ONESIMA D. BELEN, petitioner-appellant, vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and MILAGROS BELEN DE OLAGUERA, oppositors-appellees. E. A. Beltran for appellant. E. P. Villar for appellees. R. F. Aviado for Trustee Bank. REYES, J.B.L., J .: Appeal from an order, dated May 23, 1958 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceedings No. 9226, denying appellant's petition therein as hereafter discussed. Briefly, the facts and circumstances that brought about this present appeal may be narrated as follows: Benigno Diaz executed a codicil on September 29, 1944, the pertinent provisions of which read: 9.0 En caso de muerte de alguno o de todos los legatarios nom brados por mi, seran beneficiarios o sea parasan los legados a favor solamente de los descendientes y ascendientes legitimos, pero no a los viudos conyuges. 10.0 Transcurridos diez o quince aos despues de mi muerte todas mispropiedades, muebles o inmuebles, derechos y ventajosos, pueden proceder a la venta de todos dando preferencia a los legatarios y de su importe total se deduciran mil pesos (P1,000) para los cuartrohijos de mi difunto hermano Fabian, todos los gastos y reservando una cantidad suficiente y bein calcumada para sufrugar se distriburia a las siguientes personas que aun vuiven, o a sus descendientes legitimos: A Isabel M. de Santiago cincuente por ciento (50%) Los hijos de Domingo Legarda treinta por ciente (30%) Filomena Diaz diez por ciento (10%) Nestor M. Santiago diez por ciento (10%) On November 7, 1944, Benigno Diaz died; and the aforesaid codicil, together with the will, was admitted to probate in Special Proceedings No. 894 of the same Court of First Instance of Manila. The proceedings for the administration of the estate of Benigno Diaz were closed in 1950 and the estate was thereafter put under the administration of the appellee Bank of the Philippine Islands, as trustee for the benefit of the legatees. Filomena Diaz died on February 8, 1954, leaving two legitimate children, Milagros Belen de Olsguera, married, with seven (7) legitimate children, and Onesima D. Belen, single. On March 19, 1958, Onesima D. Belen filed a petition in Special Proceedings No. 9226, contending that the amount that would have appertained to Filomena Diaz under the codicil should now be divided(equally) only between herself and Milagros Belen de Olaguera, as the surviving children of the said deceased, to the exclusion, in other words, of the seven (7) legitimate children of Milagros Belen de Olaguera. The court, in its order on May 23, 1958 denied, as initially pointed out Onesima's petition. More specifically, the court said: After due consideration of the petition filed by Onesima D. Belen on March 19, 1958, wherein it is prayed that the trustee Bank of the Philippine Island be directed to deliver to her "one-half of whatever share is due to the deceased Filomena Diaz as legatee in the will and codicil of the deceased testator Benigno Diaz y Heredia, subject of trusteeship in these proceedings," this Court of the resolution of September 28, 1959, in which resolution the following was declared: "That the share of Filomena Diaz in the residue of the proceeds of the sale of the properties covered in paragraph 10 of the codicil aforesaid does not and should not from part of her estate; it pertains to her legitimate descendants; and "That the aforesaid share of Filomena Diaz should be distributed not only between her children, Milagros Belen de Olaguera and Onesima D. Belen, but also among her other legitimate descendants, if any, for descendientes include not only children but also grandchildren, etc., and in this connection. it is not amiss to observe that one may be a descendant and not yet not be an heir, and vice versa, one may be an heir and yet not be a descendant. From this order Onesima D. Belen has appealed to this Court, insisting that (1) the Court below was in error in holding that its former resolution of September 16, 1955 had been affirmed by our decision of February 28, 1958 in the case of Arguelles vs. Belen de Olaguera, G.R. No. L-10164 Feb. 28, 1958; and (2) that the term "sus descendeintes legitimos," as used in the codicil, should be interpreted to mean descendants nearest in the degree to the original legatee Filomena Diaz. In the present case, they are her two daughters (Milagros and Onesima Belen), thereby excluding the seven grandchildren of said legatee. As to her first point, the appellant is the correct ion her view that the trial court's interpretation of clause 10 of the codicil to the will of Benigno Diaz has not been affirmed in our previous decision (G.R. No. L-10164). Perusal of that judgment will show that this Court left the issue open at the time, contenting itself with pointing out that the then appellant Administrator of the estate of Folimena Diaz was not the proper party to the raise the particular issue. As the actual meaning of the provision El restro se distribuira a las siguientes personas que aun viven, o a sus descendientes legitimos, it is undeniable that but this cluase the testator ordained a simple substitution (sustitucion vulgar) with a plurality of substitutes for each legatee. This form of substitution authorized by the first poart of Article 860 of the Civil Code (Art. 778 of the Code of 1889): Two or more persons may be substituted for one and one person for two or more heirs. The issue is now squarely before us : do the words "sus descendientes legitimos" refer conjointly to all living descendant (children and grandchildren) of the legatee, as a class; or they refer to the descendants nearest in degree? Appellant Onesima Belen contends that the phrase should be taken to mean the relatives nearest in degree to Filomena Diaz; and that the legacy should be therefore divided equally between her and her sister Milagros Belen de Olaguera, to the exclusion of the latter's sons and daughters, grand children of the original legatee, Filomena Diaz. As authority in support of her thesis, appellant invokes Article 959 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (reproducing ne varieter Article 751 of the Code of 1889): A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree. The argument fails to note that this article is specifically limited in its application to the case where the beneficiaries are relatives of the testator, not those of the legatee. In such an event, the law assumes that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, in order to benefit the relatives closest to him, because, as Manresa observes, la razon y la logica ha cen fundadamente suponer que, al procurar este favorecer a sus parientes, habria de ajustarse mas a ligadas al mismo (testador) por los vinculos de la sanger y de la familia (6 Manresa, Comm., 7th Ed., p. 72). But the ratios legis (that among a testator's relative the closest are dearest) obviously does not supply where the beneficiaries are relatives of another person (the legatee) and noot of the testator . There is no logical reason in this case to presume that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, for he precisely made a testament and provided substitutes for each legatee; nor can it be said that his affections would prefer the nearest relatives of the legatee to those more distant, since he envisages all of them in a group, and only as mere substitutes for a preferred beneficiary. Should Article 959 (old Art. 751) be applied by anology? There are various reasons against this. The most important one is that under this article, as recognized by the principal commentators on the Code of 1889, the nearest of exclude all the farther relatives and right of representation does not operate. Castan, in his monograph "El derecho de representacion y mecanimos jurididos afines en la sucesion testamentaria" (Reus, 1942), says on this question (Pp. 13, 14, 15): En el subgrupo ibericio de Europia y America predomina, aunque haya ex excepciones, cuando menos en principio, no tiene cabida en la sucesion testamentaria. Asi, por ejemplo, lo establece la doctrina cientifica en Portugal y en la Argentina y lo ha sancionado la jurisprudencia en Cuba. En igual sentido, en la doctrina espaola es opinion general que el derecho de representacion, dentro del Codigo civil, no tiene lugar mas que en la sucesion intestada, y en la testamentaria en la parte refernte a las legitimas. MUCIUS SCAEVOLA juzga que la reopresentacion, atraida por la herencia legitima, es repelida por la testada, y apunta,
G.R. No. L-8927 March 10, 1914 ASUNCION NABLE JOSE, ET AL., plaintiff-appellants, vs. MARIA IGNACIA USON, ET AL., defendants-appellees. Ramon Salinas for appellants. Pedro M.a Sison for appellees. MORELAND, J .: The question involved in this appeal arises from the interpretation of the first and second clauses of a codicil to the will of Filomena Uson. They read as follows: First. I declare that all the property which belongs to me as conjugal property, referred to in my said testament, shall be the property of my aforesaid husband, Don Rafael Sison; in case all or part of said property exists at my husband's death, it is my will that at his death my sisters and nieces hereinafter named succeed him as heirs. Second. I declare to be my sisters in lawful wedlock the persons named Doa Antonia Uson, now deceased, who has left tow daughters called Maria Rosario, widow, and Maria Paz, unmarried; Maria Romualda Uson, widow of Estanislao Lengson; Ignacia Uson, married to Don Vicente Puson; Eufemia Uson, now deceased, who is survived by three daughters called Maria Salud, Maria Amparo, and Maria Asuncion; and Maria Pilar Uson; Maria Manaoag Uson, unmarried, issued had by our deceased after Don Daniel Uson with one Leonarda Fernandez, alias Andao de Lingayen, so that they may have and enjoy it in equal parts as good sisters and relatives. The court below found that the children of the deceased sisters should take only that portion which their respective mothers would have taken if they been alive at the time the will was made; that the property should be divided into six equal parts corresponding to the number of sisters; that each living sister should take one-sixth, and the children of each deceased sister should also take one-sixth, each one- sixth to be divided among said children equally. This appeal is taken from the judgment entered upon that finding, appellants asserting that under a proper construction of the paragraphs of the codicil above-quoted the property should be divided equally between the living sisters and the children of the deceased sisters, share and share alike, a niece taking the same share that a sister receives. We are of the opinion that the appellants' contention is well founded. We see no words appellants in the clauses quoted which lead necessarily to the construction placed upon those paragraphs by the learned court below. On the other hand, we find expressions which seem to indicate with fair clearness that it was the intention of the testatrix to divide her property equally between her sisters and nieces. The court below based its construction upon the theory that the other construction would be "an admission that the testatrix desired to favor her deceased sister Eufemia Uson, who left three children, more than her other deceased sister Antonia Uson, who left two children, and moreover both would be more favored than any of the other four surviving sisters, one of whom was married at the time of the execution of the said codicil and without doubt had children." As we look at the codicil we observe, first, that the testatrix, in the first paragraph thereof, declares that after her husband's death she desires that "my sisters and nieces, as hereinafter named, shall succeed him as heirs." We note, in the second place, that the testatrix, in the second paragraph of the codicil, names and identifies each one of her heirs then living, in each one of the persons whom she desires shall succeed her husband in the property. Among those mentioned specially are the nieces as well as the sisters. The nieces are referred to in no way different from the sisters. Each one stands out in the second paragraph of the codicil as clearly as the other and under exactly the same conditions. In the third place, we note, with interest, the last clause of the second paragraph of the codicil which, it seems to us, taken together with the last clause of the first paragraph of the codicil, is decisive of the intention of the testatrix. In the last clause she says that she names all of the persons whom she desires to take under her will be name "so that they must take and enjoy the property in equal parts as good sisters and relatives." We have then in the first paragraph a declaration as to who the testatrix desires shall become the owners of her property on the death of her husband. Among them we find the names of the nieces as well as of the sisters. We have also the final declaration of the testatrix that she desires that the sisters and the nieces shall take and enjoy the property in equal parts. That being so, it appears to us that the testatrix's intention is fairly clear, so clear in fact that it is unnecessary to bring in extraneous arguments to reach a conclusion as to what she intended. The judgment appealed from is hereby modified by declaring that, of the property passing under the codicil herein above referred to, the living sisters and the children of the deceased sisters shall take per capita and in equal parts, and as so modified the judgment is affirmed. No costs in this instance.
G.R. No. L-23079 February 27, 1970 RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO AUSTRIA MOZO, petitioners, vs. HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, PERFECTO CRUZ, BENITA CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ, ALBERTO CRUZ and LUZ CRUZ-SALONGA respondents. Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Sicat and Associates for petitioners. Ruben Austria for himself and co-petitioners. De los Santos, De los Santos and De los Santos for respondent Perfecto Cruz. Villareal, Almacen, Navarra and Amores for other respondents.
CASTRO, J .: On July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Special Proceedings 2457) a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, and still others who, like the petitioner, are nephews and nieces of Basilia. This opposition was, however, dismissed and the probate of the will allowed after due hearing. The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will to pass on to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children. On April 23, 1959, more than two years after her will was allowed to probate, Basilia died. The respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed executor without bond by the same court in accordance with the provisions of the decedent's will, notwithstanding the blocking attempt pursued by the petitioner Ruben Austria. Finally, on November 5, 1959, the present petitioners filed in the same proceedings a petition in intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the five respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, in effect rendering these respondents mere strangers to the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs. Notwithstanding opposition by the respondent Perfecto Cruz, as executor of the estate, the court a quo allowed the petitioners' intervention by its order of December 22, 1959, couched in broad terms, as follows: "The Petition in Intervention for Partition filed by the above-named oppositors [Ruben Austria, et al.,] dated November 5, 1959 is hereby granted." In the meantime, the contending sides debated the matter of authenticity or lack of it of the several adoption papers produced and presented by the respondents. On motion of the petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., these documents were referred to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination and advice. N.B.I. report seems to bear out the genuineness of the documents, but the petitioners, evidently dissatisfied with the results, managed to obtain a preliminary opinion from a Constabulary questioned- document examiner whose views undermine the authenticity of the said documents. The petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., thus moved the lower court to refer the adoption papers to the Philippine Constabulary for further study. The petitioners likewise located former personnel of the court which appeared to have granted the questioned adoption, and obtained written depositions from two of them denying any knowledge of the pertinent adoption proceedings. On February 6, 1963, more than three years after they were allowed to intervene, the petitioners Ruben Austria, let al., moved the lower court to set for hearing the matter of the genuineness of the adoption of the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., by the late Basilia. Before the date set by the court for hearing arrived, however, the respondent Benita Cruz-Meez who entered an appearance separately from that of her brother Perfecto Cruz, filed on February 28, 1963 a motion asking the lower court, by way of alternative relief, to confine the petitioners' intervention, should it be permitted, to properties not disposed of in the will of the decedent. On March 4, 1963, the lower court heard the respondent Benita's motion. Both sides subsequently submitted their respective memoranda, and finally, the lower court issued an order on June 4, 1963, delimiting the petitioners' intervention to the properties of the deceased which were not disposed of in the will. The petitioners moved the lower court to reconsider this latest order, eliciting thereby an opposition, from the respondents. On October 25, 1963 the same court denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. A second motion for reconsideration which set off a long exchange of memoranda from both sides, was summarily denied on April 21, 1964. Hence this petition for certiorari, praying this Court to annul the orders of June 4 and October 25, 1963 and the order of April 21, 1964, all restricting petitioners' intervention to properties that were not included in the decedent's testamentary dispositions. The uncontested premises are clear. Two interests are locked in dispute over the bulk of the estate of the deceased. Arrayed on one side are the petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, three of a number of nephews and nieces who are concededly the nearest surviving blood relatives of the decedent. On the other side are the respondents brothers and sisters, Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom heirs in the will of the deceased Basilia, and all of whom claim kinship with the decedent by virtue of legal adoption. At the heart of the controversy is Basilia's last will immaculate in its extrinsic validity since it bears the imprimatur of duly conducted probate proceedings. The complaint in intervention filed in the lower court assails the legality of the tie which the respondent Perfecto Cruz and his brothers and sisters claim to have with the decedent. The lower court had, however, assumed, by its orders in question, that the validity or invalidity of the adoption is not material nor decisive on the efficacy of the institution of heirs; for, even if the adoption in question were spurious, the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., will nevertheless succeed not as compulsory heirs but as testamentary heirs instituted in Basilia's will. This ruling apparently finds support in article, 842 of the Civil Code which reads: One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose of by will all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed. One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs. The lower court must have assumed that since the petitioners nephews and niece are not compulsory heirs, they do not possess that interest which can be prejudiced by a free-wheeling testamentary disposition. The petitioners' interest is confined to properties, if any, that have not been disposed of in the will, for to that extent intestate succession can take place and the question of the veracity of the adoption acquires relevance. The petitioners nephews and niece, upon the other hand, insist that the entire estate should descend to them by intestacy by reason of the intrinsic nullity of the institution of heirs embodied in the decedent's will. They have thus raised squarely the issue of whether or not such institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists proof that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false. The petitioners cite, as the controlling rule, article 850 of the Civil Code which reads: The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause. Coming closer to the center of the controversy, the petitioners have called the attention of the lower court and this Court to the following pertinent portions of the will of the deceased which recite: III Ang aking mga sapilitang tagapagmana (herederos forzosos) ay ang aking itinuturing na mga anak na tunay (Hijos legalmente adoptados) na sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may apelyidong Cruz. xxx xxx xxx Kung ako ay bawian ng Dios ng buhay, ay aking ipinamamana ang aking mga ari-ariang maiiwan, sa kaparaanang sumusunod: A.Aking ipinamamana sa aking nabanggit na limang anak na sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may apelyidong Cruz, na parepareho ang kaparti ng bawa't isa at walang lamangan (en partes iguales), bilang kanilang sapilitang mana (legiti[ma]), ang kalahati () ng aking kaparti sa lahat ng aming ari-ariang gananciales ng aking yumaong asawang Pedro Cruz na napapaloob sa Actuacion Especial No. 640 ng Hukumang Unang Dulugan ng Rizal at itinutukoy sa No. 1 ng parafo IV ng testamentong ito, ang kalahati () ng mga lagay na lupa at palaisdaan na nasa Obando at Polo, Bulacan, na namana ko sa aking yumaong ama na si Calixto Austria, at ang kalahati () ng ilang lagay na lupa na nasa Tinejeros, Malabon, Rizal, na aking namana sa yumao kong kapatid na si Fausto Austria. The tenor of the language used, the petitioners argue, gives rise to the inference that the late Basilia was deceived into believing that she was legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. as the latter's legitime. The petitioners further contend that had the deceased known the adoption to be spurious, she would not have instituted the respondents at all the basis of the institution being solely her belief that they were compulsory heirs. Proof therefore of the falsity of the adoption would cause a nullity of the institution of heirs and the opening of the estate wide to intestacy. Did the lower court then abuse its discretion or act in violation of the rights of the parties in barring the petitioners nephews and niece from registering their claim even to properties adjudicated by the decedent in her will? Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause. The petitioners would have us imply, from the use of the terms, "sapilitang tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana" (legitime), that the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the testatrix's belief that under the law she could not do otherwise. If this were indeed what prompted the testatrix in instituting the respondents, she did not make it known in her will. Surely if she was aware that succession to the legitime takes place by operation of law, independent of her own wishes, she would not have found it convenient to name her supposed compulsory heirs to their legitimes. Her express adoption of the rules on legitimes should very well indicate her complete agreement with that statutory scheme. But even this, like the petitioners' own proposition, is highly speculative of what was in the mind of the testatrix when she executed her will. One fact prevails, however, and it is that the decedent's will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. We cannot annul the same on the basis of guesswork or uncertain implications. And even if we should accept the petitioners' theory that the decedent instituted the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. solely because she believed that the law commanded her to do so, on the false assumption that her adoption of these respondents was valid, still such institution must stand. Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive injunction to ignore whatever false cause the testator may have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an examination of the will, that the testator clearly would not have made the institution if he had known the cause for it to be false. Now, would the late Basilia have caused the revocation of the institution of heirs if she had known that she was mistaken in treating these heirs as her legally adopted children? Or would she have instituted them nonetheless? The decedent's will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute on this point or at best is vague and uncertain. The phrases, "mga sapilitang tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana," were borrowed from the language of the law on succession and were used, respectively, to describe the class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance. They offer no absolute indication that the decedent would have willed her estate other than the way she did if she had known that she was not bound by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her estate (libre disposicion) which largely favored the respondent Perfecto Cruz, the latter's children, and the children of the respondent Benita Cruz, shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give to the respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Compare this with the relatively small devise of land which the decedent had left for her blood relatives, including the petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Mozo and the children of the petitioner Ruben Austria. Were we to exclude the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. from the inheritance, then the petitioners and the other nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate by intestacy a result which would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent. Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind should be swept away by these explicit injunctions in the Civil Code: "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." 1
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate, 2 as was done in this case. Moreover, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect. 3 A probate court has found, by final judgment, that the late Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence. In this situation, it becomes our duty to give full expression to her will. 4
At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose, and cannot be the subject of a collateral attack. 5
To the petitioners' charge that the lower court had no power to reverse its order of December 22, 1959, suffice it to state that, as borne by the records, the subsequent orders complained of served merely to clarify the first an act which the court could legally do. Every court has the inherent power to amend and control its processes and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justices. 6 That the court a quo has limited the extent of the petitioners' intervention is also within its powers as articulated by the Rules of Court. 7
ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied, at petitioners cost.
G.R. No. L-29789 December 22, 1928 In re estate of Jose Macrohon Tiahua. FRANCISCO BARRIOS, administrator-appellee, vs. EDUARDA ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., heirs-appellants. IGNACIO MACROHON, appellant. P. J. M. Moore for heirs and appellants. Pablo Lorenzo, Juan S. Alvarez, Perfecto Gabriel, and Delfin Joven for appellant Macrohon. No appearance for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J .: This is an appeal taken by Eduarda Enriquez, surviving spouse of the deceased Jose Macrohon Tiahua, and the latter's legitimate children on the one side, and Ignacio Macrohon, his adulterous son, on the other, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, laying down the following conclusions of law: (1) That an adulterous child may be instituted heir within the limits provided by law; (2) that in making Ignacio Macrohon an heir under his will, the testator did not observe the limitations prescribed by law; (3) that the institution of Ignacio Macrohon as heir under the will ought not to be declared absolutely void, but he should so share in the inheritance as not to prejudice the legitimate of the other heirs; (4) that as Exhibit 1 deals with certain acts contrary to law, such as not presenting the will to the court, and as some minors took part in it through their guardian without the latter being authorized by the court to enter into the transaction in their behalf, said exhibit cannot bind the parties, nor do the admissions made by them therein constitute estoppel; whereupon it disapproved the scheme of partition presented by the administrator and ordered him to file another in consonance with the conclusions therein laid down. In support of their appeal, Eduarda Enriquez, widow of Jose Macrohon Tiahua, and the latter's legitimate children assign the following alleged errors as committed by the trial court in its judgment, to wit: Now come the herein surviving spouse, Eduarda Enriquez, and the legitimate heirs of Jose Macrohon Tiahua, deceased, by their undersigned attorney, and allege that under the law and the evidence in the above-entitled proceeding, the lower court committed the following errors: I. In not approving the project of distribution of the estate of the herein deceased, Jose Macrohon Tiahua, as submitted by the herein executor, Francisco Barrios. II. In holding that the deceased, Jose Macrohon Tiahua, had any right to institute and name his bastard son, Ignacio Macrohon, as an heir in his will, together and in a like manner with his legitimate descendants and heirs.1awphi1.net III. And in holding that the said bastard son, Ignacio Macrohon, having been so instituted and named in the will of the said Jose Macrohon Tiahua, deceased, said Ignacio Macrohon had a right under the terms of the will and the law, to inherit a portion of the estate of the deceased, to the prejudice of the legitimate descendants and heirs of the said Jose Macrohon Tiahua, deceased. Ignacio Macrohon, adulterous son of the deceased Jose Macrohon Tiahua in turn, assigns the following alleged errors as committed by the trial court in its judgment, in support of his appeal, to wit: Comes now the appellant Ignacio Macrohon, thru the undersigned attorney's and to this Honorable Court respectfully submits that the lower court erred, as follows: 1. In holding that its order dated November 10, 1926, did not constitute res adjudicata as to question of the right of the appellant Ignacio Macrohon to inherit from his deceased father, Jose Marcohon Tiahua, under and in accordance with the will of the latter. 2. In not holding that the right of the said Ignacio Macrohon as heir of said deceased cannot, by reason of the doctrine of estoppel, be questioned by the other heirs. 3. In holding that the manner the institution of the heirs was made in the will of the testator herein falls under, or is the case contemplated by, article 765 of the Civil Code. 4. In not allowing said Ignacio Marcrohon the full share allotted to him in and by the will of the testator, that is, a portion equal to that granted in said will to each of the legitimate of the deceased, or one- tenth of the whole hereditary estate. The questions, all of law, raised by the respective parties in their respective appeals, may be reduced to the following: (1) Did the deceased Jose Macrohon Tiahua have a right to dispose of a part of his estate by will in favor of his adulterous son? (2) If so, has the deceased Jose Macrohon Tiahua infringed the limitations prescribed by the law in putting his adulterous son Ignacio Macrohon on the same footing as his legitimate children by giving him a share equal to that of each of the latter? As to the first question, while it is true that article 845 of the Civil Code provides that "illegitimate children who have not the status of natural children shall be entitled to support only," and therefore cannot demand anything more of those bound by law to support them, it does not prohibit said illegitimate children from receiving, nor their parents from giving them, something more than support, so long as the legitimate children are not prejudiced. If the law permits a testator to dispose of the free third of his hereditary estate in favor of a stranger (art. 808 of the Civil Code), there is no legal, moral or social reason to prevent him from making over that third to his illlegitimate son who has not the status of a natural son. On the contrary, by reason of blood, the son, although illegitimate, has a preferential right over a stranger unless by his behaviour he has become unworthy of such consideration. For these reasons, we are of opinion and so hold, that Jose Macrohon Tiahua could dispose of the free third of his estate in favor of his adulterous son, Ignacio Macrohon. With respect to the second question of law, Jose Macrohon Tiahua states the following in his will: After all my debts, obligations, and funeral expenses have been paid, I hereby bequeath and devise all my property, real, personal, and mixed, as follows, to wit: One-half () pro indiviso of my whole estate to my wife Eduarda Enriquez, and the other half () in equal parts pro indiviso to each of my children, including Fernando Quintas and Julia Quintas, son and daughter, respectively, of my deceased daughter, Gregoria Macrohon, who shall receive the portion corresponding to the share of my said daughter, that is, 1/44 for each of the two. Included among the children mentioned by the testator in said will, and to whom he gave the one-half of the property corresponding to him from the conjugal partnership, is the herein appellant Ignacio Macrohon, his adulterous son. Dividing this half, that is ten-twentieth parts (10/20), among his nine legitimate children and his adulterous son, Ignacio Macrohon, into equal parts, each of them will be entitled to one-twentieth of the whole estate. Now then, does the twentieth part corresponding to the share of Ignacio Macrohon impair the legitimate corresponding to each of the nine legitimate children? According to article 808 of the Civil Code, the legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of two-thirds of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother, the latter being allowed to dispose of one of said two parts in order to give it as a betterment to their legitimate children or descendants. In the present case the testator has not disposed of any of the two parts forming the legitime in order to give it as betterment to any of his children, and the said legitime therefore remains intact, and according to article 806 of the same Code, is by the law reserved for the forced heirs and the testator cannot dispose of it in any other way. Hence, the nine-legitimate children are entitled to two-thirds of said half, or two-sixths of the whole, which divided equally among them would give to each, two fifty- fourths or one twenty-seventh of the whole estate. When Jose Macrohon Tiahua, therefore, provided in his will that the one-half of the conjugal property belonging to him was to be divided equally among his nine legitimate children and one adulterous son, each to receive one- twentieth part, he did not go beyond the limits provided by law for such cases, because, one-twentieth for each of his legitimate children is more than each of his legitimate children should receive as his legitime, which only amounts to one twenty-seventh. In other words, since Jose Macrohon Tiahua could dispose of the free third of his herediatary estate in favor of his adulterous son, Ignacio Macrohon, and as he only gave a part of said free third to the latter, he did not infringe any legal prohibition and his testamentary disposition to this effect is valid and effective. Having arrived at these conclusions there is no need to discuss the other questions of law raised by the parties in their respective assignments of error. By virtue whereof, the order appealed from is modified and it is ordered that the dispositons made by Jose Macrohon Tiahua in his last will and testament be strictly complied with, without special pronouncement of costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-26545 December 16, 1927 Testate Estate of Florencia R. Mateo. PERFECTO GABRIEL, petitioner- appellee, vs. RITA R. MATEO, ET AL., opponents-appellants. R. Gonzales Lloret, Carlos S. Basa, Thomas Cary Welch and Camus, Delgado and Recto for appellants. The appellee in his own behalf.
AVANCEA, C. J .: The judgment appealed from allowed the will of Florencia Mateo dated February 6, 1923, composed of two used sheets to probate. The will appears to be signed by the testatrix and three witnesses on the left margin of each of the sheets, by the testatrix alone at the bottom, and by the three witnesses after the attestation clause. The testatrix died on August 13, 1925. Opposition to such probate was filed by Rita Mateo, the testatrix's sister, and by other relatives. The three attesting witnesses to this will, testifying in this case, declared that the signature of the testatrix were written in their presence and that they signed their names in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. The testatrix from girlhood knew how to sign her name and did so with her right hand; but as the right side of her body later became paralyzed, she learned to sign with her left hand and for many years thereafter, up to the time of her death, she used to sign with that hand. Opponents allege that Florencia Mateo did not sign this will. There are three salient arguments among those adduced by the opponents in support of their opposition. The attesting witnesses testified that the testratrix signed before they did. The signatures of the testatrix on the left margin of the two sheets of the will are between the signatures of the two witnesses Vidal Raoa and Julio Gabriel, and below her surname is the signature of the other witness Felicisimo Gabriel. The signatures of Vidal Raoa and Julio Gabriel are on a level with each other, while that of Felicisimo Gabriel is found a little lower down. The testatrix's signatures start on the line with Felicisimo Gabriel's signature, but tend to rise and her surname reaches a level with Julio Gabriel's signature. It is said that this direction of the testatrix's signature was due to the fact that when it was written Felicisimo Gabriel's signature was already there, and so she had to write her surname upwards in order to avoid interfering with that Felicisimo Gabriel, which would have been the case had she continued on the horizontal line on which she had written her first name. From this detail it is pretended to draw the inference that the attesting witnesses signed before testatrix, contrary to their testimony that she singed before they did. This deduction, however, is unnecessary. It may be inferred with equal, if not greater, logic that the testatrix signed before him, and when it came to the witness Gabriel's turn, he, finding the space below the testatrix signature free, signed his name there. On the other hand, it may be noted that the testatrix's other signature at the bottom of the will also shows a more or less marked tendency to rise, notwithstanding the fact that there was no signature with which she might interfere if she continued to write in a straight horizontal line. Furthermore, if, as the opposition alleges, the testatrix's signature is not genuine and was placed there by another person, it is strange that the latter should have done so in such a way as to write it above Gabriel's signature while following the horizontal line, when this could have been avoided by simply putting it a little higher. And this may be attributed to carelessness in the first case, but it cannot be so explained in the second. Attention is also called to the apparently different kinds of ink used by the testatrix in her signature and by the attesting witnesses. Really an examination of these signature reveals a somewhat deeper intensity of ink in the signature of the testatrix than in those of the attesting witnesses. It is alleged that this circumstance cannot be reconciled with the declaration of the attesting witnesses that they used the same pen and ink as the testatrix. But, only one of these witnesses declared this. The other one was not sure of it and said that he said that he did not perfectly remember this detail. The third scarcely made reference to this particular. At all events, this apparent difference in ink may be merely due supposing that the same ink and pen were used to the difference in pressure employed in writing these signatures, as is reasonable to suppose when we consider that the testatrix was a paralytic and wrote with her left hand; or it may have been due to the fact that the attesting witnesses dipped lightly in the ink while the testatrix dipped the pen so as to take up the ink from the bottom of the well. To bring out this irregularity, the opposition presented the expert Del Rosario who asserted, among other things, that the signature of the testatrix is more recent than that of the attesting witnesses. If this opinion is correct and if, as alleged, the testatrix's signature is forged, it would mean that the forgers, after having prepared the will and made the witnesses sign, allowed sometime to elapsed before forging the testatrix's signature, which supposition is not all probable, nor has it been explained.lawphi1.net At all events, even admitting that there is a certain question as to whether the attesting witnesses signed before or after the testatrix, or whether or not they signed with the same pen and ink, these are details of such trivial importance, considering that this will was signed two years before the date on which these witnesses gave their testimony, that it is not proper to set aside the will for this reason alone. The attesting witnesses to this will, who testified also as witnesses at the trial of this case, showed themselves to be intelligent and honest, one of them being a lawyer of twelve year's practice, and there is no reason to reject their testimony, and to suppose that they were untruthful in testifying, and that they falsified the will in question. Lastly, attention is called to the unreasonableness of the testatrix in not leaving anything to the principal opponent, her sister Rita Mateo, and to her nephews and nieces, to whom she had been so affectionate during life. But as to the affectionate relations between the deceased and the opponents, only the opponent Rita Mateo testified, and she only stated that she was on good terms with her sister during the latter's lifetime; that the said sister used to give her a sack or some gantas of rice, and, a times, a little money; that she held all her nephews and nieces in equal regard. But even supposing that this were so, there is nothing strange in the testatrix having left nothing to the opponents, or in her having left all of her estate to the only heir instituted in her will, Tomas Mateo, who is also one of her nieces. And not only is it not strange, but it seems reasonable, since, according to the evidence of the testatrix when the former was but 3 years old, and from then on up to the time of her death had never been separated from her. The opposition presented Doctor Banks as expert. He testified that the signatures of the testatrix in the will are not genuine. The petitioner, on the other hand, presented another expert, Pedro Serrano Laktao, who affirmed that these signatures are genuine. But, over the testimony of these experts, we have the categorical and positive declaration of veracious witnesses who affirm that these signatures were written by the testatrix herself. The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970 MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee, vs. ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants. Punzalan, Yabut & Eusebio for executrix-appellee. Leonardo Abola for oppositors-appellants.
TEEHANKEE, J .: Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving the Executrix-appellee's project of partition instead of Oppositors- Appellants' proposed counter-project of partition. 1
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositors- appellants. The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon. In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named heirs. Testate proceedings were in due course commenced 2 and by order dated March 13, 1961, the last will and testament of the decedent was duly allowed and admitted to probate, and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate, and upon her filing her bond and oath of office, letters testamentary were duly issued to her. After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo of Angeles, Pampanga was appointed commissioner to appraise the properties of the estate. He filed in due course his report of appraisal and the same was approved in toto by the lower court on December 12, 1963 upon joint petition of the parties. The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a total appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11. 3 (/7 of the half of the estate reserved for the legitime of legitimate children and descendants). 4 In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren. The appraised values of the real properties thus respectively devised by the testatrix to the beneficiaries named in her will, are as follows: 1. Estela Dizon ....................................... P 98,474.80 2. Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.06 3. Bernardita Dizon .................................. 51,968.17 4. Josefina Dizon ...................................... 52,056.39 5. Tomas Dizon ....................................... 131,987.41 6. Lilia Dizon .............................................. 72,182.47 7. Marina Dizon ..................................... 1,148,063.71 8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ...................................... 69,280.00 9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon ................. 72,540.00 Total Value ...................... P1,801,960.01 The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance adjudicating the estate as follows: (1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina (exacultrix-appellee) and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered to have received in the will more than their respective legitime, while the rest of the appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia received less than their respective legitime; (2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively given them in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to complete their respective legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the other hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the cash and/or properties necessary to complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number 2 above; (4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren remain untouched.<re||an1w> On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter- project of partition dated February 14, 1964, wherein they proposed the distribution of the estate on the following basis: (a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the value of one-half () of the entire estate, the value of the said one-half () amounting to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the Oppositors-Appellants should consist of their legitime, plus the devises in their favor proportionally reduced; (c) in payment of the total shares of the appellants in the entire estate, the properties devised to them plus other properties left by the Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to them; and (d) to the grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs are adjudicated the properties respectively devised to them subject to reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia, et al., of the sums by which the devise in their favor should be proportionally reduced. Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary disposition made by the testatrix of practically her whole estate of P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were proposed to be reduced to the amounts set forth after the names of the respective heirs and devisees totalling one-half thereof as follows: 1. Estela Dizon ........................................... P 49,485.56 2. Angelina Dizon ......................................... 53,421.42 3. Bernardita Dizon ....................................... 26,115.04 4. Josefina Dizon .......................................... 26,159.38 5. Tomas V. Dizon ......................................... 65,874.04 6. Lilia Dizon .................................................. 36,273.13 7. Marina Dizon ........................................... 576,938.82 8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ......................................... 34,814.50 9. Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et al .......... 36,452.80 T o t a l ................................................... P905,534.78 while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as constituting the legitime of the executrix-appellee and oppositors- appellants, to be divided among them in seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes. The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of partition, ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be completed and satisfied. While it is true that this process has been followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is observed that the executrix and the oppositors differ in respect to the source from which the portion or portions shall be taken in order to fully restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted. This is legally permissible within the limitation of the law, as aforecited." With reference to the payment in cash of some P230,552.38, principally by the executrix as the largest beneficiary of the will to be paid to her five co- heirs, the oppositors (excluding Tomas Dizon), to complete their impaired legitimes, the lower court ruled that "(T)he payment in cash so as to make the proper adjustment to meet with the requirements of the law in respect to legitimes which have been impaired is, in our opinion, a practical and valid solution in order to give effect to the last wishes of the testatrix." From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed this appeal, and raise anew the following issues: . 1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the nature of devises imputable to the free portion of her estate, and therefore subject to reduction; 2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under Article 1063, or merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code; and 3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on account of their legitime, instead of some of the real properties left by the Testatrix; which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below. The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of the testatrix which is "the life and soul of a will." 5 In consonance therewith, our Civil Code included the new provisions found in Articles 788 and 791 thereof that "(I)f a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "(T)he words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." In Villanueva vs. Juico 6 for violation of these rules of interpretation as well as of Rule 123, section 59 of the old Rules of Court, 7 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned the lower court's decision and stressed that "the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearlyappears that his intention was otherwise." 8 The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, 9 when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Guided and restricted by these fundamental premises, the Court finds for the appellee. 1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of her will, after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for probate of her last will and for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition 10 of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for the right of such compulsory heirs: ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied. ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive. This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition, wherein the five oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete their respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in the partition by will more than their respective legitimes. 2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in Article 1056 of the old Civil Code which has been reproduced now as Article 1080 of the present Civil Code. The only amendment in the provision was that Article 1080 "now permits any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by actinter vivos." 11 This was intended to repeal the then prevailing doctrine 12 that for a testator to partition his estate by an actinter vivos, he must first make a will with all the formalities provided by law. Authoritative commentators doubt the efficacy of the amendment 13 but the question does not here concern us, for this is a clear case of partition by will, duly admitted to probate, which perforce must be given full validity and effect. Aside from the provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other codal provisions support the executrix- appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere devises or legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him." 3. In Habana vs. Imbo, 14 the Court upheld the distribution made in the will of the deceased testator Pedro Teves of two large coconut plantations in favor of his daughter, Concepcion, as against adverse claims of other compulsory heirs, as being a partition by will, which should be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in accordance with Article 1080 of the Civil Code. In upholding the sale made by Concepcion to a stranger of the plantations thus partitioned in her favor in the deceased's will which was being questioned by the other compulsory heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion Teves by operation of law, became the absolute owner of said lots because 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him' (Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the latter, and, she can not be deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law (Arts. 657, 659, and 661, Civil Code). 15 Concepcion Teves could, as she did, sell the lots in question as part of her share of the proposed partition of the properties, especially when, as in the present case, the sale has been expressly recognized by herself and her co-heirs ..." 4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in their favor are in the nature of devises of real property, citing the testatrix' repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her assignment or distribution of her real properties to the respective heirs. From this erroneous premise, they proceed to the equally erroneous conclusion that "the legitime of the compulsory heirs passes to them by operation of law and that the testator can only dispose of the free portion, that is, the remainder of the estate after deducting the legitime of the compulsory heirs ... and all testamentary dispositions, either in the nature of institution of heirs or of devises or legacies, have to be taken from the remainder of the testator's estate constituting the free portion." 16
Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix' will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the whole context of the will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through her will. The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary dispositions acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the same into devises to be taken solely from the free one-half disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore, the testatrix' intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased." 17
Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the estate, as contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code precisely provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors' own theory of bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers precisely the case of the executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate in providing that "(T)he devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property, provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions by the testatrix constituted a partition by will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of the other cited codal provisions upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to be respected insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory heirs. Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired" and invoking of the construction thereof given by some authorities that "'not deemed subject to collation' in this article really means not imputable to or chargeable against the legitime", while it may have some plausibility 19 in an appropriate case, has no application in the present case. Here, we have a case of a distribution and partition of the entire estate by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will which would call for the application of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The amount of the legitime of the heirs is here determined and undisputed. 5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants, the secondary issues are likewise necessarily resolved. Their right was merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been complied with in the approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee. Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project of partition. The properties are not available for the purpose, as the testatrix had specifically partitioned and distributed them to her heirs, and the heirs are called upon, as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention of the testatrix as solemnized in her will, by implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real properties intact to her named beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee. The appraisal report of the properties of the estate as filed by the commissioner appointed by the lower court was approved in toto upon joint petition of the parties, and hence, there cannot be said to be any question and none is presented as to fairness of the valuation thereof or that the legitime of the heirs in terms of cash has been understated. The plaint of oppositors that the purchasing value of the Philippine peso has greatly declined since the testatrix' death in January, 1961 provides no legal basis or justification for overturning the wishes and intent of the testatrix. The transmission of rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code) and accordingly, the value thereof must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of the currency and properties of the estate. There is evidence in the record that prior to November 25, 1964, one of the oppositors, Bernardita, accepted the sum of P50,000.00 on account of her inheritance, which, per the parties' manifestation, 20 "does not in any way affect the adjudication made to her in the projects of partition of either party as the same is a mere advance of the cash that she should receive in both projects of partition." The payment in cash by way of making the proper adjustments in order to meet the requirements of the law on non-impairment of legitimes as well as to give effect to the last will of the testatrix has invariably been availed of and sanctioned. 21 That her co-oppositors would receive their cash differentials only now when the value of the currency has declined further, whereas they could have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at the time of approval of the project of partition and when the peso's purchasing value was higher, is due to their own decision of pursuing the present appeal. ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. Without cost.