ISRAELITE WARFARE FROM JOSHUA TO DAVID

By Boyd Seevers, Ph.D.

Northwestern College, St. Paul, Minnesota


INTRODUCTION
This paper will describe the way in which the art of warfare was practiced in Israel from
the Israelite conquest
1
through the reigns of David and Solomon as described in the Bible and
other ancient Near East sources.
2
The paper will rely primarily on the biblical descriptions of
warfare, but will also draw from the available primary literature and archaeological evidence
from Egypt, the Hittite Empire, Mesopotamia, and other Levantine powers to supplement the
biblical material and archaeological remains in Israel. It will first discuss the available sources
of information, then describe Israels organization for war, its implements of war, and its actual
practice of the art of warfare during that time.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION
This article will use the descriptions of warfare in Israel as described in the biblical texts
and relevant archaeological data from approximately 1550-925 B.C. This time frame covers the
archaeological periods from the beginning of the Late Bronze Age (ca. 1550 B.C.) through the
end of the Iron Age IIA period, which ends with the division of the Israelite monarchy in 925
B.C.
3
This paper will consider the accounts of the Israelite conquest of Canaan found in the
book of Joshua as the earliest primary material for this study, and will reference the earlier
military information from the end of the period covered by the Pentateuch as supporting
p. 1
material.
4
It will also include the period of the judges and early monarchy found in Judg and 1
Sam, and continue through the accounts of the united monarchy in 2 Sam, 1 Kgs and Chr.
These biblical texts contain a wealth of information about the changing practice of
warfare in Israel from the conquest of Canaan through the establishment of the Israelite empire.
Unlike the records from Hatti, Mesopotamia and the other Levantine kingdoms of this period, the
biblical accounts provide a reasonably complete picture of warfare as practiced in early Israel.
They describe the changing methods of organization as Israel developed from a tribal league into
a wealthy, organized monarchy, as well as give considerable detail about many aspects of the
practice of warfare. Only in the area of weaponry is the biblical evidence comparatively brief.
The archaeological remains from the time period are surprisingly meager, given the
extensive excavations carried out in the region. Only a few examples of weaponry from the time
have been uncovered. Fortifications are better represented, and will be treated in turn.

ORGANIZATION FOR WAR
As mentioned above, the nation of Israel changed drastically during the time under
investigation in this study. The biblical texts portray the nation as a loose federation of related
tribes fighting for living space at the beginning of the period. It evolved quickly into a well
established and organized, wealthy monarchy at the end that emerged as arguable the greatest
power in the region. The composition and organization of Israels military went through a
corresponding development as well, and the record of this transformation is both unusual and
informative. The Israelite military began as a militia raised by a system of tribal levies, later
supplemented and ultimately succeeded in importance by a standing army.



p. 2
Tribal Militia to Standing Army
The book of Joshua reports that the twelve tribes that comprised the nation at the time of
the conquest all supplied troops for battle through a general levy of able-bodied men of military
age, apparently those twenty years of age and up.
5
This type of militia continued through the
period of the judges and into the early monarchy. A charismatic leader would respond to a crisis
by issuing a call for troops from some or all of the tribes
6
and then lead them into battle. Y.
Yadin (1963: 255) comments, It is clear from the Biblical descriptions . . . that the tribal army
of Israel at this time was still in its militia stage, still made up of warriors from individual tribes
who were summoned to battle only in emergency. The internal organization was the
responsibility of the tribe, and each clan and family sent their quota of warrior-sons to battle.
The men would leave their farms or other occupations, take up their meager arms and fight until
the end of the crisis, at which time they would be dismissed from active service and return
every man to his own tent.
7

This system often led to problems. The tribes that did not take part could become
envious or angry at not being included. Other tribes or cities might decide that the danger was
not important to close enough to warrant taking up arms or providing support.
8
The levied
troops were probably also lightly armed
9
and poorly trained, and often found themselves
overmatched by more established armies such as those of the Philistines and Canaanites.
These problems likely helped lead to the call by the people for a king who would govern
and go out before us and fight our battles (1 Sam 8:20). Israels first king, Saul, responded to
military threats by summoning the militia (1 Sam 11:6-8; 13:3-4), and apparently began to
establish a permanent army early on. As soon as the prophet Samuel publicly proclaimed him
king, a band of soldiers
10
stayed with him, perhaps forming the core of a standing army. Saul
p. 3
made a practice of taking suitable men for military service (1 Sam 14:52), and apparently
compensated them with gifts of land and military rank.
11

Other, less official armies also appear in the biblical texts from this era. They were made
up of men wanted by the authorities or simply had no property, so they attached themselves to a
strong leader. They raided others and sometimes hired themselves out as mercenaries. Probably
the most famous of these forces gathered around David when he fled from Saul.
12
David went to
the wilderness and organized a band of followers that acted like an independent roving military
force. This band numbered six hundred (1 Sam 23:13; 27:2-3), included families (1 Chr 12:1-2),
a priest with an ephod (1 Sam 23:6), sent out raiding parties against regional nomadic groups (1
Chr 12:18), served as a vassal to a local ruler (1 Sam 27), and had a hierarchy of officers (1 Chr
12:9-13) that made up part of the corps of officers of Davids official army later on (1 Chr 12:4,
18).
Once he became king David continued developing both the militia and the standing army
as Saul had before him. Each branch had its own commanders and organization, to be discussed
below. David used his professional soldiers whenever a smaller force would suffice or speed
was essential, but he also called up the levies as needed.
13
The victory by Davids smaller,
professional army over rebellious Absalom and the levied troops (2 Sam 17:11; 18:1-8) perhaps
demonstrates the relative strength of the two forces. David also had contingents of foreign
mercenaries in his pay as bodyguards, undoubtedly to ensure their loyalty and protect himself
from local power struggles and potential revolt.
14

By the end of Davids reign, he had reorganized the army into twelve different divisions
(1 Chr 27:1-24), each consisting of twenty-four s (thousand?see below) men, and each
served one month each year. The divisions used tribal officers and levies, but included them in
p. 4
larger units that probably avoided many of the problems inherent in the tribal organization. Each
division had its own corps of officers that included the the heads of families, the commanders of
the thousands (again s ) and the hundreds, and their officers (1 Chr 27:1). David may have
carried out the census of the nations fighting men (2 Sam 24:1-10; 1 Chr 221) in order to gather
information for this organization.
15


Officers
The Bible reports that the early Israelite military had an overall commander, supported by
tribal leadership. Joshua led the Israelite force that invaded Canaan. Tribal elders may also have
functioned as military commanders or spies for their respective tribes. Lesser officers may have
been the leaders of the tribal subdivisions.
16
During the more settled time of the judges, tribal
leadership remained in place, and various charismatic leaders functioned as a temporary overall
commanders. Likely this arrangement led to problems, as the levied troops may well have been
reluctant to accept authority other than the leaders that came from their own tribes.
17

The evolution of a standing army meant that a corps of officers had to be developed
which was not tied to tribal organization. The army had a supreme commander (usu. s:s
c, commander of the army
18
)either the king or an officer appointed by him. Saul led the
army during his reign, and crown prince Jonathan also led a division (1 Sam 13:2-15). David
likewise led troops, but also appointed Abner and later Joab as commander of the army, in 1 Chr
11:6 as a reward for valor in battle. Separate officers served as commander of the militia (2 Sam
12:4-5) and of the kings private army (2 Sam 20:23; 1 Chr 18:17).
The commander of the regular army clearly held a position of great power. The texts
record Abner and Joab playing major roles in political affairs of the kingdom as well leading the
p. 5
army. They are shown taking part in the affairs of the royal family (2 Sam 14), making a treaty
(2 Sam 3:12), making or crowning a new king (1 Kgs 1:7, 19; etc.), carrying out killings for the
king (1 Kgs 28:34-4:4), rebuking the king (2 Sam 19:5-8), and disobeying the kings express
order (2 Sam 18:5, 10-15; 19:13).
A number of biblical texts suggest a hierarchy of lesser officers (:c ) over units of
thousands (but see discussion of the term s below), hundreds and fifties.
19
Other titles also
appear, but the information is not clear enough to determine how they fit into the overall
structure.

Infantry
In contrast to the more complete information available about the corps of officers, the
information about the organization of the different military branches is quite sketchy. Since
Israel had a division of chariotry only toward the end of the united monarchy, and apparently
used a navy only for trade (see below), the infantry comprised the bulk of the army for most of
our period.
The infantry (. or . :s ) was probably organized along tribal lines for most of
this period. Apparently some of the tribes or clans specialized in certain types of weaponry
suited to their region or preference, and likely would have fought as units using those weapons.
Some were proficient with every type of weapon (:: :: --1 Chr 12:33). Others
used large shield (.s ) and spear (: --12:24, 34), perhaps as heavy infantry that fought in
close formation. Still others used the long-range bow (-:) and sling (. )(12:1-2).

p. 6

Fig. 1. Early Israelite Infantryman (N. Stillman and N. Tallis 1984: Fig. 113)

The texts use a number of terms for infantry in addition to . and . :s. The
terms ::. , heroes, warriors (Judg 5:13, 23, etc.) and :., mighty warriors,
mighty men of valor (Josh 1:14; 6:2; etc.) often designated Israelite soldiers. They denoted
men of military age who were able to bear arms, had fought in combat, or had distinguished
themselves with heroic deeds. Expressions for elite warriors: :s picked men (Judg
20:15-16, 24; etc.) and :s , brave fighters (Judg 3:29; 18:2), as well as :: :s ,
man/men of war (Josh 17:1; Judg 18:11) also appear.

Chariotry
Although Israel had to face Canaanite chariots as they fought early battles and Samuel
warned about chariotry as an inevitable part of the monarchy (Josh 11:4-9; Judg 1:19; etc., 1 Sam
8:11-12), Israeli chariots do not appear until the time of David. When Joshua captured chariots
in the battle at the Waters of Merom, he burned the chariots and hamstrung the horses in
p. 7
response to the command of YHWH.
20
The brief records of Davids northern campaign report
that he captured a large number of chariots and hamstrung all but one hundred horses (2 Sam
8:4; 1 Chr 18:4), perhaps suggesting that David had begun or was planning to begin a small
branch of chariotry at this time.
21
When he conquered and absorbed the Canaanite city-states in
the region, David may also have captured and used their chariots.
In contrast to the uncertain development of chariotry under David, the texts clearly record
that his son Solomon developed an extensive chariot force and supporting infrastructure.
Solomon is said to have imported horses from Egypt and other countries, and developed an
export business to the Arameans and Hittites. Little is known about the appearance of Israelite
chariots, unless one assumes that they resemble those shown in Egyptian reliefs (see Fig. 2).
22



Fig. 2. Royal Egyptian Chariot 14 cent. B.C. (Y. Yadin 1963: 212)
p. 8


Fig. 3. Egyptian Chariot in Battle at Megiddo 1460 B.C. (J. Hackett 1989: 30-31)

The Bible also records the numbers of Solomons chariots (discussed below), and some of the
infrastructure set up to support them. Twelve district governors each had to supply the food and
supplies for the palace and its dependents for one month each year, including barley and straw
for chariot horses (1 Kgs 4:1-28). Other texts mention that Solomon built store cities and towns
for chariots and horsemen. The chariot corps undoubtedly had a hierarchy of officers, but the
texts only mention commanders of his chariots and horsemen/charioteers.
23


Navy
The biblical accounts mention an Israelite navy only in the context of merchant ships
built for trade (1 Kgs 9:26-28; 10:11-12; etc.). None of the references connect the ships to
p. 9
warfare, although records from other nations show that merchant ships could and often were
used for military purposes.
24


Size of Army
Unlike the contemporary records from the surrounding nations, the biblical texts contain
a great deal of information about the numbers of Israelite troops. Unfortunately much of it is
problematic. As one author comments, If we take them at their face value, the numbers that we
find in the Old Testament are sometimes so large that they are altogether unbelievable.
25
The
numbers of troops typically appear with the word s, usually translated thousand(s). If
s indeed carries its usual meaning thousand, then many of the references to numbers of
troops seem extremely large. For example, Samson killed one thousand men by himself using
only an animals jawbone (Judg 15:14-16). Joshua sent thirty thousand men to move into
position behind Ai at night for an ambush the following day (Josh 8:3-4). When David took his
census of fighting men the total came to 1.3+ million (2 Sam 24:9).
26

These numbers seem quite high, especially considering the size of contemporary armies.
Though clearly less complete that the biblical accounts, the contemporary sources typically give
sizes of armies in the hundreds or low thousands, perhaps as high as a few ten thousands. For
example, at the Battle of Kadesh in 1275 B.C., the great kingdoms of Egypt and Hatti apparently
assembled armies of 20,000 and 16,000 men respectively.
27
An emerging nation like Israel may
have been able to muster only a smaller number.
This difficulty has led some to suggest that the originally unpointed s should
sometimes be understood as clan, a subdivision of a tribe (Judg 6:15; 1 Sam 23:23), or pointed
as s meaning warrior or chief. Such readings would solve many, though not all the
p. 10
problems associated with s.
28
In addition to reducing the numbers of soldiers, reading s
as clan may also make sense logistically. If a clan was the largest subdivision of a tribe and
men were mustered and fought by clans, then s could stand for the soldiers who mustered
from a particular clan, whatever number that happened to be. Since the early Israelite army was
organized by tribal divisions, the biblical writers might well have expressed numbers in terms of
tribal units rather than totals of soldiers.
Unfortunately this proposed understanding s as clan does not make sense in certain
texts, particularly in the titles of officers. As mentioned earlier, the Bible mentions officers over
units of thousands (:es ), hundreds, fifties, and tens, which sound like literal numbers. If
thousands means clans instead, the lists would seem inconsistent. In addition, the titles
commanders of thousands and hundreds often appear together in contexts that seem to infer a
descending order of importance and size.
29

Regardless of how one understands the numbers and issues associated with s, the
biblical texts often give the size of Israelite and enemy forces. The numbers for Israel at the time
of the conquest and judges range from thirty-six (Josh 7:5) to four hundred s (Judg 20:1-2).
During Sauls monarchy the numbers vary from three s (1 Sam 13:2) to 330 s (1 Sam
11:8). During the reign of David, the numbers include Davids band of six hundred in the
wilderness (1 Sam 23:13; 27:2-3), and go as high as 1,570 s counted in Davids ill-advised
census (1 Chr 21:5).
p. 11
The Bible also gives numbers for Solomons chariot corps. The texts record that he
accumulated one s, four hundred chariots
30
and twelve ::e s (either horses,
charioteers or cavalry), and built forty s
-:
stalls of horses in chariot cities and Jerusalem.

Role of the King
The military leadership shown by Joshua, the various judges, and the kings played a
major part of their role as leaders of the nation. Joshua and the judges led the nation largely
because of the need for military leadership. The kings also played important roles in the civil
and religious lives of the nation, but texts often portray military effectiveness as their most
important task. One sees this in the initial call for a king (1 Sam 8:20), in the public recognition
of Saul as king after he led the rescue of Jabesh Gilead (1 Sam 11), and when David
overshadowed Saul through his military exploits (1 Sam 17-18).
Saul and David personally led their armies, at least some of the time. The accounts of
battles during Sauls reign always portray him at the head of his troops, and in at least one case,
wearing a crown and armband (2 Sam 1:10). David rose to power largely because of his military
leadership, but then shared the responsibility with his commanders Abner and Joab. Sometimes
David personally led the troops (2 Sam 5:1-2, 10:17-19; etc.), but more often sent them out with
his commanders (2 Sam 10:7; 18:3; etc.). In some cases, the texts record the troops as insisting
that David would stay behind in order to stay out of danger (2 Sam 18:3-4; 21:17).

Role of Israels God
Israels God played an important role in all aspects of life in Israel, including a major role
in the monarchy and military. YHWH chose and empowered Joshua, the judges and early kings
to take their positions of leadership, and played an active part in their military campaigns as well.
p. 12
He sometimes commanded warfare (1 Sam 15:1-3)
32
, predicted victory or defeat (Josh 1:1-9; 1
Sam 28:17-19; etc.), encouraged Israel or caused fear in their enemies (Josh 2:9-22; Judg 6:17-
40; etc.), commanded consecration of the military force before it set out (Josh 3:5)
33
, gave
instructions for battles either verbally or with the lot (Josh 5:13-6:5; Judg 20:18-28; etc.), acted
through nature or battle to aid Israel (Josh 3:7-17; Judg 4:14-15; etc.) and showed his presence
with the troops through promises or the presence of the priests (1 Sam 14:3; 18:12).
For their part, the leaders of Israel trusted in YWHW for victory (1 Sam 7:7-9; 14:10-17),
sought his direction before battle with dreams, Urim and Thummim, and through prophets (1
Sam 28:6, 15; 30:7-8; and wrongly 28:7-25), made offerings and vows before battle (Judg 11:30-
40; 1 Sam 13:8), dedicated cities and plunder to God (: - Josh 6:17-27; Judg 1:17; etc.), and
commemorated victories he gave (Josh 4:1-24; 1 Sam 7:12).
When the leaders or people committed some offense against YHWH, he punished them.
Achan broke the (: at Jericho, which led to Israels first defeat and his subsequent death
(Josh 7, 22:20). Israel was unable to drive the Canaanite inhabitants out of the land because of
covenantal disloyalty (Judg 2:1-10; 3:6) and was oppressed by enemies because of their sin
(Judg 3:7-8; 4:1-2; etc.).


IMPLEMENTS OF WAR
As indicated earlier, the relatively plentiful biblical texts and available archaeological
remains have yielded surprisingly little evidence about the weaponry used by Israel during this
period. The available information will be discussed for short, medium, and long range weapons,
as well as for defensive armor.

p. 13
Short-Range Weapons
The short range weapons mentioned most often in biblical texts from this period are the
sword (:) and spear (usually -. ). Sword appears quite often in general and poetic
references to weapons or warfare, suggesting that it was a commonly known and used weapon.
Since the curved sickle sword (see Fig. 4) was the dominant shape for swords until the influx of
the Philistines and other Sea Peoples
34
, and the common biblical expression of striking with the
edge of the sword arose from the use of this type of sword, the early Israelite swords may well
have been this type. In the story of the judge Ehud, the emphasis on the double-edged shape and
short length (1 cubit = 1.5 ft./0.5 m.) of Ehuds sword/dagger (Judg 3:16; see below) suggests
that the weapon was unusual, further supporting the idea that swords were usually sickle shaped.

Fig. 4. Sickle Swords with sharp outer edge for striking, 14 cent. B.C. (Y. Yadin 1963: 207)
p. 14

Fig. 5. Daggers, Straight Sword, 14-13 cent. B.C. (Y. Yadin 1963: 209)

Swords (see Fig. 5) appear in a number of biblical texts from this period. One text from
the time of the judges mentions four hundred s soldiers with swords (Judg 20:2), but by the
time of Saul, the Philistines had apparently largely disarmed the Israelites (1 Sam 13:19-22).
Saul and Jonathans swords are mentioned before the battle with Goliath (1 Sam 17:39), among
the items Jonathan gave to David (1 Sam 18:4), and when Saul and his weapon-bearer fell on
their swords on Mt. Gilboa (1 Sam 31:4-5). According to 1 Sam 25:13, the sword apparently
served as main weapon of Davids band. Short swords/daggers (also :) appear in the hand-
to-hand combat recorded in 2 Sam 2:16 and 23:21 as well as the reference to Ehuds weapon
mentioned above.
In addition to swords, the biblical texts indicate that the Israelites also used spears (.s )
as a short-range weapon. Surprisingly, the spear does not appear in the book of Joshua, and only
once in Judges (5:8the song of Deborah). Saul obviously used it a great deal, as shown by the
frequent references to him and spears.
35
More references from the time of David attest to the
p. 15


Fig. 6. Spear Heads, Butts, 11-10 cent. B.C., Hazor (Y. Yadin, 1963: 352)


popularity of this effective weapon for hand-to-hand fighting.
36
Even the metal point affixed to
the butt end of the spear (see Fig. 6) used for sticking it into the ground when not in use could
serve as a lethal weapon (2 Sam 2:23). Later references to spears (the apparently synonymous
: ) with (.s ) large shield (BDB s.v. III .s ) suggests its use by heavy infantry fighting in
phalanx formation.
37

Biblical texts mention at least two other short-range weapons. Abimelech and his
followers used axes to cut branches during battle to burn the tower at Shechem, apparently

Fig. 7. Head of Battle Axe, 11-10 cent. B.C., Hazor (Y. Yadin 1963: 352)

p. 16
referring to battle axes (see Fig. 7).
38
Two texts also mention a z::, apparently a short, pointed
wooden weapon also used for hand-to-hand combat.
39


Medium-Range Weapons
The only medium-range weapon appearing the biblical texts is the javelin (:), and
only in the hands of Joshua and Goliath. Joshua used a javelin to signal to the troops in ambush
behind Ai (Josh 8:18, 26). Goliath had a javelin as part of his weaponry but apparently did not
use it against David (1 Sam 17:6, 45).


Fig. 8. Inscribed Javelin Heads, ca. 1100 B.C., near Bethlehem (J. T. Milik and F.M. Cross
1954: 7)

Long-Range Weapons
Along with the short-range sword, the long-range bow (-:

) is listed in the biblical
texts as one of the primary weapons of war. It appears in poetic texts and in the Pentateuch,
40

but rarely in the earlier texts for our period. The bow does not appear in Judges and in Joshua
only in the summary account in 24:12 along with sword, perhaps suggesting that the early
p. 17
armies of Israel may not have used the bow much. Later Jonathan used a bow (1 Sam 18:4;
20:20-38), as did Davids band (1 Chr 12:2) and certain tribal groups (1 Chr 5:18; 8:40).


Fig. 9. Inscribed Arrowheads, ca. 1100 B.C., near Bethlehem (A. Mazar, 1990: fig. 8.33)


The other long-range weapon that appears in the texts from this period is the sling (.
see Fig. 10). David used one against Goliath (1 Sam 17:40-50). Some of his followers (1 Chr
12:2) as well as men from Benjamin (Judg 20:16) could sling with either hand with great skill.



Fig. 10. Egyptian Sling with one end missing, 8 cent. B.C. (C. Herzog and M. Gichon 1978: 61)


Defensive Equipment

Along with their offensive weapons, Israelites also carried defensive implements
typically shields and rarely armor. Large (.s) and small (.: ) shields appear frequently in the
texts (see above with spears). Solomon also made large and small ceremonial shields covered
with gold for display in his palace (1 Kgs 10:16-17; 2 Chr 9:15-16). Armor (:) is found in
p. 18
the texts of this period only in 1 Sam 17. Saul offered his to David for protection against
Goliath, who also wore armor (1 Sam 17:5, 38). Sauls armor consisted of a tunic, bronze
helmet and body armor, perhaps made with scales like Goliaths (see Fig. 11).

Fig. 11. Egyptian scaled armor (H. W. Catling 1977: 77)

Somewhat related to armor is the term armor-bearer (:: sc.), perhaps better
translated equipment-bearer.
41
The :: sc. aided a warrior by carrying items for him.
Joab had ten lads serving as :: sc. (2 Sam 18:15), not all of which would have carried
armor. Passages such as 1 Sam 20:40 and 21:8 refer to weapons as ::, further strengthening
the idea that :: sc. may have carried more than just armor. Abimelech (Judg 9:54),
Jonathan (1 Sam 14:1-17), Saul (1 Sam 16:21David; 31:4-6; etc.), and Joab (2 Sam 18:15;
23:37; etc.) all had equipment-bearers.





p. 19
PRACTICE OF WAR
The first two major sections of this paper have described the way that the Israelite army
was organized and the implements of war that it used. This final section will use the numerous
biblical passages dealing with battles to describe something of Israels strategy for carrying out
overall campaigns and some of the tactics that it used to fight individual battles.

Morale
As mentioned earlier, the Israelite army often fought at the command and with the
blessing of YHWH, which undoubtedly served as a needed source of encouragement.
42
The
accounts of battles in the earlier texts of this period contain a number of examples of YHWH
encouraging fearful Israelite troops facing superior foes. Such was the case at Jericho (Josh 1:2-
9; 6:2-16), Ai (Josh 7:5-9), and against the Midianites (Judg 7:1-3). Success in battle under Saul
at Jabesh Gilead (1 Sam 11) and behind Jonathan at Geba (1 Sam 13:3) would have undoubtedly
boosted morale. Overwhelming Philistine response to Jonathans effort subsequently lowered
Israelite motivation, causing many Israelite troops to hide or flee across the Jordan for safely (1
Sam 13:3-7). Likewise the Israelites cowered in fact of Goliath and the Philistines in the Elah
Valley (1 Sam 17: 4-24) and Saul feared at the sight of the Philistine army before his last battle
at Shunem (1 Sam 28:5).

Strategy
Along with demonstrating the significance of motivation and fear, the texts also reflect
much of the overall strategy used by the various Israelite military leaders. Joshua, for example,
prepared the army, crossed into enemy territory, and established a beachhead and base camp at
Gilgal (Josh 1:1-5:12). After capturing Jericho, a major city in the Rift Valley in western
p. 20
Canaan, he attacked Ai to create a foothold in the Hill Country (Josh 5:13-8:39). The defection
of Gibeon (located in the heart of the Hill Country) to the Israelites caused the other major cities
in the Hill Country to attack Gibeon. The Israelites responded, and used the momentum of their
victory to launch a successful campaign in the west and south (Josh 10:29-43) and later defeat an
alliance in the north (Josh 11).
The judges and then Saul led the tribal confederation to fend off attacks from enemies
who encroached from various directions. Saul had to focus on the particularly troublesome
Philistines who were pushing in from the southern coastal plain. The Philistines were able to
penetrate to Geba and Michmash on the eastern side of the Hill Country, forcing Saul to retreat
nearly to the Jordan River. Jonathans victory retook the Hill Country, but Saul lost divine favor
in an action against the Amalekites to the south (1 Sam 15), and then found himself facing the
Philistines again, this time in the Shephelah (western foothills). David led Israel to victory over
the Philistines, but incurred Sauls jealousy (1 Sam 17-18). Saul then wasted his resources
pursuing David, who fled to Philistine territory for safety (1 Sam 19-27). A Philistine advance
into the Jezreel Valley cut off Saul from the Israelite tribes to the north, who was forced to
respond and die in a vain attempt to stop the Philistine push (1 Sam 28-31).
David acted carefully to avoid Sauls troubles, and then moved gradually to take the
throne and build Israel into an empire. He won favor with the southern Judahites by protecting
them from nomads to the south, and then giving them gifts out of plunder taken from a battle
against the Amalekites (1 Sam 27:8-12; 30:26-31). The tribe of Judah first crowned David king
over them at the southern city of Hebron. David slowly overpowered the remains of Sauls
dynasty in the north (2 Sam 2-4) and eventually was crowned king over the northern tribes as
well. He captured the tribally neutral but centrally located Jebus to serve as his new capital and
p. 21
religious center, and repulsed the Philistine response to his acts of consolidation (2 Sam 5-7).
David then subdued the Philistines on the west, the Moabites to the east, and pushed north to the
Euphrates River (2 Sam 8:1-12; 21:15-22). He also conquered Edom and Ammon on the west (2
Sam 8:13-14; 10-12), which consolidated his control over the major trade routes in the region
and opened the channels for trade money to pour in and enrich the kingdom. David later
survived at least two internal revolts (2 Sam 15-20),
43
and passed on the empire to Solomon
amidst political intrigue and struggle for power (1 Kgs 1-2).

Season for War
Likely David and the other early Israelite leaders campaigned from spring until the wet
weather in the fall, as did the other powers of the time. This common practice is reflected in the
account of the Israelite conquest of Ammon (and Davids sin with Bathsheba) which opens with
the words, In the spring of the year, the time when kings go out to battle (2 Sam 11:1). Armies
marched during the summer when the roads were good and food was available from the spring
grain harvest.
44
Joshua crossed the Jordan and began the conquest of Canaan at the time of
spring grain harvest, which enabled the Israelites to eat the Canaanites ripened grain (Josh 3:15;
5:11-12). Later the Midianites invaded Israel at the same time (Judg 6:3-6, 11) and Samson
destroyed the ripened grain of the Philistines (Judg 15:5).

Camp
The biblical texts contain only limited information about the Israelite practice of
establishing camps (see Fig. 12).
45
The Israelites under Joshua clearly established a base camp
on the plains of Moab east of the Jordan River. The soldiers who were planning to settle on that
side of the river left their families and livestock in the camp before crossing the river with the
p. 22
rest of the army (Josh 1:12-16). Presumably the warriors from the rest of the tribes left their
families and possessions there as well, or perhaps in the base camp established at Gilgal west of
the Jordan. The camp at Gilgal served as the base for the Israelite attacks on Jericho and Ai, as

Fig. 12. Egyptian Camp at Battle of Kadesh, 13
th
cent. B.C. (Y. Yadin 1963: 236-7)
Note outer perimeter of shields, internal roads, temple in right-center, Hittite chariots attacking in
upper-right.

the site of the making of the treaty with the Gibeonites, and as the base from which they
launched their defense of Gibeon (Josh 9-10:28). Gilgal also served as a base for the southern
campaign (Josh 10:29-43), along with another camp at Makkedah in the Shephelah (Josh 10:21).

Food, Logistics
The biblical texts contain a good deal of information about the system of logistics for
maintaining the troops with food and supplies. The accounts from the time of the tribal levies
suggest that each family or tribal unit took care of its own food and perhaps even weapons.
Before their offensive against Benjamin, the attacking tribes set aside 10% of their forces to get
p. 23
provisions for the army (Judg 20:9-10). Likely each soldier carried what he could, and relied on
other relatives to resupply him or else managed as best he could as he went along. David was on
such a resupply mission with grain, bread and cheese (which he left with the quartermaster) for
his brothers and their commander when he arrived at the battlefront where he faced Goliath (1
Sam 17:15-22). Other provisions reflected in the texts include cakes of raisins and pressed figs,
wheat, barley, flour, roasted grain, beans, lentils, honey, curds, dressed sheep, water and wine.
46

The system for maintaining the army undoubtedly grew more sophisticated as the
monarchy developed. Solomons system of twelve district governors who supplied provisions
for the king and royal household and the store cities almost certainly would have included the
needs of the army (1 Kgs 4:7-28; 9:19; 10:26). Samuels warning about the king taking the best
of the peoples cattle and donkeys and 10% of their flocks (1 Sam 8:16-17) may have included
procurement of food and pack animals for armies. Donkeys, camels, mules and oxen carried
such supplies (1 Sam 25:18; 2 Sam 16:1; etc.).
The biblical texts give less information about the supply of arms for the army. Years
earlier Samuel had warned that Israels future kings would appoint weapon and equipment
makers (1 Sam 8:12). This likely occurred as the monarchy was established, but the texts do not
mention it. The members of the early militias probably had to arm themselves using their own
resources, perhaps augmented by stripping what they could from the slain after battles. Victories
over superior forces would have offered the Israelites welcome opportunities to obtain badly
needed weaponry (1 Sam 17:53-54).

Intelligence
The biblical texts also describe much of the effort the Israelite forces exerted to obtain
information about their enemies. They gathered military and political intelligence, as well as
p. 24
data about topography, land productivity, ecological factors and the ethnic makeup of
inhabitants.
47
The two spies sent to Jericho would have had the opportunity to observe the city
and fortifications as well as learn about the morale of the inhabitants (Josh 2). The success of
this mission and the subsequent attack on Jericho may have helped lead to the defeat at Ai.
Joshua again sent out spies (7:1-5) who not only reported their findings but also advised Joshua
on ultimately unsuccessful strategy. During the time of the judges, the house of Joseph sent
spies to Bethel. Like their predecessors at Jericho, they offered the promise of safety to one
inhabitant in exchange for information that would enable the Israelites to enter the city (Judg
1:22-25).
This emphasis on obtaining information continued into the monarchy. The accounts of
Saul contain numerous examples of him requesting and receiving reports about the location and
actions of his enemies.
48
David likewise sent out scouts (1 Sam 26:4), received reports (2 Sam
2:4), and gathered information from a captured enemy (1 Sam 30:11-16). As the monarchy
became established and sent out diplomats, their missions were sometimes suspected of doubling
as efforts to gather information (2 Sam 3:24-25; 10:1-4; etc.).

Tactics
The numerous accounts of battles during this period often record details about tactics
used in individual battles as well as the overall strategies discussed above. Curiously, most of
the detailed tactical information comes from Israels early history before it had a strong, well-
established army. Perhaps the authors were highlighting the help Israel received from its God
when it was too weak to win outright. Since early Israel often faced enemies with superior
forces, the texts that describe early Israels tactics portray strategies often used by outmatched
p. 25
armies. The Canaanites armies, fortified cities and chariotry forced Israel to use guerilla tactics
to compensate for their less developed military resources.
49


Battles in the Open
The early Israelites apparently tried to avoid direct attacks in the open. They often
moved their troops at night to get them into position for attacks the following day (as at Ai and
Gibeon),
50
and more than once actually attacked at night.
51
At Gibeon and later at the Waters of
Merom (Josh 11:7-8), they also used deception and surprise to help gain an advantage.
The texts occasionally mention deployment of troops and arrangement of battle lines (1
Sam 4:2; 17:2; 2 Sam 10:8), but give few details. The passage describing Joabs division of
forces in 2 Sam 10:8-14 is the most complete. More often the texts mention the division of
Israelite troops into groups, often three, for multi-pronged attacks.
52

The accounts also give examples of battles involving representative warfare and other
less common tactics. We see representative warfare in David and Goliaths dual in the Elah


Fig. 13. Each grabbed his opponent by the head and thrust his dagger into his opponents side,
Tell Halaf (cf. 2 Sam 2:16) (Y. Yadin 1963: 267)

p. 26
Valley (1 Sam 17), and apparently in the first part of the skirmish between the forces of Saul and
David at the pool of Gibeon (2 Sam 2:12-32; see Fig. 13).
53
Other unusual tactics include
Joshuas unorthodox attack on Jericho (Josh 6), Gideons attack against the Midianites with
torches hidden inside jars (Judg 7:6-25), Jonathan and his equipment-bearer making a lone sortie
against a Philistine outpost (1 Sam 14:1-46), and the different exploits of Davids champions (2
Sam 21:15-22; 23:8-23, etc.).
Only a few passages give any indication of how long the battles lasted. Sauls attack on
the Ammonites at Jabesh Gilead lasted from the last watch of the night until the heat of the day
(1 Sam 11:11). Davids band fought a group of Amalekites from dusk of one day to the evening
of the next (1 Sam 30:17).
Before, during and after battle, the Israelites communicated with messengers and
trumpets. Messengers went out to gather troops,
54
request aid (1 Sam 11:3-5), deliver news of
war from the battle by letter or by mouth (2 Sam 11:6-25), communicate with the enemy (Judg
11:12-28: 20:12-13), announce the outcome of battles (1 Sam 4:12-17; 2 Sam 18:19-32), and
deliver diplomatic messages (1 Sam 6:21; 2 Sam 2:5; etc.). Trumpets likewise signaled for
troops to assemble (Judg 6:34; 1 Sam 13:3), to announce a rebellion (2 Sam 15:10; 20:1), to
attack (Judg 7:16-22), and to cease fighting (2 Sam 2:28; 18:16; etc.).

Attacks on Cities
The early Israelite armies often did not make direct attacks on fortified cities, perhaps due
to lack of experience and equipment.
55
Sometimes they used covert approaches to infiltrate and
bypass the fortifications, such as using the entrance at Bethel (Judg 1:22-25) or the .s
(apparently water shaft) at Jebus/Jerusalem (2 Sam 5:6-8). At other times they enticed
defenders to leave their fortifications to fight in the fields, as at Ai (Josh 8:3-29) and Gibeah
p. 27
(Judg 20:29-48). The unorthodox attack on Jericho was unique, and may have been an exercise
to test the Israelites faith in their God who promised them victory.
Occasionally the texts in Joshua and Judges do seem to indicate direct attacks on fortified
cities. Josh 10:28-39 records the capture of numerous cities in the southern campaign, often
saying that the army encamped against it, and fought against it. The attack against Eglon took
only a single day (Josh 10:35), whereas Lachish held out until the second day (Josh 10:32). The
later account of Abimelechs attack against Shechem and Thebez (Judg 9:30-57) provide more
details, perhaps typical of such battles. The attack on Shechem lasted a full day. When the city
fell, the citizens took refuge in a fortified tower, which Abimelech set on fire killing those inside.
He then went against Thebez, and again the people sought refuge in a strong tower, which
Abimelech also intended to burn. This time a defender killed him by dropping a millstone on his
head.
By the time of David, the texts reflect the type of attacks and siege tactics typical of the
era. 2 Sam 11:1-12:31 gives a partial description of the siege of Rabbah, capital of Ammon.
Joab and the standing army laid siege to the city. The Israelites made attacks against the city,
and the inhabitants defended from atop the wall as well as making sorties against the attackers
(see Fig. 14). Some attackers died during these skirmishes, which occurred near the city gate at
least once (11:16-17, 23). The attackers had to take care lest they close within range of the
archers and those throwing projectiles from the walls (11:20-21). Eventually Israel captured the
citys water supply and royal citadel, and the fall of the rest of the city was imminent. David
mustered the militia and joined Joab for the final assault (12:28-29). Occasional poetic
references to scaling a wall (2 Sam 22:30; Ps 18:29) probably refer to this aspect of warfare.

p. 28


Fig. 14. Egyptian attack on Ashkelon, 13
th
cent. B.C. (Y. Yadin, 1963: 228)
Note battle in front of city, soldier attacking gate with axe, use of scaling ladders, desperate
defenders praying for divine aid.


Another siege is recounted in 2 Sam 20:15-16, when Joab again led the army, this time
to capture the rebel Sheba at Abel Beth Maacah in northern Israel. The attackers built a siege
ramp against the outer fortifications and battered the wall to breach it. The defenders negotiated
p. 29
and delivered Shebas head to Joab rather than side with the rebellion and suffer the
consequences.

Treaties
The biblical texts from this period reflect a number of alliances and treaties by those
involved in warfare. Numerous Canaanite cities formed coalitions to fight the invading Israelites
or their ally, Gibeon (Josh 9:1-2; 10:3-5; 12:7-24 lists a total of thirty-one kings). David faced
several alliances of nations in his battles with transjordanian and northern kingdoms (2 Sam 8:5;
10:6-19; 1 Chr 19:6-19).
Several accounts reflect the process used to make treaties. The Gibeonites tricked Israel
into swearing a treaty of peace (Josh 9) which made the Gibeonites vassals of Israel and subject
to forced labor. The parties sealed the treaty with an oath, perhaps after a ceremonial meal. The
Israelites honored the treaty despite the deception,
56
and came to Gibeons aid when under attack
(Josh 10:1-7). Similarly the inhabitants of Jabesh Gilead asked for a treaty from the attacking
Ammonite king, offering to become vassals (1 Sam 11). The king accepted on the condition that
he be allowed to gouge out the right eye of each to disgrace Israel.
57


Israelite Fortifications
Textual and archaeological evidence give some indication of the character of Israelite
fortifications from this period. Several texts mention fortified Israelite cities with walls, gates
and bars (1 Sam 23:7; 2 Chr 8:5), in addition to a number of fortified strongholds (s: --1
Sam 22:44:4-5; 23:29; etc.).
A corner of a large (187 x 203 ft) fortress perhaps built by Saul was uncovered at Tell el-
Ful, identified as Gibeah, Sauls capital (see Fig. 15). Later 1 Kgs 9:15-19 states that Solomon
p. 30
fortified Jerusalem Hazor, Megiddo, Gezer and other locations. The triple-chambered gates
found at Hazor, Megiddo and Gezer probably came from these building programs (see Fig. 16).
58



Fig. 15. Possible citadel of Saul, Tell el-Ful (A. Mazar, 1990, fig. 9.2)




Fig. 16. Solomonic Gates from Gezer, Hazor, Megiddo (A. Mazar 1990: Fig. 9:10)
p. 31

After the Battle
The biblical texts contain a great deal of information about events that followed a
successful battle. After a victory, the armies of Israel often took plunder, gave rewards to their
troops, disposed of enemy rulers, and kept records of their battles.

Plunder, prisoners
Although the texts seldom contain detailed lists of plunder like those often found in many
other ancient Near Eastern records, the biblical accounts often include the capture and disposal
of people and plunder including women, sheep, cattle, donkeys, camels and clothes.
59
The
Israelites sometimes committed the inhabitants and/or plunder of a particular city of YHWH,
completely destroying them (: ).
60
Sometimes they killed all the people and kept the plunder
(Josh 8:22-27; 11:10-11; etc.). More often they killed the soldiers and kept the women, children
and other plunder for themselves (Judg 21:11-12; 1 Kgs 11:15-16; etc.). They burned several
cities (Josh 6:24; 8:20-28; Judg 18:27-28; etc.), and in one case, spread salt on the site (Judg
9:45), apparently to keep anything from growing there afterward.
61

The king typically divided the spoils with his soldiers, though he often kept the best for
himself or dedicated it to YHWH (Judg 8:21; 2 Sam 8; etc.). Davids many conquests made vast
numbers of people available for forced labor. By Solomons time, Israel needed an
administration of 550 officials to oversee the immense number of laborers conquered by David,
as well to supervise building projects.
62

In addition to taking plunder, the texts often mention other activities the Israelites
performed after military victories. Sometimes they erected memorials (Josh 4:1-24; 1 Sam
7:12). Joshua burned chariots and hamstrung horses in obedience to YHWHs command (Josh
p. 32
11:6, 9). David likewise hamstrung horses (2 Sam 8:4). David also put up garrisons in
Damascus and Edom, and received tribute from Aram and Moab (2 Sam 8:6, 14).

Rewards
Soldiers could earn various rewards for great feats performed in battle. Caleb promised
his daughter in marriage to the one brave enough to lead the conquest of a city (Judg 1:12-13).
Similarly, Saul offered his daughter in marriage, plus great wealth and exemption from taxes for
the family of the one who would defeat Goliath (1 Sam 17:25-27). David did that, and later
again earned the right to marry a daughter of Saul by killing a specified number of Philistines (1
Sam 18:20-27). Joab received his position of commander of the army for leading the attack on
Jebus (1 Chr 11:6), and his words in 2 Sam 12:28 suggest that the leader of a victorious army
could name a fallen city after himself. Joab later reported that a soldier could win ten shekels (4
oz.) of silver and a warriors belt for killing an enemy commander (2 Sam 18:11). Messengers
who brought good news also expected some unspecified reward (2 Sam 18:22).
Soldiers typically claimed rewards by proving kills with severed body parts. Gideon was
assumed to be carrying severed enemy hands, indicating their deaths (Judg 8:6, 8, 15). David
needed the foreskins of dead Philistines to prove his success (1 Sam 18:25-27), though
foreskins may have been a euphemism for phalli.
63
Often severed heads also served as proof
of death as well (Judg 7:25; 1 Sam 17:51-54; 31:9; 2 Sam 20:21-22).

Enemy Rulers
Like other contemporary armies, the Israelites and their enemies gave special attention to
enemy rulers after battles. Many texts relate the capture and subsequent killing of enemy rulers
(Josh 8:23, 29; Judg 7:25; 8:18-21; 1 Sam 15:1-33; etc.) in some public manner, apparently with
p. 33
the intent to humiliate and demonstrate superiority (see Fig. 17). Joshua hung the king of Ai on a
tree until sunset, then had the body buried (Josh 8:29). After defeating the forces of five Amorite
kings, Joshua and his commanders put their feet on the kings necks in the presence of his entire
army and Joshua encouraged the troops with assurances that YHWH would likewise defeat their
other enemies. Then Joshua killed the five and had their bodies hung in trees until sunset (Josh



Fig. 17. Ramses III striking enemy rulers, 12
th
cent. B.C. (Y. Yadin 1963: 204)
p. 34
10:16-27). Victors also sometimes mutilated enemies by severing thumbs (Judg 1:4-6) or
blinding (Judg 8:18-21) those captured alive, or by removing the heads or other body parts of
those already dead (1 Sam 31:8-13; 2 Sam 4:12).

Records
As the biblical texts demonstrate, the Israelites kept records of many of their battles.
Some were quite detailed (Josh 1-10:28; Judg 4-10:5; 15-21; 1 Sam 11, 13-31; etc.); others were
brief summaries (Josh 10:29-11:23; Judg 3; 2 Sam 8; etc.). The Bible mentions other records
that have been lost (Josh 10:13; 2 Sam 1:18; 1 Kgs 11:41). Many of these accounts serve to
glorify Israels God and king. Others record the failures of the kings and people.
64


CONCLUSION
Though not complete, the biblical texts and archaeological data from Israel provide a
reasonably adequate picture of the way in which Israel practiced the art of warfare from the time
of the conquest through the united monarchy. Relevant information from surrounding cultures
complements and supports this general description of Israels organization, implements, and
practice of warfare as the nation grew into an established power.
p. 35
REFERENCES
Brown, F.; Driver, S. R.; and Briggs, C. A., eds.
1951 A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament. Oxford: Clarendon.

Catling, H. W.
1977 Panzer. Pp. 57-73 in Kriegwesen, vol. 1: Schutzwaffen und Wehrbauten, ed. H-G.
Buchholz and J. Wiesner. Gttingen: Vandenhoechk and Ruprecht.

Clark, R. E. D.
1955 The Large Numbers of the Old TestamentEspecially in Connexion with the
Exodus. Journal of Transactions of the Victoria Institute 87: 82-90.

Fensham, F. C.
1964 The Treaty Between Israel and the Gibeonites. Biblical Archaeologist 27: 96-
100.

Fouts, D. M.
1997 A Defense of the Hyperbolic Interpretation of Large Numbers in the Old
Testament. Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 40: 377-87.

Hackett, J.
1989 Warfare in the Ancient World. New York: Facts on File.

Harrison, R.K.
1969 Introduction to the Old Testament. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.

Holladay, J. S.
1986 The Stables of Ancient Israel. Pp 103-65 in The Archaeology of Jordan and
Other Studies, ed. L. T. Geraty and L. G. Herr. Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews
University.

Herzog, C. and Gichon, M.
1978 Battles of the Bible. New York: Random House.

Ikeda, Y.
1982 Solomons Trade in Horses and Chariots in Its International Setting. Pp. 215-38
in Studies in the Period of David and Solomon and Other Essays, ed. Tomoo
Ishida. Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns.

Koehler, L. and Baumgertner, W.
1994 The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament. Rev. ed. Trans. and ed.
J. E. J. Richardson. Leiden: Brill.

Malamat, A.
1953 The War of Gideon and Midian. Palestine Exploration Quarterly 85: 61-65.
p. 36

1957 Military Rationing in Papyrus Anastasi I and the Bible. Pp. 114-21 in Melanges
bibliques rdigs en lhonneur de Andre Robert. Paris: Bloud & Gay.

1979 Israelite Conduct of War in the Conquest of Canaan. Pp. 35-55 in Symposia
Celebrating the 75
th
Anniversary of the Founding of the American Schools of
Oriental Research (1900-1975), ed. F. M. Cross. Cambridge, MA: ASOR.

1982 How Inferior Israelite Forces Conquered Fortified Canaanite Cities. Biblical
Archaeological Review 8, no. 2: 24-35.

Mazar, A.
1990 Archaeology of the Land of the Bible 10,000-586 B.C.E. Anchor Bible Reference
Library. New York: Doubleday.

Mazar, B.
1963 The Military Elite of King David. Vetus Testamentum 13: 310-20.

Mendenhall, G. E.
1958 The Census Lists of Numbers 1 and 26. Journal of Biblical Literature 77: 52-66.

Milik, J. T. and Cross, F.M.
1954 Inscribed Javelin-Heads from the Period of the Judges. Bulletin of the American
Schools of Oriental Research 134: 5-15.

Niehaus, J. J.
1988 Joshua and Ancient Near Eastern Warfare. Journal of the Evangelical
Theological Society 31: 38-44.

Pritchard, J. B.
1969 Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament, 3
rd
ed. with
Supplement. Princeton: Princeton University.

Rendsburg, G.
1997 The Early History of Israel. Pp. 433-53 in Crossing Boundaries and Linking
Horizons: Studies in Honor of Michael C. Astour, eds. G. Young, et al. Bethesda,
Md.: CDL.

Seevers, B.
1998 The Practice of Ancient Near Eastern Warfare with Comparison to the Biblical
Accounts of Warfare from the Conquest to the End of the United Monarchy.
Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Trinity Evangelical Divinity School.
Schley, D. G.
1990 The lm: Officers or Special Three-Man Squads? Vetus Testamentum 40: 321-
26.

p. 37
p. 38




Soggin, A.
1982 Compulsory Labor under David and Solomon. Pp. 259-68 in Studies in the
Period of David and Solomon and Other Essays, ed. T. Ishida. Winona Lake,
Ind.: Eisenbrauns.

Stillman, N. and Tallis, N.
1984 Armies of the Ancient Near East: 3,000 B.C. to 539 B.C. Worthing, England:
Flexiprint.

Sukenik (Yadin), Y.
1948 Let the Young Men, I Pray Thee, Arise and Play Before Us. Journal of the
Palestine Oriental Society 21:110-16.

van Selms, A.
1960 The Armed Forces of Israel under Saul and David. In Studies on the Books of
Samuel: Papers Read at the 3
rd
Meeting of Die Ou Testamentiese
Werkgemeenskap in Suid-Afrika. Pretoria: University of Pretoria.

Weingreen, J.
1969 The Rebellion of Absalom. Vetus Testamentum19: 263-6.

Wenham, J. W.
1967 Large Numbers in the Old Testament. Tyndale Bulletin 18: 19-53.

Yadin, Y.
1963 The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands in the Light of Archaeological Studies. 2
vols. Trans. M. Pearlman, from Hebrew. New York: McGraw-Hill.

1964 Military and Archeological Aspects of the Conquest of Canaan in the Book of
Joshua. El Haayin, vol. 1. Jerusalem: World Jewish Bible Society.

Younger, K. L.
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History Writing. JSOT Supplement Series 98, ed. D. Clines and P. Davies.
Sheffield: JSOT Press.


1
This paper will assume the date of the Israelite conquest to fall in the middle of the second millennium B.C.,
understanding the numbering found in 1 Kgs 6:1 to be straightforward. Taking Solomons fourth year to be 966
B.C., this would place the Exodus ca. 1446 B.C. and the Israelite conquest would have begun approximately 40
years later. The mention of Israelite occupation of Heshbon for 300 years in Judg 11:26 would fit into this time
frame.
2
This article is drawn largely from the authors dissertation (B. Seevers, 1998).
p. 39

3
Dates for the archaeological periods as well as the date for the division of the monarchy are taken from A. Mazar,
1990: 232, 296.
4
The dating of the biblical texts before the time of the united Israelite monarchy is problematic, especially the
material found in the Pentateuch. See, for example, discussion and bibliography in G. Rendsburg 1997: 433-53 as
well as Harrison 1969: 291-325. That discussion is beyond the scope of this study.
5
Several texts state that men twenty years and older were considered of military age. See Num 1:3, 45; 26:2, 4 as
well as Num 14:29; Deut 2:16; and 1 Chr 27:23. G. E. Mendenhall (1958: 60) suggests 20-45 years as the age for
military service. Against this A. van Selms (1960: 55) suggests thirteen as the minimum age, but offers no support.
Similarly Herzog and Gichon (1978: 67-68) use sixteen as the minimum age.
6
Partial callupsJudg 4:6, 10; 6:35; 7:23-24. Complete callupsJudg 20:1-2; 1 Sam 11:7-8. For discussion of
whether or not these callups represented all or just some of the troops from the levied tribes, see G. E. Mendenhall,
1958: 60.
7
Judg 7:8; 20:8 (where tent is parallel to home); 1 Sam 4:10; etc. For a brief but helpful discussion of the
meaning and implications of the phrase, see P. K. McCarter 1980: 107.
8
Anger--Judg 8:1; 12:1; 5:16-17. See also Y. Yadin (1963) 280-81. Failure to supportJudg 5:23; 8:5-9; cf. 1 Kgs
12:21-24. See also discussion in Mendenhall (1958) 59.
9
Note 1 Sam 13:19-22 where only Saul and Jonathan had metal weapons when the Israelites faced the Philistines.
10
1 Sam 10:26 uses the term force, army to describe the group. See also discussion in A. van Selms
(1960) 56-59.
11
1 Sam 22:7. Note also Samuels warning in 1 Sam 8:11-15.
12
Note also the bands that gathered around Abimelech (Judg 9:4); Jephthah (Judg 11:3); Rezon (1 Kgs 11:233-24);
and perhaps Jeroboam (2 Chr 13:6-7). See B. Mazar, (1963) 310-11.
13
David sent Joab and the standing army against the Ammonites, but mustered and brought the levied troops when
the opposing force brought in reinforcements (2 Sam 10:7-19; 1 Chr 19:17-19). Joab began the siege of Rabbah
with the regular army, and David mustered the militia to aid in its final capture (2 Sam 12:26-31). Rebellious
Absolom could have used the soldiers at his disposal to pursue his father, but unwisely chose to summon the tribal
levies first (2 Sam 7:1-13). When Sheba rebelled against him, David first ordered Amasa to muster the levies and
pursue him, but then sent Abishai with the standing army when the levies were too slow to slow to assemble (2 Sam
20:1-8). See also discussions in Y. Yadin (1963) 264, 275 and C. Herzog and M. Gichon (1978) 87.
14
The Cherethites and Pelethites are often named (2 Sam 8:18; 1 Kgs 1:38, etc.) along with Gittites (2 Sam 15:18).
Schley (1990: 324) calls these mercenaries the Judean kings permanent hedge against popular revolt. They
demonstrated their loyalty even after David released them from their obligations as he fled from Absaloms
rebellion. See 2 Sam 15:14-22 and discussions in Y. Yadin (1963: 278); C. Herzog and M. Gichon (1978: 87).
Compare with discussion of Hittite guards (C. Herzog and M. Gichon, 1978: 115-17).
15
See also discussions in Y. Yadin (1963: 279-83) and C. Herzog and M. Gichon (1978: 86). The lists of national
leaders given in 1 Chr 28:1 and 29:6 in connection with the building of the temple also contains these same titles
from the tribes and the military, suggesting that this structural change may have influenced a number of aspects of
the society.
p. 40

16
See Josh 8:10, 10:24 , 23:2, for references to an unclear and perhaps fluid organization of leadership over various
functions in society including the military. Note also Num 13:1-3 where tribal leaders served as spies sent from
Kadesh Barnea, and leaders of Danite clans who went out as spies in Judg 18:1-31. See also discussion in G. E.
Mendenhall (1958: 56-59).
17
See discussion in A. van Selms (1960: 55-56).
18
The title s:s c is used of Abner (1 Sam 14:50; 17:55; etc.), Joab (1 Kgs 1:19, 25; 11:15; etc.) and Amasa
(2 Sam 19:13; 1 Kgs 2:5, etc.), who served under Saul, David and Solomon. The apparently synonymous s:s
. (1 Kgs 4:4; 2 Sam 8:16; etc.), s:s: s (2 Sam 20:23), and c (2 Sam 24:2, 4) also appear.
The titles s:s c and :. c (1 Chr 21:2; 25:1; etc.) designate other military leaders, perhaps generals
under the supreme commander. See also L. Koehler and W. Baumgartner (1994: s.v. c ).
19
Commanders over fifties occurs only in 1 Sam 8:12 for texts within the time frame in view in this article, but also
in Deut 1:15-17; 2 Kgs 1:9-14 and Isa 3:3. Commanders over tens appears only in Deut 1:15-17 and Amos 5:3.
20
Even though the Israelites may have been unskilled in chariot warfare themselves and perhaps had little use for
them in the hilly regions that they inhabited at the time, such destruction probably represented a large financial
sacrifice.
21
See Y. Yadin (1963: 284-86), C. Herzog and M. Gichon (1978: 92), as well as Y. Ikeda (1982: 217)esp. n. 15
with bibliography.
22
For Solomons trade, see 1 Kgs 10;28-29; 2 Chr 1:16-17, as well as discussions in Y. Yadin (1963: 286-87), and
esp. Y. Ikeda (1982: 218-38). Ikeda argues that Solomon would have developed the ability to produce his own
chariots, and the high prices paid to Egypt for chariots (600 shekels (15 lb./7 kg.) silver) and horses (150 shekels
(3.75 ob./1.7kg.) silver) represented the top price paid for richly ornamented ceremonial chariots and show horses.
Note also earlier prohibition in Deut 17:16-17 against acquiring large numbers of chariots or horses, particularly
from Egypt, which Solomon does not appear to be following.
23
:e :: c --1 Kgs 9:22; 2 Chr 8:9. If this reference to : e means horsemen in the sense of
cavalry rather than charioteers, then the text apparently refers to the beginning of a corps of cavalry.
24
See B. Seevers (1998: 34-36, 121-22, 178-9, 228-31, 261-3).

25
R. E. D. Clark (1955: 82). Note also J. W. Wenhams comment (1967: 19), It is notorious that the Old
Testament in many places records numbers which seem impossibly large.

26
The parallel 1 Chr 21:5 totals 1.57 million. Both numbers seem excessively large compared to the size of
contemporary armies. Likewise the censuses of Num 1 and 26 give the total number of men able to serve in the
army just before Israel entered the land as 603,550 and 601,730.

27
See B. Seevers (1998: 47-50; 122-4; 179-81; 231; 263-4). Compare also the Assyrian record in J. B. Prichard
(1969: 279) that the later northern kingdom of Israel sent two thousand chariots and ten thousand infantry to the
Battle of Qarqar in 853 B.C.

28
A thorough discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. See B. Seevers (1998: 305-9) for further
treatment.

29
See B. Seevers (1998: 308-9) for references, as well as discussion in D. Fouts (1997: 382).
p. 41


30
1 Kgs 10:26. In this case, 1,400 chariots would be a reasonable number, given the size of other chariot forces of
the time. Thutmose III captured 924 Canaanite chariots at Megiddo in 1460 B.C.; Amunhotpe II captured 1,822
chariots in two Asiatic campaigns in the late fifteenth century, B.C.; the Hittites assembled 2,500 (or 3,500) chariots
at Kadesh in 1275 B.C. (see discussion in Seevers (1998) chap. 2); Jabin of Hazor assembled 900 chariots to face
Israel in Judg 4:3, 13.

31
1 Kgs 4:26. The parallel 1 Chr 9:25 reads only four s. This figure does not match the number of horse, but
the double uncertainty of the textual variant and of the meaning of s makes it a difficult problem to address.
For a discussion of the possible chariot complexes unearthed in Israel, see J. S. Holladay (1986: 103-65).

32
See also discussion in J. J. Niehaus (1988: 38-44).

33
Note also the command to undergo debilitating circumcision (Josh 5:2-12; cf. Gen 34) after crossing into enemy
territory!

34
See B. Seevers (1998: 57-9) and Y. Yadin (1963: 350). The Sea Peoples apparently brought the longer straight
sword with them when they entered the region.

35
Saul hurled spears at David and Jonathan (1 Sam 18:10-11; 19:10; 20:33), had a spear when conferring with his
officers (1 Sam 22:6), kept his spear near him at night while pursuing David (1 Sam 26:7-22), and leaned on his
spear (from wounds or exhaustion?) at the end of his final battle (2 Sam 1:6).

36
Abishai wished to kill sleeping Saul with a spear (1 Sam 26:8). See also the exploits of Davids champions using
spears in 2 Sam 23:18; 1 Chr 11:11, 20 as well as 2 Sam 23:7.

37
1 Chr 12:8, 25; 2 Chr 11:12; 14:8; 25:5. : also appears with .: small shield (BDB s.v.
..) in the earlier Judg 5:8 and the later 2 Chr 26:14.

38
Judg 9:48. See also Y. Yadin (1965: 5).

39
Joab stabbed Absalom in the heart with three of these (2 Sam 18:14), suggesting a relatively
small size. Beniah also had a z:: (2 Sam 23:21).

40
Poetic2 Sam 1:22; 2:4; 22:15, 35 (hyperbolic reference to bow of bronze); and apparently 2 Sam 1:18.
PentateuchBows (or arrows) appear as actual bows (Gen 21:16, 20; 27:3) or general references to warfare (Gen
48:22; 49:23-24; Num 24:8; Deut 32:23, 42).

41
So BDB and A. van Selms (1960: 59-60). C. Herzog and M. Gichon (1978) use shield-bearer.

42
See also Y. Yadin (1963: 4; 1965: 11), who argues that morale is the single most important aspect of any army.

43
J. Weingreen (1969: 263-6) argues that Davids ruthlessness and indifference to mens lives in his military
campaigns helped cause the rebellions.

44
See B. Seevers (1998: 73-5).

45
Egyptian records are more thorough, even giving enough information to figure some rates of march. For a
summary, see B. Seevers (1998: 75-8, 80).

46
The lists of provisions come from Abigails conciliatory gift to Davids private army (1 Sam 25:18, 35), the
provisions that Mephibosheths servant Ziba gave to the fleeing David (2 Sam 16:1-3), the provisions supplied to
p. 42

David during Absaloms rebellion (along with bedding, bowls and articles of pottery2 Sam 17:27-29), the
provisions supplied by families of the soldiers at Davids coronation in Hebron (1 Chr 12:39-40), the food David fed
to the abandoned servant in the wilderness (1 Sam 30:11-12), and the mention of Sauls jug of water during his
pursuit of David in the wilderness (1 Sam 26:11-12). Cf. A. Malamats (1957: 114-21) analysis and comparison
with Egyptian provisions.

47
Note esp. Moses instructions to the twelve spies who entered Canaan from Kadesh Barnea (Num 13, esp. vs. 17-
20).

48
Philistines1 Sam 23:27; 28:5; David1 Sam 22:9; 23:7-25; etc.).

49
See helpful discussions in A. Malamat (1979: 40-51), (1982: 31-35), and Y. Yadin (1965: 25-26).

50
Before Ai, the Israelites made at least a six-hour night march. Before Gibeon they climbed 1900 ft. over fifteen
miles (per C. Herzog and M. Gichon, 1978: 33, 36). Note also Saul at Jabesh Gilead (1 Sam 11:11). Mesha, king of
Moab, likewise recorded that his conquest of Nebo in the ninth cent. B.C. came after a march at night (J. B.
Pritchard, 1969: 320).

51
Gideon made his unorthodox attack on the Midianites at the beginning of the middle watch, just after the changing
of the guard (Judg 7:19). Most of the Midianites would have been fast asleep by this time and the new guards would
not have had time to completely adjust to the dark conditions. The timing would still have allowed the Israelites
plenty of time to press their deceptively undermanned attack before daylight revealed their true numbers. See A.
Malamat (1953: 61-5) and Y. Yadin (1963: 257-8). Similarly Saul attacked the Ammonite camp at Jabesh Gilead
during the last watch of the night (1 Sam 11:11).

52
Three groups seem to be standard. See Gideon vs. the Midianites (Judg 7:16); Abimelech at Shechem (Judg
9:43); Saul at Jabesh Gilead and in the Hill Country (1 Sam 11:11; 13:2; and three Philistine raiding parties in
13:17-18); and David vs. Absalom (2 Sam 18:2). Y. Yadin (1963: 264) points out that three groups are the most
convenient formation for maneuver in different situations: one company on a fixed front, with a company on either
side; two companies fixed and one on a flank; or two companies committed and one held in reserve.

53
Note Y. Yadins discussions in (1963: 266-7) and (as Y. Sukenik) (1948: 110-16)

54
At times the messenger was sent with a dismembered ox (as a threat--1 Sam 11:7-8) or a dismembered person
(Judg 19:29-30).

55
The instructions in Deut 20:10-20 show that the Israelites were familiar with such direct assaults. Moses
instructed them to first offer peace when attacking a city, and make the inhabitants do forced labor if they
surrendered. If they refused, the army was to lay siege, then kill the men and take the women, children and
possessions as plunder when the city fell. However all the inhabitants of Canaan had to be killed to preserve
Israelite religious purity. Fruit trees were to be spared from being made into siege works.

56
Cf. the consequences when Saul broke the treaty in 2 Sam 21:1-14. See also F. C. Fensham (1964: 96-100) and
K. L. Younger (1990: 201-04).

57
Loss of the right eye would also severely limit the potential military capability of right-handed warriors, who
would rely on that eye to aim a bow or perhaps see around a shield held in the left hand.

58
See A. Mazar (1990) pp. 371-4 for fortress at Gibeah and pp. 384-7 for apparent Solomonic gates.

59
Van Selms (1960: 55) writes, To get out to war meant that there was an opportunity to win booty consisting not
only of arms clothing and other material things, but also of slaves and handmaids.

p. 43

60
As at Jericho (Josh 6:21-27), where Joshua pronounce a curse on anyone who rebuilt the city. Cf. Sauls loss of
divine approval on his kingship for sparing the Amalekite king and animals despite the divine call for : (1 Sam
15:1-29).

61
Seevers 1998: 211.
62
2 Sam 12:31; 1 Kgs 4:6; 5:13; etc. Note also Soggin (1982: 259-68).

63
Given the need for haste in the heat of battle, it may be more logical to assume that the solider cut off the enemys
phallus than to have taken the time for the more delicate action of removing just the foreskin. See also Seevers
(1998: 99-101) for references to Egyptians using phalli instead of hands after Merneptahs battle with Libya.

64
Glorycapture of Jericho (Josh 6); sun standing still (Josh 10:1-15); Gideons defeat of Midian (Judg 6-7);
Davids victory over Goliath (1 Sam 17) and establishment of an empire (2 Sam 8); etc. FailureAchans sin (Josh
7); repeated subjection to enemies in Judges; Sauls death by Philistines (1 Sam 31); etc.