In this unpublished decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded for further consideration of the respondent’s motion to suppress because the immigration judge failed to make sufficient factual or credibility determinations for purposes of appellate review, including the respondent's contention that statements in the I-213 were internally inconsistent. The decision was issued by Member Linda Wendtland and joined by Member Patricia Cole. Member Roger Pauley (D) issued a dissenting opinion.
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In this unpublished decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded for further consideration of the respondent’s motion to suppress because the immigration judge failed to make sufficient factual or credibility determinations for purposes of appellate review, including the respondent's contention that statements in the I-213 were internally inconsistent. The decision was issued by Member Linda Wendtland and joined by Member Patricia Cole. Member Roger Pauley (D) issued a dissenting opinion.
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In this unpublished decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded for further consideration of the respondent’s motion to suppress because the immigration judge failed to make sufficient factual or credibility determinations for purposes of appellate review, including the respondent's contention that statements in the I-213 were internally inconsistent. The decision was issued by Member Linda Wendtland and joined by Member Patricia Cole. Member Roger Pauley (D) issued a dissenting opinion.
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209 E. Washington St., Ste 305 Iowa City, IA 52240 Name: MARTINEZ-REYES, MAURO U.S. Department of Justice Executive Ofce fr Immigration Review Board of Immigration Appeals Ofce of the Clerk 5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite 2000 Fals Church. Virginia 20530 OHS/ICE Ofice of Chief Counsel - OMA 1717 Avenue H Omaha, NE 68110 A 205-002-826 Date of this notice: 9/25/2014 Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order i the above-refrenced case. Enclosure Panel Members: Pauley, Roger Cole, Patricia A. Wendtland, Linda S. Sincerely, |o t Donna Carr Chief Clerk sci1'\iarzt1 Usertea m: Docket For more unpublished BIA decisions, visit www.irac.net/unpublished Cite as: Mauro Martinez-Reyes, A205 002 826 (BIA Sept. 25, 2014) I m m i g r a n t
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w w w . i r a c . n e t , U.S. Deparment of Justice Executive Ofce fr Imigation Review Decision of te Board of Imigration Appeals Falls Church, Virginia 20530 File: A205 002 826 - Omaa, NE In re: MURO MRTINEZ-RYES IN RMOVAL PROCEEDIGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Allison McCahy, Esquire ON BEHALF OF DHS: CHARGE: Kristin Linsley Assistat Chief Counsel Date: Notice: Sec. 212(a)(6)(A)(i), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. l 182(a)(6)(A)(i)] - Present without being admitted or paoled APPLICATION: Motion to suppress; termination SEP 2 5 2014 The respondent appeas te Imigration Judge's decision dated April 12, 2013. The Immigration Judge denied the respondent's Mach 8, 2012, motion to suppress. See Exhs. 3, 4. Te Immigration Judge also sustaned the removability charge in the Notice to Appea (Exh. 1) ad grated the respondent's voluntay depaure request pursuat to section 240B(b) of the Immigration ad Nationaity Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229c(b). The respondent's request fr oral agument will be denied. See 8 C. F.R. 1003. l(e)(7) (2014). The record will be remaded. The respondent claims that on October 13, 2011, te car he was driving was stopped by a police ofcer fom te Cedar Rapids Police Department (CRPD) fr alegedly having defctive tal laps. See Respondent's Br. at 2. The respondent states that te police offcer asked him fr his driver's license, proof of insuace, ad proof of citizenship. See id. Afer the police offcer received te respondent's "identifcation," the offcer allegedly "indicated that he believed Respondent wa a illegal imigrat ad then ordered Respondent to get out of the vehicle." See id. According to the respondent, afer conducting a search of the respondent ad his vehicle-ad questioning the vehicle's passengers as to te respondent's immigration status the ofcer told the respondent that "he wa being arested fr severa trafcrelated misdemeaor chages." See id; see also Iowa District Cou documents regading charges fr (1) improper rea laps, (2) no driver's license, and (3) no insurace (Case Numbers 888093, 888091, 888092, respectively). While attending a heaing on October 14 at te Lin County Distict Cour fr his taffc ofenses, te respondent purortedly leaed fr the fst time tat he had a outstading war ant fr "faudulent practices" in the third degree. See Respondent's Br. at 3. Dung his detention at te Linn County Jal, te respondent was interogated by Agent Autio fom te Depament of Homelad Security (DHS) ad allegedly admited that he was a citizen ad national of Mexico who entered te coutry ulawlly. See Ex. 2 (Form I-213). Tereafer, he was trasfered fom te custody of the CRPD to the custody of the Cite as: Mauro Martinez-Reyes, A205 002 826 (BIA Sept. 25, 2014) I m m i g r a n t
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w w w . i r a c . n e t A205 002 826 Immigation ad Customs Enforcement. See Respondent's Br. at 3. On October 17, 2011, a Notice to Appear was issued by the DHS alleging the above charge (Exh. 1 ). On appeal, the respondent agues that the Immigration Judge ered by denying the motion to suppress ad fr admitting the 1-213 into evidence witout frst ganting his request fr an evidentiary hearing (Respondent's Br. at 4-5, 12-13). The respondent maintns that his stop and arest were egregious violations of his Fouh Amendment rights as they were racially motivated ad lacking in reasonable suspicion (Respondent's Br. at 3, 14-15). He also states that hs Fifh Amendment rights were violated as his statements to DHS Agent Autio were not voluntaily given, but rater stemmed fom the agent's coercive interogation (Respondent's Br. at 15-16). In IS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1984), the Supreme Cou held that the Fouh Amendment exclusionary rule is generally inapplicable to deportation proceedings, but lef open the possibility of applying this rle if there are egregious Fourth Amendment violations which transgress Fifh Amendment notions of fndamental firess and undermine the probative value of the evidence. See also Lopez-Gabriel v. Holder, 653 F.3d 683, 686 (8th Cir. 2011) (expressing doubt a to whether the exclusionar rule should apply in immigation proceedings on the basis of conduct by state or loca police offcers, even in the case of egegious violations, but ultimately ruling that te record did not support petitioner's belief that trf c stop ad arrest were racially motivated); Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting that "egegious" violations ae not limited to cases involving physical brutality). This Boad has recogized that although the exclusionar rule is generally inapplicable in removal proceedings, suppression is appropriate where te evidence was obtained in a maner so egregious that its use would violate due process by ofending the requirements of fndamental fairess. See, e.g., Matter of Toro, 17 l&N Dec. 340, 343 (BIA 1980); Matter of Garcia, 17 l&N Dec. 319, 321 (BIA 1980). A alien seeking the exclusion of evidence based on the Fourth Amendment bears the burden of establishing a prima fie case that the evidence should be suppressed. See Matter of Tang, 13 I&N Dec. 691, 692 (BIA 1971). Only when a alien has come frwad with adequate evidence in support of suppression will the burden shif to the DHS to justif the manner in which it obtained te evidence. See id.; see also Mater of Barcenas, 19 l&N Dec. 609, 611-12 (BIA 1988). This Board has also held that an 1-213 is inherently tustworthy and admissible to prove alienage absent ay indication that it contains inforation that is incorect or was obtained by coercion or duress. See Matter of Gomez-Gomez, 23 I&N Dec. 522, 524 (BIA 2002); Matter of Ponce-Hernandez, 22 l&N Dec. 784, 785 (BIA 1999). In this cae, te Imigation Judge recited te relevat famework fr analyzing a motion to suppress in the removal context but did not make sufcient fctual and credibility fndings fr puroses of our appellate review. In paricular, the Immigation Judge appeaed to fd that nothing about the respondent's interaction with the immigration agent (i.e., "who determined that he was a removable alien") or the arresting offcer suggests egregious conduct that would warat the suppression of te 1-213, but te Immigration Judge did not make clear ad specifc fndings as to te circumstances indicated in the current record with regard to the police ofcer's stop, arest, and detention, or with respect to the custodial interogaton by the DRS agent (I. J. at 3-4). Also, the Immigation Judge did not address the affdavit fled by the respondent's 2 Cite as: Mauro Martinez-Reyes, A205 002 826 (BIA Sept. 25, 2014) I m m i g r a n t
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w w w . i r a c . n e t A205 002 826 niece, who puoredly was a witess to his stop ad a est (Respondent's Br. at 13-14; Exh. 4 at 79-80). In addition, te Immigation Judge did not adequately assess the respondent's claim that te statements contained in the 1-213 ae interally inconsistent, inaccurate, ad not reliable. See Exh. 3 at 14. Despite the Immigration Judge's fnding that the respondent provided insufcient evidence to question the reliability of te 1-213 (l.J. at 4), his decision does not sufciently addess the respondent's claim that the faudulent practices warat was not the tue reason fr his arest since he was not notifed about this warrat until the day aer his a est (Respondent's Br. at 14-15). See also Exh. 4 at 2 (respondent's afdavit contending that contray to the I-213's statement that he was arrested by the CRPD fr an outstanding warant fr faudulent practices in the third degree, he was told by the police ofcer that the basis fr his arest wa "fr tafc tickets, ad specifcaly that [his] lights were not working"). In tis regad, we are not persuaded at this time by the DHS's contention that the "respondent was stopped ... fr a taf c violation regarding a broken tail light, no license, and no insurace, in addition to a outstanding criminal waat fr Fraudulent Practices," a the record is unclear as to the circustaces of te respondent's stop and his discovery of the criminal warat (DHS's Br. at 9-10). The respondent also disputes the I-213's description of his imigration history involving two aests by te Border Patrol on September 3 and 4, 2011, on te basis that he was shown records while detained indicating that the arests actually occured in 2003. See Exh. 4 at 2. We fnd unavailing the DHS's argument that it already had infration about the respondent's alienage as he was twice voluntarily reted to Mexico, given that the I-213 does not specif to where he wa reted ad, moreover, te DHS has not responded to his claim that te I-213 misstates the date of hs prior rets (DHS's Br. at 10).' I light of the fregoing, we conclude that fher proceedings are necessary a we are unable to adequately review the Immigration Judge's conclusions. See Matter of S-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 462, 465 (BIA 2002) (given te Boad's limited fact-fnding ability, it is "increaingly importt fr the Immigration Judge to mae clear ad complete fndings of fct that ae suppored by the record ad in compliace wit contolling law."). In sum, we will remad this case to the Imigration Judge to make the necessary fctual fndings in the frst instace. See 8 C.F.R. 1003.l(d)(3)(iv). In paricula, tere remain open questions a to the circustances surrounding the respondent's arrest by the CRPD, the nature of his interogation by DHS Agent Autio, ad the reliability of the I-213. The Immigration Judge should reassess te infrmation contained in the I-213 to determine if it ca support the fnding of alienage and then deterine whether that infration can and should be suppressed. See Matter of Barcenas, supra, at 611-12. Accordingly, the record will be remaded. 1 We also note that the I-213-which was composed 4 days afer the respondent's October 13, 2011, aest-states that the "subject claims to be a citizen of Mexico by virue of bir," but concludes by stating that he "claims to not fa persecution or torture if reted to Honduras" and tat he "declined the opportunity to speak to the Honduras Consulate." See Exh. 2 at 2-3. 3 Cite as: Mauro Martinez-Reyes, A205 002 826 (BIA Sept. 25, 2014) I m m i g r a n t
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w w w . i r a c . n e t A205 002 826 ORER: The record is remaded to the Immigration Judge fr fher proceedings consistent wth the fregoing opinion and fr te ent of a new decision. Board Member Roger A. Pauley respectfully dissents and would affir the Imigration Judge's decision finding no egregious, if indeed any, Fourth Aendment violation. See Lopez-Ferandez v. Holder, 735 F.3d 1043, 1046 n.2 (8th Cir. 2014). Nor does the respondent provide any support for his contention that his admission to being an alien from Mexico was coerced, apart rom his baseless claim that his statements were the product of an egregious unlawful search and seizure. See R's brief at 15-16. Remand here is a waste of resources at a time when Inigration Judge's dockets are burgeoning. 4 Cite as: Mauro Martinez-Reyes, A205 002 826 (BIA Sept. 25, 2014) I m m i g r a n t
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w w w . i r a c . n e t UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JSTICE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW IMGRATION COURT OMAHA, NEBRASKA File #: A205-002-826 In the Matter of: Mauro MARTINEZ-REYES, Resppndent. ) ) ) ) ) Date: April 12, 2013 IN REMOVAL PROCEEDIGS CHARGE: Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i)of te Immigration and Nationality Act ("IA") Alien present in the United States without being admitted or paoled. APPLICATION: Objections to I-213 and Motion to Suppress ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Allison McCarthy, Esq. Cole & Vondra, LLP 209 E. Washington Street, Suite 305 Iowa City, IA 52240 ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERMENT: Kristin Linsley, Assistant Chief Counsel U.S. Depament of Homelad Secuity Immigation ad Customs Enfrcement fr Omaha, Nebraska DECISION OF THE IMMIGRTION JUDGE I. Background and Procedural Histor On October 17, 2011, the Department of Homelad Security ("DHS" or "the goverent") initiated removal proceedings against Respondent by fling a Notice to Appear ("NT A") with the Immigration Court and personally serving Respondent. See Exh. 1. The NT A alleges that Respondent is a native and citizen of Mexico who arrived in the United States at or near a uknown location on an uown date without being admited or paroled afer inspection. Id. The NT A charges Respondent with removability pursuant to the above captioned section of the INA. Id On March 8, 2012, Respondent, through counsel, fled a Motion to Suppress ad Objections to 1-213 ("Motion to Suppress") requesting that all of the statements and evidence contained in the Form 1-213, Record of Deportable/nadmissible Alien ("I-213"), the initial and subsequent interviews wit Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), and al attachents to the 1-213 be suppressed. See Motion to Suppress, at 1. The goverent opposes Respondent's motion. 1 I m m i g r a n t
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w w w . i r a c . n e t II. Statement of Law Removal proceedings ae civil in nature; therefre, the protections that apply in the criminal context do not necessaly apply in a removal hearing. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984); Matter of Barcenas, 19 I&N Dec. 609, 611 (BIA 1988). The Immigration Court is not bound by the traditional rules of evidence. See Nyama v. Ashcrof, 357 F.3d 812, 816 (8th Cir. 2004); Barcenas, 19 l&N Dec. at 611. Documentay evidence is admissible if it is relevant and probative ad its use is fndamentally fair so as not to deprive the respondent of due process of the law. See Nyama, 357 F.3d at 816; Matter of Toro, 17 I&N Dec. 340, 343 (BIA 1980). A respondent challenging the legality of evidence in removal proceedings must establish a prima facie case in suppor of suppression befre DHS will be called upon to justif the manner in which it obtained the evidence. See Matter of Tang, 13 I&N Dec. 691, 692 (BIA 1971); Matter of Wong 13 I&N Dec. 820, 822 (BIA 1971). Statements made in support of suppression must be specifc, detailed, and based on personal knowledge rather than conjecte. See Wong, 13 I&N Dec. at 822. A afdavit is insuffcient on its own to demonstrate that evidence should be suppressed; however, if fcts alleged in an affdavit could suppor a basis fr excluding the evidence in question, then the respondent must support his claim by testiony. See Barcenas, 19 l&N Dec. at 611. Te identity of a respondent is never itself suppressible "as the fuit of the poisonous tree" even if an illegal arrest or interogation occured. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1040; Matter of Sandoval, 17 I&N Dec. 70, 79 (BIA 1979). A. Fourh Amendment The Fouh Amendment exclusionary rule that suppresses statements and other evidence obtained as a result of an unlawfl, warrantless arrest in cririnal proceedings is generally inapplicable to civil removal proceedings. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050. However, the Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit Cout of Appeals, and te BIA have caved out a exception fr circumstances that involve "egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might tansgress notions of fndamental firess and underine the probative value of the evidence obtained." See id., at 1050-51; Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771, 777-78 (8th Cir. 2010); Lopez-Gabriel v. Holder, 653 F.3d 683, 686 (8th Cir. 2011); Matter of Toro, 17 l&N Dec. at 343. 2 A egregious constitutional violation is defned as "brutal conduct" which "shocks the conscience" and "ofend[s] the community's sense of fair play and decency. " See Puc-Ruiz, 629 F.3d at 778 (citing Rochin v. Caliornia, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952)). While physical brtalit is not required, there must be more than an illegal seizure or arest fr te violation to constitute egregious conduct. See id (citing an unreasonable show or use of frce in arresting ad 2 In the Eighth Circuit, this exception seems to be narowing. In Garcia-Torres v. Holder, the Eighth Circuit Cour of Appeals stated that "[t]his Cout has expressed doubt whether even an egregious violation by state or local ofcers could justif exclusion in a fderal immigation proceeding, but the goverment does not raise that point here, so we need not decide it" and went on to deterine that there was no evidence of egregious conduct. Garcia Torres v. Holder, 201 l W 5105808 (8th Cir. October 28, 2011) (citing Lopez-Gabriel v. Holder, 653 F.3d 683, 686 (8t Cir. 2011 )). 2 I m m i g r a n t
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w w w . i r a c . n e t detaining a respondent and an arest based on race or appearance as examples of conduct that could constitute egregious constitutional violations). The Eight Circuit has held that "a taffc violation - however minor - creates probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle." US. v. Linkous, 285 F.3d 716, 719 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Barry, 98 F.3d 373, 376 (8th Cir. 1996)) (interal quotations omited). Once a vehicle is validly stopped, the police may "conduct an investigation reasonably related i scope" to the purpose of the stop. United States v. McCoy, 200 F.3d 582, 584 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Bloomfeld, 40 F.3d 910, 915 (8t Cir. 1994). A reasonable investigation can include questioning of one's immigation status. See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005). Because the beneft of applying the exclusionary rule i te immigration context is to deter unconstittional conduct by fderal immigration agents, the case fr excluding evidence based upon alleged misconduct by a local police ofcer is even weaer since any deterent efect would be highly attenuated. See Lopez-Gabriel v. Holder, 653 F.3d, at 686; see also Sandoval, 17 l&N Dec., at 83 ("[W]hen we balace what we consider to be the remote likelihood that the exclusion of unlawflly seized evidence fom deporation proceedings would sigifcantly affct the conduct of immigration offcers with the societal costs that could result fom such action and te alteratives available to compel respect fr constitutional rights, we ae not satisfed tat either legal or policy considerations dictate the exclusion of unlawlly seized evidence fom [removal] proceedings."). B. Form 1-213, Record ofDeportable/nadmissible Alien A Form 1-213 is an offcial DHS record that is generally suffcient to meet the government's evidentiay burden of establishing aprima facie case of removability. See Matter of Mejia, 16 l&N Dec. 6, 9 (BIA 1976); Matter of Gomez-Gomez, 23 l&N Dec. 522, 524 (BIA 2002). Absent evidence that a For 1-213 contains infrmation that is inaccuate or obtained by coercion or duress, it is considered an inerently trustworhy document admissible despite the hearsay contained within the document. See id. A illegal arest tat leads to the suppression of evidence in criminal proceedings has no bearing on removal proceedings. Mejia, 16 l&N Dec., at 8-9 (citing U.S. ex rel. Bilokumsk v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923)). Evidence of physical presence cannot be suppressed a "fit of te poisoned tree." Id III. Findings and Analysis The Court fnds that the goverent has presented sufcient evidence justifing the reason fr Respondent's arrest and subsequent ICE detention. The 1-213 states tat Respondent was arrested by the Cedar Rapids (Iowa) Police Department on an outstanding warrant fr the ofense of Fraudulent Practices Third Degree See 1-213 at Exhibit 2. Although the Respondent's affdavit asserts that he was arrested by a Cedar Rapids Police Deparment ofcer fr Improper Rear Lamps, No Driver's License, and No Insurance, it also indicates that he was infrmed of the Fraudulent Practices chage when he appeared in cour the fllowing day. See respondent's afdavit at Exhbit 4. While incarcerated fr these charges he ten was interogated by a immigration agent who determined that he was a removable alien. See id. Nothing about ths interaction suggests egregious conduct on behalf of the arresting ofcer or that any of the 3 I m m i g r a n t
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w w w . i r a c . n e t inormation contained within the I-213 was obtained by coercion or duress that would call fr the suppression of the 1-213. Although te respondent asserts tat "racism was the real reason I was arrested", the record indicates that the police ofcer had a reasonable basis fr stopping Respondent fr trafc related and other reasons (supra.). Therefre, this Cou fnds that these actions do not constitute an egregious violation of Respondent's Fourth Aendment rights. Te Eighth Circuit noted that due process requires that te court only consider evidence that is "probative and its admission fndaentally fir" and that "fairess is closely related to the reliability and torthiness of te evidence." Banat v. Holder, 551F.3d 886 (8t Cir. 2009) (quoting Tun v. Gonales, 485 F.3d 1014, 1025-26 (8th Cir. 2007) and Ezeaguna v. Ashcrof, 325 F.3d 396, 405 (3rd Cir. 2003) (interal quotatons ad citations omited)). In this case, Respondent opposes te admission of the 1-213 which is presumed reliable unless tere is evidence of inaccuracies or that the infration contained within the I-213 was obtained by coercion or duress. See supra, Part H.B. As previously stated, Respondent has not demonstrated circumstances that lead the Court to question the reliability of tis document. See supra, Part III. The Court recogizes that the 1-213 contains hearsay evidence. However, this is not the type of "highly unreliable hearsay" of which the Eighth Circuit Cour of Appeals was concered "might raise due process problems" in Banat. See Banat, 551 F.3d, at 892. The hearsay evidence in that case involved multiple layers and did not identif the original speaker. See id . . Because hearsay is not prohibited in immigration proceedings, see 8 C.F.R. 1240.7(a), and there is insufcient evidence that the hearsay evidence contained in the 1-213 is uneliable, the Cou fnds that there is no basis fr suppressing the 1-213 or requiring that te author of the 1-213 be made available fr cross examination by Respondent. IV. Conclusion For te above-stated reasons, the Court fnds that Respondent has failed to establish a primafacie case in support of suppressing the evidence contaned in the 1-213. Therefre, the Court denies his motion to suppress and fnds that its contents clearly and convincigly establish both alienage and removability. Although granted leave to fle an application fr asylum and with olding of removal, the respondent did not do so, indicating that he requests only volunty deparue. Inasmuch as he is statutorily eligible fr this frm of relief and the goverent has expressed no opposition, te fllowing orders will therefre be entered: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent's Motion to Suppress is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in lieu of an order of removal the respondent be granted voluntary departure without expense to te Goverent on or befre June 11, 2013, or any extension beyond such date as may be granted by U.S. Imigation and Customs 4 I m m i g r a n t
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, , . . Enforcement fr the Department of Homeland Security ad under such conditions as the Depaent shall impose. IT IS FURTHER ORERED that the respondent post a voluntary departure bond in the amount of $500 within fve (5) business days to the Depaent. IT IS FURTHER ORDERD that if the respondent fils to post the required bond witin fve (5) days or to depart when and as required, the privilege of voluntary departure shall be withdrawn witout frther notice or proceedings and the fllowing order shall become thereupon immediately efective: Respondent shall be removed fom te United States to Mexico on the charge contained in the Notice to A
James R. Fujimoto Immigration Judge 5 I m m i g r a n t
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w w w . i r a c . n e t A205-002-826 NOTICE TO RESPONDENTS GRANTED VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE You have been ganted the privilege of voluntarily depating fom the United States of America. The Court advises you that, if you fil to voluntarily depart the United States within the time period specifed, a removal order will automatically be entered against you. Pursuat to section 240B( d) of the Immigration ad Nationality Act, you will also be subject to the fllowing penalties: 1. You will be subject to a civil penalty of not less than $1,000 and not more than $5,000; and 2. You will be ineligible, fr a period of 10 years, to receive cancellation of removal, adjustment of status, registry, voluntar departure, or a chage of nonimmigrant status. The Court frter advises you that: 0 You have been granted pre-conclusion voluntary departure. 1. If you fle a motion to reopen or reconsider during the voluntary departure period, the grant of voluntar departure will be terminated automatically, the alterate order of removal will take efect immediately, and the penalties fr filure to depart voluntarily under section 240B(d) of the Act will not apply. 8 C.F.R.' 1240.26(b)(3)(iii). 2. There is a civil monetary penalty if you fil to depr1 within the voluntary deparure period. In accordance with the regulation, the Cour has set the presumptive amount of $3,000 (or _ instead of the presumptive amount). 8 C.F.R.' 1240.260). You have been granted post-conclusion voluntary departure. 1. If the Court set any additional conditions, you were advised of them, and were given an opportunity to accept or decline them. As you have accepted them, you must comply with the additional conditions. 8 C.F.R.' 1240.26(c)(3). 2. The Court set a specifc bond amount. You were advised of the bond amount, and were given an opportunity to accept or decline it. As you have accepted it, you have a duty to post that bond with the Departent of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enfrcement, Field Ofce Director within 5 business days of the Courts order grating voluntary departure. 8 C.F.R.' 1240.26(c)(3)(i). 3. If you have reserved your right to appeal, then you have the absolute right to appeal the decision. If you do appeal, you must provide to the Board oflmmigration Appeals, witin 30 days of fling an appeal, suffcient proof of having posted the voluntay departure bond. The Board will not reinstate the voluntary departure period in its fnal order if you do not submit timely proof to the Board that the voluntary departure bond has been posted. 8 C.F.R.' 1240.26(c)(3)(ii). 4. If you do not appeal and instead fle a motion to reopen or reconsider during the voluntar departure period, the period allowed fr voluntary departure will not be stayed, tolled, or extended, the grant of voluntary departure will be terminated automatically, the alterate order of removal will take efect imediately, and the penalties fr failure to depart voluntarily under section 240B(d) of the Act will not apply. 8 C.F.R." 1240.26(c)(3)(iii), (e)(l). 5. There is a civil monetary penalty if you fil to depart within the voluntary departue period. In accordance with the regulation, the Cou has set the presumptive amount of $3,000 (or _ instead of the presumptive amount). 8 C.F.R.' 1240.26(). I m m i g r a n t
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L1N1TAT1ONS ON D1SCRBT1ONARY RBL1BF FOR FA1LURB TO APPEA 1 YOu DVe DeeD BCDeOu1eO OI IemOV1 DeI1Dg \ \De L1me DU g1Ce BeL OILD OD LDe LLCDeO BDeeL. F11uIe LO ggeI OI LD1B DeI1Dg O\DeI LDD DeCUBe O eXCegL1OD1 C1ICU0BLDCeB DeyODO yOUI COD\IO1 w111 IeBu1L 1D yOuI De1Dg OuD 1De11g1D1e OI CeIL1D OI0B O Ie11e uDUeI LDe 10m1gIL1OD DU NL1OD11Ly ACL |Bee SeC\1OD A. De1Ow) OI geI1OO O LeD |1) yeIB LeI LDe OLe O eDLIy O LDe 1D1 OIOeI O Ie0OV1. 2. YOu DVe DeeD BCDeOU1eO OI D By1um DeI1Dg, \ LDe \1me DO g1Ce BeL OILD OD LDe L\CDe DOL1Ce. F11UIe \O ggeI OI LD1B DeI1Dg O\DeI LDD DeCuBe O eXCeg\1OD1 C1ICumBLDCeB DeyOD yOUI COD\IO1 w111 IeBu1L 1D yOuI De1Dg OuDO 1De11g1D1e OI CeI\1D OI0B O Ie11e uDeI LDe 1mm1gI\1OD DO NL1OD11Ly ACL (Bee SeCL1OD A. Be1Ow} OI geI1OO O LeD (1) yeIB IO0 LDe O\e O yOUI BCDeOU1eU DeI1Dg. 3. YOu DVe DeeD gIDLe VO1UDLIy OegI\UIe IO0 LDe UD1LeU SLLeB guIBUDL LO BeCL1OD 24B O LDe 10m1gIL1OD DU NL1OD11Ly AC\, DU Ie01D1Dg 1D LDe UD1\eU S\\eB DeyODO LDe ULDOI12eU OL OLDeI LDD DeCuBe O eXCegL1OD1 C1ICu0BLDCeB DeyODO yOuI CODLIO1 w111 IeBU1\ 1D yOuI De1Dg 1De11g1D1e OI CeIL1D OImB O Ie11e UuUeI LDe 10m1gI\1OD D NL1OD11Ly ACL (Bee SeC\1OD A. De1Ow) OI \eD |1) yeIB IOm LDe OLe O \De BCDeOU1e OegILuIe OI LDe OLe O UD1wU1 IeeDLIy, IeBgeC\1Ve1y. YOuI VO1uD\Iy OegI\UIe DODU 1 Dy w111 1BO De DIeCDe AOU1L1OD11y, 1 yOu 11 \O VO1UD\I11y OegIL \De UD1Le SLLeB w1LD1D LDe L1me geI1OU BgeC11eO yOU BD11 De BUD_eC\ LO C1V11 geD1Ly O DOL 1eBB LDD 1 DU DOL mOIe \DD 5. 4. A OIUeI O Ie0OV1 DB DeeD eDLeIeO g1DBL yOu. 1 yOU 11 LO ggeI gUIBUD\ LO 1D1 OIUeI O Ie0OV1 \ LDe \1me DO g1Ce OIeIeO Dy LDe 1NS, OLDeI LDD DeCuBe O eXCegL1OD1 C1ICUmB\DCeB DeyOD yOuI CODLIO1 yOu w111 DOL De e11g1D1e OI CeIL1D OI0B O Ie11e UDOeI LDe 1mm1gIL1OD DO NL1OD11Ly ACL (Bee SeCL1OD A. De1Ow) OI LeD |1) yeIB \eI \De OLe yOu Ie BCDeOu1eU \O ggeI. LDe LeIm "eXCegL1OD1 C1ICU0BLDCeB" IeeIB LO C1ICUmBLDCeB BUCD B BeI1OUB 111DeBB O LDe 11eD OI Ue\D O D 100eU1Le Ie1\1Ve O LDe 11eD DUL DOL 1DC1UO1Dg 1eBB CO0ge111Dg C1ICU0BLDCeB. A. THE FORNS OF RBL1BF FRON RENOVAL FOR NH1CH YOU H1LL BECONE 1NBL1G1BLE ARE: I) VO1UD\Iy OegILuIe B gIOV1OeO OI 1D BeCL1OD 24B O LDe 1001gI\1OD DO NL1OD11Ly ACL 2) CDCe11L1OD O Ie0OV1 B gIOV1OeU OI 1D BeCL1OD 24A O LDe 1001gI\1OD DO NL1OD11Ly ACL DU 3) AU_UBL0eD\ O B\LUB OI CDDge O BLLuB B gIOV1OeO OI 1D BeC\1OD 24b, 248 OI 249 O LDe 1m01gIL1OD DO NL1OD11Ly ACL. TD1B wI1\LeD DOL1Ce wB gIOV1OeU LO \De 11eD 1D EDg11BD. OI1 DOL1Ce O LDe COD\eDLB O LD1B DOL1Ce 0UBL De g1VeD LO LDe 11eD 1D D1B/DeI DL1Ve 1Dguge, OI 1D 1D ge De/BDe u eIBLDB Dy LDe 10m1gIL1OD JUOge. DLe: AgI 12, 213 10m1gIL1OD JUUge or Court C1eIk: SBRVBD BY: NA1L SONAL SERV1C P) TH1S DOCUNBNT HAS TO : [ ] AL1BN [ DATB: ' f} / CERT1F1CA OF SERV1CE ] P1EN C/O CUBLOO11 O1CeI AL1BN'B ATT/REP 1NB A\\CDmeDLB BY: COURT STAFF / [ ] EO1R~33 [ ] EO1R-28 [Le g 1SeIV1CeBL 1B\ [ ] OLDeI Y3 I m m i g r a n t