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G.R. No.

L-14474 October 31, 1960


ONESIMA D. BELEN, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and MILAGROS BELEN DE
OLAGUERA, oppositors-appellees.
E. A. Beltran for appellant.
E. P. Villar for appellees.
R. F. Aviado for Trustee Bank.
REYES, J.B.L., J .:
Appeal from an order, dated May 23, 1958 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila in Special Proceedings No. 9226, denying appellant's petition
therein as hereafter discussed.
Briefly, the facts and circumstances that brought about this present appeal
may be narrated as follows:
Benigno Diaz executed a codicil on September 29, 1944, the pertinent
provisions of which read:
9.0 En caso de muerte de alguno o de todos los legatarios nom
brados por mi, seran beneficiarios o sea parasan los legados a favor
solamente de los descendientes y ascendientes legitimos, pero no a
los viudos conyuges.
10.0 Transcurridos diez o quince aos despues de mi muerte
todas mispropiedades, muebles o inmuebles, derechos y ventajosos,
pueden proceder a la venta de todos dando preferencia a los
legatarios y de su importe total se deduciran mil pesos (P1,000) para
los cuartrohijos de mi difunto hermano Fabian, todos los gastos y
reservando una cantidad suficiente y bein calcumada para sufrugar
se distriburia a las siguientes personas que aun vuiven, o a sus
descendientes legitimos:
A Isabel M. de Santiago cincuente por ciento (50%)
Los hijos de Domingo Legarda treinta por ciente (30%)
Filomena Diaz diez por ciento (10%)
Nestor M. Santiago diez por ciento (10%)
On November 7, 1944, Benigno Diaz died; and the aforesaid codicil,
together with the will, was admitted to probate in Special Proceedings No.
894 of the same Court of First Instance of Manila. The proceedings for the
administration of the estate of Benigno Diaz were closed in 1950 and the
estate was thereafter put under the administration of the appellee Bank of
the Philippine Islands, as trustee for the benefit of the legatees.
Filomena Diaz died on February 8, 1954, leaving two legitimate children,
Milagros Belen de Olsguera, married, with seven (7) legitimate children,
and Onesima D. Belen, single.
On March 19, 1958, Onesima D. Belen filed a petition in Special
Proceedings No. 9226, contending that the amount that would have
appertained to Filomena Diaz under the codicil should now be
divided(equally) only between herself and Milagros Belen de Olaguera, as
the surviving children of the said deceased, to the exclusion, in other
words, of the seven (7) legitimate children of Milagros Belen de Olaguera.
The court, in its order on May 23, 1958 denied, as initially pointed out
Onesima's petition. More specifically, the court said:
After due consideration of the petition filed by Onesima D. Belen on
March 19, 1958, wherein it is prayed that the trustee Bank of the
Philippine Island be directed to deliver to her "one-half of whatever
share is due to the deceased Filomena Diaz as legatee in the will and
codicil of the deceased testator Benigno Diaz y Heredia, subject of
trusteeship in these proceedings," this Court of the resolution of
September 28, 1959, in which resolution the following was declared:
"That the share of Filomena Diaz in the residue of the proceeds
of the sale of the properties covered in paragraph 10 of the
codicil aforesaid does not and should not from part of her
estate; it pertains to her legitimate descendants; and
"That the aforesaid share of Filomena Diaz should be
distributed not only between her children, Milagros Belen de
Olaguera and Onesima D. Belen, but also among her other
legitimate descendants, if any, for descendientes include not
only children but also grandchildren, etc., and in this
connection. it is not amiss to observe that one may be a
descendant and not yet not be an heir, and vice versa, one may
be an heir and yet not be a descendant.
From this order Onesima D. Belen has appealed to this Court, insisting that
(1) the Court below was in error in holding that its former resolution of
September 16, 1955 had been affirmed by our decision of February 28,
1958 in the case of Arguelles vs. Belen de Olaguera, G.R. No. L-10164
Feb. 28, 1958; and (2) that the term "sus descendeintes legitimos," as used
in the codicil, should be interpreted to mean descendants nearest in the
degree to the original legatee Filomena Diaz. In the present case, they are
her two daughters (Milagros and Onesima Belen), thereby excluding the
seven grandchildren of said legatee.
As to her first point, the appellant is the correct ion her view that the trial
court's interpretation of clause 10 of the codicil to the will of Benigno Diaz
has not been affirmed in our previous decision (G.R. No. L-10164). Perusal
of that judgment will show that this Court left the issue open at the time,
contenting itself with pointing out that the then appellant Administrator of
the estate of Folimena Diaz was not the proper party to the raise the
particular issue.
As the actual meaning of the provision
El restro se distribuira a las siguientes personas que aun viven, o a
sus descendientes legitimos,
it is undeniable that but this cluase the testator ordained a simple
substitution (sustitucion vulgar) with a plurality of substitutes for each
legatee. This form of substitution authorized by the first poart of Article 860
of the Civil Code (Art. 778 of the Code of 1889):
Two or more persons may be substituted for one and one person for
two or more heirs.
The issue is now squarely before us : do the words "sus descendientes
legitimos" refer conjointly to all living descendant (children and
grandchildren) of the legatee, as a class; or they refer to the descendants
nearest in degree?
Appellant Onesima Belen contends that the phrase should be taken to
mean the relatives nearest in degree to Filomena Diaz; and that the legacy
should be therefore divided equally between her and her sister Milagros
Belen de Olaguera, to the exclusion of the latter's sons and daughters,
grand children of the original legatee, Filomena Diaz. As authority in
support of her thesis, appellant invokes Article 959 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (reproducing ne varieter Article 751 of the Code of 1889):
A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives
shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree.
The argument fails to note that this article is specifically limited in its
application to the case where the beneficiaries are relatives of the testator,
not those of the legatee. In such an event, the law assumes that the
testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, in order to benefit the
relatives closest to him, because, as Manresa observes,
la razon y la logica ha cen fundadamente suponer que, al procurar
este favorecer a sus parientes, habria de ajustarse mas a ligadas al
mismo (testador) por los vinculos de la sanger y de la familia (6
Manresa, Comm., 7th Ed., p. 72).
But the ratios legis (that among a testator's relative the closest are dearest)
obviously does not supply where the beneficiaries are relatives of another
person (the legatee) and noot of the testator . There is no logical reason in
this case to presume that the testator intended to refer to the rules of
intestacy, for he precisely made a testament and provided substitutes for
each legatee; nor can it be said that his affections would prefer the nearest
relatives of the legatee to those more distant, since he envisages all of
them in a group, and only as mere substitutes for a preferred beneficiary.
Should Article 959 (old Art. 751) be applied by anology? There are various
reasons against this. The most important one is that under this article, as
recognized by the principal commentators on the Code of 1889, the nearest
of exclude all the farther relatives and right of representation does not
operate. Castan, in his monograph "El derecho de representacion y
mecanimos jurididos afines en la sucesion testamentaria" (Reus, 1942),
says on this question (Pp. 13, 14, 15):
En el subgrupo ibericio de Europia y America predomina, aunque
haya ex excepciones, cuando menos en principio, no tiene cabida en
la sucesion testamentaria. Asi, por ejemplo, lo establece la doctrina
cientifica en Portugal y en la Argentina y lo ha sancionado la
jurisprudencia en Cuba.
En igual sentido, en la doctrina espaola es opinion general que el
derecho de representacion, dentro del Codigo civil, no tiene lugar
mas que en la sucesion intestada, y en la testamentaria en la parte
refernte a las legitimas. MUCIUS SCAEVOLA juzga que la
reopresentacion, atraida por la herencia legitima, es repelida por la
testada, y apunta,

G.R. No. L-8927 March 10, 1914
ASUNCION NABLE JOSE, ET AL., plaintiff-appellants,
vs.
MARIA IGNACIA USON, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Ramon Salinas for appellants.
Pedro M.a Sison for appellees.
MORELAND, J .:
The question involved in this appeal arises from the interpretation of the
first and second clauses of a codicil to the will of Filomena Uson. They read
as follows:
First. I declare that all the property which belongs to me as conjugal
property, referred to in my said testament, shall be the property of my
aforesaid husband, Don Rafael Sison; in case all or part of said
property exists at my husband's death, it is my will that at his death
my sisters and nieces hereinafter named succeed him as heirs.
Second. I declare to be my sisters in lawful wedlock the persons
named Doa Antonia Uson, now deceased, who has left tow
daughters called Maria Rosario, widow, and Maria Paz, unmarried;
Maria Romualda Uson, widow of Estanislao Lengson; Ignacia Uson,
married to Don Vicente Puson; Eufemia Uson, now deceased, who is
survived by three daughters called Maria Salud, Maria Amparo, and
Maria Asuncion; and Maria Pilar Uson; Maria Manaoag Uson,
unmarried, issued had by our deceased after Don Daniel Uson with
one Leonarda Fernandez, alias Andao de Lingayen, so that they may
have and enjoy it in equal parts as good sisters and relatives.
The court below found that the children of the deceased sisters should take
only that portion which their respective mothers would have taken if they
been alive at the time the will was made; that the property should be
divided into six equal parts corresponding to the number of sisters; that
each living sister should take one-sixth, and the children of each deceased
sister should also take one-sixth, each one- sixth to be divided among said
children equally.
This appeal is taken from the judgment entered upon that finding,
appellants asserting that under a proper construction of the paragraphs of
the codicil above-quoted the property should be divided equally between
the living sisters and the children of the deceased sisters, share and share
alike, a niece taking the same share that a sister receives.
We are of the opinion that the appellants' contention is well founded. We
see no words appellants in the clauses quoted which lead necessarily to
the construction placed upon those paragraphs by the learned court below.
On the other hand, we find expressions which seem to indicate with fair
clearness that it was the intention of the testatrix to divide her property
equally between her sisters and nieces. The court below based its
construction upon the theory that the other construction would be "an
admission that the testatrix desired to favor her deceased sister Eufemia
Uson, who left three children, more than her other deceased sister Antonia
Uson, who left two children, and moreover both would be more favored
than any of the other four surviving sisters, one of whom was married at the
time of the execution of the said codicil and without doubt had children."
As we look at the codicil we observe, first, that the testatrix, in the first
paragraph thereof, declares that after her husband's death she desires that
"my sisters and nieces, as hereinafter named, shall succeed him as heirs."
We note, in the second place, that the testatrix, in the second paragraph of
the codicil, names and identifies each one of her heirs then living, in each
one of the persons whom she desires shall succeed her husband in the
property. Among those mentioned specially are the nieces as well as the
sisters. The nieces are referred to in no way different from the sisters. Each
one stands out in the second paragraph of the codicil as clearly as the
other and under exactly the same conditions.
In the third place, we note, with interest, the last clause of the second
paragraph of the codicil which, it seems to us, taken together with the last
clause of the first paragraph of the codicil, is decisive of the intention of the
testatrix. In the last clause she says that she names all of the persons
whom she desires to take under her will be name "so that they must take
and enjoy the property in equal parts as good sisters and relatives."
We have then in the first paragraph a declaration as to who the testatrix
desires shall become the owners of her property on the death of her
husband. Among them we find the names of the nieces as well as of the
sisters. We have also the final declaration of the testatrix that she desires
that the sisters and the nieces shall take and enjoy the property in equal
parts. That being so, it appears to us that the testatrix's intention is fairly
clear, so clear in fact that it is unnecessary to bring in extraneous
arguments to reach a conclusion as to what she intended.
The judgment appealed from is hereby modified by declaring that, of the
property passing under the codicil herein above referred to, the living
sisters and the children of the deceased sisters shall take per capita and in
equal parts, and as so modified the judgment is affirmed. No costs in this
instance.

G.R. No. L-23079 February 27, 1970
RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO
AUSTRIA MOZO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal,
PERFECTO CRUZ, BENITA CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ, ALBERTO
CRUZ and LUZ CRUZ-SALONGA respondents.
Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Sicat and Associates for petitioners.
Ruben Austria for himself and co-petitioners.
De los Santos, De los Santos and De los Santos for respondent Perfecto
Cruz.
Villareal, Almacen, Navarra and Amores for other respondents.

CASTRO, J .:
On July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Special Proceedings 2457) a petition for probate, ante
mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the
present petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro
Austria Mozo, and still others who, like the petitioner, are nephews and
nieces of Basilia. This opposition was, however, dismissed and the probate
of the will allowed after due hearing.
The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will to
pass on to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meez, Isagani
Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had been assumed
and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children.
On April 23, 1959, more than two years after her will was allowed to
probate, Basilia died. The respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed
executor without bond by the same court in accordance with the provisions
of the decedent's will, notwithstanding the blocking attempt pursued by the
petitioner Ruben Austria.
Finally, on November 5, 1959, the present petitioners filed in the same
proceedings a petition in intervention for partition alleging in substance that
they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the five respondents Perfecto
Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in accordance
with law, in effect rendering these respondents mere strangers to the
decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs.
Notwithstanding opposition by the respondent Perfecto Cruz, as executor
of the estate, the court a quo allowed the petitioners' intervention by its
order of December 22, 1959, couched in broad terms, as follows: "The
Petition in Intervention for Partition filed by the above-named oppositors
[Ruben Austria, et al.,] dated November 5, 1959 is hereby granted."
In the meantime, the contending sides debated the matter of authenticity or
lack of it of the several adoption papers produced and presented by the
respondents. On motion of the petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., these
documents were referred to the National Bureau of Investigation for
examination and advice. N.B.I. report seems to bear out the genuineness
of the documents, but the petitioners, evidently dissatisfied with the results,
managed to obtain a preliminary opinion from a Constabulary questioned-
document examiner whose views undermine the authenticity of the said
documents. The petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., thus moved the lower
court to refer the adoption papers to the Philippine Constabulary for further
study. The petitioners likewise located former personnel of the court which
appeared to have granted the questioned adoption, and obtained written
depositions from two of them denying any knowledge of the pertinent
adoption proceedings.
On February 6, 1963, more than three years after they were allowed to
intervene, the petitioners Ruben Austria, let al., moved the lower court to
set for hearing the matter of the genuineness of the adoption of the
respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., by the late Basilia. Before the date set by
the court for hearing arrived, however, the respondent Benita Cruz-Meez
who entered an appearance separately from that of her brother Perfecto
Cruz, filed on February 28, 1963 a motion asking the lower court, by way of
alternative relief, to confine the petitioners' intervention, should it be
permitted, to properties not disposed of in the will of the decedent.
On March 4, 1963, the lower court heard the respondent Benita's motion.
Both sides subsequently submitted their respective memoranda, and
finally, the lower court issued an order on June 4, 1963, delimiting the
petitioners' intervention to the properties of the deceased which were not
disposed of in the will.
The petitioners moved the lower court to reconsider this latest order,
eliciting thereby an opposition, from the respondents. On October 25, 1963
the same court denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
A second motion for reconsideration which set off a long exchange of
memoranda from both sides, was summarily denied on April 21, 1964.
Hence this petition for certiorari, praying this Court to annul the orders of
June 4 and October 25, 1963 and the order of April 21, 1964, all restricting
petitioners' intervention to properties that were not included in the
decedent's testamentary dispositions.
The uncontested premises are clear. Two interests are locked in dispute
over the bulk of the estate of the deceased. Arrayed on one side are the
petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria
Mozo, three of a number of nephews and nieces who are concededly the
nearest surviving blood relatives of the decedent. On the other side are the
respondents brothers and sisters, Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meez,
Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom heirs in the
will of the deceased Basilia, and all of whom claim kinship with the
decedent by virtue of legal adoption. At the heart of the controversy is
Basilia's last will immaculate in its extrinsic validity since it bears the
imprimatur of duly conducted probate proceedings.
The complaint in intervention filed in the lower court assails the legality of
the tie which the respondent Perfecto Cruz and his brothers and sisters
claim to have with the decedent. The lower court had, however, assumed,
by its orders in question, that the validity or invalidity of the adoption is not
material nor decisive on the efficacy of the institution of heirs; for, even if
the adoption in question were spurious, the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et
al., will nevertheless succeed not as compulsory heirs but as testamentary
heirs instituted in Basilia's will. This ruling apparently finds support in
article, 842 of the Civil Code which reads:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose of by will all his
estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to
succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate
provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code
with regard to the legitime of said heirs.
The lower court must have assumed that since the petitioners nephews
and niece are not compulsory heirs, they do not possess that interest which
can be prejudiced by a free-wheeling testamentary disposition. The
petitioners' interest is confined to properties, if any, that have not been
disposed of in the will, for to that extent intestate succession can take place
and the question of the veracity of the adoption acquires relevance.
The petitioners nephews and niece, upon the other hand, insist that the
entire estate should descend to them by intestacy by reason of the intrinsic
nullity of the institution of heirs embodied in the decedent's will. They have
thus raised squarely the issue of whether or not such institution of heirs
would retain efficacy in the event there exists proof that the adoption of the
same heirs by the decedent is false.
The petitioners cite, as the controlling rule, article 850 of the Civil Code
which reads:
The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall
be considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that
the testator would not have made such institution if he had
known the falsity of such cause.
Coming closer to the center of the controversy, the petitioners have called
the attention of the lower court and this Court to the following pertinent
portions of the will of the deceased which recite:
III
Ang aking mga sapilitang tagapagmana (herederos forzosos)
ay ang aking itinuturing na mga anak na tunay (Hijos
legalmente adoptados) na sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at
Isagani, na pawang may apelyidong Cruz.
xxx xxx xxx
Kung ako ay bawian ng Dios ng buhay, ay aking ipinamamana
ang aking mga ari-ariang maiiwan, sa kaparaanang
sumusunod:
A.Aking ipinamamana sa aking nabanggit na limang anak na
sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may
apelyidong Cruz, na parepareho ang kaparti ng bawa't isa at
walang lamangan (en partes iguales), bilang kanilang sapilitang
mana (legiti[ma]), ang kalahati () ng aking kaparti sa lahat ng
aming ari-ariang gananciales ng aking yumaong asawang
Pedro Cruz na napapaloob sa Actuacion Especial No. 640 ng
Hukumang Unang Dulugan ng Rizal at itinutukoy sa No. 1 ng
parafo IV ng testamentong ito, ang kalahati () ng mga lagay
na lupa at palaisdaan na nasa Obando at Polo, Bulacan, na
namana ko sa aking yumaong ama na si Calixto Austria, at ang
kalahati () ng ilang lagay na lupa na nasa Tinejeros, Malabon,
Rizal, na aking namana sa yumao kong kapatid na si Fausto
Austria.
The tenor of the language used, the petitioners argue, gives rise to the
inference that the late Basilia was deceived into believing that she was
legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the respondents
Perfecto Cruz, et al. as the latter's legitime. The petitioners further contend
that had the deceased known the adoption to be spurious, she would not
have instituted the respondents at all the basis of the institution being
solely her belief that they were compulsory heirs. Proof therefore of the
falsity of the adoption would cause a nullity of the institution of heirs and the
opening of the estate wide to intestacy. Did the lower court then abuse its
discretion or act in violation of the rights of the parties in barring the
petitioners nephews and niece from registering their claim even to
properties adjudicated by the decedent in her will?
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil
Code, the following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the
institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be
shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will that the
testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of
the cause.
The petitioners would have us imply, from the use of the terms, "sapilitang
tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana" (legitime), that the
impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the
testatrix's belief that under the law she could not do otherwise. If this were
indeed what prompted the testatrix in instituting the respondents, she did
not make it known in her will. Surely if she was aware that succession to
the legitime takes place by operation of law, independent of her own
wishes, she would not have found it convenient to name her supposed
compulsory heirs to their legitimes. Her express adoption of the rules on
legitimes should very well indicate her complete agreement with that
statutory scheme. But even this, like the petitioners' own proposition, is
highly speculative of what was in the mind of the testatrix when she
executed her will. One fact prevails, however, and it is that the decedent's
will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such
institution of heirs. We cannot annul the same on the basis of guesswork or
uncertain implications.
And even if we should accept the petitioners' theory that the decedent
instituted the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. solely because she believed
that the law commanded her to do so, on the false assumption that her
adoption of these respondents was valid, still such institution must stand.
Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive injunction to ignore
whatever false cause the testator may have written in his will for the
institution of heirs. Such institution may be annulled only when one is
satisfied, after an examination of the will, that the testator clearly would not
have made the institution if he had known the cause for it to be false. Now,
would the late Basilia have caused the revocation of the institution of heirs
if she had known that she was mistaken in treating these heirs as her
legally adopted children? Or would she have instituted them nonetheless?
The decedent's will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute on this
point or at best is vague and uncertain. The phrases, "mga sapilitang
tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana," were borrowed from the language of
the law on succession and were used, respectively, to describe the class of
heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance. They offer no
absolute indication that the decedent would have willed her estate other
than the way she did if she had known that she was not bound by law to
make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her
estate (libre disposicion) which largely favored the respondent Perfecto
Cruz, the latter's children, and the children of the respondent Benita Cruz,
shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give to the respondents more
than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Compare this
with the relatively small devise of land which the decedent had left for her
blood relatives, including the petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro
Mozo and the children of the petitioner Ruben Austria. Were we to exclude
the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. from the inheritance, then the
petitioners and the other nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of
the testate by intestacy a result which would subvert the clear wishes of
the decedent.
Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind should be swept away by these
explicit injunctions in the Civil Code: "The words of a will are to receive an
interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than
one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes
of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy."
1

Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where
the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of
practically his whole estate,
2
as was done in this case. Moreover, so
compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes
of the testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the language of
the will for the purpose of giving it effect.
3
A probate court has found, by
final judgment, that the late Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz was possessed of
testamentary capacity and her last will executed free from falsification,
fraud, trickery or undue influence. In this situation, it becomes our duty to
give full expression to her will.
4

At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix
can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose, and
cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.
5

To the petitioners' charge that the lower court had no power to reverse its
order of December 22, 1959, suffice it to state that, as borne by the
records, the subsequent orders complained of served merely to clarify the
first an act which the court could legally do. Every court has the inherent
power to amend and control its processes and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justices.
6
That the court a quo has limited the
extent of the petitioners' intervention is also within its powers as articulated
by the Rules of Court.
7

ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied, at petitioners cost.

G.R. No. L-29789 December 22, 1928
In re estate of Jose Macrohon Tiahua. FRANCISCO
BARRIOS, administrator-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDA ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., heirs-appellants.
IGNACIO MACROHON, appellant.
P. J. M. Moore for heirs and appellants.
Pablo Lorenzo, Juan S. Alvarez, Perfecto Gabriel, and Delfin Joven for
appellant Macrohon.
No appearance for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J .:
This is an appeal taken by Eduarda Enriquez, surviving spouse of the
deceased Jose Macrohon Tiahua, and the latter's legitimate children on the
one side, and Ignacio Macrohon, his adulterous son, on the other, from an
order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, laying down the
following conclusions of law: (1) That an adulterous child may be instituted
heir within the limits provided by law; (2) that in making Ignacio Macrohon
an heir under his will, the testator did not observe the limitations prescribed
by law; (3) that the institution of Ignacio Macrohon as heir under the will
ought not to be declared absolutely void, but he should so share in the
inheritance as not to prejudice the legitimate of the other heirs; (4) that as
Exhibit 1 deals with certain acts contrary to law, such as not presenting the
will to the court, and as some minors took part in it through their guardian
without the latter being authorized by the court to enter into the transaction
in their behalf, said exhibit cannot bind the parties, nor do the admissions
made by them therein constitute estoppel; whereupon it disapproved the
scheme of partition presented by the administrator and ordered him to file
another in consonance with the conclusions therein laid down.
In support of their appeal, Eduarda Enriquez, widow of Jose Macrohon
Tiahua, and the latter's legitimate children assign the following alleged
errors as committed by the trial court in its judgment, to wit:
Now come the herein surviving spouse, Eduarda Enriquez, and the
legitimate heirs of Jose Macrohon Tiahua, deceased, by their
undersigned attorney, and allege that under the law and the evidence
in the above-entitled proceeding, the lower court committed the
following errors:
I. In not approving the project of distribution of the estate of the herein
deceased, Jose Macrohon Tiahua, as submitted by the herein
executor, Francisco Barrios.
II. In holding that the deceased, Jose Macrohon Tiahua, had any right
to institute and name his bastard son, Ignacio Macrohon, as an heir in
his will, together and in a like manner with his legitimate descendants
and heirs.1awphi1.net
III. And in holding that the said bastard son, Ignacio Macrohon,
having been so instituted and named in the will of the said Jose
Macrohon Tiahua, deceased, said Ignacio Macrohon had a right
under the terms of the will and the law, to inherit a portion of the
estate of the deceased, to the prejudice of the legitimate descendants
and heirs of the said Jose Macrohon Tiahua, deceased.
Ignacio Macrohon, adulterous son of the deceased Jose Macrohon Tiahua
in turn, assigns the following alleged errors as committed by the trial court
in its judgment, in support of his appeal, to wit:
Comes now the appellant Ignacio Macrohon, thru the undersigned
attorney's and to this Honorable Court respectfully submits that the
lower court erred, as follows:
1. In holding that its order dated November 10, 1926, did not
constitute res adjudicata as to question of the right of the appellant
Ignacio Macrohon to inherit from his deceased father, Jose Marcohon
Tiahua, under and in accordance with the will of the latter.
2. In not holding that the right of the said Ignacio Macrohon as heir of
said deceased cannot, by reason of the doctrine of estoppel, be
questioned by the other heirs.
3. In holding that the manner the institution of the heirs was made in
the will of the testator herein falls under, or is the case contemplated
by, article 765 of the Civil Code.
4. In not allowing said Ignacio Marcrohon the full share allotted to him
in and by the will of the testator, that is, a portion equal to that
granted in said will to each of the legitimate of the deceased, or one-
tenth of the whole hereditary estate.
The questions, all of law, raised by the respective parties in their respective
appeals, may be reduced to the following:
(1) Did the deceased Jose Macrohon Tiahua have a right to dispose of a
part of his estate by will in favor of his adulterous son? (2) If so, has the
deceased Jose Macrohon Tiahua infringed the limitations prescribed by the
law in putting his adulterous son Ignacio Macrohon on the same footing as
his legitimate children by giving him a share equal to that of each of the
latter?
As to the first question, while it is true that article 845 of the Civil Code
provides that "illegitimate children who have not the status of natural
children shall be entitled to support only," and therefore cannot demand
anything more of those bound by law to support them, it does not prohibit
said illegitimate children from receiving, nor their parents from giving them,
something more than support, so long as the legitimate children are not
prejudiced. If the law permits a testator to dispose of the free third of his
hereditary estate in favor of a stranger (art. 808 of the Civil Code), there is
no legal, moral or social reason to prevent him from making over that third
to his illlegitimate son who has not the status of a natural son. On the
contrary, by reason of blood, the son, although illegitimate, has a
preferential right over a stranger unless by his behaviour he has become
unworthy of such consideration. For these reasons, we are of opinion and
so hold, that Jose Macrohon Tiahua could dispose of the free third of his
estate in favor of his adulterous son, Ignacio Macrohon. With respect to the
second question of law, Jose Macrohon Tiahua states the following in his
will:
After all my debts, obligations, and funeral expenses have been paid,
I hereby bequeath and devise all my property, real, personal, and
mixed, as follows, to wit:
One-half () pro indiviso of my whole estate to my wife Eduarda
Enriquez, and the other half () in equal parts pro indiviso to each of
my children, including Fernando Quintas and Julia Quintas, son and
daughter, respectively, of my deceased daughter, Gregoria
Macrohon, who shall receive the portion corresponding to the share
of my said daughter, that is, 1/44 for each of the two.
Included among the children mentioned by the testator in said will, and to
whom he gave the one-half of the property corresponding to him from the
conjugal partnership, is the herein appellant Ignacio Macrohon, his
adulterous son. Dividing this half, that is ten-twentieth parts (10/20), among
his nine legitimate children and his adulterous son, Ignacio Macrohon, into
equal parts, each of them will be entitled to one-twentieth of the whole
estate.
Now then, does the twentieth part corresponding to the share of Ignacio
Macrohon impair the legitimate corresponding to each of the nine legitimate
children?
According to article 808 of the Civil Code, the legitime of legitimate children
and descendants consists of two-thirds of the hereditary estate of the father
and of the mother, the latter being allowed to dispose of one of said two
parts in order to give it as a betterment to their legitimate children or
descendants. In the present case the testator has not disposed of any of
the two parts forming the legitime in order to give it as betterment to any of
his children, and the said legitime therefore remains intact, and according
to article 806 of the same Code, is by the law reserved for the forced heirs
and the testator cannot dispose of it in any other way.
Hence, the nine-legitimate children are entitled to two-thirds of said half, or
two-sixths of the whole, which divided equally among them would give to
each, two fifty- fourths or one twenty-seventh of the whole estate. When
Jose Macrohon Tiahua, therefore, provided in his will that the one-half of
the conjugal property belonging to him was to be divided equally among his
nine legitimate children and one adulterous son, each to receive one-
twentieth part, he did not go beyond the limits provided by law for such
cases, because, one-twentieth for each of his legitimate children is more
than each of his legitimate children should receive as his legitime, which
only amounts to one twenty-seventh. In other words, since Jose Macrohon
Tiahua could dispose of the free third of his herediatary estate in favor of
his adulterous son, Ignacio Macrohon, and as he only gave a part of said
free third to the latter, he did not infringe any legal prohibition and his
testamentary disposition to this effect is valid and effective.
Having arrived at these conclusions there is no need to discuss the other
questions of law raised by the parties in their respective assignments of
error.
By virtue whereof, the order appealed from is modified and it is ordered that
the dispositons made by Jose Macrohon Tiahua in his last will and
testament be strictly complied with, without special pronouncement of
costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-26545 December 16, 1927
Testate Estate of Florencia R. Mateo. PERFECTO GABRIEL, petitioner-
appellee,
vs.
RITA R. MATEO, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
R. Gonzales Lloret, Carlos S. Basa, Thomas Cary Welch and Camus,
Delgado and Recto for appellants.
The appellee in his own behalf.

AVANCEA, C. J .:
The judgment appealed from allowed the will of Florencia Mateo dated
February 6, 1923, composed of two used sheets to probate. The will
appears to be signed by the testatrix and three witnesses on the left margin
of each of the sheets, by the testatrix alone at the bottom, and by the three
witnesses after the attestation clause. The testatrix died on August 13,
1925. Opposition to such probate was filed by Rita Mateo, the testatrix's
sister, and by other relatives.
The three attesting witnesses to this will, testifying in this case, declared
that the signature of the testatrix were written in their presence and that
they signed their names in the presence of the testatrix and of each other.
The testatrix from girlhood knew how to sign her name and did so with her
right hand; but as the right side of her body later became paralyzed, she
learned to sign with her left hand and for many years thereafter, up to the
time of her death, she used to sign with that hand. Opponents allege that
Florencia Mateo did not sign this will.
There are three salient arguments among those adduced by the opponents
in support of their opposition.
The attesting witnesses testified that the testratrix signed before they did.
The signatures of the testatrix on the left margin of the two sheets of the
will are between the signatures of the two witnesses Vidal Raoa and Julio
Gabriel, and below her surname is the signature of the other witness
Felicisimo Gabriel. The signatures of Vidal Raoa and Julio Gabriel are on
a level with each other, while that of Felicisimo Gabriel is found a little lower
down. The testatrix's signatures start on the line with Felicisimo Gabriel's
signature, but tend to rise and her surname reaches a level with Julio
Gabriel's signature.
It is said that this direction of the testatrix's signature was due to the fact
that when it was written Felicisimo Gabriel's signature was already there,
and so she had to write her surname upwards in order to avoid interfering
with that Felicisimo Gabriel, which would have been the case had she
continued on the horizontal line on which she had written her first name.
From this detail it is pretended to draw the inference that the attesting
witnesses signed before testatrix, contrary to their testimony that she
singed before they did. This deduction, however, is unnecessary. It may be
inferred with equal, if not greater, logic that the testatrix signed before him,
and when it came to the witness Gabriel's turn, he, finding the space below
the testatrix signature free, signed his name there. On the other hand, it
may be noted that the testatrix's other signature at the bottom of the will
also shows a more or less marked tendency to rise, notwithstanding the
fact that there was no signature with which she might interfere if she
continued to write in a straight horizontal line. Furthermore, if, as the
opposition alleges, the testatrix's signature is not genuine and was placed
there by another person, it is strange that the latter should have done so in
such a way as to write it above Gabriel's signature while following the
horizontal line, when this could have been avoided by simply putting it a
little higher. And this may be attributed to carelessness in the first case, but
it cannot be so explained in the second.
Attention is also called to the apparently different kinds of ink used by the
testatrix in her signature and by the attesting witnesses. Really an
examination of these signature reveals a somewhat deeper intensity of ink
in the signature of the testatrix than in those of the attesting witnesses. It is
alleged that this circumstance cannot be reconciled with the declaration of
the attesting witnesses that they used the same pen and ink as the
testatrix. But, only one of these witnesses declared this. The other one was
not sure of it and said that he said that he did not perfectly remember this
detail. The third scarcely made reference to this particular. At all events,
this apparent difference in ink may be merely
due supposing that the same ink and pen were used to the difference
in pressure employed in writing these signatures, as is reasonable to
suppose when we consider that the testatrix was a paralytic and wrote with
her left hand; or it may have been due to the fact that the attesting
witnesses dipped lightly in the ink while the testatrix dipped the pen so as
to take up the ink from the bottom of the well. To bring out this irregularity,
the opposition presented the expert Del Rosario who asserted, among
other things, that the signature of the testatrix is more recent than that of
the attesting witnesses. If this opinion is correct and if, as alleged, the
testatrix's signature is forged, it would mean that the forgers, after having
prepared the will and made the witnesses sign, allowed sometime to
elapsed before forging the testatrix's signature, which supposition is not all
probable, nor has it been explained.lawphi1.net
At all events, even admitting that there is a certain question as to whether
the attesting witnesses signed before or after the testatrix, or whether or
not they signed with the same pen and ink, these are details of such trivial
importance, considering that this will was signed two years before the date
on which these witnesses gave their testimony, that it is not proper to set
aside the will for this reason alone.
The attesting witnesses to this will, who testified also as witnesses at the
trial of this case, showed themselves to be intelligent and honest, one of
them being a lawyer of twelve year's practice, and there is no reason to
reject their testimony, and to suppose that they were untruthful in testifying,
and that they falsified the will in question.
Lastly, attention is called to the unreasonableness of the testatrix in not
leaving anything to the principal opponent, her sister Rita Mateo, and to her
nephews and nieces, to whom she had been so affectionate during life. But
as to the affectionate relations between the deceased and the opponents,
only the opponent Rita Mateo testified, and she only stated that she was on
good terms with her sister during the latter's lifetime; that the said sister
used to give her a sack or some gantas of rice, and, a times, a little money;
that she held all her nephews and nieces in equal regard. But even
supposing that this were so, there is nothing strange in the testatrix having
left nothing to the opponents, or in her having left all of her estate to the
only heir instituted in her will, Tomas Mateo, who is also one of her nieces.
And not only is it not strange, but it seems reasonable, since, according to
the evidence of the testatrix when the former was but 3 years old, and from
then on up to the time of her death had never been separated from her.
The opposition presented Doctor Banks as expert. He testified that the
signatures of the testatrix in the will are not genuine. The petitioner, on the
other hand, presented another expert, Pedro Serrano Laktao, who affirmed
that these signatures are genuine. But, over the testimony of these experts,
we have the categorical and positive declaration of veracious witnesses
who affirm that these signatures were written by the testatrix herself.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
So ordered.

G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA
DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
Punzalan, Yabut & Eusebio for executrix-appellee.
Leonardo Abola for oppositors-appellants.

TEEHANKEE, J .:
Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving
the Executrix-appellee's project of partition instead of Oppositors-
Appellants' proposed counter-project of partition.
1

On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in
Angeles, Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit,
six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita
Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and
Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is
the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased
legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven compulsory heirs
(except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-
appellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and
written in the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the
above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate
grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano
Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano
Tiambon.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her
properties appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land
appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank
deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar
Development Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named heirs.
Testate proceedings were in due course commenced
2
and by order dated
March 13, 1961, the last will and testament of the decedent was duly
allowed and admitted to probate, and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera
was appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate, and upon her filing her
bond and oath of office, letters testamentary were duly issued to her.
After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo
of Angeles, Pampanga was appointed commissioner to appraise the
properties of the estate. He filed in due course his report of appraisal and
the same was approved in toto by the lower court on December 12, 1963
upon joint petition of the parties.
The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death
thus had a total appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each
of the seven compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11.
3
(/7 of the half
of the estate reserved for the legitime of legitimate children and
descendants).
4
In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be
divided" in accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she
devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising practically the
entire bulk of her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren.
The appraised values of the real properties thus respectively devised by
the testatrix to the beneficiaries named in her will, are as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ....................................... P 98,474.80
2. Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.06
3. Bernardita Dizon .................................. 51,968.17
4. Josefina Dizon ...................................... 52,056.39
5. Tomas Dizon ....................................... 131,987.41
6. Lilia Dizon .............................................. 72,182.47
7. Marina Dizon ..................................... 1,148,063.71
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ...................................... 69,280.00
9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia,
Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly
Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon ................. 72,540.00
Total Value ...................... P1,801,960.01
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in
substance adjudicating the estate as follows:
(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina
(exacultrix-appellee) and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly
considered to have received in the will more than their
respective legitime, while the rest of the appellants, namely,
Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia received less
than their respective legitime;
(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties
respectively given them in the will, plus cash and/or properties,
to complete their respective legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on
the other hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the
properties that they received in the will less the cash and/or
properties necessary to complete the prejudiced legitime
mentioned in number 2 above;
(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the
grandchildren remain untouched.<re||an1w>
On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-
project of partition dated February 14, 1964, wherein they
proposed the distribution of the estate on the following basis:
(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally
reduced to the value of one-half () of the entire estate, the
value of the said one-half () amounting to P905,534.78; (b)
the shares of the Oppositors-Appellants should consist of their
legitime, plus the devises in their favor proportionally reduced;
(c) in payment of the total shares of the appellants in the entire
estate, the properties devised to them plus other properties left
by the Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to them; and (d) to
the grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs are adjudicated
the properties respectively devised to them subject to
reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia, et al., of the sums by
which the devise in their favor should be proportionally reduced.
Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary
disposition made by the testatrix of practically her whole estate of
P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were proposed to be reduced to the
amounts set forth after the names of the respective heirs and devisees
totalling one-half thereof as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ........................................... P 49,485.56
2. Angelina Dizon ......................................... 53,421.42
3. Bernardita Dizon ....................................... 26,115.04
4. Josefina Dizon .......................................... 26,159.38
5. Tomas V. Dizon ......................................... 65,874.04
6. Lilia Dizon .................................................. 36,273.13
7. Marina Dizon ........................................... 576,938.82
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ......................................... 34,814.50
9. Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et al .......... 36,452.80
T o t a l ................................................... P905,534.78
while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as
constituting the legitime of the executrix-appellee and oppositors-
appellants, to be divided among them in seven equal parts of P129,362.11
as their respective legitimes.
The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix'
project of partition, ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code
specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the
same shall be completed and satisfied. While it is true that this process has
been followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is observed
that the executrix and the oppositors differ in respect to the source from
which the portion or portions shall be taken in order to fully restore the
impaired legitime. The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will
substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of
Article 791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has chosen to
favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted.
This is legally permissible within the limitation of the law, as aforecited."
With reference to the payment in cash of some P230,552.38, principally by
the executrix as the largest beneficiary of the will to be paid to her five co-
heirs, the oppositors (excluding Tomas Dizon), to complete their impaired
legitimes, the lower court ruled that "(T)he payment in cash so as to make
the proper adjustment to meet with the requirements of the law in respect
to legitimes which have been impaired is, in our opinion, a practical and
valid solution in order to give effect to the last wishes of the testatrix."
From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed
this appeal, and raise anew the following issues: .
1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will
are in the nature of devises imputable to the free portion of her estate, and
therefore subject to reduction;
2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime
under Article 1063, or merely to demand completion of their legitime under
Article 906 of the Civil Code; and
3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on
account of their legitime, instead of some of the real properties left by the
Testatrix;
which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below.
The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of
the testatrix which is "the life and soul of a will."
5
In consonance therewith,
our Civil Code included the new provisions found in Articles 788 and 791
thereof that "(I)f a testamentary disposition admits of different
interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition
is to be operative shall be preferred" and "(T)he words of a will are to
receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect,
rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of
two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent
intestacy." In Villanueva vs. Juico
6
for violation of these rules of
interpretation as well as of Rule 123, section 59 of the old Rules of
Court, 7 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned
the lower court's decision and stressed that "the intention and wishes of the
testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of
interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution
and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain
and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearlyappears that his
intention was otherwise." 8
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in
the matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain, 9 when expressed clearly and precisely in his last
will amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully
obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and
legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute
their own criterion for the testator's will. Guided and restricted by these
fundamental premises, the Court finds for the appellee.
1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary
disposition was in the nature of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in the
third paragraph of her will, after commanding that upon her death all her
obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the
expenses for probate of her last will and for the administration of her
property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is
my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with
the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified
each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among
her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she
bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition
10
of her estate, as
contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the
Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate
by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as
it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs." This right of a
testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory heirs
to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for the right of
such compulsory heirs:
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by
any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand
that the same be fully satisfied.
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the
legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of
the same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's
project of partition, wherein the five oppositors-appellants
namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were
adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned
to them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to
complete their respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each were
taken from the cash and/or properties of the executrix-appellee,
Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who
admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in the
partition by will more than their respective legitimes.
2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even
in Article 1056 of the old Civil Code which has been reproduced now as
Article 1080 of the present Civil Code. The only amendment in the
provision was that Article 1080 "now permits any person (not a testator, as
under the old law) to partition his estate by actinter vivos."
11
This was
intended to repeal the then prevailing doctrine
12
that for a testator to
partition his estate by an actinter vivos, he must first make a will with all the
formalities provided by law. Authoritative commentators doubt the efficacy
of the amendment
13
but the question does not here concern us, for this is a
clear case of partition by will, duly admitted to probate, which perforce must
be given full validity and effect. Aside from the provisions of Articles 906
and 907 above quoted, other codal provisions support the executrix-
appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than
the counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby
they would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the
testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere
devises or legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion,
and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the
seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially
to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary
to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further run counter to the
provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made
confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated
to him."
3. In Habana vs. Imbo,
14
the Court upheld the distribution made in the will
of the deceased testator Pedro Teves of two large coconut plantations in
favor of his daughter, Concepcion, as against adverse claims of other
compulsory heirs, as being a partition by will, which should be respected
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in
accordance with Article 1080 of the Civil Code. In upholding the sale made
by Concepcion to a stranger of the plantations thus partitioned in her favor
in the deceased's will which was being questioned by the other compulsory
heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion Teves by operation of law, became
the absolute owner of said lots because 'A partition legally made confers
upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him'
(Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the death of her ancestors, subject to
rights and obligations of the latter, and, she can not be deprived of her
rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law (Arts. 657, 659,
and 661, Civil Code).
15
Concepcion Teves could, as she did, sell the lots in
question as part of her share of the proposed partition of the properties,
especially when, as in the present case, the sale has been expressly
recognized by herself and her co-heirs ..."
4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary
dispositions in their favor are in the nature of devises of real property, citing
the testatrix' repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her assignment or
distribution of her real properties to the respective heirs. From this
erroneous premise, they proceed to the equally erroneous conclusion that
"the legitime of the compulsory heirs passes to them by operation of law
and that the testator can only dispose of the free portion, that is, the
remainder of the estate after deducting the legitime of the compulsory heirs
... and all testamentary dispositions, either in the nature of institution of
heirs or of devises or legacies, have to be taken from the remainder of the
testator's estate constituting the free portion."
16

Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in
the testatrix' will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be
considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the whole context of the
will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some
small properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion)
that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through her will.
The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary
dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the same into
devises to be taken solely from the free one-half disposable portion of the
estate. Furthermore, the testatrix' intent that her testamentary dispositions
were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere
devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the
respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the
fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary
adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise
command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this
testament any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law
enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to
said deceased."
17

Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary
dispositions of the testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs,
do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the estate, as
contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code
precisely provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirs may dispose of
his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with
regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors' own
theory of bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers
precisely the case of the executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored by
the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate in providing that "(T)he devisee
who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property, provided its
value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share
pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual
reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die
intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions by the testatrix
constituted a partition by will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil
Code and of the other cited codal provisions upholding the primacy of the
testator's last will and testament, have to be respected insofar as they do
not prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by
will is not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise
provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired" and
invoking of the construction thereof given by some authorities that "'not
deemed subject to collation' in this article really means not imputable to or
chargeable against the legitime", while it may have some plausibility
19
in
an appropriate case, has no application in the present case. Here, we have
a case of a distribution and partition of the entire estate by the testatrix,
without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which
would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having left
merely some properties by will which would call for the application of
Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The amount of the
legitime of the heirs is here determined and undisputed.
5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants,
the secondary issues are likewise necessarily resolved. Their right was
merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil
Code and this has been complied with in the approved project of partition,
and they can no longer demand a further share from the remaining portion
of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally to
the executrix-appellee.
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed
with real properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the
approved project of partition. The properties are not available for the
purpose, as the testatrix had specifically partitioned and distributed them to
her heirs, and the heirs are called upon, as far as feasible to comply with
and give effect to the intention of the testatrix as solemnized in her will, by
implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real properties intact to
her named beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee. The appraisal
report of the properties of the estate as filed by the commissioner
appointed by the lower court was approved in toto upon joint petition of the
parties, and hence, there cannot be said to be any question and none is
presented as to fairness of the valuation thereof or that the legitime of
the heirs in terms of cash has been understated. The plaint of oppositors
that the purchasing value of the Philippine peso has greatly declined since
the testatrix' death in January, 1961 provides no legal basis or justification
for overturning the wishes and intent of the testatrix. The transmission of
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent (Article 777, Civil Code) and accordingly, the value thereof must
be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates would never be settled if
there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the
values of the currency and properties of the estate. There is evidence in the
record that prior to November 25, 1964, one of the oppositors, Bernardita,
accepted the sum of P50,000.00 on account of her inheritance, which, per
the parties' manifestation,
20
"does not in any way affect the adjudication
made to her in the projects of partition of either party as the same is a mere
advance of the cash that she should receive in both projects of partition."
The payment in cash by way of making the proper adjustments in order to
meet the requirements of the law on non-impairment of legitimes as well as
to give effect to the last will of the testatrix has invariably been availed of
and sanctioned.
21
That her co-oppositors would receive their cash
differentials only now when the value of the currency has declined further,
whereas they could have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at the time
of approval of the project of partition and when the peso's purchasing value
was higher, is due to their own decision of pursuing the present appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. Without
cost.

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