Ghost Division

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Chapter I 7th Panzer Division The Ghost Division
Like the 6th Panzer Division, 7th Panzer Division was formed in October 1939 by the conver-
sion of one of the Wehrmachfs Leichte Divisions to full Panzer Division status.
The 7th Panzer Division was a German elite armored formation which participated in the Bat-
tle of France. General Erwin Rommel commanded the division, which was nicknamed the
"Ghost Division" because of its speed and independent movement, which even the German
High Command had difficulty following. After service in France, the division served mainly
on the Eastern Front, ending its days in the defense of Germany and surrendering to the Bri-
tish army northwest of Berlin in 1945.
THE 2ND LEICHTE DIVISION WAS OFFICIALLY FORMED ON 10 NOVEMBER 1938 AT GERA, TO THE
SOUTH OF LEIPZIG. DESPITE THE FACT THAT GERMANY HAD VERY LITTLE CAVALRY STRENGTH, THE
CAVALRY ARM WAS THE MOST PRESTIGIOUS IN THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES, AND THE LIGHT DIVI-
SIONS HAD BEEN FORMED PRIMARILY AS A SOP TO THE FEW BUT HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL CAVALRY OF-
FICERS WHO DOMINATED THE HIGH COMMAND.
In 1939, the 2nd Leichte Division was under the command of General de Kavallerie Stumme.
At full strength, the division comprised 457 officers and warrant officers leading 11,000 NCOs
and men.
Panzer strength
The Division was organized and equipped into a tank-light, infantry-heavy unit. The 6th and
7th Kavallerie Schiitzen Regiments each consisted of two battalions of motorized infantry.
Other divisional units included a reconnaissance regiment, an artillery regiment, an antitank
battalion, a pioneer or combat engineer battalion, a signals battalion and other service and
support units.
Divisional armoured strength was provided by a single Panzer unit, the 33rd Panzer Battal-
ion. This included one motorized signals platoon, one staff platoon, three light panzer compa-
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nies, one motorized reserve platoon, one motorized maintenance platoon, and one light sup-
ply column. At the outbreak of war, the Panzer Abteilung had 62 tanks available, mostly
Pz.Kpfw Is and IIs, with a few Pz.Kpfw IIIs and IVs becoming operational.
The support units included more supply, maintenance and fuel columns, a divisional admin-
istration unit, a field bakery, a butcher detachment, various medical and veterinary units, a
military police troop and a field post office.
After the successful completion of the invasion of Poland, Hitler allowed Erwin Rommel to
choose whatever unit he would like to command. Although Rommel had no practical expe-
rience in tank warfare, he asked for a Panzer division and on 15 February 1940 he received
command of the 7th Panzer Division. In preparation for the invasion of the low countries, the
7th Panzer Division became part of the 15th Panzer Corps under the command of General
Hoth.
"Ghost Division" / "PhantomDivision"
The 7th Panzer Division moved with great speed through France and covered vast distances.
During the Battle of France, the 7th Panzer Division earned the name of the Ghost Division
(German:"Gespensterdivision") because its rapid movements led to few knowing exactly whe-
re the Division was, including the German High Command. Rommel had a "lead from the
front" attitude and often commanded from the turret of a tank, thus becoming a mere com-
pany commander, rather than a division commander issuing orders from his headquarters.
He expected all his commanders to lead from the front as well. In addition, he would someti-
mes deliberately 'lose' communications with the High Command if he felt it necessary. His
fearless command of the 7th Panzer Division showed his confidence and understanding of
blitzkrieg concepts. The success they experienced and his favor with Hitler prevented any re-
percussions from the High Command, some of whom criticized Rommel for being difficult to
contact and locate. Rommel described the French Campaign in his letters to his wife as "a
lightning Tour de France".
Order of Battle
7th Panzer Division
The division was formed on 10/18/39 using the 2nd Light Division and the assignment of the
66th Panzer Battalion and the 25th Panzer Regiment. Starting in February 1940, the 25th
Panzer Regiment began equipping its light panzer companies with 17 PzKpfw 38 (t) each.
This conversion was not, however, completed by the time of the invasion of France.
The 6th and 7th Kavallerieschutzen (Cavalry Rifle) Regiments became Schutzen Regiments
on 20 March 1940. The 7th Reconnaissance Regiment was broken into the 7th Motorcycle
Battalion and the 37th Reconnaissance Battalion on 1 November 1939. The 25th Panzer
Regiment (only Staff and 1st Battalion) were joined by the I/ 23rd Panzer Regiment which be-
came the 2/25th Panzer Regiment on 1 April 1940. Oddly, OKH records from this period
show the 66th Panzer Battalion as if it were the 3/ 25th Panzer Regiment. The division was
organized and equipped as follows:
7th Panzer Division
Divisional Staff (2 HMGs)
58th Motorcycle Platoon
58th (mot) Mapping Detachment 1/,2/, 3/25th Panzer Regiment
1 Panzer Signals Platoon
1 Light Panzer Staff Platoon
1 Regimental Band
3 Battalions, each with
1 (mot) Staff Company
1 Panzer Signals Platoon
1 Light Tank Platoon
1 Motorcycle Messenger Platoon
1 Pioneer Platoon
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1 Machine Gun Platoon (8 HMGs)
2 Light Panzer Companies
1 Medium Panzer Company 1 (mot) Panzer Maintenance Platoon 1 (mot) Panzer Supply Col-
umn
Total tanks: 17 PzBef, 44 PzMk, I, 96 PzMk II, 30 38(T) and 23 PzMk IV
7th Schtzen Brigade
1/, 2/6th Schtzen Regiment
1 (mot) Signals Platoon
2 Battalions, each with
1 (mot) Pioneer Platoon (3 LMGs)
3 (mot) Companies (3 50mm mortars, 4 HMGs and 18 LMGs ea)
1 (mot) Heavy Company
2 Infantry Gun Platoons (2 75mm leIG ea)
1 Mortar Platoon (6 80mm mortars)
1 Panzerabwehr Platoon (3 37mm PAK 36 and 1 LMG)
1 (mot) Light Infantry Supply Column
1/, 2/7th Schtzen Regiment
same as 6th Schutzen Regiment
7th Motorcycle Battalion
2 Motorcycle Companies (3 50mm mortars, 4 HMGs and 8 LMGs)
1 Panzerabwehr Platoon (3 37mm PAK 36 and 1 LMG)
2 Infantry Gun Platoons (2 75mm leIG)
1 (mot) Light Infantry Supply Column
37th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion
1 (mot) Signals Platoon (2 LMGs)
2 Armored Car Companies (10 20mm and 25 LMGs)
1 Motorcycle Company (3 50mm mortars, 4 HMGs and 8 LMGs)
1 Pioneer Platoon
1 Infantry Gun Platoon (2 75mm leIG)
1 (mot) Light Reconnaissance Supply Column (3 LMGs)
1/, 2/78th (mot) Artillery Regiment
1 (mot) Weather Detachment
1st and 2nd (mot) Battalions, each with:
1 (mot) Calibration Detachment
3 (mot) Batteries (4 105mm leFH and 2 LMGs ea)
42nd Panzerabwehr Battalion
2 (mot) Panzerabwehr Companies (12 37mm PAK 36 and 6 LMGs ea)
3rd Btry/59th Flak Battalion (12 20mm guns)
83rd (mot) Signals Battalion
1 (mot) Panzer Telephone Company (2 LMGs)
1 (mot) Panzer Radio Company (6 LMGs)
1 (mot) Panzer Light Signals Supply Column
58th (mot) Pioneer Battalion
1 (half-track) Pioneer Company
2 (mot) Pioneer Companies (9 LMGs ea)
1 (mot) Brko B
1 (mot) Light Pioneer Supply Column
85th Supply Troop
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1/,2/, 3/, 4/, 5/, 6/58th (mot) Light Supply Columns
7/, 8/, 9/, 10/5 8th (mot) Heavy Fuel Columns
1/,2/, 3/58th Maintenance Companies
1/, 2/(mot) Supply Platoons
Administration
58th (mot) Bakery Company
58th (mot) Butcher Company
58th (mot) Administration
Other
1/, 2/58th (mot) Medical Companies
1/,2/,3/58th Ambulances
58th (mot) Field Post Office
58th (mot) Military Police Troop
Attached 86th Flak Battalion
3 Batteries (12 20mm ea)
1.(H)/11th Reconnaissance Staffel
On 1 April 1940 the 3/28th and 4/12th Light Supply Columns became the 2/, 7/58th and the
7/58th Heavy Fuel Column was renumbered the 9/5 8th. In addition, the 21 405th and
2/12th Light Fuel Columns were merged to form the 10/58th Heavy Fuel Column.
On 12 April 1940 the 25th Panzer Regiment had 24 PzMk I, 51 PzMK II, no PzMk III, 15
PzMk IV, and 48 38(t) tanks. At the same time the 66th Panzer Battalion had 13 PzMk I, 21
PzMk II, no PzMk III, 7 PzMk IV, and 24 38(t) tanks.
On 10 May 1940, the eve of the invasion of France, the organization of the armored portion of
the division and its panzer inventory were as follows:
1/, 2/25th Panzer Regiment
1 Regimental Staff Signals Platoon
1 Regimental Staff Light Panzer Platoon
Each Battalion had
1 Panzer Staff Company
1 Medium Panzer Company
66th Panzer Battalion
Total tanks available: 34 PzMk I , 68 PzMk II , 91 38 (t), 24 PzMk IV, 8 PzBefWg 38 (t).
In 1940 the division was assigned to be part of the invasion forces scheduled for Operation
"Sealion". On 9 August 1940 the division was organized and equipped as follows: (see over)
7th Panzer Division
58th Motorcycle Platoon
58th (mot) Mapping Detachment
25th Panzer Regiment
1/25th Panzer Regiment
1 (mot) Munitions Column
2/25th Panzer Regiment
1 (mot) Munitions Column
66th Panzer Battalion
1 (mot) Munitions Column .
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7th Schtzen Brigade
6th Schtzen Regiment
1 (mot) Signals Battalion
1st and 2nd Battalions, each with
3 (mot) Schtzen Companies (18 LMGs, 2 HMGs, 3 50mm mortars and 2 80mm mortars ea)
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1 Panzerjager Platoon (3 37mm PAK 36 and 1 LMG)
2 (mot) Infantry Gun Sections (2 75mm leIG ea)
1 (mot) Light Supply Column
7th Schtzen Regiment
1 (mot) Signals Staff
1st and 2nd Battalions, each with
3 (mot) Schtzen Companies (18LMGs, 2 HMGs, 3 50mm mortars and 2 80mm mortars ea)
2 (mot) Infantry Gun Sections (2 75mm leIG ea)
1 (mot) Infantry Gun Company (5 150mm sIG)
2 Armored Car Companies (10 HMGs and 25 LMGs ea)
1 Motorcycle Company (3 50mm mortars, 3 HMGs and 18 LMGs)
1 Pioneer Platoon (3 LMGs)
1 Infantry Gun Section (2 75mm leIG)
78th (mot) Artillery Regiment
1 (mot) Weather Detachment
1 Regimental Band
1st and 2nd Battalions
3rd Battalion
3 (mot) Batteries (4 150mm sFH and 2 LMGs ea)
42nd Panzerjager Battalion
2 (mot) Companies (12 37mm PAK 36 and 6 LMGs ea)
58th (mot) Pioneer Battalion
2 (mot) Pioneer Companies (9 LMGs ea)
1 (mot) Bridging Company
2 Pioneer Platoons
3 Bridging Sections
1 Brko B Bridging Train
1 Brko K Bridging Train
1 (mot) Light Pioneer Supply Column
83rd (mot) Signals Battalion
1 (mot) Telephone Company (6 LMGs)
1 (mot) Radio Company (2 LMGs)
7th Motorcycle Battalion
2 Motorcycle Companies (2 80mm mortars, 3 50mm mortars, 2 HMGs and 18 LMGs ea)
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2 Infantry Gun Sections (2 75mm leIG ea)
86th (mot) Flak Battalion
1 Battalion Band
3 (mot) Flak Companies (12 20mm ea)
58th Vehicle Battalion
8/,9/,10/58th (mot) Heavy Fuel Columns
1/,2/,3/58th Maintenance Companies
1/, 2/(mot) Supply Platoons
58th Munition Battalion
1/,2/,3/,4/,5/,6/,7/5 8th (mot) Light Supply Columns
Other
1/, 2/5 8th (mot) Medical Companies
1, 21, 3/5 8th Ambulances
1/, 2/58th (mot) Administration Platoons
58th (mot) Military Police Troop
The 3/78th Artillery Regiment was formed from the 2/45th Artillery Regiment on 2 January
1941.The 66th Panzer Battalion became the 3/25th Panzer Regiment on 19 February 1941. On
22 June 1941, the day of the invasion of Russia, the organization of the armored portion of
the division and its panzer inventory were as follows:
1/, 2, /, 3/25th Panzer Regiment
Each Battalion had
3 Light Panzer Companies Total tanks available: 53 PzMkII, 167 38 (t), 30 PzMk IV (kz), 7 38
(t), 8 PzBefWg.
By 6 September 1941 the tank inventory had been reduced to: 9 PzMk I operational, 37 PzMk
II , 62 PzMk III , 14 PzMk IV, 8 PzBefWg .
On 15 March 1942 the 3/25th Panzer Regiment was disbanded, reducing the division to only
2 panzer battalions. The 37th Reconnaissance Battalion was merged with the 7th Motorcycle
Battalion in 1943, to form the 7th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion. In January 1943 the or-
ganization of the armored portion of the division and its panzer inventory were as follows:
1 Regimental Staff Light Panzer Platoon Each
Battalion had
3 Light Panzer Companies Total tanks available: 21 PzMk II , 91 PzMk III (50 lg), 14 PzMk III
(75) , 2 PzMk IV (kz) , 18 PzMk IV (lg), 9 PzBefWg.
The 296th Army Flak Battalion was assigned to the division in February 1943, as were the re-
mains of the now destroyed 27th Panzer Division.
In 1943 the division had:
1/, 2/6th Panzergrenadier Regiment
1/, 2/7th Panzergrenadier Regiment
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1/, 2/, 3/78th Panzer Artillery Regiment
296th Army Flak Battalion
83rd Panzer Signals Battalion
58th Panzer Pioneer Battalion
58th Divisional Support Units
On 15 February 1943 the 127th Panzer Battalion, of the 27th Panzer Division, was disbanded
and its remains were incorporated into the 25th Panzer Regiment. This probably occurred
when the l/25th Panzer Division was sent to Germany to be re-equipped with Panther PzMkV
tanks. This left the 2/25th Panzer Regiment, which began with three companies of Panzer
PzMk III and one company of Panzer PzMk IV, but was slowly totally re-equipped with Pan-
zer PzMk IV tanks. The 2/25th may have been renumbered as the l/25th Panzer Regiment.
OKH records show that the division was organized and equipped as follows during 1943:
Division Staff
1 Division Staff (2 LMGs)
58th (mot) Mapping Detachment
25th Panzer Regiment
Regimental Staff
1 Signals Platoon
1 Regimental Band
1st Battalion
1 Regimental Staff and Staff Company (received 7 PzMk III flame panzers on 18 June 1943)
4 Panzer Companies (22 PzMk IV ea)
1 Panzer Maintenance Company
6th Panzergrenadier Regiment
1 Regimental Staff
1 Regimental Band
1 (mot) Regimental Staff Company
1 Signals Platoon
1 Panzerjager Platoon (3 50mm PAK 38 and 3 LMGs)
1 Motorcycle Platoon (6 LMGs)
1st (mot) Battalion
3 (mot) Companies (4 HMGs, 18 LMGs, 2 80mm mortars and 3 PzBu39 ea)
1 Panzerjager Platoon (3 LMGs and 3 50mm PAK 38)
1 Infantry Gun Platoon (4 75mm leIG)
1 Panzerjager Platoon (3 LMGs and 3 sPzBu 41)
2nd (half-track) Battalion
3 (half-track) Companies (4 HMGs, 34 LMGs, 2 80mm mortars and 3 75mm leIG ea)
1 (half-track) Heavy Company
1 Infantry Gun Platoon (8 LMGs and 4 75mm leIG)
1 Panzerjager Platoon (3 LMGs and 3 sPzBu 41)
1 Self-Propelled Infantry Gun Company (6 150mm sIG and 7 LMGs)
7th Panzergrenadier Regiment
1 Regimental Staff
1 Regimental Band
1 (mot) Regimental Staff Company
1 Signals Platoon
1 Motorcycle Platoon (6 LMGs)
1st and 2nd (mot) Battalions
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same as 1/6th Panzergrenadier Regiment
1 Self-Propelled Infantry Gun Company (6 150mm sIG and 7 LMGs)
1 (motZ) Panzerjager Company (75mm PAK 40)
1 Self-Propelled Panzerjager Company (14 75mm PAK 40 and 14 LMGs ea)
7th Reconnaissance Battalion (early 1943 organization)
1 Armored Car Platoon (6 LMGs and 6 75mm guns)
1 Armored Car Company (24 LMGs and 18 20mm guns)
2 Motorcycle Companies (2 80mm mortars, 4 HMGs, 18 LMGs and 3 PzBu39 ea)
1 (half-track) Reconnaissance Company (2 80mm mortars, 4 HMGs, 56 LMGs and 3 75mm
leIG)
1 (mot) Heavy Reconnaissance Company
1 Panzerjager Platoon (3 LMGs and 3 75mm PAK 40) 1 Panzerjager Platoon (3 LMGs and 3
sPzBu 41)
7th Reconnaissance Battalion (as of 10 July 1943)
1 Armored Car Company (24 LMGs and 18 20mm guns)
1 Armored Car (half-track) Company (25 LMGs and 16 20mm guns)
1 Motorcycle Company (2 80mm mortars, 4 HMGs, 18 LMGs and 3 PzBu39)
1 (half-track) Heavy Reconnaissance Company
1 Staff (2 LMGs)
1 Infantry Platoon (9 LMGs)
1 Pioneer Platoon (1 37mm PAK 36, 6 flamethrowers and 13 LMGs)
1 Half-Track Gun Section (8 LMGs and 6 75mm guns)
78th Panzer Artillery Regiment
1 Regimental Staff
1 Staff Battery (2 LMGs)
1st and 2nd Battalions, each with:
1 Battalion Staff
1 Battalion Staff Battery (6 LMGs)
1st (self-propelled) Battalion (as of Aug. 1943)
1 Battalion Staff
1 Self-Propelled Battalion Staff Battery (2 LMGs)
2 Self-Propelled Batteries (6 105mm leFH SdKfz 124 Wespe and 4 LMGs ea)
1 Self-Propelled Battery (6 150mm sFH SdKfz 165 Hummel and 4 LMGs)
3rd (mot) Battalion
1 Battalion Staff
1 Battalion Staff Battery (6 LMGs)
2 (mot) Batteries (3 150mm sFH and 2 LMGs ea)
1 (mot) Battery (3 100mm K 18 guns and 2 LMGs)
78th (mot) Observation Battery (2 LMGs)
296th Army Flak Battalion
1 Staff and (mot) Staff Battery (1 LMG)
lst-2nd (motZ) Heavy Flak Batteries (4 88mm, 3 20mm and 2 LMGs ea)
3rd (motZ) Light Flak Battery (12 20mm and 2 LMGs)
4th Self-Propelled Battery (8 20mm and 2 quad 20mm Flak guns and 4 LMGs)
1 (mot) Light (20 ton) Flak Supply Column
58th Panzer Pioneer Battalion
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1 Staff (2 LMGs)
2 (half-track) Pioneer Companies (25 LMGs, 2 80mm mortars and 3 PzBu39 ea)
1 (mot) Pioneer Company (18 LMGs, 3 PzBu39) and 2 80mm mortars ea)
1 Briiko K Bridging Column (3 LMGs)
1 (mot) Light Pioneer Supply Column (2 LMGs)
83rd Panzer Signals Battalion
1 Panzer Telephone Company (6 LMGs)
1 Panzer Radio Company (16 LMGs)
1 (mot) Light Signals Supply Column (1 LMG)
58th Feldersatz Battalion
4 Companies
58th Supply Troop
l-6/58th (mot) (90 ton) Transportation Company (3 LMGs ea)
58th (mot) Heavy Fuel Column (2 LMGs)
58th (mot) Supply Company (6 LMGs)
Truck Park
1-3/58th (mot) Maintenance Companies (4 LMGs ea)
Other
58th (mot) Administration Platoon
1/, 2/58th (mot) Medical Companies (2 LMGs ea)
1/, 2/, 3/58th Ambulances
58th (mot) Military Police Troop (2 LMGs)
In July 1943 the organization of the armored portion of the division and its panzer inventory
were as follows:
Each Battalion had:
2 Light Panzer Companies Total tanks available: 12 PzMkII , 43 PzMk III (lg), 12
PzMkIII(75), 1 PzMk IV (kz), 37 PzMk IV (lg), 7 PzBefWg.
On 5 May 1944 the 1/25th Panzer Regiment was equipped with Panther tanks. The 2/25th
Panzer Regiment continued to be equipped with Panzer PzMk IV tanks. In a major battle on
23 January 1945 near Deutsch-Eylau the 25th Panzer Regiment engaged the Russians with
20 combat veicles against 200. It was obliterated, only to be quickly rebuilt. On 1 April 1945
the 4th Company/11th Panzer Regiment was equipped with infra-red equipment and at-
tached to the rebuilt 25th Panzer Regiment. The division refitted on 19 April 1945 and ab-
sorbed the Panzer Auffrischungs Verband Krampnitz. Reduced to a kampfgruppe
1
, it con-
tained a single panzer battalion from the 25th Panzer Regiment with 10 PzMk V Panther and
13 PzMk IV tanks.The division was taken into British captivity on 3 May 1945.
Commanding officers
Generalmajor Georg Stumme (18 October 1939 5 February 1940)
Generalmajor Erwin Rommel (5 February 1940 14 February 1941)
Generalmajor Hans Freiherr von Funck (15 February 1941 17 August 1943)
Oberst Wolfgang Glsemer (17 August 1943 20 August 1943)
Generalmajor Hasso von Manteuffel (20 August 1943 1 January 1944)
Generalmajor Adelbert Schulz (1 January 1944 28 January 1944)
Oberst Wolfgang Glsemer (28 January 1944 30 January 1944)
Generalmajor Dr. Karl Mauss (30 January 1944 2 May 1944)
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Generalmajor Gerhard Schmidhuber (2 May 1944 9 September 1944)
Generalmajor Dr. Karl Mauss (9 September 1944 31 October 1944)
Generalmajor Hellmuth Mder (31 October 1944 30 November 1944)
Generalmajor Dr. Karl Mauss (30 November 1944 5 January 1945)
Generalmajor Max Lemke (5 January 1945 23 January 1945)
Generalmajor Dr. Karl Mauss (23 January 1945 25 March 1945)
Oberst Hans Christern (26 March 1945 8 May 1945)
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Chapter II Fall Weiss: the invasion of Poland
1 September 1939
CHRONOLOGY
1938
29 September Britain and France agree to German demands that Czechoslovakia cede
the Sudeteniand at the Munich conference, 1-7 October German troops occupy the Sudete-
niand in Czechoslovakia
1939
15 March German army invades the remainder of Czechoslovakia, occupies Bohemia-Mora-
via and eventually allows Slovakia to form puppet state
22 March Germany seizes port of Memel from Lithuania
25 March Hitler orders start of preparations to invade Poland
March Polish army begins partial mobilisation in response to German diplomatic pressure
to cede Pomeranian corridor and allow return of Danzig to Germany
31 March British government announces its guarantee of Polish security, including maintain-
ing the status quo of Danzig
May Polish and French general staff hold meetings in France, during which France pledges
major offensive against Germany two weeks after an invasion
23 August German foreign minister Ribbentrop and Soviet foreign minister Molotov
announce German-Soviet non-aggression pact; which includes secret clauses agreeing to the
dismemberment of Poland
24 August Britain gives written assurances to Poland in the event of war with Germany
26 August Hitler planned to start war today, but postpones the attack in wake of British
security announcement
1 September War begins at 0400hrs with German battleship Schleswig-Holstein firing at
Polish garrison on Westerplatte near Danzig
2 September German aqVances out of East Prussia force Army Modlin to withdraw to Vis-
tula line
3 September France and Britain declare war on Germany
5 September Piotrkow falls, and the gateway to Warsaw is opened to German Panzers:
in the evening, Armies Lodz, Krakow, Prusy and Poznan ordered to begin retreat
behind the Vistula
7 September German tanks reach outskirts of Warsaw, but are thrown back in intense
street fighting. Marshal Rydz-Smigly decides to shift headquarters from Warsaw to
Brzesc-nad-Bugiem
9 September Army Poznan launches counter-attack along the Bzura River, catching the
German 8th Army off guard
15 September Army Group North reaches northern outskirts of Warsaw, siege resumes
16 September Polish forces along the Bzura subjected to massive artillery and air attack;
retreat to Warsaw ordered that evening
17 September Red Army begins to invade Poland from the east
19 September Army Krakow attempts to break out towards Romania through Tomaszow
Lubelski
21 September Last units from Bzura counter-offensive finally surrender
22 September Encircled by German and Soviet troops, city of Lwow finally surrenders
25 September 'Black Monday', a massive Luftwaffe attack on Warsaw causes heavy civilian
casualties
26 September Southern Warsaw forts captured
27 September Warsaw garrison surrenders
29 September Fortified Mocllin garrison surrenders
6 October Battlegroup under General Franciszek Kleeberg surrenders after a four-day battle
around Kock; last major Polish unit in the field
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THE BEGINNING OF THE INVASION of Poland saw the 2nd Leichte Division launching its
attack from the area around Horneck in Silesia. As part of the armoured spearhead of von
Reichenau's 10th Army, its mission was to take part in the elimination of Polish forces
around the key cities of Kielce and Radom. The Division advanced without much in the way
of fighting, reaching Radom by 9 September. However, fighting was harder elsewhere, and
the Division was one of several diverted to deal with a Polish counterattack at Bzura, to the
west of Warsaw.
After the battle, the Division advanced towards Modlin, continuing to encircle the south of
the Polish capital. The Poles capitulated on 27 September 1939, and German units not needed
for occupation duty were ordered home on 1 October.
Arriving in Thuringia in mid-October, the 2nd Leichte prepared for radical change. As a re-
sult of combat experience in Poland, the Wehrmacht had learned some lessons about what
kind of units were needed in large-scale combat. As a result, the four Leichte divisions were to
be reorganized as fully-fledged Panzer divisions, to be numbered from 6 to 9. The 2nd Leichte
Division was renamed the 7th Panzer Division on 18 October 1939.
The Invasion of Poland, also known as the September Campaign or 1939 Defensive War in
Poland and the Poland Campaign (German: Polenfeldzug) or Fall Weiss (Case White) in Ger-
many, was an invasion of Poland by Germany, the Soviet Union, and a small Slovak contin-
gent that marked the beginning of World War II in Europe. The German invasion began on 1
September 1939, one week after the signing of the MolotovRibbentrop Pact, while the Soviet
invasion commenced on 17 September 1939 following the Molotov-Tg agreement which
terminated the Nomonhan incident on 16 September 1939. The campaign ended on 6 Octo-
ber 1939 with Germany and the Soviet Union dividing and annexing the whole of Poland.
The morning after the Gleiwitz incident, German forces invaded Poland from the north,
south, and west. As the Germans advanced, Polish forces withdrew from their forward bases
of operation close to the PolishGerman border to more established lines of defence to the
east. After the mid-September Polish defeat in the Battle of the Bzura, the Germans gained an
undisputed advantage. Polish forces then withdrew to the southeast where they prepared for
a long defence of the Romanian Bridgehead and awaited expected support and relief from
France and the United Kingdom. The two countries had pacts with Poland and had declared
war on Germany on 3 September, though in the end their aid to Poland in the September
campaign was very limited.
The Soviet Red Army's invasion of Eastern Poland on 17 September, in accordance with a se-
cret protocol of the MolotovRibbentrop Pact, rendered the Polish plan of defence obsolete.
Facing a second front, the Polish government concluded the defence of the Romanian Brid-
gehead was no longer feasible and ordered an emergency evacuation of all troops to neutral
Romania. On 6 October, following the Polish defeat at the Battle of Kock, German and Soviet
forces gained full control over Poland. The success of the invasion marked the end of the Se-
cond Polish Republic, though Poland never formally surrendered.
On 8 October, after an initial period of military administration, Germany directly annexed
western Poland and the former Free City of Danzig and placed the remaining block of terri-
tory under the administration of the newly established General Government. The Soviet
Union incorporated its newly acquired areas into its constituent Belarusian and Ukrainian
republics, and immediately started a campaign of sovietization. In the aftermath of the inva-
sion, a collective of underground resistance organizations formed the Polish Underground
State within the territory of the former Polish state. Many of the military exiles that managed
to escape Poland subsequently joined the Polish Armed Forces in the West, an armed force lo-
yal to the Polish government in exile.
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Map 1 The map shows the beginning of World War II in September 1939 in a wider European
context.
Prelude to the campaign
In 1933, the National-Socialist German Workers' Party, under its leader Adolf Hitler, came to
power in Germany. Germany sought to gain back her lost territory in Europe, taken by the
Treaty of Versailles and also to be eventually surrounded by a ring of allied states, satellite or
puppet states. As part of this long term policy, Hitler at first pursued a policy of rapproche-
ment with Poland, trying to improve GermanPolish relations, culminating in the German
Polish Non-Aggression Pact of 1934. Earlier, Hitler's foreign policy worked to weaken ties bet-
ween Poland and France, and attempted to manoeuvre Poland into the Anti-Comintern Pact,
forming a cooperative front against the Soviet Union. Poland would be granted territory of its
own, to its northeast, but the concessions the Poles were expected to make meant that their
homeland would become largely dependent on Germany, functioning as little more than a
client state. The Poles feared that their independence would eventually be threatened altoget-
her.
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Image: http://www.panzertruppen.org/amazon/books/ww2/2-51.jpg
In addition to gaining Soviet territory, the National-Socialists were interested in establishing
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a new border with Poland because the German exclave of East Prussia was separated from
the rest of the Reich by the "Polish Corridor". The Corridor constituted land long disputed by
Poland and Germany, and inhabited by Polish majority. The Corridor became a part of Po-
land after the Treaty of Versailles. Many Germans also wanted the city of Danzig and its envi-
rons (together the Free City of Danzig) to be reincorporated into Germany. Danzig was a port
city with German majority. It had been separated from Germany after Versailles and made in-
to a nominally independent Free City of Danzig. Hitler sought to reverse these territorial los-
ses, and on many occasions made an appeal to German nationalism, promising to "liberate"
the German minority still in the Corridor, as well as Danzig.
Poland participated in the partition of Czechoslovakia that followed the Munich Agreement,
although they were not part of the agreement. It coerced Czechoslovakia to surrender the re-
gion of eskTn by issuing an ultimatum to that effect on 30 September 1938, which was
accepted by Czechoslovakia on 1 October.
By 1937, Germany began to increase its demands for Danzig, while proposing that a roadway
be built in order to connect East Prussia with Germany proper, running through the Polish
Corridor. Poland rejected this proposal, fearing that after accepting these demands, it would
become increasingly subject to the will of Germany and eventually lose its independence as
the Czechs had. Polish leaders also distrusted Hitler. Furthermore, Germany's collaboration
with anti-Polish Ukrainian nationalists from the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,
which was seen as an effort to isolate and weaken Poland, weakened Hitler's credibility from
the Polish point of view. The British were also aware of the situation between Germany and
Poland. On 31 March, Poland was backed by a guarantee from Britain and France which sta-
ted that Polish territorial integrity would be defended with their support. On the other hand,
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, still ho-
ped to strike a deal with Hitler regarding Danzig (and possibly the Polish Corridor), and Hi-
tler hoped for the same. Chamberlain and his supporters believed war could be avoided and
hoped Germany would agree to leave the rest of Poland alone. German hegemony over Cen-
tral Europe was also at stake.
With tensions mounting, Germany turned to aggressive diplomacy as well. On 28 April 1939,
it unilaterally withdrew from both the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of 1934 and the
London Naval Agreement of 1935. Talks over Danzig and the Corridor broke down and
months passed without diplomatic interaction between Germany and Poland. During this in-
terim, the Germans learned that France and Britain had failed to secure an alliance with the
Soviet Union against Germany, and that the Soviet Union was interested in an alliance with
Germany against Poland. Hitler had already issued orders to prepare for a possible "solution
of the Polish problem by military means"a Case White scenario.
However, with the surprise signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on 23 August, the de-
nouement of secret Nazi-Soviet talks held in Moscow, Germany neutralized the possibility of
Soviet opposition to a campaign against Poland and war became imminent. In fact, the So-
viets agreed to aid Germany in the event of France or the UK going to war with Germany over
Poland and, in a secret protocol of the pact, the Germans and the Soviets agreed to divide
Eastern Europe, including Poland, into two spheres of influence; the western of the country
was to go to Germany and the eastern 2/3 to the Soviet Union.
The German assault was originally scheduled to begin at 04:00 on 26 August. However, on
25 August, the Polish-British Common Defense Pact was signed as an annex to the Franco-
Polish Military Alliance. In this accord, Britain committed itself to the defence of Poland, gua-
ranteeing to preserve Polish independence. At the same time, the British and the Poles were
hinting to Berlin that they were willing to resume discussionsnot at all how Hitler hoped to
frame the conflict. Thus, he wavered and postponed his attack until 1 September, managing
to in effect halt the entire invasion "in mid-leap".
However, there was one exception: in the night of 256 August, a German sabotage group
which had not heard anything about a delay of the invasion made an attack on the Jablunkov
Pass and Mosty railway station in Silesia. On the morning of 26 August, this group was repe-
lled by Polish troops.
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Map 2 Planned and actual divisions of Poland, according to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact,
with later adjustments
The German side described all this as an incident "caused by an insane individual"
On 26 August, Hitler tried to dissuade the British and the French from interfering in the up-
coming conflict, even pledging that the Wehrmacht forces would be made available to Bri-
tain's empire in the future. The negotiations convinced Hitler that there was little chance the
Western Allies would declare war on Germany, and even if they did, because of the lack of "te-
rritorial guarantees" to Poland, they would be willing to negotiate a compromise favourable
to Germany after its conquest of Poland. Meanwhile, the increased number of overflights by
high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft and cross border troop movements signaled that war
was imminent.
On 29 August, prompted by the British, Germany issued one last diplomatic offer, with Fall
Weiss "Case White" yet to be rescheduled. That evening, the German government responded
in a communication that it aimed not only for the restoration of Danzig but also the Polish
Corridor (which had not previously been part of Hitlers demands) in addition to the safe-
guarding of the German minority in Poland. It said that they were willing to commence nego-
tiations, but indicated that a Polish representative with the power to sign an agreement had
to arrive in Berlin the next day while in the meantime it would draw up a set of proposals.
The British Cabinet was pleased that negotiations had been agreed to but, mindful of how
Emil Hacha had been forced to sign his country away under similar circumstances just
months earlier, regarded the requirement for an immediate arrival of a Polish representative
with full signing powers as an unacceptable ultimatum. On the night of 30/31 August, Ger-
man Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop read a 16-point German proposal to the Bri-
tish ambassador. When the ambassador requested a copy of the proposals for transmission to
the Polish government Ribbentrop refused on the grounds that the requested Polish repre-
sentative had failed to arrive by midnight. When Polish Ambassador Lipski went to see Rib-
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bentrop later on 31 August to indicate that Poland was favorably disposed to negotiations, he
announced that he did not have the full power to sign, and Ribbentrop dismissed him. It was
then broadcast that Poland had rejected Germany's offer, and negotiations with Poland came
to an end. Hitler issued orders for the invasion to commence soon afterwards.
On 29 August, German saboteurs planted a bomb at the railway station in Tarnw and killed
21 passengers, leaving 35 wounded.
On 30 August, the Polish Navy sent its destroyer flotilla to Britain, executing Operation Pe-
king. On the same day, Marshal of Poland Edward Rydz-migy announced the mobilization
of Polish troops. However, he was pressured into revoking the order by the French, who appa-
rently still hoped for a diplomatic settlement, failing to realize that the Germans were fully
mobilized and concentrated at the Polish border. During the night of 31 August, the Gleiwitz
incident, a false flag attack on the radio station, was staged near the border city of Gleiwitz by
German units posing as Polish troops, in Upper Silesia as part of the wider Operation Himm-
ler. On 31 August 1939, Hitler ordered hostilities against Poland to start at 4:45 the next mor-
ning. Because of the prior stoppage, Poland managed to mobilize only 70% of its planned for-
ces, and many units were still forming or moving to their designated frontline positions.
Opposing forces
Germany
Germany had a substantial numeric advantage over Poland and had developed a significant
military prior to the conflict. The Heer (army) had some 2.400 tanks organized into six pan-
zer divisions, utilizing a new operational doctrine. It held that these divisions should act in
coordination with other elements of the military, punching holes in the enemy line and isola-
ting selected units, which would be encircled and destroyed. This would be followed up by
less-mobile mechanized infantry and foot soldiers. The Luftwaffe (air force) provided both
tactical and strategic air power, particularly dive bombers that disrupted lines of supply and
communications. Together, the new methods were nicknamed "Blitzkrieg" (lightning war).
Historian Basil Liddell Hart claimed "Poland was a full demonstration of the Blitzkrieg
theory." Some other historians, however, disagree.
Aircraft played a major role in the campaign. Bombers also attacked cities, causing huge los-
ses amongst the civilian population through terror bombing. The Luftwaffe forces consisted
of 1.180 fighters, 290 Ju 87 Stuka dive bombers, 1,100 conventional bombers (mainly Hein-
kel He 111s and Dornier Do 17s), and an assortment of 550 transport and 350 reconnaissance
aircraft. In total, Germany had close to 4,000 aircraft, most of them modern. A force of 2.315
aircraft was assigned to Weiss. Due to its prior participation in the Spanish Civil War, the
Luftwaffe was probably the most experienced, best trained and best equipped air force in the
world in 1939.
Poland
Between 1936 and 1939, Poland invested heavily in the Central Industrial Region. Prepara-
tions for a defensive war with Germany were ongoing for many years, but most plans assu-
med fighting would not begin before 1942. To raise funds for industrial development, Poland
sold much of the modern equipment it produced. In 1936, a National Defence Fund was set
up to collect funds necessary for strengthening the Polish Armed forces. The Polish Army had
approximately a million soldiers, but less than half were mobilized by 1 September. Lateco-
mers sustained significant casualties when public transport became targets of the Luftwaffe.
The Polish military had fewer armored forces than the Germans, and these units, dispersed
within the infantry, were unable to effectively engage the enemy.
Experiences in the Polish-Soviet War shaped Polish Army organizational and operational
doctrine. Unlike the trench warfare of World War I, the Polish-Soviet War was a conflict in
which the cavalry's mobility played a decisive role.
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Map 3 Operations in Poland
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26/138
Poland acknowledged the benefits of mobility but was unable to invest heavily in many of the
expensive, unproven inventions since then. In spite of this, Polish cavalry brigades were used
as a mobile mounted infantry and had some successes against both German infantry and ca-
valry.
The Polish Air Force (Lotnictwo Wojskowe) was at a severe disadvantage against the German
Luftwaffe, although it was not destroyed on the ground early on, as is commonly believed.
The Polish Air Force lacked modern fighters, but its pilots were among the world's best trai-
ned, as proven a year later in the Battle of Britain, in which the Poles played a major part.
Overall, the Germans enjoyed numerical and qualitative aircraft superiority. Poland had only
about 600 aircraft, of which only 37 P-37 o bombers were modern and comparable to its
German counterparts. The Polish Air Force had roughly 185 PZL P.11 and some 95 PZL P.7
fighters, 175 PZL.23 Kara Bs, 35 Kara As, and by September, over 100 PZL.37s were produ-
ced. However, for the September Campaign, only some 70% of those aircraft were mobilized.
Only 36 PZL.37s were deployed. All those aircraft were of indigenous Polish design, with the
bombers being more modern than fighters, according to the Ludomi Rayski air force expan-
sion plan, which relied on a strong bomber force. The Polish fighters were a generation older
than their German counterparts; the PZL P.11 fighterproduced in the early 1930shad a
top speed of only 365 km/h (227 mph), far less than German bombers. To compensate, the
pilots relied on its maneuverability and high diving speed.
The tank force consisted of two armored brigades, four independent tank battalions and so-
me 30 companies of TKS tankettes attached to infantry divisions and cavalry brigades. A
standard tank of the Polish Army during the invasion of 1939 was the 7TP light tank. It was
the first tank in the world to be equipped with a diesel engine and 360Gundlach periscope.
The 7TP was significantly better armed than its most common opponents, the German Pan-
zer I and II, but only 140 tanks were produced between 1935 and the outbreak of the war. Po-
land had also a few relatively modern imported designs, such as 50 Renault R35 tanks and 38
Vickers E tanks.
The Polish Navy was a small fleet of destroyers, submarins ad smaller support vessels. Most
Polish surface units followed Operation Peking, leaving Polish ports on 20 August and esca-
ping by way of the North Sea to join with the British Royal Navy. Submarine forces participa-
ted in Operation Worek, with the goal of engaging and damaging German shipping in the Bal-
tic Sea, but they had much less success. In addition, many merchant marine ships joined the
British merchant fleet and took part in wartime convoys.
Details of the campaign
German plan
The September Campaign was devised by General Franz Halder, chief of the general staff,
and directed by General Walther von Brauchitsch, the commander in chief of the upcoming
campaign. It called for the start of hostilities before a declaration of war, and pursued a doc-
trine of mass encirclement and destruction of enemy forces. The infantryfar from comple-
tely mechanized but fitted with fast moving artillery and logistic supportwas to be suppor-
ted by Panzers and small numbers of truck-mounted infantry (the Schtzen regiments, fore-
runners of the panzergrenadiers) to assist the rapid movement of troops and concentrate on
localized parts of the enemy front, eventually isolating segments of the enemy, surrounding,
and destroying them. The pre-war "armored idea" (which an American journalist in 1939
dubbed Blitzkrieg)which was advocated by some generals, including Heinz Guderian
would have had the armor punching holes in the enemy's front and ranging deep into rear
areas; in actuality, the campaign in Poland would be fought along more traditional lines. This
stemmed from conservatism on the part of the German high command, who mainly restric-
ted the role of armor and mechanized forces to supporting the conventional infantry divi-
sions.
Poland's terrain was well suited for mobile operations when the weather cooperated; the
country had flat plains with long frontiers totalling almost 5,600 km (3,500 mi), Poland's
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long border with Germany on the west and northfacing East Prussiaextended 2,000 km
(1,200 mi).
Illustration 1: German Panzer units in Poland were equiped mainly with light tanks like the
PzKpfw II, seen here armed with a 20mm cannon.
Those had been lengthened by another 300 km (190 mi) on the southern side in the after-
math of the Munich Agreement of 1938. The German incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia
and creation of the German puppet state of Slovakia meant that Poland's southern flank was
exposed.
German planners intended to fully exploit their long border with the great enveloping ma-
noeuver of Fall Weiss. German units were to invade Poland from three directions:
A main attack over the western Polish border. This was to be carried out by Army Group
South commanded by General Gerd von Rundstedt, attacking from German Silesia and
from the Moravian and Slovak border: General Johannes Blaskowitz's 8th Army was to
drive eastward against d; General Wilhelm List's 14th Army was to push on toward
Krakw and to turn the Poles' Carpathian flank; and General Walter von Reichenau's 10th
Army, in the centre with Army Group South's armor, was to deliver the decisive blow with
a northeastward thrust into the heart of Poland.
A second route of attack from northern Prussia. General Fedor von Bock commanded
Army Group North, comprising General Georg von Kchler's 3rd Army, which was to stri-
ke southward from East Prussia, and General Gnther von Kluge's 4th Army, which was to
attack eastward across the base of the Polish Corridor.
A tertiary attack by part of Army Group South's allied Slovak units from Slovakia.
From within Poland, the German minority would assist by engaging in diversion and sabo-
tage operations through Volksdeutscher Selbstschutz units prepared before the war.
All three assaults were to converge on Warsaw, while the main Polish army was to be encir-
cled and destroyed west of the Vistula. Fall Weiss was initiated on 1 September 1939, and was
the first operation of World War II in Europe.
Polish defence plan.
The Polish political determination to deploy forces directly at the German-Polish border, ba-
sed on the Polish-British Common Defense Pact, shaped the country's defence plan, "Plan
West". Poland's most valuable natural resources, industry and population were located along
the western border in Eastern Upper Silesia. Polish policy centred on their protection espe-
28/138
cially since many politicians feared that if Poland were to retreat from the regions disputed by
Germany, Britain and France would sign a separate peace treaty with Germany similar to the
Munich Agreement of 1938. The fact that none of Poland's allies had specifically guaranteed
Polish borders or territorial integrity certainly did not help in easing Polish concerns. For the-
se reasons, Poland disregarded French advice to deploy the bulk of their forces behind the na-
tural barriers such as the Vistula and San rivers, even though some Polish generals supported
it as a better strategy. The West Plan did permit the Polish armies to retreat inside the
country, but it was supposed to be a slow retreat behind prepared positions and was intended
to give the armed forces time to complete its mobilization and execute a general counteroffen-
sive with the support of the Western Allies.
The Polish General Staff had not begun elaborating the "West" defence plan until 4 March
1939. It was assumed that the Polish Army, fighting in the initial phase of the war alone,
would be compelled to defend the western regions of the country. The plan of operations took
into account, first of all, the numerical and material superiority of the enemy and, conse-
quently, assumed the defensive character of Polish operations. The Polish intentions were:
the defence of the western regions judged as indispensable for waging the war, the taking ad-
vantage of the propitious conditions for counterblows by reserve units, the avoidance of being
smashed before the beginning of Allied operations in the West and the making of decisions
depending of the existing situation. The operational plan had not been elaborated in detail
and concerned only the first stage of operations.
The British and French estimated that Poland should be able to defend itself for two to three
months, while Poland estimated it could do so for at least six months. Poland drafted its esti-
mates based upon the expectation that the Western Allies honor their treaty obligations and
quickly start an offensive of their own. In addition, the French and British expected the war
to develop into trench warfare much like World War I. The Polish government was not noti-
fied of this strategy and based all of its defence plans on promises of quick relief by their Wes-
tern allies.
Polish forces were stretched thinly along the Polish-German border and lacked compact de-
fence lines and good defence positions along disadvantageous terrain. This strategy also left
supply lines poorly protected. One-third of Poland's forces were massed in or near the Polish
Corridor, making them vulnerable to a double envelopment from East Prussia and the west.
Another third were concentrated in the north-central part of the country, between the major
cities of d and Warsaw. The forward positioning of Polish forces vastly increased the diffi-
culty of carrying out strategic maneuvers, compounded by inadequate mobility, as Polish
units often lacked the ability to retreat from their defensive positions as they were being ove-
rrun by more mobile German mechanized formations.
As the prospect of conflict increased, the British government pressed Marshal Edward Rydz-
migy to evacuate the most modern elements of the Polish Navy from the Baltic Sea. In the
event of war the Polish military leaders realized that the ships which remained in the Baltic
were likely to be quickly sunk by the Germans. Furthermore, the Danish straits were well wit-
hin operating range of the German Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe, so there was little chance of
an evacuation plan succeeding if implemented after hostilities began. Four days after the sig-
ning of the Polish-British Common Defense Pact, three destroyers of the Polish Navy execu-
ted the Peking Plan and consequently evacuated to Great Britain.
Although the Polish military had prepared for conflict, the civilian population remained lar-
gely unprepared. Polish pre-war propaganda emphasized that any German invasion would be
easily repelled. Consequently, Polish defeats during the German invasion came as a shock to
the civilian population. Lacking training for such a disaster, the civilian population panicked
and retreated east, spreading chaos, lowering troop morale and making road transportation
for Polish troops very difficult.
Phase 1: German invasion
Following several German-staged incidents (like the Gleiwitz incident, a part of Operation
Himmler), which German propaganda used as an excuse to claim that German forces were
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acting in self-defence, the first regular act of war took place on 1 September 1939, at 04:40,
when the Luftwaffe attacked the Polish town of Wielu, destroying 75% of the city and killing
close to 1.200 people, most of them civilians. This invasion subsequently began World War
II. Five minutes later, the old German pre-dreadnought battleship Schleswig-Holstein ope-
ned fire on the Polish military transit depot at Westerplatte in the Free City of Danzig on the
Baltic Sea. At 08:00, German troopsstill without a formal declaration of war issuedatta-
cked near the Polish town of Mokra. The Battle of the Border had begun. Later that day, the
Germans attacked on Poland's western, southern and northern borders, while German air-
craft began raids on Polish cities. The main axis of attack led eastwards from Germany proper
through the western Polish border. Supporting attacks came from East Prussia in the north,
and a co-operative German-Slovak tertiary attack by units (Field Army "Bernolk") from Ger-
man-allied Slovakia in the south. All three assaults converged on the Polish capital of War-
saw.
The Allied governments declared war on Germany on 3 September; however, they failed to
provide any meaningful support. The German-French border saw only a few minor skirmis-
hes, although the majority of German forces, including 85% of their armoured forces, were
engaged in Poland. Despite some Polish successes in minor border battles, German technical,
operational and numerical superiority forced the Polish armies to retreat from the borders to-
wards Warsaw and Lww. The Luftwaffe gained air superiority early in the campaign. By des-
troying communications, the Luftwaffe increased the pace of the advance which overran Po-
lish airstrips and early warning sites, causing logistical problems for the Poles. Many Polish
Air Force units ran low on supplies, 98 of their number withdrew into then-neutral Romania.
The Polish initial strength of 400 was reduced to just 54 by 14 September and air opposition
virtually ceased.
By 3 September, when Gnther von Kluge in the north had reached the Vistula river (some
10 km (6.2 mi) from the German border at that time) and Georg von Kchler was approa-
ching the Narew River, Walther von Reichenau's armor was already beyond the Warta river;
two days later, his left wing was well to the rear of d and his right wing at the town of Kiel-
ce. By 8 September, one of his armored corpshaving advanced 225 km (140 mi) in the first
week of the campaignreached the outskirts of Warsaw. Light divisions on Reichenau's right
were on the Vistula between Warsaw and the town of Sandomierz by 9 September while
Listin the southwas on the San River above and below the town of Przemyl. At the same
time, Guderian led his 3rd Army tanks across the Narew, attacking the line of the Bug River,
already encircling Warsaw. All the German armies made progress in fulfilling their parts of
the Fall Weiss plan. The Polish armies were splitting up into uncoordinated fragments, some
of which were retreating while others were launching disjointed attacks on the nearest Ger-
man columns..
Polish forces abandoned the regions of Pomerelia (the Polish Corridor), Greater Poland and
Polish Upper Silesia in the first week. The Polish plan for border defence was proven a dismal
failure. The German advance as a whole was not slowed. On 10 September, the Polish com-
mander-in-chiefMarshal Edward Rydz-migyordered a general retreat to the southeast,
towards the so-called Romanian Bridgehead. Meanwhile, the Germans were tightening their
encirclement of the Polish forces west of the Vistula (in the d area and, still farther west,
around Pozna) and also penetrating deeply into eastern Poland. Warsawunder heavy ae-
rial bombardment since the first hours of the warwas attacked on 9 September and was put
under siege on 13 September. Around that time, advanced German forces also reached the
city of Lww, a major metropolis in eastern Poland. 1,150 German aircraft bombed Warsaw
on 24 September.
The Polish defensive plan called for a strategy of encirclement: they were to allow the Ger-
mans to advance in between two Polish Army groups in the line between Berlin and Warsaw-
Lodz, at which point Armia Prusy would move in and repulse the German spearhead, trap-
ping them. In order for this to happen, Armia Prusy needed to be fully mobilized by 3 Sep-
tember.
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Map 4: Campaign in Poland 1939
http://www.panzertruppen.org/amazon/books/ww2/map3.jpg
However, Polish military planners failed to foresee the speed of the German advance and pre-
dicted that Armia Prusy would need to be fully mobilized by 16 September, by which time it
was too late.
The largest battle during this campaignthe Battle of Bzuratook place near the Bzura river
west of Warsaw and lasted 919 September. Polish armies Pozna and Pomorze, retreating
from the border area of the Polish Corridor, attacked the flank of the advancing German 8th
Army, but the counterattack failed after initial success. After the defeat, Poland lost its ability
to take the initiative and counterattack on a large scale. German air power was instrumental
during the battle. The Luftwaffe's offensive broke what remained of Polish resistance in an
"awesome demonstration of air power". The Luftwaffe quickly destroyed the bridges across
the Bzura River. Afterward, the Polish forces were trapped out in the open, and were attacked
by wave after wave of Stukas, dropping 50 kg (110 lb) "light bombs" which caused huge num-
bers of casualties. The Polish anti-aircraft batteries ran out of ammunition and retreated to
the forests, but were then "smoked out" by the Heinkel He 111 and Dornier Do 17s dropping
100 kg (220 lb) incendiaries. The Luftwaffe left the army with the task of mopping up survi-
vors. The Stukageschwaders alone dropped 388 t (428 short tons) of bombs during this bat-
tle.
The Polish government (of President Ignacy Mocicki) and the high command (of Marshal
Edward Rydz-migy) left Warsaw in the first days of the campaign and headed southeast,
reaching Lublin on 6 September. From there, it moved on 9 September to Kremenez, and on
13 September to Zaleshiki on the Romanian border. Rydz-migy ordered the Polish forces to
retreat in the same direction, behind the Vistula and San rivers, beginning the preparations
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for the long defense of the Romanian Bridgehead area.
Phase 2: after Soviet Union invaded fromthe east
From the beginning, the German government repeatedly asked Vyacheslav Molotov whether
the Soviet Union would keep to its side of the partition bargain. The Soviet forces were hol-
ding fast along their designated invasion points pending finalization of the five-month-long
undeclared war with Japan in the far east. On 15 September 1939 the Ambassadors Molotov
and Shigenori Tg completed their agreement ending the conflict, and the Nomonhan cea-
se-fire went into effect on 16 September 1939. Now cleared of any "second front" threat from
the Japanese, Soviet premier Joseph Stalin ordered his forces into Poland on 17 September. It
was agreed that the USSR would relinquish its interest in the territories between the new bor-
der and Warsaw in exchange for inclusion of Lithuania in the Soviet "zone of interest".
By 17 September, the Polish defence was already broken and the only hope was to retreat and
reorganize along the Romanian Bridgehead. However, these plans were rendered obsolete
nearly overnight, when the over 800.000 strong Soviet Red Army entered and created the Be-
larussian and Ukrainian fronts after invading the eastern regions of Poland in violation of the
Riga Peace Treaty, the Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact, and other international treaties,
both bilateral and multilateral. Soviet diplomacy claimed that they were "protecting the Uk-
rainian and Belarusian minorities of eastern Poland since the Polish government had abando-
ned the country and the Polish state ceased to exist".
Polish border defence forces in the eastknown as the Korpus Ochrony Pograniczaconsis-
ted of about 25 battalions. Edward Rydz-migy ordered them to fall back and not engage the
Soviets. This, however, did not prevent some clashes and small battles, such as the Battle of
Grodno, as soldiers and local population attempted to defend the city. The Soviets murdered
numerous Polish officers, including prisoners of war like General Jzef Olszyna-Wilczyski.
The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists rose against the Poles, and communist partisans
organized local revolts, robbing and murdering Poles. Those movements were quickly disci-
plined by the NKVD. The Soviet invasion was one of the decisive factors that convinced the
Polish government that the war in Poland was lost. Prior to the Soviet attack from the east,
the Polish military's fall-back plan had called for long-term defence against Germany in the
south-eastern part of Poland, while awaiting relief from a Western Allies attack on Germany's
western border. However, the Polish government refused to surrender or negotiate a peace
with Germany. Instead, it ordered all units to evacuate Poland and reorganize in France.
Meanwhile, Polish forces tried to move towards the Romanian Bridgehead area, still actively
resisting the German invasion. From 1720 September, Polish armies Krakw and Lublin
were crippled at the Battle of Tomaszw Lubelski, the second largest battle of the campaign.
The city of Lww capitulated on 22 September because of Soviet intervention; the city had
been attacked by the Germans over a week earlier, and in the middle of the siege, the German
troops handed operations over to their Soviet allies. Despite a series of intensifying German
attacks, Warsawdefended by quickly reorganized retreating units, civilian volunteers and
militiaheld out until 28 September. The Modlin Fortress north of Warsaw capitulated on 29
September after an intense 16-day battle. Some isolated Polish garrisons managed to hold
their positions long after being surrounded by German forces. Westerplatte enclave's tiny ga-
rrison capitulated on 7 September and the Oksywie garrison held until 19 September; Hel
Fortified Area was defended until 2 October. In the last week of September, Hitler made a
speech in the city of Danzig in which he said:
Poland never will rise again in the form of the Versailles treaty. That is guaranteed not only
by Germany, but also Russia.
Despite a Polish victory at the Battle of Szack, after which the Soviets executed all the officers
and NCOs they had captured, the Red Army reached the line of rivers Narew, Bug River, Vis-
tula and San by 28 September, in many cases meeting German units advancing from the ot-
her direction. Polish defenders on the Hel peninsula on the shore of the Baltic Sea held out
until 2 October.
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The last operational unit of the Polish Army, General Franciszek Kleeberg's Samodzielna
Grupa Operacyjna "Polesie", surrendered after the four-day Battle of Kock near Lublin on 6
October marking the end of the September Campaign.
Civilian losses
The Polish September Campaign was an instance of total war. Consequently, civilian casual-
ties were high during and after combat. From the start, the Luftwaffe attacked civilian targets
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and columns of refugees along the roads to wreak havoc, disrupt communications, and target
Polish morale. Apart from the victims of battles, the German forces (both SS and the regular
Wehrmacht) murdered several thousand Polish civilians.
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Map 5 The race for Warsaw, 7 September 1939
During Operation Tannenberg, nearly 20,000 Poles were shot at 760 mass execution sites by
the Einsatzgruppen.
The Polish Campaign was the first action by Adolf Hitler in his attempt to create Lebens-
raum, or living space, for the ethnic German people. The German retaliation against the op-
posing Polish civilians quickly turned into an atrocity. The German retaliation quickly turned
into irregular warfare against innocent Polish men, women, and children. The brutality that
the German army carried out on the civilians was justifiable in their eyes. Many historians ha-
ve studied the reasoning behind this brutality and have found that Nazi propaganda could be
one of the factors. Nazi propaganda worked to manipulate the German people into believing
that the Jewish and other ethnic people were the enemy
Altogether, the civilian losses of Polish population amounted to about 150.000200.000 whi-
le German civilian losses amounted to roughly 3.250 (including 2.000 who died fighting Po-
lish troops as members of a fifth column).
Aftermath
Poland was divided among Germany, the Soviet Union, and Slovakia. Lithuania received the
city of Wilno and its environs on 28 October 1939 from the Soviet Union. On 8 and 13 Sep-
tember 1939, the German military districts of "Posen" (Poznan)commanded by General Al-
fred von Vollard-Bockelbergand "Westpreuen" (West Prussia)commanded by General
Walter Heitzwere established in conquered Greater Poland and Pomerelia, respectively. Ba-
sed on laws of 21 May 1935 and 1 June 1938, the German Wehrmacht shared its administrati-
ve powers with civilian "chief civil administrators" (Chefs der Zivilverwaltung, CdZ). German
dictator Adolf Hitler appointed Arthur Greiser to become the CdZ of the Posen military dis-
trict, and Danzig's Gauleiter Albert Forster to become the CdZ of the West Prussian military
district. On 3 October, the military districts "Lodz" and "Krakau" (Cracow) were set up under
command of Generalobersten (Colonel-Generals)) Gerd von Rundstedt and Wilhelm List,
and Hitler appointed Hans Frank and Arthur Seyss-Inquart as civil heads, respectively. At the
same time, Frank was appointed "supreme chief administrator" for all occupied territories.
On 28 September, another secret German-Soviet protocol modified the arrangements of Au-
gust: all of Lithuania was shifted to the Soviet sphere of influence; in exchange, the dividing
line in Poland was moved in Germany's favour, eastwards towards the Bug River. On 8 Octo-
ber, Germany formally annexed the western parts of Poland with Greiser and Forster as
Reichsstatthalter, while the south-central parts were administered as the General Govern-
ment led by Frank.
Even though water barriers separated most of the spheres of interest, the Soviet and German
troops met on numerous occasions. The most remarkable event of this kind occurred at
Brest-Litovsk on 22 September. The German 19th Panzer Corpscommanded by General
Heinz Guderianhad occupied the city, which lay within the Soviet sphere of interest. When
the Soviet 29th Tank Brigadecommander by S. M. Krivosheinapproached, the comman-
ders negotiated that the German troops would withdraw and the Soviet troops would enter
the city saluting each other. At Brest-Litovsk, Soviet and German commanders held a joint
victory parade before German forces withdrew westward behind a new demarcation line. Just
three days earlier, however, the parties had a more hostile encounter near Lwow (Lviv, Lem-
berg), when the German 137th Gebirgsjgerregimenter (mountain infantry regiment) atta-
cked a reconnaissance detachment of the Soviet 24th Tank Brigade; after a few casualties on
both sides, the parties turned to negotiations. The German troops left the area, and the Red
Army troops entered Lvov on 22 September.
The MolotovRibbentrop pact and the invasion of Poland marked the beginning of a period
during which the government of the Soviet Union increasingly tried to convince itself that the
actions of Germany were reasonable, and were not developments to be worried about, despite
evidence to the contrary. On 7 September 1939, just a few days after France and Britain joi-
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ned the war against Germany, Stalin explained to a colleague that the war was to the advanta-
ge of the Soviet Union, as follows:
A war is on between two groups of capitalist countries... for the redivision of the world, for
the domination of the world! We see nothing wrong in their having a good hard fight and
weakening each other... Hitler, without understanding it or desiring it, is shaking and under-
mining the capitalist system... We can manoeuvre, pit one side against the other to set them
fighting with each other as fiercely as possible... The annihilation of Poland would mean one
fewer bourgeois fascist state to contend with! What would be the harm if as a result of the
rout of Poland we were to extend the socialist system onto new territories and populations?
About 65.000 Polish troops were killed in the fighting, with 420.000 others being captured
by the Germans and 240.000 more by the Soviets (for a total of 660.000 prisoners). Up to
120.000 Polish troops escaped to neutral Romania (through the Romanian Bridgehead and
Hungary), and another 20.000 to Latvia and Lithuania, with the majority eventually making
their way to France or Britain. Most of the Polish Navy succeeded in evacuating to Britain as
well. German personnel losses were less than their enemies (~16.000 KIA).
None of the parties to the conflictGermany, the Western Allies or the Soviet Unionexpec-
ted that the German invasion of Poland would lead to a war that would surpass World War I
in its scale and cost. It would be months before Hitler would see the futility of his peace nego-
tiation attempts with the United Kingdom and France, but the culmination of combined Eu-
ropean and Pacific conflicts would result in what was truly a "world war". Thus, what was not
seen by most politicians and generals in 1939 is clear from the historical perspective: The Po-
lish September Campaign marked the beginning of the Second World War in Europe, which
combined with the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 and the Pacific War in 1941, formed
the cataclysm known as World War II.
The invasion of Poland led Britain and France to declare war on Germany on 3 September.
However, they did little to affect the outcome of the September Campaign. No declaration of
war was issued by Britain and France against the Soviet Union. This lack of direct help led
many Poles to believe that they had been betrayed by their Western allies.
On 23 May 1939, Hitler explained to his officers that the object of the aggression was not
Danzig, but the need to obtain German Lebensraum and details of this concept would be la-
ter formulated in the infamous Generalplan Ost. The invasion decimated urban residential
areas, civilians soon became indistinguishable from combatants, and the forthcoming Ger-
man occupation (both on the annexed territories and in the General Government) was one of
the most brutal episodes of World War II, resulting in between 5.47 million and 5.67 million
Polish deaths (about 20% of the country's "total" population, and over 90% of its Jewish mi-
nority)including the mass murder of 3 million Polish citizens (mainly Jews as part of the fi-
nal solution) in extermination camps like Auschwitz, in concentration camps, and in nume-
rous ad hoc massacres, where civilians were rounded up, taken to a nearby forest, machine-
gunned, and then buried, whether they were dead or not.
According to the Polish Institute of National Remembrance, Soviet occupation between 1939
and 1941 resulted in the death of 150,000 and deportation of 320,000 of Polish citizens,
when all who were deemed dangerous to the Soviet regime were subject to sovietization, for-
ced resettlement, imprisonment in labor camps (the Gulags) or murdered, like the Polish offi-
cers in the Katyn massacre.
Misconceptions
There are several common misconceptions regarding the Polish September Campaign.
The Polish Army fought German tanks with horse-mounted cavalry wielding lances and
swords.
In 1939, only 10% of the Polish army was made up of cavalry units. Polish cavalry never char-
ged German tanks or entrenched infantry or artillery, but usually acted as mobile infantry (li-
ke dragoons) and reconnaissance units and executed cavalry charges only in rare situations
against foot soldiers. Other armies (including German and Soviet) also fielded and extensi-
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vely used elite horse cavalry units at that time. Polish cavalry consisted of eleven brigades, as
emphasized by its military doctrine, equipped with anti tank rifles "UR" and light artillery
such as the highly effective Bofors 37 mm anti-tank gun. The myth originated from war co-
rrespondents reports of the Battle of Krojanty, where a Polish cavalry brigade was fired upon
in ambush by hidden armored vehicles, after it had mounted a sabre-charge against German
infantry.
The Polish Air Force was destroyed on the ground in the first days of the war.
The Polish Air Force, though numerically inferior, had been moved from air bases to small ca-
mouflaged airfields shortly before the war. Only some trainers and auxiliary aircraft were des-
troyed on the ground. The Polish Air Force, significantly outnumbered and with its fighters
outmatched by more advanced German fighters, remained active up to the second week of
the campaign, inflicting significant damage on the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe lost, to all opera-
tional causes, 285 aircraft, with 279 more damaged beyond repair, while the Poles lost 333
aircraft.
Poland offered little resistance and surrendered quickly.
In the first few days, Germany sustained very heavy losses: Poland cost the Germans an enti-
re armored division, thousands of soldiers, and 25% of its air strength. As for duration, the
September Campaign lasted only about one week less than the Battle of France in 1940, even
though the Anglo-French forces were much closer to parity with the Germans in numerical
strength and equipment. Furthermore, the Polish Army was preparing the Romanian Brid-
gehead, which would have prolonged Polish defence, but this plan was cancelled due to the
Soviet invasion of Poland on 17 September 1939. Poland also never officially surrendered to
the Germans. Under German occupation, the Polish army continued to fight underground, as
Armia Krajowa and forest partisansLeni. The Polish resistance movement in World War II
in German-occupied Poland was one of the largest resistance movements in all of occupied
Europe.
Blitzkrieg was first used in Poland.
It is often assumed that blitzkrieg is the strategy that Germany first used in Poland. Many
early post-war histories, such as Barrie Pitt's in The Second World War (BPC Publishing
1966), attribute German victory to "enormous development in military technique which occu-
rred between 1918 and 1940", citing that "Germany, who translated (British inter-war) theo-
ries into action called the result Blitzkrieg." This idea has been repudiated by some authors.
Matthew Cooper writes: "Throughout the Polish Campaign, the employment of the mechani-
zed units revealed the idea that they were intended solely to ease the advance and to support
the activities of the infantry. Thus, any strategic exploitation of the armoured idea was still-
born. The paralysis of command and the breakdown of morale were not made the ultimate
aim of the German ground and air forces, and were only incidental by-products of the tra-
ditional manoeuvers of rapid encirclement and of the supporting activities of the flying arti-
llery of the Luftwaffe, both of which had as their purpose the physical destruction of the
enemy troops. Such was the Vernichtungsgedanke of the Polish campaign." Vernichtungsge-
danke was a strategy dating back to Frederick the Great, and was applied in the Polish Cam-
paign little changed from the French campaigns in 1870 or 1914. The use of tanks "left much
to be desired...Fear of enemy action against the flanks of the advance, fear which was to prove
so disastrous to German prospects in the west in 1940 and in the Soviet Union in 1941, was
present from the beginning of the war." John Ellis, writing in Brute Force asserted that
"there is considerable justice in Matthew Cooper's assertion that the panzer divisions were
not given the kind of strategic (emphasis in original) mission that was to characterize authen-
tic armoured blitzkrieg, and were almost always closely subordinated to the various mass in-
fantry armies." Zaloga and Madej, in The Polish Campaign 1939, also address the subject of
mythical interpretations of Blitzkrieg and the importance of other arms in the campaign.
"Whilst Western accounts of the September campaign have stressed the shock value of the
panzers and Stuka attacks, they have tended to underestimate the punishing effect of Ger-
man artillery (emphasis added) on Polish units. Mobile and available in significant quantity,
artillery shattered as many units as any other branch of the Wehrmacht."
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Chapter III Battle of France
CHRONOLOGY
1935 Hitler announces creation of Luftwaffe, which already has 1,000 front-line aircraft.
1936 Hitler speeds up manufacture of light and medium bombers.
1937 Germany has 39 divisions in her army. March 1938 Anschluss: annexation of Austria. .
October Repossession of Sudetenland. January 1939 German Army strength now 51 divi-
sions.
March Invasion of Czechoslovakia.
May Germany signs Pact of Steel with Italy.
August Germany signs Non-Aggression Pact with Russia.
1 September Invasion of Poland.
3 September Britain and France declare war on Germany; on mobilization Germany fields
more than 100 divisions.
10 September British Expeditionary Force established in Northern France.
10 January German courier carrying plans for invasion of Holland and Belgium arrested
on Belgian territory.
February German Plan 'Sichehchnitf eventually emerges, giving main attack to von Run-
dstedt (45 divisions including 7 panzer divisions) through Ardennes on front Dinant to Se-
dan; von Bock in the north (with 29 divisions including 3 panzer divisions) to draw and hold
the Allies; von Leeb (19 divisions) in the south opposite the Maginot Line to prevent French
reinforcements moving up.
March Gamelin adopts Dyle-Breda Plan to strengthen the Allied left flank.
9 April Germany invades Norway.
9 May Chamberlain resigns British premiership. German 'tourists' cross frontiers ready to
seize road junctions. Hitler orders assault on France to open overnight.
10 May Specially trained troops in gliders land on Belgian forts at Eben Emael. German ad-
vance starts before dawn, with paratroops attacking bridge across Maas estuary. Luft-
waffe opens offensive deep into France. British Expeditionary Force and French cavalry move
to Dyle Line. French Cavalry in centre advance. Allied air effort frustrated by orders 'to avoid
built-up areas'. Churchill takes up British premiership.
11 May In the centre, Guderian reaches River Semois and crosses during the night. In the
north, Prioux with French cavalry has difficulty in reaching new positions. Georges
makes plans to move reinforcements behind Sedan, but it is already too late. Meanwhile
the Dutch air force is virtually impotent.
12 May In the north the Germans reach Zuider Zee, and the French are forced to withdraw
to cover Antwerp. Belgians pull back. In the centre, Rommel reaches Houx before night and
crosses the Meuse. D'Astier draws attention to the German advance between Dinant and
Bouillon. Guderian reaches east bank of Meuse at Sedan.
13 May Rommel increases pressure at Houx and crosses at Dinant. Boucher orders French
counterattacks, which fail. Stuka support around Sedan terrifies French. The Grossdeutsch-
land Regiment crosses near Gaulier and reaches la Marfee heights. 10 Panzer divi-
sion's assault engineers eventually cross near Wadelincourt. Panic and false reports spread
among, French troops and refugees pour southwards.
14 May Colonel Balck reaches Chehery with 1 Rifle Regiment. Reinhardt's corps, held for
two days, finally forces a partial crossing at Montherme. In the Netherlands, Prioux's cavalry
stand ground against the panzers but withdraw at night after heavy losses. Georges at last ac-
cepts the fact of German success at Sedan. Rommel reaches Onhaye. German infan-
try divisions cross at Nouzonville at the third attempt. French attacks with tanks near
Bulson fail. Guderian wheels westward, leaving 10 Panzer Division and the Grossdeutsch-
land regiment to hold the flank. French 3 Armoured Division attack is cancelled. Huntziger
and Corap make wrong appreciation and open the way for German advance. Fierce air battle
over Sedan with very heavy RAF losses. Rotterdam bombed by Germans during cease-fire ne-
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gotiations. Netherlands capitulates.
15 May Rommel continues advance towards Philippeville. 6 Panzer Division at Month-
erme manages to cross in strength. At Stonne fierce fighting eventually leaves German
Grossdeutschland in command. 1 and 2 Panzer Divisions finally break through Touchon's
force. Corap is removed and replaced by Giraud.
16 May Guderian's panzers advance 40 miles in the day. French 2 Armoured Division
still scattered. Rommel breaks through remnants of XI Corps and makes for Le Cateau.
17 May Guderian's advance is halted by the High Command but finally allowed a 'reconnais-
sance in force'. De Gaulle attacks with 4 Armoured Division, reaching Montcornet, but
turns back at nightfall.
18 May Panzers ordered to continue advance. Rommel takes Cambrai with scratch
force. Refugees hamper all movement on roads.
19 May De Gaulle makes abortive attack with tanks and infantry towards Crecy. D'Astier
fails to hold off Stukas. Weygand replaces Gamelin. Panzers in line for final advance about 50
miles from the sea.
20 May Royal Sussex Regiment fight to the end at Amiens, and Panzers wipe out two
British Territorial Army divisions. Part of 2 Panzer Division reaches the sea near
Noyelles. Ironside persuades French to take part in joint attack with BEF towards Amiens on
21 May.
21 May French fail to produce troops or air support for joint attack. Two British columns of
tanks and infantry fight a fierce action south of Arras but are eventually forced to retire.
22 May Panzers drive for the Channel ports. French (Altmayer) attack makes initial success
but is eventually halted. Gort still without orders.
23 May Decision by Gort to save BEF.
24 May Reynaud complains to Churchill over British withdrawal. Hitler orders panzers to
halt at Aa Canal, giving BEF vital time.
26 May German tanks again advance on Dunkirk.
27 May Evacuation of BEF starts.
28 May Belgium surrenders.
29 May French join in evacuation.
4 June BEF and French evacuation ends.
5-22 June Between the sea and the Meuse, Germany launches a fresh attack with 104 fully
manned divisions against the French, who now have only 60 divisions and very weak air cov-
er. Although the French fight with great courage, the Germans take Paris on 14 June and have
reached a line from Bordeaux to the Swiss frontier by the time the armistice is signed on 22
June.
Battle
In the Second World War, the Battle of France, also known as the Fall of France, was the suc-
cessful German invasion of France and the Low Countries, beginning on 10 May 1940, defea-
ting primarily French forces. The battle consisted of two main operations. In the first, Fall
Gelb (Case Yellow), German armoured units pushed through the Ardennes to cut off and su-
rround the Allied units that had advanced into Belgium. When British and adjacent French
forces were pushed back to the sea by the highly mobile and well organised German opera-
tion, the British government decided to evacuate the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) as
well as several French divisions at Dunkirk in Operation Dynamo.
With France left to fend for itself after the British evacuation, Germany launched a second
operation, Fall Rot (Case Red), which was commenced on 5 June. Initially the depleted
French forces put up stiff resistance, but German air superiority gradually overwhelmed
French artillery positions. German forces outflanked the Maginot Line and pushed deeper in-
to France as French forces began to collapse. German forces arrived in an undefended Paris
on 14 June and their commanders met with French officials who were ready to stop the
fights. Chief among these was Marshal Philippe Ptain who, contrary to the wishes of many
Frenchmen, announced he would seek an armistice.
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Map 5 Evolution of the Manstein Plan
On 22 June,
2
an armistice was signed between France and Germany, which resulted in a divi-
sion of France whereby Germany would occupy the north and west (and also keep nearly two
millions French soldiers as prisoners in Germany), Italy would control a small Italian occupa-
tion zone in the southeast, and an unoccupied zone, the zone libre, would be governed by the
newly formed Vichy government led by Marshal Ptain. France remained under Axis occupa-
tion until the liberation of the country after the Allied landings in 1944.
Following the invasion of Poland in September 1939 (which started the Second World War in
Europe), a period of inaction called the Phony War ("Sitzkrieg" or "Drle de guerre") set in
between the major powers. Adolf Hitler had hoped that France and Britain would acquiesce
in his conquest and quickly make peace. On 6 October, he may have made some type of peace
offer to both Western Powers. Even before they had time to respond, on 9 October, he also
formulated a new military policy in case their reply was negative: Fhrer-Anweisung N6, or
"Fhrer-Directive Number 6".
German strategy
Hitler had always fostered dreams about major military campaigns to defeat the Western Eu-
ropean nations as a preliminary step to the conquest of territory in Eastern Europe, thus avoi-
ding a two-front war. However, these intentions were absent from Fhrer-Directive N6. This
plan was firmly based on the seemingly more realistic assumption that Germany's military
strength would still have to be built up for several more years and that for the moment only li-
mited objectives could be envisaged. They were aimed at improving Germany's ability to sur-
vive a long, protracted war in the West. Hitler ordered a conquest of the Low Countries to be
executed at the shortest possible notice. This would stop France from occupying them first,
41/138
and prevent Allied air power from threatening the vital German Ruhr Area. It would also pro-
vide the basis for a long-term air and sea campaign against Britain. There was no mention in
the Fhrer-Directive of any immediate consecutive attack to conquer the whole of France, alt-
hough as much as possible of the border areas in northern France should be occupied.
While writing the directive, Hitler had also assumed that such an attack could be initiated
within a period of at most a few weeks, but the very day he issued it he was disabused of this
illusion. It transpired that he had been misinformed about the true state of Germany's forces.
The motorised units had to recover, repairing the damage to their vehicles incurred in the Po-
lish campaign, and ammunition stocks were largely depleted.
German armed forces structure
The overall command for all the German armed forces was the Oberkommando der Wehr-
macht (usually contracted to OKW). This was sometimes used by Hitler as an alternative
army planning staff, but the direction of the offensive on the western front was the responsi-
bility of the Oberkommando des Heeres or OKH, the Army supreme command. The com-
mander in chief of the Army was General Walther von Brauchitsch, but the main responsibi-
lity for planning belonged to the Chief of Staff, Franz Halder.
Under OKW, the other service commands were the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe or OKL,
led by Hitler's close political colleague Hermann Gring, and the Oberkommando der Mari-
ne or OKM, led by Admiral Erich Raeder.
Similarity to Schlieffen Plan
On 10 October 1939, the British refused Hitler's offer of peace; on 12 October, the French did
the same. Franz Halder, the chief of staff of the Army (Generalstabschef des Heeres), presen-
ted the first plan for Fall Gelb ("Case Yellow") on 19 October. This was the pre-war codename
of plans for a campaign in the Low Countries: the Aufmarschanweisung N1, Fall Gelb ("De-
ployment Instruction No. 1, Case Yellow"). Halder's plan has often been compared to the
Schlieffen Plan, which the Germans attempted to execute in 1914 in the opening phase of the
First World War. It was similar in that both plans entailed an advance through the middle of
Belgium, but while the intention of the Schlieffen Plan was to gain a decisive victory by execu-
ting a rapid encirclement of the French Army, Aufmarschanweisung N1 envisioned a frontal
attack, sacrificing a projected half million German soldiers to attain the limited goal of thro-
wing the Allies back to the River Somme. Germany's strength for 1940 would then be spent;
only in 1942 could the main attack against France begin.
Hitler was disappointed with Halder's plan and initially reacted by deciding that the German
army should attack early, ready or not, in the hope that Allied unpreparedness might bring
about an easy victory. This led to a series of postponements, as commanders repeatedly per-
suaded Hitler to delay the attack for a few days or weeks to remedy some critical defect in the
preparations, or to wait for better weather. Hitler also tried to alter the plan which he found
unsatisfactory, without clearly understanding how it could be improved. This mainly resulted
in a dispersion of effort; although the main axis would remain in central Belgium, secondary
attacks would be undertaken on the flanks. Hitler made such a suggestion on 11 November.
On 29 October, Halder let a second operational plan, Aufmarschanweisung N2, Fall Gelb,
reflect these changes by featuring a secondary attack on the Netherlands.
Hitler was not alone in disliking Halder's plan. General Gerd von Rundstedt, the commander
of Army Group A, also disagreed with it. Von Rundstedt recognised that it did not adhere to
the classic principles of the Bewegungskrieg ("manoeuvre warfare") which had guided Ger-
man strategy since the 19th century. A breakthrough would have to be accomplished that
would result in the encirclement and destruction of the main body of Allied forces. The most
practical place to achieve this would be in the region of Sedan, which lay in the sector of von
Rundstedt's Army Group. On 21 October, von Rundstedt agreed with his chief of staff, Gene-
ralleutnant Erich von Manstein, that an alternative operational plan had to be arranged that
would reflect these basic ideas, making Army Group A as strong as possible at the expense of
Army Group B to the north.
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Map 6 : Campaign in France
Manstein Plan
Overviewof the Plan
Developed by German Generalleutnant Erich von Manstein, the plan greatly modified the ori-
ginal 1939 versions by Franz Halder of the invasion plan known as Fall Gelb. One way to look
at the Manstein Plan was that it was the German Army's answer to the French Army's Dyle
Plan. Originally, in Aufmarschanweisung N1, Fall Gelb, the German Army planned to push
the Allied forces back through central Belgium to the Somme river, in northern France, not
unlike the first phase of the famous Schlieffen Plan of the First World War. However, on 10
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January 1940, the Mechelen Incident took place: a German aircraft carrying documents con-
taining parts of the operational plans of Fall Gelb crashed in Belgium, thus prompting
another review of the invasion plan. While Fall Gelb was revised by Halder, not fundamen-
tally changing it in Aufmarschanweisung N3, Fall Gelb, Von Manstein was able to convince
Hitler in a personal meeting on 17 February that the Wehrmacht should attack through the
Ardennes forest, followed by a strategic drive to the coast.
Details of the Plan
Von Manstein, chief of staff of Army Group A, had originally formulated his plan in October
1939 in Koblenz on instigation of his superior General Gerd von Rundstedt, who rejected Hal-
der's plan, both because of professional jealousy and because it wouldn't lead to a decisive vic-
tory over France. Von Manstein's first thoughts were rather traditional, envisaging a swing
from Sedan to the north to obliterate the Allied armies in a classical Kesselschlacht or annihi-
lation battle. When discussing his intentions with Lieutenant-General Heinz Guderian, com-
mander of Germany's elite armoured corps, the latter proposed to turn it into a more "Fulleri-
te" strategy by avoiding the main body of the Allied armies and swiftly advancing with the ar-
moured divisions to The Channel instead, to cause a collapse of the enemy by catching him
off guard and cutting off his supply lines. It was thus Guderian who introduced the true
"Blitzkrieg" elements to the plan, while Von Manstein had at first many objections against
this aspect, especially fearing the long open flank created by such an advance. Guderian ma-
naged to convince him that the danger of a French counterattack from the south could be
averted by a simultaneous secondary spoiling offensive to the south, in the direction of
Reims. Guderian before the war had generated much interest for the theories of John Fuller,
though never fully endorsing them.
When Von Manstein first presented his ideas to the OKH, he didn't mention Guderian's name
and made his classical swing to the north the main effort, while a limited number of armou-
red divisions protected the left flank of this movement, acting in a classical cavalry strategic
reconnaissance rle. These changes didn't reflect a change of mind on his part, but were
thought necessary by him because the original conception was too radical to be acceptable
and many conservative generals considered Guderian himself as too radical also. His views
were flatly rejected by Halder and Walther von Brauchitsch however. Reformulating them in
a more radical sense didn't help and late January Halder managed to remove Von Manstein
to the east by having him promoted commander of XXXVIII Army Corps. Von Manstein and
Halder were old rivals: in 1938 Von Manstein had been the successor of chief of staff Ludwig
Beck but had been removed from this position when the latter fell into disgrace with Hitler
because of the Blomberg-Fritsch Affair. On 1 September 1938, Halder, not Von Manstein, had
replaced Beck.
However two officers of Von Manstein's staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Gnther Blumentritt and
Major Henning von Tresckow, were outraged by Halder's behavior. Late January they contac-
ted Hitler's personal Army attach, Lieutenant Colonel Rudolf Schmundt (an old acquaintan-
ce of von Tresckow) when he was visiting Koblenz, who informed Hitler of the affair on 2 Fe-
bruary. Hitler, having found Halder's plans unsatisfactory from the very beginning, ordered
on 13 February a change of strategy in accordance with Von Manstein's ideas, even after ha-
ving only heard a rough outline of them. The general was invited to the Reichskanzlei in Ber-
lin to explain his plans in person to Hitler on 17 February, during a working lunch in the pre-
sence of Alfred Jodl and Erwin Rommel. Though Hitler felt an immediate antipathy against
Von Manstein, for being too arrogant and aloof, he speechlessly listened to his argumenta-
tion, becoming very impressed by Von Manstein's logic. "Certainly an exceptionally clever fe-
llow, with great operational gifts, but I don't trust him", Hitler remarked after Von Manstein
had left.
Halder now had to make a fourth main version of the attack plan, Aufmarschanweisung N4,
Fall Gelb. Von Manstein would not be further involved in the planning process, returning to
his command of the Army Corps.
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This new plan conformed to Von Manstein's proposal in this respect that Army Group A
would provide the central thrust of the invasion through the Ardennes in southern Belgium.
After crossing the Meuse River between Namur and Sedan, Army Group A would then swing
northwest towards Amiens, while Army Group B executed a feint attack in the north to lure
the Allied armies into the trap. However in many ways the plan was fundamentally changed
by Halder. It no longer envisaged a simultaneous secondary attack to the south. Also, the
"Blitzkrieg" elements were largely removed. The river crossings were to be forced by infantry
and there would be a long consolidation phase during which a large number of infantry divi-
sions would be built-up in the bridgeheads. The armoured divisions should then advance in a
coherent mass together with the infantry divisions. There would thus not be an independent
deep strategic penetration by the German armor.
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Executing the Plan
In reality however, Guderian and the other panzer generals, Rommel among them, would
simply disobey orders and advance to The Channel and further to the coastal French towns of
Calais and Dunkirk as fast as they could without waiting for the infantry, only temporarily
halted by Hitler's orders on 17, 22 and 24 May. The effects of the Manstein Plan were devasta-
ting for the Allied armies, as they were effectively encircled by Army Groups A and B, thus
sparking a desperate evacuation from Dunkirk. The losses in the north and resulting lack of
mobile reserves led to the defeat of the remaining French forces and Germany's complete vic-
tory over France.
This resounding success came as a complete surprise even to the Germans, who hardly had
dared to hope for such an outcome. Most generals had vehemently opposed the plan as being
much too risky; even those supporting it had mainly done so out of desperation, because Ger-
many's geostrategic position seemed so hopeless. Count Ciano later in the war observed that
"victory has a hundred fathers, but defeat is an orphan", and Fall Gelb would have no lack of
sires. The two most prominent among them would be Hitler himself and Halder. Because Hi-
tler hadn't liked Halder's original plans, he had suggested many alternatives, some of them
bearing some resemblance to the Manstein Plan, the closest a proposal made by him on 25
October 1939. Soon Nazi propaganda began to claim that the victory was a result of Hitler's
military genius; Hitler praised Von Manstein with the words "Of all the generals, with whom
I spoke about the new attack plan in the West, Manstein was the only one who understood
me!". Halder after the war claimed he was the main inventor, supporting this with the fact
that he had begun considering to change the main axis to Sedan even before 13 February
indeed as early as September 1939 and that Von Manstein's original proposal was too tradi-
tional.
The Manstein Plan is often seen as either the result of, or the cause of a mid-twentieth cen-
tury Revolution in military affairs. In the former hypothesis, expounded by Fuller and Basil
Liddell Hart immediately after the events, the Manstein Plan is presented as a natural outco-
me of deliberate changes in the German military doctrine during the twenties and thirties by
men as Guderian or Hans von Seeckt implementing Fuller's or Liddell Hart's ideas. Thus an
explicit "Blitzkrieg-doctrine" would have been fully established by 1939 of which the Mans-
tein Plan was but the most spectacular implementation and the Invasion of Poland an earlier
application. The doctrine would have been reflected in the organisation and equipment of the
German Army and Airforce and would have been radically different from the obsolete doctri-
nes of France, Britain and the Soviet-Union except for the contributions of some farsighted
individuals in these countries such as Mikhail Tukhachevsky and Charles de Gaulle and of
course Fuller and Liddell Hart themselves. That the earliest plans by Halder or Von Manstein
and the final plan by Halder did not conform to this doctrine is then seen as an anomaly, to
be explained by special circumstances.
In the latter hypothesis, promoted by Robert Allan Doughty and Karl-Heinz Frieser, the
Manstein Plan is instead a return to the classic principles of the 19th century Bewegungsk-
rieg but now radically adapted to the full potential of modern technology by a sudden and
unexpected departure from established German doctrine through the Blitzkrieg-elements
provided and executed by Guderian. It claims that the influence of Fuller and Liddell Hart in
Germany was limited and much exaggerated by the two writers and that no explicit true
Blitzkrieg-doctrine can be found anywhere in the official pre-war German army documenta-
tion. It finds further support in the fact that German tank production had no priority and that
the plans of the German war economy were at first based on the premise of a long protracted
war, not on the expectation of swift victories. The hypothesis allows for a gradual implemen-
tation during the thirties of technological advances in a shared moderated Bewegungskrieg
doctrine used in all major powers prior to 1940, with more subtle differences between the na-
tions. The Invasion of Poland would then not yet be a true Blitzkrieg campaign, but a classic
annihilation battle instead. The lack of Blitzkrieg elements in the official German plans for
Fall Gelb is seen as the normal and expected outcome of this situation. Only after the sudden
success of the radical execution of the Manstein Plan by Guderian would Blitzkrieg have been
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adopted as an explicit doctrine, in this view making Operation Barbarossa the first deliberate
Blitzkrieg campaign.
Guderian himself, who in both hypotheses plays a key rle, presented the situation in his
postwar book Erinnerungen eines Soldaten (literally "Memories of a Soldier" but translated
under the title Panzer Leader) as basically conforming to the second hypothesis, with him
being a lone voice struggling against the resistance by a reactionary majority of the German
officer corps.
Summarizing the Plan
It is not uncommon in the literature to call the Manstein Plan Operation Sichelschnitt and
this had led to the misunderstanding that this was the official name of the entire plan or at
least of the attack by Army Group A. The official name however was Aufmarschanweisung
N4, Fall Gelb as issued on 24 February 1940 and the suboperation through the Ardennes
had no special designation. Sichelschnitt is nothing but a literal German translation of "Sickle
Cut", a catchy expression used after the events by Winston Churchill. After the war it would
be adopted in the writings of the German generals.
Mechelen Incident
On 10 January, a German Messerschmitt Bf 108 made a forced landing at Maasmechelen,
north of Maastricht, in Belgium (the so-called "Mechelen Incident"). Among the occupants of
the aircraft was Luftwaffe Major Hellmuth Reinberger, who was carrying a copy of the latest
version of Aufmarschanweisung N2. Reinberger was unable to destroy the documents,
which quickly fell into the hands of the Belgian intelligence services. It has often been sugges-
ted that this incident was the cause of a drastic change in German plans, but this is incorrect;
in fact, a reformulation of them on 30 January, Aufmarschanweisung N3, Fall Gelb, confor-
med to the earlier versions.
Adoption of Manstein Plan
On 27 January, von Manstein was relieved of his appointment as Chief of Staff of Army
Group A and appointed commander of an army corps in Prussia, to begin his command in
Stettin on 9 February, a move instigated by Halder to reduce von Manstein's influence. Von
Manstein's indignant staff brought his case to Hitler's attention. Hitler had, without any
knowledge of von Manstein's plan, suggested an attack focused at Sedan but had been persua-
ded to forget the idea as it was too risky. On 2 February, von Manstein's plan was brought to
his attention. On 17 February, Hitler summoned von Manstein, Generals Rudolf Schmundt
(the German Army's Chief of Personnel) and Alfred Jodl, the Chief of Operations at the OKW
(the German armed forces' supreme command), to attend a conference. Hitler sat and liste-
ned, abandoning his habits of interrupting and launching into monologues. In the end, he
agreed to all of von Manstein's suggestions. The next day, he ordered the plans to be changed
in accordance with von Manstein's ideas. They appealed to Hitler mainly because they offered
some real hope of victory. Hitler recognised the breakthrough at Sedan only in tactical terms,
whereas von Manstein saw it as a means to an end. He envisaged an operation to the English
Channel and the encirclement of the Allied armies in Belgium, which, if carried out correctly,
could have a favourable strategic outcome.
Halder had no intention of deviating from established doctrine by allowing an independent
strategic penetration by the seven armoured divisions of Army Group A. Much to the outrage
of Guderian, this element was at first completely removed from the new plan, Aufmarschan-
weisung N4, Fall Gelb, issued on 24 February. However, Halder went through an "astonis-
hing change of opinion". Halder was criticised in the same way he had attacked von Manstein
when he first suggested it. The bulk of the German officer corps was appalled by the plan, and
they called him the "gravedigger of the Panzer force".
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Image: http://www.panzertruppen.org/amazon/books/ww2/3-6.jpg
Even when adapted to more conventional methods, the new plan provoked a storm of protest
from the majority of German generals. They thought it utterly irresponsible to create a con-
centration of forces in a position where they could not possibly be sufficiently supplied, while
such inadequate supply routes as there were could easily be cut off by the French. If the Allies
did not react as expected, the German offensive could end in catastrophe. Their objections
were ignored. Halder argued that, as Germany's strategic position seemed hopeless anyway,
even the slightest chance of a decisive victory outweighed the certainty of ultimate defeat im-
plied by inaction.
Blitzkrieg
The strategy, operational methods and tactics of the German Army and Luftwaffe has often
been labelled "Blitzkrieg" (Lightning War). The concept is deeply controversial and is connec-
ted to the problem of the precise nature and origin of "Blitzkrieg" operations, of which the
1940 campaign is often described as a classic example. An essential element of "Blitzkrieg"
was considered to be a strategic, or series of operational developments, executed by mechani-
sed forces which led to the total collapse of the defenders' armed forces. "Blitzkrieg" has also
been looked on as a revolutionary form of warfare. In recent years, its novelty and even its
very existence have been disputed.
Rapid and decisive victories had been pursued by armies well before the Second World War.
In the German wars of unification and First World War campaigns, the German General Staff
had attempted Bewegungskrieg (Movement War), similar to the modern perception of
"Blitzkrieg", with varying degrees of success. During the First World War, these methods of-
ten succeeded in achieving tactical breakthroughs, but the operational exploitation took time
as armies lacked motorisation, could not move quickly, and sometimes failed to achieve a de-
cisive victory altogether. The development of tanks, aircraft, and more importantly, motori-
sed infantry and artillery, enabled the Germans to implement these old methods again with
new technology in 1940. The combustion engine solved the problem of operational level ex-
ploitation.
When dealing with "Blitzkrieg" as a concept, things become complicated. It is seen as an
anomaly and there is no explicit reference to such strategy, operations or tactics in the Ger-
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man battle plans. There is no evidence in German military art, strategy or industrial prepara-
tion that points to the existence of a thought out "Blitzkrieg" tendency. Evidence suggests
that the German Reich was preparing for a long sustained war of attrition, not a quick war of
manoeuvre. Hitler's miscalculations in 1939 forced him into war before he was ready, and un-
der these circumstances the German General Staff reverted to attempting to win a quick war,
before the economic and material superiority of the Allies could make a difference, although
this was not their original intention. It was only after the defeat of France in 1940, that the
German military pursued a "Blitzkrieg"-kind of warfare to achieve its ambitions in Europe.
German historian Karl-Heinz Frieser explained:
"The campaign in the west was not a planned campaign of conquest. Instead, it was an opera-
tional act of despair to get out of a desperate strategic situation. What is called "Blitzkrieg
thinking" did not develop until after [author's emphasis] the campaign in the west. It was not
the cause but rather the consequence of victory. Something that in May 1940, had come off
successfully to everyone's surprise, was now to serve the implementation of Hitler's visions of
conquest in the form of the secret success.
Allied strategy
Early actions
In September 1939, Belgium and the Netherlands were still neutral. They had made arrange-
ments in secret with the Entente (as the Allies were still widely called) for future cooperation
should the Germans invade their territory. The Supreme Commander of the French Army
Maurice Gamelinsuggested during that month that the Allies should take advantage of the
fact that Germany was tied up in Poland by using the Low Countries as a spring board to at-
tack Germany. This suggestion was not taken up by the French government.
Just after the 1 September 1939 invasion of Poland, French soldiers advanced along the Magi-
not Line 5 km (3.1 mi) into the Saar which was called the Saar Offensive. France had emplo-
yed 98 divisions (all but 28 of them reserve or fortress formations) and 2,500 tanks against
German forces consisting of 43 divisions (32 of them reserves) and no tanks. They advanced
until they met the then thin and undermanned Siegfried Line. The French army would easily
have been able to penetrate the mere screen of German forces present had they continued
with the offensive, but they preferred to force the Germans into the offensive role and with-
drew to their own lines in October.
Dyle Plan
Strategic reasons dictated the Allied decision to advance and fight on Belgian territory when
the German attack came in the west. The British government insisted that the Flemish coast
remain under Allied control so as not to threaten British naval supremacy. The French deter-
mined that the German offensive had to be contained as far east as possible, to keep the bat-
tles off French territory. Finally, and for him personally, the most cogent argument for advan-
cing and fighting on Belgian territory was that Gamelin did not consider the French army ca-
pable of winning a mobile battle against the German army in the wide operational theatre
France would present. Belgium presented a far narrower front to contain German forma-
tions. He also argued that an advance to the Dyle river and preparing an entrenched front
there saved most of Belgium's industrial regions from falling into German hands.
Gamelin did not have the personality to simply impose his will. The first step he took was to
propose the "Escaut" variant as an option for Plan D, the code for the "Dyle plan". This would
include an advance by the French onto Dutch territory. The powerful French 1st and 9th Ar-
mies would hold the line in Belgium, from Wavre to Givet. The French 7th Army would hold
the line on the Scheldt and link up with Dutch forces. The Belgian Army would hold the
Ghent-Antwerp line. They would be reinforced by the British Army, which would hold the sec-
tion of the line east of Brussels, from Wavre to Louvain.
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SdKfz 231 6-wheeled armoured car, Utrecht., Holland, May 1940
Gamelin made the reasonable assumption that the Germans would try to attempt a breakth-
rough by concentrating their mechanised forces. They could hardly hope to break the Magi-
not Line on his right flank or to overcome the Allied concentration of forces on the left flank.
That only left the centre, but most of the centre was covered by the river Meuse. Tanks were
limited in defeating fortified river positions. However, at Namur the river made a sharp turn
to the east, creating a gap between itself and the river Dyle. This 'Gembloux Gap', ideal for
mechanised warfare, was a very dangerous weak spot. Gamelin decided to concentrate half of
his armoured reserves there, sure the main German thrust would be on the Belgian-Dutch
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plain. Gamelin reasoned that the Germans might try to overcome the Meuse position by
using infantry, but he was confident in the Belgians' ability to hold the line and believed that
while it was possible for the Germans to cross the Meuse, it would take a long time to achieve.
Gamelin made no study in the event of a German breakthrough in the south, and as a conse-
quence, did not make preparations to extricate Allied forces from Belgium.
Gamelin continued with his plans despite repeated criticism from his subordinates. Gaston
Billotte (the commander-in-chief of the First Army Group) and Alphonse Joseph Georges
(commander-in-chief of the North-Eastern front which included the First and Second Army
Groups) were particularly critical. Georges pointed out the decisive problem. He suggested
that Gamelin was too sure the German plan involved the battles, or main effort, being fought
in the Netherlands and Belgium. He argued that it seemed as if Gamelin was allowing himself
to be drawn into the Low Countries. He even suggested that an attack in Belgium might be a
diversion. In this case, if the main forces were sent into Belgium and "the main enemy attack
came in our centre, on our front between the Meuse and the Moselle, we could be deprived of
the necessary means to repel it".
The development of Allied strategy was exclusively in the hands of the French. The British, re-
cognising they were the smaller partner in the alliance, agreed to French proposals.
Allied intelligence
In the winter of 19391940, the Belgian consul-general in Cologne had anticipated the angle
of advance that Von Manstein was planning. Through intelligence reports, they deduced that
German forces were concentrating along the Belgian and Luxembourg frontiers. The Belgians
were convinced that the Germans would thrust through the Ardennes and to the English
Channel with the aim of cutting off the Allied field armies in Belgium and north-eastern Fran-
ce. They also anticipated that the Germans would try to land airborne and glider forces be-
hind the Allied lines to break open Belgian fortifications. Such warnings were not heeded by
the French or British.
In March 1940, Swiss intelligence detected six or seven Panzer Divisions on the German-Lu-
xembourg-Belgian border. More motorised divisions had also been detected in the area.
French intelligence were informed that the Germans were constructing pontoon bridges par-
tiallyabout halfwayover the Our River on the Luxembourg-German border through aerial
reconnaissance. The French military attachin the Swiss capitalBernwarned that the cen-
tre of the German assault would come on the Meuse at Sedan, sometime between 8 and 10
May. The report was dated 30 April. These reports had little effect on Gamelin.
German forces and dispositions
Strength
Germany had mobilised 4,200,000 men of the Heer, 1,000,000 of the Luftwaffe, 180,000 of
the Kriegsmarine, and 100,000 of the Waffen-SS. When consideration is made for those in
Poland, Denmark and Norway, the Army had 3,000,000 men available for the offensive on
10 May 1940. These manpower reserves were formed into 157 divisions. Of these, 135 were
earmarked for the offensive, including 42 reserve divisions.
The German forces in the West in May and June deployed some 2,439 tanks and 7,378 arti-
llery guns, including matriel reserves committed. In 193940, 45% of the army was at least
40 years old, and 50% of all the soldiers had just a few weeks training. Contrary to what the
blitzkrieg legend suggests, the German Army was not fully motorised. Just 10% of the Army
was motorised in 1940 and could muster only 120,000 vehicles, compared to the 300,000 of
the French Army. The British also had an "enviable" contingent of motorised forces. Most of
the German logistical tail consisted of horse-drawn vehicles.
Only 50% of the German divisions available in 1940 were combat ready, often being more
poorly equipped than their equivalents in the British and French Armies, or even as well as
the German Army of 1914. In the spring of 1940, the German army was semi-modern. A small
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number of the best-equipped and "elite divisions were offset by many second and third rate
divisions".
Army operational deployment
The German Army was divided into three army groups. Army Group A commanded by Gerd
von Rundstedt, composed of 45 divisions including seven armoured, was to execute the de-
cisive movement, cutting a "Sichelschnitt"not the official name of the operation but the
translation in German of a phrase after the events coined by Winston Churchill as "Sickle
Cut" (and even earlier "armoured scythe stroke")through the Allied defences in the Arden-
nes. It consisted of three armies: the 4th, 12th and 16th. It had three Panzer corps; one, the
XV, had been allocated to the 4th Army, but the other two, the XXXXI (Reinhardt) and the
XIX (Guderian) were united with the XIV Army Corps of two motorised infantry divisions, on
a special independent operational level in Panzergruppe Kleist (officially known as XXII
Corps).
Army Group B under Fedor von Bock, composed of 29 divisions including three armoured,
was tasked with advancing through the Low Countries and luring the northern units of the
Allied armies into a pocket. It consisted of the 6th and 18th Armies. Army Group C, compo-
sed of 18 divisions under Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, was charged with preventing a flanking
movement from the east, and with launching small holding attacks against the Maginot Line
and the upper Rhine. It consisted of the 1st and 7th Armies.
Communications
The real trump card for the Germans was the radio. The Panzers all had radios that allowed
voice communication with other units. This enabled German armour to respond rapidly to a
constantly changing battlefield situation. It allowed for last minute changes in tactics and im-
provisations to be formed far more quickly than the enemy. Some commanders regarded the
ability to communicate the primary method of combat. Radio drills were even considered mo-
re important than firing accurately. Communication allowed German armour to coordinate
their formations, bringing them together for a mass firepower effect in the attack or defence.
This offset the French advantage in numbers and equipment, which was deployed in "penny-
packets". The French also lacked radios and orders were passed from mouth to mouth. The
opposing systems would give the Germans a decisive edge in battle.
The radio network went beyond tank to tank commands. The system also permitted a degree
of communication between air and ground forces. Attached to Panzer Division was the Flie-
gerleittruppen (tactical air control troops) which were given wheeled vehicles. There were too
few Sd.Kfz. 251 command vehicles to make this a uniform facility throughout the army, but
the theory allowed the army in some circumstances to call upon the Luftwaffe units, while eit-
her on the ground or airborne, to support an attack that army artillery could not deal with. It
is said that Guderian's Corps' dash to the channel never had to wait more than 1520 minutes
after making such a call, for the Luftwaffe to appear over the target. A specific Junkers Ju 87
group (VIII. Fliegerkorps), which was to support the dash to the channel should Army Group
A break through in the Ardennes, kept one Ju 87 and one fighter group ready for immediate
take-off. On average, they could arrive to support armoured units within 4575 minutes of or-
ders being issued.
Army tactics
The main tool of the German land forces was combined arms combat. In contrast to the
Allies, they relied on highly mobile offensive units, with balanced numbers of well trained ar-
tillery, infantry, engineer and tank formations, all integrated into Panzer divisions. They re-
lied on excellent communication systems which enabled them to break into a position and ex-
ploit it before the enemy could react. Panzer divisions could carry out reconnaissance mis-
sions, advance to contact, defend and attack vital positions or weak spots. This ground would
then be held by infantry and artillery as pivot points for further attacks.
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Map 7 Operations in Dinant
Although their tanks were not designed for tank-versus-tank combat, they could take ground
and draw the enemy armour on to the division's anti-tank lines. This conserved the tanks to
achieve the next stage of the offensive. The units' logistics were self-contained, allowing for
three or four days of combat. The Panzer divisions would be supported by motorised and in-
fantry divisions.
The German Army lacked a formidable heavy combat tank such as the French possessed. In
armament and armour, French tanks were the stronger designs and more numerous (alt-
hough the German vehicles were faster and more mechanically reliable). But while the Ger-
man Army was outnumbered in artillery and tanks, it possessed some critical advantages
over its opponents. The newer German Panzers had a crew of five men; a Commander, gun-
ner-aimer, loader, driver and mechanic. Having a trained individual for each task allowed
each man to dedicate himself to his own mission and it made for a highly efficient combat
team. The French had fewer members, with the commander double-tasked with loading the
main gun, distracting him from his main duties in observation and tactical deployment. It
made for a far less efficient system.
Even within infantry formations, the Germans enjoyed an advantage through the doctrine of
Auftragstaktik (Mission command tactics), by which officers were expected to use their ini-
tiative to achieve their commanders' intentions, and were given control of the necessary sup-
porting arms.
Luftwaffe
One of the German strengths was the Luftwaffe. It divided its forces into two groups. In total,
1,815 combat, 487 transport and 50 glider aircraft were deployed to support Army Group B,
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while a further 3,286 combat aircraft were deployed to support Army Groups A and C.
The task of German aviation was to provide close air support in the form of the dive-bomber
and medium bomber. In 1940, the Luftwaffe was a broadly based force with no constricting
central doctrine, other than its resources should be used generally to support national stra-
tegy. It was flexible and it was able to carry out both operational, tactical and strategic bom-
bing effectively. Flexibility was the Luftwaffe's strength in 1940. While Allied air forces, in
1940, were tied to the support of the army, the Luftwaffe deployed its resources in a more ge-
neral, operational way. It switched from air superiority missions, to medium-range interdic-
tion, to strategic strikes, to close support duties depending on the need of the ground forces.
In fact, far from it being a dedicated Panzer spearhead arm, less than 15% of the Luftwaffe
was designed for close support of the army in 1939, as this aspect was not its primary mis-
sion.
Anti-aircraft defences
It is generally supposed that the Germans also had a major advantage in anti-aircraft guns, or
Flak. In reality, the generally cited figure of 2,600 88 mm (3.46 in) heavy Flak guns and
6,700 37 mm (1.46 in) and 20 mm (0.79 in) light Flak seems to refer to the German armed
forces total inventory, including the anti-aircraft defences of Germany's cities and ports and
the equipment of training units. (A 9,300-gun Flak component with the field army would ha-
ve involved more troops than the entire British Expeditionary Force) The actual provision of
Flak for the invading forces was 85 heavy and 18 light batteries belonging to the Luftwaffe,
48 'companies' of light Flak integral to divisions of the army, and 20 'companies' of light Flak
allocated as army troops that is, as a disposable reserve in the hands of HQs above corps le-
vel: altogether about 700 88 mm (3.46 in) and 180 37 mm (1.46 in) guns manned by Luftwaf-
fe ground units and 816 20 mm (0.79 in) guns manned by the army.
Allied forces and dispositions
Strength
France had spent a higher percentage of its GNP from 1918 to 1935 on its military than other
great powers, and the government had begun a large rearmament effort in 1936. Due to a low
birthrate, however, which had declined during the First World War and the Great Depres-
sion, and was exacerbated by the numbers of men who had been killed in the war, France had
a severe manpower shortage relative to its total population, which was barely half that of Ger-
many. To compensate, France had mobilised about one-third of the male population between
the ages of 20 and 45, bringing the strength of its armed forces to 5.000.000. Only
2.240.000 of these served in army units in the north. The British contributed a total strength
of 897.000 men in 1939, rising to 1.650.000 by June 1940. In May, it numbered only
500.000 men, including reserves. Dutch and Belgian manpower reserves amounted to
400.000 and 650.000 respectively.
Armies
There were 117 French divisions in total, of which 104 divisions (including 11 in reserve) were
for the defence of the north. The British Army contributed only 13 divisions, three of which
had not been organised when the campaign began. Some 22 Belgian, 10 Dutch and two Polish
divisions were also a part of the Allied order of battle. British artillery strength amounted to
1,280 guns. Belgium fielded 1,338 and the Dutch, 656. France had 10,700 pieces. This made a
total of around 14,000 artillery pieces. 45% more than the Germans. The French army was al-
so more motorised than its opponent, which still relied heavily on horses. Although the Bel-
gians, British and Dutch had barely any armour, the French had a powerful force of 3,254
tanks. The force was both larger and of higher quality than Germany's, as shown by its victory
in Hannut, the largest tank battle of the campaign.
The French Army was of mixed quality. It had in its order of battle some formidable units,
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particularly the light and heavy armoured divisions (DCR and DLM), and several professional
infantry divisions. However, many divisions were composed of reserve soldiers, above 30
years old, and were ill-equipped. A serious qualitative deficiency was a lack of anti-air arti-
llery, mobile anti-tank artillery and radio communication systems, despite the efforts of Ga-
melin to produce mobile artillery units. He used telephones and couriers to communicate
with the field during the Battle of France; only 0.15% of military spending between 1923 and
1939 had been on radios and other communications equipment.
French tactical deployment and the use of mobile units operationally was also inferior to that
of the Germans. Tactically, armour was spread thinly along the French line; French infantry
divisions were supported by tank battalions of about 100 tanks, which prevented them from
being a strong, independent operational force. Making matters worse, only a handful of
French tanks in each unit had radios installed, and the radios themselves were often unrelia-
ble, thus hampering communication. French tanks were also very slow in speed in compari-
son to the Panzers (except for the Somua S-35), as they were designed as infantry support,
enabling German tanks to offset their disadvantages by outmanoeuvring the French on the
battlefield. In 1940, French military theoreticians still considered tanks as infantry support.
As a consequence, at various points in the campaign, the French were not able to react as
quickly as German armour.
In operational terms, the French did not seem to give much thought to armoured units as of-
fensive weapons. Although some people such as Colonel de Gaulle tried during the 1930s to
convince French High Command of the necessity to form armoured divisions supported by
aviation and infantry, military conservatism prevented these "new ideas" from emerging. The
French High Command was still obsessed with holding the front as it had in 19141918. The
state of training was also unbalanced, with the majority of personnel trained only to man sta-
tic fortifications. Minimal training for mobile actions was carried out between September
1939 and May 1940.
Deployment
The French forces in the north had three Army Groups. The 2nd and 3rd Army Groups defen-
ded the Maginot Line to the east; the 1st Army Group under Gaston-Henri Billotte was situa-
ted in the west and would execute the movement forward into the Low Countries.
Initially positioned on the left flank near the coast, the French 7th Army, reinforced by a light
mechanised (armoured) division (Division Lgre Mcanise, or DLM), was intended to mo-
ve to the Netherlands via Antwerp. Next to the south were the divisions of the British Expedi-
tionary Force (BEF), which would advance to the Dyle Line and position itself to the right of
the Belgian army, from Louvain to Wavre. The French 1st Army, reinforced by two light me-
chanised divisions and with a "reserve armoured division" (DCR) in reserve, would defend
the Gembloux Gap between Wavre and Namur. The southernmost army involved in the move
forward into Belgium was the French 9th Army, which had to cover the entire Meuse sector
between Namur and Sedan.
The French 2nd Army would form the "hinge" of the movement and remain entrenched. It
was to face the concentration of the elite German armoured divisions attack at Sedan. It was
given low priority in manpower, anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons and air support, and
consisted of just five divisions. Two of these were over-age reservist units, or "Serie B" divi-
sions, and one was a West African unit from Senegal. They had to cover a considerably larger
front than they should have, considering their training and equipment, and thus formed the
weak point of the French defence system. This stemmed from the French High Command's
belief that the Ardennes forest was impassable to tanks, even though intelligence from the
Belgian army and from their own intelligence services warned them of long armour and
transport columns crossing the Ardennes and being stuck in a huge traffic-jam for some time.
The French High Command simply refused to believe this was of any importance, as it did
not suit their convictions on the matter.
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Air forces
In the air, the Allies were numerically inferior: the French Arme de l'Air had 1,562 aircraft,
and RAF Fighter Command committed 680 machines, while RAF Bomber Command could
contribute some 392 aircraft to operations. Most of the Allied aircraft were obsolete types,
such as the Morane-Saulnier M.S.406. In the fighter force, only the British Hawker Hurrica-
ne and the French Dewoitine D.520 could contend with the German Messerschmitt Bf 109,
the D.520 having better manoeuvrability although being slightly slower. On 10 May 1940,
though, only 36 D.520 fighters had been dispatched, all to one squadron. In fighter aircraft,
the Allies had the numerical advantage; 836 German Bf 109s against 81 Belgian, 261 British
and 764 French fighters of various types. The French and British also had larger aircraft re-
serves. In early June 1940, the French aviation industry had reached a considerable output,
with an estimated matriel reserve of nearly 2,000 aircraft.
However, a chronic lack of spare parts crippled this fleet. Only 29% (599) of the aircraft were
serviceable, of which 170 were bombers. Low serviceability meant the Germans had a clear
numerical superiority in medium bomber aircraft, with six times as many as the French.
Despite its disadvantages the Armee de l'Air performed far better than expected, destroying
916 enemy aircraft in air to air combat during the Battle of France, for a kill ratio of 2.35:1;
with almost a third of those kills accomplished by French pilots flying the US built Hawk 75
which accounted for 12.6% of the French single-seat fighter force.
Anti-aircraft defences
In addition to 580 13 mm (0.5 in) machine guns assigned to civilian defence, the French
Army had 1,152 25 mm (0.98 in) anti-aircraft guns, with 200 20 mm (0.79 in) autocannons
in the process of delivery, and 688 75 mm (2.95 in) guns and 24 90 mm (3.54 in) guns, the
latter having problems with barrel wear. There were also 40 First World War-vintage 105 mm
(4.1 in) anti-aircraft guns available. The BEF had 10 regiments of 3.7 in (94 mm) guns, then
the most advanced heavy anti-aircraft weapon in the world, and seven and a half regiments of
40 mm (1.57 in) Bofors: with either three or four batteries per regiment, this represented
roughly 300 heavy and 350 light AA guns. The Belgians had two heavy anti-aircraft regiments
and were in the process of introducing 40 mm (1.57 in) Bofors guns as equipment for divisio-
nal anti-aircraft troops. The Dutch had 84 75 mm (2.95 in), 39 elderly 60 mm (2.36 in), seven
100 mm (3.9 in), and 232 20 mm (0.79 in) and 40 mm (1.57 in) anti-aircraft guns, and seve-
ral hundred First World War-vintage Spandau M.25 machine guns on anti-aircraft moun-
tings.
Fall Gelb
Northern front
Germany initiated Fall Gelb on the evening prior to and the night of 10 May. During the late
evening of 9 May, German forces occupied Luxembourg. Army Group B launched its feint of-
fensive during the night into the Netherlands and Belgium. During the morning of 10 May,
Fallschirmjger (paratroopers) from the 7th Flieger and 22. Luftlande Infanteriedivision un-
der Kurt Student executed surprise landings at The Hague, on the road to Rotterdam and
against the Belgian fort at Eben-Emael in order to facilitate Army Group B's advance.
The French command reacted immediately, sending its 1st Army Group north in accordance
with Plan D. This move committed their best forces, diminishing their fighting power by the
partial disorganisation it caused and their mobility by depleting their fuel stocks. By the time
the French 7th Army crossed the Dutch border, they found the Dutch already in full retreat,
and withdrew into Belgium to protect Brussels.
The Netherlands
The Luftwaffe was guaranteed air superiority over the Netherlands by sheer numerical supe-
riority. They allocated 247 medium bombers, 147 fighter aircraft, 424 Junkers Ju 52 trans-
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ports, and 12 Heinkel He 59 seaplanes to operations over the Netherlands. The Dutch Air For-
ce, the Militaire Luchtvaartafdeling (ML), had a strength of 144 combat aircraft, half of
which were destroyed within the first day of operations. The remainder was dispersed and ac-
counted for only a handful of Luftwaffe aircraft shot down. In total the ML flew a mere 332
sorties, losing 110 of its aircraft.
The German 18. Armee secured all the strategically vital bridges in and toward Rotterdam,
which penetrated Fortress Holland and bypassed the New Water Line from the south. Howe-
ver, an operation organised separately by the Luftwaffe to seize the Dutch seat of govern-
ment, known as the Battle for The Hague, ended in complete failure. The airfields surroun-
ding the city (Ypenburg, Ockenburg, and Valkenburg) were taken with heavy casualties and
transport aircraft losses. Some 96 aircraft in all were lost to Dutch shell fire. The Luftwaffe''s
Transportgruppen operations had cost it 125 Ju 52s destroyed and 47 damaged, representing
50% of the fleet's strength. Moreover, the airborne operation had cost the German paratroo-
pers 4,000 men, of whom 1,200 were prisoners of war, out of 8,000. The Dutch evacuated
them back to Britain. The total percentage cost of the defeat was 20% of NCOs and men and
42% of German officers were lost.
The French 7th Army failed to block the German armoured reinforcements from the 9. Pan-
zerdivision, which reached Rotterdam on 13 May. That same day in the east, following the
Battle of the Grebbeberg in which a Dutch counter-offensive to contain a German breach had
failed, the Dutch retreated from the Grebbe line to the New Water Line. The Dutch Army, still
largely intact, surrendered in the evening of 14 May after the Bombing of Rotterdam by the
Luftwaffe. Heinkel He 111 medium bombers of Kampfgeschwader 54 (Bomber Wing 54) des-
troyed the centre of the city, an act which has remained controversial. The Dutch Army consi-
dered its strategic situation to have become hopeless and feared further destruction of the
major Dutch cities. The capitulation document was signed on 15 May. However, Dutch forces
continued fighting in Zeeland and the colonies while Queen Wilhelmina established a govern-
ment in exile in Britain. Dutch casualties amounted to 2,157 army, 75 air force, and 125 Navy
personnel. 2,559 civilians were also killed.
Invasion of Belgium
The Germans were able to establish air superiority in Belgium. Having completed thorough
photographic reconnaissance missions, they destroyed 83 of the 179 aircraft of the Aeronauti-
que Militaire within the first 24 hours. The Belgians would fly 77 operational missions but
would contribute little to the air campaign. The Luftwaffe was assured air superiority over
the Low Countries.
Because Army Group B had been so weakened compared to the earlier plans, the feint offensi-
ve by the German 6. Armee was in danger of stalling immediately, since the Belgian defences
on the Albert Canal position were very strong. The main approach route was blocked by Fort
Eben-Emael, a large fortress then generally considered the most modern in Europe, which
controlled the junction of the Meuse and the Albert Canal. Any delay might endanger the out-
come of the entire campaign, because it was essential that the main body of Allied troops was
engaged before Army Group A established bridgeheads. To overcome this difficulty, the Ger-
mans resorted to unconventional means in the assault on the fort. In the early hours of 10
May, DFS 230 gliders landed near the fort and unloaded assault teams that disabled the main
gun cupolas with hollow charges. The bridges over the canal were seized by German paratroo-
pers. The Belgians launched considerable counterattacks which were broken up by the Luft-
waffe. Shocked by a breach in its defences just where they had seemed the strongest, the Bel-
gian Supreme Command withdrew its divisions to the KW-line five days earlier than planned.
Similar operations against the bridges in the Netherlands, at Maastricht, failed. All were
blown up by the Dutch and only one railway bridge was taken. This stalled the German ar-
mour on Dutch territory for a time.
The BEF and the French First Army were not yet entrenched, and the news of the defeat on
the Belgian border was unwelcome. The Allies had been convinced Belgian resistance would
have given them several weeks to prepare a defensive line at the Gembloux Gap. When Gene-
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ral Erich Hoepner's XVI Panzerkorps, consisting of 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions, was laun-
ched over the newly captured bridges in the direction of the Gembloux Gap, this seemed to
confirm the expectations of the French Supreme Command that the German Schwerpunkt
would be at that point. Gembloux was located between Wavre and Namur, on flat, ideal tank
terrain. It was also an unfortified part of the Allied line. In order to gain time to dig in there,
RenPrioux, commanding the Cavalry Corps of the French 1st Army, sent two French Light
Mechanised divisions, the 2nd DLM and 3rd DLM, forward to meet the German armour at
Hannut, east of Gembloux. They would provide an advanced guarding screen which would
stall the Germans and allow sufficient time for the French 1st Army to dig into formidable po-
sitions.
Battle of Hannut and Gembloux
The resulting Battle of Hannut, which took place on 1213 May, was the largest tank battle
until that date, with about 1,500 armoured fighting vehicles participating The French disa-
bled about 160 German tanks for the loss of 91 Hotchkiss H35 and 30 Somua S35 tanks des-
troyed or captured. The Germans controlled the battlefield after a voluntary French withdra-
wal. They recovered and eventually repaired or rebuilt many of their knocked-out tanks Ger-
man irreparable losses amounted to just 49 tanks (20, 3rd Panzer and 29, 4th Panzer).
Prioux had achieved his mission in stalling the Panzers and allowing the French 1st Army to
settle, so it was a strategic victory for the French. By contrast, although Hoepner had succee-
ded in diverting the French First Army from Sedan, which was his most important mission,
he failed to destroy or forestall it. The French would escape the encirclement and still render
invaluable support to the British Army in Dunkirk just two weeks later.
On 14 May, having been stalled at Hannut, Hoepner tried to break the French line again,
against orders, leading to The Battle of the Gembloux Gap. This was the only time in the cam-
paign when German armour frontally attacked a strongly held fortified position. The attempt
was repelled by the 1st Moroccan Infantry Division, costing 4. Panzerdivision another 42
tanks, 26 of which were irreparable. This French defensive success was made irrelevant by
events further south. Following the battle with the French 1st Army on 15 May, the war diary
of the 4. Panzerdivision noted irreparable losses that day of nine Panzer Is, nine Panzer IIs,
six Panzer IIIs, eight Panzer IVs, and two command tanks; of an original total of 314. 137 ma-
chines, of which 20 were mk IIIs and four were mk IVs, remained combat-ready.
Central front
Belgian and French Ardennes
In the centre, the progress of German Army Group A was to be delayed by Belgian motorised
infantry and French mechanised cavalry divisions (Divisions Lgres de Cavalerie) advan-
cing into the Ardennes. The main resistance came from the Belgian 1st Chasseurs Ardennais
along with the 5th French Light Cavalry Division (DLC). These forces had insufficient anti-
tank capacity to block the surprisingly large number of German tanks they encountered and
quickly gave way, withdrawing behind the Meuse. The German advance was greatly hampe-
red by the sheer number of troops trying to force their way along the poor road network.
Kleist's Panzergruppe had more than 41,000 vehicles. This huge armada had been allocated
only four march routes through the Ardennes. The time-tables proved to be wildly optimistic
and there was soon heavy congestion, beginning well over the Rhine to the east, which would
last for almost two weeks. This made Army Group A very vulnerable to French air attacks, but
these did not materialise. Although Gamelin was well aware of the situation, the French bom-
ber force was far too weak to challenge German air superiority so close to the German border.
The French had tried in vain to stem the flow of the German armour during the Battle of
Maastricht and had failed with heavy losses. In two days, the bomber force had been reduced
from 135 to 72.
On 11 May, Gamelin had ordered reserve divisions to begin reinforcing the Meuse sector. Be-
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cause of the danger the Luftwaffe posed, movement over the rail network was limited to
night-time, slowing the reinforcement, but the French felt no sense of urgency as they belie-
ved the build-up of German divisions would be correspondingly slow. The French Army did
not conduct river crossings unless assured of heavy artillery support. While they were aware
that the German tank and infantry formations were strong, they were confident in their
strong fortifications and artillery superiority. However, the quality of the fighting men was
dubious. The German advance forces reached the Meuse line late in the afternoon of 12 May.
To allow each of the three armies of Army Group A to cross, three major bridgeheads were to
be established; at Sedan in the south, Monthermto the northwest and Dinant further to the
north. The first German units to arrive hardly had local numerical superiority; their already
insufficient artillery support was further limited by an average supply of just 12 rounds per
gun. Fortunately for the German divisions, the French artillery was also limited to a daily
combat supply rate of 30 rounds per "tube" (gun).
Battle of Sedan
At Sedan, the Meuse Line consisted of a strong defensive belt 6 km (3.7 mi) deep, laid out ac-
cording to the modern principles of zone defence on slopes overlooking the Meuse valley and
strengthened by 103 pillboxes, manned by the 147th Fortress Infantry Regiment. The deeper
positions were held by the 55th Infantry Division. This was only a grade "B" reserve division.
On the morning of 13 May, the 71st Infantry Division was inserted to the east of Sedan, allo-
wing 55th Infantry to narrow its front by one-third and deepen its position to over 10 km
(6.2 mi). Furthermore, it had a superiority in artillery to the German units present.
On 13 May, the German XIX Korps forced three crossings near Sedan, executed by the 1., 2.
and 10. Panzerdivisions, reinforced by the elite Grodeutschland infantry regiment. Instead
of slowly massing artillery as the French expected, the Germans concentrated most of their
air power (as they lacked strong artillery forces) to smash a hole in a narrow sector of the
French lines by carpet bombing and by dive bombing. Hermann Gring had promised Gude-
rian that there would be extraordinarily heavy air support during a continual eight-hour air
attack, from 08:00 am until dusk. The Luftwaffe executed the heaviest air bombardment the
world had yet witnessed and the most intense by the Germans during the war. The Luftwaffe
committed two Sturzkampfgeschwader (Dive Bomber Wings) to the assault, flying 300 sor-
ties against French positions. A total of 3,940 sorties were flown by nine Kampfgeschwader
(Bomber Wings).
Some of the forward pillboxes were unaffected and repulsed the crossing attempts of the 2.
and 10. Panzerdivisions. The morale of the deeper units of the 55th Infantry, however, had
been broken by the affect of the air attacks. The French supporting artillery batteries had fled.
The German infantry, at a cost of a few hundred casualties, had penetrated up to 8 km
(5.0 mi) into the French defensive zone by midnight. Even by then most of the infantry had
not crossed, much of the success being due to the actions of just six platoons, mainly assault
engineers.
The disorder that had begun at Sedan spread down the French lines. At 19:00 on 13 May, the
295th regiment of 55th Infantry Division, holding the last prepared defensive line at the Bul-
son ridge 10 km (6.2 mi) behind the river, was panicked by the false rumour that German
tanks were already behind its positions. It fled, creating a gap in the French defences, before
even a single German tank had crossed the river. This "Panic of Bulson" also involved the di-
visional artillery. The Germans had not attacked their position, and would not do so until 12
hours later, at 07:20 on 14 May. Still, the French had several hours to launch a counter offen-
sive before the Germans consolidated the bridgeheads, but failed to attack soon enough.
Recognising the gravity of the defeat at Sedan, General Gaston-Henri Billotte, commander of
the 1st Army Group, whose right flank pivoted on Sedan, urged that the bridges across the
Meuse be destroyed by air attack, convinced that "over them will pass either victory or de-
feat!". That day, every available Allied light bomber was employed in an attempt to destroy
the three bridges, but failed to hit them while suffering heavy losses. Some 44% of the Allies'
bomber strength was destroyed.
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Collapse of the Meuse front
Heinz Guderian, the commander of the German XIX. Armeekorps, had indicated on 12 May
that he wanted to enlarge the bridgehead to at least 20 km (12 mi). His superior, Ewald von
Kleist, ordered him on behalf of Hitler to limit his moves to a maximum of 8 km (5.0 mi) be-
fore consolidation. At 11:45 on 14 May, von Rundstedt confirmed this order, which implied
that the tanks should now start to dig in. Guderian was able to get to Ewald von Kleist to
agree to "reconnaissance in force", by threatening to resign and behind the scenes interven-
tions. This vague terminology allowed Guderian to move forward, effectively ignoring Ewald
von Kleist's order to halt.
In the original von Manstein Plan as Guderian had suggested, secondary attacks would be ca-
rried out to the southeast, in the rear of the Maginot Line, to confuse the French command.
This element had been removed by Halder but Guderian now sent the 10th Panzerdivision
and Grodeutschland infantry regiment south to execute precisely such a feint attack, using
the only available route south over the Stonne plateau. The commander of the French 2nd
Army, General Charles Huntziger, intended to carry out a counterattack at the same spot by
the armoured 3e Division Cuirasse de Rserve (DCR) to eliminate the bridgehead. This re-
sulted in an armoured collision, both parties trying in vain to gain ground in furious attacks
from 1517 May, the village of Stonne changing hands many times. Huntzinger considered
this at least a defensive success and limited his efforts to protecting his flank. Holding Stonne
and taking Bulson would have enabled the French to hold onto the high ground overlooking
Sedan. They could disrupt the Sedan bridgehead, even if they could not take it. Heavy battles
took place and Stonne changed hands 17 times. It fell to the Germans for the last time on the
evening of 17 May.
Guderian, meanwhile, had turned his other two armoured divisions, the 1. and 2. Panzerdivi-
sions, sharply to the west on 14 May. They began to advance at speed to the English Channel.
On 15 May, in heavy fighting, Guderian's motorised infantry dispersed the reinforcements of
the newly formed French 6th Army in their assembly area west of Sedan, undercutting the
southern flank of the French 9th Army. The 9th Army collapsed and surrendered en masse.
The 102nd Fortress Division, its flanks unsupported, was surrounded and destroyed on 15
May at the Monthermbridgehead by the 6. and 8. Panzerdivisions acting without air sup-
port. The French 2nd Army had also been seriously mauled and had rendered itself impotent.
The 9th Army was giving way because they also did not have time to fortify their lines. Erwin
Rommel had breached its defences within 24 hours of its conception. This allowed Rommel
to break free with his 7th Panzer Division, refusing to allow his division rest and advancing
both by day and night. The Ghost division advanced 30 mi (48 km) in just 24 hours.
Rommel's lines of communication with his superior, General Hermann Hoth, and his head-
quarters were cut. Disobeying orders and not waiting for the French to establish a new line of
defence, he continued to advance north-west to Avesnes-sur-Helpe, just ahead of the 1. and 2.
Panzerdivisions. Rommel was lucky, because the French 5th Motorised Infantry Division had
set up its overnight bivouac in his path, leaving its vehicles neatly lined up along the roadsi-
des. Rommel's tanks dashed right through them. The slow speed, overloaded crews and lack
of any means of communication in battle undid the French. The 5th Panzer Division joined in
the fight. The French did inflict significant losses on the division but they could not cope with
the speed of the German mobile units, which closed fast and destroyed the French armour at
close range. During this battle, the remaining elements of the 1st DCR, resting after losing all
but 16 of its tanks in Belgium, were also engaged and defeated. The French unit retreated,
with just three remaining tanks. The 1st DCR was effectively destroyed on 17 May. The Ger-
mans lost 50 out of 500 tanks in the battle.
By 17 May, Rommel claimed to have taken 10,000 prisoners and suffered only 36 losses.
[149]
Guderian was delighted with the fast advance, and encouraged his XIX Korps, consisting of
the 1., 2. and 10. Panzerdivisions to head for the channel, continuing until fuel was exhaus-
ted. However, the success of his commanders on the ground began to have effects on Hitler
who worried that the German advance was moving too fast. Halder recorded in his diary on
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17 May that "Fuhrer is terribly nervous. Frightened by his own success, he is afraid to take
any chance and so would pull the reins on us ... [he] keeps worrying about the south flank. He
rages and screams that we are on the way to ruin the whole campaign." Through deception
and different interpretations of orders to stop from Hitler and von Kleist, the commanders on
the ground were able to ignore Hitler's attempts to stop the northern advance to the sea.
LowFrench morale
The Panzerkorps now slowed their advance considerably and put themselves in a very vulne-
rable position. They were stretched out, exhausted, low on fuel, and many tanks had broken
down. There was now a dangerous gap between them and the infantry. A determined attack
by a fresh and large enough mechanised force might have cut the Panzers off and wiped them
out.
The French High Command, already contemplatively ponderous and sluggish via its firm es-
pousing of the broad strategy of "methodological warfare", however, was reeling from the
shock of the sudden offensive and was now stung by a sense of defeatism. On the morning of
15 May, French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud telephoned the new Prime Minister of the Uni-
ted Kingdom Winston Churchill and said "We have been defeated. We are beaten; we have
lost the battle." Churchill, attempting to offer some comfort to Reynaud, reminded the Prime
Minister of all the times the Germans had broken through the Allied lines in World War I
only to be stopped. Reynaud was, however, inconsolable.
Churchill flew to Paris on 16 May. He immediately recognised the gravity of the situation
when he observed that the French government was already burning its archives and was pre-
paring for an evacuation of the capital. In a sombre meeting with the French commanders,
Churchill asked General Gamelin, "Oest la masse de manoeuvre?" ["Where is the strategic
reserve?"] that had saved Paris in the First World War. "Aucune" ["There is none"] Gamelin
replied. After the war, Gamelin claimed his response was "There is no longer any." Churchill
described hearing this later as the single most shocking moment in his life. Churchill asked
Gamelin where and when the general proposed to launch a counterattack against the flanks
of the German bulge. Gamelin simply replied "inferiority of numbers, inferiority of equip-
ment, inferiority of methods".
Failed Allied counter-attacks
Some of the best Allied units in the north had seen little fighting. Had they been kept in reser-
ve they might have been used in a decisive counter-strike. In a twist of irony, pre-war General
Staff Studies had asserted the main reserves were to be kept on French soil, to resist an inva-
sion of the Low Countries, deliver a counterattack or "re-establish the integrity of the original
front".
Despite having a numerically superior armoured force, the French failed to use it properly, or
to deliver an attack on the vulnerable German bulge. The Germans combined their fighting
vehicles in major, operational formations and used them at the point of main effort. The bulk
of French armour was scattered along the front in tiny formations. Most of the French reser-
ve divisions had by now been committed. The 1st DCR had been wiped out when it had run
out of fuel and the 3rd DCR had failed to take its opportunity to destroy the German brid-
geheads at Sedan. The only armoured division still in reserve, 2nd DCR, was to attack on 16
May west of Saint-Quentin, Aisne. The division's commander could locate only seven of its 12
companies, which were scattered along a 49 mi 37 mi (79 km 60 km) front. The forma-
tion was overrun by the 8. Panzerdivision while still forming up and was effectively destroyed
as a fighting unit.
Colonel Charles de Gaulle, in command of France's hastily formed 4th DCR, attempted to
launch an attack from the south at Montcornet where Guderian had his Korps headquarters
and the 1. Panzerdivision had its rear service areas. During the Battle of Montcornet Ger-
mans hastily improvised a defence while Guderian rushed up the 10. Panzerdivision to threa-
ten De Gaulle's flank. This flank pressure and attacks by the Luftwaffe's VIII Fliegerkorps
broke up the attack. French losses on 17 May were 32 tanks and armoured vehicles, but had
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"inflicted loss on the Germans". On 19 May, after receiving reinforcements, De Gaulle made
another effort, and was repulsed with the loss of 80 of 155 vehicles. Von Richthofen's Flieger-
korps VIII had done most of the work, by targeting French units moving into position to at-
tack the vulnerable German flanks it was able to stop most counterattacks from starting. The
defeat of de Gaulle's unit and the disintegration of the French 9th Army was caused mainly by
Richthofen's air units.
Although De Gaulle had achieved a measure of success, his attacks on 17 and 19 May did not
significantly alter the overall situation. It was the only French counter-attack on the German
forces advancing to the channel.
German spearheads reach the Channel
The Allies did little to either threaten the Panzerkorps or to escape from the danger that they
posed. The Panzer troops used 1718 May to refuel, eat, sleep and return more tanks to wor-
king order. On 18 May, Rommel caused the French to give up Cambrai by merely feinting an
armoured attack toward the city.
On 19 May, General Edmund Ironside, the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, confe-
rred with General Lord Gort, commander of the BEF, at his headquarters near Lens. He ur-
ged Gort to save the BEF by attacking south-west toward Amiens. Gort replied that seven of
his nine divisions were already engaged on the Scheldt River, and he had only two divisions
left with which he would be able to mount such an attack. Ironside then asked Gort under
whose command he was acting. Gort replied that this was General Billotte, the commander of
the French 1st Army Group, but that Billotte had issued no orders for eight days. Ironside
confronted Billotte, whose own headquarters was nearby, and found him apparently incapa-
ble of taking decisive action. He returned to Britain concerned that the BEF was already doo-
med, and ordered urgent anti-invasion measures.
The German land forces could not remain inactive any longer since it would allow the Allies
to reorganise their defence or escape. On 19 May, Guderian was permitted to start moving
again and smashed through the weak British 18th and 23rd Territorial Divisions located on
the Somme river. The German units occupied Amiens and secured the westernmost bridge
over the river at Abbeville. This move isolated the British, French, Dutch, and Belgian forces
in the north. On 20 May, a reconnaissance unit from Rudolf Veiel's 2. Panzerdivision reached
Noyelles-sur-Mer, 100 kilometres (62 mi) to the west of their positions on the 17th. From the-
re, they were able to see the Somme estuary and the English Channel. A huge pocket, contai-
ning the Allied 1st Army Group (the Belgian, British, and French 1st, 7th and 9th Armies),
was created.
VIII. Fliegerkorps, under the command of Wolfram von Richthofen, covered the dash to the
channel coast. Heralded as the Ju 87s' (Stuka) "finest hour", these units responded via an ex-
tremely efficient communications system to the Panzer Divisions' every request for support,
which effectively blasted a path for the Army. The Ju 87s were particularly effective at brea-
king up attacks along the flanks of the German forces, breaking fortified positions, and dis-
rupting rear-area supply chains. The Luftwaffe also benefitted from excellent ground-to-air
communications throughout the campaign. Radio-equipped forward liaison officers could
call upon the Stukas and direct them to attack enemy positions along the axis of advance. In
some cases, the Luftwaffe responded to requests in 1020 minutes. Oberstleutnant Hans Sei-
demann (Richthofen's Chief of Staff) said that "never again was such a smoothly functioning
system for discussing and planning joint operations achieved". Closer examination reveals
the army had to wait 4575 minutes for Ju 87 units, and just 10 minutes for the Henschel Hs
123 units.
Weygand Plan
On the morning of 20 May, Maurice Gamelin ordered the armies trapped in Belgium and
northern France to fight their way south and link up with French forces that would be pus-
hing northward from the Somme river. However on the evening of 19 May, French Prime Mi-
nister Paul Reynaud had dismissed Gamelin for his failure to contain the German offensive,
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and replaced him with Maxime Weygand. Weygand had little sense of urgency. He claimed
his first mission as Commander-in-Chief would be to get a good night's sleep. Weygand was
guilty of wasting valuable time, time which was needed to form a quick and powerful counter-
attack. He cancelled Gamelin's planned offensive, then wasted several days making courtesy
visits to dignitaries in Paris. He then ordered a similar plan to Gamelin's, proposing a coun-
ter-offensive from the north and south against the German "corridor", which entailed a com-
bined thrust by the encircled armies in the pocket and French forces on the Somme front (the
newly created French 3rd Army Group, under the command of General Antoine-Marie-Be-
not Besson). The situation demanded an all-out offensive on the corridor.
On 22 May, Weygand ordered his forces to pinch off the German armoured spearhead by
combining attacks from the north and the south. On the map, this seemed like a feasible mis-
sion, as the corridor through which von Kleist's two Panzer Corps had moved to the coast
was narrow. On paper, Weygand had sufficient forces to execute it: to the north were the
three DLM and the BEF; to the south, was de Gaulle's 4th DCR. However, while the German
position was far from safe, the opportunity had been lost. The delays had allowed the Ger-
mans to push more infantry divisions into the corridor and they had pushed further along the
channel coast. Weygand flew into the pocket on 21 May and met General Billotte, commander
of the First Army Group, and King Leopold III of Belgium. The Belgian position on any offen-
sive move was made clear by Leopold. As far as he was concerned, the Belgian Army could
not conduct offensive operations as it lacked tanks and aircraft; it existed solely for defence.
The King also made clear that in the rapidly shrinking area of Belgium still free, there was
only enough food for two weeks. Leopold did not expect the BEF to jeopardise its own posi-
tion in order to keep contact with the Belgian Army, but he warned the British that if it persis-
ted with the southern offensive the Belgians would be overstretched and their army would co-
llapse. King Leopold suggested the best recourse was to establish a beach-head covering Dun-
kirk and the Belgian channel ports.
Gort doubted the French Army's ability to prevail in the offensive. On 23 May, making mat-
ters worse, Billotte was killed in a road traffic accident, leaving the Allied First Army Group in
the pocket leaderless for three days. Billotte was the only member of the Allied armies tho-
roughly informed on the Weygand plan's details. The same day, the British decided to evacua-
te from the Channel ports. In the event, communications broke down and only two minor of-
fensives, by the British and French at Arras on 21 May and by the French at Cambrai on 22
May, would be acted upon.
Major-General Harold Franklyn, commanding two tank battalions, had moved into the Arras
area. Franklyn was not aware of a French push north toward Cambrai, and the French were
unaware of a British attack heading south, out of the pocket, toward Arras. Ignorant as to the
importance of the operation, Franklyn assumed he was to relieve the Allied garrison at Arras
and to sever German communications in the immediate area. He did not therefore want to
risk throwing his main units, the 5th and 50th Infantry Divisions into the fight, especially if
the objectives were limited. He also had the French 3rd DLM available, from the French 1st
Army. It had caused the German armour severe trouble at the Battle of Hannut with its SO-
MUA S35 heavy tanks. They were given no more than a flank protection role. Only two in-
fantry battalions and two tank battalions were made available for the attack. British armour
numbers had dwindled owing to mechanical failures. However they still fielded 74 Matilda
tanks and 14 light tanks.
The resulting Battle of Arras achieved surprise and initial success against German forces
which were stretched, but it still failed. Radio communication between tanks and infantry
was poor and there was little combined arms coordination as practiced by the Germans. In
the end, hastily set up German defences (including [[8.8 cm FlaK 18/36/37/41|88 mm
(3.46 in) FlaK gun]]s and [[10.5 cm leFH 18|105 mm (4.1 in) field gun]]s) stopped the attack.
The French inflicted heavy losses on German armour as they retreated, but the Luftwaffe bro-
ke up the counter-attacks. Just 28 of the 88 British tanks survived. The French V Corps' at-
tack at Cambrai also failed. V Corps had been too disorganised after previous fighting in Bel-
gium to launch a serious effort.
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Although this attack was not part of any coordinated attempt to destroy the Panzerkorps, the
German High Command panicked even more than Rommel. They thought that hundreds of
Allied tanks were about to smash into their elite forces. It was unjustified panic. The operatio-
nal and strategic effects of the British attack was out of proportion to its tactical achieve-
ments. On the morning of the 22 May, the German High Command had regained confidence
and ordered Guderian's XIX Panzerkorps to press north and push on to the Channel ports:
the 1. Panzerdivision to Calais, the 2. Panzerdivision to Boulogne and the 10. Panzerdivision
to Dunkirk. Later, the missions of the 1st and 10. Panzerdivisions were reversed. The 1. Pan-
zer was ordered to Dunkirk while the 10. Panzer was to take Calais.
Although De Gaulle launched some ineffectual counterattacks around Peronne on 19 May,
the attack from the south was launched only on 23 May, when 7th DIC, supported by a hand-
ful of tanks, failed to retake Amiens. On 27 May, the British 1st Armoured Division, hastily
brought over from England, attacked Abbeville in force but was beaten back with crippling
losses. The next day de Gaulle tried again with the same result. But, by now, even complete
success very well might not have saved the Allied forces in the north.
BEF and the Channel ports
In the early hours of 23 May, Gort ordered a retreat from Arras. By now, he had no faith in
the Weygand plan, nor in Weygand's proposal to at least try to hold a pocket on the Flemish
coast, a so-called Rduit de Flandres. Gort knew that the ports needed to supply such a foot-
hold were already being threatened. That same day, the 2. Panzer Division had assaulted Bou-
logne. The British garrison there surrendered on 25 May, although 4,286 men were evacua-
ted by Royal Navy ships. The RAF also provided air superiority over the port, denying the
Luftwaffe an opportunity to attack the shipping.
The 10. Panzerdivision, commanded by Ferdinand Schaal, attacked Calais on 24 May. British
reinforcements (the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment, equipped with cruiser tanks, and the 30th Mo-
tor Brigade) had been hastily landed 24 hours before the Germans attacked. The defenders
held on to the port as long as possible, aware that an early capitulation would free up German
forces to advance on Dunkirk. The British and French held the town despite the best efforts of
Schaal's division to break through. Frustrated, Guderian ordered that if Calais had not fallen
by 14:00 on 26 May, he would withdraw the 10. Panzer division and ask the Luftwaffe to des-
troy the town. Eventually, the French and British ran out of ammunition and the Germans
were able to break into the fortified city at around 13:30 on 26 May 30 minutes before
Schaal's deadline was up. Despite the French surrender of the main fortifications, the British
held the docks until the morning of 27 May. Around 440 men were evacuated. The Siege of
Calais lasted for four crucial days. However, the delaying action came at a price. Some 60% of
Allied personnel were killed or wounded.
Halt order
On 23 May, Gnther von Kluge proposed that the German 4. Armee, which was poised to
continue the attack against the Allied forces at Dunkirk, should "halt and close up". Seeing
the Allies were trapped in the city, Gerd von Rundstedt agreed with von Kluge. In the 4. Ar-
mee diary, it is recorded on 23 May "will, in the main, halt tomorrow [May 24] in accordance
with Colonel-General von Rundstedt's order." General Walther von Brauchitsch, commander
in chief of the German Army, disagreed with his colleagues and wanted to continue the attack
against Dunkirk by putting the 4. Armee under Bock. Bock was busy and Halder agreed with
Von Rundstedt and with von Kluge to stop action against Dunkirk. The disagreement went to
Hitler, who overruled Brauchitsch and agreed with stopping action against Dunkirk. Hitler's
error wasn't in making the command to halt the German army but in allowing the orders al-
ready drawn up by the German generals to stand. It appears that Kleist also agreed with the
halt order, which Hitler "rubber-stamped". The halt order remains extremely controversial.
At the same time, Army Group B under Bock was stripped of most of its divisions, including
its reserves and air support. Its complement shrank to just 21 divisions, while Army Group A
swelled to 70 divisions, including all ten Panzer Divisions. Army Group B was to be used as a
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"hammer" against Army Group A's "anvil". Halder later claimed Hitler's motivation for the
transfer was his wish that the decisive battle be fought on French, not Flemish soil.
Hermann Gring convinced Hitler that the Luftwaffe could prevent any evacuation and von
Rundstedt warned him that any further effort by the armoured divisions would lead to a
much longer refitting period. The delay and failure of the Luftwaffe to stop the evacuation
wasted some three days (2427 May) and allowed the Allies to build a defence to the approa-
ches of Dunkirk, the main evacuation port. It would seem that Hitler, Gring and Rundstedt
shared responsibility for the mistake.
Operation Dynamo
The Allies launched Operation Dynamo which evacuated the encircled British, French and
Belgian troops from the northern pocket in Belgium and Pas-de-Calais, beginning on 26 May.
About 28,000 men were evacuated on the first day. The French 1st Armythe bulk of which
remained in Lilleowing to Weygand's failure to pull it back along with other French forces
to the coast, mounted a long defence of the city, the 50,000 men finally capitulating on 31
May. While the 1st Army was mounting its sacrificial defence at Lille, it drew German forces
away from Dunkirk, allowing 70,000 Allied soldiers to escape. Total Allied evacuation rates
stood at 165,000 on 31 May. The Allied position was complicated by Belgian King Lopold
III's surrender the following day, which was postponed until 28 May. The gap left by the Bel-
gian Army stretched from Ypres to Dixmude. Nevertheless, a collapse was prevented and
139,732 British and 139,097 French soldiers were evacuated. Between 31 May and 4 June, so-
me 20,000 British and 98,000 French had been saved. Still, some 3040,000 French sol-
diers of the rearguard remained to be captured. The overall total evacuated was 338,226.
During the Dunkirk battle, the Luftwaffe did its best to prevent the evacuation. It flew 1,882
bombing and 1,997 fighter sorties. British losses totalled 6% of their total losses during the
French campaign, including 60 precious fighter pilots. The Luftwaffe failed in its task of pre-
venting the evacuation, but had inflicted serious losses on the Allied forces. A total of 89 mer-
chantmen (of 126,518 grt) were lost; the Royal Navy lost 29 of its 40 destroyers sunk or se-
riously damaged. The Germans lost around 100 aircraft confirmed destroyed, and the RAF
106 fighters. Other sources put Luftwaffe losses in the Dunkirk area at 240.
Confusion still reigned. After the evacuation at Dunkirk and while Paris was enduring a
short-lived siege, part of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division was sent to Brittany but was with-
drawn after the French capitulation. The British 1st Armoured Division under General Evans,
without its infantry which had earlier been diverted to the defence of Calais, had arrived in
France in June 1940. It was joined by the former labour battalion of the 51st (Highland) Divi-
sion and was forced to fight a rearguard action. At the end of the campaign, Erwin Rommel
praised the staunch resistance of British forces, despite being under-equipped and without
ammunition for much of the fighting.
On 26 February 1945, Hitler claimed he had let the BEF escape as a "sporting" gesture, in the
hope Churchill would come to terms. Few historians accept Hitler's word in light of Directive
No. 13, which called for "the annihilation of French, British and Belgian forces in the Dunkirk
pocket".
Fall Rot
French problems
The best and most modern French armies had been sent north and lost in the resulting encir-
clement; the French had also lost much of their heavy weaponry and their best armoured for-
mations. Overall, the Allies had lost 61 divisions in Fall Gelb. Weygand was faced with the
prospect of defending a long front (stretching from Sedan to the Channel), with a greatly de-
pleted French Army now lacking significant Allied support. Weygand had only 64 French and
one remaining British division (the 51st Highland) available. Weygand lacked the reserves to
counter a breakthrough or to replace frontline troops, should they become exhausted from a
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prolonged battle on a front of 965 kilometres. The Germans had 142 divisions to use.
Adding to this grave situation, on 10 June, Italy declared war on France and Britain. Italy was
not prepared for war and made little impact during the last twelve days of fighting. Italian
dictator Benito Mussolini was aware of this and sought to profit from German successes.
Mussolini felt the conflict would soon end. As he said to the Army's Chief-of-Staff, Marshal
Badoglio, "I only need a few thousand dead so that I can sit at the peace conference as a man
who has fought." However, French General RenOlry commanding the Army of the Alps re-
sisted all Italian attacks, and then repulsed German attacks from the Rhone valley.
Collapse of the Weygand line
The Germans renewed their offensive on 5 June on the Somme. During the next three weeks,
far from the easy advance the Wehrmacht expected, they encountered strong resistance from
a rejuvenated French Army. It had fallen back on its communications, and had closer access
to repair shops, supply dumps and stores. Moreover, 112,000 evacuated French soldiers were
repatriated via the Normandy and Brittany ports. It was some substitute for the lost divisions
in Flanders. The French were also able to make good a significant amount of its armoured los-
ses and raised the 1st and 2nd DCR (heavy armoured divisions). De Gaulle's divisionthe 4th
DCRalso had its losses replaced. Morale rose and was very high by the end of May 1940.
A central explanation for the high morale was threefold; most French soldiers that knew
about the defeats, and were now joining the line, only knew of German success by hearsay;
surviving French officers had increased tactical experience against German mobile units; in-
creased confidence in their weapons after seeing their artillery, which the Wehrmacht post-
battle analysis recognised as technically very good, and their tanks perform better in combat
than the German armour. The French tanks were now known to have heavier armour and ar-
mament.
Between 23 and 28 May, they reconstituted the French 7th and 10th Armies. Weygand deci-
ded on hedgehog tactics, which were to implement defence in depth operations, and perform
delaying strategies designed to inflict maximum attrition on enemy units. He employed units
in towns and small villages, as well as major towns and cities, and fortified them 360along
their perimeter. Behind this, the new infantry, armoured, and half-mechanised divisions for-
med up, ready to counterattack and relieve the surrounded units, which were ordered to hold
out at all costs.
Army Group B attacked either side of Paris. Of its 47 divisions it had the majority of the mobi-
le units. In fact, only 48 hours into the offensive, the Germans had not made any major
breakthroughs. The Germans had been "stopped in their tracks". On the Aisne, Erich Hoep-
ner's XVI Panzerkorps employed over 1,000 AFVs, two Panzer Divisions and a motorised di-
vision against the French. The assault was crude, and Hoepner soon lost 80 out of 500 AFVs
in the first attack. The German 4. Armee succeeded in capturing bridgeheads over the Somme
river, but the Germans struggled to get over the Aisne. Weygand had organised a defence in
depth and frustrated the crossing. In a series of examples at Amiens, the Germans were re-
peatedly driven back by powerful French artillery concentrations, and came to recognise im-
proved French tactics. Once again, the German Army relied on the Luftwaffe to help decisi-
vely, by silencing French guns and enabling the German infantry to inch forward. German
progress was made only late on the third day of operations, finally forcing crossings. The
French Air Force attempted to bomb them but failed. German sources acknowledged the bat-
tle was, "hard and costly in lives, the enemy putting up severe resistance, particularly in the
woods and tree lines continuing the fight when our troops had pushed passed the point of re-
sistance". However, south of Abbeville, the French 10th Army under General Robert Altmayer
had its front broken and it was forced to retreat to Rouen and south along the Seine river. The
rapid German advances were the sign of a weakening enemy. Rommel and his 7. Panzerdivi-
sion headed west over the Seine river through Normandy and captured the port of Cherbourg
on 18 June. On the way to Cherbourg, Rommel forced the surrender of the British 51st (High-
land) Division on 12 June. In close-quarter combat, the Luftwaffe was struggling to have an
impact. However, in an operational sense, they helped disperse French armour. The German
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spearheads were overextended and vulnerable to counter strokes, but the concentration of
the Luftwaffe denied the French the ability to concentrate, and the fear of air attack negated
their mass and mobile use by Weygand.
On 10 June, the French government declared Paris an open city. The German 18. Armee now
deployed against Paris. The French resisted the approaches to the capital strongly, but the li-
ne was broken in several places. Weygand now asserted it would not take long for the French
Army to disintegrate. On 13 June, Churchill attended an Allied Supreme War Council Mee-
ting at Tours. He suggested a union between the two countries. It was rejected. On 14 June,
Paris fell. Those Parisians who stayed in the city found that in most cases the Germans were
extremely well mannered.
On top of this added danger, the situation in the air had also grown critical. The Luftwaffe es-
tablished air supremacy (as opposed to air superiority) as the French air arm was on the ver-
ge of collapse. The French Air Force (Arme de l'Air) had only just begun to make the majo-
rity of bomber sorties; between 5 and 9 June (during Operation Paula), over 1,815 missions,
of which 518 were by bombers, were flown. The number of sorties flown declined as losses
were now becoming impossible to replace. The RAF attempted to divert the attention of the
Luftwaffe with 660 sorties flown against targets over the Dunkirk area but losses were heavy;
on 21 June alone, 37 Bristol Blenheims were destroyed. After 9 June, French aerial resistance
virtually ceased, some surviving aircraft withdrew to French North Africa. The Luftwaffe now
"ran riot". Its attacks were focused on the direct and indirect support of the German Army.
The Luftwaffe subjected lines of resistance to ferocious assault, which then quickly collapsed
under armoured attack.
Collapse of the Maginot line
Meanwhile, to the east, Army Group C was to help Army Group A encircle and capture the
French forces on the Maginot line. The goal of the operation was to envelop the Metz region,
with its fortifications, in order to prevent a French counter offensive from the Alsace region
against the German line on the Somme. Guderian's XIX Korps was to advance to the French
border with Switzerland and trap the French forces in the Vosges Mountains while the XVI
Korps attacked the Maginot Line from the west, into its vulnerable rear to take the cities of
Verdun, Toul and Metz. The French, meanwhile, had moved the French 2nd Army Group
from the Alsace and Lorraine to the 'Weygand line' on the Somme, leaving only small forces
guarding the Maginot line. After Army Group B had begun its offensive against Paris and into
Normandy, Army Groups A began its advance into the rear of the Maginot line. On 15 June,
Army Group C launched Operation Tiger, a frontal assault across the Rhine river and into
France.
German attempts to break open or into the Maginot line prior to Tiger had failed. One assault
lasted for eight hours on the extreme north of the line, costing the Germans 46 dead and 251
wounded, while just two French were killed (one at Ferme-Chappy and one at Fermont for-
tress). On 15 June, the last well-equipped French forces, including the French 4th Army were
preparing to leave as the Germans struck. The French now holding the line were skeletal.
The Germans greatly outnumbered the French. They could call upon the I Armeekorps of se-
ven divisions and 1,000 artillery pieces, although most were First World War vintage, and
could not penetrate the thick armour of the fortresses. Only 88 mm guns could do the job,
and 16 were allocated to the operation. To bolster this, 150 mm and eight railway batteries
were also employed. The Luftwaffe deployed the V Fliegerkorps to give air support.
The battle was difficult and slow progress was made against strong French resistance. Howe-
ver, each fortress was overcome one by one. One fortress (Schoenenbourg) fired 15,802
75 mm rounds at attacking German infantry. It was the most heavily shelled of all the French
positions. Nevertheless, its armour protected it from fatal damage. The same day Tiger was
launched, Operation Kleiner Br began. Five assault divisions of the VII Armeekorps crossed
the Rhine into the Colmar area with a view to advancing to the Vosges Mountains. It had 400
artillery pieces bolstered by heavy artillery and mortars. They drove the French 104th and
105th Divisions back into the Vosges Mountains on 17 June. However, on the same day Gude-
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rian's XIX Korps reached the Swiss border and the Maginot defences were cut off from the
rest of France. Most units surrendered on 25 June, and the Germans claimed to have taken
500,000 prisoners. Some main fortresses continued the fight, despite appeals for surrender.
The last only capitulated on 10 July, after a request from General Alphonse Joseph Georges,
and only then under protest. Of the 58 major fortifications on the Maginot Line, just 10 were
captured by the Wehrmacht in battle.
The second BEF evacuation
The evacuation of the second BEF took place during Operation Ariel between 15 and 25 June.
The Luftwaffe, with complete domination of the French skies, was determined to prevent mo-
re Allied evacuations after the Dunkirk debacle. I. Fliegerkorps was assigned to the Nor-
mandy and Brittany sectors. On 9 and 10 June, the port of Cherbourg was subject to 15 ton-
nes of German bombs, whilst Le Havre received 10 bombing attacks which sank 2949 GRT of
escaping Allied shipping. On 17 June, Junkers Ju 88smainly from Kampfgeschwader 30
sank a "10,000 tonne ship" which was the 16243 GRT liner RMS Lancastria off St Nazaire,
killing some 4,000 Allied personnel (nearly doubling the British killed in the battle of Fran-
ce). Nevertheless, the Luftwaffe failed to prevent the mass evacuation of some 190,000
200,000 Allied personnel.
Surrender and armistice
Discouraged by his cabinet's hostile reaction to a British proposal to unite France and Britain
to avoid surrender, and believing that his ministers no longer supported him, Prime Minister
Paul Reynaud resigned on 16 June. He was succeeded by Marshal Philippe Ptain, who deli-
vered a radio address to the French people announcing his intention to ask for an armistice
with Germany. When Hitler received word from the French government that they wished to
negotiate an armistice, he selected the Compigne Forest as the site for the negotiations.
Compigne had been the site of the 1918 Armistice, which had ended the First World War
with a humiliating defeat for Germany; Hitler viewed the choice of location as a supreme mo-
ment of revenge for Germany over France. The armistice was signed on 22 June 1940 in the
very same railway carriage in which the 1918 Armistice was signed (it was removed from a
museum building and placed on the precise spot where it was located in 1918), Hitler sat in
the same chair in which Marshal Ferdinand Foch had sat when he faced the defeated German
representatives. After listening to the reading of the preamble, Hitler, in a calculated gesture
of disdain to the French delegates, left the carriage, leaving the negotiations to the Chief of
Staff of the OKW, Wilhelm Keitel. The armistice and the cease-fire went into effect at 01:35
on 25 June.
Aftermath
France was divided into a German occupation zone in the north and west and a nominally in-
dependent state in the south. The new French state known as Vichy France, was headed by
Ptain. Charles de Gaulle, who had been made an Undersecretary of National Defence by Rey-
naud in London at the time of the surrender, made his Appeal of 18 June in which he refused
to recognise Ptain's Vichy government as legitimate and began the task of organising the
Free French Forces.
The British doubted Admiral Franois Darlan's promise not to allow the French fleet at Tou-
lon to fall into German hands by the wording of the armistice conditions. They feared the Ger-
mans would seize the French Navy's fleet, docked at ports in Vichy France and North Africa
and use them in an invasion of Britain (Operation Sea Lion). Within a month, the Royal Navy
would attack the French naval forces which were stationed in North Africa.
[241]
The British
Chiefs of Staff Committee had concluded in May 1940 that if France collapsed, "we do not
think we could continue the war with any chance of success" without "full economic and fi-
nancial support" from the United States. Churchill's desire for American aid led in September
to the Destroyers for Bases agreement that began the wartime Anglo-American partnership.
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The occupation of the various zones continued until November 1942, when the Allies laun-
ched Operation Torch, the invasion of Western North Africa. To safeguard southern France,
the Germans enacted Operation Anton, and occupied Vichy France. In June 1944, the Wes-
tern Allies launched Operation Overlord. Followed by the smaller but easier Operation Anvil-
Dragon on the French Mediterranean coast on 15 August. German troops in western and cen-
tral France now run the risk of becoming cut off, and began to retire towards Germany, with
the exceptions of the extremly fortified submarine bases at the French Atlantic coast, which
remained in German hands until the German capitulation. On 24 August 1944 Paris was libe-
rated, and by September most of the country was in Allied hands.
By the time of the liberation, some 580,000 French had been killed (Of these 40.000 were ki-
lled by the western Allied, during the bombardments of the first 48 hours of Operation Over-
lord). Military deaths were 92,000 in 19391940. Some 58,000 died from 1940 to 1945 figh-
ting in the Free French forces. In Alsace-Lorraine some province citizens joined the German
Army (most of them were forced to). Some 40,000 became casualties. Civilian casualties
amounted to around 150,000 (60,000 by aerial bombing, 60,000 in the resistance, and
30,000 murdered by German occupation forces). Prisoners of war and deportee totals were
around 1,900,000. Of this, around 240,000 died in captivity. An estimated 40,000 were pri-
soners of war, 100,000 racial deportees, 60,000 political prisoners and 40,000 died as slave
labourers.
Hitler Appoints Twelve Field Marshals
On 19 July, at a ceremony at the Kroll Opera House, Hitler promoted nine generals from the
Army and three from the Luftwaffe to the rank of Field Marshal:
Walther von Brauchitsch, Commander in chief of the Army
Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of Staff of the OKW
Gerd von Rundstedt, Commander in chief of Army Group A
Fedor von Bock, Commander in chief of Army Group B
Wilhelm von Leeb, Commander in chief of Army Group C
Gnther von Kluge, Commander of the Fourth Army
Wilhelm List, Commander of the Twelfth Army
Erwin von Witzleben, Commander of the First Army
Walter von Reichenau, Commander of the Sixth Army
Albert Kesselring, Commander of the Second Air Fleet
Erhard Milch, Inspector General of the Luftwaffe
Hugo Sperrle, Commander of the Third Air Fleet
This number of promotions to what had previously been the highest rank in the Wehrmacht
(Hermann Gring, Commander in chief of the Luftwaffe and already a Field Marshal, was ele-
vated to the new rank of Reichsmarschall) was unprecedented. Throughout the whole of the
First World War, Kaiser Wilhelm II had promoted only five generals to Field Marshal.
Casualties
Axis
German overall casualties are hard to determine. A common estimate is about 27,074 killed,
111,034 wounded and 18,384 missing. Nevertheless, Germans killed may have been as high as
49,000 men, due to additional non-combat causes, wounded who died and missing who were
confirmed dead.
The battle for France had cost the Luftwaffe 28% of its front line strength, some 1,236 to
1,428 aircraft destroyed (1,129 to enemy action, 299 in accidents). A further 323488 were
damaged (225 to enemy action, 263 in accidents), making a total of 36% of the Luftwaffe
strength negatively affected. Luftwaffe casualties amounted to 6,653, including 4,417 air-
crew; of these 1,129 were killed and 1,930 missing and captured. A great number were libera-
ted from French prison camps upon the French capitulation.
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Italian casualties were 1,247 killed or missing and 2,361 wounded. Additionally, there were
more than 2,000 cases of frostbite from combat in the subzero temperatures of the French
Alps.
Allied
Casualties were as follows:
France: According to the Defence Historical Service, 85,310 killed (including 5,400 Maghre-
bis), 12,000 missing, 120,000 wounded and 1,540,000 captured (including 67,400 Maghre-
bis). Some recent French research indicates that the number of killed had been between
55,000 and 85,000. In August 1940, 1,540,000 prisoners were taken into Germany where
roughly 940,000 remained until 1945 when they were liberated by advancing Allied forces. At
least 3,000 Senegalese Tirailleurs were murdered after being taken prisoner. While in Ger-
man captivity, 24,600 French prisoners died; 71,000 escaped; 220,000 were released by va-
rious agreements between the Vichy government and Germany; several hundred thousand
were paroled because of disability and/or sickness. Aerial losses are estimated at 1,274 air-
craft destroyed during the campaign.
Britain: 68,111 killed in action, wounded or captured (among them fewer than 10,000 killed,
including the Lancastria disaster). Some 64,000 vehicles destroyed or abandoned and 2,472
guns destroyed or abandoned. RAF losses throughout the entire campaign (10 May 22 Ju-
ne) amounted to 931 aircraft and 1,526 casualties.
Belgium: Losses in manpower were 6,093 killed and wounded. Some 2,000 prisoners of war
died in captivity and more than 500 were missing. Those captured amounted to 200,000.
Belgian wounded amounted to 15,850. They lost 112 aircraft destroyed.
Poland: Losses in manpower were around 6,000 killed and wounded. Nearly 12,000 troops
(2nd Infantry Division) were interned in Switzerland for the duration of the war.
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Chapter IV Operation Barbarossa
Operation Barbarossa (German: Unternehmen Barbarossa), was the code name for Ger-
many's invasion of the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Beginning on 22 June
1941, over 4 million soldiers of the Axis powers invaded the USSR along a 2,900 km
(1,800 mi) front, the largest invasion in the history of warfare. In addition to troops, Barba-
rossa used 600,000 motor vehicles and 750,000 horses. The ambitious operation was driven
by Adolf Hitler's persistent desire to conquer the Soviet territories (as embodied in General-
plan Ost). It marked the beginning of the pivotal phase in deciding the victors of the war. The
German invasion of the Soviet Union suffered and caused a high rate of fatalities: 95% of all
German Army casualties that occurred from 1941 to 1944, and 65% of all Allied military ca-
sualties from the entire war.
Operation Barbarossa was named after Frederick Barbarossa, the medieval Holy Roman Em-
peror. Planning started on 18 December 1940; the secret preparations and the military opera-
tion itself lasted from June to December 1941. The Red Army repelled the Wehrmacht's stron-
gest blow, and Adolf Hitler did not achieve the expected victory, but the Soviet Union's situa-
tion remained dire. Tactically, the Germans won resounding victories and occupied some of
the most important economic areas of the Soviet Union, mainly in Ukraine. Despite these suc-
cesses, the Germans were pushed back from Moscow and could never again mount a simulta-
neous offensive along the entire strategic SovietGerman front.
Operation Barbarossa's failure led to Hitler's demands for further operations inside the
USSR, all of which eventually failed, such as continuing the Siege of Leningrad, Operation
Nordlicht, and the Battle of Stalingrad, among other battles on occupied Soviet territory.
Operation Barbarossa was the largest military operation in human history in both manpower
and casualties. Its failure was a turning point in the Third Reich's fortunes. Most importantly,
Operation Barbarossa opened up the Eastern Front, to which more forces were committed
than in any other theater of war in world history. Regions covered by the operation became
the site of some of the largest battles, deadliest atrocities, highest casualties, and most horri-
fic conditions for Soviets and Germans alikeall of which influenced the course of both
World War II and 20th century history. The German forces captured over 3 million Soviet
POWs in 1941, who did not enjoy the protection stipulated in the Geneva Conventions. Most
of them never returned alive. Germany deliberately starved the prisoners to death as part of
its Hunger Plan, i.e., the program to reduce the Eastern European population
German theory regarding the Soviet Union
As early as 1925, Hitler suggested in Mein Kampf that he would invade the Soviet Union, as-
serting that the German people needed Lebensraum ("living space", i.e. land and raw mate-
rials) and that these should be sought in the East. National-socialist racial ideology cast the
Soviet Union as populated by "Untermenschen," ethnic Slavs ruled by their "Jewish Bolshe-
vik" masters. Mein Kampf said Germany's destiny was to turn "to the East" as it did "six hun-
dred years ago" and "the end of the Jewish domination in Russia will also be the end of Rus-
sia as a State." Thereafter, Hitler spoke of an inescapable battle against "pan-Slav ideals", in
which victory would lead to "permanent mastery of the world", though he said they would
"walk part of the road with the Russians, if that will help us." Accordingly, it was Nazi stated
policy to kill, deport, or enslave the Russian and other Slavic populations and repopulate the
land with Germanic peoples (see Generalplan Ost).
Before World War II, observers believed that in a war with the Soviet Union, Germany would
attack through the Baltic states while the Kriegsmarine would seize Leningrad by sea. They
assumed that possessing the entire Baltic basin would satisfy Hitler, who would not repeat
Napoleon's mistake of attacking Moscow.
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Map 8 Operation Barbarossa
19391940 German-Soviet relationship
The Soviet Union and Germany signed a non-aggression pact, the MolotovRibbentrop Pact,
shortly before the German invasion of Poland that triggered the Second World War in 1939,
and which was followed by the Soviet invasion of Poland. A secret protocol to the pact outli-
73/138
ned an agreement between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union on the division of the border
states between their respective "spheres of influence". The Soviet Union and Germany would
split Poland if an invasion were to occur, and Latvia, Estonia and Finland were defined as fa-
lling within the Soviet sphere of influence. The pact surprised the world because of the par-
ties' mutual hostility and their conflicting ideologies. As a result of the pact, Germany and the
Soviet Union had reasonably strong diplomatic relations and an important economic rela-
tionship. The countries entered a trade pact in 1940, in which the Soviets received German
military and industrial equipment in exchange for raw materials, such as oil or wheat, to help
Germany circumvent a British blockade.
Despite the parties' ongoing relations, each side was strongly suspicious of the other's inten-
tions. After Germany entered the Axis Pact with Japan and Italy, it began negotiations about
a potential Soviet entry into the pact. After two days of negotiations in Berlin from 1214 No-
vember, Germany presented a proposed written agreement for Soviet entry into the Axis. The
Soviet Union offered a written counterproposal agreement on 25 November 1940, to which
Germany did not respond. As both sides began colliding with each other in Eastern Europe,
conflict appeared more likely, though they signed a border and commercial agreement ad-
dressing several open issues in January 1941. Germany broke the pact by starting Operation
Barbarossa: arguably this decision led to Germany's losing the war.
Germany plans the invasion
Joseph Stalin's reputation contributed both to the Nazis' justification of their assault and
their faith in success. In the late 1930s, many competent and experienced military officers we-
re killed in the Great Purge, leaving the Red Army weakened and leaderless. The Nazis often
emphasized the Soviet regime's brutality when targeting the Slavs with propaganda. German
propaganda claimed the Red Army was preparing to attack them, and their own invasion was
thus presented as pre-emptive.
In the summer of 1940, when German raw materials crises and a potential collision with the
Soviet Union over territory in the Balkans arose, an eventual invasion of the Soviet Union in-
creasingly looked like Hitler's only solution. While no concrete plans were made yet, Hitler
told one of his generals in June that the victories in western Europe "finally freed his hands
for his important real task: the showdown with Bolshevism", though German generals told
Hitler that occupying Western Russia would create "more of a drain than a relief for Ger-
many's economic situation." The Fhrer anticipated additional benefits:
When the Soviet Union was defeated, the labor shortage in German industry could be re-
lieved by demobilization of many soldiers.
Ukraine would be a reliable source of agricultural products.
Having the Soviet Union as a source of forced labor under German rule would vastly im-
prove Germany's geostrategic position.
Defeat of the Soviet Union would further isolate the Allies, especially the United King-
dom.
[citation needed]
The German economy needed more oil and controlling the Baku Oilfields would achieve
this; as Albert Speer, the German Minister for Armaments and War Production, later said
in his interrogation, "the need for oil certainly was a prime motive" in the decision to inva-
de.
On 5 December 1940, Hitler received military plans for the invasion, and approved them all,
with the start scheduled for May 1941. On 18 December, Hitler signed War Directive No. 21 to
the German High Command for an operation now codenamed "Operation Barbarossa" sta-
ting: "The German Wehrmacht must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick cam-
paign." The operation was named after Emperor Frederick Barbarossa of the Holy Roman
Empire, a leader of the Third Crusade in the 12th century. The invasion was set for 15 May
1941. The plan for Barbarossa assumed that the Wehrmacht would emerge victorious if it
could destroy the bulk of the Red Army west of the Western Dvina and Dnieper Rivers. This
assumption will be proven fatally wrong less than a month into the invasion.
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Map 9 Situation in Europe by May/June 1941, at the end of the Balkans Campaign and imme-
diately before Operation Barbarossa
In a 1978 essay "Das Russlandbild der fhrenden deutschen Militrs" ("The Picture of Russia
held by the Leadership of the German Military"), the German historian Andreas Hillgruber
examined the views about the Soviet Union held by the German military elite in the period
June 1940 to June 1941. According to Hillgruber, the following were the case:
The Wehrmacht was ill-informed about the Soviet Union, especially the military and the
economy.
Because of the paucity of information, Wehrmacht thinking about the Soviet Union were
based upon traditional German stereotypes of Russia as a primitive, backward "Asiatic"
country, a "colossus with feet of clay" that lacked the strength to stand up to a superior op-
ponent.
The leadership of the Wehrmacht viewed war with the Soviet Union from an extremely na-
rrow military viewpoint with little consideration given to politics, the economy or culture.
The industrial capacity of the Soviet Union was not considered at all as a factor that might
influence the outcome of a German-Soviet war.
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The average soldier of the Red Army was considered brave and tough, but the Red Army
officer corps were held in contempt.
The Wehrmacht leadership after the victory over France was in a state of hubris with the
Wehrmacht being seen as more or less invincible.
As such, it was assumed that the Soviet Union was destined to be defeated, and that it
would take Germany between six to eight weeks to destroy the Soviet Union.
Hillgruber argued that these assumptions about the Soviet Union shared by the entire mili-
tary elite allowed Hitler to push through a "war of annihilation" against the Soviet Union with
the assistance of "several military leaders", even though it was quite clear to the military that
such a war would violate all standards of civilized warfare and would be waged in the most in-
humane fashion possible.
In the Soviet Union, speaking to his generals in December, Stalin mentioned Hitler's referen-
ces to an attack on the Soviet Union in Mein Kampf, and said they must always be ready to re-
pulse a German attack, and that Hitler thought the Red Army would need four years to ready
itself. Hence, "we must be ready much earlier" and "we will try to delay the war for another
two years."
In autumn 1940, high-ranking German officials drafted a memorandum on the dangers of an
invasion of the Soviet Union. They said Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltic States would end
up as only a further economic burden for Germany. Another German official argued that the
Soviets in their current bureaucratic form were harmless, the occupation would not produce a
gain for Germany and "why should it not stew next to us in its damp Bolshevism?"
Hitler ignored German economic naysayers, and told Hermann Gring that everyone on all
sides was always raising economic misgivings against a threatening war with Russia. From
now onward he wasn't going to listen to any more of that kind of talk and from now on he was
going to stop up his ears in order to get his peace of mind. This was passed on to General
Georg Thomas, who had been preparing reports on the negative economic consequences of
an invasion of the Soviet Unionthat it would be a net economic drain unless it was captured
intact.
Beginning in March 1941, Gring's Green Folder laid out details of the Soviet Union's propo-
sed economic disposal after the invasion. The entire urban population of the invaded land
was to be starved to death, thus creating an agricultural surplus to feed Germany and allo-
wing the urban population's replacement by a German upper class. In the summer of 1941,
German Nazi-ideologist Alfred Rosenberg suggested that conquered Soviet territory should
be administered in the following Reichskommissariates:
Ostland (The Baltic countries and Belarus, extended eastward by about 500 km)
Ukraine (Ukraine, enlarged eastwards to the Volga)
Kaukasus (Southern Russia and the Caucasus region)
Moskowien (Moscow metropolitan area and the rest of European Russia)
Turkestan (Central Asian republics and territories)
Nazi policy aimed to destroy the Soviet Union as a political entity in accordance with the geo-
political Lebensraum idea ("Drang nach Osten") for the benefit of future generations of the
"Nordic Aryan master race" .
We have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down.
Adolf Hitler
Operation Barbarossa was to combine a northern assault towards Leningrad, a symbolic cap-
turing of Moscow, and an economic strategy of seizing oil fields in the south beyond Ukraine.
Hitler and his generals disagreed on which of these aspects should take priority and where
Germany should focus its energies; deciding on priorities required a compromise. While plan-
ning Barbarossa in 19401941, in many discussions with his generals, Hitler repeated his or-
der: "Leningrad first, the Donetsk Basin second, Moscow third."
Hitler believed Moscow was of "no great importance" in the defeat of the Soviet Union, and
instead believed victory will come with the destruction of the Red Army west of the capital.
This will later lead to conflict between Hitler and several German senior officers including
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Guderian, Engel, Bock and Halder, who believed the decisive victory could only be delivered
at Moscow. Hitler was impatient to get on with his long-desired invasion of the east. He was
convinced Britain would sue for peace, once the Germans triumphed in the Soviet Union, the
real area of Germany's interests. General Franz Halder noted in his diaries that, by destroying
the Soviet Union, Germany would destroy Britain's hope of victory.
Hitler had grown overconfident from his rapid success in Western Europe and the Red
Army's ineptitude in the Winter War against Finland in 19391940. He expected victory wit-
hin a few months and therefore did not prepare for a war lasting into the winter. This meant
his troops lacked adequate warm clothing and preparations for a longer campaign when they
began their attack. The assumption that the Soviet Union would quickly capitulate would pro-
ve to be his undoing.
German preparations
When Barbarossa commences, the world will hold its breath and make no comment.
Adolf Hitler
The Germans had begun massing troops near the Soviet border even before the campaign in
the Balkans had finished. By the third week in February 1941, 680,000 German troops were
stationed on the Romanian-Soviet border. In preparation for the attack, Hitler moved 3.2 mi-
llion German and about 500,000 Axis soldiers to the Soviet border, launched many aerial
surveillance missions over Soviet territory, and stockpiled materiel in the East. The Soviets
were still taken by surprise, mostly due to Stalin's belief that the Third Reich was unlikely to
attack only two years after signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The Soviet leader also belie-
ved the Nazis would be likely to finish their war with Britain before opening a new front. He
refused to believe repeated warnings from his intelligence services on the Nazi buildup, fea-
ring the reports to be British misinformation designed to spark a war between Germany and
the USSR.
Spy Dr. Richard Sorge gave Stalin the exact German launch date; Swedish cryptanalysts led
by Arne Beurling also knew the date beforehand, but Sorge and other informers (e.g. from
Berlin Police dept.) had previously given different invasion dates which passed peacefully be-
fore the actual invasion. In addition, British intelligence gathering information through Ultra
warned the Soviet Union of impending invasion several months prior to 22 June 1941.
The Germans set up deception operations, from April 1941, to add substance to their claims
that Britain was the real target: Operations Haifisch and Harpune. These simulated prepara-
tions in Norway, the Channel coast and Britain. There were supporting activities such as ship
concentrations, reconnaissance flights and training exercises. Some details of these bogus in-
vasion plans were deliberately leaked.
German military planners also researched Napoleon's failed invasion of Russia. In their
calculations they concluded that there was little danger of a large-scale retreat of the Soviet
army into the Russian interior, as it could not afford to give up the Baltic states, Ukraine, or
the Moscow and Leningrad regions, all of which were vital to the Red Army for supply rea-
sons and would thus have to be defended.
The strategy Hitler and his generals agreed on involved three separate army groups assigned
to capture specific regions and cities of the Soviet Union. The main German thrusts were con-
ducted along historical invasion routes. Army Group North was to march through the Baltics
into northern Russia, and either take or destroy the city of Leningrad (now Saint Petersburg).
Army Group Center would advance to Smolensk and then Moscow, marching through what is
now Belarus and the west-central regions of Russia proper. Army Group South was to strike
the heavily populated and agricultural heartland of Ukraine, taking Kiev before continuing
eastward over the steppes of the southern USSR to the Volga with the aim of controlling the
oil-rich Caucasus.
Hitler, the OKW and the various high commands disagreed about what the main objectives
should be. In preparing for Barbarossa, most of the OKW argued for a straight thrust to Mos-
cow, but Hitler kept asserting his intention to seize the resource-rich Ukraine and Baltics be-
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fore concentrating on the Soviet capital. An initial delay, which postponed the start of Barba-
rossa from mid-May to the end of June 1941, may have been insignificant, especially since the
Russian muddy season came late that year. However, more time was lost at various critical
moments as Hitler and the OKW suspended operations in order to argue about strategic ob-
jectives.
The Germans also decided to bring rear forces (mostly Waffen-SS units and Einsatzgruppen)
into the conquered territories to counter any partisan activity in areas they controlled.
Soviet preparations
Despite the estimations held by Hitler and others in the German high command, the Soviet
Union was by no means weak. Rapid industrialization in the 1930s had led to industrial out-
put second only to that of the United States, and equal to Germany. Production of military
equipment grew steadily, and in the pre-war years the economy became progressively more
oriented toward military production. Tukhachevsky, one of the prominent military theorist in
tank warfare in the interwar period, lobbied the Kremlin for colossal investment in the re-
sources that were required for production of weapons in mass quantities, and in 1930 he for-
warded a memo to Kremlin, pressing the case for "40,000 aircrafts and 50,000 tanks." In the
early 1930s, a very modern operational doctrine for the Red Army was developed and pro-
mulgated in the 1936 field regulations. The defence expenditures also grew rapidly. By 1933
the defence expenditure had reached 12% of the gross national product, from 5.2% in 1913,
and by 1940 it was at 18%.
On 5 May 1941, Stalin gave a speech to graduates of military academies in Moscow declaring:
"War with Germany is inevitable. If comrade Molotov can manage to postpone the war for
two or three months that will be our good fortune, but you yourselves must go off and take
measures to raise the combat readiness of our forces".
Development of the
armed forces of the
Soviet Union
from 1939 to 1941
1 January 1939 22 June 1941 % increase
Divisions calculated 131.5 316.5 140.7
Personnel 2,485,000 5,774,000 132.4
Guns and mortars 55,800 117,600 110.7
Tanks 21,100 25,700 21.8
Aircraft 7,700 18,700 142.8
According to Taylor and Proektor (1974), the Soviet armed forces in the western districts we-
re outnumbered, with 2.6 million Soviet soldiers versus 3.9 million for the Axis. However,
Glantz reports about 3.8 million as the total force of the Axis in June 1941, of which 900,000
were deployed in the West. The overall size of the Soviet armed forces in early July 1941,
amounted to a little more than 5 million men, 2.6 million in the west, 1.8 million in the far
east, with the rest being deployed or training elsewhere. These figures, however, can be mis-
leading. The figure for Soviet strength in the western districts of the Soviet Union counts only
the First Strategic Echelon, which was stationed on and behind the Soviet western frontier to
a depth of 400 kilometers; it also underestimates the size of the First Strategic Echelon,
which was actually 2.9 million strong. The figure does not include the smaller Second Strate-
gic Echelon, which as of 22 June 1941 was in process of moving toward the frontier; accor-
ding to the Soviet strategic plan, it was scheduled to be in position reinforcing the First Stra-
tegic Echelon by early July. The total Axis strength is also exaggerated; 3.3 million German
troops were earmarked for participation in Barbarossa, but that figure includes reserves
which did not take part in the initial assault. A further 600,000 troops provided by Ger-
many's allies also participated, but mostly after the initial assault.
On 22 June, the German Wehrmacht achieved a local superiority in its initial assault (98 Ger-
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man divisions), including 29 armoured and motorized divisions, some 90% of its mobile for-
ces, attacking on a front of 1,200 km (750 mi) between the Baltic Sea and the Carpathian
Mountains, against NKVD border troops and the divisions of the Soviet First Operational
Echelon (the part of the First Strategic Echelon stationed immediately behind the frontier in
the three western Special Military Districts) because it had completed its deployment and was
ready to attack about two weeks before the Red Army was scheduled to have finished its own
deployment with the Second Strategic Echelon in place. At the time, 41% of stationary Soviet
bases were located in the near-boundary districts, many of them in the 200 km (120 mi) strip
around the border; according to Red Army directive, fuel, equipment, railroad cars, etc. were
similarly concentrated there.
Moreover, on mobilization, as the war went on, the Red Army gained steadily in strength.
While the strength of both sides varied, in general the 1941 campaign was fought with a slight
Axis numerical superiority in manpower at the front. According to Mikhail Meltyukhov
(2000:477), by the start of war, the Red Army numbered altogether 5,774,211 troops:
4,605,321 in ground forces, 475,656 in air forces, 353,752 in the navy, 167,582 as border
guards and 171,900 in internal troops of the NKVD.
In some key weapons systems, however, the Soviet numerical advantage was considerable. In
tanks, for example, the Red Army had a large quantitative superiority. It possessed 23,106
tanks, of which about 12,782 were in the five Western Military Districts (three of which di-
rectly faced the German invasion front). However, maintenance and readiness standards we-
re very poor; ammunition and radios were in short supply, and many units lacked the trucks
needed to carry supplies.
Also, from 1938, the Soviets had partly dispersed their tanks to infantry divisions for infantry
support, but after their experiences in the Winter War and their observation of the German
campaign against France, had begun to emulate the Germans and organize most of their ar-
mored assets into large armour divisions and corps. This reorganization was only partially
implemented at the dawn of Barbarossa, as not enough tanks were available to bring the me-
chanized corps up to organic strength.
The German Wehrmacht had about 5,200 tanks overall, of which 3,350 were committed to
the invasion. This yields a balance of immediately available tanks of about 4:1 in the Red
Army's favor. The most advanced Soviet tank models, however, the T-34 and KV-1, were not
available in large numbers early in the war, and only accounted for 7.2% of the total Soviet
tank force.
The Soviet numerical advantage in heavy equipment was also more than offset by the greatly
superior training and readiness of German forces. The Soviet officer corps and high com-
mand had been massacred in Stalin's Great Purge (19361938). Of 90 generals arrested, only
six survived the purges, as did only 36 of 180 divisional commanders, and just seven out of 57
army corps commanders. In total, some 30,000 Red Army personnel were executed, while
more were deported to Siberia and replaced with officers deemed more "politically reliable."
Three of the five pre-war marshals and about two thirds of the corps and division comman-
ders were shot. This often left younger, less experienced officers in their places; for example,
in 1941, 75% of Red Army officers had held their posts for less than one year. The average So-
viet corps commander was 12 years younger than the average German division commander.
These officers tended to be very reluctant to take the initiative and often lacked the training
necessary for their jobs.
The number of aircraft was also heavily in the Soviets' favor. However, Soviet aircraft were
largely obsolete, and Soviet artillery lacked modern fire control techniques. Most Soviet units
were on a peacetime footing, explaining why aviation units had their aircraft parked in closely
bunched neat rows, rather than dispersed, making easy targets for the Luftwaffe in the first
days of the conflict. Prior to the invasion the VVS (Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily, Soviet Air For-
ce) was forbidden to shoot down Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft, despite hundreds of pre-
war incursions into Soviet airspace.
The Soviet war effort in the first phase of the Eastern front war was severely hampered by a
shortage of modern aircraft. The Soviet fighter force was equipped with large numbers of ob-
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solete aircraft, such as the I-15 biplane and the I-16. In 1941, the MiG-3, LaGG-3 and Yak-1
were just starting to roll off the production lines, but were far inferior in all-round performan-
ce to the Messerschmitt Bf 109 or later, the Fw 190, when it entered operations in September
1941. Few aircraft had radios and those that were available were unencrypted and did not
work reliably. The poor performance of the VVS during the Winter War with Finland had in-
creased the Luftwaffe's confidence that the Soviets could be mastered. The standard of flight
training had been accelerated in preparation for a German attack that was expected to come
in 1942 or later. But Soviet pilot training was extremely poor. Order No 0362 of the People's
Commissar of Defense, dated 22 December 1940, ordered flight training to be accelerated
and shortened. Incredibly, while the Soviets had 201 MiG-3s and 37 MiG-1s combat ready on
22 June 1941, only four pilots had been trained to handle these machines.
The Red Army was dispersed and unprepared, and units were often separated and without
transportation to concentrate prior to combat. Although the Red Army had numerous, well-
designed artillery pieces, some of the guns had no ammunition. Artillery units often lacked
transportation to move their guns. Tank units were rarely well-equipped, and also lacked trai-
ning and logistical support. Maintenance standards were very poor. Units were sent into com-
bat with no arrangements for refueling, ammunition resupply, or personnel replacement. Of-
ten, after a single engagement, units were destroyed or rendered ineffective. The army was in
the midst of reorganizing the armor units into large tank corps, adding to the disorganization.
As a result, although on paper the Red Army in 1941 seemed at least the equal of the German
army, the reality in the field was far different; incompetent officers, as well as partial lack of
equipment, insufficient motorized logistical support, and poor training placed the Red Army
at a severe disadvantage.
In August 1940 British intelligence had received hints of German plans to attack the Soviets
only a week after Hitler informally approved the plans for Barbarossa. Stalin's distrust of the
British led to his ignoring the warnings, believing it to be a trick designed to bring the Soviet
Union into the war. In the spring of 1941, Stalin's own intelligence services and American in-
telligence made regular and repeated warnings of an impending German attack. However,
Stalin chose to ignore these warnings. Although acknowledging the possibility of an attack in
general and making significant preparations, he decided not to run the risk of provoking Hi-
tler. He also had an ill-founded confidence in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which had been
signed just two years before. Last, he also suspected the British of trying to spread false ru-
mours in order to trigger a war between Germany and the USSR. Consequently, the Soviet
border troops were not put on full alert and were sometimes even forbidden to fire back wit-
hout permission when attackedthough a partial alert was implemented on 10 Aprilthey
were simply not ready when the German attack came.
Enormous Soviet forces were massed behind the western border in case the Germans did at-
tack. However, these forces were very vulnerable due to changes in the tactical doctrine of the
Red Army. In 1938, it had adopted, on the instigation of General Pavlov, a standard linear de-
fence tactic on a line with other nations. Infantry divisions, reinforced by an organic tank
component, would be dug in to form heavily fortified zones. Then came the shock of the Fall
of France. The French Army, considered the strongest in the world, was defeated in a mere
six weeks. Soviet analysis of events, based on incomplete information, concluded that the co-
llapse of the French was caused by a reliance on linear defence and a lack of armored reser-
ves.
The Soviets decided not to repeat these mistakes. Instead of digging in for linear defence, the
infantry divisions would henceforth be concentrated in large formations. Most tanks would
also be concentrated into 29 mechanized corps, each with over 1031 tanks. Should the Ger-
mans attack, their armoured spearheads would be cut off and wiped out by the mechanized
corps. These would then cooperate with the infantry armies to drive back the German in-
fantry, vulnerable in its approach march. The Soviet left wing, in Ukraine, was to be enor-
mously reinforced to be able to execute a strategic envelopment: after destroying German
Army Group South, it would swing north through Poland in the back of Army Groups Centre
and North. With the complete annihilation of the encircled German Army thus made inevi-
80/138
table, a Red Army offensive into the rest of Europe would follow.
The Soviet offensive plans theory
Immediately after the German invasion of the USSR, Adolf Hitler put forward a thesis that
the Red Army made extensive preparations for an offensive war in Europe, thus justifying the
German invasion as a pre-emptive strike. After the war this view was brought forward by so-
me Wehrmacht leaders, like Wilhelm Keitel.
This thesis was reiterated in the 1980s based on the analysis of circumstantial evidence.
Thus, it has been found that a proposal was drawn up by Zhukov and signed by Vasilevsky
and Vatutin suggesting secret mobilization and deploying Red Army troops on the Western
border, under the cover of training. The proposed operation's objective was to cut Germany
off from its allies, and especially Romania with its oilfields that Germany needed to conduct
the war.
According to Viktor Suvorov, Stalin planned to use Germany as a proxy (the "Icebreaker")
against the West. Stalin's idea was to fuel Hitler's aggressive plans against Europe, and only
after the countries had fought each otherand exhausted themselves to some extentwould
the USSR make their strike. For this reason Stalin provided significant material and political
support to Adolf Hitler, while at the same time preparing the Red Army to "liberate" the who-
le of Europe from Nazi occupation. Suvorov argued that German Barbarossa actually was a
pre-emptive strike that capitalized on the Soviet troop concentrations immediately on the
1941 borders. Some others who support the idea that Stalin prepared to attack, like Mikhail
Meltyukhov, reject this part of Suvorov's theory, arguing that both sides prepared for attack
on their own, not in response to the other side's preparations.
Although this thesis has drawn the attention of the general public in some countries, and has
been supported by some historians (examples include Vladimir Nevezhin, Boris Sokolov, Va-
leri Danilov, Joachim Hoffmann and Mark Solonin), it has not been accepted by many wes-
tern historians
The invasion
The Frontier Battles (22 June 1941 3 July 1941)
At 03:15 on Sunday, 22 June 1941, the Axis bombed major cities in Soviet-occupied Poland. It
is hard to pinpoint the opposing sides' strength in this initial phase, as most German figures
include reserves allocated to the East but not yet committed, as well as several other compa-
rability issues between the German and USSR's figures. Roughly three million Wehrmacht
troops went into action on 22 June, and they faced slightly fewer Soviet troops in the border
Military Districts. The contribution of the German allies would generally not make itself felt
until later. The surprise was complete: though the Stavka, alarmed by reports that Wehr-
macht units were approaching the border, had at 00:30 ordered that the border troops be
warned that war was imminent, only a small number of units were alerted in time.
At around noon June 22 1941 the news of the invasion was broadcast to the population by
Molotov, as follows:
Citizens and Citizenesses of the Soviet Union! Today, at four o'clock in the morning, without
addressing any grievances to the Soviet Union, without declaration of war, German forces fell
on our country, attacked our frontiers in many places and bombed out cities... an act of trea-
chery unprecedented in the history of civilized nations... The Red Army and the whole nation
will wage a victorious Patriotic War for our beloved country, for honour, for liberty.. Our cau-
se is just. The enemy will be beaten. Victory will be ours.
By calling upon the population's devotion to their nation rather than the Party, Molotov
struck a patriotic chord while allowing a stunned people to absorb the shattering news. The
invasion did not come as a surprise to Stalin but he was completely astounded.
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Map 10 Frontier Battles Army Group North
It was not until 3 July before Stalin addressed the nation for the first time since the start of
the German invasion, and just like Molotov's announcement of the war on 22 June, he called
for a "patriotic war... of the entire Soviet people".
In Germany, on the morning of 22 June, Goebbels announced the invasion to the waking na-
tion in a radio broadcast:
At this moment a march is taking place that, for its extent, compares with the greatest the
world has ever seen. I have decided today to place the fate and future of the Reich and our
people in the hands of our soldiers. May God aid us, especially in this fight.
Later the same morning, Hitler proclaimed to colleagues, "before three months have passed,
we shall witness a collapse of Russia, the like of which has never been seen in history."
Aside from the roughly 3.2 million German ground troops engaged in, or earmarked for the
Eastern Campaign, about 500.000 Romanian, Hungarian, Slovakian, Croatian, and Italian
troops accompanied the German forces, while the Army of Finland made a major contribu-
tion in the north. The 250th Spanish "Blue" Infantry Division was a formation of volunteered
Spanish Falangists and Nazi sympathisers.
Luftwaffe reconnaissance units worked frantically to plot troop concentration, supply dumps,
and airfields, and mark them for destruction. The Luftwaffe's task was to neutralize the So-
viet Air Force. This was not achieved in the first days of operations, despite the Soviets having
concentrated aircraft in huge groups on the permanent airfields rather than dispersing them
on field landing strips, making them ideal targets. The Luftwaffe claimed to have destroyed
1,489 aircraft on the first day of operations. Hermann GringChief of the Luftwaffedis-
trusted the reports and ordered the figure checked. Picking through the wreckages of Soviet
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airfields, the Luftwaffe's figures proved conservative, as over 2.000 destroyed Soviet aircraft
were found. The Luftwaffe lost 35 aircraft on the first day of combat. The Germans claimed to
have destroyed only 3.100 Soviet aircraft in the first three days. In fact Soviet losses were far
higher; according to Russian historian Viktor Kulikov, some 3.922 Soviet aircraft had been
lost. The Luftwaffe had achieved air superiority over all three sectors of the front, and would
maintain it until the close of the year. The Luftwaffe could now devote large numbers of its
Geschwader (also see Luftwaffe Organization) to support the ground forces.
Invasion musical theme
Each German invasion of a foreign country had an official musical theme that was frequently
played for the purposes of Nazi propaganda over the totally government controlled radio sta-
tions after the invasion was officially announced to whip up enthusiasm for the military ope-
ration among the German population. The theme song for Operation Barbarossa was Les pre-
ludes by Franz Liszt.
Army Group North
CHRONOLOGY
November 1939-March 1940 Russo-Finnish Winter War
1940
5 August General Marcks completes his Operationsentwurf Ost.
7 August OKW completes Aufbau Ost.
12-13 November Molotov visits Berlin.
18 November Soviets learn German invasion includes attack on Leningrad.
28 November-3 December Paulus hosts Barbarossa wargames.
5 December Hitler approves basic plan.
17-20 December Barbarossa logistical wargames.
18 December Fuhrer Directive 21 issued.
23 December-13 January, 1941 Kremlin command conferences and wargames; another
shake-up within Soviet high command.
1941
31 January Aufmarschanweisung Ost published.
25-27 May Finnish Chief of Staff visits OKW.
12 June Kriegsmarine begins mining Baltic.
22 June Barbarossatag. German invasion begins. Soviet
Military Districts become fronts.
24-29 June Battle of Raseiniai, XLI Panzer Corps against
12th Mechanized Corps.
26 June LVI Panzer Corps captures Dunaburg bridgehead.
29 June-6 July Mountain Corps Norway's first attack across Litsa River.
30 June Sobennikov replaces Kuznetsov as commander of
the Northwest Front.
1 July XXXVI Corps and Finns attack at Salla.
9 July Piadyshev takes command of LOG.
10 July Voroshilov arrives at Northwest Direction; Finns attack
in Karelia north of Lake Ladoga.
13-17 July Mountain Corps Norway's second attack across Litsa River.
14 July 6th Panzer Division achieves bridgehead over the River Narva.
14-18 July 11th Army counterattack against LVI Panzer Corps at Soltsy.
19 July Fuhrer Directive 33 issued.
21 July Hitler visits Army Group North headquarters.
23 July Supplement to Fuhrer Directive issued.
30 July Fuhrer Directive 34 published.
31 July Finns attack in Karelia south of Lake Ladoga.
8-10 August German general offensive on Luga River begins.
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12 August Supplement to Fuhrer Directive 34 issued; 11th, 27th, 34th, 48th Armies attack
Sixteenth Army at Staraya Russa.
19 August LVI Panzer Corps counterattacks to Staraya
Russa. 22 August Hitler issues Denkschrift ending high command debate.
26 August LVII Panzer from Army Group Center captures Velikie Luki.
28 August Tallinn falls to XLI I Corps.
29 August Vyborg taken by Finnish IV Corps.
1 September XXXVI Corps and Finns unite at Allakurtti,
2 September Von Brauchitsch and Haider visit Army Group North headquarters.
8 September Finns reach Svir River; XXXIX Panzer Corps captures Shlisselburg encircling
Leningrad.
8-20 September Mountain Corps Norway's third attack across Litsa River.
9 September Zhukov arrives in Leningrad; XLI Panzer Corps renews assault toward Kras-
nogvardeysk.
14 September Amphibious assault on Muhu Island.
15 September Germans assault Saaremaa Island.
16 September XLI Panzer Corps occupies Strelnya, 8th Army cut off from Leningrad.
22 September Germans issue directive on starvation of Leningrad.
25 September Frontlines around Leningrad essentially solidify for duration of siege.
1 October Finnish VII Corps takes Petrozavodsk.
12 October Attack of Hiiumaa Island.
16 October XXXIX Panzer Corps begins attack toward Tikhvin.
26 October Von Leeb visits the Fuhrer's Headquarters.
8 November Tikhvin falls.
12 November 52nd Army counterattack at Volkhov.
15 November Finnish Group "F" links up on Kandalaksha axis.
19 November 4th Army launches attack to recapture Tikhvin.
6 December Finnish II Corps and Group "O" take Medvezh'yegorsk.
7 December Germans evacuate Tikhvin.
Mid-December Frontlines stabilize on Volkhov River.
1942
16 January Hitler relieves von Leeb as Army Group North Commander.
Opposite Army Group North were two Soviet armies. The Wehrmacht OKH thrust the 4th
Panzer Group, with a strength of 600 tanks, at the junction of the two Soviet armies in that
sector. The 4th Panzer Group's objective was to cross the Neman and Daugava Rivers which
were the two largest obstacles in the advance to Leningrad. On the first day, the tanks crossed
the River Neman and penetrated 50 mi (80 km). Near Raseiniai, the armoured units were
counterattacked by 300 tanks of the 3rd and 12th Soviet Mechanized Corps. It took four days
for the Germans to encircle and destroy the Soviet armour who lacked fuel, ammunition and
coordination. By the end of the first week the Soviet Mechanized Corps had lost 90% of its
strength. The Panzer Groups then crossed the Daugava near Daugavpils. The Germans were
now within striking distance of Leningrad. However, due to their deteriorated supply situa-
tion, Hitler ordered the Panzer Groups to hold their position while the infantry formations
caught up. The orders to hold would last over a week, giving time for the Soviets to build up a
defence around Leningrad and along the bank of the Luga River. Further complicating the So-
viet position, on 22 June the anti-Soviet June Uprising in Lithuania began, and on the next
day an independent Lithuania was proclaimed. An estimated 30,000 Lithuanian rebels enga-
ged Soviet forces, joined by ethnic Lithuanians from the Red Army. As the Germans reached
further north, armed resistance against the Soviets broke out in Estonia as well. The "Battle
of Estonia" ended on 7 August, when the 18th Army reached the Gulf of Finland coast.
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Army Group Centre
CHRONOLOGY
1941
February 20 Goring creates Luftwaffe planning staff for Barbarossa.
June 22-30 Battle for Fortress Brest.
June 23-25 Boldin's counterattack at Grodno.
June 24 LVII Panzer Corps captures Vilnius.
June 28-29 20th & 18th Panzer Divisions close Minsk Kessel.
June 30 Hoth and Guderian confer. OKH directs Von Bock to advance on Smolensk.
July 3-27 Von Kluge commands Fourth Panzer Army.
July 4 3rd Panzer Division captures Dnepr bridge at Rogatchev.
July 8 20th Panzer Division captures Dvina bridge at Ulla.
July 12 Stavka orders Timoshenko to organize counterattacks toward Bobruisk and prepare
defense of Mogilev.
July 15 7th Panzer Division captures Yartsevo, isolating Smolensk.
July 16 29th Motorized Division enters Smolensk, completing "loose" encirclement.
July 17-27 Battle for Mogilev after Soviets frustrate initial German attempts to lever
River Dnepr.
July 20 10th Panzer Division occupies Yelnia.
July 21-July 22 Luftwaffe initiates bombing of Moscow.
July 23-August 7 Timoshenko counteroffensive - Group Kachalov
July 24-27 Timoshenko counteroffensive - Groups Kalinin & Khomenko, plus Gorodovikov's
cavalry raid.
July 29-31 Timoshenko counteroffensive - Group Maslinnikov.
August 3 IX Army & XXIV Panzer Corps encircle Roslavl.
August 5 Germans consider battle for Smolensk to be over.
August 11 Soviets begin general offensive around Yelnia.
August 19 XXIV Panzer Corps plus VII & XIII Army Corps capture Gomel.
September 6 Soviets re-occupy Yelnia. Hitler issues his Directive 35.
September 7 XIII, XLIII & XXXV Army Corps capture Chernigov.
September 10 Stavka instructs forces before Moscow to transition to defense.
September 30 & October 2 Army Group Center begins Operation Typhoon.
October 7 7th & 10th Panzer Divisions close Viazma Kessel. Beginning of rasputitsa, and
first snowfalls.
October 8 XLVII Panzer Corps & LI 11 Army Corps close Bryansk Kessel.
October 8, 9 & 19 Soviets issue various directives on defense of Moscow.
October 11-16 First battle of Mozhaisk line ends in stalemate. Town of Mozhaisk falls on
19th.
October 13 Kaluga falls.
October 14 1st Panzer Division enters Kalinin.
November 13 Haider hosts conference of Ostheer chiefs of staff at Orsha.
November 14 & 16 November Zhukov launches pre-emptive attacks against Army Group
Center.
November 15 Von Bock's left wing begins Operation Volga Reservoir.'
November 18 Guderian launches final assault south of Moscow.
November 22 Klin falls.
November 25 17th Panzer Division reaches Kashira - Guderian's farthest advance.
Army Group Centre was composed of 9th Army, 2nd Army, 2nd Panzer Group, 3rd Panzer
Group; and other rear, reserve, and headquarter armies. Opposite Army Group Centre were
four Soviet armies: the 3rd, 4th, 10th and 11th Armies.
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Map 11 Frontier Battles Army Group Center
The Soviet Armies occupied a salient that jutted into German occupied Polish territory with
the Soviet salient's center at Biaystok. Beyond Biaystok was Minsk, the capital of Byelorus-
sian Soviet Socialist Republic and a key railway junction. Army Group Centre's two Panzer
Groups' goal was to meet at Minsk, denying the Red Army an escape route from the salient.
The 3rd Panzer Group broke through the junction of two Soviet Fronts in the north of the sa-
lient, and crossed the River Neman while the 2nd Panzer Group crossed the Bug River river
in the South. As the Panzer Groups attacked, the 9th and 2nd of Armies of Army Group Cen-
tre struck at the salient, eventually encircling Soviet troops at Biaystok.
Stavka at first failed to grasp the dimensions of the catastrophe that had befallen the Soviet
Union. Marshall Timoshenko ordered all Soviet forces to launch a general counter-offensive,
but with supply and ammunition dumps destroyed, and complete collapse of communication,
the uncoordinated attacks failed. Zhukov signed the infamous Directive of People's Commis-
sariat of Defence No. 3, under pressure from Stalin as he later claimed, which ordered the
Red Army to start an offensive. He commanded the troops "to encircle and destroy the enemy
grouping near Suwaki and to seize the Suwaki region by the evening of 26 June" and "to en-
circle and destroy the enemy grouping invading Vladimir-Volynia and Brody direction" and
even "to seize the Lublin region by the evening of 24 June" This maneuver failed, and disorga-
nized Red Army units were soon destroyed by the Wehrmacht.
On 27 June, 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups met up at Minsk, advancing 200 mi (320 km) into
Soviet territory and a third of the way to Moscow. In the vast pocket between Minsk and the
Polish border, the remnants of thirty-two Soviet Rifle divisions, eight Tank, Motorized, Ca-
valry and Artillery divisions were encircled. By 3 July, three encircled Soviet Armies (3rd, 4th
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and 10th) were destroyed in the vicinity of Minsk. Hitler had believed that the Red Army
would collapse if the Wehrmacht could destroy the bulk of the their forces west of the Wes-
tern Dvina and Dnieper Rivers. However after the victory at Minsk, as Army Group Center
reached Western Dvina and Dnieper Rivers, they encountered another 5 Soviet Armies (16th,
19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd). Three of these Soviet Armies (16th, 19th, and 20th) were quickly
encircled and eventually decimated in the vicinity of Smolensk, while the other two were seve-
rely weakened. However, these successes came at very steep cost for the Wehrmacht. Accor-
ding to Halder the chief of the OKH General Staff, by 2 August Army Group Centre had lost
74,500 men and received only 23,000 as replacement since the start of the campaign. Later
still, by 28 August Halder recorded that the Panzer divisions of the 2nd and 3rd Panzer
Groups were operating with an average tank strength of 45%, with the 7th Panzer Division
the lowest at only strength of 24%.
Army Group South
CHRONOLOGY
1940
2 June Hitler tells von Rundstedt about eastern campaign.
18 June Haider sets up Eastern Front Study Group.
31 July Hitler briefs generals on his intent to invade USSR.
5 August Marcks completes his plan.
7 August OKW completes "Aufbau Ost."
October-May 1941 Luftwaffe aerial reconnaissance over the USSR.
Mid-October Stalin redirects Soviet main effort from Moscow to the Ukraine.
12-13 November Molotov visits Berlin.
28 November-3 December Paulus hosts Barbarossa wargames.
5 December Hitler approves basic plan.
18 December Fuhrer Directive 21 issued,
23 December-13 January 1941 Kremlin command conferences and wargames; another
shake-up within Soviet high command.
1941
31 January "Aufmarschweisung" adds Rumania to Barbarossa planning.
30 March Hitler describes Barbarossa to 250 generals as a "struggle of two world views."
6 April Germans begin Balkans campaign.
23 May Soviets call up 1905-1918 reservists, establish martial law.
30 May Mussolini establishes a corps for action in the USSR although Germans have not of-
ficially told Italy about Barbarossa.
6 June "Commissar Order" issued.
14 June Hitler clarifies Barbarossa objectives to Wehrmacht leaders: Leningrad, the Uk-
raine, Donbas and Caucasus. Moscow is not included.
20 June Rumanians first officially briefed on Barbarossa.
22 June Barbarossatag; Soviet Military Districts become Fronts.
23 June Stavka created.
24 June First Panzer Group passes through Sixth Army; Kiponos' counterattacks begin. 27
June Unattributed bombing brings Hungary into war.
29 June 1 st Mountain Division enters L'vov.
2 July Operation Munich crosses Rumanian border.
7 July 13th Panzer Division reaches Berdichev.
9 July 14th Panzer Division takes Zithomir.
10 July 13th Panzer Division reaches Irpen River, ten miles from Kiev, rest of III Panzer
Corps close behind; Stavka creates Strategic Direction.
13 July Kirponos begins counterattacks against "Zithomir Corridor."
15 July 26th Army counterattacks at Kanev into First Panzer Group's rear. 17 July XI Corps
crosses Dnestr River.
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21 July Rumanians cross Dnestr; XLVIII Panzer Corps reaches Monastyrishche near Uman.
23 July Soviet counterattack at Monastyrishche.
27 July Seventeenth Army breaks free of Stalin Line, heads for junction with First Panzer
Group.
30 July Sixth Army's first direct assault on Kiev.
3 August 16th Panzer and 1 st Mountain Divisions link up at Pervomaysk, closing Uman
pocket.
5 August Stalin fires Zhukov as Chief of Staff. 7 August 26th Army renews attacks at Kanev.
8 August Uman fighting over; Rumanians close on Odessa; Sixth Army's second attack on
Kiev.
10 August Stavka gives up Dnepr River line. 16 August First Rumanian assault on Odessa.
19 August "LSSAH" takes Kherson; 9th Panzer Division gains bridgehead at Zaporozhe.
20 August Seventeenth Army wins Dnepr bridgehead at Kremenchug.
23 August 5th Army retreats behind Dnepr.
24 August Sixth Army reaches Desna.
25 August Soviets cut off Sixth Army (until 2 September); 13th Panzer Division takes bridge-
head at Dnepropetrovsk.
26 August XVII Corps takes Chernobyl; Tyulenev replaced.
30 August OKH issues order for Kiev Kessel.
31 August Red Army abandons right bank of Dnepr.
7 September Sensing impending doom at Kiev, Kirponos requests permission to give up
Desna line.
9 September Stalin approves Desna move; von Rundstedt orders Eleventh Army to attack
Crimea.
10 September Sixth and Second Armies (Army Group Center) link up; 3rd Panzer Division
reaches Romny; XLVIII Panzer Corps shifted to Kremenchug.
11 September Stalin fires Budenny, Timoshenko becomes commander of Southwest Direc-
tion.
12 September Von Schobert killed at Berisiav.
13 September XXIV Panzer Corps takes Lokhvitsa; XLVIII Panzer Corps fighting for
Lubny.
14 September 3rd and 16th Panzer Divisions (ink up at Lokhvitsa, completing Kiev encircle-
ment.
16 September XXIX Corps' final assault on Kiev begins.
17 September Stalin permits evacuation of Kiev; von Manstein takes over Eleventh Army.
20 September Kirponos killed escaping Kiev.
23 September Soviet 9th and 18th Armies begin Sea of Azov battle.
24 September Kiev fighting dies down; LIV Corps begins first assault at Perekop (until
28th).
25 September Von Rundstedt orders First Panzer Group to counterattack behind Soviets at
Melitopol.
29 September Oktyarbrsky suggests to Stalin that Odessa be abandoned.
1 October First Panzer Group attacks toward Melitopol.
2 October Rumanians renew assault on Odessa.
5 October Panzer Groups become Panzer Armies.
7 October XIV Panzer Corps and "LSSAH" meet at Berdyansk and close Melitopol pocket.
10 October Hoth replaces ailing von Stulpnagel.
15 October Soviets abandon Odessa at night.
18 October LIV Corps launches second attack at Perekop (through 26th).
21 October OKH orders Army Group South to Stalingrad and Maikop!
24 October Sixth Army takes Kharkov.
9 November Timoshenko briefs Stalin on Rostov attack plan.
16 November Eleventh Army reaches Kerch.
20 November III Panzer Corps reaches Rostov.
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25 November 56th Army launches counterattack at Rostov.
27 November Timoshenko counteroffensive opens along entire First Panzer Army salient.
28 November Von Kleist orders III Panzer Corps out of Rostov.
30 November Von Rundstedt approves retreat to Mius River.
1 December Von Rundstedt resigns; von Reichenau named replacement.
2 December Hitler visits Army Group and Panzer Army headquarters.
Opposite Army Group South were three Soviet armies, the 5th, 6th and 26th. Soviet comman-
ders reacted quicker and the Germans faced determined resistance from the start. The Ger-
man infantry armies struck at the junctions of these armies while the 1st Panzer Group drove
its armored spearhead of 600 tanks right through the Soviet 6th Army, aiming to take Brody.
On 26 June, five Soviet mechanized corps with over 1,000 tanks mounted a massive counter-
attack on the 1st Panzer Group. The battle was among the fiercest of the 1941 campaign, las-
ting over four days. In the end the Germans prevailed, though the Soviets inflicted heavy los-
ses on the 1st Panzer Group.
With the Soviet counter-offensives' failure, the last substantial Soviet tank forces in Western
Ukraine had been decimated, and the Red Army assumed a defensive posture, focusing on
strategic withdrawal under severe pressure. The Soviet air arm, the VVS, lost 1,561 aircraft
over Kiev. The battle was a huge tactical victory, but Hitler considered it a strategic one. No-
netheless, it had drawn the German forces away from an early offensive against Moscow, and
had delayed further German progress by 11 weeks. General Kurt von Tippelskirch later noted,
"The Russians had indeed lost a battle, but they won the campaign".
Summary of the first phase
By the end of the first week, all three German Army Groups had achieved major campaign ob-
jectives. However, in the vast pocket around Minsk and Biaystok, the Soviets were still figh-
ting; reducing the pocket was causing high German casualties and many Red Army troops we-
re escaping. The estimated casualties of the Red Army amount to 600,000 killed, missing,
captured or wounded.
Franz Halder, chief of the OKH General Staff, summarized the achievements made in the ope-
ning phase of the operation in his diary as follow: "The objective to shatter the bulk of the
Russian Army this [western] side of the Dvina and Dnieper has been accomplished... It is
thus probably no overstatement to say that the Russian Campaign has been won in the space
of two weeks."
Battle for Smolensk (3 July 1941 5 August 1941)
On 3 July, Hitler finally gave the go-ahead for the Panzers to resume their drive east after the
infantry divisions had caught up. However, a rainstorm typical of Russian summers slowed
their progress and Russian defenses stiffened. The delays gave the Soviets time to organize a
massive counterattack against Army Group Center. Army Group Center's ultimate objective
was Smolensk, which commanded the road to Moscow. Facing the Germans was an old So-
viet defensive line held by six armies. On 6 July, the Soviets attacked the 3rd Panzer Army
with 700 tanks. The Germans defeated this counterattack with overwhelming air superiority.
The 2nd Panzer Army crossed the River Dnieper and closed on Smolensk from the south whi-
le the 3rd Panzer Army, after defeating the Soviet counterattack, closed on Smolensk from
the north. Trapped between their pincers were three Soviet armies. On 18 July, the Panzer
Groups came to within 10 miles of closing the gap but the trap would not snap shut until 26
July. When the Panzer Groups finally closed the gap, 300,000 Red Army soldiers were captu-
red
[124]
but liquidating the pocket took another 10 days in which time 100,000 Red Army sol-
diers escaped to stand between the Germans and Moscow.
Four weeks into the campaign, the Germans realized they had grossly underestimated Soviet
strength. The German troops had used their initial supplies without attaining the expected
strategic freedom of movement. Operations were now slowed down to allow for resupply; the
delay was to be used to adapt strategy to the new situation.
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Map 12 Army Group South
90/138
Hitler had lost faith in encirclement as large numbers of Soviet soldiers had escaped the pin-
cers. Hitler now believed he could defeat the Soviets by economic damage, depriving them of
the industrial capacity to continue the war. That meant seizing the industrial center of Khar-
kov, the Donets Basin and the oil fields of the Caucasus in the south and a speedy capture of
Leningrad, a major center of military production, in the north. He also wanted to link up with
the Finns to the north.
Fedor von Bock and almost all the German generals involved in Operation Barbarossa, vehe-
mently argued in favor of continuing the all-out drive toward Moscow. Besides the psycholo-
gical importance of capturing the enemy's capital, the generals pointed out that Moscow was
a major center of arms production and the center of the Soviet communications and transpor-
tation system. More importantly, intelligence reports indicated that the bulk of the Red Army
was deployed near Moscow under Semyon Timoshenko for an all-out defense of the capital.
But Hitler was adamant, and issued a direct order to Guderian, bypassing his commanding
officer von Bock, to send Army Group Centre's tanks to the north and south, temporarily hal-
ting the drive to Moscow.
Kiev and Leningrad (5 August 1941 2 October 1941)
By mid-July below the Pinsk Marshes, the Germans had come within a few kilometers of
Kiev. The 1st Panzer Army then went south while the German 17th Army struck east and in
between the Germans trapped three Soviet armies near Uman. As the Germans eliminated
the pocket, the tanks turned north and crossed the Dnieper. Meanwhile, the 2nd Panzer
Army, diverted from Army Group Centre, had crossed the River Desna with 2nd Army on its
right flank. The two Panzer armies now trapped four Soviet armies and parts of two others.
For its final attack on Leningrad, the 4th Panzer Army was reinforced by tanks from Army
Group Centre. On 8 August, the Panzers broke through the Soviet defenses; the German 16th
Army attacked to the northeast, the 18th Army and the Estonian guerilla Forest Brothers clea-
red the country and advanced to Lake Peipus. By the end of August, 4th Panzer Army had pe-
netrated to within 30 mi (48 km) of Leningrad. The Finns had pushed southeast on both si-
des of Lake Ladoga, reaching the old Finnish-Soviet frontier.
At this stage, Hitler ordered the final destruction of Leningrad with no prisoners taken, and
on 9 September, Army Group North began the final push which within ten days brought it
within 7 mi (11 km) of the city. However, the advance over the last 10 km (6.2 mi) proved very
slow and casualties mounted. At this stage, Hitler lost patience and ordered that Leningrad
should not be stormed but starved into submission. Deprived of its Panzer forces, Army
Group Center had remained static and was subjected to numerous Soviet counter-attacks in
particular the Yelnya Offensive in which the Germans suffered their first major tactical defeat
since their invasion began. These attacks drew Hitler's attention back to Army Group Center
and its drive on Moscow. The Germans ordered the 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies to break off
their siege of Leningrad and support Army Group Center on its attack on Moscow.
Before the attack on Moscow could begin, operations in Kiev needed to be finished. Half of
Army Group Centre had swung to the south in the back of the Kiev position, while Army
Group South moved to the north from its Dniepr bridgehead. The encirclement of Soviet For-
ces in Kiev was achieved on 16 September. A savage battle ensued in which the Soviets were
hammered with tanks, artillery, and aerial bombardment. In the end, after ten days of vicious
fighting, the Germans claimed over 600,000 Soviet soldiers captured. Actual losses were
452,720 men, 3,867 artillery guns and mortars from 43 Divisions of the 5th, 37th, 26th and
21st Soviet Armies.
Operation Typhoon (2 October 1941 5 December 1941)
After Kiev, the Red Army no longer outnumbered the Germans and there were no more di-
rectly available trained reserves. To defend Moscow, Stalin could field 800.000 men in 83 di-
visions, but no more than 25 divisions were fully effective. Operation Typhoon, the drive to
Moscow, began on 2 October. In front of Army Group Centre was a series of elaborate defen-
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se lines, the first centered on Vyazma and the second on Mozhaysk.
The first blow took the Soviets completely by surprise as 2nd Panzer Army returning from the
south took Oryol which was 75 mi (121 km) south of the Soviet first main defense line. Three
days later the Panzers pushed on Bryansk while 2nd Army attacked from the west. The Soviet
3rd and 13th Armies were now encircled. To the north, the 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies atta-
cked Vyazma, trapping the 19th, 20th, 24th and 32nd Armies. Moscow's first line of defence
had been shattered. The pocket eventually yielded 673,000 Soviet prisoners, bringing the
tally since the start of the invasion to three million Soviet soldiers captured. The Soviets had
only 90,000 men and 150 tanks left for the defense of Moscow.
The German government publicly predicted the imminent capture of Moscow, convincing fo-
reign correspondents of pending Soviet collapse. On 13 October, 3rd Panzer Army penetrated
to within 90 mi (140 km) of the capital. Martial law was declared in Moscow. Almost from the
beginning of Operation Typhoon the weather had deteriorated. Temperatures fell while there
was a continued rainfall, turning the unpaved road network into mud and steadily slowing
the German advance on Moscow to as little as 2 mi (3.2 km) a day. The supply situation ra-
pidly deteriorated. On 31 October, the German Army High Command ordered a halt to Opera-
tion Typhoon while the armies were re-organized. The pause gave the Soviets, who were in a
far better supply situation, time to consolidate their positions and organize formations of
newly activated reservists. In little over a month the Soviets organized eleven new armies
which included 30 divisions of Siberian troops. These had been freed from the Soviet far east
as Soviet intelligence had assured Stalin there was no longer a threat from the Japanese. With
the Siberian forces came over 1,000 tanks and 1,000 aircraft.
The Germans were nearing exhaustion, while they also began to recall Napoleon's invasion of
Russia. General Gnther Blumentritt noted in his diary:
They remembered what happened to Napoleon's Army. Most of them began to re-read Cau-
laincourt's grim account of 1812. That had a weighty influence at this critical time in 1941. I
can still see Von Kluge trudging through the mud from his sleeping quarters to his office and
standing before the map with Caulaincourt's book in his hand.
On 15 November, with the ground hardening due to the cold weather, the Germans once
again began the attack on Moscow. Although the troops themselves were now able to advance
again, there had been no delay allowed to improve the supply situation. Facing the Germans
were the 5th, 16th, 30th, 43rd, 49th, and 50th Soviet armies. The Germans intended to let 3rd
and 4th Panzer Armies cross the Moscow Canal and envelop Moscow from the northeast. 2nd
Panzer Army would attack Tula and then close in on Moscow from the south. As the Soviets
reacted to the flanks, 4th Army would attack the center. In two weeks of desperate fighting,
lacking sufficient fuel and ammunition, the Germans slowly crept towards Moscow. However,
in the south, 2nd Panzer Army was being blocked. On 22 November, Soviet Siberian units
augmented with the 49th and 50th Soviet Armies attacked the 2nd Panzer Army and inflicted
a shocking defeat on the Germans. However, 4th Panzer Army pushed the Soviet 16th Army
back and succeeded in crossing the Moscow canal and began the encirclement.
On 2 December, part of the 258th Infantry Division advanced to within 15 mi (24 km) of Mos-
cow, and could see the spires of the Kremlin, but by then the first blizzards of the winter be-
gan. A Reconnaissance-Battalion also managed to reach the town of Khimkisome 8 km
(5.0 mi) away from Moscowand captured its bridge over the Moscow-Volga Canal as well as
its railway station, which marked the farthest advance of German forces on Moscow. The
Wehrmacht was not equipped for winter warfare. Frostbite and disease caused more casual-
ties than combat, and dead and wounded had already reached 155,000 in three weeks. Some
divisions were now at 50% strength. The bitter cold also caused severe problems for their
guns and equipment, and weather conditions grounded the Luftwaffe. Newly built-up Soviet
units near Moscow now numbered over 500,000 men, and on 5 December, they launched a
massive counterattack which pushed the Germans back over 200 mi (320 km). The invasion
of the USSR eventually cost the German Army over 210,000 killed and missing and 620,000
wounded in 1941, a third of whom became casualties after 1 October and an unknown num-
ber of Axis casualties such as Hungarians, Romanians and Waffen SS troops as well as co-be-
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lligerent Finns.
This phase of the operation was cut short because of the Russian winter and resulted in the
heaviest loses of the war on the German side. This failure resulted in the end of the Third Ger-
man Reich.
Events
Shirer argues that the fatal decision of the operation was the postponement from the original
date of 15 May because Hitler wanted to intervene against an anti-German coup in Yugoslavia
and Greek advances against Italy's occupation of Albania. However, this was just one of the
reasons for the postponementthe other was the late spring of 1941 in Russia, compounded
by particularly rainy weather in June 1941 that made a number of roads in western parts of
the Soviet Union impassable to heavy vehicles. During the campaign, Hitler ordered the main
thrust toward Moscow to be diverted southward to help the southern army group capture Uk-
raine. This move delayed the assault on the Soviet capital, though it also helped secure Army
Group Center's southern flank. By the time they turned to Moscow, the Red Army's fierce re-
sistance, the mud following the autumn rains and, eventually, snow, brought their advance to
a halt.
In addition, resistance by the Soviets, who proclaimed a Great Patriotic War in defence of
the motherland, was much fiercer than the German command had expected. The border for-
tress of Brest, Belarus illustrates that tenacity: attacked on the very first day of the German
invasion, the fortress was expected to fall within hours, but held out over a week. (Soviet pro-
paganda later asserted it held out for six weeks). German logistics also became a major pro-
blem, as supply lines grew very long and vulnerable to Soviet partisan attacks in the rear. The
Soviets carried out a scorched earth policy on some of the land they were forced to abandon
in order to deny the Germans food, fuel, and buildings.
Despite the setbacks, the German advance continued, often destroying or surrounding whole
armies of Soviet troops and forcing them to surrender. The battle for Kiev was especially bru-
tal. On 19 September, Army Group South seized control of Kiev, and took 665,000 Soviets
prisoner. Kiev was later awarded the title Hero City for its heroic defence.
Army Group North, which was to conquer the Baltic countries and eventually Leningrad, rea-
ched the southern outskirts of Leningrad by August 1941. There, fierce Soviet resistance stop-
ped it. Since capturing the city seemed too costly, German command decided to starve the
city to death by blockade, starting the Siege of Leningrad. The city held out, despite several at-
tempts by the Germans to break through its defenses, unrelenting air and artillery attacks,
and severe shortages of food and fuel, until the Germans were driven back again from the
city's approaches in early 1944. The siege resulted in the deaths of some one million of the
city's inhabitants. Leningrad was the first Soviet city to receive the title of 'Hero City'.
In addition to the main attacks of Barbarossa, German forces occupied the Finnish district of
Petsamo in order to secure its important nickel mines. They also launched a series of attacks
against Murmansk beginning on 28 June 1941, known as Operation Silberfuchs.
Reasons for initial Soviet defeats
"Lenin left us a great estate and we made shit out of it", was how Stalin crisply summarised
the first weeks of the war to his lieutenants. The Red Army and air force were so badly defea-
ted in 1941 chiefly because they were ill-prepared for the Axis surprise attack. By 1941 the
Germans were the most experienced and best-trained troops in the world for the rapid, blitzk-
rieg-style warfare that encompassed the Eastern Front during the second half of 1941.
The Axis had a doctrine of mobility and annihilation, excellent communications, and the con-
fidence of repeated low-cost victories. The Soviet armed forces, by contrast, lacked leaders-
hip, training, and readiness. The officer corps of the Red Army had been decimated by Sta-
lin's Great Purge of 19361938, and their replacements, appointed by Stalin for political rea-
sons, often lacked military competence, which was shown by the difficulty that the Soviet
Union had in defeating Finland in the Russo-Finnish War of 19391940.
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Map 13 German advances during the opening phases of Operation Barbarossa
http://www.panzertruppen.org/amazon/books/ww2/map13.PNG
Of the five marshals created in 1935, only two emerged from the Stalin's purge with their li-
ves; 50 out of the 57 corps commanders were killed, 154 out of the 186 divisional commander
and 401 out of 456 colonels; many other officers were dismissed. Stalin further underscored
his control by reasserting the role of political commissars at the divisional level and below to
oversee and ensure the political correctness and loyalty of the army to the regime. The com-
missars held a position equal to that of the commander but with the authority to counter-
mand his orders.
Nonetheless, the impact of the purges must be seen in context of the military strength of the
armed forces in 1937, which was far from actualizing the goals set by the military reforms that
began in the early 1930s. By 1941 about 80% of the officers dismissed during the purge had
been reinstated. Also, between January 1939 and May 1941, 161 new divisions were activated.
Therefore, although about 75% of all the officers had been in the position for less than one
year by 1941, that was because of the rapid increase in creation of military units, not because
of the purge. Hence it is the combined effect of the purge and the rapid expansion of the army
that led to its dilution.
Much of Soviet planning assumed that in case of a German invasion the main forces of each
side would need up to two weeks to meet each other and Stalin forbade any ideas of a cam-
paign deep inside the Soviet territory. Thus the Axis attack came when new organizations and
promising, but untested, weapons were just beginning to trickle into operational units. Much
of the Soviet Army in Europe was concentrated along the new western border of the Soviet
Union, in former Polish territory that lacked significant defenses, allowing many Soviet mili-
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tary units to be overrun and destroyed in the first weeks of war. Initially, many Soviet units
were also hampered by Semyon Timoshenko's and Georgy Zhukov's prewar orders (deman-
ded by Joseph Stalin) not to engage or to respond to provocations (followed by a similarly da-
maging first reaction from Moscow, an order to stand and fight, then counterattack; this left
those units vulnerable to encirclement), by a lack of experienced officers, and by bureaucratic
inertia.
Soviet tactical errors in the first few weeks of the offensive proved catastrophic. Initially, the
Red Army was fooled by overestimation of its own capabilities. Instead of intercepting Ger-
man armour, Soviet mechanised corps were ambushed and destroyed after Luftwaffe dive
bombers inflicted heavy losses. Soviet tanks, poorly maintained and manned by inexperien-
ced crews, suffered an appalling rate of breakdowns. Lack of spare parts and trucks ensured a
logistical collapse. The decision not to dig in the infantry divisions proved disastrous. Wit-
hout tanks or sufficient motorization, Soviet troops could not wage mobile warfare against
the Axis.
Stalin's orders not to retreat or surrender led to static linear positions that German tanks ea-
sily breached, again quickly cutting supply lines and surrounding whole Soviet armies. Only
later did Stalin allow his troops to retreat wherever possible and regroup, to mount a defense
in depth, or to counterattack. More than 2.4 million Soviet troops had been captured by De-
cember 1941, by which time German and Soviet forces were fighting almost in the suburbs of
Moscow. Until the end of the war, about three million Soviet prisoners were to die from expo-
sure, starvation, disease, or willful mistreatment by the German regime.
In his memoirs, Zhukov summarized the predicament as follows:
two or three years would have given the Soviet people a brilliant army, perhaps the best in the
world [but] history allotted us too small a period of peace to get everything organized as it
should have been. We began many things correctly and there were many things we had no ti-
me to finish. Our miscalculation regarding the possible time of the fascist Germany's attack
told greatly.
Outcome
The climax of Operation Barbarossa came when Army Group Center, already short on sup-
plies because of the October mud, was ordered to advance on Moscow; forward units of the
2nd Panzer Division's 38th Panzer Pioneer Battalion (38PzPi.Abtl.) (armored engineers) ca-
me within sight of the spires of the Kremlin when they reached the rail line just south of the
town of Lobnya, 16 km (9.9 mi) from Moscow, on 1 December 1941. Soviet troops, well sup-
plied and reinforced by fresh divisions from Siberia, defended Moscow in the Battle of Mos-
cow, and drove the Germans back as the winter advanced. The bulk of the counter-offensive
was directed at Army Group Center, which was closest to Moscow.
With no shelter, few supplies, inadequate winter clothing, and chronic food shortages, Ger-
man troops had no choice but to wait out the winter in the frozen wasteland. The Germans
avoided being routed by Soviet counterattacks but suffered heavy casualties from battle and
exposure.
At the time, the seizure of Moscow was considered the key to victory for Germany. Nowadays,
historians debate whether the loss of the Soviet capital would have caused the collapse of the
USSR; but Operation Barbarossa failed to achieve that goal. In December 1941, Germany joi-
ned Japan in declaring war against the United States.
The outcome of Operation Barbarossa was a disaster for the Germans, and the Soviets were
badly damaged. Although the Germans had failed to take Moscow outright, they held huge
areas of the western Soviet Union, including the entire regions of what are now Belarus, Uk-
raine, and the Baltic states, plus parts of Russia proper west of Moscow. German forces had
advanced 1.050 mi (1,.90 km), and maintained a linearly measured front of 1,900 mi
(3.100 km). The Germans held up to 500,000 sq mi (1.300.000 km2) of territory with over
75 million people at the end of 1941, and went on to seize another 250,000 sq mi
(650.000 km2) before being forced to retreat after defeats at Stalingrad and Kursk. However,
the occupied areas were not always properly controlled by the Germans and underground ac-
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tivity rapidly escalated. Wehrmacht occupation was brutal from the start, due to directives is-
sued by Hitler himself at the operation's start, according to which Slavic peoples were consi-
dered a race of sub-human people. This attitude alienated the population, while in some
areas (such as Ukraine) it seems that some local people had been ready to consider the Ger-
mans as liberators helping to rid them of Stalin. Anti-German partisan operations intensified
when Red Army units that had dissolved into the country's large uninhabited areas re-emer-
ged as underground forces, and under the German repressive policies. The Germans held on
stubbornly in the face of Soviet counterattacks, resulting in huge casualties on both sides in
many battles.
The war on the Eastern Front went on for four years. The death toll may never be established
with any degree of certainty. A recent estimate of Soviet military deaths is 8.7 million that lost
their lives either in combat or in Axis captivity. Soviet civilian deaths remain under conten-
tion, though roughly 20 million is a frequently cited figure. German military deaths are also
to a large extent unclear. The most recent German estimate (Rdiger Overmans) concluded
that about 4.3 million Germans and a further 900,000 Axis forces lost their lives either in
combat or in Soviet captivity. Operation Barbarossa is listed as the single most lethal military
operation in world history.
The Soviet Union had not signed the Geneva Convention (1929). However, a month after the
German invasion in 1941, an offer was made for a reciprocal adherence to the Hague conven-
tion. This 'note' was left unanswered by Third Reich officials.
Causes of the failure of Operation Barbarossa
The gravity of the beleaguered German army's situation towards the end of 1941 was due to
the Red Army's increasing strength and factors that in the short run severely restricted the
German forces' effectiveness. Chief among these were their overstretched deployment, a se-
rious transport crisis and the eroded strength of most divisions. The infantry deficit that ap-
peared by 1 September 1941 was never made good. For the rest of the war in the Soviet Union,
the Wehrmacht would be short of infantry and support services.
Parallels have been drawn with Napoleon's invasion of Russia.
Underestimation of the Capacity of Soviet Mobilization
The German High Command grossly underestimated the mobilization potential of the Red
Army. From the onset of the campaign till the end of 1941, the Soviet Union raised 825 divi-
sion-equivalents, tapping into its mobilization pool of over 10 million men . Between the on-
set of the war and the end of June alone, 800,000 men were mobilized; and another 600,000
in July. The plan for Barbarossa assumed that the Wehrmacht would emerge victorious if it
could destroy the bulk of the Red Army west of the Western Dvina and Dnieper Rivers. By 3
July, Army Group Centre had destroyed three encircled Soviet Armies (3rd, 4th and 10th) in
the vicinity of Minsk. And as Army Group Centre arrived on the banks of the Western Dvina
and Dnieper Rivers on 7 July, they discovered another 5 Soviet Armies (16th, 19th, 20th, 21st
and 22nd). By 10 July, it became clear that the assumptions regarding the result of destroying
the Red Army forces west of the two rivers proved patently incorrect. Nonetheless, three of
these Soviet Armies (16th, 19th, and 20th) were quickly encircled and eventually decimated
in the vicinity of Smolensk, while the other two were severely weakened. In just the first six
weeks of the invasion, which is between late June and early August, the Red Army had lost as
many as 1.5 million troops (killed, wounded or capture). But notwithstanding, by 6 August
another row of five Soviet Armies (24th, 28th, 29th, 30th, and Group Iartsevo) were facing
Army Group Centre. Furthermore, unknown to German intelligence, still another row of So-
viet Armies were forming to the rear (31st, 33rd, and 43rd). In comparison, according to Hal-
der the chief of the OKH General Staff, by 2 August Army Group Centre had lost 74,500 men
(killed, wounded, or missing) and had only managed to receive 23,000 replacements. By the
end of August the Red Army losses rose to nearly 3 million (killed, wounded or capture), but
that didn't hinder it from raising more men for the defence of Moscow. By September it beca-
me clear that the mobilization capacity of the Red Army had been severely underestimated.
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Map 14 Eastern Front 1941-06 to 1941-12
http://www.panzertruppen.org/amazon/books/ww2/map14.png
Franz Halder chief of OKH Gerenal Staff wrote in his diary in 1941:
The whole situation makes it increasingly plain that we have underestimated the Russian co-
lossus... [Soviet] divisions are not armed and equipped according to our standards, and their
tactical leadership is often poor. But there they are, and as we smash a dozen of them the Rus-
sians simply put up another dozen. The time factor favours them, as they are near their own
resources, while we are moving farther and farther away from ours. And so our troops, spraw-
led over the immense front line, without depth, are subject to the incessant attacks of the
enemy.
The Red Army proved it could replace huge losses quickly, and was not destroyed as a cohe-
rent force. When divisions of conscripts trained before the war were destroyed, new cons-
cripts replaced them. On average, about half a million men were drafted each month for the
duration of the war. The Soviets also proved very skilled in raising and training many new ar-
mies from the different ethnic populations of the far flung republics. The ability to mobilize
vast (if often poorly trained and equipped) forces rapidly and continually allowed the Soviet
Union to survive the critical first six months of the war.
Faults of logistical planning
At the start of the war in the dry summer, the Germans took the Soviets by surprise and des-
troyed a large part of the Soviet Red Army in the first weeks. When good weather gave way to
the harsh autumn and winter and the Red Army recovered, the German offensive began to
falter. The German army could not be supplied sufficiently for prolonged combat; indeed,
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there was not enough fuel for the whole army to reach its objectives.
This was well understood by the German supply units even before the operation, but their
warnings were disregarded. The entire German plan assumed that within six to eight weeks
they would have attained full strategic freedom due to a complete collapse of the Red Army.
Only then could they have diverted necessary logistic support to fuelling the few mobile units
needed to occupy the defeated state.
German infantry and tanks stormed 300 mi (480 km) ahead in the first week, but their
supply lines struggled to keep up. Soviet railroads could at first not be fully used due to a dif-
ference in railway gauges, and dismantled railroad facilities in border areas. In addition, road
systems that looked impressive on the map, were in reality under-developed. Lack of supplies
significantly slowed down the blitzkrieg.
The German logistical planning also seriously overestimated the condition of the Soviet trans-
portation network. The road and railway network of former Eastern Poland was well known,
but beyond that information was limited. Roads that looked impressive on maps turned out
to be just mere dust roads or were only in the planning stages.
Weather
A paper published by the U.S. Army's Combat Studies Institute in 1981 concluded that Hi-
tler's plans miscarried before the onset of severe winter weather. He was confident in a quick
victory, so he did not prepare properly for a winter warfare in the Soviet Union. Moreover, his
eastern army suffered more than 734,000 casualties (about 23% of its average strength of
3,200,000 troops) in the first five months of the invasion, and on 27 November 1941, General
Eduard Wagner, Quartermaster General of the German Army, reported "We are at the end of
our resources in both personnel and material. We are about to be confronted with the dan-
gers of deep winter."
The German forces were unready to deal with harsh weather and the poor road network of
the USSR. In September, terrain slowed the Wehrmacht's progress. Few roads were paved.
The ground in the USSR was very loose sand in summer, sticky muck in autumn, and heavy
snow in winter. German tanks had narrow treads with little traction and poor flotation in
mud. In contrast, the new generation of Soviet tanks such as the T-34 and KV had wider
tracks and were far more mobile in these conditions. The 600,000 large western European
horses the Germans used for supply and artillery movement did not cope well with this weat-
her. The smaller horses the Red Army used were much better adapted to the climate and
could even scrape the icy ground with their hooves to dig up the weeds beneath.
German troops were mostly unprepared for the harsh weather changes in the rainy autumn
and early winter of 1941. Equipment had been prepared for such winter conditions, but the
severely overstrained transport network could not move it to the front. Consequently, the
troops lacked adequate cold-weather gear, and some soldiers had to pack newspapers into
their jackets to stay warm while temperatures dropped to below 40 C (40 F). While at
least some cold weather uniforms were available, they rarely reached the Eastern Front be-
cause Hitler ordered that supply lines give more priority to shipments of ammunition and
fuel. To operate furnaces and heaters, the Germans also burned precious fuel that was in
short supply. Soviet soldiers, in contrast, often had warm, quilted uniforms, felt-lined boots,
and fur hats.
German weapons malfunctioned in the cold. Lubricating oils were unsuitable for these tem-
peratures, leading to engine malfunction and misfiring weapons. To load shells into a tanks
main gun, frozen grease had to be chipped off with a knife. Soviet units faced less severe pro-
blems due to their experience with cold weather. Aircraft had insulating blankets to keep
their engines warm while parked. Lighter-weight oil was used. German tanks and armored ve-
hicles could not move due to a lack of antifreeze, causing fuel to solidify. The cold was so in-
tense that vehicles needed fires to be lit under the engines before they could be started.
Because few Russian roads were paved, when the rains and snow came in late October and
early November, most of the main roads turned to mud and with a combination of longer
supply lines, the German advance stalled within sight of the spires of Moscow. The Soviet De-
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cember 1941 counteroffensive led primarily by Siberian troops trained for harsh winter com-
bat recently arriving from the east along with the numerous T-34 tanks held in reserve advan-
ced up to 100 mi (160 km) in some sectors, showed that mobile warfare was still possible in
the Russian winter.
When the severe winter began, Hitler feared a repetition of Napoleon's disastrous retreat
from Moscow. He ordered the German forces to hold their ground defiantly in the face of So-
viet counterattacks. This became known as the "stand or die" order. Some advised historians
have argued that this order prevented the Germans from being routed, others contend that
this order restricted Germany's ability to conduct mobile defensive warfare and led to heavy
casualties from battle and cold.
Aftermath
With the failure in the Battle of Moscow, all German plans of a quick defeat of the Soviet
Union had to be revised. The Soviet counter offensives in the Winter of 1941 caused heavy ca-
sualties on both sides, but ultimately lifted the German threat to Moscow. Nevertheless despi-
te this setback, the Soviet Union suffered heavily from the loss of large parts of its army, allo-
wing the Germans to mount another large-scale offensive in the summer of 1942, called Case
Blue, now directed towards the oil fields of Baku. This offensive again failed in the same way
as Barbarossa, the Germans conquering vast amounts of no-mans-land, but ultimately failing
to achieve their final goals with the defeat at Stalingrad. With the now fully operational Soviet
war economy, the Soviet Union was able to simply outproduce the Germans, who were not
prepared for a long war of attrition. This way, the last German all-out offensive in 1943 at the
Battle of Kursk failed. After three years of constant warfare the Germans were exhausted and
so the Soviets were finally able to defeat the Germans decisively in Operation Bagration in the
summer of 1944. This led to a chain of fast Soviet victories which pushed the Germans back
to Berlin in just one year, leading to the surrender of Germany on 8 May 1945.
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Chapter V Rommel and the German 7th Panzer division in France 1940
The Initial Days of the Campaign
The purpose of this paper is to give a detailed account of the first days of the German 7th Pan-
zer Divisions actions during the Campaign in France 1940. The purpose is also to analyse the
impact the division commander, General Erwin Rommel, and his leadership, had on the divi-
sions actions.
Background
With this brief message
3
Erwin Rommel took command of the 7th Panzer Division on Fe-
bruary 10, 1940. Until this moment Rommels career was nothing much to boast about. As
one of many veterans and heroes from the First World War, Rommel in the interwar period
had a hard time making a mark for himself.
4
His extraordinary accomplishments as an infantry leader during World War One left few
marks among the German military society until Rommels book Infantry Attacks was relea-
sed in 1937. Hitler himself read Infantry Attacks and made Rommel the leader of his own li-
feguard during the campaign In Poland. After the campaign in Poland Rommel was asked of
his further wishes and gave the answer that he wanted to command a Panzer Division. Rom-
mel was given the command in the place of the both older and more experienced comman-
ders.
Inevitably, any account of the German 7th Panzer Divisions actions in France, 1940, to a lar-
ge extent involves Erwin Rommel. Nevertheless, Rommel often showed audacity and never
hesitated to take command of a situation no matter how big or small. He was a man of action,
and it seems that he often reacted in a spontaneous and somewhat impulsive manner.
5
His style of command and personality characterized much of the actions of the division.
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The opposing forces
At the time of the campaign in France, Germany did not possess an overwhelming military
strength. The Germans had 135 divisions compared to 151 for the allied side. Germany had so-
me 2500 tanks while the allies had more than 4000. The German tanks were not technically
superior to those of the allies. Only in the air did the Germans have superiority both in
numbers of aircraft and in their technical performance.
The German superiority, instead, lay in their tactics with narrow and deep penetrations. The
Germans only had 10 Panzer Divisions,
6
but they were used with a devastating effect when
they were concentrated on a narrow front.
Moreover, the German Army was of superior quality. Intense training and development in
the interwar period and the recent experiences from the campaign in Poland had turned the
German Army into a magnificent war-machine. Germany was prepared for a short decisive
war and had for years directed her industrial and military resources to prepare for this.
The French Army of 1940 relied heavily on the experiences from World War One.
The French
7
side concluded that the defence would
8
save them from another attack by the
Germans, and the Maginot Line was constructed. France had prepared for a careful, initially
defensive war that would allow her to coax military contributions from former allies, particu-
larly Britain.
9
The morale in the French Army had never quite rehabilitated itself after the First World War.
The enormous losses in manpower and the terrible experiences of the large annihilation bat-
tles had left the French soldiers with a Constant vision of death that penetrated him (the
French soldier) with a resignation which bordered on fatalism
10
The soldiers of the First
World War should have been an important part of the backbone of the French Army of 1940,
but infected by the horrors of Verdun, they were morally bled white.
11
The German Army never suffered quite so much from the horrors of Verdun. This can be due
to the fewer Germans that participated in relation to the number of combatants. Germany al-
so drew totally different conclusions from Verdun than the French did. The Germans conclu-
ded that the stalemate of the First Word War could be solved with the panzer columns, while
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the French constructed large fortifications, such as the Maginot Line.
The plans
The plans on the strategic level and their history are well known.
12
The basic idea with the
move through the Ardennes was to surprise the French and gain a quick victory. The French
considered the Ardennes impregnable. Marshal Ptain in March 1934 stated that the Arden-
nes were impregnable, provided that the French made some special dispositions. This was
not a unique view of Ptain; it was the general view of the whole French Army.
13
The French plan for the Ardennes involved two of their weakest armies, the 9th in the area of
Dinant and the 2nd in the area of Sedan. In addition the Belgians had a division of Chasseurs
Ardennais
14
that were supposed to delay the Germans in the Ardennes and then withdraw to
the area of the upper Meuse and Namur and constitute a part of the main Belgian defence li-
nes.
15
Organization
The 7th Panzer Division was at the beginning of 1940 a comparatively new unit. The division
was created out of the former 2nd Light Division that was converted to a Panzer Division in
the winter of 1939 - 1940. The 7th Panzer Division was initially a part of the 2nd Army Corps,
but was on May 10 at 1600 hours
16
, attached to the 15th Panzer Corps which was comman-
ded by General Hoth. Besides the 7th, the corps also consisted of the 5th Panzer Division.
17
Compared to the older types of German Panzer Divisions, the converted divisions had fewer
tanks and only one panzer regiment instead of two. The only panzer regiment, however, had
more tanks than a regiment in the older divisions.
The staff of a German Panzer Division was small and the operations staff was particularly
small.
18
The division had no assistant division commander and no executive officer in any
component element. There was no chief of staff, but a 1st general staff officer who ran the in-
ternal affairs of the division and coordinated the parts.
19
He also maintained contact with
neighboring units. With a small operations staff, the division commander had a more direct
relationship with his subordinates. This meant that the division commander had a greater op-
portunity to lead from the front of the division.
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Preparations
When the news came about the new divisional commander, Hans von Luck
20
describes how
there were some initial doubts among the officers about Rommels ability as a tank comman-
der: Much as we admired this man we wondered if an infantryman could be a commander
of tanks
21
They soon found out. Rommel had made himself thoroughly familiar with the tactics
22
of
tank warfare. After Rommel took command of the division a period of hard intense training
began. The division was moved to the little village of Heimersheim on the northern fringe of
the Rhoen Mountains. The training was made even more difficult by the severe winter weat-
her. Field exercises were organized in all weathers, and also by night. Rommel made the same
units always work together. In this way the tank people, artillerymen and infantrymen came
to know each other and became coordinated.
The staff of the 2nd Corps provided the intelligence available to the 7th Panzer Division.
23
The information provided outlined a number of enemy units inside the Ardennes. These
units, according to the intelligence, were deployed in two main lines. The line closest to the
German border was manned by the 1st Division of the Chasseurs Ardennais and stretched
from Malmedy to Arlon.
24
The intelligence also provided some details on the Belgian disposi-
tions. The regiments of the 1st Division, according to the German intelligence were deployed:
With the 1st Regiment in the line Bastogne Arlon
25
With the 2nd Regiment in the line Lamerscher Bastogne
With the 3rd Regiment in the line Salm Trois Ponts Bowies Geilig Lamerscher
The second line, according to the Germans, stretched along the river Ourthe from south of
Durbuy to south of Libramont and was manned by parts of the 1st Belgian Cavalry Division.
The possibilities of a strong delaying action by the Belgians, with support of the rich possibili-
ties for demolitions, were also mentioned in the
intelligence.
26
The orders for the attack are dated February 27, 1940. The first part of the corps order deals
with the start of the attack. After the codeword Danzig was given, the 7th Panzer Division
could start the attack over the border into Belgium. The next section of the order deals with
the operational secrecy. It is a good example of the importance the Germans put on measures
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to prevent the attack from being discovered by the French in advance. The order stressed that
sound from engines; light sources and anything that could arouse any suspicion by the Bel-
gians should be avoided.
Then the order outlined the marching routes to the Belgian border and the task for the divi-
sion. The task for the first day of the attack was to break through the Belgian defence lines
and advance to the heights near Samre and also make a crossing over the Ourthe at La Ro-
che.
In the last hours before the start of the attack Rommel wrote a brief letter to his wife:
9 May 1940
Dearest Lu,
Were packing up at last. Lets hope not in vain. Youll get all of the news for the next days
from the papers. Dont worry yourself. Everything will go all right.
27
May 10
On May 10 the border into Belgium was crossed at Hemmeres. In the sector of the 7th Panzer
Divisions planned attack, the opponents in the months before the outbreak of the war had
placed obstacles of all kinds and destroyed some of the roads.
28
Many of the demolitions we-
re undefended and therefore Rommels unit was only delayed in a few places. Many of the de-
molitions could be bypassed by taking another road or by a short move in the terrain beside
the obstacle.
The air support had a major impact.
29
Two Fliegerkorps with some 1500 aircraft, had the
task of preventing any disturbance of the panzer units on their way towards the Meuse. The
achievements of the airmen meant that no serious disturbance from the air against the Ger-
man ground forces was made.
30
The short activity report of the 7th Panzer Division for May 10 only tells of one engagement,
but the complete story of the engagement shows what could have been accomplished from
the Belgian side if the ideas that were shown in the example had been completed. The combat
mentioned in the war archives took place at Chabrehez. The brief writing hides the intensity
105/138
of the combat that delayed the Germans for more than 4 hours. Here two platoons from the
Belgian Chasseurs Ardennais had taken advantage of the terrain and prepared defensive posi-
tions with tank obstacles. The intention was to delay
31
the Germans for as long as possible.
At 1800 hours the leading elements of Rommels division reached the valley east of Cha-
brehez.
32
At the bottom of the valley the Germans from the 7th Motorcycle Battalion found an anti-
tank ditch, and Belgian soldiers were spotted in the village of Chabrehez.
The Belgian soldiers discovered a tank and at first thought it was a Belgian light tank, but
they soon discovered that the tank was German. More tanks appeared and one of them ad-
vanced into the valley to the barricaded bridge over the stream.
A German soldier climbed out of the tank and examined the obstacle. Then the tank turned
around and moved towards Les Tailles. Subsequently, the leading company of the 7th Mo-
torcycle Battalion appeared over the crest and the Belgians opened fire with handguns and a
machine-gun section. The German company deployed and responded. Under the German fi-
re, one of the Belgian platoons was struck with panic and fled. Their platoon commander had
to stop them with a revolver and got them back into their positions.
The initial fighting now broke out in a short and intense action. Under the Belgian fire the
German company deployed and tried to take the valley. An effort to turn the southern flank
was checked by one of the Belgian platoons. The Belgian defence proved too strong and the
commander of the 7th Motorcycle Battalion, Major Steinkeller, decided to await the arrival of
reinforcements. Then the attack could be renewed at dawn on May 11.
When Rommel arrived at Steinkellers command post installed in Les Tailles, he immediately
expressed that the Belgian resistance was to be broken as soon as possible and the advance
towards the Ourthe resumed. Rommel ordered additional units to be sent forward and a
short conference between Rommel, Steinkeller and Colonel Frst, the commander of the 7th
Rifle Brigade took place. Hauptmann Heilbron and Lieutenant Kleinschmidt, commander of
the 1st and 2nd companies of the Motorcycle Battalion also took part.
Rommels plan was to take Chabrehez by a large flanking movement
33
. First the enemy was
to be fixed frontally and distracted from the movement. Then Kleinschmidts company was to
make the flanking movement to the north of Chabrehez and attack the enemy from the rear.
After the conference, the heavy weapons company of the Motorcycle Battalion arrived, deplo-
yed and opened fire on the Belgians. Four light German tanks started to advance against the
Belgian positions. The tanks had problems with the swampy fields at the bottom of the valley
and two of the tanks were immobilized on the fields and one was blocked from further advan-
ce by some trees.
34
106/138
More German reinforcements arrived and the situation for the Belgians started to grow wor-
se. During this fighting, Kleinschmidts company arrived at the edge of the woods at the
height of the village of Chabrehez. The movement was totally unseen by the Belgians and two
of the platoons were ordered to continue the advance to penetrate the village from the west.
The remaining platoon was given the mission to attack the Belgian line in the flank and rear.
The attack could be carried out as intended and in the face of German superiority the Bel-
gians had to give up, although some of them succeeded in withdrawing.
It was 2100 hours when Major Steinkeller reported the capture of Chabrehez and 50 Belgian
prisoners to the division. In Chabrehez the situation was still confused with the Germans fi-
ring at each other, and Major Steinkeller decided to withdraw his troops to Les Tailles.
At 2200 hours Rommel left the battle and headed back in his column. The swampy roads to-
gether with lack of initiative had caused the rear units of the division to virtually come to a
107/138
halt at a great depth from Chabrehez to the German frontier.
As a result of the fighting at Chabrehez and the traffic problems, the 7th Panzer Division was
unable to solve its task for the day. The division lost a number of hours and was behind its ti-
metable. During the days ahead, the division had to make up for the initial delays.
35
May 11
After the fighting at Chabrehez, the advance of the 7th Panzer Division continued on May 11.
That day was a better one for the division.
36
The initial advance from Chabrehez to the north
of La Roche went without much contact with the enemy. At this time the Belgian units had
been ordered to withdraw to the north.
37
The division advanced on three different roads and crossed the Ourthe in three places. In the
south the 7th Rifle Regiment passed the Ourthe at La Roche. In the centre the engineers built
a bridge at Marcourt that was used by the 6th Rifle Regiment, and in the north, at Beffe, the
25th Panzer Regiment forded the river.
West of Waha the lead elements of the division for the first time had contact with French me-
chanized units from the 1st French Cavalry Division. This first encounter with the French
units was brief and when Rommels units plastered the opponent with fire, it led to a hasty re-
treat.
On May 11 Rommel wrote his wife again.
38
May 11 1940
Dearest Lu,
Ive come up for breath for the first time today and have a moment to write. Everything
wonderful so far. I am way ahead of my neighbors. Im completely hoarse from orders and
shouting. Had a bare three hours sleep and an occasional meal. Otherwise Im absolutely fi-
ne. Make do with this, please. Im too tired for more
In the evening the division was deployed with the forward units at the area of Marche-
en-Famenne and the remaining parts in the terrain between Marche-en-Famenne and La Ro-
che.
May 12
The advance continued on May 12 at 0700 hours from the line Marche-en-Famenne Har-
sin. At 0900 hours the northern part of Rommels units, the 25th Panzer Regiment, collided
with French units in the line Haversin Forse. A battle broke out and at 1025 hours the Pan-
zer Regiment broke through the French lines and reached the heights northwest of Leignon
at 1230 hours
39
.
108/138
Further to the south the 7th Rifle Regiment broke through the enemy lines in the area of
Ychippe Nortwest of Chevetogne at 1230. The last part of the advance to the Meuse was co-
vered by the 7th Motorcycle Battalion in the north and parts of the 7th Rifle Regiment and
parts of the 25th Panzer Regiment in the south.
At 2200 hours the 7th Motorcycle Battalion had reached the Meuse in the terrain south
of Houx.
40
Further to the south the 1st battalion of the 7th Rifle Regiment together with
one Panzer Company reached the Meuse in the area of Dinant at 1615 hours.
41
The commander of the 15th Corps, General Hoth, realized that he in Rommel had an opportu-
nity for greater success and he therefore gave Rommel command of one of the panzer regi-
ments of the 5th Panzer Division. The 31st Panzer Regiment was at the head of the 5th Panzer
Division, north of Rommels units. With this additional regiment, two Panzer Regiments
spearheaded Rommels advance.
42
109/138
At nightfall on
43
May 12, Rommels motorized Rifle Brigade had reached the Meuse and the
7th Panzer Division had a firm grip over the eastern side of the Meuse. With a fast move Rom-
mel had hoped to take the bridges over the Meuse before they were blown up, but this did not
succeed.
The 7th Panzer Division now stood before its hardest task so far crossing the Meuse. North
of the units belonging to the 7th Panzer Division, the spearhead of the 5th Panzer Division
reached the Meuse in the area of Yvoir Houx at 1725 hours.
44
These units were under Rom-
mels command at the time. Between 2200 and 2300 hours a motorcycle company from the
5th Panzer Division discovered an old weir and a lock that connected an island to both sides
of the river by the village of Houx.
45
The men from the motorcycle company used the weir
and lock and crossed the river. The enemy discovered what was happening and the Germans
soon took heavy casualties.
When
46
Rommel estimated the situation in the evening, he realized that the situation was
worse than expected. No real foothold on the western side of the river had been taken and the
enemy was firing at everything that moved on the eastern side.
47
110/138
May 13
Rommel gave the order for the Meuse crossing on the evening May 12. It was, in typical Ger-
man style, very brief, only some two typed pages.
48
His intentions were to cross the river in two places:
The 6th Rifle Regiment and the 7th Motorcycle Battalion were supposed to cross the river at
the terrain south of the weir at Houx.
The 7th Rifle Regiment and the Panzer Regiment were supposed to cross the river at the
northern parts of Dinant west of Leffe.
First, the riflemen were supposed to cross the river in rubber boats in several places and seize
a bridgehead on the west side of the river. Then the engineers would build bridges and ferries
to get the panzers over to the western side. On the western side of the river, French units had
prepared their defence. The rapid advance of the Germans had not given the French the time
needed to reach the positions at the Meuse. The defence line was therefore thin. In the north,
the 5th Motorized Division had reached its positions, but its neighbour in the south, the 18th
Infantry Division, had only managed to get six of its battalions into position.
The French defence line was thin, and in the Houx area it got thinner after one of the batta-
lions of the 5th Motorized was moved to the south to strengthen the line
of the 18th Division.
49
On May 13, Rommel was on his feet early. At 0300 hours he was at Houx north of Dinant,
where he left his armoured car and headed for the river. Down by the river the 6th Rifle Regi-
ment tried to cross in rubber boats, but they were held back by intense fire from the other si-
de. At this point Rommel got the idea to set some buildings on fire. He calculated that the
smoke would then give the German infantrymen badly needed cover to make the crossing.
50
Meanwhile, the 7th Motorcycle Battalion had succeeded in taking the village of
Grange (west of Houx). But the riverbank had not been cleared the way Rommel had inten-
ded. He therefore gave the order to clear the rocks on the west bank. Rommel then drove to
Dinant. Arriving there, he found that the 7th Rifle Regiment had succeeded in getting one ri-
fle company across the river, but under the intense enemy fire the crossing equipment had
been shot to pieces and the crossing had to be halted. Rommel realized that he could not get
any more men over at this time. He intended to arrange tank and artillery support and drove
off to the division headquarters. After making the necessary arrangements he drove off to Lef-
fe, just north of Dinant. Here the crossing had been stopped, but the tanks and field howit-
zers Rommel had ordered forward soon arrived and with the covering fire, the crossing got
going again.
51
Rommel took command of the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Rifle Regiment and personally direc-
ted the operations for some time and also crossed the river in one of the first boats.
On the western side of the river Rommel defended himself against a French counterattack to-
gether with one of the rifle companies before he returned to the eastern side of the river.
52
Rommel then drove to the northern crossing point. On the western side of the river, Rommel
could see some additional success by the 6th Infantry Regiment.
In the afternoon things were looking better for the 7th Panzer Division. In the north the cros-
sing was in full motion and some 20 badly needed anti-tank guns had crossed the river. A
company of engineers had also started the construction of an 8-ton bridge. Rommel stopped
the construction and instead ordered the construction of a 16-ton bridge. Rommels aim was
to get parts of the Panzer regiment across as soon as possible. During the construction of the
bridge the pontoons were hit a number of times by enemy fire and at least one of the pon-
toons sank together with a tank. The construction was delayed and at nightfall the first tanks
crossed the river. By the next morning only 15 tanks had crossed.
53
The corps commander, General Hoth, in the evening gave the order that the two bridgeheads
were to be connected the next day, and, through this, the French artillery would be prevented
from affecting the crossingpoints on the river. Rommel did not wait until the next day. He or-
dered the 7th Infantry Regiment to attack during the night.
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May 14
During the night
54
, Colonel Bismarck with the 7th Rifle Regiment had taken the terrain on
the outskirts of the village of Onhaye, west of Dinant. The regiment had wrapped up some
enemy positions in the area surrounding Onhaye.
Down by the river, Rommel worked to get his forces across the river when suddenly, at 0745
hours, he got a message from Bismarck saying that the enemy had surrounded him. At the sa-
me time, radio communications broke down. Rommel immediately decided to relieve Bis-
marck with every available tank.
At 0800 hours, the 25th Panzer Regiment, commanded by Colonel Rothenburg had gathered
some 25 tanks on the western side of the river. The tank-force quickly moved up behind Bis-
marck. With five tanks as support, Rothenburg made an enveloping movement to attack On-
haye from the rear. After some confusion, and with radio communications working again, it
showed that there had been a misunderstanding.
112/138
Probably eingetroffen had
55
been understood as eingeschlossen. During the rest of the
day, intense fighting took place in Onhaye and finally Rommel had to call in close air support
by Stukas to get rid of the stubbornly fighting enemy.
On the evening of May 14, Onhaye was cleared of the enemy and a breakthrough in the enemy
lines was made. The morale of the enemy gave way, and Rommel could continue his attack.
In the evening, the area of Anthe was reached and the enemy had retired to a line running
through Florennes.
May 15
Rommels order for
56
May 15 was to advance in one single long step to Cerfontaine. Rommel
himself rode in one of the leading tanks. As flank protection in the north Rommel had orde-
red the 31st Panzer Regiment from the 5th Panzer
113/138
Division.
57
At 0800 hours Rommel got a message saying that he would have Stukas for close air support
114/138
during the day.
58
Rommel ordered the Stukas into action immediately, just ahead of his
tanks.54When the leading elements of the division reached the village of Flavion, enemy
tanks were spotted in the terrain north of the road.
59
The enemy unit was the French 1st Ar-
moured Division. This division had been advancing from the area of Charleroi since 1600
hours on May 14 for a counterattack. At 2100 hours the French 1st had made a halt in the te-
rrain to wait for the refuelling vehicles that had been delayed due to a mistake by the division
commander.
60
He had ordered the refuelling vehicles to advance in the rear of the divisions column. Stukas
attacked some of them on their way to refuel the French tanks, and a few of them arrived at
Flavion at about 0900 hours the next day, May 15.
The tanks in the French units could have been formidable opponents. The heaviest one, the
Char B1, was very hard to penetrate with the German tank guns. This time though, many of
the French tanks were immobilized from lack of fuel. Another setback of the French tanks
was the lack of radio communications. While the Germans had radios in every tank, only a
few French ones were equipped with sets. Moreover, the French tank crews were not as tho-
roughly trained as the German ones.
61
In the terrain north of Flavion a tank battle broke out at about 1000 hours. The Germans
quickly deployed against the French tanks and fierce fighting broke out. Rommels armour
did great damage to the French division and when the leading tanks of the 31st Panzer Regi-
ment from the 5th Panzer Division emerged, Rommel broke off and left the remaining French
tanks to the newly arrived regiment.
62
Finally, the French division commander, General Bruneau, gave the order to retreat. Of his
original 170 tanks, 36 headed for the French border. The next morning the number was redu-
ced even further to 16.
63
The 7th Panzer Division continued its advance and in the evening reached Cerfontaine. Du-
ring the day Rommels units had destroyed or captured seventy-five tanks, taken 450 priso-
ners and advanced seventeen miles. It was a decisive blow against the French forces.
64
May 16
The 7th Panzer Divisions mission for the day was to break through the extended Maginot Li-
ne.
65
The actual Maginot Line ended at Longwy and the extension was no way near the real
thing. It consisted of minor fortifications and anti-tank ditches that had been built during the
past winter. The sector where the 7th Panzer Division was supposed to attack through the line
was one of the weakest. The French had plans for bigger and stronger fortifications, but these
plans had never been carried out, and in the way of the 7th Panzer Division there were only a
few minor obstacles.
When Rommel was giving his orders for the coming actions, the army commander von Kluge
arrived. He was pleased with what he heard, and soon approved of the plans.
115/138
Rommels intentions
66
were to cross the French border at Sivry. The reconnaissance batta-
lion would advance in a broad formation and the artillery would follow to Sivry. The panzer
regiment would then advance to terrain from where it could cover the fortified line with fire.
Finally, the infantry brigade would take the fortified line and remove obstacles, after which
the panzer regiment would continue its advance.
67
116/138
When the attack started Rommel was in the same tank as the commander of the forward bat-
talion.
68
They passed Sivry and advanced slowly against Clairfayts, which was avoided as the
road was mined. Suddenly a French pillbox was spotted 50 100 m ahead. Beside the pillbox
a number of French soldiers were standing and when the Germans started firing at them they
ran into the pillbox.
69
At the same time, the anti-tank ditch was spotted and it was also disco-
vered that prefabricated steel obstacles blocked the road from Clairfayts.
70
As darkness started to fall, Rommel ordered the advance through the line with the intention
of reaching Avesnes. At the front, the tanks fired on the terrain ahead and the divisional arti-
llery fired at roads and villages further ahead. Rommels intention with this was to prevent
the French from laying mines and placing obstacles on the roads.
In the sharp moonlight Rommel ordered the advance of the tanks and the French were taken
by surprise by the ease with which Rommel was able to break through the fortified line. They
were also surprised by the fact that Rommel, contrary to all rules, launched an attack in the
dark.
71
When the 7th Panzer Division got close to Avesnes the advance was slowed as Rommel sus-
pected that strong French units could defend the city. Finally, he again ordered the advance
to continue at the highest speed. In Avesnes some remaining parts of the French 1st Division
were caught by surprise and fighting broke out. The French succeeded in breaking into the
German columns and several German tanks were destroyed. Finally, a German Mark IV tank
arrived and destroyed the remaining French tanks.
72
After Avesnes was cleared of the enemy Rommel tried to contact the corps staff for further or-
ders, but got no answer. He then decided to continue his advance with the objective of rea-
ching the bridge over the Sambre in Landrecies. The 7th Panzer Division started to run short
of ammunition and the advance continued with silenced guns. When Landrecies was reached
the bridge was taken intact.
73
Epilogue
The 7th Panzer Division continued its successful participation in the campaign. Some hard
fighting remained, but the worst part of the war in France was concluded. The campaign en-
ded on June 22
74
after just six weeks of war. The German Panzer units had played a decisive
role in defeating France. After the campaign in France the 7th Panzer Division saw action on
the Eastern front. Rommel was replaced as division commander, and the division fought all
the way to the end of the war in 1945.
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Figure 22: The advance of the 7th Panzer Division through the extended Maginot Line on
May 16.
Rommels further career continued with the command of the Afrika Korps in Libya where, af-
ter he had taken Tobruk, he was promoted to Field Marshal. The war in Africa also made
Rommel one of the most famous German commanders of all times.
Rommels command of the German forces in Africa ended when he got sick and had to leave
to recover. His next command was to deal with the Italian situation in 1943.
Rommels last command was over Army Group B in France with the task of preventing an ex-
pected allied invasion in Normandy. Before the allied invasion Rommel was wounded and be-
came hospitalized when aircraft attacked the car he was travelling in. Rommels life ended on
October 14, 1944. He was accused of being a part of the conspiracy against Hitler, and
was forced to commit suicide by swallowing a poison capsule.
Rommel as a commander
Rommel was a particularly aggressive commander and led many of the actions of the division
from the front. His experiences from World War One had taught Rommel that the best way to
avoid the chaos of combat was to stay in the place of the main effort and keep the initiative.
Thereby, the uncertainty of war could be reduced. Even when studying Rommel there is often
the impression that many of his decisions were instinctive and impulsive, Rommel was able
to carefully plan his actions if he had the time. He also thought of his decisions on the battle-
field. There are many examples of this in Infantry Attacks. One of many examples can be
found on page 9 where Rommel carefully considered his decision:
Should I wait until other forces came up or storm the entrance of Bleid with my platoon? The
latter course of action seemed proper. The strongest enemy force was in the building on the
far side of the road.
Therefore we had to take this building first. My attack plan was to open fire on the enemy on
the ground floor and garret of the building with the 2nd section and go around the building to
the right with the first section and take it by assault.
75
118/138
The quotation shows that Rommel in fact considered his decisions on the battlefield.
Later information on Rommels planning and decision-making can be found in numerous pla-
ces in The Rommel Papers.
76
In fact, large parts of the book cover Rommels thinking about
operational and tactical issues. In addition, some of Rommels own sketches are included.
77
The maps are good examples of Rommels way of planning before a battle.
In the first days of the campaign in France, Rommel on a number of occasions intervened
successfully in the actions of the division. The first occasion was the fighting at Chabrehez
where Rommel made good use of his expertise in infantry warfare. The division had come to
a halt, hesitating on how to deal with the Belgian defenders, when Rommel arrived and gave
orders for how the attack should be carried out. Rommels intervention probably saved a
number of hours for the division. The delay would have been longer without the swift and de-
cisive attack by the 7th Motorcycle Battalion ordered by Rommel.
Rommels anger over the disorder in the division column at the time of the fighting at Cha-
brehez
78
also meant that the officers of the division became aware of the demands of Rom-
mels leadership.
After this initial setback, less hesitation and more aggressiveness was shown from the divi-
sion.
The next occasion where Rommel intervened directly in the actions of the division was on
May 13 when the division was about to cross the Meuse. Rommel intervened in several pla-
ces. The first one was when the 6th Rifle Regiment was held back by enemy fire. Rommel sho-
wed his tactical brilliance and set some houses on fire to create a smoke screen. The next oc-
casion was when the 7th Rifle Regiment was stopped trying to cross the Meuse.
Rommel personally intervened by arranging fire support and taking command of the 2nd Bat-
talion and the crossing was resumed. Next, Rommel got the crossing north of Dinant going
again and he personally crossed the river and took part in defending against a French counte-
rattack on the western side of the Meuse.
After this, Rommel intervened in the construction of the bridge north of Dinant.
As a result, the division could get across some badly needed tanks during the coming night.
After the crossing Rommel again showed his aggressiveness when he got the message that Co-
lonel Bismarck was surrounded. The message was wrong, but Rommel again showed his dri-
ve when he immediately gathered all available tanks and advanced to rescue Bismarck.
Considering all the occasions of the first days of the campaign when Rommel intervened in
the actions of the division, it feels safe to conclude that he was a decisive factor in the success
of the division.
In all the mentioned examples the situation was bad or had come to a standstill, when Rom-
mel got things moving again. With a less aggressive division commander the 7th Panzer Divi-
sion could have lost 12 hours more at Chabrehez.
At the Meuse, the division could have been stopped for a long period without the decisive in-
tervention from Rommel. At Flavion Rommel showed the ability to think in an operational di-
mension when he left the battle and continued his advance and thereby cut off the French
support lines and created havoc in the rear French units.
To achieve what Rommel did without any former experience of armoured units was an ex-
traordinary accomplishment and showed his military genius. Rommels extraordinary ability
to respond to the tide of battle events and his rapid and assured actions unveiled a master of
manoeuvre that is unmatched even today.
Robert N. Wiegert
The author is a Lieutenant Colonel and is serving r the Swedish National Defence College.
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, R.I.
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120/138
Chapter VI AN ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF
FIELD MARSHAL ERWIN ROMMEL IN THE AFRIKA KORPS
INTRODUCTION
There is no doubt that Field Marshal Rommel was an exceptional leader. He possessed, and
exhibited many qualities required to be an outstanding operational leader.
Why was he then such a seemingly poor one at times? "Operational leadership" is a term that
applies to commanders and their staffs who are concerned with the practical application of
operational art. Operational art is "concerned with both theory and practice of planning, pre-
paring, conducting, and sustaining major operations and campaigns aimed to accomplish
operational or strategic objectives in a theater." This paper will evaluate Field Marshall Erwin
Rommel's operational leadership during his first year of command of the Afrika Korps and of-
fer reasons why he failed as a successful operational leader even though he possessed many of
the qualities required to be an exceptional one.
Throughout my research it became very evident that Rommel failed to do two things: he was
not concerned with the operational logistical support for his forces and he failed to unders-
tand the primacy of policy and strategy. He failed to transition his superior's strategic objecti-
ves into theater operational objectives. Instead, he developed and tried to implement his own
operational objectives thereby trying to force Germany's leadership to accept new strategic
objectives. He tried to attain these operational objectives through tactical means by totally
by-passing the operational art required to accomplish these objectives. These two failures
caused the eventual loss of North Africa and assisted in Germany's overall loss.
Additional faults that Rommel possessed was that he did not effectively coordinate or foster
unity of effort with his Italian allies; and that he personally took command of tactical opera-
tions on numerous occasions, causing confusion and uncertainty among his forces.
The reason Rommel viewed as a great leader is because of his accomplishments as a tactical
leader; however had he been a better operational leader the war in African could well have
turned out very differently than it did.
BACKGROUND
The war in North Africa was going poorly for the Italians. Hitler feared that if the Italians lost
Libya that this would severely affect the Axis alliance, additionally it would free up British for-
ces in Egypt to fight elsewhere, and it would give the British additional airfields in North Afri-
ca that could cause severe damage to German interests. Hitler had no intentions of making
North Africa into another major front especially since his strategic objective was Russia.
What he wanted was to assist the Italians in defending Libya so as to keep them as an ally and
to keep them in the war, and to keep the British troops away from his southern flanks. What
Hitler did not want or need was another strategic objective to further decrease his dwindling
forces. Since Libya was over 1300 miles from Berlin, Hitler needed a commander who could
act semi-independently, who possessed exceptional initiative, stamina, originality and bold-
ness to assist a morally and physically weak ally. Hitler chose Rommel because he had these
qualities. Unfortunately, these same qualities would eventually make him a liability to Hi-
tler's
strategic objective.
Rommel arrived in Tripoli in February, 1941; he immediately began plans for attacking and
driving the British out of Libya. In March, he started his offensive, which lasted until May. He
drove the British toward Egypt, but was held at Tobruk, where the British were well dug in
and fortified. The numerous assaults on Tobruk resulted in great losses for Rommel. Rommel
then withdrew and strengthened his defenses around Tobruk. The British counter attack
from Tobruk was very costly to the British, due to Rommel's intelligence, ingenious use of ar-
tillery, and dug in defenses. The Allied Crusader offensive in November, 1941 caught Rommel
by surprise, and would eventually push Rommel to retreat towards Tripoli. In so many ways
Rommel displayed the qualities of an exceptional operational leader.
121/138
He developed in the Afrika Korps a strong sense of identity, and a feeling of unity. So much
so, that this self confidence became a strong force multiplier, because they knew that under
Rommel they could accomplish anything. To them, Rommel was God. How could they not
idolize Rommel? He was the ideal soldier, fearless, resourceful, tireless, competent. His unre-
lenting energy allowed him to be everywhere and do everything. He was a soldier's general,
fighting along side with them at the front instead of the rear. He had the same effect on his
enemies, who credited him with having supernatural powers. This prompted the British Com-
mander in Chief (Middle East Force) to order his commanders, for psychological reasons, to
stop referring to Rommel as if he was a "superman".
CHARACTER TRAITS
Character is perhaps the most important factor of a successful operational leader.
The personality traits that Rommel possessed were those needed by an operational leader.
The ones that stand out the most were his moral courage, boldness, professional knowledge,
initiative, decisiveness, toughness, ability to motivate, ability to think big, and his leadership
by personal example.
His moral courage was unparalleled. Rommel and his Afrika Korps were credited for fighting
by the rules and for being gentlemen. Rommel refused to obey an order by Hitler to "slaugh-
ter" all enemy troops who were discovered to be on commando missions, even if those troops
were surrendering. Rommel treated all prisoners of war fairly and humanely.
There is no doubt Rommel possessed incredible boldness. This boldness was displayed in the
combat maneuvering and in the personal risks that he exposed himself to daily. An example
of his boldness was the launching of a successful counter offensive in March 1941 against re-
cent British gains at Cyrenaica. He sensed that the British were exhausted and in the process
of reorganizing after their prolonged offensive drive through Cyrenaica. He therefore laun-
ched a counter offensive after being in country for only 6 weeks and with less than half of his
expected forces. Rommel's boldness allowed him to exploit every offensive opportunity that
presented itself to him.
Another example of his boldness was his attack on Mersa Brega. His superiors had ordered
Rommel not to attack Mersa Brega until his second Panzer Division arrived in May 1941.
Rommel however attacked, and conquered it in March 1941 because he reasoned that by May
the enemy's defenses might be impregnable. Rommel's ingenuity and professional knowledge
of his forces was unequaled. Rommel used an old weapon in a new way by using his 88 mm
AA guns with their barrels horizontal in a anti-tank role. This technique proved disastrous for
the British.
Additionally, Rommel developed new battle techniques by using anti-tank guns in the front li-
ne with the tanks, and by using an anti-tank gun line as a defensive surprise.
These new techniques also proved disastrous for the British. Rommel also displayed great ini-
tiative and creativity. When Rommel's panzer division arrived at night from Germany, he im-
mediately ordered the unloading of all tanks and equipment, even though this would risk an
air attack since the unloading would require the use of flood lights. This was done so that his
division would be ready to deploy early the next morning. Rommel was very aware that he
was weaker than the British forces, however he wanted to keep the British guessing as to his
over all strength.
Therefore, when Rommel paraded his forces, after disembarking in Tripoli, he had his tanks
drive several times around the block before rolling off to the east, so as to make it look like he
had an endless amount of tanks. In another deception, Rommel ordered the construction of a
large number of dummy tanks, which were made of wood and mounted on Volkswagen auto-
mobiles. Again this was done so as to make Rommel appear as strong as possible and thereby
induce caution on the British, to prevent an attack until Rommel was fully ready.
OPERATIONAL TASKS
There are certain operational tasks that an operational leader must successfully accomplish
to be considered successful.19 Rommel's operational planning, operational training, and em-
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ployment and sustainment of combat forces will be evaluated to determine how successful he
was as an operational leader. Although there are more tasks then listed, only the above will be
evaluated since those task are considered the reasons why Rommel succeeded or failed in bat-
tle.
OPERATIONAL PLANNING
The attack on Tobruk in April 1941 was ill conceived and planned by Rommel. The attack was
forced upon his commanders with very little intelligence and conducted with little support.
Rommel forced the attack because he falsely believed that the British were evacuating, and he
wanted to inflict as much damage to the retreating forces as possible.
He acted as a tactical leader instead of an operational leader. He eagerly believed every radio
and photo intelligence that indicated that the British were pulling out of Tobruk, and he
equally dismissed all intelligence that showed otherwise. The attack was so ill planned that
the Panzer Division Commander under Rommel who had already lost 120 out of 161 tanks in
the assault refused Rommel's order to assault Tobruk again until proper air photo, dive bom-
ber attacks, air cover, and spotter planes were made available. Rommel failed to take Tobruk,
and the resulting causalities required the Afrika Korps to take a defensive position.
Another attack that was ill planned was Rommel's "dash to the wire" during the British Crusa-
der offensive in November 1941.22 The "wire" was the boundary between British Egypt and
Italian Libya. When Rommel's "dash" started he had almost won the Crusader battle; howe-
ver by the time the "dash" ended the scales had tilted against him.
He failed because of his impatience, lack of planning, and lack of logistics. Rommel forced the
attack because of his wish to annihilate the retreating enemy. Unfortunately, he didn't consi-
der the logistical support required, or the fact that his men were exhausted or that his tanks
needed repairs. Although his divisional commanders and staff recommended against atta-
cking, Rommel was adamant and took personnel charge of the attack. Because of his impa-
tience Rommel failed to realize the enemy's positions and was unable to communicate with
his headquarters and with his divisional commanders at times.
Due to Rommel's poor planning the British were able to force Rommel into his first retreat
back to Tripoli.
Rommel's problem was that he viewed the North African campaign as a large battle.
He thought more on terms of tactical than he did on operational. Put aside the fact that Rom-
mel should not have been fighting such an offensive war as he was, since it was
against the strategic objective of Germany; if, however, the operational objective was to take
the Suez Canal, Rommel was fighting it all wrong. He was acting as a tactical commander. He
was going from battle to battle instead of stepping back and taking a look at the big picture. If
he would have done this, it would have been evident to him that he would need more supplies
and resources, and therefore he would need air superiority and control of the seas in order to
obtain his objective. Rommel failed to ask and answer the four fundamental questions: "What
operational level goals or conditions must be achieved in order to meet the nation's strategic
objectives? What sequence of actions must be planned and executed to reach those operatio-
nal goals? How should the joint force's assets be applied to accomplish that sequence? What
are the likely derivative costs and risks?"
OPERATIONAL TRAINING
Very little operational training was available to Rommel due to the almost immediate actions
and constant advances that Rommel took against the British upon arriving in North Africa.
However, when time was available, Rommel effectively used it to conduct corps wide trai-
ning. While the British forces were being contained in Tobruk, Rommel deployed Axis forces
so that a flexible response could be made to stop any British attack on his flanks; additionally
the Afrika Korps were put through rigorous training for an assault against Tobruk using tank
and anti-tank guns together. Because of this constant training, Rommel's men were able to
coordinate their attacks even when the situation changed. This allowed Rommel to have "a
concentrated stroke at speed. "
123/138
EMPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT OF COMBAT FORCES
If Rommel had the additional resources and logistical support necessary, his employment of-
ferees for the majority of his first year would have been correct. The fact that he was able to
win battles without the additional logistical support is a tribute to his tactical proficiency,
boldness, and initiative. Unfortunately, it was at the unnecessary expense of his forces and re-
sources. In a majority of his battles, Rommel was over extended. He relied on captured
enemy equipment and supplies to continue his advances and to resupply his forces. It seemed
that Rommel took care of logistical emergencies as they occurred instead of adequately plan-
ning and preparing prior to engaging in battle so as to prevent the emergencies.
Operational logistics was one of the main reasons Rommel failed as an Operational Leader.
He did not place enough emphasis and priority on logistics. While he was in Africa, Rommel
twice advanced 1500 miles from Tripoli to Egypt, and would twice flee from Egypt to Tripoli
all because of logistical support and lack of it. Tripoli was Rommel's main supply base. The
further he got from his main base, the more difficult it was establishing advance supply sta-
tions. Rommel states that the reason for giving up pursuit of the enemy is almost always due
to the difficulty of the quartermaster from being able to span the lengthened supply routes,
and the quartermaster's not using his' initiative and improvisation to increase the supply rou-
tes. Here he places the blame on the quartermaster for not providing the required supplies to
accomplish the objectives. It is however, the responsibility of the operational commander to
ensure the supplies are available. His lack of concern for logistics was appalling. When ques-
tioned by his superior how he would supply and feed the additional panzer corps that he had
requested, Rommel answered: "That's quite immaterial to me. That's your pigeon."
Rommel's abortive attack on Tobruk in May 1941 and his defeat at the "wire" were due to his
weak logistical support, in addition to his poor planning.30 Rommel should have been more
aware of his logistical situation and less concerned with the tactical situation.
PRIMACY OF POLICY AND STRATEGY
Policy determines military strategy.31 Military strategy in turns determines strategic and ope-
rational objectives. Rommel's objective, as directed by the German High Command, was to
assist the Italians and to ensure that they did not retreat to Tripoli without a fight. Fortuna-
tely for the Allies, Rommel decided that he would change his mission, and perhaps create a
new range of possibilities for German strategy. In a clear violation of his orders, Rommel told
his staff that his objective was the Suez Canal. He did not realize that even if he was able to
reach the Canal he would not have been able to hold it. More than likely, he would have nee-
ded three things to realize his objective.
Malta needed to be in Axis control, he would need air superiority, and he would need secure
sea lanes in order to get protection, supplies and resources. He could not get any of these, sin-
ce they were out of his control. No matter how victorious he was in North Africa, he required
the assistance of his superiors to reach his own objective. Since his objective was not the ob-
jective of his superiors it would seem evident that he would not receive the assistance he nee-
ded to continue on. He hoped that once he got to the Suez Canal his superiors would either be
forced to give him more support or they would see that his objective was better than their li-
mited North African objective and thereby change or increase their strategic objective. Rom-
mel wanted the German strategy to include the conquest of the Middle East. He believed that
if he could go past the Suez Canal, along with success in Russia, Turkey might be persuaded
to join the Axis' powers, thereby giving Germany access and possible control of Middle East
oil.
While reporting to Hitler's headquarters on his progress in March 1941, Rommel was told by
the Commander and Chief of the Army, "that there was no intention of striking a decisive
blow in Africa in the near future". Rommel then proceeded to instantly and methodically dis-
regard those clear and cautious orders upon his return to Africa. Rommel was unable to see
that his role in Germany's grand strategy was to be a minor role.
It is the task of the operational leadership to point out to the political leadership that certain
124/138
military aims cannot be accomplished, or provide alternatives to those military aims if
another military aim can be accomplished more efficiently. However, an operational com-
mander can not conduct operations that will adversely affect the national strategy or inten-
ded strategic objective. The commander must accept the objective and accomplish it. Rom-
mel never accepted the fact that the North African Campaign would only be a minor operatio-
nal objective and not the objective that would bring victory for Germany. Since he did not ac-
cept his superiors' strategic objective he desperately tried to influence their decision by win-
ning battles, and requesting additional material and forces to continue his personal operatio-
nal objective. This of course would take away vital resources from the real strategic objective
of Russia. Rommel could not see this and therefore seriously damaged Germany's chances to
accomplish its strategic objective. By overstepping his orders Rommel brought about a situa-
tion for which his decisions had adverse strategic implications, and for which he did not have
adequate supplies to accomplish.
OTHER FACTORS
Rommel failed to inform and coordinate his planned operations on numerous occasions with
his Italian superiors and allies. He basically wanted as little to do with the Italians as possi-
ble. Through his lack of coordination, Rommel failed to effectively use unity of effort, which
would have greatly increased his effectiveness and capabilities. An excellent example of his
lack of unity of effort was on the attack on Tobruk in April 1941, in which he failed to inform
the Italians that he intended to attack Tobruk. Had Rommel informed the Italians he could
have received valuable detailed plans for the fort at Tobruk since the Italians had built the
fort. As it was, Rommel didn't receive the plans until after the battle.
On several occasions Rommel personally led the attack against the enemy. This caused severe
difficulties and confusion among his staff, divisional commanders, and forces. Clearly, Rom-
mel could have best served the Afrika Korps by providing leadership and coordination from
the rear instead of being concerned with tactical vice operational matters.
COUNTER ARGUMENTS
Rommel was never told that Russia was to be invaded. Therefore, he was not aware of the
strategic objective until after Germany attacked Russia. Therefore, Rommel's advances to-
wards Egypt may have been done so as to give the German High Command a strategic objecti-
ve.
Perhaps the reason that Rommel so often led from the front was that he had too little oppor-
tunity of exercising his corps as a formation with all its weapons, and perhaps because he did
not have the time to assess his commanders and to ensure they could accomplish exactly
what he wanted them to do. Therefore, especially in the beginning there may have been an in-
creased need to lead from the front in order to make changes quickly to more effectively use
his divisions. Since he did lead from the front, Rommel was able to outclass his enemies in ra-
pidity of decision and movement because he personally took command of his armor.
CONCLUSION
Within Rommel's first year in North Africa, the Afrika Korps had some terrific successes pus-
hing the Allied forces back. These successes were in large part due to Rommel's tactical lea-
dership at the unnecessary expense of forces and equipment. Although Rommel possessed
and displayed extraordinary operational leadership qualities, he failed as an operational lea-
der because he did not grasp the importance of operational logistics and because he failed to
understand the primacy of policy and strategy.
Rommel possessed the needed character traits to be a great operational leader; however, he
continuously thought like a tactical leader. His lack of unity of effort with his Italian allies
and his desire to lead from the front seriously effected his ability to coordinate and direct all
his forces more efficiently. Since he acted more like a tactical leader than an operational lea-
der he was unable to grasp the big picture. Had he been a better operational leader, his suc-
125/138
cesses would not have been so costly in lives and resources, and it could possibly have saved
Germany from losing North Africa, and would have assisted Germany in attaining her strate-
gic objective in Russia.
APPENDIX
Map 15 Panzer action in Poland, 1939
In Operation 'White', Hitler commits the German Army and Luftwaffe to the invasion of Po-
land. When two Army Groups, North and South, strike concentrically at a weak opponent -
mostly infantry divisions deployed within fifty miles of the frontier, Polish forces are en-
circled and within seventeen days the campaign is virtually at an end. Warsaw, unsuited to
armoured attack, continues to resist until 27 September. German double encirclement strat-
egy and previous experience gained from Condor Legion operations in Spain prove decisive.
Hoth and Hoepner (Third and Fourth Panzer Armies) 1 September 1939. The main weight of
Panzer assault lies with the three motorized corps, XIV, XV and XVI, spearheading German
Tenth Army (von Reichenau).
126/138
Von Kleist and Guderian (First and Second Panzer Armies) 1 September 1939, also deployed
in conjunction with infantry armies, operate on the wings of the offensive.
Operations are led by six panzer divisions, including a 'mixed' division (Kempf), four light di-
visions, and four motorized divisions. Included in the invasion force are SS Regiments: Adolf
Hitler (SSLAH), Deutschland and Ger-mania.
Guderian (1) XIX MotK: 2nd, 20th MotDivs; 3rd PzDiv
Kempf (2) PzDiv Kempf: 7th PzRegt, SS Regt Deutschland, etc.
Guderian (3) Redeployed XIX MotK: After 7 September includes 10th PzDiv
Von Wietersheim(4) XIV MotK: 1st LtDiv, 13th, 29th MotDivs; and later 5th Pz Div
Hoepner (5) XVI MotK: 1st, 4th PzDivs; two InfDivs
Hoth (6) XV MotK: 2nd, 3rd LtDivs; 25th PzRegt
Von Kleist (7) XXII MotK: 2nd PzDiv; 4th LtDiv
(8) (Eighth Army) XIII AK includes SS Regt Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler before transfer to
Tenth Army
(9) (Fourteenth Army) VIII AK includes SS Regt Germania
A Gr North/South von Bock/von Runstedt; 37 infantry, three mountain, fifteen mobile
divs, 3,195 tanks
Polish Army 38 infantry divisions, eleven cavalry, two motorized brigades, 600-700 light
tanks (500 battle-fit)
Luftwaffe Kesselring 1st Air Fleet-A Gr North; Lohr 4th Air
Fleet-A Gr South, 1,550 aircraft
Polish Air Force 750 aircraft (500 battle-fit)
127/138
Map 16 Victory in the West, 1940
In Operation 'Yellow', Army Groups 'A' and 'B' with Luftwaffe support, smash across the
Meuse and in ten days outmanoeuvre the Western Allies whose armies, including a British
Expeditionary Force of nine divisions, serve a French commander-in-chief - General Game-
lin, replaced 19 May 1940 by General Weygand.
Schmidt and Hoepner (Fourth Panzer Army) 10 May with two panzer corps (1) and (2) allot-
ted to Army Group 'B', lead a decoy offensive into Holland and Belgium where airborne oper-
ations under General Kurt Student aim to reduce key defences astride the Army Group axis of
advance.
Von Kleist and subordinate Guderian (First and Second Panzer Armies) 13 May attack west
across the Meuse at Sedan-Montherme (4), (5), (6) initiating the main armoured movement
of Operation 'Yellow' - a westward thrust by two panzer and one motorized infantry corps
under Panzer Croup von Kleist (K) - the vanguard of Army Croup 'A'. See also Panzer break-
through, France.
Von Kleist leads German Twelfth Army (List), but under pressure from superior headquar-
ters, limits subordinates to a narrow range of action. Despite this, the panzer group pushes
ahead until Hitler's nervousness at the danger to the resulting panzer 'corridor' and technical
considerations finally halts the armour.
Hoth (Third Panzer Army) 13 May starting from a Meuse crossing at Dinant - (3) - also
strikes west, reinforcing von Kleist.
A total of ten panzer divisions, six and two-thirds motorized infantry divisions support Army
Groups 'A' and 'B'. The panzer force is swiftly regrouped for phase two of the battle - Opera-
tion 'Red'* commencing 5 June 1940.
Schmidt (1) XXXIX PzK: 9th PzDiv; SS Verfugungs Div; After 13 May LSSAH
Hoepner(2) XVI PzK: 3rd, 4th PzDivs; 20th InfDivMot; SS Totenkopf
Hoth (3) XV PzK: 5th PzDiv; 7th PzDiv
(K) Reinhardt (4) XXXXI PzK: 6th PzDiv; 8th PzDiv
(K) Guderian (5) XIX PzK: 1st PzDiv; 2nd PzDiv; 10th PzDiv; Inf Regt Mot-Gross Deutsch-
land (K) Von Wietersheim(6) XIV MotK: 2nd, 13th, 29th InfDivs Mot
*Hoth (7) XV PzK: 5th, 7th PzDivs; 2nd InfDiv Mot
"Von Kleist Gr (8) XIV PzK von Wietersheim: 9th, 10th PzDivs; 13th Inf Div Mot, SS Verfu-
gungs Div, InfReg Mot-Gross Deutschland. After 12 June SS Totenkopf Div XVI PzK Hoep-
ner: 3rd, 4th PzDivs; Reserve LSSAH
*Guderian Gr (9) XXXIX PzK Schmidt: 1st, 2nd PzDivs; 29th InfDiv Mot
XXXXI PzK Reinhardt: 6th, 8th PzDivs; 20th InfDiv Mot
German Army Von Brauchitsch: 120 infantry divs, 16% mobile divs, 2,574 tanks
A Grs 'A', 'B' Von Runstedt 45 1/3 divisions; von Bock 29Vi divisions
Luftwaffe Kesselring 2nd Air Fleet-A Gr 'B'; Sperrle 3rd Air Fleet-A Gr 'A': 2,750 aircraft
Western Allies Gamelin; 10 Dutch, 22 Belgian, 9 British (plus 1 Inf Tank Bde), 77 French
infantry divs, 6 (Fr) mobile divs, 3,600 tanks
Allied Air Forces 2,372 aircraft ind 1,151 fighters.
128/138
Map 17 Operation Barbarossa June 1941
In Operation 'Barbarossa', Army Groups North, Centre and South with powerful Luftwaffe
support strike in three directions: Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev-Rostov.
Encirclements of the Red Army are a triumphant feature of the early days, but military opera-
129/138
tions fanning out over a vast and often trackless interior are soon brought to a standstill.
Halted by difficult terrain, bad weather, inadequate supplies and exhausted by an unyielding
defence, the panzer divisions after capturing Kiev are driven to unrewarding battles for Len-
ingrad and Moscow.
Hoepner (Fourth Pz-Army) 22 June leads Army Group North (von Leeb) to Leningrad. Gu-
derian and Hoth (Second and Third Pz-Armies) 22 June responsible for the main German ef-
fort, lead Army Group Centre (von Bock) in the Moscow direction. Von Kleist (First Pz Army)
22 June leads Army Group South (von Runstedt) to Kiev and Rostov.
The outstanding panzer success of the early weeks is an envelopment of five Russian armies
east of Kiev resulting in 600,000 prisoners for which von Kleist and Guderian are responsi-
ble. In the course of a subsequent operation, 'Typhoon' 2 October 1941, convergent action by
Guderian, Reinhardt and Hoepner encircling Bryansk and Vyasma proves equally rewarding.
Seventeen panzer divisions, thirteen and a half motorized divisions lead 'Barbarossa' - but de-
spite optimistic predictions of a three-week campaign, operations are destined to last four
years. Expanded and re-equipped, in later campaigns the panzer force will nevertheless fail to
match Russian numbers or strategy. Divisions are switched between theatres, fronts, and con-
trolling corps. Four years later on the Central Front in January 1945, when the Red Army
pushes across the Vistula, only four panzer divisions supporting indifferently equipped infan-
try divisions face 163 Russian divisions. At the conclusion of hostilities the panzer force is to-
tally burned out and only weak battle groups remain at the Army's disposal.
Hoepner (4) PzGr 4: XXXXI PzK Reinhardt, LVI von Manstein: three PzDivs 1st, 6th, 8th:
three MotDivs 3rd, 36th and SS Totenkopf (later trapped with SS 'Polizei', 'Danemark' and
others at Demjansk).
Hoth (3) PzGrS: XXXIX PzK Schmidt, LVII PzK Kuntzen: four PzDivs 7th, 12th, 19th, 20th:
three MotDivs 14th, 18th, 20th: No SS formations
Guderian (2) PzGr 2: XXIV PzK Geyr, XXXXVI PzK Vietinghoff XXXXVII PzK Lemelsen,
five PzDivs 3rd, 4th, 10th, 17th, 18th: 3 1/2 Mot Divs 10th, 29th, SS Das Reich (later switched
to Hoepner for attack on Moscow) and Regiment 'Gross Deutschland'
Von Kleist (1) PzGr 1: III PzK von Mackensen; XIV PzK von Wietersheim; XXXXVIII PzK
Kempf; five PzDivs 9th, 11th, 13th, 14th, 16th; four MotDivs 16th, 25th, SS 'Wiking', SS (Bri-
gade) 'Leibstandarte' AH, Regt Gen Goering. OKH Reserve 2nd, 5th PzDivs: 60th MotDiv
German Army von Brauchitsch 153 divisions (seventeen Pz, + two reserve, 134 mot divs)
3,417 tanks
Luftwaffe Keller, 1st Air Fleet; I Air Corps/A Gr North; Kesselring 2 Air Fleet, II, VIII Air
Corps/A Gr Centre; Lohr 4th Air Fleet, IV, V Air Corps/A Gr South; - 3.800 aircraft
Red Army/Air Force 150-180 divs, 20,000 tanks, but only 1000 T34s and 500 KVs,
10.000 aircraft (2.750 modem types).
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B0014L7NF4
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674-65921-X
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19191945. Oxford University Press. 2001. ISBN 978-0-19-924630-4
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Routledge, London. 2000. ISBN 978-0-7146-8150-4
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The Journal of Military History, Vol. 64, No. 1 (Jan. 2000), pp. 97140
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INDEX
Chapter I 7th Panzer Division The Ghost Division................................................................. 6
Panzer strength........................................................................................................................ 6
"Ghost Division" / "Phantom Division" .................................................................................. 7
Order of Battle ......................................................................................................................... 7
Commanding officers .............................................................................................................15
Chapter II Fall Weiss: the invasion of Poland ..................................................................... 18
Map 1 The map shows the beginning of World War II in September 1939 in a wider Eu-
ropean context. .................................................................................................................20
Prelude to the campaign...................................................................................................20
Map 2 Planned and actual divisions of Poland, according to the Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact, with later adjustments ............................................................................................. 23
Opposing forces ..................................................................................................................... 24
Germany............................................................................................................................ 24
Poland................................................................................................................................ 24
133/138
Map 3 Operations in Poland............................................................................................. 25
Details of the campaign......................................................................................................... 26
German plan ..................................................................................................................... 26
Illustration 1: German Panzer units in Poland were equiped mainly with light tanks like
the PzKpfw II, seen here armed with a 20mm cannon.................................................... 27
Polish defence plan. .......................................................................................................... 27
Phase 1: German invasion .....................................................................................................28
Map 4: Campaign in Poland 1939 ....................................................................................30
Phase 2: after Soviet Union invaded from the east............................................................... 31
Civilian losses......................................................................................................................... 32
Map 5 The race for Warsaw, 7 September 1939............................................................... 34
Aftermath............................................................................................................................... 34
Misconceptions...................................................................................................................... 35
Chapter III Battle of France ....................................................................................................... 38
CHRONOLOGY ..................................................................................................................... 38
Battle ...................................................................................................................................... 39
Map 5 Evolution of the Manstein Plan ............................................................................40
German strategy ....................................................................................................................40
German armed forces structure ............................................................................................ 41
Similarity to Schlieffen Plan.................................................................................................. 41
Map 6 : Campaign in France ............................................................................................ 42
Manstein Plan........................................................................................................................ 42
Overview of the Plan......................................................................................................... 42
Details of the Plan............................................................................................................. 43
Executing the Plan ............................................................................................................ 45
Summarizing the Plan ...................................................................................................... 46
Mechelen Incident ................................................................................................................. 46
Adoption of Manstein Plan.................................................................................................... 46
Blitzkrieg................................................................................................................................ 47
Allied strategy ........................................................................................................................48
Early actions......................................................................................................................48
Dyle Plan ...........................................................................................................................48
Allied intelligence.............................................................................................................. 50
German forces and dispositions............................................................................................ 50
Strength............................................................................................................................. 50
Army operational deployment...........................................................................................51
Communications................................................................................................................51
Army tactics .......................................................................................................................51
Map 7 Operations in Dinant ............................................................................................. 52
Luftwaffe ........................................................................................................................... 52
Anti-aircraft defences ....................................................................................................... 53
Allied forces and dispositions................................................................................................ 53
Strength............................................................................................................................. 53
Armies ............................................................................................................................... 53
Deployment....................................................................................................................... 54
Air forces ........................................................................................................................... 55
Anti-aircraft defences ....................................................................................................... 55
Fall Gelb................................................................................................................................. 55
Northern front................................................................................................................... 55
The Netherlands................................................................................................................ 55
Invasion of Belgium.......................................................................................................... 56
Battle of Hannut and Gembloux....................................................................................... 57
Central front........................................................................................................................... 57
Belgian and French Ardennes .......................................................................................... 57
134/138
Battle of Sedan .................................................................................................................. 58
Collapse of the Meuse front .............................................................................................. 59
Low French morale ...........................................................................................................60
Failed Allied counter-attacks............................................................................................60
German spearheads reach the Channel............................................................................ 61
Weygand Plan ................................................................................................................... 61
BEF and the Channel ports............................................................................................... 63
Halt order.......................................................................................................................... 63
Operation Dynamo ........................................................................................................... 64
Fall Rot................................................................................................................................... 64
French problems ............................................................................................................... 64
Collapse of the Weygand line ........................................................................................... 65
Collapse of the Maginot line............................................................................................. 66
The second BEF evacuation.............................................................................................. 67
Surrender and armistice ................................................................................................... 67
Aftermath............................................................................................................................... 67
Hitler Appoints Twelve Field Marshals ................................................................................68
Casualties ...............................................................................................................................68
Axis ....................................................................................................................................68
Allied ................................................................................................................................. 69
Chapter III Operation Barbarossa ..............................................................................................71
German theory regarding the Soviet Union...........................................................................71
Map 8 Operation Barbarossa............................................................................................ 72
19391940 German-Soviet relationship............................................................................... 72
Germany plans the invasion.................................................................................................. 73
Map 9 Situation in Europe by May/June 1941, at the end of the Balkans Campaign and
immediately before Operation Barbarossa ...................................................................... 74
German preparations ............................................................................................................ 76
Soviet preparations................................................................................................................ 77
The Soviet offensive plans theory..........................................................................................80
The invasion...........................................................................................................................80
The Frontier Battles (22 June 1941 3 July 1941) ..........................................................80
Map 10 Frontier Battles Army Group North ................................................................... 81
Army Group North............................................................................................................82
CHRONOLOGY.................................................................................................................82
Army Group Centre...........................................................................................................84
CHRONOLOGY.................................................................................................................84
Map 11 Frontier Battles Army Group Center ................................................................... 85
Army Group South............................................................................................................86
CHRONOLOGY.................................................................................................................86
Summary of the first phase...............................................................................................88
Battle for Smolensk (3 July 1941 5 August 1941)..........................................................88
Map 12 Army Group South...............................................................................................89
Kiev and Leningrad (5 August 1941 2 October 1941)....................................................90
Operation Typhoon (2 October 1941 5 December 1941) ..............................................90
Events..................................................................................................................................... 92
Reasons for initial Soviet defeats .......................................................................................... 92
Map 13 German advances during the opening phases of Operation Barbarossa ........... 93
Outcome................................................................................................................................. 94
Causes of the failure of Operation Barbarossa ..................................................................... 95
Underestimation of the Capacity of Soviet Mobilization................................................. 95
Map 14 Eastern Front 1941-06 to 1941-12 ....................................................................... 96
Faults of logistical planning .................................................................................................. 96
Weather ............................................................................................................................. 97
135/138
Aftermath...............................................................................................................................98
Chapter IV Rommel and the German 7th Panzer division in France 1940 ............................ 100
The Initial Days of the Campaign........................................................................................ 100
Background..................................................................................................................... 100
The opposing forces..............................................................................................................101
The plans.............................................................................................................................. 102
Organization ........................................................................................................................ 102
Preparations......................................................................................................................... 103
May 10.................................................................................................................................. 104
May 11................................................................................................................................... 107
May 12.................................................................................................................................. 107
May 13 ...................................................................................................................................110
May 15 ...................................................................................................................................112
May 16...................................................................................................................................114
Epilogue ................................................................................................................................116
Rommel as a commander..................................................................................................... 117
Chapter V AN ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF FIELD MARSHAL ER-
WIN ROMMEL IN THE AFRIKA KORPS............................................................................... 120
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 120
BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................... 120
CHARACTER TRAITS..........................................................................................................121
OPERATIONAL TASKS........................................................................................................121
OPERATIONAL PLANNING .............................................................................................. 122
OPERATIONAL TRAINING ............................................................................................... 122
EMPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT OF COMBAT FORCES........................................ 123
PRIMACY OF POLICY AND STRATEGY ........................................................................... 123
OTHER FACTORS............................................................................................................... 124
COUNTER ARGUMENTS................................................................................................... 124
CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................... 124
APPENDIX ............................................................................................................................... 125
Map 15 Panzer action in Poland, 1939 ........................................................................... 125
Map 16 Victory in the West, 1940...................................................................................127
Map 17 Operation Barbarossa June 1941....................................................................... 128
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................... 129
INDEX ...................................................................................................................................... 132
Notes ......................................................................................................................................... 135
Notes
1
In military history and military slang, the German term Kampfgruppe (pl. Kampfgruppen;
abbrev. KG, or KGr in Luftwaffe usage during World War II) can refer to a combat formation
of any kind, but most usually to that employed by the German Wehrmacht and its allies du-
ring World War II and, to a lesser extent, in World War I. It also referred to bomber groups in
Luftwaffe usage, which themselves consisted of three or four Staffeln (squadrons), and exis-
ted within Kampfgeschwader bomber wings of three or four Kampfgruppen per wing. The
Kampfgruppe was an ad-hoc combined arms formation, usually employing combination of
tanks, infantry, and artillery (including anti-tank) elements, generally organised for a particu-
lar task or operation. A Kampfgruppe could range in size from a corps to a company, but the
most common was an Abteilung (battalion)-sized formation. Kampfgruppen were generally
referred to by either their commanding officer's name or the parent division.
136/138
2
Early plans for Fall Gelb; below left the original Manstein Plan in the form as it was first pre-
sented to the OKH. Note that the small attacks to the south were to be carried out simulta-
neously to the main effort, not as a second phase operation and that only a limited number of
armoured divisions takes part in the drive to The Channel
3
The man who lies low and awaits developments usually comes off second best E Rommel1
4
Hart Liddell, Basil: The Rommel Papers, Da Capo Press Inc, New York 1953, p 7.
5
The Germans concentrated their build-up of the air force on a few types of aircraft. The pri-
mary task was to fly in support of the army in the field. The build-up of the air force also
meant that the German panzer forces were provided with long-range artillery, the Stukas.
See: Horne, Alistair. To Loose a Battle. Macmillan Publishers Limited, London 1990, p 119
124.
6
For an account of the development of the German armoured force, see. Guderian, Heinz:
Panzer Leader. , Da Capo Press Inc, New York 1996, s 1846. For an account of the develop-
ment of the German Army in the interwar period see. Corum, James S: The Roots of Blitzk-
rieg, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 1992.
7
Frieser, Karl-Heinz: Blitzkrieg Legende, R.Oldenburg Verlag, Mnchen 1995, s 65.
8
Comparative strength May 10, 1940 Germany The Allies Divisions Artillery Tanks Bomb and
Bomb and interceptor interceptor on stand-by at the 2-2009
9
Posen, Barry R: The sources of military doctrine, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and Lon-
don 1984, s 8182.
10
Marshal Ptain at the inauguration of the Ossuaire at Verdun in 1927. See: Horne, Alistair:
The Price of Glory. Penguin Books, London 1993, s 341.
11
Ibid.
12
There are numerous books that describe the plans and all the thoughts behind the plans. Se
for example: Op cit footnote 5 or Op. cit footnote 3.
13
HOp. cit footnote 3, p 114.
14
The Chasseurs Ardennais units mainly consisted of light troops, but had some heavier wea-
pons such as anti-tank guns and even some light tanks. The troops were a mixture of militia-
men and volunteers. See Hautecler,Georges. Rommel and Guderian against the Chasseurs
Ardennais. The Nafziger Collection Inc, West Chester, 2003, s 14.
15
Ibid, p 7.
16
U.S. Archives, German Records, roll T 314 550, frame 6.
17
Op. cit footnote 5, p 279.
18
Op. cit footnote 5, p 118.
19
Stolfi, Russel H.S: A Bias for Action: The German 7th Panzer Division in France and Rus-
sia 1940 1941. Marine Corps University 1991, s 1415. The leadership conducted at the
front of the division was typical of Rommel. Although Rommel did not have a real possibility
to bring some of the older and more experienced officers with him on the battlefield, it is ob-
vious that he liked to have an adviser and discussion partner with him on the battlefield. This
is shown clearly in the parts of The Rommel Papers covering the campaign in Africa, were
Rommel often had his chief of staff with him on the battlefield.
20
Hans von Luck was initially a company commander in the reconnaissance battalion. When
the battalion commander was killed, Rommel ordered von Luck to take command of the who-
le battalion. See: von Luck, Hans: Panzer Commander, Dell Publishing, New York, 1989, p
42.
21
Ibid, p. 35.
22
Rommel was obviously interested in tactics. He worked as a teacher at the Military Aca-
demy in Potsdam. He also wrote two books on tactics. The most known is Infantry Attacks,
but he also wrote an exercise book for small units: Problems for Platoon and Company, pu-
blished in 1935.
23
24
Ibid. According to Hautecler the intelligence in this case was correct. See Hautecler, p. 9.
25
Ibid
26
Ibid
137/138
27
This was a habit of Rommel. He tried to write to his wife every day during all of his cam-
paigns. Some of the letters can be found in The Rommel Papers. Liddell-Hart, p 6.
28
The demolition plan of the Chasseurs Ardennais can be found in: Hautecler, p 69-70.
29
Figure 5: The order with the task of the 7th Panzer Division on May 10.25
30
Sheppard, Alan: France 1940 Blitzkrieg in the West. Oxford, Osprey 1990, p 39.
31
Figure 6: The short account in the war archives of the 7th Panzer Divisions actions on
May 10.28
32
Op cit footnote 11, p. 40.
33
Figur 7: Map over the fighting at Chabrehez The map is drawn by the author on the basis
of the map in: Hautecler, op. cit. footnote 11,p. 76. The height information has been simpli-
fied to enhance the visibility of the Belgian dispositions and the German movements.
34
Op cit footnote 11, p 44-45.
35
36
May 11.32
37
The order was given at 0650 hours on May 11, see: OP cit footnote 11, p. 54. U.S. Archives,
German Records, roll T 315 401, frame 1223.
38
Ibid. U.S. Archives, German Records, roll T 315 400, frame 157.
39
Figure 9: The situation of the 7th Panzer Division on the evening of May 11.35
40
May 12.36
41
U.S. Archives, German Records, roll T 315 401, frame 757-762.
42
The exact time when the 31st Panzer Regiment was placed under Rommel is not mentioned
in the war archives. According to the archives this took place at noon. See: U.S. Archives, Ger-
man Records, roll T 315 401, frame 757.
43
Figure 11: The area where the 7th Panzer Division advanced on May 12.
44
45
This seems to be the basis for a common misunderstanding on the events of the Meuse cros-
sing in the area of Dinant. The first unit of the 15th Panzer Corps to cross the Meuse was the
3rd Motorcycle Company of the Panzer Aufklrungsabteilung from the 5th Panzer Division.
See: Op cit footnote 5, p. 281. In many accounts the 7th Motorcycle Battalion of the 7th Pan-
zer Division is mentioned as the first unit of the 15th Corps to cross the Meuse in the area of
Dinant. See for example: Sheppard, 43. Even Alistair Horne seems to have gotten this wrong.
He doesnt mention that the first units that crossed the Meuse belonged to the 5th Panzer Di-
vision. See Horne, To Lose a Battle, 308 310. The German war archives do not mention any
part of the 7th Motorcycle Battalion having crossed the Meuse on the evening of May 12. Ins-
tead, according to the archives, the 7th Motorcycle Battalion, reinforced with the 1st Pioneer
Company, attacked across the river in the terrain 800 meters south of Houx at 0430 hours on
May 13. See: U.S. Archives, German Records, roll T 315 401, frame 763.
46
May 13.42 U.S. Archives, German Records, roll T 315 400, frame 157
47
48
Frieser, Karl Heinz: Dinant Avesnes Arras. Der Angriff der 7.Panzerdivision unter
Rommel in Westfeltzug dargestellt an drei Beispielen, s 43-44.
49
Op cit footnote 3, p. 310 312.
50
51
Ibid. p. 910.
52
Ibid, p 10.
53
Ibid, p 11.
54
Figure 13: The places were the 7th Panzer Division crossed the river. 49 Op cit footnote 5,
p 283.
55
May 14.50 U.S. Archives, German Records, roll T 315 400, frame 158.
56
Figure 15: Map showing the area of Dinant and Onhaye.
138/138
57
Figure 16: The message from Colonel Bismarck to Rommel. U.S. Archives, German Re-
cords, roll T 315 402 frame 227.
58
Figur 17: Map showing the area of anthe and Onhaye and the area where the 7th Panzer
Division was deployed on the evening of May 14.52 U.S. Archives, German Records, roll T
315 401, frame 769.
59
May 15.53 U.S. Archives, German Records, roll T 315 400, frame 158.
60
Figure 19: map showing the area of the 7th Panzer Divisions intentions for the advance
on May 15. Op cit footnote 3, p. 407408.
61
For a discussion on the French thinking on tanks and doctrine, see: Horne, To Loose a Bat-
tle, s 7880.
62
Op. cit footnote 5, p. 295.
63
64
Ibid, p 412.
65
Op cit footnote 1, p 17.
66
Figure 20: The armoured battle at Flavion May 15, 1940. Map drawn by the author on the
basis of the information in: Frieser, Karl-Heinz. Blitzkrieg Legende, s
67
68
May 16. U.S. Archives, German Records, Divisions, roll T 315 400, frame 158.
69
Jean Hannecart, who runs a small museum covering the events at Clairfayts, has confirmed
these initial events to the author. The museum is situated in the road crossing some 100 me-
ters from the pillbox-line. Hannecart was present as a young boy when the events took place.
70
71
The final attack through the line started at 2300 hours. See: U.S. Archives, German Re-
cords, Divisions, roll T 315 401, frame 775.
72
Op cit footnote 1, p. 20 21.
73
Ibid, p. 22.
74
The armistice was signed 2150 hours on June 22. The shooting would officially end at 35
minutes past midnight on June 25. See: Op cit footnote 3, p. 665.
75
Rommel, Erwin: Infantry Attacks. Greenhill books, London, 1995, p 9.
76
See, for example, Rommels writing on the plan for the battle of Tobruk starting on page
225 in The Rommel papers.
77
See for example, the sketch of Rommels intentions if he were to break through at Alamein
on page 259 in the Rommel papers.
78
Rommel scolded some of the officers and his orders at Chabrehez were in direct opposition
to the initial orders by the commander of the 7th Motorcycle Battalion. See: Hautecler, s 44.

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