LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
243 SCRA 32 QUIASON, J.
FACTS: Atienza lived together with De Castro and their two children whenever he is in Manila. In December 1991, he saw Judge Brillantes sleeping on his bed. He was informed by their houseboy that Judge Brillantes had been cohabiting with De Castro. Atienza ignored the information given to him, instructed the houseboy to take care of his children, and left the house. Thereafter, Judge Brillantes prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his children for him.
Atienza filed a complaint for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Brillantes. Atienza alleged that Judge Brillantes was married with Ongkiko with whom he had five children. Judge Brillantes admitted that he had children with Ongkiko but was never married to her. Judge Brillantes claimed that the marriage between him and Ongkiko is void because of lack of marriage license. He also claimed that the marriage between him and De Castro is valid.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Brillantes can contract a second marriage without a judicial declaration of nullity.
RULING: Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
ROBERTO DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993 226 SCRA 572 ROMERO, J.
FACTS: Delia Domingo alleged that Roberto Domingo and she were married at Carmona, Cavite with evidences of marriage certificate and marriage license without knowing that Roberto had a previous marriage with Dela Paz which is still valid. She came to know about the prior marriage when Dela Paz sued them for bigamy. Subsequently, Delia filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and as a consequence, to declare that she is the exclusive owner of all properties she acquired during the marriage and to recover them from him. Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the marriage being void ab initio, the petition of declaration of nullity is unnecessary. He added that Delia has no property which in his possession. ISSUE: Whether or not Delia may claim for a declaration of nullity against Roberto on the ground of bigamy. RULING: With regards to the declaration of nullity of mariage, the court held that crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 [of the Family Code] is the position in the provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000 334 SCRA 106 BUENA, J.
FACTS: In June 16, 1973, Beltran and Felix married and had 4 children. After 24 years of marriage, Beltran filed an action for a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of Felixs psychological incapacity. In answer to the said petition, Felix alleged that it was Beltran who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with Salting. Thereafter, Felix filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against Beltran and his paramour.
In September 16, 1997, the court found probable cause and ordered a warrant of arrest against Beltran. In order to forestall said warrant, Beltran raised the issue that the civil case for declaration of nullity of their marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a prejudicial question.
RULING: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO vs. CONSUELO TAN G.R. No. 137110 August 1, 2000 337 SCRA 28 PANGANIBAN, J.
FACTS: Mercado married Tan on June 27, 1991 while Mercado was still married to Oliva. When Tan filed a letter-complaint for bigamy against Mercado, Mercado filed an action for declaration of nullity against Oliva more than a month later. In a decision dated May 6, 1993, the marriage between Mercado and Oliva was declared null and void.
ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy even though he filed a declaration of nullity of the former marriage.
RULING: In Terre vs. Terre, the court declared that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. The crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. MANUEL SIAYNGCO G.R. NO. 158896 October 27, 2004 441 SCRA 422 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
FACTS: Carating-Siayngco and Siayngco were married on June 27, 1973. Having known that they cannot have a child, they adopted a baby boy in 1977 and named the boy, Jeremy. On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life together, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that she incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly parents, the staff in his office and anything not of her liking like the physical arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial matters; that she showed no respect or regard at all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge of the Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around the house within the hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less about his professional advancement as she did not even give him moral support and encouragement; that her psychological incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment and vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation from her own parents since childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and incurable and, even if treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond the emotional and physical capacity of the parties; and that he endured and suffered through his turbulent and loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22) years. In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her at their conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against her so that he could be free to marry his paramour; that she is a loving wife and mother; that it was respondent Manuel who was remiss in his marital and family obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel in all his endeavors despite his philandering; that she was raised in a real happy family and had a happy childhood contrary to what was stated in the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity against petitioner Juanita.
RULING: The court held that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wifes lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.