torrens title to the property involved which it acquired in a foreclosure sale upon mortgage executed in its favor.
The background facts may be recited as follows:
Way back in 1950, Ruperta Lavilles mortgaged a 48,965 square meter-parcel of land situate in Passi, Iloilo (Lot 1504, Passi Cadastral Survey) to
the PNB as security for a loan of P1,800.00. The lot was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title 27070 in the name of Ruperta Lavill es. The mortgage
was duly recorded.
On January 12, 1958, while the mortgage above described was in full force and effect, and without PNB's knowledge and consent, Ruperta Lavilles sold
to appellant Primitiva Mallorca 20,000 square meters of the mortgaged land.
On January 17, 1958, Mallorca moved the Iloilo cadastral court to have the sale to her duly annotated on the title, 3 and, for the purpose, to
require PNB to surrender the owner's copy of TCT 27070 to the Register of Deeds.
The court order of February 3, 1958 directed PNB to deliver said TCT 27070 to the Register of Deeds, and warned that "[t]he mortgage in favor of the
Philippine National Bank is duly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds and to whomsoever the land is sold the vendee will assume the
responsibility of complying with the provisions of the mortgage."
The Register of Deeds then cancelled TCT 27070, issued a new one, TCT 24256, making two co-owner's copies of the title one each for Ruperta
Lavilles and for Primitiva Mallorca. PNB's mortgage lien was annotated on both copies.
Ruperta Lavilles failed to pay her mortgage debt. PNB, on April 16, 1958, foreclosed the mortgage extrajudicially. On May 12, 1958, a certificate of sale
was issued to PNB as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale. This certificate of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Iloilo.
In March, 1959, Mallorca sued PNB to enforce her right of redemption, with damages. 4
On February 9, 1960, judgment was rendered in the case just stated, dismissing the claim for damages but declaring Mallorca"entitled to exercise her
right of redemption with respect to the 20,000 square meters sold to her by Ruperta Lavilles within the period specified by law."
Mallorca's appeal from this judgment was, on June 18, 1960, denied by the lower court it was filed out of time. Her move to reconsider was rejected.
She then went to the Court of Appeals on mandamus. On January 14, 1961, the appellate court denied the same for lack of merit. 5
Primitiva Mallorca failed to exercise her right of redemption as decreed by the court.
Thus, the final deed of sale in favor of PNB, dated February 19, 1962, was presented to the Register of Deeds on April 10, 1962 for registration. The
latter refused to register without Mallorca's co- owner's copy of TCT 24256. By letter of May 18, 1962, the Register of Deeds required Mallorca to
surrender said copy. She did not comply.
And so, PNB lodged the present petition for consolidation of title in the cadastral court. The bank prayed that Mallorca's co- owner's copy of TCT 24256
be declared null and void, and that the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the same and to issue a new title in the name of PNB, upon payment of
the legal fees.
By order of August 18, 1962, the court a quo required Mallorca "to deliver the co-owner's duplicate copy of TCT 24256 to the Register of Deeds within a
period of five (5) days."
Mallorca appealed this order to the Court of Appeals. 6 The latter, however, in its resolution of February 18, 1964, certified the case to this Court, as the
issues present questions of law.
1 Appellant's stand is that her undivided interest consisting of 20,000 square meters of the mortgaged lot, remained unaffected by the foreclosure and
subsequent sale to PNB. Because, so she argues, she was not a party to the real estate mortgage in favor of PNB, and she "neither secured nor
contracted a loan" with said bank. What PNB foreclosed, she maintains, "was that portion belonging to Ruperta Lavilles only", not the part belonging to
her.
Appellant's position clashes with precepts well-entrenched in law. By Article 2126 of the Civil Code, 7 a "mortgage directly and immediately subjects the
property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted." Sale or
transfer cannot affect or release the mortgage. A purchaser is necessarily bound to acknowledge and respect the encumbrance to which is subjected the
purchased thing and which is at the disposal of the creditor "in order that he, under the terms of the contract, may recover the amount of his credit
therefrom." 8 For, a recorded real estate mortgage is a right in rem, a lien on the property whoever its owner may be. 9 Because the personality of the
owner is disregarded; the mortgage subsists notwithstanding changes of ownership; the last transferee is just as much of a debtor as the first one; and
this, independent of whether the transferee knows or not the person of the mortgagee. 10 So it is, that a mortgage lien is inseparable from the property
mortgaged. All subsequent purchasers thereof must respect the mortgage, whether the transfer to them be with or without the consent of the
mortgagee. For, the mortgage, until discharged, follows the property. 11
And then, militating against appellant's cause is one other special feature of a real mortgage its indivisibility. 12 This Court has understood mortgage
indivisibility in the sense that each and every parcel under mortgage answers for the totality of the debt. 13
It does not really matter that the mortgagee, as in this case, did not oppose the subsequent sale. Naturally, because the sale was without PNB's
knowledge. Even if such knowledge is chargeable to PNB, its failure to object to the sale could not have any impairing effect upon its rights as
mortgagee. After all, a real mortgage is merely an encumbrance; it does not extinguish the title of the debtor, whose right to dispose a principal
attribute of ownership is not thereby lost. 14 And, on the assumption thatPNB recognized the efficaciousness of the sale by Ruperta Lavilles of a
portion of the mortgaged land to Primitiva Mallorca, which Lavilles "had the right to make" and which anyway PNB "cannot oppose", PNB cannot be
prejudiced thereby, for, at all events, "such sale could not affect the mortgage, as the latter follows the property whoever the possessor may be." 15
On Primitiva Mallorca's part, she cannot rightfully deny the mortgage lien on the portion of the land she purchased. First. Registration of the mortgage in
the Register of Deeds is notice to all persons of the existence thereof. 16 Second. By express provision of Section 39 of the Land Registration Act,
"every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrance except
those noted on said certificate." 17 Clear implication exists that if an encumbrance is so noted, that purchaser is bound thereby. Third. Mallorca herself
petitioned the court to orderPNB to deliver the owner's copy of TCT 27070 to the Register of Deeds for annotation of Mallorca's interest, as heretofore
adverted to. And the court, in giving its stamp of approval to the petition, expressly directed that "to whomsoever the land is sold the vendee will assume
the responsibility of complying with the provisions of the mortgage." Fourth.Mallorca's own co-owner's copy of the title issued to her carried PNB's
mortgage lien. Fifth. The fact that Mallorca failed to exercise her right of redemption, which she sought to enforce in a judicial court, ends her interest to
the land she claims, and, doubtless, estops her from denyingPNB's mortgage lien thereon.
We, accordingly, rule that PNB has the right to consolidate its title on the entire lot mortgaged by Ruperta Lavilles in its favor, including the P20,000
square meter-undivided interest of Primitiva Mallorca. And this, by virtue of the foreclosure sale and the expiry of Mallorca's right of redemption.

2. In a final effort to overturn the order under review, appellant espouses the thesis that the lower court, acting as a cadastral court, is without jurisdiction
in the premises. Her syllogism is this: she is questioning the right of PNB to declare TCT 24256 as null and void insofar as the 20,000 square meter-
undivided portion is concerned; the issue is thus raised to the level of "contentious litigation"; and, going by jurisprudence, 18 a cadastral court is devoid
of power to act thereon.
The precedents appellant depends on cannot serve as authority in her case. For, those cases involved unresolvedissues. Here, the
question she presents whether her undivided share in the lot is encumbered or unencumbered has been definitely passed upon in the
redemption case she brought against PNB (Civil Case 5149, Court of First Instance of Iloilo).Mallorca herself acknowledged the validity of that
encumbrance when she commenced said civil case. Given the facts, PNB's petition to consolidate title falls under the rule that a cadastral court has
jurisdiction to entertain a petition for the cancellation of an outstanding certificate of title where the registered owner has been lawfully divested of
his title thereof. 19 For, the truth is that this case presents no substantial controversy. As held in the case of Castillo vs. Ramos, supra, pp. 814-815

"where a petition concerning the cancellation of any encumbrance noted on a Torrens certificate of title is filed within the record of
the land registration case in which the basic decree was entered and there is no substantial controversy in regard thereto
between the petitioner and any other interested party, such petition may be considered as a mere incidental matter in such land
registration case and may therein be acted upon by the proper court." 20
Upon the record as it stands, the lower court order of August 18, 1962 is, as it is hereby, affirmed.
Costs against oppositor-appellant. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando. JJ., concur.

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