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I. THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

A. Constitution: effectivity, definition, nature and concepts

De Leon v. Esguerra (1987)
De Leon, whose term as Barangay Captain was to expire on June 7, 1988, was replaced as Captain by
Governor Esguerra under the Freedom Constitution, which granted the Governor the power to appoint
successors to local government posts until Feb. 25, 1987. However, the Supreme Court held that the
power no longer existed upon effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. In turn, the 1987 Constitution
became effective on Feb. 2, 1987, when the plebiscite was held, and not when the results were
announced.
1. Interpretation of the Constitution

Francisco v. House of Representatives (2003)
Francisco challenged the filing of a Second Impeachment Complaint within the same year against SC
Chief Justice Davide, Jr., on the ground that it was barred by Art. XI, Section 3 (5) of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, and gave the following rules for the interpretation of the
Constitution:
1) Verba legiswhenever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed.
2) Ratio legis et animathe words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the
intent of the framers.
3) Ut magis valeat quam pereatthe Constitution has to be interpreted as a whole.

2. Definition of State (to be related with PIL discussion)

CIR v. Campos Rueda (1971)
Campos Rueda died in Tangier, Morocco, an international zone in North Africa. The CIR assessed her
estate for deficiency taxes. Ruedas defense was a tax treaty between Tangiers and the Philippines. The
Supreme Court held that Tangier was a state, defining such as a politically organized sovereign
community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its
territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law. The stress is on its being a
nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its
government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international
personality.

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B. Parts
C. Amendments and revisions
In General (Art. XVII):
By Congress as Constituent Assembly

Gonzales v. Comelec (1967)

In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for
the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be
held on the same day that the general national elections shall be held. Gonzales challenged the propriety
of the act.

The SC upheld RA 4913. Congress has legislative power which is plenary in nature but the power to
amend the Constitution is not included. The power to amend is within the constituent power of the
people. The Congress possesses constituent power as it is a delegation of the people of their constituent
power.

By Constitutional Convention

Imbong v. Comelec (1970)

The 1971 Constitutional Convention Act was enacted by Congress acting as a legislative body. Imbong
challenged its constitutionality. The SC upheld the act. The power to enact the implementing details of the
Constitutional Convention -- as opposed to the exclusive authority of Congress as a Constituent Assembly
to call for the ConCon -- is within the competency of Congress exercising its comprehensive legislative
power, as long as the statutory details do not clash with any specific provision in the Constitution.
Congress continued to exercise its legislative powers even if it was already the Constituent Assembly and
it did not abandon its legislative duties.

By Peoples Initiative

Santiago v. Comelec (1997)

Republic Act No. 6735 provided for the system of initiative and referendum for local legislation and
national statutes, without providing for initiative for the amendment of the Constitution. A petition was
filed to amend the constitution regarding term limits. However, the SC held that the constitutional
provision on people's initiatives under the 1987 Constitution (Article XVII 2) required implementing
legislation to be executory. R.A. 6735 lacked the implementing rules for people's initiatives and such lack
could not be cured by Comelec providing rules. Congress also could not delegate its legislative authority
to Comelec, so Comelec could not validly promulgate rules on the matter as it was not empowered to do
so under law.

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Completeness on its face

Lambino v. Comelec (2006)

Lambino made a petition to amend the 1987 Constitution via peoples initiative. However, his petition did
not include the full text of the proposed amendments. The SC ruled that the initiative did not meet the
requirements of the Constitution. An amendment is directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition only if the people sign a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
To do otherwise would be deceptive and misleading and would render the initiative void, since there
should be both direct proposal and authorship by the person affixing their signature to the petition.

Submission of Proposed Amendments
Must be made as a whole. No piecemeal submission allowed.

Tolentino v. Comelec (1971)

The 1971 Constitutional Convention ordered the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the
proposed amendment to lower the voting age without submitting the other amendments to the
Constitution for ratification. The SC held this to be unconstitutional.. The language of the 1973
Constitutions provision on amendments is clear on the matter of how many elections may be held to
ratify any amendments proposed by a constituent assembly or constitutional convention: one. It is
important that the parts of the Constitution must have harmony as an integrated whole. In order for a
plebiscite for the ratification of amendments to be validly held, it must provide voters not only sufficient
time but means for said voter to intelligently appraise the nature of the amendment per se as well as its
relation to other parts of the Constitution with which it forms a whole.

D. Self-executing and non-self-executing provisions
1. Self-Executing
2. Non-Self-executing
E. General provisions
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II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. National territory
1. Archipelagic doctrine
B. State immunity
C. General principles and state policies
2. Sovereignty of the People and Republicanism
3. Adherence to International Law
4. Supremacy of Civilian Authority
5. Government as protector of People & People as Defenders of the State
6. Separation of Church and State
7. Independent foreign policy and a nuclear-free Philippines
8. A just and dynamic social order
9. Social justice

Calalang v. Williams (1940)
An ordinance was passed preventing animal-drawn vehicles from passing through certain thoroughfares.
Calalang challenged the ordinance. The Supreme Court held that it was a valid exercise of police power, in
the interests of social justice.
Defining Social Justice, it is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the state so that justice in its
rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. It is the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the government of measure calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the member of the community, constitutionally, through
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments. It is founded upon the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.
Labor
Agrarian and natural resources reform
Urban land reform and housing
Health



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Oposa v. Factoran (1993)

Oposa, et al. filed a petition to prevent further logging licenses from being issued. The Supreme Court,
recognizing the intergenerational equity of the petitioners as the basis of their standing, held that the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is explicitly provided in Art. II 16 of the Constitution. While it
is found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, not Bill of Rights, but it is not any less
important than any civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. It concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation and is assumed to exist from the inception of mankind. Thus, those
provisions are self-executing.
Women
Peoples organizations
Respect for human dignity and human rights
Education
Language
Science and technology
Arts and culture
The family

D. Separation of powers
E. Checks and balances
F. Delegation of powers
G. Forms of government
1. De jure v. De Facto
2. Presidential v. Parliamentary
3. Unitary v. Federal

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III. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Who may exercise legislative powers
Congress
Delegation
To local governments
To the People through initiative and referendum
To the President under martial law rule or in a revolutionary government.

Sanidad v. Comelec (1976)

President Marcos, in exercise of his emergency powers, proposed amendments to the Constitution and
proposals to set up the machinery and procedures required for the ratification of his proposals by the
people. Pablo and Pablito Sanidad challenged the validity of the amendments, as the power to amend is
legislative. The SC upheld the amendments, because the governmental powers in a crisis government are
more or less concentrated in the President. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of
martial law is a valid act. This is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent
assembly normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not
convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity
render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose constitutional
amendments.

Although the President has nothing to do with the proposition or adoption of amendments to the
constitution, it is permissible to grant more powers to the President in times of emergency in the interest
of restoring normalcy.
Congress
The Senate
Composition, Qualifications, and Term of Office

Dimaporo v. Mitra (1991)

Dimaporo, while serving as Representative of Lanao del Sur, filed a COC for the post of ARMM Governor.
He lost the latter election, and despite making known his desire to continue as Representative, was not
able to return to that office. The Supreme Court did not allow him to take office as Representative again.
It differentiated a term, i.e. the period an official may serve as provided for by law from tenure, i.e. the
period that an official actually serves. The Constitution protects the term, not the tenure. By filing the
certificate of candidacy, Dimaporo shortened his tenure. Thus, there is no violation of the Constitution
when he was prevented from re-assuming his post. A term of office prescribed by the Constitution may
not be extended or shortened by law, but the period during which an officer actually serves (tenure) may
be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of the officer.
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The House of Representatives

Aquino v. COMELEC (1995)

Agapito Aquino filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the 2
nd
district of
Makati. However, it was shown that he had been a resident of Concepcion, Tarlac, for the previous 52
years. Ruling that Aquino was not a resident of Makati for the 1 year period required in the Constitution,
The Supreme Court held that the residence requirement in Constitution connotes domicile. Domicile is
the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where
he may be found at any given time, intends to return and remain. A person may have several residences
but just one domicile. An intention to return is established by determining (1) whether there was
abandonment of domicile of origin, and (2) whether there was establishment of permanent residence in
the district

District Representatives and questions on Apportionment and
Reapportionment

Bagabuyo v. COMELEC APPORTIONMENT-REAPPORTIONMENT case
RA 9371, which provided for apportionment of lone district of City of Cagayan de Oro was assailed on
constitutional grounds, on the ground that it is not re-apportionment legislation but that it involves the
division and conversion of an LGU. The Supreme Court held that RA 9371 is simply a reapportionment
legislation passed in accordance with the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, section 5(4).
Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes
in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.

LEGISLATIVE
APPORTIONMENT
CREATION, DIVISION,
MERGER, ABOLITION,
ALTERATION OF
BOUNDARY OF LGUs
Constitutional Provision Article VI, Sec. 5 Article X, Sec. 10
Meaning Determination of the
number of representatives
which a state, country or
other subdivision may send
to a legislative body
Concerned with
commencement,
termination, and
modification of an LGUs
corporate existence and
territorial coverage
Requirement Legislation providing
for apportionment
Each city with a
criteria established in
Local Government
Code
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population of at least
250, 000 shall have
one representative.

Approval by a
majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in
the political units
affected
Result LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT
No legal personality
Purpose:
representation
LOCAL GOVT UNIT
Political subdivision
Can discharge govt
functions
Has political and
economic effects on
inhabitants
Has own IRA; can
generate own
revenue

The Party List System

BANAT v. COMELEC (2009)

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate,
questioned the proclamation of party-list representatives released by the COMELEC, as well as the
formula being used. BANATs claims were that the 2% threshold is invalid, and that the 20% allotment to
party-list representatives is a mandatory requirement, not merely a ceiling.

On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule
(Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
The Supreme Court, granting the positions, laid down the following guidelines:
The Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters:
1. The 20% allocation---the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of
the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party-list.
2. The 2% threshold---only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid votes cast for
the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives.
3. The three-seat limit--- each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained,
is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.
4. Proportional representation---the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed in proportion to their total number of votes.

How to Allot Slots to Party List Representatives:
1. Find total number of Party List Representatives
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Following the Constitution, the total number of seats allocated to party list is in reference to the
seats for representatives of legislative districts. The combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party-list. This ceiling is provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(2).

2
nd
level of analysis: Allocation of Seats for Party List Representatives
The allocation of party list seats was left to the wisdom of Legislature. Congress enacted RA 7941
(Party List System Act).
Sec. 11, RA 7941:
1. Parties should be ranked from highest to lowest based on the number of votes garnered.
2. Parties receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast shall be entitled to one seat.

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rd
level of analysis: Allocation of Additional Seats
The Court departs from the Veterans procedure in allocating additional seats. 2% threshold in 2
nd

round of allocation is declared unconstitutional. The 2% threshold set by Veterans in the 2
nd
round of
allocation of seats prevents filling of the seats allocated for party list. The number of additional seats to be
allocated is
[Maximum number of seats for party list] -[guaranteed seats].
In allocating additional seats, even the parties who did not garner 2% could be entitled to
additional seats.
Procedure in second round of seat allocation:
1. Correct formula in determining the number of additional seats:
[Number of votes received/total number of votes] x Remaining available seats
2. Seat is assigned to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely
distributed.
3. 3-seat cap is applied to determine to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list
candidate is entitled.

Participation of major political parties in Party list elections
Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. But, by a vote of 8-7, Court decides to continue with the ruling in Veterans, disallowing
major political parties from participating in the party list election.
NOTE: But in Atong Paglaum the Court laid down new guidelines on the participation of major
political parties as follows:

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ATONG PAGLAUM v. COMELEC (2013)
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (a) national parties or organizations,
(b) regional parties or organizations, and (c) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to
represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party that field
candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its
sectoral wing.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in
well-defined political constituencies.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent.
6. National, regional and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

Legislative Privileges, Inhibitions and Disqualifications

Salaries

Philconsa v. Mathay (1966)

Philconsa challenged the appropriation of salaries of the members of Congress set out in the GAA for
1965-1966, which had been increased the year before (1964). The controversy came because the
Senators who took part in the approval of the law would be in office until 1969. The SC agreed with
Philconsa. The term mentioned in the provision refers to the term of the Congress as a whole. Members
of Congress who approved the increase will not have the salary increase.

Freedom from Arrest Article VI, Sec. 11
While Congress is in session (Art. VI, Sec. 15)

Martinez v. Morfe (1972)

An information was filed against Martinez for falsification of public documents, and 2 informations
Bautista for violations of the Revised Election Code. As members of the Constitutional Convention, they
invoked the protection of the Constitution against search and arrest against members of Congress.
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However, the SC held that Martinez and Bautista were not covered by the privilege. Parliamentary
immunity granted to the members of the legislature and the Constitutional Convention was never meant
to shield them from criminal liability, only to protect them from possible harassment. Any privileges
extended to the legislature should not harm the State. Immunity from arrest does not cover any
prosecution for treason, felony and breach of peace. Here, petitioners are charged with felonies; hence,
the immunity does not apply to them.

Speech and Debate

Jimenez v. Cabangbang (1966)

Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National
Defense. He caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the Philippines, alleging that there
were plans to hold a coup dtat. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang for damages due to the
Cabangbangs libellous statements. In response, Cabangbang invoked the parliamentary immunity from
suit.

The SC held that he was not entitled to the privileges. The expression "speeches or debates herein" in Art.
VI 15 (1935 Constitution) only refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their
official functions, such as speeches (sponsorship, interpellation, privilege uttered in Committees or to
Congress in plenary session), statements and votes cast while Congress is in session, as well as bills
introduced in Congress. It also includes other acts performed by the same either in or out of
Congressional premises while in the official discharge of their duty when they performed the acts. It does
not include acts not connected with the discharge of their office.
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Disqualifications and Other Prohibitions
a. From holding any other office or employment in Government during term without forfeiting seat
b. From appointment to any office which may have been created or its emoluments increased during his
term
c. From personally appearing as counsel
d. From financial interest in any contract with, or in any franchise granted by the government during his
term
e. From intervening in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on account of his office
Duties
f. Duty to Disclose
g. Full disclosure of financial and business interests
h. Notify the House of potential conflict of interest from proposed legislation of which they are authors

Flores v. Drilon (1993)

The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 that allowed the Mayor of Olongapo City to be
appointed as Chairman of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority was challenged on the ground that it
violated the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other
government posts.
The SC agreed and declared the provisions unconstitutional. Art. IX-B 7 of the Constitution expresses
the policy against concentrating several public positions in one person, so that a public official may serve
full-time with dedication and efficiency. While the provision allows appointive officials to hold multiple
offices within limits, par. 1 for elective officials is more stringent in not allowing exceptions unless the
Constitution itself says so. While the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains
throughout his tenure/incumbency, the official may resign first from his elective post to cast off the
constitutionally-attached disqualifications. The respondent does not automatically forfeit his elective
office when he is appointed to another position.
Quorum and Voting Majorities

Avelino v. Cuenco (1949)

Senator Taada invoked his right to speak on the Senate floor to formulate charges against then Senate
President Avelino. However, Avelino and his camp employed dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall
Taada from delivering his piece. Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder.
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Avelino banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately followed by his
followers.

The remaining members voted to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the
Senate. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate
President. This was unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippines
the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding
before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President.

On the issue of quorum, the SC held that as there were 23 senators considered to be in session that time
(including Soto, excluding Confesor), twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three
senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, the
House does not mean all the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute the House.
There is a difference between a majority of all the members of the House and a majority of the House,
the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of
the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at
least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt about Quorum then,
and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for
Cuenco, one against and one abstained
Discipline of Members

Osmea Jr. v. Pendatun, et al. (1960)

Congressman Osmea Jr made a privilege speech entitled, A Message to Garcia, in which he accused
Garcia of corruption. A Special Committee was formed through House Resolution 59, to investigate and
discipline Osmea. Osmea asked for the annulment of the resolution on the ground of infringement
upon his parliamentary immunity through a petition for declaratory relief.

The SC denied his petition. The rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation,
modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded
by the legislative body.

Arroyo v. De Venecia (1997)

A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code. Arroyo et al., all members of the HOR, claimed that there was a violation of the
rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. They claimed that the passage of the bill was railroaded.

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The SC ruled that it did not have the power to inquire into allegations that Congress failed to comply with
its own rules while enacting a law when no constitutional provision or rights of private individuals were
violated. Within the limits of constitutional restraints, fundamental rights and a reasonable relation
between the means of proceeding and the intended results, all matters of methods for internal
procedures are open to the determination of the House and cannot be subject to judicial inquiry. There
was no grave abuse of discretion, only a matter of internal procedure.

Garcillano v. House Committees (2008)

A legislative inquiry was carried out regarding the Hello Garci tapes in relation to election fraud. The
propriety of the legislative inquiry was challenged based on the non-publication of the Senate rules of
procedure in accordance with Art. VI 21.

The SC struck down the proceedings for lack of publication of the rules. It would be an injustice if a citizen
is burdened with violating a law or rule he did not get notice of. It consists of publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines (Civil Code Art. 2) and the law
shall only take effect 15 days after said publication. Publication via the Internet alone is considered
invalid since the provisions state that the rules must be published in the OG or in a newspaper. According
to RA 8792, an electronic document serves as the functional equivalent of a written document for
evidentiary purposes. Thus, it does not make the Internet a medium for publishing laws, rules, and
regulations.

The rules must also be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of 12 Senators as it is a
continuing body independent of the Senate before it, and its own rules state that they expire after every
Senate.

Santiago v. Sandiganbayan (2001)
Defensor-Santiago was preventively suspended by the SB for 90 days in accordance with RA 3019. She
assailed the SBs authority to do so, claiming contravention of Art. VI, Sec. 16(3) which provides for
suspension only for 60 days max.

The SC held that the SB had the authority to suspend Santiago. Suspension in Art VI, Sec. 16(3) is different
from preventive suspension under RA 3019, Sec. 13. Preventive suspension is not a penalty and thus is
not a suspension under the purview of the Constitution.

De Venecia v. Sandiganbayan (2002)
De Venecia, as House Speaker, was cited in contempt of court for not implementing the preventive
suspension by Sandiganbayan against one of the House Members. While the Supreme Court held the case
moot and academic, since the term of the member expired while the case was pending, further
differences between Art. VI, Sec. 16(3) and RA 3019, Sec. 13 were discussed, to wit:
o Art. VI, Sec. 16(3):
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House-imposed sanction
Penalty for disorderly behavior to enforce discipline, maintain order in proceedings
or vindicate honor and integrity
o RA 3019, Sec. 13:
Prevent accused from influencing witnesses
Prevent tampering with documentary evidence
Prevent committing further crimes while in office
Sessions
Regular Sessions
Special Session
Restrictions
Adjournment for more than 3 days
As to venue
Emergency Sessions
Vacancy in Pres/ VPres office
Ability of President to discharge powers and duties of office
Presidential proclamation of martial law or suspension of habeas
corpus
Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments
Powers of Congress

White Light v. City of Manila (2009)
The City of Manila issued an ordinance disallowing the operation of motels as well as offering quick-time
rates. White Light as well as various other motels challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance.
The Supreme Court struck down the ordinance for being unconstitutional.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to
underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and
flexible response as the conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the
State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people.
Agustin v. Edu (1979)
LOI 229 was issued by Pres. Marcos, recommending the enactment of local legislation for the installation
of road safety signs and devices. Upon constitutional challenge, the SC held there was no unlawful
delegation of police power.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of police power, there must be a standard which implies at the
very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down the fundamental
policy. The standard lays down the legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out boundaries, and specifies
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the public agency to apply it. With this standard, the executive or administrative agency designated to
carry out the legislative policy may promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
General Plenary Powers
Legislative Power
Substantive Limitations
Express Substantive Limitations
Bill of Rights
Appropriations
Taxation (infra)
Public Money in a Special fund
Increase of appellate jurisdiction of the SC without its advice
and concurrence
Granting title of royalty or nobility
Implied Substantive Limitations
Delegation of legislative powers
Criterion of valid delegation

Abakada Guro v. Exec. Sec. (2005)
The grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT under certain circumstances was
challenged for being undue delegation of legislative power, as VAT was not mentioned in Art VI, Sec 28.
The SC held that there was no undue delegation.

Congress did not give President the power to exercise discretion in making a law, only the power to
ascertain the facts necessary to exercise the law.
The criteria for valid delegation are that:
Law is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate
Law fixes a standard, the limits of which are determinate and determinable to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions
Undue delegation of legislative power

Pelaez v. Auditor General (1965)

By virtue of several PDs, 33 municipalities were created. Pelaez challenged the constitutionality of their
creation. The SC agreed with him, ruling that while the power to fix common boundaries of adjoining
municipalities to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction may be administrative in nature, the authority to
create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.

The questioned statutes did not meet the requirements for a valid delegation of power to fix details in
enforcing a law. They neither enunciated a policy to be implemented by the President nor gave a
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sufficiently precise standard to avoid the violation. The phrase as the public welfare may require is
so overbroad that it rests in the President a virtually unfettered discretion that is tantamount to a
delegation of legislative power. For the President to create municipalities will be for him to exercise the
power of control over local government units denied to him by the Constitution.
Proper delegation by express authority of the constitution
Delegation to the president to fix tariffs, rates, etc.

Garcia v. Executive Secretary (1992)
EO 475 (reducing the rate of additional duty on all imported articles from 9% to 5% according to their
value, except for crude oil and other oil products which continue to have a 9% additional duty) and E.O.
478 (which laid a special duty on imported crude oil and oil products) were constitutionally challenged.

The SC upheld the validity of the EOs. Under Art. VI 24 of the Constitution, the enactment of
appropriation revenue and tariff bills is within the province of the legislative and not the executive
branch. Art. VI 28(2) allows Congress to authorize the President to fix within specific limits, among
others, tariff rates and other duties. There is explicit constitutional permission to allow the E.O.s to be
issued. The Tariff and Customs Code also laid down sufficiently determinate benefits for the valid
delegation of legislative power.
Delegation to the President in times of war or national emergency
Delegation to Local government
Delegation of power to carry out defined policy to prescribe standards

Rafael v. Embroidery Board (1967)

RA 3137 (creating an embroidery and apparel control and inspection board and providing for a special
assessment to be levied upon all entities engaged in an amount to be fixed by the Board) was
constitutionally challenged for being an undue delegation of legislative power.

The SC upheld the law. Article XVI 4 (2) sets a reasonable basis under which the special assessment may
be imposed. The true distinction between delegation of power to legislate and conferring of authority as
to the execution of the law is that the former involves a discretion as to what the law shall be, while in the
latter, the authority as to its execution has to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.

Osmea v. Orbos (1993)

PD 1956, which empowered the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve the increase of fuel prices or
impose additional amounts on petroleum products which proceeds shall accrue to the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was established to reimburse ailing oil companies in the event of
sudden price increases. The decree was challenged on the ground of undue delegation of legislative
powers to the ERB.

18

The SC upheld the PD. The provision conferring authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on
petrol products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. The standard to
which the delegate of legislative authority has to conform may be implied from the policy and purpose of
the act, not only spelled out specifically. The challenged law sets forth a determinable standard that
governs the exercise of power granted to the ERB.
Promulgation of Internal Rules and Regulations
Prohibition Against Passage of Irrepealable Laws
Procedural Limitations (see part on Legislative process for more detail)
Oversight
1. Congressional Scrutiny
2. Congressional Investigation
3. Legislative Supervision
Question Hour (Art. VI, Sec. 22)
Legislative Investigations

Arnault v. Nazareno (1950)

A legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong
estates was undertaken. During the Senate investigation, one witness, Arnault, refused to reveal the
identity of the representative of the vendor to whom he delivered money, at the same time invoking his
constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution holding Arnault in
contempt and ordered him imprisoned in the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned. Arnault
petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus.

The SC did not issue the writ. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of
the legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer
any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject to his constitutional right against self-incrimination.

The question subject of the refusal for which the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is
pertinent to the matter under inquiry. It is not necessary for the legislative to show that every question
addressed to a witness is material to any proposed legislation, but it is required that each question be
pertinent to the matter under inquiry. If the subject of investigation before the Committee is within
legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness relates to the subject, obedience
to the process may be enforced by the Committee by imprisonment. The power to hold a non-member of
Congress in contempt is a power necessary to enable Congress to perform its function without
obstruction. Therefore, the Court finds no sound reason to limit such power which has already been
recognized as an appropriate auxiliary power of Congress.




19

Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (1991)

A Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Investigation was commenced regarding Kokoy Romualdez
participation in various corporations put up by the Marcoses. The investigation was started based on a
privileged speech delivered by Sen. Enrile. Bengzon, called as a witness, challenged the propriety of the
investigation.
The SC ruled that the investigation did not have a valid legislative purpose. Investigations must be in aid
of legislation in accordance with duly published rules of procedure and must respect the rights of the
persons appearing in or affected by the inquiries. Senator Enriles privilege speech that prompted the
committee investigation contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation, only a call to look into a
possible violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The call seems to fall under the jurisdiction
of the courts rather than the legislature, such as the case filed with the Sandiganbayan. For the Committee
to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan would be an
encroachment into the exclusive domain of the court.

Senate v. Executive Secretary (2006)

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci
tapes surfaced, prompting the Senate to conduct public hearings to investigate the said anomalies. The
investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to
speak before the committee as resource persons. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect
immediately. EO 464 prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the
judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege. EO 464 was challenged for
contravening the power of inquiry vested in Congress.

The SC held that it did. Executive privilege is based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers
and is one of the exemptions to the power of legislative inquiry. It exempts the executive from disclosing
information to the public, Congress and the courts. To determine the validity of a claim of privilege, the
question that must be asked is not only if the requested information falls within one of the traditional
privileges, but also if that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting. Presumption inclines
heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

(Question hour vs. legislative inquiry)

On the validity of 1 of E.O. 464 (which applies specifically to heads of executive departments): the
required prior consent is grounded on Art. VI 22 or what is known as question hour. ConCom records
show that it was considered distinct from inquiries in aid of legislation. In question hour, attendance is
meant to be discretionary. In aid of legislation, attendance is compulsory. In the absence of a mandatory
question period, it becomes a greater imperative to enforce Congress right to executive information in
the performance of its legislative function. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, department
heads can only exempt themselves by a valid claim of inquiry. The only officials exempt are the President
on whom the executive power is vested and members of the Supreme Court on whom the judicial power
20

is vested as a collegial body as co-equal branches of government. For 1, the requirement for Presidential
consent is limited only to appearances of department heads in the question hour but not in inquiries in
aid of legislation unless a valid claim of privilege is made by the President or Executive Secretary.

Although some executive officials hold information covered by executive privilege, there can be no
implied claim of executive privilege thereby exempting some officials from attending inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress has a right to know the reasons behind the claim of executive privilege before an
official would be exempt from the investigation.

Act as Board of Canvassers for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections
Call special election for President and Vice-President
Revoke or extend suspension of privilege of writ of habeas corpus and
declaration of martial law
Approve presidential amnesties
Confirm certain appointments
Cf. Commission on Appointments (Art. VI, Sec. 18)
Concur in treaties (Senate)
Bayan v. Zamora (2000)

The VFA was challenged on the ground of Art. XVIII 25 on military bases in the Philippines.

The presence of U.S. Armed Forces in the Philippines pursuant to the VFA is allowed under Art. XVIII 25
for 2 reasons:

1. The VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the U.S.
since it was attested and duly certified by a U.S. government representative. That it was not submitted for
advice and consent of the U.S. Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international
agreement/treaty recognized by the U.S. since it is a matter of internal U.S. law, where the U.S. submits to
its Senate policymaking agreements for advice or consent, while those that further implement these
policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress within 60 days of ratification.

2. Joint R.P.-U.S. military exercises fall under the provisions of the earlier R.P.-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty
of 1951 that was signed and duly ratified with both countries senates concurring; the VFA is simply an
implementing agreement to the main Military Defense Treaty, so it was not necessary to submit it to the
U.S. Senate, but only to its Congress. This is why the U.S. certified it as a binding international agreement
(treaty) that substantially complies with Art. XVIII 25.

21

Declaration of war and declaration of emergency powers
Be judge of presidents physical fitness
(16) Power of impeachment
(17) Amendment or revision of the Constitution (supra)

6. The legislative process
Requirement as to bills
As to title
Embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

Lidasan v. Comelec (1967)

R.A. 4790 (An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur) was challenged
for falling short of the constitutional requirement that bills shall embrace 1 subject that must be
expressed in the title.

The SC ruled that the Act was unconstitutional. The Constitution has 2 limitations for bills: 1) Congress
can not conglomerate under 1 statute heteregeneous subjects, and, 2) The title of the bill must be
couched in language sufficient to notify legislators and the public of the import of the single title.
Complying with the second directive is imperative since the Constitution does not require Congress to
read a bills entire text during deliberations. For H.B. 1247/R.A. 4790, only its title was read from its
introduction to its final approval in the House.

The test of the sufficiency of a title a bill is whether or not it is misleading. If the language is so uncertain
that an average person reading it is not informed of its purpose, or if it is misleading by referring to one
subject when another is embraced in the act or by omitting any indication of its real subject/scope, it is
misleading. It is not required that the title use language of such precision that it fully catalogues all its
contents and minute details, but that it serves its constitutional purpose of informing all interested
persons of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.

Power of taxation and requirement as to tax laws

Lutz v. Araneta (1955)

Commonwealth Act 567 Section provided for an increase of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar
on a graduated basis, while section 3 levied on owners or persons in control of lands devoted to
cultivating sugar cane and ceded to others for a consideration a tax equivalent to the difference between
the value of the consideration collected and the amount representing 12% of the assessed value of the
land. The Act was challenged on constitutional grounds.

22

The SC upheld the Act. Commonwealth Act 567 was not purely an exercise of taxing power but was an
exercise of the police power, since tax was levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for
rehabilitating and stabilizing the threatened sugar industry. It is rational that the tax be taken from those
who will benefit when it is spent. It is inherent in the power to tax that a state is free to choose who to
tax.

Tan v. Del Rosario (1994)

Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of RA 7496 (Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme)
amending certain provisions of the NIRC and RR No. 2-936 promulgated by respondent pursuant to RA
7496.

The SC upheld the RA. The contention that RA 7496 goes against the constitutional requirement that
taxation be uniform and equitable ignores that such a system of income taxation where single
proprietorship and professionals be taxed differently from corporations and partnership had long been
the prevailing rule. Uniformity of taxation merely required that all subjects of objects of taxation
similarly situated were to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities and did not discount
classification as long as:
the standards are substantial making real differences;
the categorization is germane to achieve legislative purpose;
the law applies, ceteris paribus, to both present and future conditions; and
the classification applies equally to the same class.

Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (infra, under Judiciary)

First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA (1994)

The Omnibus Investments Code gave the SC appellate jurisdiction over BOI decisions. The SC issued a
circular giving the CA that jurisdiction, on the ground that its appellate jurisdiction could not be increased
without its concurrence.

After the 1987 Constitution took effect, Congress was now barred from increasing Supreme Courts
appellate jurisdiction without its concurrence. This was done in order to give the Court a measure of
control over the cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. The indiscriminate enactment of legislation
enlarging the Courts appellate jurisdiction could unnecessarily burden the Court and undermine its
essential function of expounding the law in profound national aspect.

D. Legislative veto

23

IV. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Qualifications, Election, Term and Oath
Privileges, inhibitions, and disqualifications
Presidential Immunity

In Re: Bermudez (1986)
Bermudez filed a petition for declaratory relief on whether the provisions of the Freedom Constitution
referred to the incumbent President or the previously-elected president.

The Supreme Court dismissed the action, holding first that it referred to the incumbent president, and
secondly that a suit cannot be brought against the incumbent President. The petition for declaratory
relief was essentially a suit against President Aquino, and Bermudez had no standing to file it.

Soliven v. Makasiar (1988)
Soliven was sued by Pres. Aquino for libel. Soliven alleged that because the President is immune from
suit, neither can she file a suit.
The SC disagreed. The immunity may be invoked ONLY by the holder of the office. Nothing prevents the
President (and only the President) from waiving the privilege and submitting to court's jurisdiction.
Clinton v. Jones (1997)
Pres. Clinton was charged with sexual harassment by Paula Jones for acts done while he was Governor of
Arkansas. The SC held that the sitting president can be involved in a lawsuit during his tenure for actions
not related to his official duties as President, and before his term commenced.
Presidential Privileges
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (2008)
Neri, along with other officers, was invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee regarding
the NBN-ZTE project. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri
refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a)
whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to
prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other
hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is
privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate v. Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for
contempt.
The SC upheld the invocation of privilege. The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by
compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
24

The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications
privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized
in Philippine jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational
proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos
Cabinet. And,
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege
and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Aside from these, other executive privileges include:
1. Deliberative process privilege
2. Military or State Secrets
3. Identity of government informers in some circumstances
4. Information related to pending investigations
5. Foreign relations

AKBAYAN v. Aquino (2008)
AKBAYAN and the other petitioners filed a petition asking for the government to release the records of
the negotiations leading up to the JPEPA.
The SC denied the petition. While there was indeed a right to information on matters of public concern,
this was only on a case by case basis. The validity of executive privilege depends on ground invoked to
justify it and context in which it is made. The privileged status of a privileged document rests not on the
need to protect national security but on the obvious realization that officials will not communicate
candidly among themselves if people will find out what they talk about anyway. Here, the negotiations of
the JPEPA falls under the diplomatic negotiations privilege.
Prohibition from holding other appointments
Exceptions to prohibition from holding another office

CLU v. Executive Secretary, supra. (1991)

Dela Cruz v. COA (2001)

The payment of salaries to ex-officio members of the NHA Board who were in the Cabinet, or their
alternates, was denied by the COA. The propriety of that COA decision was challenged.

25

The SC upheld the decision. However, while it was correct to rule that the payment of compensation was
not allowed, the prohibition against multiple offices was not interpreted to apply to posts of executive
officials in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law as required by the primary function of their office
and without additional compensation. The term ex-officio referred to authority derived from official
character, not merely conferred upon the individual character but rather annexed to the official position.
However, since the position is an actual and legal part of the principal office, it followed that the official
concerned had no right to receive additional compensation for services in the same position since the
services were already paid for by the compensation attached to the principal office.

Powers and Functions of the President
Executive Power
Power to execute laws
Ople v. Torres (1998)

AO 308 was issued, adopting a national computerized identification system. Ople challenged the AOs
constitutionality.

The SC struck down the AO. Executive power to enforce and administer the laws into practical separation
is vested in the President. As Chief Executive, the President is also granted administrative power over
bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively. Administrative
power is concerned with the work applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
constitutional organs. However, the administrative order should be issued in relation to specific aspects
in the administrative operation of the government. It should not impair citizens rights and privileges or
impose a duty on them, and must not substitute for general policy-making that Congress enact as laws.


Power of Appointment
In general

Sarmiento v. Mison (1987)

Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the Secretary of the
Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed
the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by CoA.

The SC upheld the appointment. Positions to be filled by the President by appointment are divided into 4
groups:
1) heads of executive department, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in the Constitution,
2) all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law,
26

3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, &
4) officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
Only the first group is appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The
Customs commissioner was not one of those within the first group.

Manalo v. Sistoza (1999)

Sistoza questioned the constitutionality and legality of the appointments by former Pres. Corazon Aquino
of senior officers of the PNP, who were promoted to the rank of Chief Superintendent and Director
without their appointments submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation.

The SC upheld the appointments. Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the CA and
require confirmation of appointments to other positions not within the Constitution. The PNP is separate
from the AFP. It is different from and independent of the AFP. Its military ranks are not similar to the
AFP, thus directors and chief superintendents of the PNP do not fall under the first category of
presidential appointees requiring CA confirmation

b. Commission on Appointments confirmation
c. Midnight Appointments
d. Power of removal
Power of Control and Supervision
a. Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
b. Control over Executive departments and offices

Lacson-Magallanes Co. v. Pao (1967)

Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao; he later ceded his rights to
LMC of which he is a co-owner. Pao asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The Director of Lands
denied Paos request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to
the Office of the President. Executive Secretary Pajo ruled in favor of Pao. LMC challenged the decision
of the Executive Secretary as an undue delegation of power.

The SC did not agree. The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his
control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. Implicit
is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In
this context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a
department secretary. Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes
upon the President's power of control over the executive departments. And control simply means the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

27

The Chief Executive may delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not
command that he perform in person. The President is not expected to perform in person all the
multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary
unit which assists the President.

Buklod ng Manggagawang EIIB v. Executive Secretary (2000)

President Corazon Aquino created the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to primarily
conduct anti-smuggling operations in areas outside the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In the year
2000, President Estrada issued an order deactivating the EIIB. He subsequently ordered the employees of
EIIB to be separated from the service. Thereafter, he created the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force
Aduana, which EIIB employees claim to be essentially the same as EIIB. The employees of EIIB, through
the Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, invoked the Supreme Courts power of judicial review in questioning the
said orders. EIIB employees maintained that the President has no power to abolish a public office, as that
is a power solely lodged in the legislature; and that the abolition violates their constitutional right to
security of tenure.

The SC upheld the reorganization. As a general rule, the power to abolish an office is lodged with the
legislative. However, the Presidents power of control may justify his deactivating the functions of a
particular office or certain laws may grant him the broad continuing authority to carry out reorganization
measures for reasons of economy and productivity.
c. Supervision of Local Governments and Autonomous Regions

Pimentel v. Aguirre (2000)

President Ramos issued AO 372 The Adoption of Economy Measures in Government for FY 1998, which
required LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% for their authorized regular appropriations of non-
personal services. Subsequently, President Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section 4 of AO 372 reducing
to 5% the amount of the internal revenues allotment (IRA) to be withheld from the LGUs. The
constitutionality of the directive to withhold 10% of this IRA is challenged for being in contravention of
Section 286 of the Local Government Code and of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, providing the
automatic release of its share in the national income revenue.

The SC upheld Section 1, which directed the LGUs to reduce expenditures, as being part of the Presidents
supervision over local government. Supervision is meant to oversee, while control meant to power to
alter what a subordinate has done and substitute ones judgment. The Chief Executive wields no more
authority than that of checking whether local government were performing their duties as provided by
Constitution and statutes. But LGUs continue to be agents of the national government.

28

However, Section 4, which withheld 5% of the IRA from LGUs was struck down for being
unconstitutional. It is a basic feature of local government autonomy that their share of the IRA should be
automatically released.

Military Powers

IBP v. Zamora (2000)

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Art. VII, Sec. 18 of the Constitution, President Estrada,
in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

The SC upheld deployment of the Marines. Calling out armed forces is discretionary power solely vested
in the Presidents wisdom but the matter may be reviewed by the Court to see whether or not there was
grave abuse of discretion

Here, the deployment of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian
law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the
Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render
logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military
authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP
does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious
incursion of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Article XVI, Sec. 5(4) of the
Constitution.

Lansang v. Garcia (1971)
Two hand grenades were thrown at a Liberal Party caucus in 1971, killing 8. Pres. Marcos issued PP 889
which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail
the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al. were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for
interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al. questioned the validity of the suspension of the privilege of
the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites
The SC found that there was valid basis for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The requirements for such a suspension are:
1. Invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof
2. Public safety requires the suspension.
Here, the existence of the New People's Army is proof of rebellion regardless of how small it is.
The absence of any other incident after the bombing is not proof of lack of rebellion.
29

Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary (2004)
On July 27, 2003, the Oakwood mutiny took place. Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 47 declaring a
"state of rebellion" & General Order No. 4 directing AFP & PNP to suppress the rebellion. By that evening,
soldiers agreed to return to barracks. GMA, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of
rebellion, only doing so on August 1, 2003 thru Proclamation No. 435.
The SC upheld the declaration of a state of rebellion. Actual invasion/rebellion and requirement of public
safety are not required for calling out the armed forces. Nothing prohibits President from declaring a
state of rebellion; it springs from powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. Finally, calling out
of the armed forces is not the same as a declaration of martial law.
Gudani v. Senga (2006)
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the
surfacing of the Hello Garci tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department
including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP
Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al. from
appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two appeared
before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were
relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle
of the Chain of Command. Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected to Court Martial proceedings for
willfully violating an order of a superior officer.
The SC upheld EO 464. The President as Commander-in-Chief has absolute authority over persons and
actions of the members of the armed forces. Significant concessions to personal freedoms are expected in
the military. Preventing military officers from testifying before Congress springs from Commander-in-
Chief powers, not executive privilege.
David v. Arroyo (2006)
As a result of the events of EDSA II, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, declaring a state of national
emergency, invoking Article VII, Sec. 18 of the 1987 Constitution. On the same day, she also issued
General Order No. 5 directing the AFP and PNP to immediately carry out appropriate actions to suppress
and prevent the lawless violence by invoking Article II, Sec. 4 of the same, citing elements of the extreme
left and right being in alliance to bring down the President. A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via
PP1021.
Randy David and the petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of the 1987 Constitution
have been violated, thus the case at hand.
In relation to the validity of the declaration of a state of national emergency, the SC ruled that as there is
no law defining acts of terrorism, it is President Arroyo alone, under General Order No. 5 who has the
discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism, without restrictions. Thus, the due process clause
has been violated and that portion of General Order No. 5 is unconstitutional.
30

Pardoning Power
a. Nature and limitations
b. Forms of Executive Clemency
Diplomatic Powers
a. Contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans
b. Deportation of undesirable aliens
Residual Powers
Marcos v. Manglapus (1989)
Imelda Marcos wanted to return home from Hawaii. Her return was prevented by Pres. Aquino. She
invoked her rights to travel and abode.
The SC upheld the decision to prevent her from returning to the Philippines as an exercise of the
Presidents residual powers. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor
judicial has to be executive. The President's residual power is for protecting people's general welfare,
preserving and defending the Constitution, protecting the peace, attending to day-to-day problems. Even
the Resolution proposed in the House urging the President to allow Marcos to return shows recognition
of this power. Residual powers are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty to safeguard and
protect general welfare.
Powers relating to appropriation Measures
Delegated powers
Veto power


C. Rules on Succession
a. Constructive Resignation
b. The Vice President
c. Right of Succession and Membership in Cabinet
Estrada v. Desierto (2001)
After the events of EDSA II, whereby President Estrada left Malacaang and Gloria Arroyo was sworn in
as President, Estrada filed a petition for prohibition to enjoin the Ombudsman from proceeding with any
cases against him and to declare him to still be the incumbent president.


31

The SC denied the petition, holding that Estrada had constructively resigned, because both elements of
resignation were present, namely:
1. Intent
2. Acts of relinquishment (calling for snap election in which Estrada would not be a candidate, listening
to Pimentel's advice for resignation, negotiation for peaceful and orderly transfer of power, declaring
his intent to leave without anything about reassuming the presidency, etc.)
As for prosecution of cases against him, resignation or retirement is not a bar to prosecution. Neither was
there a pending impeachment case when he resigned; if this were a bar to a criminal prosecution, then he
would be perpetually immune. Finally, Congress has already recognized Arroyo as the new President, and
so the decision can no longer be reviewed by the Court.
32


V. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Concepts
Judicial Power.

Ynot v. IAC (1987)
EO 626-A banned the killing and intra-province transport of carabao and carabeef. Ynot was caught in
violation of EO 626-A as he was transporting 6 carabaos. He went to trial court seeking to declare EO
626-A unconstitutional. The Trial Court ruled that they cannot answer questions of constitutionality.

However, the SC ruled that it could. All courts in the hierarchy can exercise both judicial power and
judicial review, subject to later review by the SC (Sec. 5 (2) (a))

Judicial Review
a. Definition, nature, principles
Marbury v. Madison (1803)
As outgoing President, John Adams, appointed judges, including Marbury, to positions as justices of the
peace, in Marburys case in the District of Columbia,, with the concurrence of the Senate. However, the
commissions were never served upon the offices, so Marbury was never able to carry out his duties. He
appealed to the SC for a writ of mandamus to compel State Secretary James Madison to appoint him as a
judge.

1. Marbury has a right to the commission. Presidential commission has three stages --- nomination,
appointment, and commission. When the President signs the commission, it creates a vested right.
2. Marbury has a relief for his right. Because withholding the commission would be violative of the
vested right, there must be a remedy.
3. The most appropriate relief in this case is a writ of mandamus. According to the Constitution, the SC
can only have appellate jurisdiction over writs of mandamus. However, the law that Adams signed
gave the Supreme Court original jurisdiction. Therefore, there was a dispute over which one should be
followed. The Constitution is the paramount law, and it is the judiciary that decides questions of
constitutionality. It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what is
law. Using this reasoning, the court held that it was the Constitution that must prevail, and so they
could not award the writ of mandamus.






33


1. Requisites of judicial review
a. Actual case or controversy
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra.
o An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, and opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution. It is "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interest"; a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific
relief.
o A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
o Ripeness entails that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture. The questioned acts should have already
been carried out
o Exception to the mootness rule: Court will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:
first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved;
third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles
to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Operative fact doctrine
Moot Questions

Gonzales v. Narvasa (2000)
Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the creation of
the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential
consultants, advisers and assistants. The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to
study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the Constitution, and the manner of
implementing them.

The SC held that the petition was moot and academic. As the questioned commission had been dissolved,
it was impossible to grant the relief prayed for by the petitioner. The Court could no longer enjoin a body
that no longer existed from acting. Any ruling regarding the matter would simply be in the nature of an
advisory opinion and definitely beyond the permissible scope of judicial power.

Political Question Doctrine


34


Avelino v. Cuenco, supra, under Internal Government of Congress: Quorum

The court did not have jurisdiction over the petition. Due to the separation of powers, the political nature
of the controversy and the Constitution giving the Senate the power to elect its own President, the
judiciary cannot interfere with or take over the matter. The remedy lies with the Senate and not with the
Court.

Miranda v. Aguirre (1999)

RA 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component
city. RA 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. In 1998, RA 8528 amended RA No.
7720 to the effect that the City of Santiago was downgraded from an independent component city to a
component city. Miranda, et al., assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of provision to
submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.
On the threshold issue of whether or not the case involved a political question, the Court upheld its
jurisdiction. Questions of whether laws passed by Congress complied with the requirements of the
constitution posed a question only the Court could decide.

A political question connotes a question of policy and referred to those questions which under the
constitution were
1) to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or
2) in regard to which full discretionary authority had been delegated to the legislative/executive
branch of government.
Political questions are concerned with issues on the wisdom and not legality of a particular measure.
Additionally, a political question has no standards by which its legality or constitutionality could be
determined. A purely justiciable issue implied a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or
omission violative of such right and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law for said breach of right.
Safeguards of Judicial Independence
a. Fiscal autonomy Art. VIII, Sec. 3
i. appropriations shall not be reduced below the amount appropriated for the
previous year
ii. Appropriations will be automatically and regularly released.
b. Report on the judiciary Art. VIII, Sec. 16
c. Automatic release of appropriation for the judiciary Art. VIII, Sec. 3

35

Judicial Restraint
Appointments to the Judiciary
Supreme Court
En banc and division cases
Procedural Rule-making
Administrative Supervision over Lower Courts


Maceda v. Vasquez (1993)

Bonifacio Maceda falsified his certificate of service saying he had submitted the decisions for all his civil
and criminal cases, when he had not submitted anything. His clerk reported him to the Ombudsman.

The Court ruled that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over the matter. Judges are liable under the
Supreme Court, not the Ombudsman. Only the SC can oversee judges compliance with the law and take
proper administrative action.

In re Demetria (2001)

Judge Demetria had been trying to intercede on behalf of drug queen Yu Yuk Lai. The Supreme Court
ruled that the evidence against Demetria proved her guilty. However, it is up to the SC to implement the
proper administrative actions.

Original and Appellate Jurisdiction

VI. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
Constitutional Safeguards to Ensure Independence of Commissions

Macalintal v. COMELEC (2003)

The constitutionality of RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) was challenged. The
controversial provisions were:
o Sec 5: allowed immigrants to register by executing affidavit expressing intent to return
Constitutional. Does not violate Art. V, Sec. 1 (Residency Rule). Rather, it
enfranchises Filipinos abroad domiciled in the Philippines.
o Sec 18.5: empowered COMELEC to proclaim winning candidates
Unconstitutional. Violates Art. VII, Sec. 4; winning candidates for President and VP
are to be proclaimed by Congress.
o Sec 25: allowed Congress, through oversight committee, to review, revise, amend and
approve IRR of COMELEC.
36

Unconstitutional. Violates Art. IX-A, Sec. 1, on COMELEC independence. Congress
may not intrude into the jurisdiction of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory
powers.

Brillantes v. Yorac (1990)

Yorac, as Associate COMELEC Chairman, was appointed by the President as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Brillantes challenged Yoracs appointment for being contrary to Article IX-C, Sec. 1(2) of 1987
Constitution, where "(I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity."

The SC agreed. The appointment was unconstitutional. Article IX-A, Sec. 1 provides for the independence
of ConCom from the executive department.
Powers and Functions of Each Commission
Prohibited Offices and Interests

Flores v. Drilon, supra.
i. Standardization of pay and ban on double compensation
ii. Ban on partisan political activities
iii. Removal or suspension only for a cause
iv. Right to self-organization
v. Right to strike: Government employees, including members of the CSC, do not have
the right to strike.

Jurisdiction of each Constitutional Commission

Tan v. COMELEC (2003)

Tan was designated by COMELEC as Vice-Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers in Davao for the May
1992 synchronized national and local elections conformably with provisions of Section 20 (a) of Republic
Act 6646 and Section 221 (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. Manuel Garcia was proclaimed Congressman
of 2
nd
Dist. Davao.

Alterado filed a number of cases questioning the validity of the proclamation, including an administrative
charge against the Board of Canvassers and Tan for Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross Incompetence,
and Acts Inimical to the Service, before the COMELEC.

On petition for review, the SC upheld the COMELECs jurisdiction over the administrative case.
COMELECs authority under Article IX, Sec. 2(6-8) of 1987 Constitution is all-encompassing when it
comes to election matters. The administrative case is related to the performance of his duties as Election
canvasser, not as a City Prosecutor. COMELECs mandate includes the authority to exercise direct and
37

immediate suspension and control over national and local officials or employees, including members of
any national and local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government, required by law to
perform duties relative to the conduct of elections.

Daza v. Singson (1989)

The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting in a political realignment in the
lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew
the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber
elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of the original members except Daza who
was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned such replacement on the ground that the LDPs reorganization
was not permanent and stable.

The SC disagreed. The LDP has been existing for more than one year and its members include the
Philippine President, and its internal disagreements are expected in any political organization in a
democracy. The test that the party must survive a general congressional election was never laid down in
jurisprudence. The Court ruled in favor of the authority of the House to change its representation in the
CoA to reflect at any time the permanent changes and not merely temporary alliances or factional
divisions without severance of loyalties/formal disaffiliation that may transpire in the political
alignments of its members.

Guingona v. Gonzales (1992)
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the Senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-
NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To fulfil the requirement that each party must have a
representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political
party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators elected. The result of the computation under that formula was
that 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-
PDP-LABAN would be part of the COA. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from
their party; he rounded 7.5 up to 8; and decided that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the
same party in the CoA. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged
that the compromise is against proportional representation.

The SC agreed that the proposed membership was unconstitutional. The proposed scheme does not
comply with the requirement that 12 senators be elected on the basis of proportional representation of
the political parties in the Senate; to disturb the resulting fractional membership of political parties in the
CoA by adding together 2 halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation
since it gave the LDP an added member by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political
party, which is deprived of representation.

Instead, the correct rule is that in Coseteng v. Mitraa political party must have at least 2 senators in the
Senate to have a CoA representative.
38

Review of final orders, resolutions and decisions
2. In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions
3. In the exercise of administrative functions

VII. BILL OF RIGHTS

A. Fundamental powers of the state (police power, eminent domain, taxation)
1. Concept, application and limits
2. Requisites for valid exercise
3. Similarities and differences
Due process v. eminent domain

Churchill v. Rafferty (1915)
Act 2339 authorized the CIR to remove any sign or billboard that is offensive to the sight or otherwise a
nuisance, and collect an annual tax of P4 per sqm. The SC upheld the provisions because what was being
regulated was the use of public thoroughfares, and the police power measure validly protected the
comfort and convenience of the public, particularly the prevention of nuisance due to billboards which
were offensive to the sight. Thus, what was involved here was not taking that would require just
compensation, but regulation in accordance with due process.

U.S. v. Toribio (1905)
Toribio was charged for violation of Act no. 1147, because he had a carabao slaughtered for human
consumption. He claimed that the act constituted taking without just compensation. The court held that it
was not taking for public use in the concept of eminent domain, but rather taking in the exercise of the
States police power.
4. Delegation
B. Private acts and the Bill of Rights
C. Due process the rights to life, liberty & property
1. Relativity of due process
2. Procedural and substantive due process
Procedural:
Banco Espaol-Filipino v. Palanca (1918)
Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security for his debt. Palanca
left for China and never returned until he died. As Palanca was a non-resident, El Banco had to notify
Engracio about the suit for the foreclosure of his property by publication. The lower court eventually
allowed Banco to execute upon the property. 7 years later, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his
administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due
process as Engracio never received the summons.
The SC ruled against Palanca, holding that the requisites for judicial due process had been met. The
requisites are:
1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the
matter before it
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property
subject of the proceedings.
3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.
39

4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.
Ang Tibay v. CIR (1940)
Ang Tibay laid off workers belonging to the NLU. NLU protested this alleged unfair labor practice to the
CIR, which ruled in its favor despite the lack of evidence. The SC in the instant case remanded the case to
the CIR for a new trial, finding that the NLU may have been deprived of some primary rights when it tried
to prove its case before the CIR. This case is considered to have codified the 7 elements of Administrative
Due Process, namely:
1. Hearing
2. Tribunal must have considered evidence presented.
3. Decision must find support in evidence.
4. Evidence must be substantial.
5. Decision must be rendered based on evidence presented at the hearing.
6. Administrative agency must act on its own opinion on the law and facts of the controversy, and
7. The decision must be made in such a manner that the parties know the issues involved and the
reasons behind the decision made.

De Bisschop v. Galang (1963)
Bisschop, an American citizen was allowed to stay in the Philippines for 3 years, until August 1, 1959. His
application for extension of stay was decided by the Board of Commissioners, which ordered him to
depart within 5 days. No decision was promulgated. The CFI ordered Commissioner Galang to desist and
refrain from arresting and deporting Bisschop, until proper and legal proceedings are conducted by the
Board in connection with his application for extension of stay.
The SC overturned the CFI. A day in court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings. In certain
administrative proceedings, the right to notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law.

David v. Aquilizan (1979)
David had a large parcel of land in Polomolok, Cotabato, which he left in the care of Felomeno and
Ricardo Jugar. David later withdrew the land from the brothers and has not allowed them to return.
Justice Aquilizan handled the case filed by the brothers against David. He rendered a decision in favor of
the brothers without any hearing. J Aquilizan admitted that there was indeed no hearing conducted but
he said the decision has already become final and executory as the period for appeal has already lapsed.
The SC ruled in favor of David. A decision rendered without a hearing is null and void and may be
attacked directly or collaterally. The decision is null and void for want of due process. And it has been
held that a final and executory judgment may be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation
when the judgment is void for lack of due process of law. In legal contemplation, it is as if no judgment
has been rendered at all.

Taada v. Tuvera, supra.
There can be no finding of a violation of a law if the law has not been published, as that would be violative
of procedural due process.

People v. Pomar (1924)
An act was enacted by Congress, providing that employers should grant pregnant female employees
maternity leave. Pomar allowed his employee to take a vacation for her delivery but refused to pay her
the wages during such period. The SC held the pertinent provisions of the Act unconstitutional for
infringing on ones right to contract.
40

The constitution of the Philippine Islands guarantees to every citizen his liberty and one of his liberties is
the liberty to contract. The law would deprive Pomar and all other entities employing women of the said
liberty, without due process of law.

Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (1919)
Rubi filed a petition for habeas corpus after he and the rest of the Mangyans of Mindoro were relocated
by the Government. The SC did not grant the petition. It held that the relocation of non-Christians was a
valid exercise of the police power.

NDC and AGRIX v. Phil. Veterans (1990)
PVB attempted to foreclose a mortgage of Agrix, but the latter company invoked PD1717, rehabilitating
Agrix and declaring all its obligations cancelled and its mortgages extinguished. The SC struck down the
PD. There was not a sufficient public interest involved. The cancellation of the obligations was violative of
due process, because it extinguished property rights and impaired contracts.

Balacuit v. CFI, 163 SCRA 182 (2 Bernas 41) C2 (1988)
The Municipal Board of Butuan City issued Ordinance 640 to address the complaint of parents that it is
too financially burdensome for them to pay the full admission price for their children. The Ordinance
provided that admission tickets for movies, public exhibitions, games, contests, and other performances,
should be sold at half the price for children between 7 and 12 years of age. Violators would be penalized
with imprisonment and/or a fine.
The SC ruled that Ordinance 640 is an invalid exercise of police power and, as a consequence, it violates
the due process clause of the constitution. A valid exercise of police power requires that it should be for
(a.) the publics interest, (b.) the means employed should be reasonable and it should not be oppressive.
Here, the court did not find a tangible link between the ordinance and the promotion of public health,
security, morals, or welfare. Furthermore, the means employed were judged to be unfair since they
unjustly prejudice the affected businesses by restraining their right to trade and even violating their right
to enter into contracts.

Agustin v. Edu, supra.
The proposed measure to compel each vehicle to supply reflective safety devise is a valid exercise of
police power, it having been issued in order to protect public safety.

Ople v. Torres, supra.
The proposed national ID system violates the right to privacy of each individual, as it does not safeguard
the information therein contained.

White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, supra.
The prohibition against quick-time stays in hotels is unconstitutional, being violative of due process and
the right to privacy. While upholding morals is a valid state purpose, there are other purposes for renting
a hotel for less than 5 hours. As an unreasonable means towards a valid end, the ordinance is
unconstitutional and void.
3. Constitutional and statutory due process
4. Hierarchy of rights

PBMEA v. PBM (1993)
The Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization carried out a mass demonstration at Malacaang
on March 4, 1969 in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police department, against the wishes of
41

the PBM management. PBMEO was found guilty of bargaining in bad faith and its officers were ordered to
be dismissed.
The SC did not agree. The demonstration was not a strike; it was an exercise of their rights to engage in
concerted activities for ... mutual aid or protection." Thus, the companys action constituted as
interference to their right to engage in concerted activity. While it is true that PBMs right to property
was infringe, such rights must be weighed against the human rights of the workers. In the hierarchy of
rights, human rights outweigh mere property rights.
5. Judicial standards of review
6. Void-for-vagueness doctrine
D. Equal protection

People v. Vera (1937)
Cu Unjieng applied for probation after being convicted by the trial court in Manila. Judge Tuason of the
Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office (IPO). The IPO denied the application.
However, Judge Vera upon another request by Cu Unjieng allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The
City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because
it is in violation of Sec. 11 of Act No. 4221 which granted provincial boards the power to provide a system
of probation to convicted persons. Nowhere in the law is it stated that the law is applicable to a city like
Manila.
The SC struck down the law for being unconstitutional. The provincial boards are given absolute
discretion which is violative of the Constitution and the doctrine of the nondelegability of power. Further,
it is a violation of equal protection provided for in the Constitution. The challenged section of Act No.
4221 means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system
of probation within their locality. This would mean that convicts in provinces where no probation officer
is instituted may not avail of their right to probation.

Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City (1968)
The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing on any and all productions of
centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to
one per centum (1%) per export sale to USA and other foreign countries. Payments for said tax were
made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. The company filed before the CFI of Leyte a
complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor alleging that the
ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity
of taxation.
The SC ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The equal protection clause applies only to persons
or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation,
subject to the Cayat requisites. A perusal of the requisites shows that the questioned ordinance does not
meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
and none other. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central for the coverage of the tax.

People v. Cayat (1939)
Cayat was fined for possessing A-1-1 gin in contravention of the statute prohibiting non-Christian tribes
from possessing liquors aside from native wines and liquors. He challenged the statute on the ground of
violation of equal protection.
The SC held Act constitutional, as there was a valid distinction. This case laid down the classic requisites
for reasonable classification, namely
1. It must rest on substantial distinctions which make real differences,
2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law
42

3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
4. It must apply equally to all members of the same class.
International School Alliance v. Quisumbing (2000)
A group of local hired teachers working at the International School of Manila claim that the fact that they
are paid less than their foreign hired counterparts violates equal protection. The SC agreed, not on the
ground that local hires and foreign hires should be treated similarly, in fact holding that the foreign hired
teachers were part of a different bargaining unit, but because it upheld the principle of equal pay for
equal work as enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

1. Concept
2. Requisites for valid classification
3. Standards of judicial review
a) Rational Basis Test
b) Strict Scrutiny Test
c) Intermediate Scrutiny Test
E. Searches and seizures

People v. Malmstedt (1991)
Malmstedt (defendant) entered the Philippines in 1988. In 7 May 1989, defendant went to Baguio and the
following day, went to Sagada and stayed there for 2 days. The NARCOM set up checkpoints near Sagada.
Information was received that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.
Malmstedts bus was stopped and NARCOM members conducted inspection. CIC Galutan noticed a bulge
on defendants waist and suspecting that it was a gun, he asked for defendants passport and other
documents but the latter failed to comply. Thereupon, Galutan ordered defendant to bring out whatever
it was that was bulging on his waist. It turned out to be a pouch bag, which contained 4 suspicious-
looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. The wrapped object contained hashish, a derivative of
marijuana.
Malmstedy was thus convicted for a violation of Dangerous Drug Act of 1972. The SC upheld the search
and the conviction. There was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then
and there committing a crime, arising from a) persistent reports of drugs being transported from Sagada,
b) information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that day had drugs, and c) there was a bulge on
the waist of defendant and he failed to present his passport. Malmstedt, at the time of the arrest, was
actually in possession of illegal drugs, and thus caught in flagrante delicto. As there was a valid
warrantless arrest, there was a lawful search even without a search warrant.

People v. CFI (1980)
One week before February 9, 1974, an undisclosed informer told RASAC (Regional Anti-Smuggling Action
Center) that dutiable (taxable) goods will be transported from Angeles to Manila in a Blue Dodge car. As a
result of the information thus gathered, 4,441 wristwatches and 1,075 bracelets of assorted brands were
found in the car. Eventually, Hope and Medina were found guilty of smuggling. On appeal, the SC upheld
the warrantless search. The Tariff and Customs Code grants persons duly commissioned to do
warrantless searches if there is reason to suspect that the code being violated (i.e. suspecting the
existence of smuggled items). The fact that the search was made of a moving vehicle justified the finding
of probable cause all the more.

Roan v. Gonzales (1986)
Roan claimed to have been a victim of an illegal search and seizure conducted by military authorities,
evidence acquired thereby being used as evidence in his case for illegal possession of firearms. While a
43

warrant was issued, none of the articles in the warrant were found. Rather, a Colt Magnum and 18 live
bullets were found, which are now the bases of the charges against Roan.
The warrant was void for absence of examination of the applicant. Even consent to the search cannot cure
the invalidity of the warrant. As a result, the evidence gathered thereby is inadmissible. The plain view
rule does not apply here. The weapon did not just appear. It was searched for by the authorities.

Valmonte v. Villa (1989)
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to
Letter of Instruction (LOI) 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP. As part of its duty to
maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. Valmonte et al. sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere
as unconstitutional.
The SC upheld the LOI. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela may be
considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective
territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Between the inherent
right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a
warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

Aniag v. COMELEC (1994)
In preparation for the 1992 national elections, COMELEC issued a resolution ordering a gun ban and the
summary disqualification of candidates found to be engaged in gunrunning, using/transporting firearms,
etc. Due to this, petitioner was asked by the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Reps to surrender the
firearms issued to him by such office. Petitioner ordered his driver, Arellano, to deliver the firearms to
the Batasan Complex. However, the PNP already set up a check-point about 20 meters from the Batasan
entry. The car was searched, the firearms seized and Arellano was detained (but later released for his
meritorious sworn explanation. Petitioner Congressman then went to the Office of the City Prosecutor to
explain that the driver was just returning the firearms and that Arellano was neither a
bodyguard/security officer. However, COMELEC still ordered the filing of Information against petitioner
and his driver.
The SC ruled that the search and seizure was invalid. It may be valid even if not authorized by authority,
provided that the search conducted at police or military checkpoints which we declared are not illegal
per se, and stressed that the warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the
vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle
is merely limited to a visual search. Also, a warrantless search could only be resorted to if the officers
have probable cause to believe BEFORE the search that either 1) the motorist was an offender or that 2)
the evidence related to the crime will be found in the vehicle searched.
1. Concept
Guazon v. De Villa (1990)
Guazon and the other petitioners claimed to be victims of saturation drives held by the military and
police. The SC held that the saturation drives were unconstitutional, for having infringed on the right
of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures.
2. Warrant requirement
a) Requisites



44

PICOP v. Asuncion (1999)
A raid was conducted on the PICOP compound, pursuant to a search warrant for that purpose. The raid
yielded several illegally possessed firearms, and resulted in the conviction of various officers of PICOP for
possession of illegal firearms. However, the SC found the issuance of the search warrant invalid, because
the judge did not personally examine the complainant and other deponents, and the policeman who
testified during the hearing had no personal knowledge that there were illegal firearms, and the warrants
failed to describe the place to be searched with particularity.

3. Warrantless searches

Manalili v. CA (1997)
Manalili was charged with Illegal Possession of marijuana. He was arrested after being stopped and
frisked, because he had reddish eyes and was walking in a swaying manner. He was convicted.
Ruling on the validity of his arrest due to stop-and-frisk, the SC upheld the arrest. When dealing with a
rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation where there is no time to secure an arrest or a search
warrant, policemen should employ limited, flexible responses like "stop-and-frisk" which are
graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess, the lawmen being ever vigilant to
respect and not to violate or to treat cavalierly the citizen's constitutional rights against unreasonable
arrest, search and seizure.

People v. Marti (1991)
Marti was convicted of possession of marijuana. The marijuana had been found by the proprietor of a
shipping company where he attempted to have 4 packages of marijuana delivered abroad. The proprietor
opened the packages, leading Marti to challenge the search as illegal. However, the SC upheld the
conviction. The bill of rights, particularly the prohibition against warrantless searches does not bind
parties other than the government.

Stonehill v. Diokno (1967)
42 search warrants were issued, ordering police officers to search for documents, articles, etc, which
could be used to violate the laws. The evidence found via the searches led to convictions for violations of
Custom Laws, Tax Laws, and the Revised Penal Codes. The SC ruled that the warrants, being general
warrants, were void.
4. Warrantless arrests

Umil v. Ramos (1990)
The petitioners were arrested for various offenses without warrants. They all filed petitions for habeas
corpus. The SC denied the petitions. All the petitioners were arrested for continuing offenses like
rebellion or inciting to sedition. Thus, an arrest of an NPA member while being treated for injuries at
hospital was valid even without a warrant, as the offense of rebellion continued to be committed. The
arrest was thus in flagrante delicto.

People v. Chua Ho San (1999)
Chua Ho San was convicted of possession of shabu. He was arrested after landing on the shore in a
motorboat. Upon landing, he fled the scene until the police caught him. He was searched and a bag
containing 28.7 kg of shabu was found on his person. The SC acquitted Chua, ruling that while a valid
warrantless search may follow as a consequence of a valid warrantless arrest, here, the warrantless
arrest, not being based on probable cause that an offense was committed, was void. As a result, the search
and seizure was also void, and the bag of shabu was inadmissible as evidence.

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People v. Aminnudin (1988)
The PC officers received a tip from an informant that Aminnudin was bound for Iloilo onboard MV
WILCOM 9 carrying marijuana. Aminnudin was searched and arrested after disembarking from the
vessel. The PC officers found 3 kilos of marijuana in his bag. He was charged and found guilty of illegally
transporting marijuana by the CFI of Iloilo. The decision was appealed to the SC. The SC ruled that there
was no valid search and arrest so the evidence against him was inadmissible. He was acquitted.

People v. Burgos (1986)
Ruben Burgos was convicted by the Davao del Sur RTC for Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance
of Subversion. He was arrested while plowing his field. The Philippine Constabulary did not have a
warrant. They based their operation on the sole testimony of Cesar Masamlok who allegedly was coerced
by accused to join the NPA using his gun. The SC ruled that the arrest and subsequent search was illegal
because it did not fall under the warrantless arrests covered by Rule 113, Sec. 6. Personal knowledge on
the part of the arresting officer is important. Applying the Stonehill doctrine, the evidence was
inadmissible. Burgos was thus acquitted.
5. Administrative arrests
6. Drug, alcohol and blood tests
F. Privacy of communications and correspondence
1. Private and public communications
2. Intrusion, when allowed
3. Writ of habeas data
G. Freedom of expression
1. Concept and scope
People v. Nabong (1932)
Nabong gave a speech to a gathering of communists, saying that they should overthrow the
government, establish their own government of the poor and that they should use whips on the
Constabulary men, whom he accused of being corrupt. The SC ruled that Nabongs language advocated
an overthrow of the government through violent means, and was therefore seditious.

National Press Club v. COMELEC (1992)
Three cases were filed, in the hopes of rendering void Section 11 of the RA 6646 or the Electoral
Reforms Act, which prohibits the sale or donation of print, space and air time "for campaign or other
political purposes," except to the Commission on Elections, on the ground of violation of the freedom
of the press. The SC held that since the said section does not restrict news reporting by the mass
media companies, nor does it reach commentaries and opinions of broadcasters and writers, the
petition must be dismissed. The controversial provision has not gone outside the permissible bounds
of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods, which is granted to the
COMELEC by the Constitution under Art. IX-C.

Adiong v. COMELEC (1992)
COMELEC Resolution No. 2347 was promulgated providing that campaign materials (stickers, printed
materials, decals, leaflets etc.) may be posted only in authorized posting areas, as well as prohibiting
the display of election propaganda in any place including mobile or stationary private/public places,
except those in the allowable areas.
The SC declared the resolution void on the ground that the prohibition of posting of stickers and other
materials on an individuals property does not only deprive the said individual from the use of his
property (since the owner is not allowed to place campaign materials on his property) but also
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deprives him of his right to free speech and information, since posting/placing such material or
property expresses his political views or the candidates he believes in.

US v. Bustos (1918)
In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, then prepared
and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging the
justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for
his removal. The complainants charged that the justice of the peace solicited bribe money in
consideration of favorable decisions. Criminal action was filed against the petitioners, charging that
portions of the petition presented to the Executive Secretary were libelous.
The SC acquitted Bustos et al. Express malice was not proved by the prosecution. Good faith
surrounded the action of the petitioners. Their ends and motives were justifiable. The guaranties of a
free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the
law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit
subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as
any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled.

In Re: Jurado (1995)
Emil Jurado is a columnist-lawyer who wrote several articles about improper transactions in the
judiciary. CJ Narvasa issued an administrative order creating an ad hoc committee to investigate
corruption in the judiciary. Jurado was one of those invited to appear before the committee and to testify
as to his knowledge as he had a lot to say about the topic in his columns. He refused. Some of the subjects
of his writings also wrote to the SC saying that what he wrote were lies and asked the Court to take
appropriate action.
Doctrine: False reports about a public official or other person are not shielded from sanction by the
cardinal right to free speech enshrined in the Constitution. Even the most liberal view of free speech has
never countenanced the publication of falsehoods, specially the persistent and unmitigated dissemination
of patent lies.

a) Prior restraint (censorship)

Franciso Chavez v. Secretary Raul Gonzalez (2008)
After the 2004 National Elections, a controversy came out after cassette tapes that allegedly recorded
conversations involving PGMA and Garcillano went on air. Given that such conversations were being
aired all over broadcast media, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye and the NTC, on separate occasions, issued
warnings against broadcast companies to stop airing such information. Chavez asked that such warnings
be declared null and void for violating freedom of speech, expression, and the press. The Court agreed
with the petitioner given that the warnings, which were content-based restrictions, failed to pass the
strict scrutiny standard and the clear and present danger test. The evidence of the respondents fell short
of satisfying such standards required.

People v. Perez (1923)
Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, met with Ludovice, and during their discussion said
The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad
thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence." Leonard Wood was the Governor-General of
the Philippine Islands. He was convicted of sedition.
The SC upheld the conviction. A seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the rights of the
Filipino people and on American sovereignty. Perezs words were seditious. Criticism, no matter how
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severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, but
when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech
and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the
prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the Constitution and the laws, and the existence of the
State.

Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans (1985)
Radio station DYRE, owned by Eastern Broadcasting, filed a petition to compel the respondents to reopen
the station after it was summarily closed on grounds of national security. It was allegedly closed on the
charge that it was used to incite sedition. No hearing was held and no proof was submitted to establish
the factual basis for closure.
While the case became moot and academic upon the withdrawal of EBC, the SC issued certain guidelines
for similar circumstances:
1. The seven requisites of administrative proceedings in Ang Tibay v. CIR should be followed before a
broadcast station is closed or its operations curtailed.
2. While there is no controlling and precise definition of due process, it furnishes an unavoidable
standard to which government action must conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty, or
property, in each appropriate case, may be valid.
3. Media is entitled to the broad protection of freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for
limitations on freedom of expression is the clear and present danger rule that words are used in
such circumstances and are of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
4. Broadcasting has to be licensed. The freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser
in scope than print media. This is because (1) broadcast media is more pervasive, and (2) easily
accessible to children. Because of its pervasiveness, the impact of inflammatory or offensive speech
on people would be difficult to monitor or predict. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio (and
television) audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze, and reject the utterance.
5. The clear and present danger test must take the particular circumstance of broadcast media into
account. There has to be a balance between the governments right to be protected against broadcasts
which incite listeners to overthrow it, and the peoples right to be informed.
6. The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy.
7. Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and
freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution. (Sec. 1 and Sec. 4, Art. III).

SWS v. COMELEC (2001)
SWS and Kamahalan Publishing seek to enjoin COMELEC from enforcing Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair
Election Act) which prohibits the publishing of election surveys 15 days before the election of national
candidates and 7 days before the election of local candidates. The petitioners wish to publish surveys
covering the entire election period and argue that the resolution violates their right to free speech and
expression. The SC held that the resolution is invalid as because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though
such suppression is only for a limited period, and that (3) the governmental interest sought to be
promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
b) Subsequent punishment
2. Content-based and content-neutral regulations
a) Tests
b) Applications


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Osmea v. COMELEC (1998)
This is a petition for prohibition, seeking a reexamination of the validity of 11(b) of RA No. 6646, which
prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or airtime for campaign or other
political purposes, except to the COMELEC. Petitioners are candidates for public office in the upcoming
elections, who contend that the events after NPC v. Comelec have shown undesirable effects because the
ban on political ads has failed to level the playing field and has worked against poor candidates. The SC
ruled that RA 6646 is a valid exercise of the power of the state to regulate media of communication to
ensure equal opportunity. It merely regulates the time, place and manner of advertising of political ads
and it does not abridge freedom of speech and of the press.

Policarpio v. Manila Times (1962)
Policarpio, executive secretary of the UNESCO National Commission, was charged with malversation of
public funds and estafa through falsification of public documents. The Manila Times ran a story
exaggerating the charges against her. The Manila Times claimed immunity because of the freedom of the
press. The SC ruled that damages should be awarded to Policarpio. The freedom of speech and press
immunity presuppose that the derogatory information they publish are both true and fair and made in
good faith, without comments or remarks.

Ayer Productions v. Judge Capulong (1990)
Ayer Productions wanted to make a film about the EDSA Revolution titled The Four-Day Revolution.
Sen. Enrile did not want to appear in the movie and sought to have the continued production enjoined.
The SC did not grant the injunction. The subject matter of the film is of public interest. Even the right of
privacy must yield to the freedom of expression, notwithstanding the fact that the film was made
primarily for profit.

Gonzalez v. Kalaw Katigbak (1985)
Gonzalez, on behalf of Malaya Films, assails the Boards classification of their production Kapit sa Patalim
as For Adults Only and its resolution to issue a permit only if the petitioner makes certain changes and
deletions. It was held that the Board did not commit any grave abuse of discretion because its resolution
was supported by the fact that a number of scenes in the movie are not fit for public viewing. Hence the
Court restated the test to determine obscenity: Whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.

Pita v. CA (1989)
Pursuant to an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, magazines, publications
and other reading materials, including Pitas Pinoy Playboy magazines, believed to be obscene,
pornographic and indecent were confiscated and burned in public. Pita thus filed a case for injunction to
enjoin the City Mayor and his agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from preventing the sale
or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is
not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech and of the press.
The SC dismissed the petition. Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to
protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws
punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications. Using the Kottinger rule, the test of
obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article
charged as being obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men
as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the
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circumstances of the case and that the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense
of the community reached by it."

3. Facial challenges and the overbreadth doctrine
4. Tests
5. State regulation of different types of mass media
6. Commercial speech
7. Private vs. government speech
8. Hecklers veto
H. Freedom of religion
1. Non-establishment clause

Aglipay v. Ruiz (1937)
Gregorio Aglipay, the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, filed for a writ of prohibition
against Juan Ruiz, Director of Posts, to stop him from selling postage stamps which commemorated the
33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Catholic Church in Manila. Petitioner alleges
that this violates the Constitutional provision prohibiting the use of public money for the benefit of any
religious denomination. The Court denied the petition. The Director of Posts acted by virtue of Act No.
4052 which appropriated 60,000 pesos for the cost of printing of stamps with new designs. The stamps
themselves featured a map of the Philippines. The governments goal was to promote the Philippines.
There was no religious goal. The proceeds of the sale of the stamps also went to the government and not
to any church.

Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos (1994)
The officers of a civic organizationSamahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikaylaunched a fund drive to
renovate the chapel of Bgy Tikay in Malolos, Bulacan. Chairman Martin Centeno and Vicente Yco
approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles and solicited P1500 from her. This was done without a license
from the DSWD. Angeles filed a complaint, and because of that, an information was filed against Centeno,
Yco, and Religio Evaristo for violating Presidential Decree 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law.
On the infringement of religious freedoms, the SC discussed the dual nature of legislation on the subject
of religion. On the one hand, it prevents the compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed. On the
other, it protects the free exercise of any chosen form of religion. Thus, there are two constitutional
freedoms regarding religionthe freedom to believe and the freedom to act on the basis of ones belief.
While the former is absolute, the latter can be subject to regulation for the protection of society.
In this case, the state may protect the public from fraudulent solicitation by requiring those who solicit to
establish identity and authority to solicit. Even though the regulation resulting from such a policy may
infringe religious acts, it is not invalid because the general regulation protecting citizens from unjust
solicitation is not open to any constitutional objection.

Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union (1974)
Victoriano is a member of Iglesia ni Cristo who is an employee at the Elizalde Rope Factory, and a
member of the Elizalde Rope Workers Union. The company and the union are in a closed shop agreement
where all employees must be a member of the collective bargaining union in order to maintain
employment. RA 3350 was passed which states that CBAs shall no longer cover members of any religious
sects which prohibit affiliation in any labor organization. The union assails the constitutionality of RA
3350 because it infringes on the right of association, impairs contracts and discriminates in favor of such
members of religious sects. The Court upheld the constitutionality of RA 3350 because (1) the Union
misread the law, which actually does not prohibit association, but only reinforces a persons right to
refrain from association, (2) the right to religion is superior over contractual rights, and (3) the
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government may pass laws in pursuit of a valid secular cause even though this may be beneficial to some
religions.

American Bible Society v. City of Manila (1957)
American Bible Society (ABS) is a nonstock, nonprofit, religious missionary corporation distributing and
selling bibles/gospel portions in the Philippines. ABS was informed that it has to comply with Ordinance
No. 3000 (obtain a mayors permit) and Ordinance No. 2529 (pay municipal license fee for the period
covering 1945 to 1953 and amounting to 5, 821.45). ABS paid in protest and filed a case to declare said
Ordinances void and to seek a refund. Trial court dismissed case. SC ruled that Ordinance 3000 is valid as
it merely requires a mayors permit. Ordinance 2529 is also valid but cannot be made to apply to ABS
because such license fee constitutes a restraint in the free exercise of religion. The constitutional
guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right
to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right could only be justified like other
restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is clear and present danger of any
substantive evil, which the State has the right to prevent.

Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent (1993)
Petitioners in this consolidated petition are high school and elementary students from Cebu who were
expelled for not participating in the flag ceremony of their schools. They are represented by their parents.
As Jehovahs Witnesses, they consider the flag as an idol which, according to their religion, should not be
worshipped. They believe that the flag ceremony is a form of worship which is prohibited by their
religion. Respondents counter by invoking RA 1265, Department Order 8 and the ruling of Gerona v.
Secretary of Education which upheld that all students should participate in the flag ceremony. The Court
reversed the Gerona ruling and ruled in favor of the petitioners. Expelling them based on their religious
beliefs would be a curtailment of their right to religious profession and worship and their right to free
education.

Iglesia Ni Cristo v. CA (1996)
The Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) operates a TV program titled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo. The Board of Review for
Motion Pictures and Television classified such program as rated X, being not fit for public viewing as it
offends and constitutes an attack against other religions. The SC held that INC is protected by Art. III, Sec.
4 of the Constitution. The Board failed to show any imminent or grave danger that would be brought
about by the telecast of the show. Also, the show itself is not an attack against, but rather a criticism of,
other religions. Such ground (i.e., criticism) is not a valid ground in order to prohibit the broadcasting of
the show. SC also affirmed MTRCBs power to regulate these types of television programs citing the 1921
case of Sotto v Ruiz regarding the Director of Posts power to check as to whether or not publications are
of a libelous character.

German v. Barangan (1985)
German et al. converged at JP Laurel Street in Manila to hear mass at the St. Jude Chapel, which is near
Malacaang. Respondents Barangan and Lariosa blocked them, saying that (1) their actions show that
they are not there to hear mass, but to stage a demonstration, and (2) the security of President Marcos is
of utmost concern. Petitioners filed a case, saying that Barangan and Lariosa impaired their constitutional
freedom to exercise religion. The SC held that this freedom is not absolute. Good faith is required to
validly exercise this freedom, and the facts show that the petitioners are not exercising good faith. Also, if
the freedom clashes with a social or national interest, which in this case is the safety of the President,
then the former must yield to the latter. Hence, the petition was dismissed.


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a) Concept and basis
b) Acts permitted and not permitted by the clause
c) Test
2. Free exercise clause
3. Tests
a) Clear and Present Danger Test
b) Compelling State Interest Test
c) Conscientious Objector Test
I. Liberty of abode and freedom of movement

Villavicencio v. Lukban (1919)
Justo Lukban, as Manila City's Mayor, together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took
custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 without their consent and knowledge and
shipped them to Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of
prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc. Villavicencio thus filed a petition for
habeas corpus.
The SC granted the petition, reasoning that public officials, within the reach of process, may not be
permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the
act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective
recourse.

Lorenzo v. Dir. of Health (1927)
In accordance with the Revised Administrative Code, Lorenzo was confined for having leprosy. He filed a
petition for habeas corpus alleging that his right to abode and freedom of movement was infringed. The
SC denied the petition. The Director of Health was empowered to order lepers confinement in order to
secure public health.
1. Limitations
2. Right to travel

Rubi v. Provincial Board, supra.
The right to travel can validly be suspended in the valid exercise of police power.

Manotoc v. CA (1986)
Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was not allowed to depart for the States pending a case filed with the SEC. He was
later charged with estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail. Even though released on bail, he was
not allowed to leave the country. He thus filed a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the prior orders
and the SEC communication request denying his leave to travel abroad, alleging that his right to travel
had been violated.
The SC held that it had not. The court has power to prohibit persons admitted to bail from leaving the
country because this is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition
imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence
operates as a valid restriction on his constitutional right to travel.
a) Watch-list and hold departure orders
3. Return to ones country



52

Marcos v. Manglapus, supra.
The right to return to ones country is separate from the right to travel and to abode. As such, it may be
suspended by the President in the exercise of residual powers.

J. Right to information

1. Limitations

Valmonte v. Belmonte, supra.
While the people have the right to information, including court records, and they may access the said
records, they cannot compel judicial officers or custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern

2. Publication of laws and regulations

Taada v. Tuvera, supra.

3. Access to court records

Baldora v. Dimaano (1976)
In a verified letter-complaint, the Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charged Municipal Judge Rodolfo
B. Dimaano with abuse of authority in refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the
criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated
report on the peace and order conditions of the said municipality. The Court ruled that Judge Dimaano
(respondent) did not act arbitrarily since he allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books
of the respondent under certain conditions and under his command and supervision. It has not been
shown that the rules and conditions imposed by the respondent were unreasonable.

4. Right to information relative to:

a) Government contract negotiations

b) Diplomatic negotiations

Akbayan v. Aquino, supra.
The right to information does not include the records of diplomatic negotiations.
K. Right of association

People v. Ferrer (1972)
Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA 1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act
of 1957 a bill of attainder. The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 outlawed the CPP and similar associations
penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party as an organized
conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion
and other illegal means. It declared that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the
Philippines.
The SC upheld the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes
without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination with a legislative
determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites
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must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups, 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and
reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for purposes of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations
having the same purpose and their successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not the person.
Membership of these organizations to be unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired with the intent
to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. Thus it is the element of membership with
knowledge that is punishable. Further, the statute is prospective in nature.

PBM Employees v. PBM, supra.
A demonstration against the abuses of police is protected as an exercise of the right to peaceably
assemble to petition the government for redress of grievances.

JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing (1983)
JBL Reyes, in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a permit to rally from Luneta Park
until the front gate of the US embassy. Manila Mayor Bagatsing denied the petition. The mayor claimed
that there had been intelligence reports that indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless
elements. He thus issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within a 500-meter
radius of the US embassy.
The SC struck down the ordinance. While under international law, the receiving state is tasked with the
protection of foreign diplomats from any lawless element, and while the Vienna Convention is a
restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law, the same cannot prevail over the
Constitutional rights to free speech and to peaceably assemble.


L. Eminent domain

People v. Fajardo (1958)
Fajardo was convicted for violating an ordinance which penalized the construction of a building that
destroys the view of the public plaza. The SC struck down the ordinance, ruling that it is unreasonable
and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own
property; thus, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property
without just compensation.

Republic v. PLDT (1969)
The BOT is a government arm engaged in the operation of telecommunication services in the country by
utilizing such facilities as may be available in the area. After its creation, the BOT set up its own
Government Telephone System (GTS) by renting the trunk lines of PLDT. BOT entered into an agreement
with RCA Communications (a telecommunications company in the US with a domestic station in the
Philippines), associate of PLDT, for joint overseas telephone service whereby BOT would convey overseas
calls received by RCA to local residents. PLDT complained to the BOT that it violated their agreement
since the trunk lines were used not only for the use of government offices but even to serve the general
public in competition with the business of PLDT. When plaintiff failed to reply, PLDT disconnected the
lines rented by plaintiff. The plaintiff commenced suit against PLDT to execute a contract for the use of
the facilities of PLDT's telephones system under such conditions as the court may consider reasonable.
The SC held that: The state, may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership
upon payment of just compensation; there is no reason why the state may not require a public utility to
render services in the general interest provided just compensation is paid.

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Republic v. Castellvi (1974)
The Republic of the Philippines (Philippine Air Force) leased the property of respondent Castellvi near
Basa airbase on a yearly basis. In 1956, the respondent decided to terminate the lease contract and asked
the petitioner to vacate the place. The petitioner did not comply, so the respondent filed an ejectment suit
against petitioner. The respondent however filed expropriation proceedings warranting the dismissal of
the ejectment suit. For the other respondent Gozun, her land was also being expropriated but there was
no prior lease agreement with petitioner unlike in the case of Castellvi.
The SC said that the prices in 1959 will apply since in 1947, they did not possess the property with a
permanent characteristic seeing that they were just leasing on a yearly basis. Their possession did not
also deprive the owner of the benefits of the land since they were paying rent. It was only in 1959 when
they filed the expropriation proceedings that they gained possession with a permanent character when
the lower court granted them such possession. The price of Php 10.00 however was quite high taking in
consideration that the said properties could be sold on a range of Php 2.50 4.00 per sq meters and the
fact that the value of the peso went down. The proper price is now at Php5.00 per square meters.
This case is doctrinal for giving the elements of a compensable taking, to wit:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property
2. For more than a momentary period
3. Under warrant or color of legal authority
4. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected
5. The owner must be ousted of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
De Knecht v. Bautista (1980)
Aquino, as the Minister of Public Highways, made a plan for the extension of EDSA. The original plan was
that the extension would cut through Cuneta Avenue. He changed this plan to a new one, wherein the
extension would cut through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. Petitioner De Knecht is a resident that
will be affected by the new plan. She went to Pasay CFI to file a case, in order to enjoin Aquino and the
Republic from going through with the new plan. Respondent Judge Bautista issued a writ of possession in
favor of the Republic. The SC set aside the writ. To justify its decision, the SC used the recommendations
of the Human Settlements Commission as basis. The Commission said that although the original plan was
more expensive, it was a better choice, taking into consideration the progress and development of the
country.

Republic v. De Knecht (1990)
Republic wanted to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard and also construct an outfall for flood waters. Along
the planned extension route is De Knechts property. De Knecht does not want to sell her property. De
Knecht filed a case titled De Knecht v Bautista which she won in 1980. The Court cited the social impact
factor making expropriation of the land arbitrary. In 1983, the Batasang Pambansa passed BP340
expropriating the said property. The lower court granted petitioners (Republic) plea of denying the
motion to dismiss expropriation proceeding citing said law. The SC affirmed said ruling stating that since
residents have already moved, the social impact factor which was the basis in De Knecht v. Bautista has
already disappeared, making the expropriation proceedings no longer arbitrary. The court also said that
expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with
the land owner but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation.
1. Concept
2. Expansive concept of public use


55

Association of Small Landowners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform (1989)
These are consolidated cases which involve common legal issues, including serious challenges to the
constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No. 228, Presidential Proclamation No.
131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.

The SC ruled that agrarian reform under the Constitution is an exercise of the power of eminent domain.
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that
logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. Property
condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on
the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which
should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not
compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the
payment of just compensation to the owner. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely
prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of
private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes
necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area
allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just
compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What
is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial
rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the
police power but of the power of eminent domain

Sumulong v. Guerrero (1987)
NHA filed an expropriation complaint for petitioners land, which was granted by Buenaventura.
Petitioners said that socialized housing was not public use, and that PD 1224, the law which the NHA
used, was unconstitutional. The SC held that the expanded notion of public use, supported by
Constitutional provisions on social justice and land reform, include the concept of socialized housing.
They also held that eminent domain cannot be restricted just because the property is small. Individual
interests must be subordinated to state or public interest. However, SC said that just compensation must
take into account all factors, and the NHAs valuations did not take into account individual factors. Also, to
deny petitioners the opportunity to challenge the correctness of the valuations of just compensation is a
denial of due process. The SC remanded the case back to the court of origin in order to determine the
proper compensation.

City Government v. Judge Ericta (1983)
Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled An ordinance regulating the establishment, maintenance and
operation of private memorial type cemetery or burial ground within the jurisdiction of Quezon City and
providing penalties for the violation thereof. The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of
the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who
are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be
determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power.
The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the
setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds
of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the
people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

3. Just compensation
56


EPZA v. Dulay (1989)
The case concerns the land where the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) was to be
constructed. San Antonio Development Corporation (SADC) claimed that the lands were expropriated to
the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay
then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine just compensation. It was
later found out that the payment of the government to SADC would be P15 per square meter, which was
objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and
according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by
the assessor, whichever is lower.
The SC ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional. The
method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial
prerogative. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter which, under the Constitution, is reserved to
them for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one
of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to
what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just
compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial
determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private
property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive
order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts findings.
Reyes v. NHA (2003)
The NHA expropriated the Reyes land, for the purpose of relocating squatters from Metro Manila.
However, it instead planned to build low cost housing units. Reyes thus challenged the expropriation,
claiming that the judgment of expropriation was forfeited when the NHA used the land for another
purpose.
The SC ruled that Reyes could not insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the
Constitution by contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public
use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes.
The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit,"
"public welfare," and "public convenience." Thus, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general
welfare satisfies the requirement of public use."
In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public
purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms,
entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns. The Constitution itself allows the State
to undertake, for the common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of
urban land reform and housing which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. The expropriation of
private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of
social justice.
a) Determination

Ansaldo v. CA (1990)
Ansaldos land was taken by the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communication.
Twenty-six years later, Ansaldo asked to be compensated for the taking. The SC held that the
determination of the value should be determined at the time of taking, not at the time of the filing of the
suit.
b) Effect of delay
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4. Abandonment of intended use and right of repurchase
5. Miscellaneous application
M. Contract clause

Rutter v. Esteban (1953)
Esteban bought 2 pieces of land on Aug. 20, 1941. He was able to pay the first 2 installments, but was not
able to pay the next 2 installments, leading Rutter to file a suit to recover a sum of money. Esteban
claimed that the enforcement of the payment was barred by RA 342, Sec. 2 of which provides that all
debts and obligations contracted before Dec. 8, 1941 shall not be due and demandable for 8 years after
settlement of the war damage claim of the debtor by the Philippine War Damage Commission. The next
section provided that if Sec. 2 was made void and unenforceable, then the moratoriums would be revived
and continue.
The SC struck down the RA and the related moratorium for impairing contracts. The determination of the
constitutionality of the moratorium statute is the determination of a period for the suspension of the
remedy. Further, laws altering contracts impair the obligation thereof when they are unreasonable in
light of the circumstances. Finally, impairment should only refer to the remedy and not to a substantive
right.
Here, the RA, in effect, gives 12 years before creditors could enforce their obligations. This is
unreasonable and oppressive under the circumstances.

Ortigas v. Bel-Air (1991)
Jupiter Street was reclassified into a commercial zone from its former designation as a residential zone.
Presley, who leases the property owned by the Almendrases in Jupiter street, operates a pandesal store in
that address. Bel-Air Village Association asked them to shut it down pursuant to their agreement
annotated in the TCT that the property would be used for residential purposes only. The SC, pursuant to
its ruling in the Sangalang case, held that although the contract is binding between the parties, this may
be impaired by a lawful exercise of police powerin this case, the reclassification of Jupiter into a
commercial zone.

Ortigas v. Feati (1979)
Ortigas sold two lots in a subdivision along EDSA to Emma Chavez. These lots were supposed to only be
used for residential purposes, and this stipulation was annotated on the TCT. Chavez sold the lots to
Feati, who wanted to use the lots for commercial purposes. Their basis was Mandaluyong Municipal
Councils Resolution 27, classifying that area as commercial/industrial. The SC said that the non-
impairment clause must be balanced with the proper exercise of police power, and that the stipulations
should be subordinate to the resolution. If the exercise of police power is done properly, the individual
interests must be subordinate to the general welfare.
1. Contemporary application of the contract clause
N. Legal assistance and free access to courts
O. Rights of suspects
1. Availability
2. Requisites
3. Waiver
P. Rights of the accused
1. Criminal due process



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Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (2001)
Former President Joseph Estrada was charged with plunder under RA 7080, the Plunder Law. He
challenged the provision that For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary
to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The SC held
that, while not every act needs to be proven beyond reasonable doubt, there is no violation of criminal
due process, as it must still be proven that there is an unlawful scheme or conspiracy beyond reasonable
doubt.

US v. Ling Su Fan (1910)
Ling Su Fan was convicted of exporting Philippine silver coins, pursuant to Act 1411. Ling Su Fan
challenged the said act for being violative of due process. The SC upheld the Act, laying down the ff.
requirements for due process of statutes:
First: That there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative
department of the Government;
Second: That this law shall be reasonable in its operation;
Third: That it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and
Fourth: That it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class.

2. Bail
3. Presumption of innocence
4. Right to be heard
5. Assistance of counsel

People v. Espiritu (1999)
Espiritu made an extra-judicial confession, assisted by Atty. Mangallay, whom he did not retain
personally, but who was retained by his uncle. He thus challenged the validity of the confession. The SC
upheld the confession. The right to counsel does not mean that the accused must personally hire his own
counsel. The constitutional requirement is satisfied when a counsel is engaged by anyone acting on behalf
of the person under investigation, or appointed by the court upon petition of the said person or by
someone on his behalf.

People v. Continente (2000)
The trial court convicted the accused of murder. Among the evidence the trial court relied upon were the
confessions of the accused. The accused argued that their confession were inadmissible in evidence,
since they were not informed of their constitutional right.
The written statements contained an explanation that the investigation dealt with the participation of the
accused who chose not to give any statement to the investigator and a warning that any statement
obtained from the accused might be used against them in court. They contained advice that the accused
might engage the service of a lawyer of their own choice and that if they could not afford the service of a
lawyer, they would be provided with one for free. Despite the manifestation of the accused that they
intended to give their statements, the investigator requested two lawyers to act as counsel for the
accused. The lawyers conferred with the accused before their investigation. The accused were informed
of their constitutional rights in the presence of their counsel. The confessions are thus admissible in
evidence.



59

People v. Obrero (2000)
At Obreros custodial investigation, he was assigned a lawyer who was the station commander of another
precinct. The SC held that his right to counsel was infringed upon, as the said lawyer could not be
considered independent.
6. Right to be informed

Pecho v. People (1996)
Pecho was convicted of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents. The
decision was assailed on the ground that the accused may not be convicted of that crime because the
information was for a violation of RA 3019. He thus alleged violation of his right to be informed of this
charge against him in the filing of the information.
The SC upheld the conviction. The objectives of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the crime of which he is charged are as follows:
1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to
make his defense;
2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the
same cause; and
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to
support a conviction, if one should be had.
In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. The
complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the
crime. What determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of
facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or
complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law. It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which although not the
one charged, is necessarily included in the latter. It has been shown that the information filed in court is
considered as charging for two offenses, which the counsel of the accused failed to object to. Therefore he
can be convicted for both or either of the charges.

7. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial

8. Right of confrontation

9. Compulsory process

10. Trials in absentia

Q. Writ of habeas corpus

Lansang v. Garcia, supra.
The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus has 2 requisites:
1. Invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof
2. Public safety requires the suspension.
Here, the existence of the New People's Army is proof of rebellion regardless of how small it is. The
absence of any other incident after the bombing is not proof of lack of rebellion.
60


R. Writs of amparo, habeas data, and kalikasan

S. Self-incrimination clause

Chavez v. CA (1968)
Chavez was convicted of qualified theft of a motor vehicle. During the trial, Fiscal Grecia asked Chavez to
be the first witness. Counsel for the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez)
will only be an ordinary witness and not a state witness. Counsel for the accused averred that it will only
incriminate his client. The testimony was permitted.
The SC ruled that Chavez was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional
right to remain silent. It could not be said that he waived his right for he did not volunteer to take the
stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness.

Beltran v. Samson and Jose (1929)
Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as
ordered by the respondent Judge, claiming a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination
because such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have
procured in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against
himself.
The SC agreed, ruling that writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers;
writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention
and in the case at bar, writing means that Beltran is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is
the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. For purposes of the constitutional
privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is
compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish
evidence against himself.

Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, supra.
The right against self-incrimination may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions are asked of
them.

Galman v. Pamaran (1985)
Galman was made to testify before the Agrava board following the assassination of Ninoy Aquino. He
invoked his right against self-incrimination. The SC held that it applied even in non-criminal proceedings,
as the word criminal had been deleted from the Constitutional provision.

Villaflor v. Summers (1920)
In a criminal case before the CFI of Manila, Villaflor was charged with adultery. Upon petition by the
fiscal, the court ordered Villaflor to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors
to determine if she was pregnant or not. Villaflor refused, claiming that it amounted to self-incrimination.
The SC disagreed. The Court laid down the rule that the constitutional guaranty that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, on a proper showing
and under an order of the trial court, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. The
proviso is that torture or force shall be avoided.

1. Scope and coverage

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a) Foreign laws

2. Application

3. Immunity statutes

T. Involuntary servitude and political prisoners


US v. Pompeya (1915)
An ordinance was passed, in accordance with Act 1309, requiring every able-bodied male resident of the
municipality of Iloilo to render service on patrol duty. Pompeya was convicted for refusing to render such
service. The SC upheld Act 1309 and the ordinance, holding that the power exercised under the
provisions of Act No. 1309 falls within the police power of the state and that the state was fully
authorized and justified in conferring the same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that,
therefore, the provisions of the said Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation of the
rights of the persons affected thereby, in accordance with the time-honored obligation of the individual to
assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his community.


U. Excessive fines and cruel and inhuman punishments

People v. Echegaray (1996) and Echegaray v. Sec. of Justice (1999)
Echegaray was sentenced to death. The imposition of the death penalty was challenged on the ground
that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The SC ruled that the imposition of the death penalty,
per se, is not cruel and unusual punishment. The cruelty against which the Constitution protects a
convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in
any method employed to extinguish life humanely.

People v. Dionisio (1968)
Dionisio was fined for taking bets on a horse race without authority. He complained that the imposition of
the fine was excessive, and constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute in themselves cruel and unusual punishment, for the
Constitutional structure has been interpreted as referring to penalties that are inhumane and barbarous,
or shocking to the conscience and fines or imprisonment are definitely not in this category. Nor does
mere severity constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

V. Non-imprisonment for debts

Lozano v. Martinez (1986)
The constitutionality of BP 22 was challenged, as it was alleged that it violated the constitutional
prohibition against imprisonment for non-payment of debts. The SC upheld the law, ruling that the law
punishes the act of issuing unfunded checks, not the non-payment of the debts which they represent.

Serafin v. Lindayag (1975)
Serafin failed to pay a simple indebtedness of P1500. Thus, a case was filed against her, which was
admitted by the court. Serafin filed a case against respondent Judge for not dismissing the case and for
issuing a warrant of arrest, as the debt she owed falls on the category of a simple indebtedness, since
62

elements of estafa are not present. Furthermore, she contended that no person should be imprisoned for
non-payment of a loan of a sum of money.
The court held that the judge committed grave abuse of discretion. Serafin did not commit any offense as
her debt is considered a simple loan granted by her friends to her. Under the Constitution she is
protected from imprisonment.
W. Double jeopardy
1. Requisites

People v. Obsania (1968)
Obsania was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of Balungao. His counsel moved
for the dismissal of the charge for failure to allege lewd designs in the information. Said motion was
granted. From this order of dismissal, the prosecution appealed.
The SC held that there was no double jeopardy in this case. In order that the accused may invoke double
jeopardy, the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution

a) valid complaint,
b) competent court,
c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge,
d) defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.

Here, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Court judge upon the defendant's motion to
dismiss. The doctrine of double jeopardy does not apply when the case is dismissed with the express
consent of the defendant. The dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense
because his action in having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or
privilege for the reason that he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and
rendering a judgment of conviction against him.

People v. Relova (1987)
The People of the Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an
information for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the
petitioners motion for reconsideration. Opulencia was charged under a Batangas ordinance for installing
illegal electric wiring devices. The case was dismissed. Two months later, he was charged for theft of
electricity under the Revised Penal Code. The Court dismissed the complaint on the ground of double
jeopardy.
The SC held that double jeopardy had attached in this case. The Bill of Rights gives two instances or kinds
of double jeopardy. The first would be that No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense and the second sentence states that If an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance, the
conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the same act. In the case at bar, it was evident
that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the second kind or definition of double jeopardy
wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. It further explains that even if
the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that the first charge constitutes a violation of an
ordinance and the second charge was a violation against the Revised Penal Code, the fact that the two
charges sprung from one and the same act of conviction or acquittal under either the law or the
ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other, thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy.
2. Motions for reconsideration and appeals
3. Dismissal with consent of accused
63

X. Ex post facto laws and bills of attainder

Republic v. Fernandez (1956)
Fernandez was assessed war profits taxes. He challenged the tax for being an ex post facto law. However,
the SC ruled that the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws does not apply to tax statutes.

People v. Ferrer, supra.
The Anti-Subversive Act is not a bill of attainder. It was prospective in application, and does not single out
persons, but conduct.
64


VIII. CITIZENSHIP

A. Who Are Filipino Citizens
B. Modes of Acquiring Citizenship
C. Naturalization and Denaturalization
D. Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance
E. Loss and Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship

Coquilla v. Comelec (2002)

Coquilla was born of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar, where he grew up and resided. In 1965, he
joined the US Navy and was subsequently naturalized as a US citizen. On November 10, 2000, he took his
oath as a citizen of the Philippines subsequently after his application for repatriation was approved. On
November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar. On February
27, 2001, he filed his COC stating therein that he has been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.

This led Alvarez, incumbent mayor of Oras who was running for re-election, to seek the cancellation of
the COC on the ground that the latter had resided in Oras for only about 6 months since when he took his
oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

The Supreme Court ruled that Coquilla was still an alien. A person loses Philippine citizenship and
domicile of origin by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy, as residence in the U.S. is a
requirement for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. This results in the abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines. The person may only be said to have been domiciled in the Philippines again once he
repatriates or by an act of Congress, but the period before this act of reacquisition will not count in the
residency requirement for elected officials. His status during that period is one of an alien who has
obtained an immigrant visa and has waived his status as a non-resident.

a. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
b. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

A. General Principles

Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. The Public Service Commission (1940)

Petitioner, in questioning an unfavourable decision of the PSC, raised the issue that Section 1 of the
Commonwealth Act No. 454 which granted PSC its powers is not a valid delegation of legislative power.

65

The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the same
time to forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers, and thereby
obtain efficiency and prevent disposition. However, the maxim of delegatus non potest delegari or
delegate potestas non potest delegari is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of
powers. With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency
toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the
court.

Manila Electric Company v. Pasay Transportation Company, Inc. et al. (1932)

In question is the validity of Section 11 of Act No. 1446 which provided that members of the Supreme
Court shall sit as a board of arbitrators in cases where any franchise or right of way is granted to any
person or corporation other than an original grantee.

The members of the Supreme Court cannot sit as a board of arbitrators to resolve disputes between
public utilities. The issue is not whether or not there has been a delegation of legislative authority to a
court but rather whether or not the members of the Supreme Court have the legal right to sit as a board
of arbitrators and act in such capacity.

The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our
government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as
the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other
department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers
expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members
should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty
not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions.


Noblejas v. Teehankee (1968)

Commissioner of Land Registration Noblejas asserted that the Secretary of Justice has no disciplinary
powers over him as RA No. 1151 entitled the Commissioner of Land Registration to the same
compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of Court of First Instance and thus, he may
only be investigated by the Supreme Court.

To adopt Noblejas theory would mean placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of investigating and
disciplining all these officials, whose functions are plainly executive, and the consequent curtailment
by mere implication from the Legislative grant, of the President's power to discipline and remove
administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and which the Constitution expressly placed
under the President's supervision and control. There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature
to charge the judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment
of judicial duties.

The court was brought into being by the judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested with judicial
power only and can have no jurisdiction except over cases and controversies falling within the classes
enumerated in that article. It cannot give decisions which are merely advisory; nor can it exercise or
participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative.

66

In re Rodolfo Manzano (1988)

RTC Judge Manzano was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice
created pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856. He sought the Supreme Courts permission to
accept the appointment.

The Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions. Administrative functions
are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their
own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature
or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not
be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

B. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
C. POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

1. Quasi-legislative (rule-making) powers

Non-delegation doctrine

Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners (1916)

Pursuant to Act No. 2307, the Board required Compania to present annually a detailed report of finances
and operations of such vessels as are operated by it as a common carrier within the Philippines, in the
form and containing the matters prescribed by the Board.

Act No. 2307 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power as Legislature seems simply to have
authorized the Board to require what it wants, thereby delegating to the latter all its powers over a given
subject matter in a manner almost absolute. A law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when
it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgement of the
delegate, so that, in its form and substance, it is a law in all its details, in presenti, but which may be left to
take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

People v. Vera (1937)

The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is being assailed for the reason that it unduly delegates legislative
power in that the provincial boards were given the power to decide whether the law would be effective
within their territory or not.

The efficiency of an act as a declaration of legislative will must come from Congress although the
ascertainment of the contingency upon which the act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it
may designate.

Pelaez v. Auditor General (1965)

The President, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued
several Executive Orders creating 33 municipalities. Section 68 was assailed to be an undue delegation of
legislative power.
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The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. Congress may delegate
to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details of the execution of the law. For such
to be valid, the law must be complete in itself and it must fix a standard to which such delegate must
conform in the performance of his duties.

Edu v. Ericta (1970)

The Reflector Law and the administrative order issued to implement it were assailed as an undue
delegation of legislative power.

To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be
directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its
functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what the scope of his authority is.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that
the legislature itself determined matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy.

Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor and Employment (1981)

FTWU alleged that the delegation to the Minister of Labor and Employment the power and discretion to
assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration to the NLRC constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power.

The regulations made to implement a legislative policy should be germane to the purpose of the law and
the regulation should not be in contradiction with it, but conforms to the standards that the law
prescribes. The strict non-delegation rule enunciated in People vs. Vera may be considered too rigid and
inflexible, especially for the social and economic legislation needed by the times.

PHILCOMSAT v. Alcuaz (1989)

NTC which was granted by EO 19 with the jurisdiction, control and regulation over PHILCOMSAT reduced
PHILCOMSATs rates by 15%.

In the delegation of rate-fixing power of the legislature, the only standard which the legislature is
required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and
just. EO 546 which created the NTC limited it by the requirements of public safety, public interest,
reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a
valid delegation of legislative power.

Chiongbian v. Orbos (1995)

RA 6735 gave the President the power to merge the regions that did not opt to join the ARMM. Thus,
through an Executive Order, the President reorganized the cities and the provinces which did not opt to
join the ARMM, into new regions. The law was assailed to be an undue delegation of legislative power
because it does not provide a standard for the exercise of any power delegated.

A legislative standard need not be express. It may simply be gathered or implied, and may be embodied in
other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation. The standard for the power to
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merge existing regions is also to be found in RA 5345 giving the President the power to reorganize the
Executive department to promote simplicity, economy, and efficiency in the government.

ABAKADA v. Ermita (2005)

A proviso in the VAT Reform Act states that the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12% is at issue on the
ground that it constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers to the President.

The proviso is constitutional. There is only a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement/administration of the 12% increase is contingent. While the power to tax cannot be
delegated to executive agencies, details as to the enforcement/administration of an exercise of such
power may be left to them, including the power to determine the existence of facts on which its operation
depends.


Permissible delegation

a. Ascertainment of fact

Lovina v. Moreno (1963)

RA 2056 was assailed to be unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications with sweeping, unrestrained, final, and unappealable authority to pass upon the issues
of whether a river or stream is public and navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such waters and is
constitutive as a public nuisance, and whether the law applies to the state of facts.

RA 2056 does not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works.
The mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply
the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may
affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers.

b. Filling in of details

Alegre v. Collector of Customs (1920)

Act 3263 which created and empowered the Fiber Standardization Board to determine the official grades
of Philippine fibers, and which imposed a limit on exports of fibers without certification by the Fiber
Standardization Board was assailed to be unconstitutional on the ground that it was an invalid delegation
of legislative power.

The power delegated to the board was merely to enforce the intent and purpose of the law. The
legislature itself could not grade, inspect, and bale the hemp, and so the Fiber Standardization Board was
properly vested with the administrative power to do so and embody the purpose and intent of the law.





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Limits on Rule-Making Power

Olsen & Co. v. Aldanese (1922)

Collector of Internal Revenue issued AO 35 pursuant to the rule-making power granted it Act 2613 and
required that cigars for export be long-filler as such was the product of Cagayan, Isabela and Nueva
Vizcaya.

The authority of the Collector to make any rules and regulations must be founded upon some legislative
act, and that they must follow and be within the purview of the act.

Syman v. Jacinto (1953)

A memorandum order issued by the Insular Collector of Customs provided that seizure cases, whether
appealed or not, are subject to review by the Insular Collector; that such decisions and their supporting
papers should be submitted to his office; and that pending action by him on such decisions, final disposal
of the goods shall not be made.

The Memorandum Order is invalid for failing to comply with Section 551 of the Revised Administrative
Code that forms and regulations must be approved by the Department Head and published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise publicly promulgated to become effective.

People v. Maceren (1977)

5 accused used an electrocuting device to catch fish through electric current and were charged with
having violated the Fisheries Administration Order No. 84-1.

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exceeded his authority in issuing the AO. The
Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro-fishing. Rule-making power must be confined to details
for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it had been enacted. The legislature
cannot delegate the power to declare what shall constitute a crime and how its hall be punished, which is
a power vested exclusively in it.

Toledo v. CSC (1991)

Toledo was appointed to a position in COMELEC when he was 57 years old. However, Section 22, Rule III
of the Civil Service on Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP) prohibits the appointment of persons 57
years old or above into the government service without prior approval by the CSC.

The statute creating the CSC contained no provision limiting persons in the public service by age. This
prohibition was purely a creation of the CSC and thus cannot be valid, having no basis in the law which it
was meant to implement. The administrative rules must be germane to the purpose of the law which it
was meant to implement.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. CA (1995)

ROHs request to avail of the one-time tax amnesty granted by EO 41 was denied since Revenue
Memorandum Order No. 4-87 implementing the EO construed the amnesty coverage to include only
assessments issued by the BIR after the promulgation of the EO.
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Issuances must remain consistent with the law. EO 41 was very explicit, requiring nothing more than a
simple application of its provisions.

Land Bank of the Philippines v. CA (1995)

DAR issued an administrative order permitting the opening of trust accounts or the earmarking of a sum
by the LBP, in lieu of depositing in cash or LBP bonds in an accessible bank designated by DAR the
compensation for the land taken under RA 6657.

Section 16(e) of RA 6657 explicitly provided that the deposit must be made in cash or through LBP
bonds. Compensation cannot be made through earmarking or the establishment of a trust fund. The
power of administrative agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary
to this, administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment. Settled is the
rule that administrative regulations must be in the harmony with the provisions of the law.

GMCR v. Bell Telecommunications (1997)

NTC is a collegiate body, requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the commission in order
to validly decide a case. Corollarily, pronouncements issued solely by the Chairman/Commissioner are
contrary to law. Administrative regulations derive their validity from the statute that they were intended
to implement. They must not restrict, expand, diminish, supplant or modify the law.

Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority (1998)

PCA issued a resolution declaring that it is withdrawing from all regulation of the coconut processing
industry in that its regulation would only be limited to monitoring. PCA was charged to carry out the
States policy to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and palm oil
industry. PCAs resolution disregards such legislative purpose. Any change in the policy must be made by
the legislative department of the government. It is beyond the power of an administrative agency to
dismantle it.

Ople v. Torres (1998)

Administrative Order 308 (Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System) is null
and void for being unconstitutional as it does not merely implement the legislative policy of the
Administrative Code but establishes a computerized reference system which requires a delicate
adjustment of various contending state policies. An administrative order may not unilaterally impose a
new legislative policy.

Philippine Bank of Communications v. CIR ( 1999)

Memorandum circulars are in the nature of administrative rulings, and while given great weight, are not
conclusive and may in fact be ignored if they are erroneous. The State cannot be estopped by the
mistakes or errors of its officials or agents.




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China Banking Co. v. Board of Trustees of HDMF (1999)

The rules and regulations which are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal
provisions that have the effect of law should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the
legislature to the administrative agency. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.


Publication and effectivity

People v. Que Po Lay

Que Po Lay was convicted under the penal provision of Central Bank Circular No. 20 for failing to sell
foreign exchange a day after he acquired it.

The law was published only after the act was committed. Circulars which prescribe a penalty for its
violation should be published before becoming effective for the people to be officially informed. Before
the public may be bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must
be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and penalties.

Taada v. Tuvera (1980)

All laws must be published in full, except issuances which are internal in nature, letters of instruction
concerning guidelines to be followed by subordinates, or municipal ordinances (covered by LGC). Article
2 of the Civil Code requires publication to be made in the Official Gazette and the clause unless otherwise
provided, refers to the date of effectivity, not the requirement of publication. Publication is
indispensable, and to omit it would offend due process, denying public knowledge of the laws. Section 6
of Article III of the 1987 Constitution recognizes the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern which applies especially to legislative enactments.

Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Torres (1992)

DOLE issued DO 16 temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino
domestic helpers bound for HK and the POEA issued Memorandum Circular Nos. 30 and 37 in relation to
said DO. These issuances were alleged to have not met the publication requirement as they were not filed
with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR).

The issuances are invalid for lack of publication as required in Art. 2 Civil Code (Official Gazette), Art. 5
Labor Code (circulars published in newspapers of general circulation), and Section 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2,
Book VII of the Administrative Code (filing with UP Law Center). Administrative rules and regulations
must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.

Republic v. Express Telecom Co. (2002)

The 1993 Revised Rules of the NTC were not published in a newspaper of general circulation, thus, they
did not take effect. Even though the 1993 Rules were filed with the UP Law Center, in accordance with
Section 3, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code, the same is not the operative act that gives
rules valid force and effect since the bulletin of codified rules by the ONAR is furnished only to the Office
of the President, Congress, all appellate courts, the National Library, and other public officers or agencies
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specified by Congress. Publication in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation is required
before laws can take effect.

Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (2008)

Although the circulars were issued before the 1987 Administrative Code was enacted, such circulars
were not exempt from the publication requirement because the Administrative Code required that
existing rules must be registered within 3 months from the date of the Administrative Codes effectivity.
Publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules intended to enforce
or implement existing laws, may have binding force and effect. Such requirements were put in place as
safeguards against abuses on the part of the lawmakers and as guarantees to the constitutional right to
due process and to information on matters of public concern.

Board of Trustees of GSIS v. Velasco (2011)

The assailed resolutions pertain only to internal rules to regulate GSIS personnel, thus, there was no need
to comply with the publication or filing requirements. According to the UP Law Centers guidelines,
interpretative regulations, and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public need not be filed with the center.


Interpretative Rules

Hilado v. Collector (1956)

While the Collector had the authority under the NIRC to issue circulars as an interpretation or
interpretative regulation of the code, the Secretary of Finance is empowered to revoke, repeal, or
abrogate the acts or previous rulings if such were based on an incorrect construction of a statute. There
are no vested rights to be taken from a wrong interpretation of the law. An administrative officer cannot
change a law enacted by Congress.

Victorias Co. vs. Social Security Commission (1962)

Rules and regulations issued by an administrative agency are binding on courts so long as the procedure
fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the
legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with its innate wisdom. On the other hand,
administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally
determine what the law means.

Peralta v. CSC (1992)

When an administrative agency or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it
merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory,
for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. Administrative construction is not
necessarily binding upon the courts. However, action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set
aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.


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Examples of Rule-making in various agencies

Bureau of Forestry

Director of Forestry v. Munoz

Piadecos Spanish title cannot be used to register under Forestry Administrative Order No. 12-2. This AO
has the force and effect of law, it was promulgated pursuant to Section 1817 of the Administrative Code
which empowered the Bureau of Forestry to issue regulations deemed expedient or necessary to secure
the protection and conservation of the public forests in such manner as to insure a continued supply of
valuable timber and other forest products for the future, and regulating the use and occupancy of the
forests and forest reserves, to the same end. When Congress authorized the promulgation of
administrative rules and regulations to implement laws, all that is required is that it be germane to the
purpose of the law and that it conforms to the standards set by the same.

Board of Examiners of Nurses

Sand v. Abad Santos Educational Institution (1974)

Article VIII, Rule 69, Section 5 of the Rules and Regulations of the Board of Examiners for Nurses
provided for periodic inspection of nursing schools, and barred graduates of such schools that do not
comply with the minimum requirements and standards from admission to the nurses examination or
registration as a nurse.

The rule is valid and applicable to all nursing schools. Statutory authority exists for the Board to conduct
periodic inspections of nursing schools in order to discharge its supervisory and regulatory functions
vested in it under the Philippine Nursing Act.

Philippine Patent Office

American Tobacco v. Director of Patents (1975)

Rule 168 of the Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in trademark cases allowing
the Director of Patents to delegate the hearing of proceedings to other officers, with the proviso that all
judgements must be prepared by the Director, is assailed because the law states that the Director must
hear all cases.

The rule is valid. The power conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration of a
statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order
to carry out its purposes and provisions may be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular
function, unless by express provision of the act or by implication it has been withheld.
The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not
preclude him from utilizing the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis
of which the officer makes his decision.




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Philippine Overseas Employment Administration

Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. v. POEA

POEA issuances are being assailed as invalid because POEA allegedly has no authority to fix rates
affecting death and workmens compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels.

Legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be
delegated through is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced. Congress may
constitutionally delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation and effectuate its policies because the legislature may find it impracticable, if not impossible,
to anticipate situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect.

Movie and Television Review and Classification Board

Soriano v. Laguardia

MTRCB suspended the show of Ang Dating Daan because the host made offensive remarks against a
person from another sect. The power of the MTRCB to regulate and supervise the exhibition of TV
programs carries with it or necessarily implies the authority to take effective punitive action for violation
of the law sought to be enforced.


2. Quasi-Judicial (adjudicatory) functions

Power to issue subpoena, declare contempt

Evangelista v. Jarencio (1975)

Manalastas was subpoenaed by the PARGO in connection with investigations regarding corrupt
transactions in the Manila city government. Under its enabling law, the PARGO enjoys the authority to
issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations. This power is not limited to PARGOs
exercise of quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions. Investigations are useful for all administrative
functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising
and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more
specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what, if anything, should be done.

A subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is: (1) within the authority of the
agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; (3) the information is reasonably relevant.

Guevara v. COMELEC (1958)

Comelec ordered Guevara to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for having
published an article which allegedly tended to influence the Comelec in the adjudication of a controversy
regarding contracts to manufacture ballot boxes. Comelec has no power or authority to submit Guevarra
to contempt proceedings if its purpose is to discipline him because of the publication of the article. In
proceeding on the preparation of ballot boxes, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise
any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as
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postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature. Its exercise by administrative bodies
has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. The exercise of that power
by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid.

Catura v. CIR (1971)

CIR, in connection with a complaint filed for unauthorized disbursement of union funds, issued an order
requiring and directing the petitioners who were union officers, to deliver and deposit to the Court all
the said Association's book of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and
other documents related to the finances of the said labor union at the hearing of this petition x x x. The
Court recognized the power of the administrative agency to issue subpoenas even if there was no explicit
statutory grant because it was necessary to assure the effective administration of the statute involved.

Tolentino v. Inciong (1979)

NLRC Chairman Inciong issued subpoenas requiring Tolentino and CFI Judge de los Angeles to appear
before NLRC to explain why they should not be held in contempt for trying to use old society tactics to
prevent union election duly ordered by the NLRC under PD 21.

The subpoenas were beyond Inciongs power to issue. The concern of Inciong that the objectives of the
law should be attained did not warrant his exercise of a power which was not conferred. The competence
"to hold any person in contempt for refusal to comply certainly cannot extend to a judge of the court of
first instance.

Warrants of arrest, administrative searches

Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board (1963)

Deportation Board issued warrants of arrest against Qua Chee Gan and 6 others, all aliens, who were
charged with the unauthorized purchase/remittance of U.S. dollars, as well as attempted bribery of a
Central Bank official and a U.S. Air Force captain to evade prosecution.

The Presidents power to investigate may be delegated, so the Board may conduct the investigation as the
authorized agent of the President. But it was not clear whether the Presidents authority carries with it
the power to order the arrest of the alien complained of. Assuming that the President possesses such a
power, he cannot validly delegate it because the discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or
not is personal to the one upon whom the authority devolves. Official functions requiring the exercise of
discretion and judgment may not be delegated.

Vivo v. Montesa (1968)

Immigration issued warrants of arrest against 7 persons for the purpose of bringing them before the
Commissioner to show cause why they should not be deported for fraudulently entering the country.

The issuance of the warrants of arrest by the Immigration Commissioner and the arrest pursuant to such
administrative warrant are in conflict with Bill of Rights as warrants may only be issued by a judge. The
arrest of a foreigner necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when there is
already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the
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power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable
that the alien be arrested.

Santos v. Commissioner (1976)
Santos was arrested by virtue of warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Immigration while his deportation case was pending. The Qua Chee Gan ruling was applied. The
Commissioner cannot issue a warrant of arrest for purposes of investigation. But the Commissioner can
issue it if there already was a deportation order.

Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago (1988)
Petitioners were charged for committing acts of pedophilia. A warrant of arrest was issued by the judge
and they were apprehended. They however questioned the authority of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation to arrest and detain them.

Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a
preventive measure. It is summary and nature and therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in
accordance with ordinary court proceedings. What is essential is that there be a specific charge against
the alien intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a
counsel if desired. The charge must be substantiated by competent evidence, hearsay evidence may even
be admitted.

Lucien Tran Van Nghia v. Liwag (1989)

Lucien, a French national was arrested without a warrant. He contended that the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation had no power, authority, or jurisdiction to cause his arrest because it was
made in violation of Art. III, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

Although the requirement of probable cause to be determined by a Judge does not extend to deportation
proceedings, there should still be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported;
a fair hearing should be conducted with the assistance of counsel, if desired; and the charge should be
substantiated by competent evidence.

Salazar v. Achacoso (1990)

Petitioner was charged with illegal recruitment. Law enforcers went to her residence where it was
discovered that she was operating a dance studio. Documents and other personal property were seized.

The warrant was not issued by a judge, but by the Secretary of Labor; and, assuming that the Secretary of
Labor is authorized to issue warrants, the same is invalid for being general.

Board of Commissioners (CID) v. De la Rosa (1991)

28 years after Gatchalian was admitted as a Filipino citizen, the Board of Commissioners issued a mission
order/ warrant of arrest against him so he could be investigated for violating the Immigration Act.



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The Board cannot issue warrants of arrest for investigative purposes. In implementing the Immigration
Act, the Commissioner of Immigration could issue warrants of arrest only after the Board determined the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien.

Imposition of Fines and Penalties

Civil Aeronautics Board v. PAL (1975)

PALs flight from Tuguegarao to Manila made a flagstop in Baguio City to pick up 20 passengers who
could not be accommodated in its regular flight. This was done without the prior approval of the Civil
Aeronautics Board. The CAB issued a resolution imposing a fine.

CAB was fully authorized by law [R.A. 776 Civil Aeronautics Act] to impose fines in the nature of civil or
administrative penalties for violation of its rules and regulations, but not to impose fines in the nature of
criminal penalty, which can only be done by courts of justice.

Scotys Dept. Store v. Micaller (1956)

Scotys Dept. Store was found by the CIR to have committed unfair labor practice and ordered to reinstate
Micaller, pay backwages and pay a fine.

CIR could not impose fines or other penal sanctions because it did not have jurisdiction over criminal
cases, as giving it such jurisdiction would be in contravention of the due process clause of the
Constitution.

RCPI v. Board of Communications (1977)

Diego Morales and Pacifico Innocencio separately filed complaints against RCPI before the Board of
Communications (BOC) alleging that RCPI is liable to them for damages for its failure to deliver certain
telegrams meant to inform them of the deaths of their close relatives. The BOC imposed a fine on RCPI
pursuant to Sec. 21 of the Public Service Act.

RCPI cannot be made to pay the said fine because a fine can only be imposed on a public service that
violates the terms and conditions of any certificate or any order, decision or regulation of the
Commission. If the Morales and Inocencio suffered injury allegedly due to RCPIs contractual breach, their
recourse should have been in the courts.

Perez v. LPG Refillers (2006)

A circular issued by the DOE implementing BP33 which provided penalties for enumerated acts therein
was being assailed for not being in conformity with the law it seeks to implement.

Circular is valid. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, defines what constitute punishable acts involving petroleum
products and sets the minimum and maximum limits for the corresponding penalties. The Circular
merely implements the said law, albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers,
marketers, and dealers.



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Public Hearing Committee v. SM Prime (2010)

LLDA inspected the wastewater of SM City Manila and found that in did not conform with the effluent
standards imposed by law. LLDA imposed a fine of P1,000 a day.

LLDA had the authority to impose fines and penalties since the law clothed the LLDA not only with the
express powers granted to it, but also those which are implied or incidental but, nonetheless, are
necessary or essential for the full and proper implementation of its purposes and functions.


Administrative Procedure

Due Process

While administrative agencies may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements, this does not mean that they can entirely disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process.


Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations (1950)

Ang Tibay laid off workers belonging to the NLU. NLU protested this alleged unfair labor practice.

Even though the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not
mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There
are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones cause and submit evidence in
support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) There must be something to support a finding or conclusion;
(4) The evidence supporting the decision must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of the subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the
decision rendered.

Asprec v. Itchon (1966)

Petitioner claims denial of due process because he was not present during the hearings. Despite the
quasi-judicial nature of the administrative agency, the Board was right to proceed notwithstanding
petitioners absence during the proceedings. He had opportunity to defend himself, which he waived
when he or his counsel did not appear during the last day of hearing.


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Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. v. NLRC (1998)

In a case for illegal dismissal, POEA rendered a decision without conducting a full-blown trial. Vinta
alleged that is was deprived of due process because no trial was done. While administrative agencies
must observe due process, such does not require a trial. Due process in administrative proceedings only
requires that the parties are given the opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied if the parties are
given the opportunity to submit position papers.

Bachrach Motor Co. v. CIR (1978)

Bachrachs lone witness, Kaplin, after his testimony, later went abroad, rendering the RTEA unable to
cross-examine him. CIR struck Kaplins testimony off the records and dismissed Bachrachs petition. The
right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or
civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is
fundamental right which is part of due process.

U.P. Board of Regents v. CA (1999)

Arokiaswamy was charged with plagiarism but the disciplinary proceedings against her were not
finalized until after she had received her Ph.D. After a showing of overwhelming evidence of intellectual
dishonesty, the UP Board of Regents resolved to withdraw her degree.

She was afforded due process which in administrative proceedings is essentially the opportunity to
explain one's side of a controversy or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. UP has a constitutional right to academic freedom which included its determination of whom it can
confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates. If such conferment was obtained through fraud, it
has the right to revoke or withdraw it.

Zambales Chromite Mining Co. v. CA (1979)

The Director of Mines dismissed petitioners petition to mining claims. While the case was on appeal at
the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, said director became its Secretary and dismissed
petitioners appeal. Petitioner was denied due process. The director acted with grave abuse of discretion.
He should have inhibited and asked the Undersecretary to decide on the appeal, otherwise it would be a
biased review. A decision cannot be reviewed on appeal by the same officer who decided it a quo.

Rivera v. CSC and Landbank of the Philippines (1995)

The reviewing officer must be other than the officer whose decision is under review. Otherwise, there
could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. Such would be a denial of due
process.

Pefianco v. Moral (2000)

A respondent in an administrative case is NOT entitled to be informed of the findings and
recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is
entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a
reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during the hearings
of the investigation committee.
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Napolcom National Appellate Board and PNP v. Bernabe (2000)

Due process as a constitutional precept does not always and in all situations require a trial-type
proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an
opportunity to explain or defend himself. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied
to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Respondent was given notice of the complaints/charges against him and an opportunity to answer. He
submitted an affidavit answering point by point the charges against him. He even appealed from the
decision of the PNP Chief dismissing him from the police service to the National Appellate Board, and
submitted a memorandum. Consequently, he was given more than adequate opportunity to explain his
side.

Shoppes Manila v. NLRC (2004)

Shoppes alleged that the Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion for deciding the case without
conducting a hearing. Formal hearing is not mandatory and is dependent on the discretion of the labor
arbiter. Under Sec. 5, Rule V of New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the LA has the authority to
determine whether or not there is a necessity to conduct formal hearings. It is discretionary and is
something that the parties cannot demand as a matter of right. The requirements of due process are
satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to submit the respective position papers.

Autencio v. Manara (2005)

Autencio was charged with dishonesty and misconduct in office for changing the payroll of employees.
She was informed of the charges, gave her Answer, presented affidavits and was assisted by counsel in a
pre-hearing conference. After she was found guilty, she appealed to the Civil Service Commission and
claimed that she was tricked into waiving her right to present evidence and thus she was not afforded
due process

In administrative cases, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain ones side suffices to meet the
requirements of due process. A formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary. For the purpose of
ascertaining the truth, an investigation will be conducted, during which technical rules applicable to
judicial proceedings need not always be adhered to. And where the party has the opportunity to appeal
or seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, defects in procedural due process may be
cured.

Samalio v. CA (2005)

The due process requirement is satisfied where parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand. In line with jurisprudence, denial of due process cannot be
successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration, which Samalio admits he had filed with the BID and the CSC.

Domingo v. Rayala (2008)
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following
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a. The right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondents legal rights;
b. A real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and
evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights;
c. A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and
d. A finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration
during the hearing or contained in the records, or made known to the parties affected.

A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. v. Office of the President (2010)

Due process does not always require a trial-type proceeding. Litigants may be heard through pleadings,
written explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral arguments. The standard of due process that
must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not
ignored. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. Any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing of an MR.

Gannapao v. CSC (2011)

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be
safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party
was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process. In this
case, petitioner availed of all legal remedies available to him and was allowed to present evidence to
defend himself, thus there was no denial of due process.

Notice and Hearing

When required

National Development Corp. v. Collector (1963) When required by law

Pursuant to a charge of violation of the Tariff and Customs Act, C.F. Sharp & Company, was imposed a
fine. Its request that the case be set for investigation and hearing was denied by the Collector of Customs.
Collector committed grave abuse of discretion in imposing the fine without the benefit of an investigation
or hearing, as requested. Under the Tariff and Customs Code, in order that an imported article or
merchandise may be considered a cargo that should be manifested, it must first be so established,
because there are other effects that a vessel may carry that are excluded from the requirement of the law.
And even if customs authorities have claimed that an article or merchandise is NOT within the exception,
it does not automatically make the vessel liable. It is still necessary that the vessel, its owner, or its
operator be given a chance to show otherwise

Bautista v. Workmens Compensation Commission (1979) When making quasi-judicial decisions

Bautistas claim was dismissed by the Department of Labors Workmens Compensation Commission due
to his and his counsels repeated non-appearance at 3 scheduled hearings of the case. Bautista was
deprived of due process by the hearing officer. It was proven that he and his counsel were not duly
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notifiedeither they were not notified at all, or they received notice too late, only after the scheduled
dates of hearing. The Commissions rules require giving of reasonable notice of hearing to each party
interested, which is done by serving upon him, personally or by registered mail, a copy of the notice,
either at his last known post office address or through his counsel. The purpose is to ensure observance
and protection of an interested partys right to a hearing. The actions of the hearing officer and the
Commission are a foul blow to the Constitutions social justice clause and injunction for the State to afford
full protection to labor. The government, especially labor agencies, has an obligation to give meaning and
substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man.

Equitable Banking Corp. v. NLRC (1997) When terminating employment

Sadac, VP of Equitable Banks Legal Department was accused of abusive conduct, inefficiency,
ineffectiveness, mismanagement and decisiveness. Bank Chairman sent him a memo stating that instead
of conducting a formal hearing, the bank would instead wait for his voluntary resignation. Sadac filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal. He was denied due process. Bank ignored the procedural requirements for
terminating employment (notice apprising the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought, and another notice informing the employee of the employers decision to dismiss
him). The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain ones side.
But meetings in the nature of consultation or conferences are NOT valid substitutes for the proper
observance of notice and hearing.

Felix Uy v. CoA (2000) When making quasi-judicial decisions

The COAs finding of bad faith, and thus personal liability on Governor Paredes part, was based solely on
the MSPBs decision, which did not meet the quantum of proof necessary to overcome the presumption of
good faith. The COAs power to decide administrative cases involving expenditure of public funds
involves the quasi-judicial aspect of government audit, which means that proceedings before it must
comply with the fundamental requirements of procedural due process. These were not complied with,
since Governor Paredes was never made a party to nor served a notice of the proceedings before the COA.
It would be unfair for the COA to hold him personally liable for petitioners claims, amounting to millions
of pesos, without giving him an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in his defence.


When not required

Suntay v. People (1957) When the basis for making the quasi-judicial decision is clear

A verified complaint was filed against Suntay for taking Alicia Nubla, a 16-year old minor, from her school
with lewd design and having carnal knowledge of her. Suntay applied for and was granted a passport by
the DFA, and he left for the U.S. shortly after. DFA Secretary Garcia instructed the Philippine Ambassador
to the U.S. to cancel Suntays passport and compel him to return to the Philippines. Suntay sought to
enjoin Secretary Garcia from cancelling his passport without previous hearing.

Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. Hearing would have been proper and
necessary if the reason for withdrawal or cancellation of Suntays passport were unclear and doubtful.
But when discretion is exercised by an officer (Secretary Garcia) vested with it upon an undisputed fact
(the filing of a charge of seduction against Suntay), hearing may be dispensed with as a prerequisite to
action (cancellation of Suntays passport).

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Bisschop v. Galang (1963) When deciding applications for extension of stay of aliens
Bisschop, an American citizen, applied for extension of stay in the Philippines. Commissioner Galang
advised Bisschop that his application had been denied by the Board of Commissioners and that he should
depart within 5 days. Bisschops counsel requested a copy of the Boards decision, but was told that in
such cases, for reasons of practicability and expediency, no formal decision was promulgated.

First, Commissioners of Immigration are not required to conduct formal hearings on applications for
extension of stay of aliens. Since the law is silent as to the procedure in such cases, courts have no
jurisdiction to review the purely administrative practice of immigration authorities of not granting
formal hearings therein. A day in court is NOT a matter of right in administrative proceedings. In certain
administrative proceedings, the right to notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law.
Commissioner Galangs letter advising Bisschop to depart in 5 days was a mere formality and far from
final. The requirement to leave before the start of deportation proceedings is only an advice to the party
that unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be compelled to take steps for his expulsion. Second,
Commissioners of Immigration are NOT required to promulgate written decisions in cases involving
extension of stay of aliens. There is nothing in immigration laws which require the Board to render
written decisions in such cases.

Pollution Adjudication Board v. CA (1991) When public interest so requires

Pollution Adjudication Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar Textile Finishing Corporation to
cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations, which were discharging
untreated wastewater directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River.

Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in certain situations, wherein the
ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests through the exercise of police power. In the case at bar, the ex parte Order was proper because
stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive wastes into Philippine waters should not wait until
protracted litigation over the correctness of such orders has run its full course. Industrial establishments
are not constitutionally entitled to reduce their costs/expenses and increase their profits by putting the
public interest at risk by disregarding the requirements of anti-pollution statutory and regulatory
provisions. Solar may contest the correctness of the ex parte order in a public hearing before the Board,
where it would have the opportunity to controvert the basis of such order. That such an opportunity is
subsequently available is really all that is required by the due process clause of the Constitution in
situations like the case at bar.


Form and Promulgation of Judgment

Indias v. Phil. Iron Mines (1957)

Indias filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against Phil. Iron Mines. Hearings were conducted by a
hearing examiner, after which, the examiner rendered his report stating that the charge was
unsubstantiated by evidence, and recommended its dismissal. The Court of Industrial Relations issued
and order dismissing the complaint saying After a perusal of the record of the case, the Court finds no
sufficient justification for modifying said recommendation, findings and conclusions, and, consequently,
this case is hereby dismissed. Indias challenges the order saying that it made without stating the facts
and law in support of the order.
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While the order does not make its own discussion of the evidence or its own findings of fact, such is not
necessary if the court is satisfied with the report of its examiner which already contains a full discussion
of the evidence and the findings of fact. The situation would be different if the court disagrees with the
report, in which case it should state the reasons for its disagreement. When the CIR refers a case to a
commissioner for investigation, report, and recommendation, and at such investigation the parties were
given an opportunity to be heard, the requirement of due process is satisfied.

Serrano v. PSC (1968)

The Public Service Commission (PSC) made a joint decision passing on the claim of 99 applicants for
certificates of public convenience to operate a taxicab service. It granted certificates to 60 applicants, as
listed in the decision. With regard to the remaining applicants, the decision stated "the applications not
included in the list of those granted are either [dismissed] for lack of interest or failure to prosecute or
[denied] for failure to qualify". Serrano challenged the PSC decision on the ground that the decision does
not clearly state the facts as to each case regarding the qualification and financial ability of the applicant
and the other factors constituting the criterion used as basis in granting the application.

The Constitutional provision which mandates that a decision must clearly and distinctly state the facts
and the law on which it is based only applies to courts and not to administrative agencies. However, the
non-inclusion of the administrative tribunal within the scope of the Constitutional provision does not
warrant the summary disposition of Serrano's application. In Ang Tibay, it was held that an
administrative tribunal must not disregard the requirement of due process, and that as a matter of due
process, the administrative tribunal must render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.

Solid Homes v. Laserna (2008)

Laserna filed a complaint against Solid Homes for delivery of title and execution of deed of sale before the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). HLURB arbiter rendered a decision which was
appealed to the HLURB Board and subsequently to the Office of the President. The Office of the President,
in its decision, merely adopted by reference the findings of the Board.

The Constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of
memorandum decisions which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in
decisions of inferior tribunals. In Francisco vs. Permskul, the Court laid down the conditions to make a
memorandum decision valid:
1) it should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an
annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision; and

2) it is resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties and
easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will
require an extended discussion of the laws involved.

The Constitutional mandate need not apply to decisions rendered in administrative proceedings, as in
this case; it applies only to decisions rendered in judicial proceedings. The rights of parties in
administrative proceedings are not violated as long as the constitutional requirement of due process has
been satisfied as laid down in Ang Tibay. There is no requirement that the decision must express clearly
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and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. For as long as the administrative decision is
grounded on evidence, and expressed in a manner that sufficiently informs the parties of the factual and
legal bases of the decision, the due process requirement is satisfied.

Department of Health v. Camposano (2005)

An administrative charge was filed against Camposano, et al., employees of the DOH, for Dishonesty and
Grave Misconduct in connection with an alleged anomalous purchase of certain medicines. PCAGC issued
a resolution finding Camposano, et al. guilty, and recommending their dismissal. Relying on the
recommendation by the PCAGC, the DOH Secretary, issued an order dismissing Camposano, et al.

PCAGC does not have the power to impose any administrative sanctions directly; its authority is limited
to conducting investigations, and preparing findings and recommendations. The power to impose
sanctions belonged to the disciplining authority, which is the DOH Secretary, who had to observe due
process prior to imposing penalties. The Secretary's decision in this case, did not comply with the 6th
requisite stated in the Ang Tibay case. The actual exercise of the disciplining authoritys prerogative
requires a prior independent consideration of the law and the facts. Failure to comply with results in an
invalid decision. The disciplining authority should not merely and solely rely on an investigators
recommendation, but must personally weigh and assess the evidence gathered.

American Tobacco v. Director of Patents (1975)

Petitioners challenge the validity of the amendment of Rule 168 of the Rules of Practice before the
Philippine Patent Office, which authorized the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of the
office to hear inter partes proceedings, because under the law, the Director of Patents must personally
hear and decide the cases.

The power conferred upon an administrative agency to issue such regulations as may be deemed
necessary in order to carry out its purposes is an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular
function, unless it is withheld by express provisions of the law. It could hardly be expected, in view of the
magnitude of the Director's responsibility, to require him to hear personally each and every case pending
in his office. While the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency or officer vested by
law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision
of the administrative agency or officer will be made. It is sufficient that the judgment an discretion finally
exercised are those of the officer authorized by law.

Albert v. Gangan (2001)

It is a basic tenet of due process that the decision of a government agency must state the facts and the law
on which the decision is based. COAs decision merely stated conclusions of law while facts and
circumstance regarding the disallowance were missing, inaccurate, or incomplete. There has to be factual
basis why the expenditure is alleged to be fraudulent or why was there a misrepresentation.

Arocha v. Vivo (1967)

When the BOC first acted on the case of Gatchalian, its members acted independently, as shown by the
different dates they have expressed their votes. They did not actually meet to discuss, and vote on the
case. Individual action by members of a board plainly renders nugatory the purpose of its constitution as
a Board. The powers and duties of boards and commissions may not be exercised by the individual
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members separately. Their acts are official only when done by the members convened in session, upon a
concurrence of at least a majority and with at least a quorum present.

Neria v. Commissioner of Immigration (1968)

Promulgation means "the delivery of the decision to the Clerk of Court for filing and publication". Based
on the Immigration Rules and Regulations, promulgation takes place even before the decision is written,
and a copy is served on the alien. The date of promulgation is the date when the BSI voted and resolved to
admit an alien, and this date can be ascertained from the minutes of the proceedings of the BSI.

Realty Exchange Venture Corp. v. Sendino (1994)

Sendino filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against REVI with the Office of Appeals,
Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the HLURB. HLURB rendered judgment in favor of Sendino.
REVI contended, among others, that the decision cannot stand because it was not rendered by the Board
of Commissioners en banc.

The Board is specifically mandated by its governing law to adopt rules of procedure for the conduct of its
business and perform such functions necessary for the effective accomplishment of its above mentioned
functions."There is nothing in the provisions of the EOs defining the powers and duties of the Board
which denies or withholds the power to delegate adjudicatory functions to divisions for the purpose of
effectively carrying out its administrative responsibilities and quasi-judicial powers.


Jurisdiction

Go Tek v. Deportation Board (1977)

Go Tek was arrested during a raid of a suspected guerilla unit. Fake dollar checks were also found in his
possession, causing him to be charged with illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and
other instruments of credit under Art. 168, RPC. A case for his deportation proceeded simultaneously
before the Deportation Board.

Deportation Board had jurisdiction to investigate Go Tek despite the fact that he has yet to be convicted
of the criminal charge against him and despite the fact that his alleged acts do not fall under the
enumeration of the grounds for deportation in Sec. 37 of the Immigration Law. Under the law,
deportation may be effected either by order of the President after his or his agents due investigation or
upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or his designated officer after the Board of
Commissioners determination of the existence of a ground for deportation. Section 69 does not
enumerate grounds for deportation. It merely provides that the Deportation Board is authorized to
conduct investigations on possibly deportable aliens and forward its recommendations to the President.
The Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of facts which warrant the deportation
of aliens. An executive order of deportation is not dependent on a prior judicial conviction. Conviction or
acquittal of a criminal charge does not constitute res judicata in the deportation proceedings.





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Guy v. Ignacio (2010)

Atty. Ignacio filed a complaint for blacklisting and deportation against two sisters on the basis that they
were Canadian citizens illegally working in the Philippines. They refused to comply with a subpoena
causing them to be charged with violating the Philippine Immigration Act.

The general rule is that courts will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and services in determining technical
and intricate matters of fact. However, this case falls under one of the exceptions to the rule, namely:
where the claim of citizenship is so substantial that there is reasonable ground to believe that the claim is
correct. When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to
immediate review should be recognized and courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings.

Go v. Ramos (2009)

The Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation reversed an earlier decision
of an Associate Commissioner which dismissed a complaint against Go for being an illegal and
undesirable alien. Pursuant to this reversal, a charge sheet was filed against Go for violating the
Immigration Act. Thus, Go filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC questioning the
jurisdiction of the Board to continue the deportation proceedings.

The Board had the authority to hear and determine the deportation case against a deportee and in the
process determine also the question of citizenship raised by him. The exception where judicial
determination was allowed was when the courts themselves believe that there was a substantial claim of
citizenship, and the evidence submitted was conclusive of such citizenship. The courts could in these
cases review and even enjoin the proceedings. The Boards jurisdiction was not divested by mere claim of
citizenship. Of course, the Boards decision was not final, but subject to judicial review. Here, the facts
were not such that the Court was convinced that the Boards jurisdiction should be ousted.

De la Fuente v. De Veyra (1983)
The Philippine Coast Guard caught a vessel unloading cargo to small watercrafts. The captain of the
vessel was not able to present the appropriate documents for the cargo so he and his crew were arrested
for smuggling. The Customs of Sual-Dagupan issued a warrant of seizure and detention.

The exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the Collector of Customs precludes a
CFI from assuming cognizance over such cases. Congress conferred jurisdiction over seizure and
forfeiture cases to the customs authorities. The law affords the Collector of Customs sufficient latitude in
determining whether or not a certain article is subject to seizure or forfeiture and his decision on the
matter is appealable to the Commissioner of Customs and then to the Court of Tax Appeals, not to the CFI,
which may not interfere with the Commissioners decisions. There may only be further judicial review in
appropriate cases via a certiorari proceeding.

Cario v. Commission on Human Rights (1991)

800 public school teachers undertook concerted mass actions on account of the failure of public
authorities to heed their grievances. A return-to-work order was issued but they continued the mass
actions. As a result, the teachers were administratively charged and preventively suspended. After an
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investigation, they were dismissed. The DECS Secretary affirmed the dismissal. The teachers submitted
sworn statements to the CHR impugning their dismissal.

The CHR has no power to exercise adjudicatory power. The most that can be conceded to the CHR, under
the Constitution is the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. However, fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function
of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. Hence, merely having the power to
investigate, the CHR should not try and resolve the matter involving the public school teachers alleged
dismissal without due process. The issues involved in the controversy are clearly within the original
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education as provided for by the Civil Service Law and also within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Simon v. CHR (1994)

A Demolition Notice was sent to the North EDSA Vendors Association, Inc. from the Office of the Quezon
City Mayor. The squatters-vendors filed a letter-complaint with the CHR asking the latter to enjoin the QC
Mayor from pushing through with the demolition, which the CHR did.

The Court reiterated its ruling in Cario v. CHR that it is only the first of the CHRs constitutionally
enumerated powers that bears resemblance with adjudication - but that resemblance does not equate to
adjudication. It was not the intention of the Constitutional Commission to make the CHR a quasi-judicial
body.

Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA (1994)

The Caloocan City Government was operating a dumpsite which was polluting the nearby creek/tributary
of the Marilao River. The LLDA issued a cease and desist order against it. On the other hand, the RTC of
Caloocan issued a cease and desist order against the LLDA. The controversy was brought before the CA,
which held that the LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the
operation of the dumpsite.

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board, except
in cases where a special law provides for another forum. The LLDA, is specifically mandated under RA
4850 to carry out the national policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced
growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces with due regard for ...the prevention of
undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant of power, the
LLDAs jurisdiction was correctly invoked in this case. The LLDA must also be deemed to possess the
power to issue cease and desist orders. While it is true that it was not expressly conferred such a power,
its enabling laws granted it the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of
pollution".

Union Bank v. HLURB (1992)

A condominium buyer purchased a unit without knowing that the whole condominium project had been
mortgaged to Union Bank. The mortgage was foreclosed and the property was sold to Far East Bank at
public auction. The buyer filed a complaint for annulment of Far Easts title to the unit. Union Bank and
Far East Bank alleged that the HLURB had no jurisdiction.

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HLURB has jurisdiction. The relevant laws in this case include: PD 957, which gave the NHA exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business; PD 1344, which gave the NHA the exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving unsound real estate business practices; and EO 648, which
transferred the above-mentioned functions to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (later
became the HLURB). The jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad enough to
include jurisdiction over complaints for specific performance of the sale, or annulment of the mortgage,
of a condominium unit .
Mateo v. CA (1995)

Several Morong Water District (MOWAD) employees filed a complaint against their general manager
Edgar Sta. Maria. The MOWAD board members conducted an investigation and placed Edgar under
preventive suspension. Eventually, Edgar was dismissed causing him to file a special civil action for quo
warranto and mandamus before the RTC.

The RTC does not have jurisdiction. MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to PD 198.
The SC has previously held that employees of GOCCs with original charters, such as MOWAD, fall under
the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. Under PD 807, EO 292 and Memorandum Circular No. 44
(1990) of the CSC, the party aggrieved by an action of the government involving termination of services
may appeal to the Commission within 15 days of the action. Thereafter, the final resolution of the CSC
may be appealed to the CA. The Civil Service Commission under the Constitution is the single arbiter of all
contests relating to the civil service. Thus, RTCs have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving
dismissal of officers and employees covered by the Civil Service Law.

PAL v. Civil Aeronautics Board (1997)

Grandair applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) with the CAB and
requested for a Temporary Operating Permit (TOP). PAL opposed the application alleging that the CAB
had no jurisdiction to hear the application since Grandair did not have a franchise to operate from
Congress. CAB denied the opposition and approved the issuance of the TOP.

The CAB has jurisdiction. The CAB is expressly authorized under RA 776 to issue a TOP or a CPCN upon
its own initiative. Nothing in the said law negates the power to issue the said permit before the
completion of the applicants evidence and that of the oppositors in the main petition. There is also
nothing in the law or the Constitution which indicates that a legislative franchise is an indispensable
requirement for an entity to operate as a domestic air transport operator. Although the Constitution
recognizes Congress' control over any franchise, certificate or authority to operate a public utility,
Congress has seen it fit to delegate this function to government agencies, specialized particularly in their
respective areas of public service. A reading of RA 776 reveals the clear intent of Congress to delegate the
authority to regulate the issuance of a license to operate domestic air transport services to the CAB.

Eristingcol v. CA (1999)

Eristingcol was building a house in Urdaneta Village but the homeowners association meted a P400,000
penalty against her for violating certain provisions in the associations Construction Rules and
Regulations. Eristingcol filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of these rules before the RTC but the
Association alleged that RTC does not have jurisdiction over the complaint.

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The RTC does not have jurisdiction. A scrutiny of Eristingcols allegations reveals that the nature of the
controversy only superficially delves into the validity of the Construction Rules. The crux of the complaint
is actually the associations supposed arbitrary implementation of the Construction Rules against her. EO
535, which created the HIGC, transferred to it the regulatory and administrative functions over
homeowners associations originally vested with the SEC. Upon the enactment of RA 8763, the powers
and functions of the HIGC with respect to homeowners associations were again transferred - this time to
the HLURB. Thus, based on the allegations of the complaint, it is the HLURB - not the RTC - which has
jurisdiction over this case.

Deltaventures Resources, Inc. v. Cabato (2000)

Deltaventures filed a complaint for injunction with the RTC reiterating the same allegations in a third
party claim in a case pending before the NLRC. RTC held that it cannot issue an injunction against the
NLRC and that the NLRC retains the authority over all proceedings in relation to the execution of its
decisions.

Deltaventures should have filed its third party claim before the LA. The NLRCs Manual on Execution of
Judgment provides the mechanism for a third-party claimant to assert his claim over a property levied by
a sheriff on account of a labor judgment. The broad powers granted to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
under the Labor Code should be deemed to vest in them jurisdiction over incidents arising from, in
connection with or relating to labor disputes, to the exclusion of other courts. Moreover, the Labor Code
explicitly prohibits the issuance of any injunction or restraining order in any case involving labor
disputes by any court or other entity.

Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil (2002)

The Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) received several complaints from certain members of the
Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc. (DARBCI) alleging mismanagement and/or
misappropriation of funds by the then incumbent officers and members of the board of directors of
DARBCI (respondents). Before the respondents could file an answer, the CDA ordered the funds of
DARBCI to be frozen prompting the respondents to file a petition for certiorari before the RTC primarily
questioning CDAs jurisdiction to resolve the complaints.

Sec. 3 of RA 6939 enumerates the powers, functions and responsibilities of the CDA. It can be gleaned
from this provision that the authority of the CDA is to discharge purely administrative functions.
Nowhere in the law is CDA expressly granted the authority to adjudicate cooperative disputes. A review
of the deliberations by both chambers of Congress prior to the enactment of RA 6939 shows that the
intent of the legislature was not to vest quasi-judicial authority upon CDA. Thus, the CDA is devoid of any
quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate intra-cooperative disputes and more particularly disputes as
regards the election of the members of the Board of Directors and officers of cooperatives.

De Jesus v. COA (2003)

An auditing team from the Commission on Audit (COA) audited the accounts of the Catbalogan Water
District (CWD) and discovered that members of CWD's board granted themselves certain benefits. The
COA issued notices disallowing the payment of the allowances and bonuses granted to the members of
the board, on the ground that the payments run counter to PD 198, or the Provincial Water Utilities Act.
The members of the board question the jurisdiction of COA to disallow the payments.

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The Constitution mandates the COA to audit all government agencies, including government-owned and
controlled corporations. A water district is a government-owned and controlled corporation with a
special charter since it is created pursuant to PD 198. Thus, CWD is subject to the jurisdiction of COA. COA
did not usurp the functions of the LWUA. To hold otherwise would lead to a situation where the board of
an administrative agency, by the mere act of issuing a resolution, can put to naught the broad and
extensive powers granted to the COA by the Constitution.

CSC v. Alfonso (2009)

A complaint was filed against Alfonso, the director of the human resources department of the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines (PUP), charging him with violation of the Civil Service Law. He allegedly
included himself in a special order for overnight services which allowed him to make considerable
earnings for allegedly working for 24 hours straight daily, for 3 weeks. The Civil Service Commission
(CSC) issued a resolution formally charging Alfonso with Grave Misconduct, and imposing a 90-day
preventive suspension on him. Alfonso argued that the CSC had no jurisdiction because the PUP Board of
Regents has the exclusive authority to appoint and remove PUP employees.

As the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC has jurisdiction to supervise the performance
of and discipline, if need be, all government employees, including those employed in government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters such as PUP. All PUP officers and employees, whether
they be classified as teachers or professors, are deemed, first and foremost, civil servants accountable to
the people and answerable to the CSC in cases of complaints lodged by a citizen against them as public
servants. While there are laws which allow the creation of disciplinary committees in different agencies
of the government to hear and decide administrative complaints against their respective officers and
employees, such cannot be interpreted as having divested the CSC of its inherent power to supervise and
discipline government employees. To hold otherwise would not only negate the very purpose for which
the CSC was established, but would also impliedly amend the Constitution itself.

Shell v. Jalos (2010)

Shell and the Republic of the Philippines entered into a service contract for the exploration and extraction
of petroleum. As a consequence of which, Shell constructed a pipeline from its production platform to its
processing plant. Jalos, et al. filed a complaint for damages against Shell with the RTC, alleging that they
are fishermen, and that Shell's construction of the pipeline adversely affected their livelihood. Shell
argued that the case is a pollution case, thus the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has primary
jurisdiction over the controversy.

While the complaint did not use the term pollution, the acts it alleged constitute pollution as defined in
the law (PD 984). In determining Jalos, et al.'s complaint for damages, the proper tribunal must
determine whether or not the operation of the pipeline adversely altered the coastal waters' properties
and negatively affected its life sustaining function. The power and expertise needed to determine such
issue lies with the PAB. The definition of the pollution" connotes the need for specialized knowledge and
skills in determining the presence, cause, and effects of pollution. These knowledge and skills are not
within the competence of ordinary courts. Resort must first be made to the PAB, which is the agency
possessed of expertise in determining pollution-related matters.




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Machado v. Gatdula (2010)

The Machados allegedly blocked the right of way of Gatdula's property. Gatdula asked the Commission on
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) to settle the controversy between the parties. COSLAP assumed
jurisdiction, and the parties participated in the proceedings.

COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the controversy. It may only assume jurisdiction in the cases
enumerated under the law which created it. The present controversy does not fall under those
enumerated circumstances. The Machados cannot be held in estoppel for having participated in the
COSLAP proceedings, as jurisdiction is conferred by law, and not by the parties. COSLAP having no
jurisdiction, its decision is null and void. As such, it cannot be the source of any right or obligation, and all
acts pursuant to it have no legal effect. The void judgment can never become final, and any writ of
execution based on it is void.

Vda. Herrera v. Bernardo (2011)

The Bernardos filed a complaint before the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP)
against Herrera for interference, disturbance, unlawful claim, harassment and trespassing over a portion
of a parcel of land.

Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction that can only wield powers
which are specifically granted to it by its enabling statute. The present case does not fall under any of the
instances enumerated in EO 561, the law which created COSLAP, when COSLAP can exercise its
adjudicatory functions. The Bernardos' cause of action before the COSLAP pertains to their claim of
ownership over the subject property, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the Courts. Since COSLAP
had no jurisdiction, all the proceedings therein are null and void. Herrera is not estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of COSLAP. Estoppel by laches as a bar to question jurisdiction is the
exception, and not the rule. For a party to be estopped from questioning a tribunal's jurisdiction, the issue
of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled
to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.


Administrative and Judicial Proceedings Arising from the same Facts

Galang v. CA (1961)

Tee Hook Chun arrived in the Philippines with a Philippine passport. Galang, the Commissioner of
Immigration, ordered the exclusion of Tee as he was not entitled to use a Philippine passport. A criminal
case was filed against Tee for violation of the immigration law. He was found guilty. On appeal to the CA,
the appellate court ordered his release upon filing of bail. The Commissioner did not release Tee because
of the exclusion order previously issued. Upon petition by Tee, the CA issued a writ of habeas corpus. It
said that the filing of the criminal action is a waiver of the administrative proceeding to exclude THC.

Although the criminal action and the administrative proceeding for his exclusion arise from the same set
of facts, one does not bar the action in the other. The institution of the criminal action is not a waiver of
the authority to institute administrative action. Although arising from the same facts, the criminal and
administrative actions were done pursuant to different provisions of the immigration act.


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Co San v. Director of Patents (1961)

Co San was acquitted in an unfair competition case filed by Jose Ong Lian Bio in the CA. In another case,
Co San filed a petition with the Philippine Patent Office for cancellation of letters of patent issued to Ong
Lian Bio over two designs for luggages. Co San's petition was dismissed. Co San contends that the
Director of Patents should have accepted the findings of fact of the CA that Co San was the prior user of
the design in issue and that the designs in the Letter Patents issued to Jose Ong Lian Bio are not new and
original.

The Director of Patents in the administrative case is not bound by the findings arrived at by the CA in the
criminal case. The question in the cancellation proceedings refers to the validity of the design patents
issued to Ong Lian Bio; while the inquiry in the criminal case is whether Co San unfairly competed against
the luggage of Ong Lian Bio protected by the design patent. The first is within the cognizance of the Patent
Office; the second under the jurisdiction of the CFI. The acquittal of Co San by the CA was not based on the
cancellation of a patent but on the opinion that he had not deceived Jose Ong Lian Bio.

Villanos v. Subido (1972)

Villanos, a public school teacher, wrote a letter jointly addressed to her co-teachers, containing libelous
remarks against the said co-teachers. A criminal action for libel was instituted against Villanos. She was
convicted, and her conviction was affirmed by the CA. The co-teachers also filed an administrative
complaint against Villanos for gross discourtesy to them, and for using disgraceful language.

A condemnatory decision in a criminal case, even if final, by itself alone, cannot serve as basis for a
decision in an administrative case involving the same facts, for the simple reason that matters that are
material in the administrative case are not necessarily relevant in the criminal case. The finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt in the criminal case is not conclusive on the administrative case. There are
defenses, excuses and attenuating circumstances of value in administrative proceedings which are not
admissible in the trial of the criminal cases. Even where criminal conviction is specified by law as a
ground for suspension or removal of an official or employee, such conviction does not ex-proprio vigore
(by its own force) justify automatic suspension without investigation and hearing as to such conviction.

PNR v. Domingo (1971)
Mafe, a mechanic employed by the Philippine national Railways (PNR), was charged with qualified theft
for stealing a brass bearing from PNR. He was acquitted by the trial court on the ground that the
prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. After the promulgation of judgment,
Mafe filed a motion to amend the decision alleging that he was dismissed by the PNR. He argued that
since he was acquitted of the crime for which he was dismissed, he should be reinstated. Judge Domingo
of the trial court ordered the reinstatement, and payment of backwages of Mafe.

The trial court, in the criminal case, has no authority to order the payment of backwages in the event of
an acquittal of the accused employee. An acquittal of the accused does not necessarily mean that he is not
civilly liable. The exception to this is if the acquittal was for absolute lack of evidence which amounted to
a judicial declaration that the accused was innocent and did not commit the act charged. Such exception
is not applicable in this case because Mafe was acquitted merely on reasonable doubt. Such an acquittal
could not overturn the verdict of guilty in the administrative case, by virtue of which Mafe had already
been dismissed. While an accused who had been acquitted may, in appropriate cases, claim payment of
backwages or reinstatement, his relief lies not in the same criminal case but in the proper administrative
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civil action prescribed by law. Generally, acquittal in a criminal case does not carry with it relief from
administrative liability. The administrative case may proceed independently of the criminal action for the
same act or omission and requires only a preponderance of evidence to establish administrative guilt.

Tan v. COMELEC (1994)

Tan, as the City Prosecutor of Davao, was designated by the COMELEC as the Vice-Chairman of the City
Board of Canvasser of Davao City. Garcia won the mayoralty elections, and his rival candidate, Alterado,
filed a number of cases questioning the validity of Garcia's proclamation. The electoral protests were
eventually dismissed. Alterado filed with the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for Falsification of Public
Documents against Tan. Alterado also filed with the COMELEC an administrative complaint against Tan.
Tan moved to dismiss the administrative complaint in the COMELEC on several grounds, among which is
forum-shopping.

Dismissal on the ground of forum-shopping is untenable. The investigation then being conducted by the
Ombudsman on the criminal case, on the one hand, and the inquiry into the administrative charges by the
COMELEC, on the other hand, are entirely independent proceedings. Neither would the results in one
conclude the other. An absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution or
vice versa.

Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman (2000)

An administrative case for serious misconduct and/or fraud or wilful breach of trust was filed against
Ocampo with the Ombudsman. He did not file his counter-affidavit, and was later dismissed. On his MR,
he alleged, through a manifestation that his criminal case for estafa based on the same facts was
dismissed by the RTC.

Dismissal of the criminal complaint only means that there was failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt on the part of the accused. The quantum of evidence required in an administrative proceeding
(substantial evidence) is different from that in a criminal proceeding (proof beyond reasonable doubt).
Considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, procedure followed and sanctions imposed in
criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions of one body should not necessarily
be binding on the other.

Millares v. Go (2001)
An administrative complaint for grave misconduct based on the charge of double homicide resulted to
Millares dismissal from service. However, the criminal case for homicide that was filed against Millares
based on the same facts was dismissed.

Factual findings of administrative agencies, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
conclusive upon the Court. Criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters
such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.

Ferrer v. Sandiganbayan (2008)

Ferrer was charged with a violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019.The Office of the President absolved him of
administrative liability, but the Sandiganbayans second division refused to grant any of the reliefs he
sought including a motion for reinvestigation, motions for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari, and a
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motion for re-evaluation of a finding of probable cause. The dismissal of an administrative case does not
necessarily bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of
the administrative complaint.

Acuzar v. Journal (2010)

Jorolan filed an administrative case against Acuzar before the Peoples Law Enforcement Board, charging
Acuzar of grave misconduct for allegedly having an illicit relationship with Jorolans minor daughter. He
also filed a criminal case against Azucar for violation of the Child Abuse Act. PLEB found Acuzar guilty
and ordered him dismissed from the PNP.

Criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from one another. Criminal cases require
proof beyond reasonable doubt, while administrative cases only require substantial evidence. They could
proceed independently of each other. The PLEB correctly exercised jurisdiction over the case, it being the
administrative disciplinary body tasked to hear complaints against erring PNP members.



Rules of Evidence

Philippine Movie Picture Workers Association v. Premier Production (1953)

The company filed a petition with the CIR seeking authority to lay off 44 of its workers. The CIR
conducted an ocular inspection of the studios and its premises, and on the strength of its findings,
authorized the lay-off of the workers.

The workers were still entitled to hearing. Ocular inspection is not equivalent to a trial or presentation of
evidence, as it is only an auxiliary remedy. Nevertheless, conducting an ocular inspection in order to
resolve an issue is not expressly prohibited.

Estate of Florenciano Buan v. Pambusco (1956)

Buan applied for a certificate of public convenience with PSC. PSC ordered a survey of passenger traffic to
determine the necessity of such CPC. It stationed at two strategic places two of its checkers who
determined the number of passengers for one week. The checkers later submitted their findings. PSC
then denied Buans application.

The sending of checkers for purposes of observation was justified. An administrative agency may act on
its own and use methods which will enable it to obtain substantial evidence. The court is not required to
examine the proof relied upon by agencies in their decisions de novo.

Rizal Light Co. v. Municipality of Rizal (1968)

On the basis of the evidence adduced from an inspection made by PSCs engineers on Rizal Lights electric
plant, and after the latters failure to appear in hearings and to submit evidence, PSC revoked Rizal Lights
CPC and granted one for Morong Electric.

The Court is not required to examine the proof anew, and the revocation made by PSC was valid. When
prosecuting and investigating duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body such as the PSC,
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said body may make steps it believes appropriate for the proper exercise of said duties, particularly in the
manner of informing itself whether there is probable violation of law and/or its rules and regulations. It
may initiate an investigation, file a complaint, and then try the charge as preferred. So long as the
respondent is given a day in court, there can be no denial of due process, and objections to said procedure
cannot be sustained.

Borja v. Moreno (1964)

Borja allegedly closed the Matlaue, a public river located in his private land, in violation of a law. He was
subjected to an administrative complaint by the DPWC which ruled against him. Later, the trial court
granted Borjas request and declared null and void DPWCs decision.

There was substantial evidence to support that it was indeed a public navigable river, and if there is
substantial evidence to support the findings of an administrative official in matters within its
competence, the courts are bound to look no further - not even to consider evidence of a preponderant
nature. The court, however, did not overturn the trial courts decision because the investigation wherein
the evidence was received was conducted with manifest disregard of due process.

Maceda v. Energy Regulation Board (1991)

In line with the hearing regarding the provisional increase in oil prices, ERB prescribed that testimonies
were to be in affidavit form and that Caltexs cross-examination be deferred to allow other applicants for
the increase to present their evidence first. Maceda objected to this order alleging that it resulted in a
violation of his right to due process.

The exercise of this discretion in the order of testimony out of the order prescribed by the rules is not
improper, because such a relaxed procedure is especially true in administrative bodies. In the broad
interest of justice, the administrative body may, in any particular manner, except itself from technical
rules and apply such suitable procedure as shall promote its objectives.

Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottles Phils. Inc (2003)

62 Coke employees filed a complaint for ULP but failed to attend the scheduled mandatory conferences or
to submit their affidavits so the claims of 52 of them were dismissed. The Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision ordering reinstatement and full backwages. However, the CA ruled that the affidavit of 7 out of
the remaining 10 should not have been given probative value for their failure to affirm the contents
thereof and undergo cross-examination.

It was proper to ascribe evidentiary value to the affidavits despite the failure to affirm their contents and
undergo cross-examination. The NLRC is not bound by technicalities of law and procedure. It was
conferred by law the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Trial-type hearings
are not even required. Rules of evidence are also not strictly observed in proceedings before
administrative bodies where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only.

Note: This decision seems contrary to the Administrative Code which, in Sec. 12, (3) provides that every
party shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses presented against him and to submit rebuttal
evidence. However, it must be remembered that Art. 221 of the Labor Code explicitly states that the
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and
intention of this Code that the Commission and its members shall use every and all reasonable means to
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ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law and
procedure, all in the interest of due process.

Civil Service Commission v. Colangco (2008)

Colangco took and passed the professional board examination for teachers and was later appointed as a
teacher. Thereafter, CSC made an investigation and found Colangco guilty of dishonesty and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service because it was not him who applied for and took the exam.
CA ruled that photocopied documents used by CSC should have been authenticated and that only
documents or public records duly acknowledged or certified could be presented in evidence without
further proof.

CSC cases do not require strict adherence to technical rules of evidence, so it validly considered the
admissibility of such evidence. Moreover, CSC ensured that Colangco was accorded due process during
the investigation and that there was substantial evidence supporting the finding that he was guilty.

3. Fact-finding, investigative, licensing and rate-fixing powers


Fixing of Rates, Wages, Prices

Panay Autobus Co. v. Philippine Railway Co. (1933)

Public Service Commission granted the Phil. Railway Co. the power to fix its own rates in order to
compete with the rates of road trucks and auto buses. Such grant is invalid. The Legislature delegated to
the PSC the power of fixing rates of public services but it was not authorized by law to delegate to Phil.
Railway Co. the power to alter its freight rates whenever it should find it necessary to do so, because the
PSC cannot determine whether such new rates will be just and reasonable.

KMU Labor Center v. Garcia (1994)
The authority given by LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the
authorized existing fare is an undue delegation of legislative authority. LTFRB is only authorized under
EO 202 to determine, prescribe, approve, review and adjust fare rates relative to the operation of public
land transportation services.

Ynchausti Steamship Co. v. Public Utility Commissioner (1922)

When a public utility entered the public service, the control and operation of its property was subject to
reasonable rules and regulation by the public. To that extent, it was a taking of private property. When
the taking was not full, final or complete, but in the nature of continuous taking and appropriation, it
follows that there would be a fluctuation in the market value of the property in public service. Thus, in
fixing just rates, it must be founded upon conditions fair and reasonable both to the owner and the public.

Vigan Electric v. PSC (1964)

In making findings of fact, PSC performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid
exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing, otherwise, the order is null and void. As a
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general rule, a public utility must be afforded some opportunity to be heard as to the propriety and
reasonableness of rates fixed for its services by a public service commission.

Manila International Airport Authority v. Airspan Corp. (2004)

MIAA is an attached agency of the DOTC and as such, Section 9, Chapter 2, Book VII of the 1987
Administrative Code applies to it, which provides that no rule or final order involving the fixing of rates
shall be valid unless the proposed rates have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at
least two weeks before the first hearing thereon.


Licensing Function

Gonzalo Sy Trading v. Central Bank (1976)

A license is not a contract between the sovereign and the licensee and it is not a form of property to
which the constitutional prescription against impairment of the obligation of contracts may extend. A
license is a special privilege of a permission or authority to do what is within its terms.



D. Judicial Recourse and Review

Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction or Preliminary Resort

General Principles
If the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate
questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within
the proper jurisdiction of a court. (Industrial Enterprises v. CA, (1990))
The doctrine applies where a claim is originally cognizable in courts, and comes into play
whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative
body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view (Industrial Enterprises v. CA, supra.)
It behooves the courts to stand aside even when apparently they have statutory power to
proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency.
Just to be clear, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not mean that cases (which are
under the primary jurisdiction of the administrative agencies) brought to the courts should
be dismissed outright. Rather, where primary jurisdiction comes to play in a case, the
judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for
its view. (Industrial Enterprises vs. CA, supra.)
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. (Viadad v. RTC Negros, (1993))



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Philippine Global Communications v. Relova (1980)

Phil. Global Communications was granted authority to establish a station in Cebu City. Other
telecommunications companies opposed the grant. They filed a petition for declaratory relief with the
CFI, arguing that PGCs legislative franchise restricted where and how it could establish stations in the
Philippines. PGC moved to dismiss the petition, but the motion was denied, so it went to the Supreme
Court. It argued that the primary jurisdiction rested with the NTC, which had yet to resolve the other
telecommunications companies motion for reconsideration.

Since there was a legitimate legal question regarding the scope of PGCs legislative franchise, the courts
could properly have jurisdiction. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction would only operate if it could be
proved that the administrative agency in question did have authority to act. There being doubts
regarding the NTCs power in this case, the judicial remedy sought by the other telecommunications
companies was proper.

Vidad v. RTC Negros Occidental (1993)

A group of public school teachers held a mass action/strike demanding that their salaries be released.
The DECS Regional Office issued a return to work order, but the teachers did not accede. This led to the
filing of administrative complaints. In response, the teachers filed a complaint for injunction, prohibition
and damages against the officials, and a TRO was granted. The DECS officials filed an MTD. Both motions
were denied, leading to a certiorari to the SC.

The OSG could properly represent the officials, and the MTDs were correctly denied. As to the latter, the
Court held that if the bad faith on the part of the officials is proven, damages are in order, and so the
complaints could be dismissed. However, in the interest of good order, the court cases should be
suspended until a final determination in the administrative proceedings.

Industrial Enterprises v. CA (1990)

IEI filed an action for rescission of the MOA it executed with MMIC. RTC rescinded the MOA. CA reversed.
IEI's cause of action was not merely the rescission of a contract but the reversion or return to it of the
operation of the coal blocks, which properly falls within the domain of BED. Moreover, the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction finds application in this case but does not warrant its dismissal. It should only be
suspended until after the matters within the competence of the BED are threshed out and determined.

DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION: The Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular
case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that
its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative
bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of fact are involved, then relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the
matter is within the proper jurisdiction of court.

Conrad v. CA (1995)

Fitrite and its sister company Victoria are engaged in biscuits and cookies business bearing the
trademark Sunshine, which trademark was registered with the BPTTT. The companies found out that
another company, Conrad, was designated as exclusive dealer of Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., an American
company. Fitrite and Victoria sought to enjoin Conrad from continuing its business as its acts allegedly
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constitute infringement and unfair competition under the Trademark Law. On motion by Conrad, the RTC
dismissed the case on the ground that the BPTTT has jurisdiction considering the American company had
already filed a cancellation case against Fitrite and Victoria with the BPTTT.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not applicable in this case. The issue involved in the administrative
case is different from that of the issue before the RTC. In the administrative case, the issue is whether the
trademark of Fitrite/ Victoria is subject to cancellation. In the case before the RTC, the issue is whether
Conrad's acts constitute infringement of Fitrite's trademark.

Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA (2000)

Parcels of land owned by petitioner were taken by the DAR for distribution pursuant to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It was dissatisfied with the valuation of the land so it filed a
petition for a determination of just compensation for its property with the RTC. The RTC dismissed the
petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the
orders of the DARAB.

Pursuant to Rule XIII, Sec. 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the decision of the Adjudicator on the
land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable
to the Board but shall be brought to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court within 15 days from
receipt of the notice thereof. Since Veterans petition in the RTC was filed beyond the 15-day period, the
RTC correctly dismissed the case.


Exhaustion of administrative remedies

General Principles
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made with the
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before
the same may be elevated to a court of justice for review. (Estrada et al. vs. CA, (2004))
Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a
system of administrative appeal/reconsideration, the courts will not entertain a case unless the
available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have
been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum
(Paredes v. CA; Lopez v. City of Manila, (1999); Garcia v. CA (2001))
Only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-
judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine (Smart v. NTC (2003))
The Court in Smart v. NTC defined quasi-legislative or rule-making power as the power to make
rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the
granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation and separation of powers. On the other hand,
quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power was defined as the power to hear and
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance
with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.

Exceptions to the doctrine:
a. Issue involved is purely a legal question
b. Administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
c. There is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency involved
d. There is irreparable injury
101

e. Subject matter is a private land, in land case proceedings
f. Rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
g. There are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention
h. Violation of due process
i. Respondent is a department secretary who acts as an alter ego of the President bearing the
implied and assumed approval of the latter
j. When to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable
k. When it would amount to a nullification of a claim
l. The claim is small
m. Strong public interest is involved
n. In quo warranto proceedings
o. No administrative review is provided by law
p. The rule of qualified political agency applies
q. Issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot


Pascual v. Provincial Board (1959)

Pascual was administratively charged for acts allegedly committed during his previous term as mayor. He
filed a motion to dismiss with the Provincial Board alleging that he cannot be punished for acts
committed during his previous term. The Board denied his motion. He filed a petition for prohibition with
the CFI, which dismissed his petition on the ground of being premature, as he had not appealed to the
Executive Secretary as provided in the Admin Code.
While the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is followed in this jurisdiction, the said
principle has some exceptions. One exception, under which this present case falls, is where the question
involved is a purely legal question. With regard to the acts involved as a ground to discipline him, the SC
subscribes to the predominant view in US jurisprudence that a municipal officer cannot be removed for
acts committed during his previous term.

Alzate v. Aldana (1960)

Anacleto Alzate, Principal of the South Provincial High School, wrote to the Director of Public schools
claiming that considering his length of service and other qualifications he is entitled to automatic salary
increases of 5 salary rates as provided for by law. The Director replied telling him that he is only entitled
to an increase of 1 salary rate. Alzate requested for reconsideration of the ruling but after almost a
month, no action had been taken by the Director. Thus, he filed an action for mandamus to compel the
respondents Director of Schools and the Division Superintendent of Schools to adjust his salary. The
respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Alzates petition failed to state a cause of action
in view of the latters alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court granted this
motion.

The fact that the parties had to agree and the court had to approve the agreement that the Director shall
recommend to the proper official no later than 30 June 1958 and before the closing of office hours on the
same date the commitment of the sum claimed by Alzate to prevent its automatic reversion is a
recognition by the parties as well as the court of the validity and urgency of the action taken by the
petitioner. In view of the special circumstances of the case, Alzates resort to court action without
awaiting the Directors action is not premature.

102

Cipriano v. Marcelino (1972)

Leticias boss, the municipal treasurer of Calabanga, CamSur, refused to pay her salary and cash
equivalent of vacation and sick leaves after Leticia resigned. She went to court through an action for
mandamus but this was dismissed because she failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of the exception that there is no plain,
speedy, or adequate remedy. The SC granted Leticias petition and ordered Marcelino to pay up.

Corpus v. Cuaderno (1962)
Corpus was removed from his appointment as Special Assistant to the Governor in the Central Bank by
the Monetary Board after it found that it would prejudice the CBs interest for him to remain in that
position. It also appointed a replacement. Corpus filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and quo
warranto in order to get his job back. The lower court dismissed his petition on the ground that he failed
to exhaust administrative remedies available to him.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply. Corpus did not need to go to the
Office of the President because no law required it. He did not need to appeal to the Civil Service
Commission because the applicable law was the Central Bank charter, which gave the power to remove
employees to the Monetary Board, and not the more general Civil Service Law. At most, appeal to the CSC
was permissive or voluntary. The SC also took into consideration that the case is a quo warranto
proceeding. The Rules of Court emphasized a need for speed in resolving cases that involved occupation
of public offices, because otherwise the government might have to pay two people for one job.

De Lara v. Cloribel (1965)

There was a pending conflict between De Lara and P&B with the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. The Secretary issued an order prohibiting De Lara from operating and entering the contested
area until after the conflict was finally decided. De Lara defied this. P&B thus filed a complaint before the
CFI of Manila for injunction and damages against De Lara and the Bureau of Forestry. De Lara filed a
motion to dismiss, alleging that P&B failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before taking the issue
to court. This was denied.

As a rule a petition for certiorari interposed to dispute the validity of an order or decision rendered by an
administrative official in pursuance of the powers and duties with which he is invested cannot be
entertained if the party in interest fails to avail of the administrative remedies. Officials are the most
competent to pass upon matters that exclusively come within their jurisdiction. However, such rule may
be relaxed when its application may cause great and irreparable damage which cannot otherwise be
prevented except by taking the opportune appropriate court action.

Paredes v. CA (1996)
Petitioners sought the nullification of 3 rules of A.O. Nos. 1 & 2 on rate increases before the CA which
dismissed their petition and MR on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. SC affirmed
the CA ruling that the petitioners should have first availed of the accessible remedy provided in the
enabling law (i.e., BP 325), which required Cabinet approval of such rate increases and charges, before
resorting to the judicial process.

103

The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies which mandates that relief should first be sought
from the highest or most superior administrative agency, the likes of the Cabinet, may prove that a resort
to the courts would be unnecessary thereby preventing the courts from being swamped by a resort to
them in the first instance. Also, courts should be reluctant to interfere with administrative action prior to
its completion or finality, the reason being that in the absence of a final order or decision, the power of
the administrative agency concerned has not been fully exercised and there can be no irreparable harm.

Quasha v. SEC (1978)

Quasha challenged Manila Polo Clubs conversion to a proprietary club and asked for a TRO. SEC denied.
He went to the SC who granted such TRO.

Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply. Appeal to the SEC would not be a plain,
speedy, adequate remedy. Considering that it was the holiday season and that he was trying to beat the
deadline, the petition direct to the SC was proper.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan (1996)

PCGG issued sequestration orders against Sipalay and Allied. They assailed such orders. It was only 7
years after that PCGG filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to exhaust all administrative
remedies.

The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply. There was no absolute necessity of
appealing respondent PCGGs resolution to the Office of the President. Official inaction or unreasonable
delay, as heretofore intimated, is one of the exceptions to the rule on non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies. The other exception is where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine,
consisting in the PCGGs being guilty of estoppel by laches.

Paat v. CA (1997)

The de Guzmans truck was confiscated by the DENR. After failing to provide an explanation, the order of
confiscation was affirmed by the DENR Regional Executive Director. They filed a letter of reconsideration,
which had a pronouncement that if it be denied, then the same letter must be considered an appeal to the
DENR secretary. True enough, the Regional Director forwarded the letter as an appeal. Pending
resolution however, the de Guzmans filed a replevin suit before the RTC Cagayan.

The statement in the reconsideration letter re: an appeal meant that the de Guzmans knew they had other
forums to go to for exhaustion of administrative remedies, before they could come to court. The RTC,
then, did not have jurisdiction to issue a replevin.

Lopez v. City of Manila (1999)

The City Council of Manila enacted Manila Ordinance No. 7894, entitled An Ordinance Prescribed as the
Revised Schedule of FMVs of Real Properties of the City of Manila. With the implementation of the
ordinance, the tax on the land owned by Lopez was increased by 580%. Lopez filed a special proceeding
for the declaration of nullity of MO 7894. On the same date, Manila Ordinance No. 7905 amending
Ordinance 7894 took effect, reducing by 50% the assessment levels. The trial court dismissed the
petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

104

The case does not fall under the exception to the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies. General
Rule: Where the law provides for the remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or
officer, relief to courts can be sought only after exhausting all remedies provided. The reason rests upon
the presumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error, may
amend its decision on a given matter and decide it properly. Exceptions: With regard to questions on the
legality of a tax ordinance, the remedies available to the taxpayer are provided under Sections 187, 226,
and 252 of RA 7160. Also, the subsequent amendment of MO 7894 has rendered Lopez petition, moot
and academic, for his failure to amend his cause of action.

Garcia v. CA (2001)

An administrative complaint was filed against Garcia. While the case was pending, he filed for a TRO to
enjoin the proceedings of the administrative case. The trial court granted the TRO and subsequently a
writ of preliminary injunction.

Garcias petitions, while the administrative case was pending, were in violation of the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. While there are exceptions to that general rule, the case does not
fall under the exceptions. The court also ruled that the trial court gravely abused its discretion by
granting Garcias motions.

DAR v. Apex Investment (2003)

Apexs lands were subjected to CARL. But DAR Notices of the acquisition were not received by Apex
because it changed its office when it became SM investments and the Notices were sent to the old office
address. Apex only learned of the acquisition in a newspaper. It filed a protest and a supplemental protest
with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office. It was only more than a year after that PARO forwarded the
protest to DAR. DAR only made Apex submit documents which were already attached to its Protest.
Meanwhile, Apexs TCT has been cancelled and transferred to an alleged farmer-beneficiary. Apex filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA.

The aggrieved landowners were not supposed to wait until the DAR acted on their letter-protests (after it
had sat on them for almost a year) before resorting to judicial process. Given the official indifference
which, under the circumstances could have continued forever, the landowners had to act to assert and
protect their interests.

Smart v. NTC (2003)
Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, NTC promulgated rules and regulations on the billing
of telecommunications services. Petitioners-communications companies filed an action for declaration of
nullity of the billing circulars. The NTC moved to dismiss the case for failure of petitioners to exhaust
administrative remedies.

The trial court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the civil case. Judicial power includes the authority of
the courts to determine the validity of the acts of administrative agencies. In questioning the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust
administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the
assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. In like manner, the doctrine of
105

primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory function.

Estrada et al. v. CA (2004)

Estrada, Canilang, and Lim as concerned citizens and taxpayers, filed before the Olongapo City RTC a
complaint for Injunction and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and TRO against
respondent Bacnotan Cement Corporation and 4 other parties. They alleged that BCCs cement plant is a
nuisance as it will cause pollution, and prayed that BCC be restrained and prohibited from operating it.
BCC filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Estrada et al. failed to exhaust administrative remedies before
going to court, i.e. they should have gone to the DENR via the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) first,
which renders their complaint dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. RTC denied BCCs
motion to dismiss and granted Estrada et al.s prayer. CA set aside the RTCs order, and lifted the writ of
injunction and dismissed the complaint insofar as BCC was concerned. Estrada et al. filed a petition for
review on certiorari before the SC.

Estrada et al. failed to exhaust administrative remedies before going to court, which renders their
complaint dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. The case is NOT one of those recognized
exceptional circumstances where prior resort to administrative agencies need not be made before going
to court. There is NO basis to their claim that their immediate recourse to the regular courts is justified
because they were in danger of suffering grave and irreparable injury from the operation of BCCs cement
plant, and the DENR is powerless to grant them proper relief. The DENR, via the Pollution Adjudication
Board, has the power to grant Estrada et al. the proper relief.

Regino v. PCST (2004)

Regino (student) filed a Complaint for damages against PCST and two of its teachers for having
disallowed her from taking final examinations allegedly due to her refusal to buy tickets for the schools
fund raising campaign. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. According to respondents, the question raised involved the determination of the wisdom of an
administrative policy of the PCST; hence, the case should have been initiated before the proper
administrative body, Commission of Higher Education (CHED).

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no bearing on the present case since Regino is
not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST. Also, exhaustion of administrative remedies is
applicable only when there is competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter
complained of. In this case, the CHED does not have the power to award damages. Hence, Regino could
not have commenced her case before the Commission. Lastly, the exhaustion doctrine admits of
exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial
court. Regino's action for damages inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil
Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts.

Flores v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan (2005)

An administrative complaint was filed against Mayor Flores with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The
Sanggunian issued an Order recommending to the Governor the preventive suspension of Flores. Flores
wrote a letter to the Governor asking to veto the Order. Without filing for reconsideration of the Order,
or waiting for the Governor's action, he filed a petition for certiorari with the CA to nullify the Order. The
CA dismissed his petition for failure to exhaust all administrative remedies.
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Flores still had remedies within the administrative machinery. He could have filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order. He could have also waited for the Governor to act on the matter,
considering that the Governor is the one empowered by the law to impose preventive suspension. Having
failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies, the intervention of the courts should not be
resorted to.

CSC v. DBM (2005)

The Civil Service Commission (CSC) filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court seeking to
compel the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to release the balance of its budget for fiscal
year 2002. DBM opposed arguing, among others, that CSCs petition must be dismissed because the latter
failed to exhaust administrative remedies as it could have sought clarification from DBMs Secretary
regarding the extent of its fiscal autonomy before resorting to court action.

The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only where there is an express legal provision
requiring such administrative step as a condition precedent to taking action in court. As the CSC is not
mandated by any law to seek clarification from the Secretary of Budget and Management prior to filing
the present action, its failure to do so does not call for the application of the rule.

Obiasca v. Basallote (2010)

Jeane was appointed to Administrative Officer II and she immediately assumed the duties of her office.
She later learned that her appointment was never transmitted to the CSC for approval because of a
requirement imposed by the Superintendent of Schools that she failed to submit. Rather than aid her in
the submission of this requirement, the principal of her school refused to affix her signature and the
Superintendent advised Jeane to just go back to being a teacher. Barely two months later, Arlin was
assigned to the position of Administrative Officer II. Jeane complained to the CSC, which eventually
recalled Arlins appointment and approved Jeanes appointment. Arlin went up to the CA right away,
forgetting to file an appeal to the CSC resolution which then became final.

SC struck his petition down on this ground as well as on substantive grounds. One must exhaust
administrative remedies provided by law before resorting to the courts.

Factors affecting finality of administrative decisions

1. Failure to seasonably file a Motion for Reconsideration within the period provided for by law or by
the rules of procedure duly issued by administrative bodies. (Fortich v. Corona, (1998)).
Compliance with the period is not only a mandatory but also a jurisdictional requirement.
(Antique Sawmill Inc. v. Zayco, (1960))
2. Decisions of administrative officials which are not clearly wrong will not be interfered with by
courts. (Sotto v. Ruiz ,(1921)) However, judicial review is available if the decision is rendered in
excess of authority. The availability of judicial review remains despite the absence of a statutory
provision to that effect. (Uy v. Palomar, (1969))
3. Decisions or orders issued by administrative agencies or officials in the exercise of administrative
functions are generally not interfered with by courts because such bodies are generally better
equipped technically to decide administrative questions and non-legal factors, such as
government policy on the matter. (Manuel v. Villena, (1971)). However, if the administrative
official has gone beyond his authority or the decision was vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake,
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judicial review is proper (Manuel v. Villena, (1971)). In addition, judicial review has also been held
to be proper in case the administrative official has exercised grave abuse of discretion or if an
error of law, fraud or collusion attended the decision (SMC v. Secretary of Labor, (1975)).
4. Findings of fact of administrative agencies which are supported by substantial evidence are
accorded great weight and respect on appeal. (UCPB v. E. Guanzon, (2009)) Thus, if the findings
are not supported by substantial evidence, the court can make its own independent evaluation of
facts. (UCPB v. E. Guanzon, (2009))

Summary of grounds when judicial review is valid despite finality of administrative decisions:
Decision is clearly wrong.
Decision is manifestly arbitrary, capricious or unjust.
Decision is not based upon any reasonable interpretation of law.
Administrative body or officer has gone beyond statutory authority.
Administrative agency exercised unconstitutional powers.
Decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake.
Lack of jurisdiction.
Grave abuse of discretion.
Decision violates or fails to comply with some mandatory provision of law.

Fortich v. Corona (1998)

The Quisumbings 144 hectare- land was previously covered by the CARP, but an ordinance was passed
converting some areas, including their land, into an industrial zone. Several government sectors
approved the application for conversion, including the Office of the President. DAR filed a motion for
reconsideration but did not make it within the reglementary period, so it filed a second MR. Pending
resolution of the second MR, the Sumilao farmers who were the supposed beneficiaries of the land under
the CARP staged a hunger strike in front of DAR, which led the Office of the President, through Deputy
Executive Secretary Corona, to issue a Win-Win Resolution modifying its earlier decision after it had
already been final and executory, and which reduced the land to be converted to 44 hectares.

Since no one had seasonably filed an MR of the first decision, it had already become final and executory.
Thus, the Office of the President had already lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case and to modify its
decision. It could also not have entertained the second MR because AO No. 18 and the Rules of Court
provide that only one MR is allowed. Even if the second MR was allowed under exceptionally
meritorious cases, it could not have been entertained because the first MR was not seasonably filed,
thereby allowing the first decision to lapse into finality.

Antique Sawmill Inc v. Zayco (1960)

Zayco appealed an order of the Secretary of Agriculture to the Office of the President 50 days from the
receipt of the order sought to be reconsidered, which was beyond the 30-day reglementary period. Zayco
contends that the period provided by the rules is a mere procedural technicality which, at least in
administrative proceedings, may be liberally construed.

Compliance with the period provided by law for the perfection of an appeal is not merely mandatory but
also a jurisdictional requirement. Failure to comply with the reglementary period has the effect of
rendering final the judgment of the court. That administrative rules and regulations have the force of law
and can no longer be questioned, because public interest requires that proceedings already terminated
should not be altered at every step.
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Sotto v. Ruiz (1921)

Ruiz, the Director of Posts, refused to forward as registered mail copies of The Independent, a weekly
periodical, because it allegedly contained libelous matters. The Director of Posts has the power to
determine whether certain mail matter is obscene, lewd or libelous. However, this authority is subject to
review by the court when there is clear error in his judgment. In this case, since there was no direct
attack on any person, the contents could not be deemed libelous.

Uy v. Palomar (1969)

Uy, a PCSO agent, devised a Grand Christmas Bonus Award plan in order to boost the sales of tickets for
the PCSO Grand Christmas Sweepstakes Draw. However, the Postmaster General found that his plan
amounted to conducting a lottery or gift enterprise in violation of the Postal Law and issued a Fraud
Order directing all postmasters to return all mail matter sent by Uy. Uy questioned this order.

The absence of statutory provisions for judicial review does not necessarily mean that access to the
courts is barred; the courts will not interfere with the decisions of the Postmaster General unless it
clearly appears that the decision is wrong, notwithstanding the absence of statutory provision for judicial
review of his action. Indeed, the Postmaster General issued the fraud order in a mistaken view of the law,
as Uys plan is not lottery or gift enterprise for failing to satisfy the test laid down in jurisprudence. There
being no legal basis for the fraud order, there was also no adequate administrative remedy for Uy to avail
of. His action for injunction was proper and not premature for failure to exhaust all remedies.

Manuel v. Villena (1971)

Manuel filed an application for a Tree Farm Permit on his land, but was denied by the Director of Forestry
because a certain Villena already filed for the same application on the same land. Manuel argued that he
was denied due process for not being afforded the services of counsel and that the investigation
concerning the application was not completed.

As a general rule, courts will refuse to interfere with proceedings undertaken by administrative bodies or
officials in the exercise of administrative functions, because such bodies are generally better equipped
technically to decide administrative questions and that non-legal factors, such as government policy on
the matter, are usually involved in the decisions. However, if (1) the official has gone beyond his statutory
authority, exercising unconstitutional powers, or clearly acting arbitrarily and without regard to his duty
or with grave abuse of discretion; or (2) the decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake, judicial
review is proper. In this case, Manuel was not only afforded an investigation, but also allowed to appeal
the Secretarys decision. Thus, no denial of due process was shown.

San Miguel Co. v. Secretary of Labor (1975)

Yanglay was dismissed from his job as operator in the crown cork department of SMC after investigation
due to illegal trafficking in company medicines. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC.
After notifying both San Miguel and Yanglay, a mediator-fact finder conducted a preliminary hearing. The
NLRC adopted the mediator-fact finders report that Yanglays dismissal was unjustified but it also ruled
that San Miguel did not commit ULP. The NLRC ordered Yanglays reinstatement with backwages. San
Miguel filed an MR, claiming that the NLRCs decision was premature, because the mediator-fact finders
report must be passed upon by an arbitrator.
109


While the NLRCs action was summary, it did not amount to a denial of due process. Both the mediator-
fact finder and the NLRC decided the case on the basis of the companys investigation. It was evident from
the mediator-fact finders report that he had considered all the facts and evidence presented by both
parties, and, more importantly, that they no longer intended to present further evidence on the matter.
Because of this, it was proper for the NLRC to exercise its power of arbitration, and after assessing the
evidence before it, render a decision.

UCPB v. E. Guanzon (2009)

EGI filed with the BSP an administrative complaint against UCPB, et al. for the commission of
irregularities and conducting business in an unsafe or unsound manner. The BSP Monetary Board, in a
letter-decision, dismissed the administrative complaint of EGI. On appeal, the CA set aside the BSP letter-
decision and remanded the case to the BSP Monetary Board for further proceedings. UCPB argued that CA
erred in disregarding the findings of fact of the BSP Monetary Board which should be accorded great
respect.

Although, as a general rule, findings of facts of an administrative agency, which has acquired expertise in
the particular field of its endeavor, are accorded great weight on appeal, such rule cannot be applied with
respect to the assailed findings of the BSP Monetary Board in this case. Rather, what applies is the
recognized exception that if such findings are not supported by substantial evidence, the Court can make
its own independent evaluation of the facts. Here, the factual findings of the BSP Monetary Board in its
letter-decision were not supported by substantial evidence.

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c. ELECTION LAW
A. Suffrage

Suffrage is the right to vote in the election of officers chosen by the people and in the determination of
questions submitted to the people. It includes election, plebiscite, initiative, and referendum. (Nachura,
2009)

When the right of suffrage is exercised

1. Regular Election
Provided by law for the election of officers either nation-wide or in certain subdivisions thereof,
after the expiration of the full term of the former officers

ALU v. Letrondo-Montejo (G.R. No. 111988, 1994)
Employees of AMS Farming Corporation wanted to go on holiday on the date set out for the SK
elections, claiming that this was a regular election deemed holiday in their CBA. The Court agreed,
ruling that the fact that only those between 15 and 21 take part in the election for members of the
SK does not make it any less a regular local election. The Constitution provides, for example, for
the sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives of, among others, women and youth.
Only voters belonging to the relevant sectors can take part in the election of their representatives.
Yet it cannot be denied that such election is a regular national election and the day set for its
holding, a holiday.

2. Special Election
One held to fill a vacancy in office before the expiration of the full term for which the incumbent
was elected

3. Plebiscite

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Section 10 of the Local Government Code No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected.
Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections within 120 days from the date
of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes
another date.

Padilla v. Comelec (1992)
R.A. 7155 was enacted creating the municipality of Tulay-na-Lupa. Pursuant to the law and the
Constitution, a plebiscite was held. The Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and
111

disapproval of the creation of Tulay-na-Lupa. Governor Padilla filed a case to set aside the
plebiscite conducted and to have a new one conducted. He argued that the plebiscite conducted
was invalid because a plebiscite should be conducted only in the political units affected, i.e. the 12
barangays comprising Tulay-na-Lupa, to the exclusion of the remaining portions of the mother
unit. The meaning of the phrase political units directly affected is not limited to the political
units being taken together to make a new LGU. It refers to the residents of the political entity who
would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof, i.e. the entire mother
unit.

Miranda v. Aguirre (1999)
In 1994, R.A. 7720 converting the Municipality of Santiago into an independent component city
was passed and later ratified in a plebiscite. A mere four years later, R.A. 8528, amending R.A.
7720 was enacted, changing the status of Santiago to a component city. Miranda et al. challenged
the constitutionality of the latter law, because it did not contain a provision which submitted the
law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite. R.A. 8528 was declared
unconstitutional for failing to comply with the requirement of plebiscite. A plebiscite is still
necessary even if it involves just the reclassification from independent component city to
component city. A reading of the constitutional provisions shows that the acts of creating, dividing,
merging, abolishing, or substantially altering boundaries of LGUs involve a common denominator:
material change in the political and economic rights of the LGUs directly affected and their
inhabitants.

4. Initiative

Section 3(a) of R.A. 6735 (The Initiative and Referendum Act)
The power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislation through an election called for the purpose.

Three Kinds of Initiative:
a. Initiative on the Constitution
b. Initiative on national legislation (statutes)
c. Initiative on local legislation

Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, 1997)
A lawyer filed a petition to amend the Constitution with the COMELEC. The Court explained that
the Constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can only be
implemented by a law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed. R.A. 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned.






112

5. Referendum
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC (1996)
After the Garcia v. COMELEC case was decided by the SC, eventually, the COMELEC scheduled a
referendum for the electorate to vote on the petition of Garcia, Calimbas, et al. The SBMA filed suit
against the COMELEC, seeking to prevent the holding of a referendum. The SC ruled in favor of the
SBMA and held that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. In its assailed resolution,
the COMELEC was preparing for a referendum when it was clear that the petition of Garcia,
Calimbas, et al. was one for initiative. The SC clarified that initiative is different from a
referendum. Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject
them at polls independent of the legislative assembly. Referendum is the right reserved to the
people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and
which, in most cases, would, without action on the part of electors, become a law.


B. Qualification and disqualification of voters

Article V, Section 1 of the Constitution
To exercise the right of suffrage, a person must be (1) a Filipino citizen; (2) at least 18 years of age; (3) a
resident of the Philippines for at least one year; (4) a resident of the place where he proposes to vote for
at least six months; and (5) not otherwise disqualified by law. No literacy, property, or other substantive
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.

Section 9 of R.A. 8189 (Voters Registration Act of 1996)
Any person, who, on the day of registration may not have reached the required age or period of residence
but who, on the day of the election, shall possess such qualifications, may register as a voter.

Pundaodaya v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 179313, 2009)
The petitioner filed a disqualification case against her opponent on the ground that the latter lacked
the residency qualification. In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous
terms. Both impart not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, when absent for business, pleasure, or like reasons, one intends to return. The
Court found that petitioners opponent had indeed no residency qualification since he had not
abandoned his domicile of origin for his present residence.

Marcos v. COMELEC (1995)
Imelda Marcos ran as a representative in Leyte. The Court ruled in her favor and explained that it is
not necessary that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence or domicile in a
municipality. It is enough that he should live there, provided that his stay is accompanied by his
intention to reside therein permanently.

Aquino v. COMELEC (1995)
Aquinos domicile of origin was Tarlac, but he ran in Makati. The Court found him ineligible for the
elective position in Makati because of the residency requirement. There is nothing wrong in an
individual changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove
that he has effected a change of residence for the period required by law. In this case, however,
Aquino was unable to sufficiently prove change of residence.

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Section 118 of B.P. 881 (Omnibus Election Code)
The following are disqualified to register as voters:
1. Those convicted by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one year, unless pardoned
or granted amnesty, but their rights are reacquired upon expiration of five years after service of
sentence;
2. Those adjudged by final judgment as having committed any crime involving disloyalty to government
or any crime against national security, but their rights are reacquired upon expiration of five years after
service of sentence; and
3. Insane or incompetent persons, as declared by competent authority.

C. Registration of voters

Section 3(a) of R.A. 8189
Registration is the act of accomplishing and filing a sworn application for the registration by a qualified
voter before the election officer of the city or municipality wherein he resides and including the same in
the book of registered voters upon approval by the Election Registration Board.

Section 8 of R.A. 8189
The personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the
Election Officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the
period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election.

Section 18 of R.A. 8189
The right to register may be challenged through the following process:
1. Any voter, candidate, or representative of a registered political party may challenge in writing any
application for registration, stating the grounds therefor. The challenge shall be under oath and be
attached to the application, together with the proof of notice of hearing to the challenger and the
applicant.
2. Oppositions to contest a registrants application for inclusion in the voters list must, in all cases, be
filed not later than the second Monday of the month in which the same is scheduled to be heard or
processed by the Election Registration Board.
3. The hearing on the challenge shall be heard on the third Monday of the month and the decision shall be
rendered before the end of the month.

Section 27 of R.A. 8189
Deactivation of the registration of certain persons involves removal of their registration records from the
corresponding precinct book of voters and placing the same in the inactive file, properly marked
deactivated and dated in indelible ink. The registration of the following may be deactivated:

1. Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one
year, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty;
2. Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by a competent court or tribunal of having
caused/committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly-constituted government such as rebellion,
sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any crime against national security, unless
restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with law;
3. Any person declared by competent authority to be insane or incompetent unless such disqualification
has been subsequently removed by a declaration of a proper authority that such person is no longer
insane or incompetent;
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4. Any person who did not vote in two successive preceding regular elections as shown by their voting
records. For this purpose, regular elections do not include the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections;
5. Any person whose registration has been ordered excluded by the Court; and
6. Any person who has lost his Filipino citizenship.

Section 28 of R.A. 8189
Any voter whose registration has been deactivated may file with the Election Officer a sworn application
for reactivation of his registration in the form of an affidavit stating that the grounds for the deactivation
no longer exist any time but not later than 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special
election. The Election Officer shall submit said application to the Election Registration Board for
appropriate action.

Yra v. Abano (G.R. No. 30187, 1928)
Abano was a native of Meycauayan who studied in Manila, where he was registered to vote. After
completing his studies as a lawyer, Abano returned to Meycauayan and ran for office though his
cancellation of voters registration in Manila was denied because of his failure to deposit in the mails
on time. In ruling in Abanos favor, the Court explained that the registration of a voter does not
confer the right to vote; it is but a condition precedent to the exercise of the right. Registration is a
regulation, not a qualification.

D. Inclusion and exclusion proceedings

Section 34 of R.A. 8189 (Petition for Inclusion)
Any person whose application for registration has been disapproved by the Board or whose name has
been stricken out from the list may file with the court a petition to include his name in the permanent list
of voters in his precinct. The petition may be filed any time except 105 days prior to a regular election or
75 days prior to a special election. The petition must be accompanied by (1) a certificate of disapproval of
his application; and (2) proof of service of notice of his petition upon the Board. The petition shall be
decided within 15 days after its filing.

Section 35 of R.A. 8189 (Petition for Exclusion)
Any registered voter, representative of a political party, or the Election Officer may file with the court a
sworn petition for the exclusion of a voter from the permanent list of voters giving the name, address,
and precinct of the challenged voter. The petition may be filed at any time except 100 days prior to a
regular election or 65 days before a special election. The petition must be accompanied by proof of notice
to the Board and to the challenged voter. The petition shall be decided within 10 days from its filing.

Section 32 of R.A. 8189 (Common Procedure)
1. A petition for inclusion, exclusion, or correction of names of voters shall be filed during office hours;
2. Notice of the place, date, and time of the hearing of the petition shall be served upon the members of
the Board and the challenged voter upon filing of the petition;
3. A petition shall refer to only one precinct and shall implead the Board as respondents;
4. No costs shall be assessed against any party in these proceedings. However, if the court should find
that the application has been filed solely to harass the adverse party and cause him to incur expenses, it
shall order the culpable party to pay the costs and incidental expenses;
5. Any voter, candidate, or political party who may be affected by the proceedings may intervene and
present his evidence;
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6. The decision shall be based on the evidence presented and in no case rendered upon a stipulation of
facts. If the question is whether or not the voter is real or fictitious, his non-appearance on the day set for
hearing shall be prima facie evidence that the challenged voter is fictitious; and
7. The petition shall be heard and decided within ten days from the date of its filing. Cases appealed to the
RTC shall be decided within ten days from receipt of the appeal. In all cases, the court shall decide these
petitions not later than 15 days before the election and the decision shall become final and executory.

Section 33 of R.A. 8189
The Municipal and Metropolitan Trial Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases
of inclusion and exclusion of voters in their respective cities or municipalities. Decisions of the Municipal
or Metropolitan Trial Courts may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Regional Trial Court within
five (5) days from receipt of notice thereof. Otherwise, said decision shall become final and executory.
The regional trial court shall decide the appeal within ten (10) days from the time it is received and the
decision shall immediately become final and executory. No motion for reconsideration shall be
entertained.

Domino v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 134015, 1999)
Domino ran for Congress in Sarangani but his opponent filed a petition to cancel his certificate of
candidacy and claimed he had failed to meet the residency qualification. The COMELEC disqualified
Domino and cancelled his certificate of candidacy. Domino questioned the COMELECs jurisdiction
and offered up as proof of residency the MeTC of Quezon Citys factual findings that he was a resident
of Sarangani. The Court ruled that it is not within the competence of the trial court in exclusion
proceedings to declare the challenged voter as a resident of another municipality. The jurisdiction of
the trial court is limited only to determining the right of the voter to remain on the list of voters or to
declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in which he is registered,
specifying the ground for the voters disqualifications. The power to order the change or transfer of
registration from one place of residence to another rests with the Registration Board.

E. Political parties

Section 3(c) of R.A. 7941 (Party-List System Act)
A political party is an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles, and
policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public
office. It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.

Section 3(d) of R.A. 7941
A sectoral party is an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas works, and other similar sectors) whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector.

Section 3(e) of R.A. 7941
A sectoral organization is a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar
physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests, or concerns.

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Section 3(f) of R.A. 7941
A coalition is an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for
political and/or election purposes.

Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 203766, 2013)
This case stemmed from 54 petitions for certiorari from Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties who
were disqualified by the COMELEC in May 2013 as party-list for not being qualified as representatives
for marginalized or underrepresented sectors. R.A. 7941 does not require national and regional
parties or organizations to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The phrase
marginalized and underrepresented should refer only to those sectors in Section 5 that are, by their
nature, economically marginalized and underrepresented. The nominees of the sectoral party either
must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented.
National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.


1. Jurisdiction of the COMELEC over political parties

Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution
The Commission on Elections shall register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or
coalitions.

Rule 32, Section 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
Any political party, organization, or coalition of political parties seeking registration pursuant to Section
2(5) of Article IX-C of the Constitution shall file with the Law Department of the Commission a petition
duly verified by the its President and Secretary-General, or any official duly authorized to do so under its
Constitution and By-laws.

2. Registration

Article IX-C, Section 7 of the Constitution
No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid except for those
registered under the party-list system.

Section 5 of R.A. 7941
Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization, or coalition for the purpose of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than 90 days before the election a petition verified
by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national,
regional, or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations.

Section 60 of B.P. 881
To acquire juridical personality, quality it for subsequent accreditation, and to entitle it to the rights and
privileges herein granted to political parties, a political party shall first be duly registered with the
Commission. Any registered political party that, singly or in coalition with others, fails to obtain at least
ten percent of the votes cast in the constituency in which it nominated and supported a candidate or
candidates in the election next following its registration shall, after notice and hearing be deemed to have
forfeited such status as a registered political party in such constituency.

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Section 6 of R.A. 7941
The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint and after due notice and hearing, cancel the
registration of a party, organization, or coalition on any of the following grounds:
1. It is a religious sect or denomination, organization, or association, organized for religious purposes;
2. It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
3. It is a foreign party or organization;
4. It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, or
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;
5. It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to elections
6. It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
7. It has ceased to exist for at least one year; or
8. It fails to participate in the last two preceding elections or fails to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.


F. Candidacy

1. Qualifications of candidates

For President and Vice President (Article VII, Section 2 of the Constitution)
1. Natural-born-citizen
2. At least 40 years old on the day of the election
3. Able to read and write
4. Registered voter
5. Resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding the day of the election

For Senator (Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution)
1. Natural-born citizen
2. At least 35 years old on the day of the election
3. Able to read and write
4. Registered voter
5. Resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the
election

For District Representatives (Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution)
1. Natural-born citizen
2. Registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected
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3. Resident of the same district for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day
of the election
4. Able to read and write
5. At least 25 years old on the day of the election

For Elective Local Officials (Section 39 of the Local Government Code)
1. An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a
resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to
read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
2. Candidates for the position of governor, vice- governor or member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, or Mayor, vice-mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
3. Candidates for the position of Mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component
cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
4. Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan must
be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
5. Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay must be
at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
6. Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of age but not more
than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.

2. Filing of certificates of candidacy

Sinaca v. Mula (G.R. No. 135691, 1999)

In the May 1998 elections, petitioner Emmanuel Sinaca was a substitute candidate for the mayoral
post of the LAKAS Matugas Wing after their original candidate, Teodoro Sinaca, Jr., was disqualified
for being convicted of bigamy. In ruling that Emmanuel Sinaca was validly substituted for the original
candidate, the Court explained that a certificate of candidacy is a statement of a person seeking to run
for a public office certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is
eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs if he belongs to any, and his
post-office address for all election purposes being well-stated.





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a) Effect of filing

Section 11 of R.A. 8436, as amended by R.A. 9369
Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a
candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided,
That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall effect only upon that start of the
aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers, and employees in government-
owned or-controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and
must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certification of candidacy.

Section 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.

Section 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
If a person files two certificates of candidacy, each for a different office, the person shall not be eligible
for either office. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificate of candidacy,
the person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for
which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices.

Quinto v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 189698, 2010)
The petitioners were appointed officials who intended to run in the elections. Prior to the elections,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678 pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. 9369, which amended Section 11
of R.A. 8436. The third paragraph of Section 13 provided that all persons holding a public appointive
office would be considered ipso facto resigned from office upon filing of his certificate of candidacy.
The petitioners argued that this provision violated equal protection. Although initially the Court
agreed with them, upon MR it ruled that the provision and the COMELEC Resolution were valid.

b) Substitution of candidates

Section 13 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
If after the last day for the filing of a certificate of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered
political party dies, withdraws, or is disqualified for any cause, he may be substituted by a candidate
belonging to, and nominated by, the same political party. No substitute shall be allowed for any
independent candidate. No person who has withdrawn his candidacy for a position shall be eligible as
substitute candidate for any other position after the deadline for filing of certificates of candidacy.

c) Ministerial duty of COMELEC to receive certificate

Section 8 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
The receiving officer shall have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of the
certificates of candidacy or nomination by registered political parties or coalition of political parties on
or before the deadline for filing of certificates of candidacy, provided said certificates are under oath
and contain all the required data and in the form prescribed by the Commission.
EXCEPTIONS: When the COMELEC may refuse or cancel a certificate of candidacy (as found in B.P. 881)
1. Section 68 (when candidates are disqualified)
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2. Section 69 (nuisance candidates)
3. Section 78 (upon petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy)

Luna v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 165983, 2007)
Joy Charisma Luna filed her certificate of candidacy as substitute for Hans Roger Luna. The COMELEC
invalidated her substitution because it found that while Hans Roger had withdrawn his candidacy,
when he first filed he was not of age and since no certificate of candidacy was validly filed, such could
not be the basis for a substitution. The Court disagreed with the COMELEC and reiterated that
COMELEC only has a ministerial duty to receive acknowledge receipt of a certificate of candidacy.

d) Nuisance candidates

Section 69 of B.P. 881
The Commission may motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the
election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the
names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that
the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has
been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.

Section 14 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
The petition against a nuisance candidate must be filed within five days from the last day for the filing
of certificates of candidacy.

Bautista v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 133840, 1998)
Efren Bautista ran as mayor in the 1998 elections alongside Edwin Bautista. The latter was declared a
nuisance candidate but the decision of the COMELEC, while made known to the public, did not become
final until after election. After election day, Cipriano Efren Bautista received 17,981 votes, Edwin
Bautista got 29 votes, and because of the confusion 21,016 Bautista votes were either tallied but not
credited to petitioner or simply not tallied at all. The Court explained that strictly speaking, a cancelled
certificate cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Moreover, a stray vote is
invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention of the voter. In this case, the Court
ruled in favor of Efren Bautista and counted the 21,000 votes in his favor. While Edwins
disqualification was not yet final, the public did know of it, hence any Bautista on the ballot was a
clear reference to Efren, who was already a well-known local politician before the election in point.

e) Petition to deny or cancel certificates of candidacy

Section 78 of B.P. 881
A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not
later than fifteen days before the election.


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Salcedo II v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 135886, 1999)
The respondent Salcedo married a man who was already married and used his last name in her
certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC Second Division found that this constituted material
misrepresentation that was a ground for the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy, but the
COMELEC en banc disagreed. The Court agreed with the COMELEC en banc and explained that for it to
be a ground to deny or cancel a certificate of candidacy, the false representation must (a) pertain to a
material matter affecting substantive rights of a candidate; and (b) consist of a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.

f) Effect of disqualification

Section 6 of R.A. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987)
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry,
or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

g) Withdrawal of candidates

Section 73 of B.P. 881
No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy
within the period fixed herein. A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the
election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath. No
person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his
certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However,
before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who was filed
more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be
eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices. The filing or withdrawal of
a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a
candidate may have incurred.

Monsale v. Nico (G.R. No. L-2539, 1949)
Monsale and Nico were opponents for the office of mayor. Monsale withdrew his certificate of
candidacy after the period for filingand then he withdrew his withdrawal. In the election, Monsale got
more votes than Nico but ultimately Nico was proclaimed the winner. The withdrawal of the certificate
of candidacy shall effect the disqualification of the candidate to be elected for the position. The
withdrawal of the withdrawal, for the purpose of reviving the certificate of candidacy, must be made
within the period provided by law for the filing of certificates of candidacy.








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G. Campaign

Section 79 of B.P. 811
(a) The term candidate refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has
filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or
coalition of parties;
(b) The term election campaign or partisan political activity refers to an act designed to promote the
election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate;
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election
of any candidate for public office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the
election of any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
The foregoing enumerated acts if performed for the purpose of enhancing the chances of aspirants for
nomination for candidacy to a public office by a political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties shall
not be considered as election campaign or partisan election activity. Public expressions or opinions or
discussions of probable issues in a forthcoming election or on attributes of or criticisms against probable
candidates proposed to be nominated in a forthcoming political party convention shall not be construed
as part of any election campaign or partisan political activity contemplated under this Article.

1. Premature campaigning
Section 80 of B.P. 881
It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or
association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during
the campaign period: Provided, That political parties may hold political conventions or meetings to
nominate their official candidates within thirty days before the commencement of the campaign
period and forty-five days for Presidential and Vice-Presidential election.

Penera v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 131613, 2009)
Penera was disqualified as a mayoralty candidate for engaging in election campaigning before the
campaign period. The Court ruled in her favor. A candidate is any person aspiring for or seeking an
elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy. Any person who files a certificate of
candidacy within the period for filing shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Accordingly, a candidate is only liable
for an election offense for acts done during the campaign period, not before. Any unlawful act or
omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period, when
partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate. Before the start of the campaign period, the
same partisan political acts are lawful.





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2. Prohibited contributions

Section 94(a) of B.P. 881
The term contribution includes a gift, donation, subscription, loan, advance or deposit of money or
anything of value, or a contract, promise or agreement to contribute, whether or not legally
enforceable, made for the purpose of influencing the results of the elections but shall not include
services rendered without compensation by individuals volunteering a portion or all of their time in
behalf of a candidate or political party. It shall also include the use of facilities voluntarily donated by
other persons, the money value of which can be assessed based on the rates prevailing in the area.

Section 95 of B.P. 881
No contribution for purposes of partisan political activity shall be made directly or indirectly by any
of the following:
(a) Public or private financial institutions: Provided, however, That nothing herein shall prevent the
making of any loan to a candidate or political party by any such public or private financial institutions
legally in the business of lending money, and that the loan is made in accordance with laws and
regulations and in the ordinary course of business;
(b) Natural and juridical persons operating a public utility or in possession of or exploiting any
natural resources of the nation;
(c) Natural and juridical persons who hold contracts or sub-contracts to supply the government or
any of its divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities, with goods or services or to perform
construction or other works;
(d) Natural and juridical persons who have been granted franchises, incentives, exemptions,
allocations or similar privileges or concessions by the government or any of its divisions, subdivisions
or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations;
(e) Natural and juridical persons who, within one year prior to the date of the election, have been
granted loans or other accommodations in excess of P100,000 by the government or any of its
divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities including government-owned or controlled corporations;
(f) Educational institutions which have received grants of public funds amounting to no less than
P100,000.00;
(g) Officials or employees in the Civil Service, or members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; and
(h) Foreigners and foreign corporations.

It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or receive any contribution from any of the persons or
entities enumerated herein.











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3. Lawful and prohibited election propaganda

Section 82 of B.P. 881
Lawful election propaganda shall include:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers or other written or printed materials of a size not more
than eight and one-half inches in width and fourteen inches in length;
(b) Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or against any particular candidate;
(c) Cloth, paper or cardboard posters, whether framed or posted, with an area exceeding two feet by
three feet, except that, at the site and on the occasion of a public meeting or rally, or in announcing the
holding of said meeting or rally, streamers not exceeding three feet by eight feet in size, shall be
allowed: Provided, That said streamers may not be displayed except one week before the date of the
meeting or rally and that it shall be removed within seventy-two hours after said meeting or rally; or
(d) All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by this Code as the Commission may
authorize after due notice to all interested parties and hearing where all the interested parties were
given an equal opportunity to be heard: Provided, That the Commission's authorization shall be
published in two newspapers of general circulation throughout the nation for at least twice within
one week after the authorization has been granted.

Section 85 of B.P. 881
It shall be unlawful:
(a) To print, publish, post or distribute any poster, pamphlet, circular, handbill, or printed matter
urging voters to vote for or against any candidate unless they bear the names and addresses of the
printer and payor as required in Section 84 hereof;
(b) To erect, put up, make use of, attach, float or display any billboard, tinplate-poster, balloons and
the like, of whatever size, shape, form or kind, advertising for or against any candidate or political
party;
(c) To purchase, manufacture, request, distribute or accept electoral propaganda gadgets, such as
pens, lighters, fans of whatever nature, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, shirts, hats,
bandanas, matches, cigarettes and the like, except that campaign supporters accompanying a
candidate shall be allowed to wear hats and/or shirts or T-shirts advertising a candidate;
(d) To show or display publicly any advertisement or propaganda for or against any candidate by
means of cinematography, audio-visual units or other screen projections except telecasts which may
be allowed as hereinafter provided; and
(e) For any radio broadcasting or television station to sell or give free of charge air time for campaign
and other political purposes except as authorized in this Code under the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission pursuant thereto.

Any prohibited election propaganda gadget or advertisement shall be stopped, confiscated or torn
down by the representative of the Commission upon specific authority of the Commission.









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4. Limitations on expenses
Section 13 of R.A. 7166 (An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for
Electoral Reforms)
The amount that a candidate or registered political party may spend for election campaign shall be as
follows:
1. For candidates. - Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice-President; and for other candidates
Three Pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where he filed his
certificate of candidacy: Provided, That a candidate without any political party and without support
from any political party may be allowed to spend Five Pesos (P5.00) for every such voter; and
2. For political parties. - Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency or
constituencies where it has official candidates.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding any contribution in cash or in kind to any
candidate or political party or coalition of parties for campaign purposes, duly reported to the
Commission shall not be subject to the payment of any gift tax.

5. Statement of contributions and expenses
Section 14 of R.A. 7166
Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within 30 days after the election, file in
duplicate with the offices of the Commission, the full, true, and itemized statement of all contributions
and expenditures in connection with the election. No person elected to any public office shall enter
upon the duties of his office until he and the political party that nominated him has filed the statement
of contributions and expenditures required by law. Except candidates for elective barangay office,
failure to file the statements or reports shall constitute an administrative offense. For a second or
subsequent offenses, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office.

Pilar v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 115245, 1995)
Pilar ran for a position in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Isabela but subsequently withdrew his
candidacy. The COMELEC fined him for his failure to file his statement of contributions and expenses.
The Court ruled in favor of the COMELEC and explained that candidates who withdrew after the filing
of their certificates of candidacy are still required to comply with the filing of statement of all
contributions and expenses.

H. Board of Election Inspectors and Board of Canvassers

1. Composition

Section 164 of B.P. 881
At least thirty days before the date when the voters list is to be prepare in accordance with this Code,
in the case of a regular election or fifteen days before a special election, the Commission shall, directly
or through its duly authorized representatives, constitute a board of election inspectors for each
precinct to be composed of a chairman and a poll clerk who must be public school teachers, priority to
be given to civil service eligibles, and two members, each representing the two accredited political
parties. The appointment shall state the precinct to which they are assigned and the date of the
appointment.

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Section 221 of B.P. 881
There shall be a board of canvassers for each province, city, municipality, and district of Metropolitan
Manila as follows:
(a) Provincial board of canvassers. - the provincial board of canvassers shall be composed of the
provincial election supervisor or a senior lawyer in the regional office of the Commission, as
chairman, the provincial fiscal, as vice-chairman, and the provincial superintendent of schools, and
one representative from each of the ruling party and the dominant opposition political party in the
constituency concerned entitled to be represented, as members.
(b) City board of canvassers. - the city board of canvassers shall be composed of the city election
registrar or a lawyer of the Commission, as chairman, the city fiscal and the city superintendent of
schools, and one representative from each of the ruling party and the dominant opposition political
party entitled to be represented, as members.
(c) District board of canvassers of Metropolitan Manila - the district board of canvassers shall be
composed of a lawyer of the Commission, as chairman, and a ranking fiscal in the district and the most
senior district school supervisor in the district to be appointed upon consultation with the Ministry of
Justice and the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, respectively, and one representative from
each of the ruling party and the dominant opposition political party in the constituency concerned, as
members.
(d) Municipal board of canvassers. - the municipal board of canvassers shall be composed of the
election registrar or a representative of the Commission, as chairman, the municipal treasurer, and
the district supervisor or in his absence any public school principal in the municipality and one
representative from each of the ruling party and the dominant opposition political party entitled to be
represented, as members.
(e) Board of canvassers for newly created political subdivisions - the Commission shall constitute a
board of canvassers and appoint the members thereof for the first election in a newly created
province, city or municipality in case the officials who shall act as members thereof have not yet
assumed their duties and functions.

2. Powers
Section 168 of B.P. 881
The board of election inspectors shall have the following powers and functions:
a. Conduct the voting and counting of votes in their respective polling places;
b. Act as deputies of the Commission in the supervision and control of the election in the polling
places wherein they are assigned, to assure the holding of the same in a free, orderly and honest
manner; and
c. Perform such other functions prescribed by this Code or by the rules and regulations promulgated
by the Commission.

Abes v. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-28348, 1967)
Abes et al. sought (among others) the nullification of elections in Quezon City for city officials. The
COMELEC denied their petition and ordered the board of canvassers to proceed with the canvass. The
Court denied the petition and reiterated that the board of canvassers is a ministerial body. It is
enjoined by law to canvass all votes on election returns submitted to it in due form. Its powers are
limited generally to the mechanical or mathematical function of ascertaining and declaring the
apparent result of the election by adding or compiling the votes cast for each candidate as shown on
the face of the returns before them, and then declaring or certifying the result so ascertained.

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I. Remedies and jurisdiction in election law

1. Petition not to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
Section 78 of B.P. 881
A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

2. Petition for disqualification
Section 68 of B.P. 881
Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a
competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83,
85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident
of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this
Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.

Gonzales v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 192856, 2011)
Gonzales ran for Congress in Albay, but a petition for disqualification and cancellation of certificate of
candidacy was filed against him, alleging he was a Spanish national. He won the election but the
COMELEC invalidated his proclamation. In ruling for Gonzales, the Court had to distinguish between a
petition for disqualification and a petition for cancellation of a certificate of candidacy (since the
petition against Gonzales seemed to be both at once): a petition to disqualify a candidate under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on prohibited acts committed by a candidate. In
contrast, the petition for cancellation of a certificate of candidacy is based on material
misrepresentations in the certificate of candidacy. A petition to disqualify may be filed not later than
the date of proclamation under Section 68, while a petition for the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy must be filed within 25 days from the filing of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78.











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3. Petition to declare failure of elections
Section 6 of B.P. 881
If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in
any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by
law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission
of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect,
and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election,
the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice
and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted
in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

Section 4 of R.A. 7166
The COMELEC en banc has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for
declaration of failure of election or for annulment of election results.

4. Pre-proclamation controversy

Section 1 of Rule 3, COMELEC Resolution No. 8804
A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of
the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or
coalition of political parties, or by any accredited and participating party list group, before the board
or directly with the Commission.

Section 1 of Rule 4, COMELEC Resolution No. 8804
There is illegal composition of the BOC when, among other similar circumstances, any of the members
do not possess legal qualifications and appointments. The information technology capable person
required to assist the BOC by Republic Act No. 9369 shall be included as among those whose lack of
qualifications may be questioned.

Section 2 of Rule 4, COMELEC Resolution No. 8804
There is illegal proceedings of the BOC when the canvassing is a sham or mere ceremony, the results
of which are pre-determined and manipulated as when any of the following circumstances are
present:
a) precipitate canvassing;
b) terrorism;
c) lack of sufficient notice to the members of the BOC's;
d) Improper venue

Section 242 of B.P. 881
The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation controversies. It may motu
proprio or upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing, order the partial or total
suspension of the proclamation of any candidate-elect or annual partially or totally any proclamation,
if one has been made, as the evidence shall warrant in accordance with the succeeding sections.


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5. Election protest
Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804

Section 1
The Commission on Elections, through any of its Divisions, shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all election protests involving elective regional (the autonomous regions), provincial, and city
officials.

Section 2
A petition contesting the elections or returns of an elective regional, provincial, or city official shall be
filed with the Commission by any candidate who was voted for in the same office and who received
the second of third highest number of votes or, in a multi-slot position, was among the next four
candidates following the last ranked winner duly proclaimed, as reflected in the official results of the
election contained in the Statement of Votes. The party filing the protest shall be designated as the
protestant; the adverse party shall be known as the protestee.

Section 3
An election protest or petition for quo warranto shall be filed directly with the Commission in ten (10)
legible copies plus such number of copies corresponding to the number of protestees, within a non-
extendible period of ten days following the date of proclamation. Each contest shall refer exclusively
to one office but contents for offices of the Sangguniang Pampook, Sangguniang Panlalawigan or
Sangguniang Panglungsod may be consolidated in one case.

Section 4
Service and filing of pleadings, including the initiatory petition and other papers, shall be done
personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the Commission, a resort to other modes of
service must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done
personally. A violation of this Rule shall be a cause to consider the pleading or paper as not filed.

Section 5
An election protest shall be verified by an affidavit stating that the affiant has read the petition and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of affiant's own knowledge or based on authentic
records. A verification based on information and belief or upon the knowledge, information and
belief is not a sufficient verification. The protestant shall personally sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping which must be annexed to the election protest. An unverified petition or one with
insufficient verification or unaccompanied by a certificate of non-forum shopping shall be dismissed
outright and shall not suspend the running of the reglementary period to file an election protest.

Section 6
The pendency of a pre-proclamation controversy involving the validity of the proclamation as defined
by law shall suspend the running of the period to file an election protest.







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6. Quo warranto
Section 253 of B.P. 881
Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or
city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a
sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the
results of the election. Any voter contesting the election of any municipal or barangay officer on the
ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for
quo warranto with the regional trial court or metropolitan or municipal trial court, respectively,
within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.

Section 7 of Rule 6, COMELEC Resolution No. 8804
An election protest or petition for quo warranto shall specifically state the following facts:
a) The position involved
b) That the protestant was a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been
voted for the same office.
c) The date of proclamation; and
d) The number of votes credited to the parties per proclamation.
An election protest shall also state:
e) The total number of precincts of the region, province or city concerned;
f) The protested precincts and votes of the parties in the protested precincts per the Statement of
Votes By Precinct or, if the votes of the parties are not specified an explanation why the votes are not
specified;
g) A detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of showing the electoral frauds,
anomalies or irregularities in the protested precincts.

Villamor v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 169865, 2006)
Villamor won as mayor and his opponent filed a pre-proclamation protest. Not content, his opponent
also filed an election protest. The Court ruled in Villamors favor and explained that the filing of an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto generally has the effect of barring the subsequent filing
of a pre-proclamation controversy or petition to annul proclamation. It also amounts to the
abandonment of any pre-proclamation controversy or petition to annul proclamation filed earlier,
depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the
validity of his proclamation. Once the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction over an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be decided in the case
itself and not in another proceeding.

Dumayas, Jr. v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 141952-53, 2001)
Dumayas and Bernal were rivals for a mayoralty post. After moving (in a motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC) to declare Dumayas proclamation invalid, Bernal filed a case for quo warranto
against him. The Court dismissed Dumayas petition, which claimed that by filing the quo warranto
Bernal had abandoned his motion for reconsideration. In certain cases, a pre-proclamation
controversy may still proceed notwithstanding the filing of an election protest or petition for quo
warranto, to wit:
1. What is filed in not really a quo warranto or election protest but a petition to annul a proclamation
2. Quo warranto is not the proper remedy
3. The BOC is improperly constituted
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4. The filing of a quo warranto or an election protest is expressly made without prejudice to pre-
proclamation contest, or is made ad cautelam
5. The proclamation is null and void

J. Prosecution of election offenses

Section 261 of B.P. 881 enumerates and details 30 different election offenses. Please consult codal
for full list.

Article IX-C, Section 2(6) of the Constitution
The COMELEC has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute cases involving violations of election laws.

Section 43 of R.A. 9369
The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the power, concurrent with the
other prosecuting arms of the government, to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under this Code, and prosecute the same.

People v. Judge Basilia (G.R. Nos. 83938-40, 1989)
The Provincial Prosecutor filed several cases for violations of the Omnibus Election Code, which the Judge
dismissed because COMELEC has the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute election offenses. The
Court disagreed and ruled in favor of the People. The COMELEC may delegate its power to investigate and
prosecute election offenses to the Provincial Prosecutor, as provided in the same Omnibus Election Code.

BANAT Party-List v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 177508, 2009)
BANAT brought the petition to assail the constitutionality of several provisions in R.A. 9369. The Court
upheld the laws validity, explaining that (in particular) Section 43 of R.A. 9369 does not violate Section
2(6) of Article IX-C of the Constitution. The grant of exclusive power to investigate and prosecute election
offenses to COMELEC was not by virtue of the Constitution but through B.P. 881, a legislative enactment
which is precisely amended by R.A. 9369. Section 43 grants COMELEC the power, concurrent with other
prosecuting arms of the government, to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses and
prosecute the same. It is a valid amendment of Section 265 of B.P. 881, pursuant to the plenary power of
the legislature to amend or repeal laws.

Section 267 of B.P. 881
Election offenses shall prescribe after five years from the date of their commission. If the discovery of the
offense be made in an election contest proceedings, the period of prescription shall commence on the
date on which the judgment in such proceedings becomes final and executory.

Section 268 of B.P. 881
The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action
or proceedings for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or
failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From
the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases.

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d. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

A. PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
1. CONCEPT
a) Distinguished from government-owned or controlled corporations

Province of Negros Occidental v. COA (2010)
Facts: The Commission on Audit (COA), in conformity with Republic Act 6758 (concerning the policy of
standardization of compensation), did not allow the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental to
implement its Resolution 720A which allocated the provinces retained earnings to the health care and
hospitalization of provincial officials and employees. COA says such allocation would require the
approval of the President.

Doctrine: Presidential approval is not required as it applies only to government offices/agencies,
government-owned and controlled corporations and their respective governing boards which are under
the control of the President. LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the President,
and as such, the President's authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are
faithfully executed. The President cannot lay down the rules, nor can he modify or replace them.

2. CLASSIFICATIONS
a) Quasi-corporations

MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association (2000)
Facts: The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) sent a letter to the Bel-Air Village
Association requesting the latter to open its private road (Neptune street) to the public and informing it
that its perimeter wall adjacent to Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.

Doctrine: The MMDAs power is limited to administration and implementation of metro-wide services in
Metro Manila and is not a Local Government Unit nor a public corporation endowed with legislative
power nor police power to enact ordinances for the closure or opening of roads. It can only lay down
policies and coordinate with various agencies, as well as the private sector.

MMDA v. Dante Garin (2005)
Facts: Atty. Garins drivers license was confiscated by the MMDA for illegal parking in Manila, pursuant
to Sec. 5(f) of Republic Act 7924 granting the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke
drivers licenses without need of any other legislative enactment.

Doctrine: The MMDAs power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses is construed to mean
enforcing existing traffic rules and regulations and thus, it can only can only confiscate or suspend
drivers licenses pursuant to existing traffic laws and regulations enacted by Congress or, in this case, the
City of Manila and not without need of any other legislative enactment. The MMDA is not a political unit
of government and does not possess police power nor the power to legislate.


133

MMDA v. Viron Transportation Co. (2007)
Facts: Viron filed a petition for declaratory relief when the MMDA was about to issue a circular ordering
the closure of bus terminals in Metro Manila in accordance with Executive Order 179 issued by the
President of the Philippines commanding the closing of bus terminals at Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue
(EDSA), to be replaced by four integrated terminals.

Doctrine:The MMDA is not the proper implementing agency for implementing Executive Order 179 as
the Presidents authority to implement the project must be exercised through the Department of
Transportation and Communications. Republic Act 7924 does not grant the MMDA nor its Council the
power to enact ordinances and approve resolutions for the general welfare of Metro Manilas inhabitants
and as such, because of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, it cannot order the removal
of the terminals involved in this case.

b) Municipal corporations

Villas v. City of Manila (1921)
Facts: Villas et al., creditors of the City of Manila under the Spanish regime, demanded payment from the
City of Manila after cession to the US.

Doctrine: A Municipal Corporation has two kinds of powers public and private; the former is clothed
with sovereignty and is a legal individual while the latter enables it to act like a corporate legal
individual. Hence, the new City of Manila, despite the cession to the US, is still liable to the Villas as
private property remains as it was prior to the cession and this includes any corporate liability incurred
by such city or municipality.


Republic v. City of Davao (2002)
Facts: The City of Davao claims that it is not required by law to secure an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau to construct its Artica Sports Dome.

Doctrine: Davao is covered by the law which requires all persons to secure an ECC when they undertake
an environmentally-critical project. As the Civil Code defines a person as either natural or juridical and as
the state and its political subdivisions (i.e., local government units) are juridical persons, the City of
Davao, being a local government unit and thus a juridical person, is not excluded from the coverage of the
law requiring persons to secure an ECC.

B. Municipal corporations
1. Elements
2. Nature and functions

Buklod ng Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos v. E.M. Ramos and Sons (2011)
Facts: The corporation E.M. Ramos and Sons claims that the Department of Agrarian Reform cannot, in
implementing the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), subject the unirrigated agricultural
land that the former acquired as the said land has been converted into a residential subdivision by virtue
of Ordinance 29-A.
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Doctrine: Zoning classification is an exercise by the local government unit of its police power and not the
power of eminent domain. Per Sec. 20 of the Local Government Code, the authority to reclassify land
primarily resides in the sanggunian of the city or municipality, and as the Ordinance has already
reclassified the land in this case to a residential area, it is no longer covered by CARP.

3. Requisites for creation, conversion, division, merger or dissolution

Population Requirement
Aldaba v. COMELEC (2010)
Facts: : Congress enacted Republic Act 9151 creating Malolos City using the projected population rate
instead of the current population rate to meet the population criteria in the Constitution.

Doctrine: Republic Act 9151 is unconstitutional because the Constitution requires an actual population
of 250,000 at the time of the citys creation.


Territory Requirement

Navarro v. Ermita (2010)
Facts: Navarro, et al. claim that Republic Act 9355, which creates the province of Dinagat Island, is
unconstitutional because it failed to comply with the land area requirement as the said province only has
a total land area of 802.12 sq. km.

Doctrine: Republic Act 9355 is unconstitutional because it failed to meet the land area requirement of at
least 2,000 sq. km. (the area need not be contiguous) as stipulated in the Local Government Code(LGC).
The Constitution mandates that the creation of Local Government Units must follow the criteria provided
in the LGC or else it will violate of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.


Navarro v. Ermita (2011)
Facts: Intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that the exemption from territorial
contiguity, when the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the
application of the minimum land area requirement

Doctrine: Republic Act 9355 is valid and constitutional. The exemption from the minimum land area
requirement when the Local Government Unit to be created consists of one or more islands is
expressly stated in the Local Government Code for municipalities but is absent in the requisites for the
creation of a province, but such exemption is expressly stated in Art. 9(2) of the Local Government Code
Implementing Rules and Regulations (LGC-IRR). The omission of the exemption in the case of provinces
was intended to be corrected by Art. 9(2) of the LGC-IRR to reflect the true legislative intent. This will
also be consistent with the declared policy to provide said local government units genuine and
meaningful local autonomy by construing liberally the contiguity and minimum land area requirements
for prospective local government units in order to achieve the desired results.

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Creation by Legislation

League of Cities v. COMELEC (2008)
Facts: Congress enacted into law Republic Act 9009 which increased the annual requirement for
conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million, but nevertheless approved 16
cityhood bills exempting them from the P100 million requirement.

Doctrine: The 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional for not complying with the P100 million income
requirement. Congress can only prescribe the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government
Code and not in any other law (i.e. Cityhood laws). Since RA 9009 was enacted prior to the cityhood bills
then the cityhood bills should observe the same criteria.


League of Cities v. COMELEC (2009)
Facts: This involves a Motion for Reconsideration on the 2008 case.
Doctrine: The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional, for it is wrong to hold that the criteria for creation of
an LGU may not be provided for in any other law aside from the Local Government Code for this would
result in the conclusion that Republic Act 9009 which increased the income requirement is
unconstitutional. The only conceivable reason why the Constitution employs the clause in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code is to lay stress that it is Congress alone -and
no other- which can impose the criteria.


League of Cities v. COMELEC (2010)
Facts: This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the 2009 case.

Doctrine: The 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional for not complying with the P100 million income
requirement. The pendency or non-pendency of the cityhood bills is not a material difference so as to
distinguish one municipality from the other.


League of Cities v. COMELEC (Feb. 2011)

Facts: This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the 2010 case.
Doctrine: The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. Congress intended that the 16 cities be exempted
from the requirement of Republic Act 9009 while the two bills (RA 9009 and 16 Cityhood Bills) were still
pending; Congress has the power to modify the Local Government Code and it did so for both RA 9009
and the Cityhood laws.


League of Cities v. COMELEC (Apr. 2011)

Facts: This involves a Motion for Reconsideration ad cautelam.
Doctrine: The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. Senator Pimentel during the deliberations showed
that Republic Act 9009 would not apply to the conversion bills then pending deliberation in the Senate
during the 11th Congress, for Local Government Units covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to a class of
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their own, having proven themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective
provinces (by being tourism spots, centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of
transportation, and havens of agricultural, mineral and other natural resources).


Aquino and Robredo v. COMELEC (2010)

Facts: Aquino, et al. claim that the 1
st
district of Camarines Sur will no longer meet the minimum
population of 250,000 after Republic Act 9176 reapportions the 1
st
and 2
nd
legislative districts of
Camarines Sur.

Held: Republic Act 9716 is constitutional. Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution requires a 250,000
minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not for a province. Records of
the Constitutional Commission show that the population was not the sole determinant of the creation of a
legislative district.


Sema v. COMELEC (2008)
Facts: Congress enacted Republic Act 9054 by virtue of which Congress delegated to the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays within the ARMM.

Doctrine: Sec. 19, Art. VI of Republic Act 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities. Regional legislative bodies may be delegated
the power to create municipalities and barangays provided in Sec. 10, Art, X of the Constitution but only
Congress may create provinces and cities.


Kida v. Senate of the Philippines (2011)
Facts: Congress enacted into law Republic Act 10153 postponing the regional elections in the ARMM and
recognizing the Presidents power to appoint Officers-In-Charge (OICs)to temporarily assume these
vacant positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials.

Doctrine: Synchronizing the ARMM elections to coincide with the countrys regular national and local
elections is not violative of the Constitution and of the autonomy of the ARMM. Sec. 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution gives the President the power to appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The grant of power to the President to appoint OICs is thus constitutional.

Composition

Ordillo v. COMELEC (1990)
Facts: In the plebiscite for the ratification of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) Organic Act, only
Ifugao province voted to be part of the CAR.

Doctrine: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the CAR. The Constitution is clear that the
137

autonomous regions must consist of more than one province, as the term region used in its ordinary
sense means two or more provinces. Further, it can be seen from Republic Act 6766 (Organic Act of the
CAR) that Congress never intended that a single province can constitute an autonomous region;
otherwise, the province will be composed of two sets of officials: one for the Ifugao Local Government
Unit and another set of regional officials for the CAR, both of whom will be exercising executive and
legislative powers over the same area.


Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA (1990)
Facts: Pres. Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order (EO) 220 creating the Cordillera Administrative
Region. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the EO claiming the creation of the Cordillera
Administrative Region by the President contravened the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy for
the provinces and the city which compose the CAR.

Doctrine: E.O. 220 is constitutional as it does not create an autonomous regional government but merely
created a region for administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating the planning and
implementation of programs and services. Furthermore, the bodies created by E.O. 220 do not supplant
the existing local governmental structure, nor do they serve as autonomous government agencies.


Plebiscite Requirement

Bagabuyo v. COMELEC (2008)
Facts: Rogelio Bagabuyo argued that Republic Act 9371, which increased the legislative districts of
Cagayan de Oro from one to two, is not merely a legislative apportionment; hence, a plebiscite has to be
conducted per Sec. 8 of the Local Government Code.

Doctrine: A plebiscite is not required because what is involved is only a legislative apportionment. The
Constitution and LGC expressly require a plebiscite to effect any creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundary of a Local Government Unit (LGU) and since a legislative district is not a local
government unit or a political subdivision, no plebiscite is required for the creation, dissolution or other
similar actions on legislative districts.


Samson v. Aguirre (1999)
Facts: Congress enacted into law Republic Act 8535 creating Novaliches City out of fifteen Quezon City
barangays. Moises Samson challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act 8535, alleging that a)
certifications as to income, population, and land area were not presented to Congress during the
deliberations for the passage of RA 8535 b) that there was no certification attesting to the fact that the
mother local government unit, Quezon City, would not be adversely affected by the creation of the City of
Novaliches in terms of income, population and land area and that c) there was no seat of government
provided in the law for the proposed city of Novaliches.

Doctrine: RA 8535 is constitutional. The plebiscite requirement has been complied with, with all
constituents of Quezon City having been properly included and given the opportunity to raise issues on
the adverse effects on Quezon City by the creation of Novaliches City even before they voted on the
138

principal question of the cityhood of Novaliches. Furthermore, the official statements of the
representatives from the Bureau of Local Government Finance and the NSO testifying that the combined
annual income and population of the fifteen barangays satisfied the requirements of the Local
Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations served the same purpose as the required
certifications. There was no need to consider the land area since the proposed city must comply with
requirements on income and population or land area. Though the law did not provide for a seat of
government, this is not fatal as under Sec. 12 of the Local Government Code, the City of Novaliches can
still establish a seat of government after its creation. Also, the chief executive of Quezon City, Mayor
Mathay, did not raise any adverse issue during the public hearings on the law in question, showing that
the creation of Novaliches City did not have any perceived adverse effect on Quezon City.


Tobias v. Abalos (1994)
Facts: Tobias questions the plebiscite held for Republic Act 7675, a law converting the municipality of
Mandaluyong into a highly-urbanized city, as it only included the people of Mandaluyong when,
according to Tobias, San Juan should have also been included as it once belonged to the same legislative
district as Mandaluyong.

Doctrine: The plebiscite is valid as the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly-urbanized city, and the matter of separate district representation was only
ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as
they had nothing to do with the change of status of Mandaluyong.


Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez, et al. (1994)

Facts: President Garcia issued Executive Order (EO) 353 creating the Municipal District of San Andres,
which later became a municipality. The petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the EO because it
constitutes the usurpation of legislative power by the President. Respondents argued that the enactment
of the Local Government Code into law rendered the issue moot as the Municipality of San Andres has
turned into a de facto municipal corporation.

Doctrine: The Municipality of San Andres attained a status closely approximating that of a de facto
municipal corporation, by virtue of the circumstances of the case, such as the existence of governmental
acts (e.g., EO 174 classifying the municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality) that point to the
states recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Furthermore, by virtue
of Sec. 442 (d) of the Local Government Code, which states that municipal districts organized pursuant
to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal
officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the Code shall be considered regular
municipalities, it has now attained the status of a de jure municipality. Also, the petitioner challenged the
legality of EO 353 only thirty years after its issuance. A quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful
authority of a political subdivision should be timely raised.






139

C. PRINCIPLES OF LOCAL AUTONOMY

Province of Batangas v. Romulo (2004)

Facts: Pres. Estrada created the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) which imposed a
set of criteria for release of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), which IRA should have been
automatically distributed to the LGUs.

Doctrine: The LGSEF is invalid as the President may not impose conditions on the release of the IRA
because such imposition of conditions is contrary to the principle of local autonomy. Also, the
Constitution and the Local Government Code mandate that Local Government Units (LGUs) are entitled to
a just share in the national taxes which share shall be determined by law and which must automatically
be released to the LGUs.


Sampiano v. Indar (2009)

Facts: After Sampiano filed a petition for annulment of proclamation against Ogka, the COMELEC issued
an order whereby Sampiano would discharge the functions as mayor so as to prevent paralysis to public
service pending determination and final resolution of the controversy. Ogka asked that the Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA) of the municipality be held and not released in the mean time.

Doctrine: The IRA may not be automatically released. The automatic release of the IRA under Sec. 286 is
a mandate to the national government through the Department of Budget and Management to effect
automatic release of the said funds from the treasury directly to the local government units, free from
any holdbacks or liens imposed by the national government, but this automatic realease of the IRA from
the national treasury does not prevent the proper court from deferring or suspending its release to
particular local officials when there is a legal question presented in court as to the rights of the parties to
receive the IRA.


National Liga ng mga Barangay v. Paredes (2004)

Facts: The Liga ng mga Barangay claims that the appointment of DILG Sec. Barbers as Interim Caretaker
of the Liga until a new set of officers have been duly elected and assumed office (due to alleged election
irregularities) amounts to undue interference by the DILG.

Doctrine: The DILGs acts are tantamount to exercise of control, and Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution
provides that the President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments,
which excludes the power of control. As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga, the DILGs
authority is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay down such rules itself nor
does it have the discretion to modify or replace the same.






140

Disomangcop v. Datumanong (2004)

Facts: Republic Act 6074, the first Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Organic Act, as
implemented by Executive Order 426, devolved the functions of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) in ARMM to the regional government. The DPWH Secretary then issued Department
Order 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering office which shall have jurisdiction over all
national infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and the province of
Lanao del Sur (both of which are part of the ARMM). Republic Act 8999 was signed into law by Pres.
Estrada which established an engineering district in the 1st district of Lanao del Sur. Subsequently,
Republic Act 9054 was passed, transferring and devolving the administrative and fiscal management of
public works and funds for public works to the Autonomous Regional Government.

Doctrine: Because Republic Act 8999 sought to create an office the functions of which have been
previously devolved to the regional government, it in effect sought to amend RA 6074 and as such, RA
8999 never became operative as any law amending RA 6074 must first be approved by the people of
ARMM through a plebiscite.This holding is concommitant with the devolution of functions of the DPWH
to the regional government of ARMM. Devolution pertains to the transfer of powers, responsibilities and
resources for the performance of certain functions from the central government to local government
units, thereby granting greater autonomy to local government units in recognition of their right to self-
government, to make them self-reliant and to improve their administrative and technical capabilities.
D.O. 119, as it runs counter to E.O. 426 and R.A. 9054, is also inoperative.


Pimentel v. Executive Secretary (2012)

Facts: Former Senator Aquilino Pimentel claims that the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program involves
the recentralization of government funds as the Department of Social Welfare and Development has full
control over the identification of the beneficiaries and the manner of delivery of such services.

Doctrine: There was no recentralization as the local government units have no power over a program
for which funding has been provided by the National Government under the General Appropriations Act,
even if the said program is within the jurisdiction of an LGU. The programs and services involved in the
Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program are funded by the National Government, which it may designate to
implementing agencies such as the DSWD. The concept of local autonomy does imply the establishment
of local government units into mini-states, as what is involved in local autonomy is decentralization of
administration and not of power.


Civil Service Commission v. Quida-Yu (2012)
Facts: The Department of Health (DOH) refused to recognize Dr. Yu, the Provincial Health Officer (PHO)
II appointed by the Basilan governor, as Chief of Hospital II after the Basilan General Hospital was re-
nationalized because DOH claims that the PHO position never devolved to Basilan.

Doctrine: The PHO position devolved to the LGU as devolution involves the absorption of personnel
from former national offices, including the Basilan General Hospital. As the PHO position occupied by Dr.
Yu was re-nationalized and as Dr. Yu was one of the personnel reverted to the DOH, she acquired a
vested right to the re-classified position of Chief of Hospital II, and should not have been made to retain
her original item of PHO II.
141



San Juan v. Civil Service Commission (1991)
Facts: The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) recommended the appointment of private
respondent Cecilia Almajose, disregarding the letter of the Rizal governor endorsing Dalisay Santos for
the position of Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal.

Doctrine: The recommendatory power of the Governor is not merely directory. As such, if the
recommended nominee failed to meet the requirements set by law, the DBM may choose not to appoint
him/her but the DBM may not appoint persons other than those recommended by the governor and
should instead ask the governor to submit a new list of nominees. When a law is capable of two
interpretations (one for centralized power and another, beneficial to local autonomy), the law must be
interpreted in favor of autonomy.


Pimentel v. Aguirre (2000)
Facts: The President issued Administrative Order 372, pursuant to his general power of supervision over
local governments, commanding all local government units to identify and implement measures to
reduce their expenditures for the year by at least twenty-five percent, and withholding an amount
equivalent to 10% of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) from the local government units pending the
assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal
situation.

Doctrine: The withholding of the amount equivalent to 10% of the IRA is invalid as it contravenes the
Constitution and the Local Government Code, and encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local
governments. Concommittant with the local government units fiscal autonomy is the automatic release
of its IRA.


Tan v. COMELEC (1986)

Facts: Tan, et al. argued that Batas Pambansa (BP) 885, which provides for the creation of the province of
Negros del Norte, is unconstitutional as it mandated the conduct of a plebiscite only in the areas which
shall compose the new province of Negros del Norte, to the exclusion of the voters in the remaining areas
of the parent province Negros Occidental, which areas, Tan argued, will be similarly affected by the said
creation of a new province.

Doctrine: BP 885 is unconstitutional as it contravenes Sec. 3, Article XI of the then prevailing 1973
Constitution, which states that no province may be created or divided, or its boundary substantially
altered without the approval of a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. All the
cities and municipalities of the province of Negros Occidental compose the units affected, and not merely
those which shall compose the new province. Thus, the parent province of Negros Occidental should be
included in the plebiscite since the result of the creation of a new province will affect Negros Occidentals
territory, population and economy.



142

Tan v. Perena (2005)

Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of Daanbantayan in Cebu issued Municipal Ordinance 7 which provides
that a maximum of 3 cockpits shall be allowed in their municipality despite the fact that Presidential
Decree (PD) 449 (Cockfighting Law) states that only one cockpit is allowed in each city/municipality,
unless its population is over 100,000 people, in which case 2 cockpits shall be allowed.

Doctrine: Albeit the Sangguniang Bayan is granted the power to authorize and license the establishment,
operation, and maintenance of cockpits in line with the policy of local autonomy in the Constitution, its
discretion is limited as it cannot authorize acts which contravene the Constitution nor laws passed by
Congress. As such, Municipal Ordinance 7 is void for contravening PD 449.


Batangas CATV v. CA (2004)

Facts: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Batangas City passed Resolution 210 allowing Batangas CATV to
operate in the area and charge its subscribers provided that the increase in rates charged must first be
approved by the Sanggunian. Batangas CATV did otherwise, and increased its rates without securing the
Sanggunians approval.

Doctrine: While a local government unit may prescribe regulations under the general welfare clause of
the Local Government Code, it may only do so as regards the use of public properties or the physical
realities of a constructive CATV system, such as use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of
structures and the parceling of large regions. As such, Resolution 210 is invalid as it is the National
Telecommunications Commission and not the Sangguniang Panglungsod that has the power to regulate
the industry by prescribing regulatory measures and approving the increase or decrease of rates.


Veloso v. COA (2011)
Facts: The Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed the disbursement of funds for exemplary public
service awards granted by Ordinance 8040 (of the City of Manila) to elective local officials of Manila who
have been elected for three consecutive terms because it argued that this would amount to double
compensation.

Doctrine: While the local government units have fiscal autonomy, their disbursements are still within
COAs audit jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Local Government Code and the Constitution prohibits double
compensation, unless specifically authorized by Congress.


ACORD v. Executive Secretary Zamora (2005)
Facts: Under the General Appropriations Act of 2000, P10 billion classified as Unprogrammed Fund
was provided in addition to the original amount allotted to fund the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA)
but withheld until the revenue targets submitted by the President to Congress was met.

Doctrine: The withholding of the P10 billion is unconstitutional as it contravenes the constitutional
mandate providing for the automatic release of the IRA to local governments units as their just share in
the national taxes.
143


D. POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS (LGUs)

1. Police power (general welfare clause)

Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary (2005)
Facts: The Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary and the Department of Public
Works and Highways Secretary entered into a Memorandum of Agreement providing for the use of a
parcel of land in San Mateo as a sanitary landfill. The Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo in turn passed a
resolution banning the opening of dumpsites within its jurisdiction.
Doctrine: The Court held that the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo has the right to pass a resolution
preventing the opening of a dumpsite within its territorial jurisdiction because of the detrimental effect
to the health and safety of San Mateo residents and its adverse effect on the environment and sources of
water. This is pursuant to its right to promote the general welfare of its inhabitants.


Rimando v. Naguilan Emission Testing Center (2012)
Facts: Naguilan Emission Testing Center applied for a business permit which Mayor Rimando refused to
grant. The former filed a mandamus case against Mayor Rimando to compel him to issue the business
permit.

Doctrine: Mayor Rimando cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since its
issuance is a delegated police power and thus, discretionary and not merely ministerial. The power of the
municipal mayor to issue licenses is pursuant to the general welfare clause in Section 16 the Local
Government Code. Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative
bodies.


Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon City and the MMDA (2011)
Facts: Gancayco questioned the validity of Quezon City Ordinance 2904 which required commercial
buildings to provide arcades in front of their establishments for pedestrians.

Doctrine: Congress granted the city government, through its city council, police power by virtue of the
Revised Quezon City Charter, which allowed the regulation of the construction of buildings. Property
rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in the exercise of police power, but the
methods and means used in exercising such power to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare
must have a reasonable relation to the end in view. The ordinance in question is valid as the citys
primary goal in enacting it was to increase health and safety of the city since these arcardes were
intended to provide safe and convenient passageways along the sidewalk for pedestrians.






144

The Learning Center and Spouses Alfonso v. Ayala Alabang Homeowners Association (2010)
Facts: The Ayala-Alabang Homeowners Association sued the spouses Alfredo for breach of contract
because the spouses built a grade school on the property in addition to the preparatory school indicated
in the title. The spouses argued that the association had no basis to enforce the restriction in the title as
an ordinance had been passed reclassifying the land on which the grade school was built from residential
to institutional.

Doctrine: Although the land had validly been classified as institutional by the zoning ordinance, the
restriction must still be upheld because the land was situated within a residential area. The increased
traffic that would be brought about by the expansion of preparatory school (with the addition of the
grade school) would effectively prevent the adjacent property owners from enjoying their own
properties.


Ortigas and Co. v. Feati Bank (1996)
Facts: Ortigas sued Feati Bank for building a commercial building contrary to its contract. Feati Bank
argued that the land in question was reclassified into a commercial zone by virtue of a Mandaluyong
resolution.

Doctrine: The Mandaluyong resolution is a valid exercise of police power, and Ortigas cannot prevent
Feati Bank from building a commercial building on the land. While the non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute as it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise
of police power. The Local Autonomy Act (Republic Act 2264) grants municipal councils the power to
adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the municipality.


Social Justice Society v. Atienza Jr. (2007)
Facts: The Social Justice Society, by way of mandamus, sought to compel Mayor Atienza to enforce
Ordinancy 8027 (which restricts the use of the properties of Caltex, Shell and Petron in the Pandacan
area from being used as oil terminals and reclassified the area of Pandacan from industrial to
commercial) and remove all the oil terminals.

Doctrine: The Local Government Code imposes upon Mayor Atienza the duty, as chief executive of the
city, to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. The mandamus, having met
the criteria, is granted as it is Mayor Atienzas ministerial duty to enforce the said ordinance and remove
the oil terminals.


Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr. (2008)
Facts: Caltex, Shell, and Petron argued that Ordinance 8027 is an invalid exercise of police power
because it is unfair and oppressive as it prohibits the said corporations from doing business.

Doctrine: Ordinance 8027 was a valid exercise of police power as it was enacted by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Manila which, as the City of Manilas legislative body, is authorized to exercise police
power. Furthermore, the City of Manila properly exercised its police power because there was 1) a lawful
145

subject (i.e., the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
the interference of the State), and there was used 2) a lawful method (since the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals). The Sanggunian was compelled to take measures to protect the residents
of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan terminals. Lastly,
only the use of the properties as oil terminals was restricted, as the corporations may still use the said
properties for other purposes.


Lucena Grand Central Terminal v. JAC Liner (2005)
Facts: The City Council of Lucena passed Ordinances 1631 and 1778 which prohibited outside buses and
jeepneys from entering the city and a policy that they will load and unload passengers only in the
common terminal.

Doctrine: Both ordinances are an improper exercise of police power as they went beyond what was
reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Per the requirements of the proper exercise of police
power (a lawful subject and lawful method), there was a lawful subject in the form of traffic congestion,
but the method employed was not lawful as allowing only one terminal to have full control of bus-
jeepney terminal activities would subject users to unduly oppressive fees, rentals and charges.


Parayno v. Jovellanos (2006)
Facts: Parayno argued that Resolution 50, which recommended to the Mayor of Calasiao the transfer or
closure of the formers gasoline station pursuant to an ordinance prohibiting the placement of gasoline
service stations within 100 meters away from any school, church, or hospital is an invalid exercise of
police power.

Doctrine: The Resolution was an invalid exercise of police power as the Ordinance which served as its
basis only prohibits gasoline service stations within 100 meters from any school, church or hospital, and
not gasoline filling stations. The ordinance makes a distinction between gasoline filling stations and
gasoline service centers, prohibiting the latter and not the former. Also, there was no due process as the
Sangguniang Bayan sought to abate the alleged nuisance (Paraynos gasoline filling station) without
proper judicial proceedings.


City of Manila v. Laguio (2005)
Facts: The Malate Tourist Development Corporation assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance 7774
which prohibits hotels and motels in certain areas of Ermita-Malate.

Doctrine: Ordinance 7774 is an invalid exercise of police power as the closing down and transfer of
hotels, motels, and other businesses prohibited under it has no reasonable relation to the promotion and
protection of social and moral values of Manila. The prohibition of hotels and motels in the Ermita-Malate
area will not per se protect and promote the welfare of the community from prostitution, adultery,
fornication, or the spread of sexual disease.


146

White Light Corp v. City of Manila (2009)
Facts: The City of Manila issued Ordinance 7744 prohibiting short-time admission rates (booking rooms
for less than 12 hours) in hotels, motels, and other similar establishments to lower the rate of illicit
activities. White Light Corp, owner of several hotels and motels in the area, assailed the ordinance for
being violative of the right to privacy and the freedom of movement.

Doctrine: The Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power and is unconstitutional. To be valid, an
ordinance must be within the local government units corporate powers to enact and must a) not
contravene the Constitution or any statute, b) not be unfair or oppresive, c) not be partial or
discriminatory, d) not prohibit but may regulate trade, e) must be consistent with public policy and f)
must not be unreasonable. In this case, the goal (minimizing or eliminating the use of the establishments
covered by the ordinance for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and other illicit activities) is lawful, but the
means employed was an arbitrary intrusion into private rights since it also had the effect of prohibiting
the legitimate use of the said establishments. The means of enforcement must be reasonably necessary to
attain the purpose of the ordinance and there must be no other alternative action less intrusive of private
rights.

2. Eminent domain

Albon v. Fernando (2006)
Facts: Albon filed a taxpayers suit against the City of Marikina for using public funds to repair private
property via the issuance of Ordinance 59 which provides for public works to widen, clear and repair the
sidewalk of Marikina Greenheights subdivision.

Doctrine: The Ordinance is valid but the case was remanded to determine whether it is the City or the
subdivision that owned the sidewalks. Such determination is important as Sec. 335 of the Local
Government Code provides that public money cannot be used for private purposes.


City of Manila v Chinese Community (1919)
Facts: The City of Manila wanted to expropriate land, used as a cemetery, for the extension of Rizal
Avenue. The Chinese Community claims that the expropriation was not necessary because there were
other lots which could be expropriated for the same purpose.

Doctrine: Though the City Charter of Manila allows it to expropriate land for public purposes, the right of
expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation in that where the statute does not
designate the property to be taken nor how it may be taken, the necessity of taking a particular property
is a question for the courts to decide. In this case, the first condition on expropriation by the City of
Manila was met, as the land sought to be expropriated is private but the second condition (public
purpose) was not met as it was not shown that the extension of the street was necessary and its
extension through the cemetery was also not shown to be necessary as other lots have been offered to
the city free of charge.



147

Figuracion v. Libi (2007)
Facts: Figuracions land was expropriated by the City of Cebu to extend N. Escario Street and as not all of
the land was used, the remainder was reconveyed to Figuracion. The Libis (who occupied the remainder
of the said land) opposed the reconveyance to Figuracion.

Doctrine: Reversion is a proceeding where the State seeks the return of lands of the public domain or the
improvements thereon through cancellation of private title erroneously or fraudulently issued over it.
The Local Government Code grants local government units the power of reversion of public roads and the
Revised Charter of the City of Cebu states that property withdrawn from public servitude may be used or
conveyed for any purpose, which includes reconveyance to the previous owner. As such, the City of Cebu
had every right to reconvey the remainder of the land to Figuracion.


Spouses Yusay v. CA (2011)

Facts: Spouses Yusay argued that Resolution 552, which authorized the expropriation of the land of the
spouses Yusay for the development of low-cost housing, is invalid as it does not satisfy the requirement
that an ordinance first be passed authorizing the mayor to exercise the power to expropriate.

Doctrine: The resolution is not a valid authorization for the mayor to exercise the power to expropriate
as he can only exercise the power of eminent domain through an ordinance, which is a law possessing a
general and permanent character, as opposed to a resolution which is merely a declaration of a sentiment
or opinion of a law-making body on a specific matter and which is temporary in nature.


Province of Camarines Sur v. CA (1993)
Facts: The Solicitor General claims that before Camarines Sur can expropriate property (by virtue of
Resolution 129) for the purposes of putting up a farm and housing project for government employees,
the province must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).

Doctrine: Expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is not subject to the prior
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary as Sec. 9 of the Local Government Code does
not require the approval of the DAR Secretary for converting agricultural land to non-agricultural land. It
is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether expropriation is for a
public purpose or for public use since expropriation is an expression of legislative policy.


Masikip v. Pasig City (2006)
Facts: Masikip assailed Ordinance 42 (which authorizes the Mayor of Pasig to expropriate Masikips lot
to build a sports and development and recreational activity center for Barangay Caniogan residents), and
argued that there is no genuine necessity for the expropriation because there exists an established sports
development and recreational activity center being used by residents of the said Barangay.

Doctrine: The Court cited the case of City of Manila v. Arellano Law College to emphasize that the
necessity for the expropriation must be reasonable or of practical necessity (not an absolute one), which
would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the
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condemning party and the property owner consistent with such benefit. The ascertainment of the
necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land. In this case, there was no
genuine necessity for the expropriation because the sports and recreation facility envisioned to be built
was not for a public purpose but merely for the exclusive use of the residents of the Melendres
Compound Homeowners Association.


Barangay Sindalan v. CA (2007)
Facts: The spouses Magtoto argued that the plan to expropriate part of their property in order to make a
feeder road leading to the municipal road is actually for the private use of the homeowners of Davsan II
Subdivision.

Doctrine: There was no genuine necessity for the expropriation because only the subdivision residents
would benefit from the feeder road. Although the public nature of the prospective exercise of
expropriation cannot depend on the numerical count of those to be served or the smallness or largeness
of the community to be benefited, the essential requirement for a valid exercise of eminent domain is for
the expropriator to prove that the expropriation is for a public use.


JIL Christian School Foundation v. Municipality of Pasig (2005)
Facts: An ordinance was issued authorizing the Mayor to initiate expropriation of Cuangcos property to
be converted into a road leading to a barangay which was a fire hazard. However, the Cuangcos told Pasig
City that they sold the land to JIL Christian School, and JIL claims that there was no valid and definite
offer made to them by Pasig City.

Doctrine: The expropriation was improper as there was no valid and definite offer. Before a local
government unit can exercise the power of eminent domain, there must first be a) an ordinance enacted
by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the
power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property; b) The
power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor
and the landless; c) There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution and other pertinent laws; and d) A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. There was no offer
because the letter Pasig sent the Cuangcos and the invitation to the engineers office only proved its
intent to acquire the property for a right of way and did not amount to a valid and definite offer.


Antonio v. Geronimo (2005)
Facts: Antonio, against whom Catolos filed an unlawful detainer suit, moved to stay the demolition of his
property on Catolos land because he contends that the two resolutions passed by Pasig City authorizing
the expropriation of Catolos land (passed while the demolition was taking place) were supervening
events that rendered the demolition unjust and inequitable.

Doctrine: The resolutions for expropriation were not supervening events because the rule is that if
judgment is rendered against the defendant, it is immediately executory. Also, the Mayor cannot exercise
the power of eminent domain pursuant to two resolutions of the municipal council as he may only do so
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pursuant to an ordinance.


Ortega v. City of Cebu (2009)
Facts: Cebu contends that the price set by the Regional Trial Court on the expropriated property of the
Ortegas land was beyond the reach of the intended beneficiaries of the socialized housing program.

Doctrine: The determination of just compensation is a judicial prerogative, and Cebu discontinued the
expropriation just because the compensation fixed is beyond its financial capacity. An order fixing just
compensation does not affect a prior order of expropriation.

3. Taxing power

Ongsuco v. Malones (2009)
Facts: Petitioners, stall holders at the market, argued that a public hearing was required for the
imposition of the fees imposed by Ordinance 89-01, which raised the rental and goodwill fees for the
Maasin Public Market. Maasin countered that the ordinance is not a tax measure but involved the
operation and management of an economic enterprise of the municipality.

Doctrine: The rentals and goodwill fees imposed by the municipal ordinance are charges, making the
municipal ordinance void and unenforceable as there was no valid public hearing conducted as mandated
by Sec. 186 of the Local Government Code, which expressly provides that ordinances levying taxes, fees
or charges cannot be enacted without any public hearing.


GSIS v. City Treasurer of Manila (2009)
Facts: The City Treasurer assessed real property taxes on the 2 properties owned by the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), but GSIS argued that both its old charter and current charter exempt it
from all forms of taxes.

Doctrine: GSIS is exempt from real property tax because as an instrumentality of the national
government, the GSIS is outside the scope of local taxation. Although the Local Government Code (LGC)
stripped the GSIS of its tax exemption, Republic Act 8291 later restored the said exemption. However,
realty taxes may be assessed on the GSIS property being leased by Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC), but
the said taxes shall be paid by the taxable entity (i.e., MHC) pursuant to the beneficial use principle
under Sec. 234(a) of the LGC which provides that the unpaid tax attaches to the property and is
chargeable against the taxable person who had actual or beneficial use and possession of it, regardless of
whether or not it is the owner.


Quezon City v. Bayan Telecommunications (2006)
Facts: Bayantel holds a legislative franchise whereby it was granted exemption from real estate taxes by
virtue of the term exclusive of the franchise qualifying the phrase same taxes on its real estate,
building and personal property, found in Sec. 14 of its franchise, Republic Act 3259. However, the Local
Government Code (LGC) withdrew exemptions from real estate taxes for properties of whatever kind
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located within Metro Manila. Thereafter, Congress enacted Republic Act 7633 which restored the realty
tax exemption granted by Bayantels original franchise. The Quezon City government enacted a local
Revenue Code, imposing real property tax on all real properties in its territorial jurisdiction and thus
expressly withdrew all tax exemption privileges in general.

Doctrine: Bayantel is exempt from realty taxes on its properties that are actually, directly and
exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise. Congress may grant a tax exemption previously
withdrawn by the LGC. Despite the fact that Sec. 5, Article X of the Constitution gives local legislative
bodies the power to tax, their exercise of this power may be subject to guidelines and limitations as
Congress may provide. Thus, the power to tax is still primarily vested in Congress. Through Sec. 232 of
the Local Government Code which provides that a province or city or municipality within the
Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem tax on real propertynot hereinafter
specifically exempted, the Congress highlighted its power to thereafter exempt certain realties from the
taxing power of local government units. The use, in turn, of the same phrase exclusive of this franchise
in Republic Act 7633, which was the basis for Bayantes exemption from realty taxes prior to the LGC,
shows the intention on the part of Congress to once again remove from the LGCs delegated taxing power
all of the franchisees properties actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise.


MIAA v. CA (2006)
Facts: The Office of Government Corporate Counsel withdrew the tax exemption enjoyed by the Manila
International Airport Authority (or the MIAA, whose charter exempts it from real estate tax) arguing that
Sec. 193 of the Local Government Code (LGC) expressly withdraws the tax exemption privileges of
government-owned and controlled corporations.

Doctrine: MIAA, not being a government-owned and controlled corporation, is exempt from real estate
tax because it is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers. An instrumentality refers
to any agency of the National Government not integrated within the department framework, vested with
special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. Sec. 133 of the LGC states
that the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays shall not extend to the levy of
taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities. This
constitutes a limitation imposed by Congress on the local governments exercise of the power to tax.
Furthermore, the power of local governments to tax national government instrumentalities is construed
strictly against local governments and the rule is that a tax is never presumed and that there must be
clear language in the law imposing the tax.


Quezon City v. ABS-CBN (2008)

Facts: The Quezon City Revenue Code imposed a franchise tax on businesses within its jurisdiction.
Republic Act 7966 granted ABS-CBN a franchise which provided that it would pay franchise tax
equivalent to 3% of gross receipts in lieu of all other taxes. Quezon City argued that the in lieu of other
taxes clause could not have been intended to prevail over the constitutional mandate ensuring the
viability and self-sufficiency of local government units.

Doctrine: While Congress has the inherent power to tax and grant tax exemptions, Sec. 5, Article X of the
1987 Constitution confers on municipal corporations a general power to levy taxes and otherwise create
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sources of revenue and they no longer have to wait for a statutory grant of these powers. In interpreting
statutory provisions on municipal fiscal powers, doubts will be resolved in favor of municipal
corporations. In this case, the in lieu of other taxes provision does not expressly provide in clear and
unambiguous language what kind of taxes ABS-CBN is exempted from, and as a claim of tax exemption is
not favored nor presumed in law but must be clearly shown, ABS-CBN is liable for Quezon Citys
franchise tax.


Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation (2005)
Facts: The notice of assessment of business taxes against BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation did not
state the legal basis of the business taxes assessed. The City Treasurer claimed that the condominium
owners were making profit by making the condominiums market price higher through its amenities

Doctrine: BA Lepanto is not liable for business taxes because Yamanes notice of assessment did not
state the legal basis of the tax. Sec. 131(d) of the Local Government Code defines business as trade or
commercial activity regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit and as the
purpose of the condominium corporation has nothing to do with profit-making (as the owner of the
condominium unit and not the condominium corporation obtains profit from the sale of the units and it is
also the owner who pays capital gains tax on the appreciated value of the condominium) it does not fall
under the definition of a business which is liable to pay business taxes.


Secretary of Finance v. Ilarde (2005)
Facts: Cabaluna was charged more than 24% of the land taxes due him as penalty for his failure to pay
land taxes. He paid the amount under protest on the ground that the two regulations issued by the then
Minister of Finance which served as the basis for penalty for delinquent payments, violated Sec. 66 of the
Real Property Tax Code, which imposed a 24% limit on penalties for delinquent taxes.

Doctrine: Both regulations are invalid because they go beyond the 24% limit prescribed by Sec. 66 of the
Real Property Tax Code. The issuance of Executive Order (EO) 73 (which the Minister of Finance claims is
the basis of the two regulations in question) did not alter the structure of real property tax assessments
as provded for in the Real Property Tax Code. The provision in Sec. 2 of EO 73 giving the Minister of
Finance the power to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement the said EO does
not give the Minister of Finance the authority to tinker with the rates of penalty on delinquency taxes in
the Real Property Tax Code because EO 73 did not cover the topic of amendment of rates of delinquest
taxes or the amendment of rates of penalty on delinquent taxes. However, from January 1992 onwards, it
is the Local Government Code that will govern (in this case the assessed taxes were for 1986-1992 and
1991-1992).


Smart Communications Inc. v. Davao City (2008)
Facts: Smart argued that its telecenter in Davao City is exempt from the payment of local franchise tax
because its legislative franchise allegedly exempts it from all taxes by way of the national franchise tax
which is paid in lieu of all taxes.


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Doctrine: Smart is liable to pay Davaos franchise tax because its legislative franchise did not expressly
provide the specific taxes from which it was exempt. The in lieu of all taxes clause in Smarts legislative
franchise did not expressly and categorically state that the exemption applies to both local and national
taxes and thus, the phrase in question must be applied only to national internal revenue taxes. Tax
exemptions are never presumed and are construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of
the taxing authority.

4. Closure and opening of roads

Favis v. City of Baguio (1969)

Facts: The City Council of Baguio passed a resolution permitting the lease of two city lots to Shell, which
caused the street used by Favis as his ingress/egress to be diminished.

Doctrine: The resolution is valid because the city is empowered by its Charter to close or reduce the size
of a city street. By the resolution, no right of the public is defeated (the portion leased to Shell not being
necessary for public use). The power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary and will not ordinarily be
controlled or interfered with by the courts, unless there be fraud or collusion. In determining the
advisability of closing a street, the municipality must consider the following: a) the topography of the
property surrounding the street in light of ingress and egress to other streets, b) the relationship of the
street in the road system throughout the subdivision, c) the problem posed by the dead end of the
street, d) the width of the street, e) the cost of rebuilding and maintaining the street as contrasted to its
ultimate value to all of the property in the vicinity, d) inconvenience of those visiting the subdivision, and
e) whether the closing of the street would cut off any property owners from access to a street.

Sanggalang v. IAC (1989)
Facts: The Bel-Air Village Association contested the action of the Mayor of Makati of ordering the
opening of Jupiter street to the public to decongest traffic and for public convenience, arguing that Jupiter
Street is for the exclusive use of Bel-Air residents.

Doctrine: The Mayors act is valid because in this case, the city has the power to open a city street for
public use. Despite loss of privacy among Bel-Air residents, more important than this is the duty of a local
executive to take care of the needs of the majority at the expense of the minority.

5. Legislative power
a) Requisites for valid ordinance
b) Local initiative and referendum
6. Corporate powers
a) To sue and be sued


Department of Public Services Labor Union v. Court of Industrial Relations (1961)
Facts: The Mayor and Municipal Board of Manila moved to dismiss the case filed against them by the
Department of Public Services Labor Union to enforce Republic Act 1880, which reduced the 7 day work
week of government employees to 5 days. The Mayor claiming that the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR)
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and that they were immune from suit.

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Doctrine: The CIR has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case since the City of Manila, through the
Department of Public Services (in which the laborers worked), performed governmental functions (i.e.,
functions where it does not obtain pecuniary profit but only acts in the interest of health, safety and
advancement of the public good or welfare as affecting the public generally) and therefore acted as an
agent of the state and is immune from suit, unless it gives express consent to be sued.


Municipal Board of Cebu City v. Court of Tax Appeals (1964)
Facts: The Municipal Board, representing Cebu City, appealed the exemption from realty taxes granted
by the Board of Assessment Appeals of Cebu City to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CTA dismissed
the case on the ground that the Board of Assessment Appeals is merely the instrumentality of the City of
Cebu and the latter, being a governmental agency, is not among those who may appeal to the CTA
because it is not a person, association or corporation adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the
Collector of Internal Revenue, the Collector of Customs or any provincial or city Board of Assessment
Appeals who may file an appeal in the CTA.

Doctrine: The City of Cebu can appeal from the Board of Assessment Appeals decision. The City of Cebu
constitutes a political body corporate created by a special charter (Commonwealth Act No. 58), endowed
with the powers which pertain to a municipal corporation. As such, it possesses the capacity to sue and
be sued.


Calleja v. CA (1967)
Facts: Calleja, a civil service employee whose position was abolished by the municipal council of Iriga for
lack of funds, filed an action for mandamus against the Municipality of Iriga, which was granted. A copy of
the decision was given to the Provincial Fiscal representing Iriga but the notice of appeal and appeal
bond was filed not by the Provincial Fiscal but by the municipal attorney. Calleja argued that it was only
the Provincial Fiscal who could represent Iriga.

Doctrine: The municipal attorney of a municipality is a legal officer of the municipality and thus, can
represent the same. Sec. 3, paragraph 3 (a) of Republic Act 2264 provides that the municipality may
create the office of Municipal Attorney who shall act as the legal counsel of the municipality. In addition,
the Municipal Council of Iriga passed Resolution 36 which provides that the Municipal Attorney shall be
the chief legal adviser of the municipality and has the duty to represent the municipality or any municipal
officer who is a party in a case in his official capacity.


Province of Cebu v. IAC (1987)
Facts: The officers and members of the Cebu Mayor's League (in behalf of their respective
municipalities), along with some taxpayers, hired a private attorney to sue for the nullification of the
donation made by Vice Gov. Almendras.

Doctrine: The hiring of the private attorney in this case is called for. Although the rule is that only the
provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in law suits, and
although private attorneys cannot collaborate with the fiscal and municipal attorney unless there is
board authorization, the municipality may hire a private lawyer provided it be expressly limited to
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situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. Here, the Provincial Board would
never have given authorization for the hiring of a private attorney. Furthermore, even if the provincial
fiscal should side with the governor in the filing of the case in question, the provincial board, whose
members are defendants in this case, can simply frustrate his efforts by directing him to dismiss the case
or by refusing to appropriate funds for the expenses of the litigation. Thus, this case falls under the
situation where a private attorney may be hired by the municipality as the provincial fiscal is disqualified
to represent it.


Municipality of Pililla, Rizal v. CA (1994)
Facts: Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC) questioned the authority of Private Attorney Mendiola to
represent the municipality of Pililla in the computation of PPCs business tax.

Doctrine: Atty. Mendiola cannot represent Pililla. The municipalitys authority to employ a private
lawyer is expressly limited to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified from representing it
and for such exception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the
municipalitys case must appear on record. In this case, the fiscal was not disqualified but merely refused
to represent the municipality, which refusal is not a legal justification to employ the services of a private
counsel. The municipal council should have requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting
provincial fiscal.

b) To acquire and sell property

Vergara v. Ombudsman (2009)
Facts: Vergara alleges that the agreements between the Mayor of Calamba (who was authorized by
Resolution 115 to negotiate and purchase a parcel of land for the new city hall) and Pamana Inc. and
Prudential Bank are void because they were not ratified by the city council.

Doctrine: Ratification by the city council is not a condition sine qua non for the local chief executive to be
able to enter into contracts on behalf of the city. Sec. 22 (c) of the Local Government Code only requires
prior authorization from the City Council and in this case, Resolutions 115 and 280 were the City
Councils stamp of approval and authority for the mayor to purchase the subject lots. As such, the
agreements, though not ratified by the city council, are valid


City of Caloocan v. CA and Gotesco (2006)
Facts: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Caloocan passed Ordinance 68 which authorized the Mayor to
negotiate and sell the citys patrimonial property. Mayor Asistio and Mr. Go of Ever Gotesco executed a
deed of absolute sale over the property. Thereafter, the Sangguniang Panglungsod issued an ordinance
amending the previous ordinance to comply (and increasing the selling price) to secure the Commission
on Audits approval of the sale. The new mayor, Mayor Malonzo, vetoed the amended ordinance, refused
to sign the amended deed of sale, and filed suit to enjoin the registration of what he deemed was an
anomalous sale and to annul the deed of absolute sale and cancel the title issued to Gotesco.

Doctrine: Sec. 455 of the Local Government Code gives the Mayor the authority to file suits for the
recovery of funds and property for the city even without prior authorization from the Sanggunian. This is
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supported by Sec. 9 of the Caloocan City Charter which provides that the mayor has the power to
institute judicial proceedings to recover property and funds of the city. However, since the mayor is the
proper party to file such suits, he should necessarily be the one to sign the certification against forum-
shopping and not the City Legal Officer who was merely the Citys counsel and not a party to the case.

c) To enter into contracts
(i) Requisites

Vice Mayor Vicencio v. COA Chairman Villar, et al. (2012)
Facts: The new Vice Mayor, Vicencio, used Ordinance 15-2003 (authorizing then Vice Mayor Yambao to
enter into contracts for consultancy services) to also enter into a new contract for consultancy services

Doctrine: Vice Mayor Vicencio had no authority to enter into new consultancy contracts using Ordinance
15-2003, as the said Ordinance is not a continuing authority for any person who enters the Office of the
Vice Mayor to enter into subsequent, albeit similar, contracts. Sec. 456 of the Local Government Code
provides that there is no inherent authority on the part of the city Vice Mayor to enter into contracts on
behalf of the local government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor.

(ii) Ultra vires contracts

Boracay Foundation, Inc. v. Province of Aklan, et al. (2012)
Facts: Boracay Foundation, Inc. argues that the favorable endorsement of the local government units
(LGUs) of Barangay Caticlan and Malay Municipality pursuant to the consultation procedures as required
by Local Government Code (LGC) was not obtained by the Province of Aklan, and that there were no
proper consultations entered into with the concerned LGUs when the Sangguniang Bayan of Caticlan
issued a resolution stating its strong opposition on the expansion of the port facilities at Caticlan.

Doctrine: There was no proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the project. Sec. 16 of the
LGC provides that it is the duty of LGUs to promote the peoples right to a balanced ecology, and it is the
duty of national government agencies in the maintenance of ecological balance to secure prior public
consultation and approval of the LGUs for these projects. As such, the projects implementation was
illegal.

7. Liability of LGUs

Filinvest Land Inc. v. Flood-affected Homeowners of Meritville Alliance (2007)
Facts: Homeowners of Meritville filed a complaint against Filinvest Land, Inc. (developer of Meritville)
because their lots were always flooded during the typhoon season allegedly due to the latters negligence.

Doctrine: Sec. 17 of the Local Government Code makes local government units responsible for providing
basic services and facilities (including those that deal with drainage, sewerage and flood control). As it is
the Naga River which overflows and causes flooding, and as the said river is public property, it is the
responsibility of the government, particularly the city government of Las Pias City, to devise and
implement flood-control measures to address the problem.


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City of Manila v. Teotico (1968)
Facts: Teotico filed an action for damages against the City of Manila because he fell into an uncovered
manhole and suffered injuries. The City of Manila averred that it is not liable as Sec. 4 of the Charter of
the City of Manila states that the city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or
property arising from...the negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board or other enforcers while enforcing
or attempting to enforce the provisions of the charter or any other law or ordinance. Teotico argued that
the city is liable under Art. 2189 of the Civil Code, which holds provinces, cities and municipalities liable
for damages for the death of or injuries suffered by any person due to the defective condition of roads,
streets and other public works under their control and supervision.
Doctrine: The applicable provision is that of Art. 2189 of the Civil Code as it governs liability due to
defective streets, which Teotico alleged to be the cause of his injuries. Sec. 4 of the City Charter is not
decisive on the issue as it refers merely to liability arising from negligence in general, regardless of the
object thereof, while Art. 2189 governs liability due to defective streets in particular. On the allegation
of the City of Manila that it is not liable because the street where Teotico was injured was a national
highway, the Court ruled that under Art. 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary that the defective
roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality on which responsibility is placed. It is enough
that the said province, city or municipality have either control or supervision over the said street or road.


Guilatco v. City of Dagupan (1989)
Facts: Guilatco filed an action for damages against the City of Dagupan because she fell into an uncovered
manhole on a sidewalk on Perez Boulevard, and suffered injuries. The City of Dagupan argued that Perez
Boulevard, where the drainage hole is located, is a national road which is not under the supervision or
control of the city.

Doctrine: The City of Dagupan is liable for damages. It is not necessary for the liability under Art. 2189 to
attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted, but it is only required that the province, city or municipality has either control
or supervision over said street or road. The City Charter clearly indicates that the city has supervision
and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located as the said charter provides that
the laying out, construction and improvement of streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and
regulation of their use, may be legislated by the Municipal Board.


Palafox vs. Province of Ilocos Norte (1958)

Facts: The heirs of Palafox filed an action for damages against the Province of Ilocos Norte when Palafox
died after he was hit by a truck being driven by a driver of the provincial government while the latter was
working in the highway construction.

Doctrine: The Province of Ilocos Norte is not liable for damages as the corporate liability of municipal
corporations only applies where the government is engaged in proprietary or business functions. To
attach liability to the state for the negligence of its officer or employee, the latter must be acting as a
special agent. In the case at bar, the Province of Ilocos Norte, through the driver of the truck, was engaged
in a governmental function and as such, cannot be sued for damages.

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Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila v. CA (2005)
Facts: Chan filed an action for damages against the Municipality of San Juan after she suffered injuries
when the tire of her car fell into a manhole left open due to the excavations at the corner of two roads in
San Juan.

Doctrine: The Municipality of San Juan is liable for damages, for it is not necessary for the liability under
Art. 2189 to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from
which responsibility is exacted. It is only required that the province, city or municipality have either
control or supervision over said street or road. Although it was the Department of Public Works and
Highways that issued the permit to undertake the excavation, the Municipality of San Juan is still liable as
it is mandated to exercise supervision and control over the place in question, as the sangguniang bayan of
municipalities are mandated by the Local Government Code to regulate the drilling and excavation of
the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other pipes, the building and repair ofsewers,
drains, and it must also adopt measures to ensure public safety against open canals, manholesand
similar hazards to life and property, and provide just compensation or relief for persons suffering from
them.


Municipality of Tiwi and Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi v. Betito (2010)

Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi (a municipality of Albay) authorized Mayor Corral, through a
resolution, to hire a lawyer to represent Tiwi in the recovery of their rightful share in realty taxes to be
paid by the National Power Corporation to the province of Albay. Thus, Mayor Corral entered into a
Contract of Legal services with Atty. Betito and Atty. Lawenko.

Doctrine: The Court held that the Municipality of Tiwi is bound by the Contract of Legal Services entered
into by Mayor Corral as the prior authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi (required under Sec. 44
of the Local Government Code for the Mayor to be able to contract on behalf of the municipality) was
granted by the said Sanggunian. The Sangguniang Bayans ratification of the contract, however, is not
necessary for the contract to bind Tiwi.


Fajardo v. Hon. Alfredo Lim (2006)
Facts: Fajardo filed an action for damages against Mayor Lim and City Administrator Marzan for not
releasing the checks for the purchase of Fajardos lots.

Doctrine: The Local Government Code requires the City Administrator to countersign the check
payment. As such, the judgment granting mandamus was directed to whoever was holding the Office of
City Administrator to release the checks. Mayor Lim was absolved of any civil liability and no damages
were awarded to Fajardo.






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8. Settlement of boundary disputes

Calanza v. PICOP (2009)
Facts: The Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) claims that the land it occupies for
which Calanza secured a mining permit from Davao Oriental is situated in Surigao del Sur and not in
Davao Oriental. When Calanza filed a case in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), PICOP averred that the RTC
had no jurisdiction over the dispute since the area is between two municipalities of two different
provinces.

Doctrine: The RTC has no original jurisdiction over the dispute, as Sec. 118 of the Local Government
Code (LGC) provides that boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different
provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the Sanggunians of the provinces concerned. While
Sec. 119 of the LGC gives a dissatisfied party an avenue to question the decision of the Sanggunian to the
RTC having jurisdiction over the area, the RTC cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction over the case since
there was no petition that was filed and decided by the Sangguniang Panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and
Surigao del Sur.



City of Pasig v. COMELEC and Municipality of Cainta (1999)

Facts: The City of Pasig wanted to create two barangays which Cainta claims are the subjects of a
territorial dispute in a pending case before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Cainta wanted to
suspend or cancel the plebiscites for the creation of these two barangays.

Doctrine: The plebiscites must be suspended as the boundary dispute between Pasig and Cainta must
first be decided before plebiscites may be held, and the boundaries must be clear for they define the
limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit.


Kananga v. Madrona (2003)
Facts: Kananga moved to dismiss the case involving a dispute between the Municipality of Kananga and
Ormoc City, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc, for lack of jurisdiction.

Doctrine: Sec. 118 of the Local Government Code, requiring that boundary disputes involving
municipalities or component cities of different provinces be jointly referred for settlement to the
sanggunians of the provinces concerned, has no application in this case since one party is an independent
component city. Since there is no legal provision specifically governing jurisdiction over boundary
disputes between a municipality and an independent component city, the general rules governing
jurisdiction should then be used and as the RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies
except those expressly withheld from their plenary powers, the RTCs have the power to hear and resolve
the dispute in the case at bar.





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9. Succession of elective officials

Unda v. COMELEC (1990)
Facts: Unda, the elected Vice Mayor, assumed the position of the deceased Mayor Guiling and was made
to succeed Guiling as protestee in an election protest filed by Rangiris.

Doctrine: Unda can substitute Guiling as protestee in the election protest filed by Rangiris place. The
Local Government Code states that the Vice Mayor stands next in line of succession to the Mayor in case
of a permanent vacancy in the latters position; as such, in this case, Unda as incumbent Vice Mayor
succeeded by operation of law to the vacated office of Mayor and is entitled to occupy the same for the
unexpired term of the deceased Mayor. As the successor, he is the one directly concerned in the fair and
regular conduct of the election, which makes him the real party in interest in the election protest filed by
Rangiris and in which he must be substituted as the protestee.


Macalincag v. Chang (1992)
Facts: The acting Secretary of Finance issued an Order of Preventive Suspension against Makati
Municipal Treasurer Chang. Chang contends that a government officer is not suspended until someone
has assumed the post and the officer subject of the suspension order has ceased performing his official
function.

Doctrine: Preventive suspension under Sec. 41 of the Presidential Decree 807 (Civil Service Law) does
not provide for the requirement of designating a replacement for the preventive suspension to be
effected. Furthermore, Sec. 156 of Batas Pambansa 337 provides that in case of suspension of the
municipal treasurer, the assistant municipal treasurer or the treasury official next in rank shall
automatically assume the position. As such, Changs preventive suspension became effective upon his
receipt of the order of preventive suspension, making the designation of the officer-in-charge to replace
Chang immaterial to the effectivity of his suspension.


Sandoval v. COMELEC (1993)
Facts: Socrates, elected Mayor of Puerto Princesa, argued that the recall resolution, which allowed
Hagedorn to run in the recall election despite the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against a
fourth consecutive term for elective local officials, was improper due to the absence of notice to the
Preparatory Recall Assembly members.

Doctrine: The recall assembly was proper. Hagedorn is not disqualified from running in the recall
election as any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition on
serving for more than 3 consecutive terms contained in Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code. Any
subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after three consecutive
terms and the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.





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Montebon v. COMELEC (2008)
Facts: After a Petition for Disqualification was filed against Potencioso on the ground that he has already
served three terms as municipal councilor, Potencioso argued that he is qualified to run anew because his
second term was interrupted when he succeeded as Vice Mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of Vice
Mayor Mendoza.

Doctrine: Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code provides that an elective local official cannot serve for
more than three consecutive terms, and that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does
not interrupt the continuity of service. For an official to be disqualified from running because of the
three-term limit, the official must have been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post, and he must have fully served three consecutive terms. In this case, there was an
interruption in Potenciosos second term as municipal councilor as he succeeded the retired Vice Mayor
Mendoza. Such succession in local government offices is by operation of law and does not constitute
voluntary renunciation of office. Thus, since the succession did not amount to a voluntary renunciation of
office (which does not interrupt the continuity of service), Potencioso could not be said to have fully
served his second term and as such, he is entitled to run for another term as municipal councilor.


Mendoza v. Familara and COMELEC (2011)
Facts: After a Petition for Disqualification was filed against Mendoza on the ground that he had already
served three consecutive terms, Mendoza argued that the three-term limit on barangay elective officials
in Republic Act 9164 (An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections)
was passed by Congress only in 2002 and should thus not cover the elections reckoned from 1994, thus
rendering him qualified to run for a new term as Barangay Captain.

Doctrine: Mendoza is disqualified from running as the three-term limit on barangay elective officials has
been embodied by the Barangay Law (enacted in 1988) even before the 1994 elections and was adopted
by the Local Government Code. The term limitation applies to all local elective officials without any
exclusion or qualification.


Mendoza et al. v. Laxina (2003)
Facts: Laxina took his oath of office and assumed office as Barangay Chairman. Fermo, a rival candidate,
filed an election protest and was declared by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) as the winner, and it
thereafter granted Fermos motion for execution pending appeal, causing Laxina to vacate the position
and relinquish it to Fermo. Subsequently, COMELEC annulled the MTCs order granting execution of the
decision pending appeal and ordered Fermo to vacate the office of Barangay Chairman. He thereafter re-
took his oath of office. Mendoza and other barangay councilors filed a case against Laxina for making it
appear in the payroll that he and his appointees rendered services before renewing his oath of office and
reassuming his office.

Doctrine: The re-taking of an oath of office by a duly-proclaimed but subsequently unseated local
elective official is not a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption into his office. Once
Laxina was proclaimed and duly sworn into office the first time, he became entitled to assume office and
exercise its functions. The pendency of an election protest is not sufficient basis to stop him from
assuming office or discharging his functions. When the COMELEC nullified the writ of execution pending
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appeal issued by the MTC in favor of Fermo, the MTCs decision proclaiming Fermo as winner of the
election was stayed and the status quo or when Laxina was occupying the office of Barangay Captain
was restored. As such, the re-taking of his oath was a mere formality, because through the stay of the
MTCs decision, it was as if the writ of execution was not issued and he was not ousted from office.


Mayor Abundo v. COMELEC (2013)

Facts: After a Petition for Disqualification was filed against Abundo on the ground of the three-term limit,
Abundo argued that his second term is not to be counted in the three-term limit. In that election, he was
declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest only after two years from the year of the
election and as such, the said period during which he served should not be considered as full service of
that particular term.

Doctrine: Abundo is not disqualified from running for another term. For an official to be disqualified, the
official concerned must have been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post
and should have fully served three consecutive terms. In this case, his opponent Torres served as Mayor
for two years of his second term before he (Abundo) was declared the rightful winner in the mayoralty
contest. This period should be considered an interruption, which removed Abundos case from the ambit
of the three-term limit.


10. Discipline of local officials

a) Elective officials
(i) Grounds


Sison v. People (2010)

Facts: During a post-audit investigation, it was found out that Mayor Sison did not conduct public bidding
during his term. Thus, 7 counts of violations of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) were filed against him in the Sandiganbayan.

Doctrine: Mayor Sison is guilty of violations of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 because he did not conduct
any public bidding and did not fulfil the requirements of a personal canvass. There was no showing that
that the award was decided by the Committee on Awards. Sison's signing in a dual capacity - as chairman
and member (representing the head of office for whose use the supplies were being procured) is
prohibited.


Amora, Jr. v. COMELEC (2011)

Facts: A Petition for Disqualification was filed against Amora, a candidate for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol,
on the ground that his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) was defectively notarized, as the COC was not
properly sworn to in accordance with the Omnibus Election Code as Amora only presented his
Community Tax Certificate to the notary public instead of presenting competent evidence of his identity.

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Doctrine: Amora should not be disqualified as Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code does not specify
that a defective notarization is a ground for the disqualification of a candidate. Furthermore, since Amora
and the Notary Public knew each other, there was no need for competent evidence of identity, and the
notary public only needs to indicate that he/she personally knows the candidate.


Valles v. COMELEC (2000)
Facts: A Petition for Disqualification was filed against Lopez, a candidate for Governor of Davao Oriental,
on the ground that she was an Australian citizen.

Doctrine: Lopez is not disqualified. Sec. 40(d) of the Local Government Code uses the term dual
citizenship as a disqualification, meaning dual allegiance. For candidates like Lopez with dual citizenship,
it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. As such, if in the certificate of candidacy, one
declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto, such a declaration, under oath, operates
as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. In this case, Lopez should not be disqualified as the
Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the
nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth. Lopez, is a Filipino
citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. Also, the fact that Lopez was born in Australia did not
amount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. Furthermore, the fact that Lopez was a holder of an
Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration did not mean that she was renouncing her
Filipino citizenship since a renunciation must be express to result in the loss of citizenship.


Moreno v. COMELEC (2006)
Facts: A Petition for Disqualification was filed against Moreno, a candidate for Punong Barangay, on the
ground that he was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. Moreno argued that
he was already granted probation thus he is not disqualifed to run as the disqualification under the Local
Government Code (LGC) only applies only to those who served their sentence.

Doctrine: Moreno should not be disqualified as Sec. 40(a) of the LGC provides that those who have been
sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by imprisonment of one year or more, within two
years after serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local position. This provision,
however, does not specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local elective office.



Rodriguez v. COMELEC (1996)
Facts: A Petition for Disqualification was filed against Rodriguez, a candidate for Governor of Quezon
Province, on the ground that he was a fugitive from justice because he left the United States where a
charge has been filed against him before the Los Angeles Municipal Court. Under Sec. 40(e) of the Local
Government Code, 'fugitives from justice' are disqualified from running for any elective local position.

Doctrine: Rodriguez should be not be disqualified and his proclamation as the winner of the
gubernatorial elections should not be nullified as he is not a fugitive from justice. A fugitive from justice
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includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment, but likewise those who, after
being charged, flee to avoid persecution. Rodriguez is not a fugitive from justice as his arrival in the
Philippines from the United States preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court
and of the issuance of the arrest warrant by the same court by almost five months. There was thus no
intent to evade (which is compelling factor which causes ones flight from a particular jurisdiction) since
there can only be such when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment
or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.


Mercado v. Manzano (1999)
Facts: A Petition for Disqualification was filed against Manzano, a candidate for Vice Mayor of Makati
City, on the ground that he is an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration, and
that he misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Doctrine: Manzano should not be disqualified because the dual citizenship meant in Sec. 40 (d) of the
Local Government Code as a ground for disqualification, refers to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person
is simultaneously considered a national by the said states, while dual allegiance, refers to the situation in
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. For candidates
with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate
of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. Manzanos oath of allegiance to
the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his
education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, shows his
election of Philippine citizenship.


Abella v. COMELEC (1991)

Facts: A Petition for Disqualification was filed against Abella, a candidate for Governor of Leyte, on the
ground of alleged false statements in her certificate of candidacy regarding her residence she
stipulated that she was a resident of the Municipality of Kananga when in truth she was a resident of
Ormoc City, a component city of the Province of Leyte whose charter prohibits her from voting for any
provincial elective officials and likewise running for such positions.

Doctrine: Abella should be disqualified as Sec. 42(1) of the Local Government Code provides that those
who are not qualified voters registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or province where the
person proposes to be elected are disqualified from running. It was proven that Abella left her residence
in Kananga in 1975 to move to Ormoc City with her husband, and there was no proof that she cancelled
her voters registration in Ormoc City and transferred registration in Kananga.


Frivaldo v. COMELEC (1996)
Facts: A Petition for Disqualification was filed against Frivaldo, the newly elected Governor of Sorsogon,
on the ground that he was only repatriated as a citizen of the Philippines on the day of his oath-taking.

Doctrine: Frivaldo should be disqualified. The Omnibus Election Code says that the perfection of
qualifications must have been on the day of the elections and not upon taking his oath of office.
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Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC (1992)
Facts: A Petition for Disqualification was filed against Labo Jr., a candidate for Baguio City Mayor, on the
ground that he made a false representation when he stated therein that he is a "natural-born" citizen of
the Philippines.

Doctrine: Labo should be disqualified as he failed to prove that he has reacquired his Philippine
citizenship by a direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. Philippine citizenship is an
indispensable requirement for holding an elective office, and even if he was elected by the majority of the
electorate is of no moment because the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by
the electorate alone, for if a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total
loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. The
candidate who got the second highest vote may not be proclaimed as governor when the candidate for
such position was disqualified unless the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their
votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.


Jalosjos v. COMELEC and Cardino (2012)
Facts: A Petition for Cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) was filed against Jalosjos, a
candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City, on the ground that he made a false material representation in his
COC when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor Jalosjos was convicted by
final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prision mayor.

Doctrine: Jalosjos made misrepresentations in his COC, and therefore the same was null and void.
Section 40 of the Local Government Code provides that those who have received a sentence of prisin
mayor by final judgment are disqualified from running for any elective local position, for the penalty of
prisin mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory penalties of temporary
absolute disqualification (which deprives one of the right to vote and being elected into office during the
meting of the penalty) and perpetual special disqualification which, upon the finality of the judgment, will
automatically render him ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually.


Mayor Talaga v. COMELEC and Alcala (2012)
Facts: A Petition for Cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) was filed against Talaga, a
candidate for Mayor of Lucena City, on the ground that he made a false material representation in his
COC when he declared under oath that he was eligible to run for the Office of Mayor despite knowing that
he had been elected and had served three consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena City. Talaga argued that
the Sangguniang Bayan preventively suspended him from office during his second and third terms, so the
three-limit rule did not apply to him.

Doctrine: Talaga deliberately made misrepresentations in his COC, therefore the same was null and void.
The false representation here must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. To prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race,
one may resort to either a petition for disqualification under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code (the
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effect of which will be the prohibition of the person from continuing as a candidate) or to a petition to
deny due course to, or cancel, a certificate of candidacy grounded on a statement of a material
representation in the said certificate that is false (the effect of which is the cancellation or denial of due
course of the persons certificate, with the said person not treated as a candidate at all as if she never
filed a COC). A person whose COC was cancelled does not give rise to a valid candidacy and therefore
cannot be substituted by another person.


Cayat v. COMELEC (2007)

Facts: A Petition for Disqualification was filed against Cayat, a candidate for Mayor of Burguias Benguet,
on the ground that he made a misrepresentation that he was eligible to run when in truth he had been
convicted by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, consequently disqualifying him from
running.

Doctrine: Cayat should be disqualified because Sec. 40(a)(1) of the Local Government COde provides
that those who have received a sentence by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude for an
offense punishable by one year or more of imprisonment within two years after serving sentence are
disqualified from running for any elective local position. Moral turpitude had been defined as everything
which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in
the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty or good morals, and for which the crime of acts of lasciviousness clearly involves moral
turpitude. Sec. 6 of Republic Act 6646 provides that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an
election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. Cayat was disqualified twenty-
three days before the elections; thus he was legally a non-existent candidate during the elections. The
candidate with the second highest number of votes shall become the Mayor.


Bautista v. COMELEC (2003)

Facts: A Petition for Cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was filed against Bautista, a candidate for
Punong Barangay Barangay Lumbangan, on the ground that he was not a registered voter in Lumbangan.

Doctrine: Bautista is disqualified as Sec. 39(a) of the Local Government Code provides that an elective
local official must not only be a qualified elector or a qualified voter, he must also be a registered
voter where he intends to be elected. Bautista admitted in his affidavit that he was not a registered voter
of Barangay Lumbangan, and his name was stricken off the voter's list and once made aware of such fact,
he never did anything to register anew. As Bautista was only disqualified after the elections, the highest
ranking Sangguniang Barangay member, or in the case of his permanent disability, the second highest
ranking Sangguniang member, shall become the Punong Barangay.








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Bernardo, et al. v. Abalos, et al. (2004)
Facts: The charge against Abalos Jr., who ran for Mayor of Mandaluyong City, of vote-buying was
dismissed by the Commission on Elections due to insufficiency of evidence.

Doctrine: The complainant failed to establish that they violated the Omnibus Election Act referring to
electioneering because all the acts were committed even before the start of the campaign period. As such,
Abalos, Jr. is innocent.


Maquiling v. COMELEC (2013)
Facts: There were three Mayoralty candidates in Lanao del Norte Balua, Arnado and Maquiling. Balua
filed a Petition for Disqualification with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) against Arnado, a dual
citizen who applied for repatriation, took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines in an
Affidavit of Renunciation, but despite his oath, still continuously used his U.S. Passport even after filing
his Certificate of Candidacy (COC). Arnado subsequently won in the elections, but the COMELEC First
Division disqualified him but the COMELEC en banc ruled in his favor and upheld his repatriation.

Doctrine: The Court held that Arnado is disqualified from running because while he satisfied the two
requirements needed to qualify to run for a public office under Republic Act 9255 (i.e., taking the Oath of
Allegiance and renouncing his foreign citizenship), his use of a foreign passport after renouncing his
foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to ones nationality and
citizenship. By representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted
to his earlier status as a dual citizen who is, under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code, disqualified
from running for any local elective position. As Arnaldo is barred from even being a candidate, his COC is
rendered void from the beginning and the votes cast in his favor should not have even been counted.
Maquiling is thus the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes, making him the
winner of the elections. The rule of succession under the Local Government Code will thus not apply.


(ii) Jurisdiction


Ombudsman v. Rodriguez (2010)
Facts: Punong Barangay Rodriguez argued that the Sangguniang Bayan and not the Ombudsman should
exercise jurisdiction over the complaint filed against him for abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression,
misconduct in office, and neglect of duty.

Doctrine: Although Sec. 61 of the Local Government Code provides that the Sangguniang Bayan has
disciplinary authority over any elective barangay official, the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction
with the Sangguniang Bayan over administrative cases against elective barangay officials occupying
positions below salary grade 27, such as the position of Punong Barangay Rodriguez. Even if they filed in
the Ombudsman and the Sangguniang Bayan identical complaints against Rodriguez, they did not violate
the rule against forum shopping because their complaint was in the nature of an administrative case. In
administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the
body in which the complaint is filed first, and which first opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. In this case, since the
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complaint was filed first with the Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman opted to assume jurisdiction over
the complaint, the Ombudsmans exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the Sangguniang Bayan
exercising concurrent jurisdiction.


Laxina, Sr. v. Ombudsman (2005)
Facts: A complaint for grave misconduct was filed against Barangay Chairman Laxina, for an alleged
attempted rape. The Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) referred the complaint to the
Quezon City Council, while a similar complaint was filed with the Ombudsman. Laxina argued that the
respondents (the Ombudsman, the DILG Secretary and the City Mayor of Quezon City) should have
dismissed the cases against him on the ground of forum-shopping.

Doctrine: Firstly, the rule on forum-shopping applies only to judicial cases or proceedings and not to
administrative cases. Secondly, the Ombudsman and the Quezon City Council have concurrent
jurisdiction over administrative cases against elective officials like Laxina. Thirdly, Laxina is estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman as the records show that Laxina participated in the
proceedings by filing his counter-affidavit with supporting evidence. He also did not inform the
Ombudsman of the existence of the other administrative complaint of which he is presumably aware at
the time the proceedings in the Ombudsman were ongoing. Participation in the administrative
proceedings without raising any objection thereto bars the parties from raising any jurisdictional
infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered against them.


Espiritu v. Melgar (1992)
Facts: A preventive suspension was imposed by the Provincial Governor on Mayor Melgar of Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro after a complaint for grave misconduct for alleged assault and use of physical violence
was filed against him in the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), and a similar
complaint filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro.

Doctrine: The Court held that, per Sec. 63 of the Local Government Code, the Provincial Governor has the
authority to suspend Melgar. The Provincial Governor of Oriental Mindoro is authorized by law to
preventively suspend Melgar at any time after the issues had been joined and any of the following
grounds enumerated in Sec. 63 of the LGC were shown to exist 1) when there is reasonable ground to
believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, 2) when the evidence of
culpability is strong, 3) When the gravity of the offense so warrants, or 4) when the continuance in office
of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records
and other evidence.

(iii) Preventive suspension

Bunye v. Escareal (1993)
Facts: The Sandiganbayan placed Mayor Bunye et al. under suspension for violation of Republic Act (RA)
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Bunye, et al. argued that the suspension for violation of RA
3019 partakes of a penalty even before a judgment of conviction is reached, and is thus violative of her
constitutional right to be presumed innocent.

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Doctrine: The suspension is mandatory under RA 3019. Section 13 of RA 3019 provides that the
suspension of a public officer upon the filing of a valid information is mandatory. Preventive suspension
is not violative of the Constitution as it is not a penalty.


Ganzon v. CA (1991)
Facts: Mayor Ganzon, who was given a 60-day preventive suspension and three more suspension orders
due to the finding of probable cause in the ten administrative complaints that he faced, claims that the
President and his agents (in this case, the Department of Interior and Local Government) no longer have
the power to suspend a local official because the phrase as may be provided by law (in relation to the
exercise by the President of the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials) has been
removed in the 1987 Constitution.

Doctrine: The deletion of the phrase as may be provided by law did not divest the President of the
power to investigate, discipline, or remove local officials as the President can still suspend a local official
but, such must be consistent with law. Thus, Congress maintains its control over municipal corporations,
although it may delegate such power to the President. However, only one suspension order should have
been imposed in this case as ten suspension orders would prevent the mayor from performing his
functions. The suspension is not meant to serve as a penalty but merely to prevent the accused from
influencing the course of the investigation.


Mondano v. Silvosa (1955)

Facts: Mayor Mondano, accused of rape and concubinage, questions his suspension from office by the
Provincial Governor as indorsed by the Assistant Executive Secretary pursuant to a complaint filed before
the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee.

Doctrine: The investigation and suspension were illegal because, although provincial supervision over
municipal officials belongs to the Provincial Governor and he may submit written charges before the
Provincial Board and suspend the official, the charges in this case are not malfeasances contemplated
under Sec. 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code. The charges may be considered as involving moral
turpitude, but before the Provincial Board/Governor may formally charge and suspend the petitioner,
there must first be a conviction which was lacking in this case.


Hebron v. Reyes (1958)
Facts: Mayor Hebron, charged with oppression, grave abuse of authority and serious misconduct, was
suspended indefinitely by the Office of the President while the case was under investigation.

Doctrine: The suspension was illegal because the President has no original power to suspend a local
official. The Executive must observe the mandatory procedure for disciplinary actions over municipal
officials to be exercised by the Provincial Board provided in Secs. 2188 to 2191 of the Revised
Administrative Code and the National Government may conduct an investigation only as a means to
ascertain whether or not the Provincial board should take action.

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Miranda v. Sandiganbayan (2005)

Facts: Mayor Mirando, who was placed under preventive suspension by the Ombudsman for 6 months
for violating Republic Act 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees), argued that based on Section 63(b) of the Local Governmen Code (LGC), local elective
officials could not be preventively suspended for a period beyond 60 days.

Doctrine: The Ombudsman may suspend a local elective official for not more than 90 days.
Administrative complaints commenced under the Ombudsman Law are distinct from those initiated
under the Local Government Code, as Section 63 of the LGC does not govern preventive suspensions
imposed by the Ombudsman, which is a constitutionally created office and independent from the
Executive branch of government; the Ombudsmans power of preventive suspension is governed by
Republic Act No. 6770.


Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan (1994)
Facts: Governor Bolastig, who was placed under preventive suspension for 90 days by the
Sandiganbayan for violating Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), argued that there
can only be preventive suspension when it is shown that the suspension order prevents the accused from
using his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the
prosecution of the case against him

Doctrine: Sec. 13 of Republic Act 3019 provides that it is mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend
any public officer against whom a valid information charging violation of that law. The duration of
preventive suspension will vary to the extent that it is contingent on the time it takes the court to decide
the case but not on account of any discretion lodged in the court, taking into account the probability that
the accused may use his office to hamper his prosecution.


(iv) Removal

SB of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos v. Punong Barangay Severino Martinez (2008)
Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan penalized Barangay Captain Martinez by removing him from office
because of an administrative charge of Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and Violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act filed against the Barangay Captain.

Doctrine: The Sangguniang Bayan can not remove Martinez from office. Sec. 60 of the Local Government
Code provides that the power to remove elective local officials from office is lodged with the courts.

(v) Administrative appeal

Catu v. Rellosa (2008)

Facts: Rellosa, the Punong Barangay, represented one of the parties involved in a complaint against the
tenants of the building owned by the Catus after the conciliation meeting that Rellosa arranged failed.
170


Doctrine: Rellosa may appear as counsel of two of the parties subject to authorization from the
Department of Interior and Local Government. Although Section 90 of Republic Act 7160 (The Local
Government Code) provides that local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their
functions as local chief executives, punong barangays are not mentioned in this prohibition in the Local
Government Code. Therefore, Rellosa as Punong Barangay was not forbidden to practice his profession.
However, he violated the Revised Civil Service Rules, particularly Sec. 12 which prohibits officers or
employees from directly engaging in any private business, vocation or profession without written
permission from the head of the department. As punong barangay, Rellosa should have obtained prior
written permission from the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before entering his appearance
as counsel of two of the parties.


Republic v. Rambuyong (2010)

Facts: Atty. Richard Rambuyong, then incumbent Vice Mayor of Ipil, appeared as counsel of Chua in a
case filed for collection of a sum of money/damages against the National Power Corporation (NPC).

Doctrine: Rambuyong may not appear as counsel of Chua. Section 2(10) of the Local Government Code
(LGC) provides that NPC is a government instrumentality, and Sec. 90(b)(1) of the LGC provides that
sanggunian members are prohibited to appear as counsel before any court wherein any office, agency or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party and being a government owned and controlled
corporation (GOCC), NPC falls is within the term instrumentality.


People v. Sandiganbayan (2008)
Facts: Mayor Villapando was charged with violation of Art. 244 of the Revised Penal Code (which
provides that any public officer who shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any public office any person
lacking the legal qualifications shall be penalized) when he hired Tiape as Municipal Administrative and
Development Planning Consultant in the Office of the Municipal Mayor, when it has not yet been more
than a year since Tiape lost the elections.

Doctrine: Tiape is ineligible to assume the position as Sec. 6, Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution and Sec.
94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 prohibits losing candidates within one year after such
election to be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled
corporation or in any of their subsidiaries. A losing candidate has to wait one year before assuming any
appointed position.


Sales v. Carreon, Jr. (2007)

Facts: The newly elected Mayor Carreon, Jr. revoked all 83 appointments made by then Dapitan City
Mayor Ruiz, in compliance with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular imposing a
ban on issuing appointments in the civil service during the election period, arguing that the questioned
appointments were not only "issued in bulk" but that there was no urgent need to fill those positions.

Doctrine: All 83 appointments are void. The CSC is required to publish the list of vacant positions and
171

such publication shall be posted by the chief personnel or administrative officer of all local government
units in the designated places. The vacant positions may only be filled by the appointing authority after
they have been reported to the CSC as vacant, and only after publication. In this case, the publication of
vacancies was made even before the positions involved actually became vacant.


Quirog v. Aumentado (2008)
Facts: Bohol Provincial Governor Relampagos appointment of Quirog as Provincial Government
Department Head of the Office of the Provincial Agriculture was opposed on the ground that Quirog was
part of the bulk of midnight appointments made by Governor Relampagos before the end of this term.

Doctrine: Quirogs appointment was valid. The appointment of Quirog cannot be categorized as a
midnight appointment as Quirog had been discharging and performing the duties concomitant with the
subject position for a year prior to her permanent appointment thereto.


Nazareo v. City of Dumaguete (2009)
Facts: The newly elected Dumaguete City Mayor Perdices announced that he would not honor the
appointments made by former Mayor Remollo, who promoted 15 and regularized another 74 city hall
employees.

Doctrine: The Supreme Court held that all the promotions and regularizations were void. Although not
all 'mass appointments' are prohibited by the Civil Service Commission, it must be shown that the
appointments have undergone the regular screening process, that the appointee is qualified, that there is
a need to fill up the vacancy immediately, and that the appointments are not in bulk. The validity of an
appointment issued immediately before and after elections by an outgoing local chief executive is to be
determined on the basis of the nature, character, and merit of the individual appointment and the
particular circumstances surrounding the same. In this case, there was no evidence to show any
deliberation on the qualifications of the appointed city hall employees, nor any indication of an urgent
need for the issuance of such appointments.


Montuerto v. Ty (2008)
Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan requested the Civil Service Commission to revoke the appointment of
Montuerto as Budget Officer as it was not with the concurrence of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Doctrine: Montuertos appointment was invalid. Sec. 443(a) and (d) of the Local Government Code
provides that the head of a department or office in the municipal government, such as the Municipal
Budget Officer, shall be appointed by the mayor with the concurrence of the majority of all Sangguniang
Bayan members subject to civil service law, rules and regulations.






172

Mayor Tolentino v. COMELEC (2010)

Facts: Election protests were filed against the proclamation of Tolentino and de Castro as duly elected
Mayor and Vice-Mayor, respectively. In light of the issuances of the Commission on Elections ordering the
revision of forty-four ballot boxes without first resolving whether sixteen of the said forty-four ballot
boxes, which were segregated or set aside, should be included in the revision, and without resolving how
the revision (examination of ballots which results from a general averment of fraud or irregularities in
the counting of votes) proceedings would be conducted, Tolentino and de Castro argued that they were
denied their right to due process.

Doctrine: Tolentino and de Castro were not denied their right to due process, as the requirements for
procedural due process enumerated in Air Manila Inc v. Balatbat 1) the right to notice, be it actual or
constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a persons legal right, 2) the right to a
reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence
in his favor, 3) the right to a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and
impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction, and 4) the right to a finding or decision of that tribunal
supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at least ascertained in the records or
disclosed to the parties, were satisfied when the parties were afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand. The COMELEC had required Tolentino to provide the names
of his revisors (who will raise objections, claim the votes for him, or contest votes in favor of his
opponent) and he has not alleged being deprived of this opportunity. The opportunity during the revision
stage to raise all objections, present his evidence and witnesses and file his memorandum before the case
would be submitted for resolution, fully meet the demands of due process.


Acuzar v. Jarolan and Hon. Apresa (2010)
Facts: Acuzar, who was dismissed from the Philippine National Police for an administrative case for
having an illicit relationship with a minor argued that he was denied due process because the Peoples
Law Enforcement Board (PLEB)s decision was reached allegedly without giving him an opportunity to
be heard.

Doctrine: Acuzar was not denied due process in an administrative context, as due process does not
require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. In administrative proceedings,
procedural due process has been recognized to include: 1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the
institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights, 2) a real opportunity to be heard
personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to
defend ones rights, 3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a
person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality, and 4) a
finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during
the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. Acuzar was notified of the
complaint against him, he was able to submit his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses, and
he attended hearings with his counsel.

(vi) Doctrine of condonation
b) Appointive officials



173

De Villa et al. v. The City of Bacolod (1990)
Facts: The City of Bacolod argues that the Integrated National Police (INP) Director Generals act of
relieving Lt. Col. Plotena as Bacolod City INP Station Commander and assigning him to the Philippine
Constabulary (PC) Provincial Headquarters in Bacolod City is invalid and illegal because Executive Orders
(EO) 1027 and 1028 provided that there had to be prior recommendation of, or consultation with the
local chief executive which is the City Mayor of Bacolod before any relief is done.

Doctrine: EOs 1012 and 1027 did not remove administrative supervision and control (i.e., the power to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter) over police units from the INP chief.
The local executives have general supervision (i.e., the power to see to it that units or elements of the INP
perform their duties properly according to existing laws and rules) and operational supervision (i.e., the
same as general supervision, with the added power to deploy or employ such units or elements in
coordination with the Provincial or District Police Superintendent, Station Commander or Officer-in-
Charge) over local police units, but no power of administrative supervision or control over them. As such,
under existing laws, the power to relieve or reassign a city INP Station Commander is lodged with the INP
Director General and consequently, the INP Director Generals act of relieving Lt. Col. Plotena as Bacolod
INP Station Commander and assigning him to the PC Provincial Headquarters in Bacolod City is valid and
legal.

11. Recall
12. Term limits


Carpio v. Executive Secretary (1992)
Facts: Carpio claims that there was a manifest derogation of the power of control of the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) over the Philippine National Police (PNP) when Republic Act 6975 vested the
power to choose the PNP Provincial Director and the Chiefs of Police in the Governors and Mayors,
respectively, the power of operational supervision and control over police units in city and municipal
mayors, participation in appointments to the positions of Senior Superintendent to Deputy Director-
General as well as the administration of qualifying entrance examinations in the Civil Service
Commission, and disciplinary powers over PNP members in the Peoples Law Enforcement Boards and
city and municipal mayors.

Doctrine: There is no usurpation of the power of control of the NAPOLCOM. Under Sec. 51 of Republic
ACt 6975, full control remains with the National Police Commission, and under this provision, local
executives are only acting as representatives of the NAPOLCOM; They will choose the officers concerned
from a list of eligibles to be recommended by PNP officials.


Ignacio v. Banate, Jr. (1987)

Facts: Ignacio, then President of the Katipunang Panlungsod ng mga Barangay (KPB) and a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod or City Council, argued that Banate, his appointed replacement in the KPB,
is not qualified to replace him because Banate is not an officer, much less President of the Katipunan and
has not been duly elected for any said positions.

174

Doctrine: Banate, Jr., not being a Barangay Captain and never having been elected president of the
association of barangay councils, cannot be appointed a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod as an
unqualified person cannot be appointed a member even in an acting capacity. Sec 3, par. 1 of Batas
Pambansa 51 provides that one has to be a barangay chairman and president of the barangacy councils to
be qualified. Since the appointment of Ignacios successor (Banate) is invalid, Ignacios tenure could not
be terminated on the basis of such appointment.


Galarosa v. Valencia (1993)

Facts: Lasay, the incumbent Barangay Captain of barangay Gimaloto of the municipality of Sorsogon,
assails that Galarosa, the incumbent president of the Katipunang Bayan or Association of Barangay
Councils (ABC) of the municipality of Sorsogon, and an appointed member of the Sanggunian Bayan of
Sorsogon, should be replaced since the terms of office of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon has already
ended.

Doctrine: Galarosa's term as ex-officio member of Sangguniang Bayan ends with the end of the term of
the latter. He can continue to serve as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan beyond 30 June 1992 (the
date when the term of office of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon expired) but only through holding
over authority as there is no law which prohibits them from holding over as members of the Sangguniang
Bayan if there has yet to be a reelection of Barangay Captain. The hold-over authority of ABC presidents
is also recognized. Thus, while his term of office has expired, Galarosa can stay on as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan until the officers of the Liga are elected.



e. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
National Patrimony
Regalian Doctrine

La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association v. Ramos (2004)
The La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association challenged the issuance of mining permits and other measures
allowing for the exploration, development of natural resources. The Court held that the mining permits
should no longer be issued, applying the the Regalian Doctrine.

The Regalian Doctrine, which declares all natural resources of the Philippines, including mineral lands
and minerals, to be property belonging to the State, extends not only to land but also to "all natural
wealth that may be found in the bowels of the earth." Spain, in particular, recognized the unique value of
natural resources, viewing them, especially minerals, as an abundant source of revenue to finance its
wars against other nations.
175

Nationalist and Citizenship Requirement Provisions
EDU of Natural Resources
Franchises, Authority, and Certificates of Public Utilities
Acquisition Ownership and Transfer of Public and Private Lands
Practice of Professions
Organization and Regulation of Corporations, Private and Public
Monopolies, Restraint of Trade and Unfair Competition

National Economy and Patrimony
Tanada v. Angara (1997)
Senate Resolution No. 97, which ratified the World Trade Organization Agreement, was challenged, on
the ground that it violates Article II, Section 19 and Article XII, Sections 10 and 12 of the 1987
Constitution (embodying the Filipino First policy).
The SC upheld the WTO agreement. While the Constitution has a bias towards Filipino goods, services,
labor, and enterprises, there is also a need for some degree of equality and reciprocity in the countrys
business dealings with the rest of the world. The framers did not intend to adopt an isolationist policy. A
self-reliant and independent national economy cannot be interpreted to mean a bar on foreign
investments, goods, and services. It is not economic seclusion, nor is it mendicancy in the international
community. What the Constitution shall do is protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign
competition.
Natural Resources
La Bugal Blaan Tribal Assn v. Ramos (2004), supra.

Issue: What is the proper interpretation of the phrase agreements involving either technical or financial
assistance in Art. XII, Section 2(4) of the Constitution?

Held: The exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources may be undertaken in the
following ways: 1) the State by itself directly and solely, 2) by co-production, joint venture or production
sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or corporations, 3) small-scale utilization allowed by law in
favor of Filipino citizens, and, 5) large-scale EDU of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils via
agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance according
to the general terms and conditions provided by law.

176

The use of the word involving signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of assistance or
activities having to do with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or technical assistance.
Service contracts were not banned under the 1987 Constitution.

Agrarian Reform
Urban Land Reform and Housing
Organization and Regulation of Private Corporations
Operation of Public Utilities
On Mass Media and Advertising Industry
Practice of Professions
State Operation of Private Enterprises
Agan v. Piatco (2004)
The consortium that eventually became PIATCO was awarded the NAIA III terminal project. As a
consequence, it entered into a Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement
of the NAIA Passenger Terminal III (1997 Concession Agreement). The Government granted PIATCO the
franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period and to collect the fees,
rentals and other charges in accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997 Concession
Agreement. The Agreement provided that the concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) years
commencing from the in-service date, and may be renewed at the option of the Government for a period
not exceeding twenty-five (25) years. At the end of the concession period, PIATCO shall transfer the
development facility to MIAA.
Meanwhile, the MIAA which was charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA Terminals I
and II, had existing concession contracts with various service providers to offer international airline
airport services. This led the employees of the service providers to file a petition for prohibition. Several
employees of MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the legality of the various agreements.
On the issue of whether or not the State can temporarily take over a business affected with public
interest, the SC held in this case that it could not. PIATCO could not, by mere contractual stipulation,
contravene the Constitutional provision on temporary government takeover and obligate the government
to pay reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal and/or Terminal Complex.
Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides that in times of national emergency, when the
public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed
by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest. The national emergency contemplated in that provision was defined to
include threat from external aggression, calamities or national disasters, but not strikes unless it is of
such proportion that it would paralyze government service. The duration of the emergency is the
determining factor as to how long the temporary takeover of the government will last.
177

Monopolies, Combinations, and Unfair Competition
NEA v. Mendoza (1985)
The IBP Oriental Mindoro Chapter opposed the increased electric rates being charged by ORMECO in
accordance with the NEAs approved increase in rates, on the ground that it did so without a public
hearing. The CFI issued a restraining order that prevented ORMECO from charging the rates.
The Supreme Court held that the CFI gravely abused its discretion and set the order aside.because the
consumers are members of the cooperative ORMECO, which is a non-profit organization. The consumers
are already represented by the Board of Directors whom they had elected. The necessity of a public
hearing is lost.
Money, Banking, and Credit
Cooperatives
Communication and Information in Nation-Building
Autonomy of Local Governments
Recognition of Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities
Honest Public Service and Full Public Disclosure
Valmonte v. Belmonte (1989)

Valmonte wanted Belmonte to give him a list of names of the opposition members of the Batasang
Pambansa who were able to secure a P2 million loan on guaranty of Imelda Marcos from the GSIS. GSIS
refused on the ground of confidentiality. Valmonte, et al., filed a petition for mandamus.

The SC held that the right to access the records does not include the right to compel custodians of official
records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the
government and the administrator of insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Its funds assume a
public character. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with
utmost prudence and in strict compliance with law. The public nature of the funds and the public office of
the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.

Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (2002)

PEA is the central implementing agency for reclamation projects in the country. It took over the leasing
and selling functions of the DENR as far as reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned. PEA entered into a
Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. Despite a Senate
investigation report, the Legal Task Force appointed by the President upheld the JVA. Chavez filed a
petition for mandamus and asked that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA.

178

The SC held that the right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a
final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and
should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets, and
similar matters affecting national security and public order.

f. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
g. EDUCATION, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS
h. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Guidelines
Please note that there are a number of cases that come up frequently in the study of international
law because they are rich with information and helpful explanations on different aspects of
international law (e.g. North Sea Case, Nicaragua v. United States). For the purpose of this
reference material, these cases have been distilled to provide only the very basic doctrines
relevant to the subject being discussed and necessary to have a comprehensive understanding of
international law. A greater appreciation of the teachings of these cases can only be reached by
reading the cases in full.

A. International Law and National Law

International Law (IL) is a body of principles, norms, and processes which regulates the relations
of states and other international persons, and governs their conduct affecting the interests of the
international community of states as a whole. (Magallona)
IL is characterized as a continuing process of authoritative decisions. It is a system of normative
conductconduct which is regarded by each actor, and by the group as a whole, as being
obligatory. (Higgins, Problems and Process, 1994)
The development of IL follows the actual use of rules described as rules of IL by governments. All
normal governments employ experts to provide routine and other advice on matters of IL and
constantly define their relations with other states in terms of IL. Governments and their officials
routinely use rules which they have for a long time called the law of nations or international
law. Reference by governments to international law has been part of the normal process of
decision-making. (Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 1998 Edition)
International law is that law which deals with the conduct of states and of international
organizations and with their relations inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons,
whether natural or juridical. (Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States)




179

Table 1. Comparison of International Law and National/Municipal Law (Based on the discussion in
Bernas, Introduction to Public International Law)
International National
Source Found in treaties and
customs grown among
states
Product of local custom or of
legislation
Relations Regulated Regulates relations between
states
Regulates relations between
individual persons under the
state
Substance A law between sovereign
states
A law of a sovereign over
individuals

Based on existing treaties, when there is a conflict between international and national law, the
rule provided in international law must prevail:

Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.

Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States (1949)
Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties and other sources
of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws as an excuse for
failure to perform this duty.

However, domestic law still has an impact on international law. As will be discussed further under
Sources of International Law, domestic law can be a source of international law if it propounds a
rule or custom generally accepted by domestic legal systems.

B. Sources of International Law

Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are
submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of the rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the
parties agree thereto.
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Note!
In certain cases, the ICJ will render a decision on a dispute without actually applying any of the foregoing
sources of international law. This happens when the Court declares that there is nothing on which to
give judgment, such as when the object of the claim has disappeared.

CASE

Nuclear Test Cases (New Zealand v. France, Australia v. France, 1974)
France was conducting atmospheric nuclear tests over the South Pacific, prompting complaints from
Australia and New Zealand. The Court ruled that since France, through its President and Minister of
Defense, had made several public statements that the testing would cease, the object of the dispute
ceased to exist. When it is the intention of a state making a declaration that it should be bound according
to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the state being
legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with its declaration.

SOURCES OF LAW DIFFERENTIATED

1. International Conventions refer to law-making treaties and other similar sources.
Treaties create legal obligations, the non-observance of which by individual states will not dissolve the
obligations.

Note! (Exception)
Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on Treaties
Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens)
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general
international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole
as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm
of general international law having the same character.

Examples:
The Hague Convention of 1899 and 1907 on the Law of War and Neutrality
The Geneva Protocol of 1925 of Prohibited Weapons

2. International Custom (or Customary Law) States create law by what they do in practice or by their
conduct, believing that their practice or conduct is obligatory. In order for customary law to form, States
must act with the belief that the practice is required by law, and not because of courtesy or political
expediency. (Magallona)

Elements of Customary Law
a. Uniformity, consistency, and generality of practice complete uniformity, consistency, and
generality is not required. Rather, it must be established by a party relying on this custom that this
custom has been established and is binding on the other party. (See Asylum Case and Colombia v.
Peru in case list below) Evidence of uniform, consistent, and general state practice may be
established in numerous ways, e.g. the presentation of bilateral treaties, conclusions of
international conferences, and resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.
181

b. Opinio juris et necessitatis the belief on the part of States that a particular custom or conduct is
obligatory
* On duration of practice Duration is not necessarily an element for the establishment of customary law.
(See North Sea Case below) However, it may be used as evidence of uniform, consistent, and general
practice by States.

Note! (Exception)
While a custom is coming to be established, the emerging custom will not be binding upon a state that is a
persistent objector. Evidence of the states objection to the practice must be clear and consistent. (See
North Sea Case below)

CASES

Kuroda v. Jalandoni (1949, Philippine case)
Kuroda was charged with war crimes following the Japanese Occupation. Kuroda argued that since the
Philippines was not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land
Warfare, the crimes he was charged with were not based on law. The Supreme Court ruled that the rules
and regulations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally
accepted principles of international law, hence these rules became part of Philippine law despite the
Philippines status as non-signatory to the relevant Conventions.

Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States, 1986, International Court of Justice)
Nicaragua instituted proceedings against the United States in relation to military and paramilitary
activities in and against Nicaragua. In response to Nicaraguas invocation of the customary prohibition on
the use of force, the United States argued that the customary exception to the prohibition is the right to
individual and collective self-defense. The ICJ first made a clear pronouncement as to the prohibition on
the use of force as a well-established rule in customary IL (since both Nicaragua and the United States
practiced and displayed belief in its status as law) before acknowledging that there was an exception to
this general rule.

North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969)
Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands were in dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf
they shared. Denmark and the Netherlands argued that the use of the equidistance principle in
delimitation was a principle of customary or general IL, binding on Germany. The Court ruled that
Germany was not bound to use the equidistance principle because this principle was not a principle of
customary law. While the Court acknowledged that a customary rule could evolve in a relatively short
period of time, what was material was whether there was extensive and substantially uniform state
practice particularly among states whose interests were specially affected. There was no evidence that
the equidistance principle was consistently used to delineate the continental shelf of states in dispute
over it. On the contrary, Germany had persistently objected to the use of the equidistance principle.

Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru, 1950, International Court of Justice)
Colombia unilaterally granted a Peruvian rebel asylum in the Colombian embassy in Peru. In defense of
its action, Colombia argued that diplomatic asylum (where the refugee is in the territory of the state
where the offense was committed) was a principle of customary law and presented numerous treaties
and conventions on extradition as evidence. While the Court acknowledged the conventions, it ruled that
182

due to the limited number of states which had ratified the conventions, diplomatic asylum was not yet a
principle of customary law.

Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Advisory Opinion of the ICJ,
1996)
The question posed to the Court by the United Nations General Assembly was: Is the threat or use of
nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under IL? The Court ruled that there was no rule in
customary IL which permits or prohibits the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The Court noted that the
members of the international community were divided on the matter of nuclear weapons, making it
difficult to determine uniform practice or even opinio juris. Instead the Court held that the use of nuclear
weapons should be subject to the same rules and restraints as other weapons (e.g. necessity and
proportionality under international humanitarian law), regardless of the unique nature of nuclear
weapons.

The Case of the Paquete Habana (American Case, 1900)
During the Spanish-American War, two Spanish fishing vessels were seized by the American navy while
they were fishing off the coast of Cuba. The fishermen were treated as prisoners of war and their cargo
seized. The Court ruled that while there was no specific law, statute, or treaty exempting fishing boats
from capture during wartime, it was an ancient rule of custom that nations were to leave fishing vessels
alone. By tracing the origins of the custom, the Court found that it was a custom between civilized nations
to leave fishing vessels alone even during wartime, and this custom had ripened into a rule of
international law.

The Case Concerning the Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India, 1960)
Portugal claimed a right of passage between its territory of Damao to its landlocked territories of Dadra
and Nagar-Aveli, both of which were surrounded by Indian territory. The Court held that Portugal could
claim a right of passage based on long-standing local custom between India and Portugal themselves. A
customary rule may develop to bind two states and impose mutual rights and obligations, provided that it
is shown this was a long-held practice between the two states and accepted by them as regulating their
relations.

Salonga v. Executive Secretary (Philippine Case, 2009)
Daniel Smith was moved from the Makati City Jail to a detention cell in the US Embassy. The Court held
that it was a customary rule that foreign armed forces allowed to enter a states territory are immune
from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The VFA, which was the relevant agreement,
provided that while Smith could be in US custody pending trial, in the event of a conviction he should be
detained by Philippine authorities.

3. General Principles of Law while general principles of law may include rules of customary law, they
are primarily rules that have become so well-established and accepted that they are no longer directly
associated with state practice.

Examples:
Principle of consent
Principle of reciprocity
Principle of equality of states
Principle of finality of awards and settlements
Principle of the legal validity of agreements
Principle of good faith
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Principle of domestic jurisdiction

CASES

Prosecutor v. Tadic (ICTY, 1995)
Tadic was charged before the ICTY for war crimes he was alleged to have committed in Bosnia. He argued
that the Tribunal was not established according to law and therefore lacked jurisdiction, and that it was a
general principle of law that the charges brought against him should only be determined by a tribunal
established by law. The Court ruled that the tribunal was established by law and reaffirmed the
Tribunals jurisdiction based on the general principle of la competence de la competence (French) or
kompetenz-kompetenz (German). The power of a tribunal to determine its jurisdiction over a dispute is a
major part of the incidental or inherent jurisdiction of any judicial or arbitral tribunal. It is a necessary
component in the exercise of the judicial function and does not need to be expressly provided for in the
constitutive documents of tribunals.

Case Concerning Preah Vihear Temple (Cambodia v. Thailand, ICJ, 1962)
The temple of Preah Vihear sat on the border of Cambodia and Thailand. The demarcation of the
Cambodia-Thailand border was, by agreement, to follow the natural waterline but the maps drawn up
were not in compliance with the agreement and the temple was marked as being on Cambodian soil.
Several decades passed before Thailand questioned the maps, and the Court ruled that based on its
behavior Thailand was deemed to have accepted the maps (in so many words, the principle of estoppel).

Corfu Channel Case (ICJ, 1949)
British warships sailed through Albanian waters in the North Corfu, hitting several mines that had been
laid in the water. The Court ruled that the Albanian authorities had an obligation to notify the British
warships about the existence of minefields in Albanian waters. This obligation was not anchored on the
Hague Convention of 1907, but on general and well-recognized principles of international law:
elementary considerations of humanity (especially in times of peace, not just war), freedom of maritime
communication, and the obligation of every state to ensure that its territory will not be used in a manner
that will violate the rights of other states.

Chorzow Factory Case (Permanent Court of International Justice, 1928)
Germany claimed reparations from Poland for the latters takeover of a nitrate factory in Chorzow. The
Court ruled that it is a general principle of international law (and even a general conception of law) that
any breach of a right or obligation involves an obligation to make reparation. Reparation must wipe out
all the consequences of the illegal act and must restore the victim to the state he would have been if not
for the illegal act. If this is not possible, then the victim must be compensated in an amount
corresponding to the value which restitution would bear.

Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company Case (ICJ, 1970)
The company in this case was a Canadian company in Spain which eventually went bankrupt. Belgium
initiated proceedings before the ICJ on behalf of Belgian shareholders of the company, who were
supposedly prejudiced by the bankruptcy proceedings in Spain. The Court explained that it is to rules
generally accepted by municipal systems, and not to the municipal law of a particular state, that
international law refers. The Court ruled that it was a general principle of international law that if an
illegal act is committed against a company, it is the country of which the company is a national that can
seek protection or redress (in this case, Canada). No rule of international law confers this right to the
country of which a shareholder is a national.

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TEXACO v. Libya (1978)
Libya sought to nationalize all the rights, interests, and properties of TEXACO, arguing that municipal and
not international law should govern the process. Both parties cited UN General Assembly Resolutions as
bases for their arguments. The Court ruled that UN General Assembly Resolutions are not binding
declarations of general principles of international law, and for such resolutions to be binding they must
be accepted by the members of the UN, in particular those member states that are specially affected by
the resolution (e.g. developing countries).

BP Exploration v. Libya (1973)
BP and Libya were in disagreement as to which law should govern their dispute: international law alone,
or Libyan law? Based on the concession agreement entered into by BP and Libya, the Court ruled that
Libyan law would be applied insofar as Libyan law corresponded to principles of international law. Only
when there were no principles of Libyan law common with international law would the general
principles of international law be applied. In other words, when Libyan law is in conflict with
international law, then general principles of law must be applied.

Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (1963)
The parties were in conflict over the terms of two agreements for the export and sale of oil. The Court
ruled in favor of ARAMCOs claim as first concessionaire, declaring that the principle of respect for
acquired rights is one of the fundamental principles both of public international law and of municipal law
of most civilized states.

4. Judicial Decisions and the Teachings of the Most Highly Qualified Publicists it is important to
stress that these are subsidiary sources for the determination of the rules of law. Ultimately, the tribunal
before which these sources are presented must determine the value and persuasiveness of the material
presented.

Judicial Decisions
a. Decisions of international tribunals (e.g. the International Court of Justice, the respective regional
human rights courts such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights)
b. Decisions of ad hoc international tribunals these differ from other international tribunals in that
they are established by a number of states for a special purpose. Due to the special nature of these
tribunals, they are often a source of valuable pronouncements on highly specific issues. An
example of an ad hoc international tribunal would be the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, from which a great number of vital doctrines of international humanitarian
law have emerged.
c. Decisions of national and municipal courts

Writings of the Most Highly Qualified Publicists

Again, the determination of whether a publicist is indeed the most highly qualified is ultimately up to
the discretion of the tribunal before which the publicists work is presented. There are certain materials,
however, that have been considered at least as authoritative as the writings of the most highly qualified
publicists, i.e. the Draft Articles on State Responsibility prepared by the International Law Commission
and the reports and resolutions of the Institute of International Law and other expert bodies.
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CASE

Medellin v. Texas (American Case, 2008)
Medellin and his gang-mates were sentenced to death for the rape/slay of two little girls. He argued that
he had a right under the Vienna Convention and customary law to a review and reconsideration of his
sentence, among his evidence a declaration of President Bush that the US would comply with its
obligations under the ICJ decision in Avena. The Court ruled that the Avena decision was not enforceable
as domestic law. As provided in Article 94 of the UN Charter, decisions of the ICJ only explicitly binds
states which are a party to the case. Even an undertaking to comply with the decision is not an
acknowledgment that an ICJ decision will have immediate legal effect in the courts of UN members, but a
commitment on the part of UN members to take future actions of compliance through their political
branches.

C. Important Concepts

Other than the basic outline of international law and its sources provided above, there are a few
fundamental concepts that must be highlighted in order to solidify ones understanding of international
law.

1. Obligations erga omnes
CASES

Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company Case (supra)
An obligation erga omnes is an obligation of every state towards the international community as a whole.
It is an obligation which is the concern of all states. In view of the importance of the rights involved in this
kind of obligation, all states can be held to have a legal interest in their protection.

The Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia, ICJ Case, 1995)
Portugal instituted proceedings against Australia over the latters continuing negotiations with Indonesia
in relation to the delimitation of the continental shelf between Australia and East Timor. Portugal alleged
that Australia had violated the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination, as well as
Portugals right as the administering power. While the Court refused to rule on the case because
Indonesia was not a party, it agreed that the right of peoples to self-determination has an erga omnes
character. However, simply because a right invoked is of an erga omnes character does not mean that the
Court can acquire jurisdiction over a state which has not consented to the Courts jurisdiction in a case.
Regardless of the character of the right invoked, the Court cannot evaluate the lawfulness of the conduct
of a state which is not a party to the case.

2. Jus cogens
Jus cogens, as discussed in Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (see above), is
an absolute rule of international law. It is a general principle of law that has become so firmly established
and recognized by the international community of states as a whole that derogation is simply not
permitted. It can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character. There is no consensus as to the criteria which would enable one to identify which general
principles of law have become peremptory norms. For instance, some important provisions of human
186

rights treaties (e.g. due process) have not been clearly established to be jus cogens. (Aust, Handbook of
International Law, 2010)

Examples of accepted jus cogens norms:
Prohibition on genocide
Prohibition on slavery
Prohibition on racial discrimination
Prohibition on torture and crimes against humanity
Prohibition on the use of force

CASE

Ex Parte Pinochet (ICJ Case, 1999)
Pinochet was the former head of state of Chile accused with, among others, the crime of torture. Spain
sought his extradition while he was in London for medical treatment. In denying his immunity for the
crime of torture, the Court explained that the rule of international law prohibiting torture has the
character of jus cogens or a peremptory norm. The violation of a jus cogens norm cannot be subject to any
kind of immunity; the universal jurisdiction granted over those who violate the rule against torture is
justified by its jus cogens nature.

3. Ex aequo et bono
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)

1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are
submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the
rules of law.

2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if
the parties agree thereto.

Ex aequo et bono is a Latin phrase that roughly translates to what is fair and just and is very similar to
the concept of equity. As provided in Article 38(2) of the ICJ Statute, if the parties agree to it, then the
Court may decide a case without adhering to the existing rules of international law and resolve the
dispute according to what is fair and just under the circumstances.








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D. Subjects of International Law

Table 2. Enumeration of Subjects in International Law
Established Legal Persons
1. States
2. Political entities legally proximate to
states (e.g. the former Free City of
Danzig)
3. Condominium the joint exercise of
state power within a particular
territory by means of an autonomous
local administration acting as an
agent of the states
4. Internationalized territories a
special status created by multilateral
treaties and protected by an
international organization
5. UN administration of territories
immediately prior to independence
(e.g. UN Transitional Administration
of East Timor)
6. International organizations
7. Agencies of states entities acting as
agents of states with delegated
powers (e.g. an arbitral tribunal)
Special Types of Personalities
1. Non-self-governing peoples
2. National liberation movements
3. States in statu nascendi the
continuity of the political entity of
the state, in certain cases, in order to
give effect to acts done before
independence
4. Legal constructions the opposite of
#3 above, when called for a states
legal entity may be projected in
certain cases even though the state
has politically ceased to exist
5. Belligerent/insurgent communities
para-statal entities recognized as
possessing a definite if limited form
of international personality
6. Entities sui generis e.g. the Holy See
and the Vatican
7. Individuals

CASES

Barcelona Traction Case (supra)
Even in municipal law, there is a clear distinction between the rights of a company and those of a
shareholder. Only the company, which has a distinct and separate legal personality from its shareholders,
may make a claim for compensation. A wrong done to the company does in fact prejudice its
shareholders, but this does not mean that both the company and shareholders are entitled to make
claims for compensation.

Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the UN (ICJ Advisory Opinion, 1949)
The UN General Assembly asked the ICJ several questions relating to whether the UN could bring claims
for reparations for itself and in behalf of its agents. The Court ruled that the UN was an international
person subject of international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties, as well as
the corresponding capacity to protect its rights by bringing international claims. The competence to bring
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an international claim is the capacity to resort to the customary methods recognized by international law
for the establishment, presentation, and settlement of claims.

Mavrommatis Case (Permanent Court of International Justice, 1924)
Mavrommatis was a Greek national embroiled in disputes with Great Britain over concessions awarded
to him in British-controlled Palestine. When Greece brought Britain before the Court, the Court took
cognizance of the case, finding that there was in fact a dispute between two states: Britain and Greece.
The latter was claiming indemnity because Britain had acted in breach of its obligations to one of Greeces
subjects. A state is entitled to protect its subjects when they are injured by acts of another state which are
contrary to international law.

1. STATES

Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States
The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications:
1. A permanent population;
2. A defined territory;
3. Government; and
4. Capacity to enter into relations with other states.

NOTES ON QUALIFICATIONS FOR STATEHOOD

1. Territory arguably the most important qualification. There must be a reasonably stable basis for a
political community in control of a specific area. While clearly demarcated borders are not necessary,
there must be an area clearly marked as a place where a political community is established.

TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY

Sovereignty in the relation between states signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of
the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the functions of a state. It is
the principle of exclusive competence of the state with regard to its own territory. (Island of Palmas Case)

Summary of Modes of Acquiring Territorial Sovereignty (Brownlie)
1. Discovery and effective occupation after discovering territory, there must be effective
occupation, i.e. an intention to act as a sovereign over that territory (animus occupandi) as well as
the continuous display of such authority
2. Cession the transfer of territory from one state to another by agreement, usually treaty. The
validity of the cession depends on the validity of the title of the ceding state
3. Prescription occupation which must be
a. Under the title of sovereignty;
b. Peaceful and uninterrupted;
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c. Public; and
d. Endure for a length of time
4. Accession or accretion the natural process of land transfer resulting in an increase of territory

Cases

Island of Palmas Case (PCIJ, 1932)
The Dutch and the Americans were in dispute over the island: the Dutch claimed that the Dutch East
Indies Company possessed and exercised rights of sovereignty through agreements made with the
natives; the Americans claimed that they had acquired their rights through the Spanish, who supposedly
discovered the island around the same time that they found the rest of the Philippines. The Court favored
the Dutch based on the evidence presented, emphasizing that it was not only discovery of the island that
established sovereignty, but effective occupation through the display of state authority.

Eastern Greenland Case (PCIJ, 1933)
Norway and Denmark were in dispute over the territory of Eastern Greenland. Both sides had equal
amounts of evidence with varying substance to prove their claim, but tipping it in Denmarks favor was
public acquiescence by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs as to Denmarks sovereignty over the
territory. While acquiescence is not a means of gaining title, it strengthened Denmarks claim.
Additionally, while Norway was in constant occupation of the area in dispute, there was no exercise of
state authority. What was material to the Court was not just physical possession, but the intent to
exercise state authority over an area.

Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (United Kingdom v. France, ICJ, 1951)
The UK and France were in dispute over two groups of rocky islands, both citing ancient title, treaties,
and supposedly sovereign acts. The Court ruled in favor of the UK because it proved the exercise of
jurisdiction, local administration, and legislation over the islands. The exercise of ordinary local
administration (licensing, customs, ordinary court functions, the registry of deeds, etc.) was better proof
of sovereignty than any ancient title or treaty, in the Courts view.

Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v. Malaysia, ICJ,
2002)
Indonesia and Malaysia were in dispute over two islands, both citing treaties, colonial effectivites, and
title by succession. The ICJ ruled in Malaysias favor because of its acts of administration over the
islands (e.g. its regulation on the gathering of turtle eggs and declaration of a bird sanctuary).

Eritrea v. Yemen (ICJ, 1998)
Eritrea and Yemen were in dispute over numerous islands, citing historic title (on the part of Yemen) and
effective occupation for over a hundred years (on the part of Eritrea). The Court did not award all the
islands to one claimant, instead determining the ownership of each island or island group individually. Of
note in this case is the Courts use of the Portico Doctrine: Islands nearest to coastal states (particularly
those within the states territorial sea) belong to such states.




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Libya v. Chad (ICJ, 1994)
Libya and Chad were embroiled in a dispute over boundaries. Chad was citing a treaty entered into
between Libya and France, when France was still Chads colonial ruler. The Court ruled in Chads favor,
propounding the theory of auto-limitation: in order to prevent conflict and instability, a boundary
established by a treaty becomes permanent, though the treaty itself is not necessarily permanent.

Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway, ICJ, 1975)
After drawing its own baselines, Norway issued a decree delineating its exclusive fishery zones,
prompting protest from the UK. The Court laid down the fundamental considerations in the drawing of
baselines and the determination of territorial waters: (1) the baselines must not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast because it is land which confers upon the
coastal state the right to the waters off its coast; (2) the seas lying within the baseline must be closely
linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters; and (3) the economic interest
peculiar to the region, as evidenced by long usage.

Western Sahara Case (ICJ, 1975)
Morocco and Mauritania both made claims to the effect that they had legal ties to the Western Sahara.
Spain argued that the Western Sahara was terra nullius at the time, hence its occupation thereof was not
to the prejudice of any recognized State. The Court ruled that the Western Sahara was not terra nullius
(or a territory belonging to no one) over which sovereignty may be acquired through occupation. State
practice is to the effect that a territory inhabited by tribes with a socio-political organization (e.g. the
Bedouins) is not terra nullius. But neither can there be reversion of title to either Morocco or Mauritania,
since neither were able to prove legal ties that demonstrated either states control over the region.

El Salvador v. Honduras with Nicaragua Intervening (ICJ, 1992)
Following the collapse of Spanish rule over Central America, several states sought to have their
boundaries determined by the Court. The Court did not rely on the rule of effective occupation, since after
all only one colonial power controlled the area and merely established administrative boundaries.
Instead, the Court applied the principle of uti possidetis juris: previous colonial boundaries are continually
adopted, and the succeeding state must respect the boundaries set forth by the outgoing colonial powers.

Clipperton Island Arbitration (France v. Mexico, 1931)
France declared sovereignty over Clipperton Island after Frances navy first landed on the uninhabited
island in 1858. The Court ruled that France had successfully acquired title over what was terra nullius
through occupation. It also elaborated that continued physical occupation of territory is not necessary
where: (1) the territory is terra nullius at the time the occupying state arrives there; and (2) taking of
possession and intent to possess is shown by a public declaration of sovereignty.

2. Population together with territory, population provides the physical evidence for the existence of a
state. As an element of a state, people simply means a community of persons sufficient in number and
capable of maintaining the permanent existence of the community and held together by a common bond
of law. It is of no legal consequence if they possess diverse racial, cultural, or economic interests. Nor is a
minimum population required. (Bernas)

3. Government the existence of an effective government with centralized legislative and administrative
organs is the best evidence of a stable political community. That being said, no specific form of
government has been required in international law. Furthermore, states have been considered to
continue to exist in the absence of an effective governmentsuch as when states are rocked by violent
internal upheavals or during the occupation by a foreign power.
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4. Capacity to enter into relations with other states this qualification is attached to the concept of
independence, as well as an implied requirement: recognition of statehood by other states. After all, if
other states do not recognize one to be a fellow state, relations are not possible. However, it has been
argued that a new state acquires legal personality purely by its own acts in achieving the objective
qualifications of statehood, rather than through recognition by other states. If recognition were made a
requirement of statehood, some states could not be considered such on account of the refusal by some
other states to recognize their independence (e.g. Taiwan and Kosovo).


2. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

An international organization is an organization that is set up by treaty among two or more states. Since
the constitutive document of international organization is a treaty, only states are members of
international organizations. (Bernas)

An important feature of international organizations is they often enjoy immunities and privileges in order
to facilitate the effective exercise of their functions. Their powers and privileges are in turn kept in check
by the treaties that created them.

Examples of International Organizations:
United Nations
International Court of Justice

CASES

Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (supra)
International organizations are subjects of international law which do not, unlike States, possess a
general competence. International organizations are governed by the principle of speciality, i.e. they are
invested by the States which create them with powers, the limits of which are a function of the common
interests whose promotion those States entrust to them. The powers conferred on international
organizations are normally the subject of an express statement in their constituent instruments.
Nevertheless, the necessities of international life may point to the need for organizations to possess
subsidiary (or implied) powers not expressly provided for in their basic instruments.

International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja (Philippine Case, 1990, G.R. No. 85750)
This involved two consolidated cases: ICMC v. Calleja and Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. International
Rice Research Institute (IRRI). In the case of ICMC, the Court affirmed the immunity of ICMC as a
specialized agency under the Charter of the United Nations. With respect to IRRI, the Court noted that
while it was not an international organization because it was the product of a MOA between the
Philippines and two private organizations, the promulgation of a Presidential Decree granted IRRI the
privileges and immunities of an international organization. The Court explained that the objective of
granting immunity to international organizations is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by
the host country in their internal workings.

World Health Organization v. Aquino (Philippine Case, G.R. No. L-35131, 1972)
A judge issued a search warrant for the personal effects of an official of the WHO. In quashing the
warrant, the Court explained that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts
should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government. Where the plea
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of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, the judicial department must
follow the action of the political branch and should not embarrass the latter by assuming antagonistic
jurisdiction.

Department of Foreign Affairs v. National Labor Relations Board (Philippine Case, G.R. No. 113191,
1996)
An illegal dismissal case was filed against the Asian Development Bank. In upholding the ADBs immunity,
the Court cited several provisions of the ADBs Charter granting it immunity from legal process of every
form. It also repeated the doctrine in the earlier case of WHO v. Aquino and pointed out that the Charter
of the ADB was a treaty that the Philippines was a party to. In entering into that treaty, the political
branches of the Philippine government extended immunities to the ADB which could not be ignored by
the judicial department.

Jeffrey Liang (Hue Feng) v. People (Philippine Case, G.R. No. 125865, 2001)
Liang was charged with grave oral defamation. While Liang, an economist, was an agent of an
international organization, the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB was not absolute. The
immunity is limited to acts performed in an official capacity and does not cover the commission of a
crimeslander or oral defamation are not acts that can be considered as ones performed in official
capacity.

3. INDIVIDUALS

In the early days of international law, individuals were objects, or at best beneficiaries of
international law, exclusively under the control of states. (Bernas)
The international legal status of individuals is unique: it is lopsided because as far as their
international obligations are concerned, they are required to respect certain fundamental values
and may be punished as individuals for failure to do so. However, when their individual rights are
violated, they do not always have the right to bring their cases before international bodies and
instead have to rely on their own states to bring the cases on their behalf. The only exception is
when a treaty that their state has entered into or a resolution that an international organization
has adopted envisages the right of the individual to bring a case to an international body on his
own behalf. (Cassese, International Law, 2001; Bernas)

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

International Criminal Law can trace its beginnings to the end of World War II, when the world
was confronted with the reality that during the war millions of crimes had been committed by
individuals. The horror of the Second World War brought about the idea that in certain cases,
some acts are so horrific that compensation from the state will not suffice, and the individual
directly responsible must be punished. The earliest courts for international criminal law were
the Nuremberg Tribunal and Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal.
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1978 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions
were the next step in the development of international criminal law, though the particular
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focus of these conventions and protocols were crimes committed in the context of an armed
conflict.
The Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal (1993) and Rwanda War Crimes Tribunal (1994) were
special tribunals under the United Nations Security Council. Again, the focus of these bodies
was the punishment of crimes committed in the context of an armed conflict. However, these
ad hoc tribunals brought back an idea that the UN had been contemplating since its creation:
the necessity for a permanent court to deal with cases of international criminal law.
The Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court was adopted by the UN in 1998.
The Four Most Serious International Crimes (as provided in the Rome Statute)
1. Genocide
2. Crimes against humanity
3. War crimes
4. The crime of aggression
The principle of complementarity applies with respect to jurisdiction: municipal courts of
states party to the Statute still have the primary duty to prosecute international crimes
committed by their nationals or committed in their territory. The International Criminal Court
(ICC) will only have jurisdiction if the state is unwilling or genuinely unable to prosecute the
international crime.

E. Diplomatic and Consular Law

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) is the codification of rules of international law
particularly applicable to the political relations of states. Diplomatic relations between states are entered
into by mutual consent.

The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1967) is the codification of rules of international law
particularly applicable to consular relations. While consular relations between states are also entered
into by mutual consent, consular relations are more specific than diplomatic relations. Consuls attend to
administrative and economic matters between the sending and receiving states. It is clarified in Article
3(2) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that a diplomatic mission may still perform
consular functions.









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Table 3. Comparison of the two Vienna Conventions
On Diplomatic Relations On Consular Relations
Functions Article 3:
1. Representing the sending
state (SS) in the receiving state
(RS).
2. Protecting the interests of the
SS and its nationals in the RS.
3. Negotiating with the
government of the RS.
4. Ascertaining by all lawful
means the conditions and
developments in the RS and
reporting such to the SS.
5. Promoting friendly relations
between the SS and RS, as well
as developing their economic,
cultural, and scientific relations.
Article 5 (summarized, trimmed
down from full enumeration):
1. Protecting the interests of the
SS and its nationals (both
individual and bodies
corporate).
2. Furthering the development of
commercial, economic, cultural,
and scientific relations, as well
as promoting friendly relations.
3. Ascertaining by all lawful
means the conditions and
developments in the RS
commercial, economic, cultural,
and scientific life, and reporting
to persons interested.
4. Issuing passports and travel
documents to SS nationals;
issuing visas and other
documents to persons wishing to
travel to the SS.
5. Assisting nationals of the SS.
6. Acting as notary, civil
registrar, in similar capacities,
and performing certain functions
of administrative nature not
contrary to RS laws.
7. Following RS procedural laws,
representing or arranging for the
representation of SS nationals
before RS tribunals and
authorities.
8. Transmitting judicial and
extra-judicial documents.
9. Exercising rights of
supervision and inspection in
respect of SS vessels, aircraft,
and crew.
10. Performing other functions
entrusted to a consular post by
the SS, not prohibited by RS laws
or not objected to by the RS.
Heads Article 14: Classes of Heads
1. Ambassadors or nuncios
2. Envoys, ministers, and
internuncios
3. Charges des affaires
Article 9: Classes of Heads
1. Consuls-general
2. Consuls
3. Vice-consuls
4. Consular agents
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Except as concerns precedence
(i.e. seniority) and etiquette,
there shall be no differentiation
between heads of mission by
reason of their class
Persona non grata Article 9:
1. The RS may, at any time and
without having to explain its
decision, notify the SS that the
head of the mission, any member
of the diplomatic staff, or
member of the mission is
persona non grata or not
acceptable. The SS shall either
recall or terminate the persons
functions with the mission. The
declaration of a person to be
persona non grata or not
acceptable may come before his
arrival in the RS territory.
2. If the SS refuses or fails within
a reasonable period to carry out
its obligation to recall or
terminate the persons functions,
the RS may refuse to recognize
the person as a member of the
mission.
Article 23:
1. The RS may, at any time and
without explanation, notify the
SS that a consular officer or any
member of the consular staff is
persona non grata or not
acceptable. The SS shall either
recall the person or terminate
his functions with the consular
post.
2. If the SS refuses or fails within
a reasonable time to carry out its
obligation to recall/terminate
functions, the RS may either
withdraw the exequatur (the
declaration made by the RS
recognizing the consul of the SS
and authorizing him to perform
his function in the RS. There is
no prescribed form for an
exequatur.
3. A person appointed as a
member of the consular post
may be declared unacceptable,
without explanation, before
arriving in the territory of the RS
or before beginning his duties.
The SS shall withdraw his
appointment.
End of Function Article 43:
1. Upon notification by the SS to
the RS that the functions of the
diplomatic agent have come to
an end.
2. Upon notification by the RS to
the SS that it refuses to
recognize the diplomatic agent
as a member of the mission.
Article 25:
1. Upon notification by the SS to
the RS that the functions of a
member of the consular post
have come to an end.
2. Upon withdrawal of the
exequatur.
3. Notification by the RS to the SS
that the RS has ceased to
consider the member of the
consular staff as a member of the
consular staff.
Inviolability of
Agent/Officer
Article 29: The person of a
diplomatic agent shall be
inviolable. He shall not be liable
Article 40: The RS shall treat
consular officers with due
respect and shall take all
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to any form of arrest or
detention. The RS shall treat him
with due respect and shall take
all appropriate steps to prevent
any attack on his person,
freedom, or dignity.
appropriate steps to prevent any
attack on their person, freedom,
or dignity.

Article 41:
1. Consular officers shall not be
liable to arrest or detention
pending trial except in the case of
a grave crime and pursuant to a
decision by the competent
judicial authority.
2. Consular officers shall not be
committed to prison or liable to
any other form of restriction on
their personal freedom save in
execution of a judicial decision of
final effect (same exception as
#1 above).
3. If criminal proceedings are
instituted against a consular
officer, he must appear before
the competent authorities. The
proceedings shall be conducted
with the respect due him by
reason of his official position and
(except in cases of grave crime)
in a manner which will hamper
the exercise of official functions
as little as possible. In cases of
grave crime, when it becomes
necessary to detain a consular
officer, the proceedings against
him shall be instituted with
minimum delay.
Inviolability of
Premises
Article 22:
1. The premises of the mission
shall be inviolable. The agents of
the RS may not enter without the
consent of the head of the
mission.
2. The RS is under a special duty
to take all appropriate steps to
protect the premises of the
mission against any intrusion or
damage, and to prevent any
disturbance of the mission or
impairment of its dignity.
3. Premises of the mission,
furnishings, and other property
Article 31:
1. Consular premises shall be
inviolable to the extent provided
in this article.
2. The RS authorities shall not
enter that part of the consular
premises which is used
exclusively for the purpose of the
work of the consular post except
with the consent of the head of
the consular post or of his
designee, or of the head of the
diplomatic mission. Such consent
may be assumed in cases of fire
or other disaster requiring
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thereon, including the means of
transport of the mission, shall be
immune from search,
requisition, attachment, or
execution.

Article 30:
1. The private residence of a
diplomatic agent shall enjoy the
same inviolability and protection
as the premises of the mission.
2. His papers, correspondence,
and (except as provided in
Article 31 below) property shall
also be inviolable.
prompt protective action.
3. The RS is under a special duty
to take all appropriate steps to
protect the consular premises
against any intrusion or damage
and to prevent any disturbance
of the peace of the consular post
or impairment of its dignity.
4. Consular premises,
furnishings, property of the
consular post, and its means of
transport shall be immune from
any form of requisition for
purposes of national defense or
public utility. If expropriation is
necessary for such purposes, all
possible steps shall be taken to
avoid impeding performance of
consular functions and prompt,
adequate, and effective
compensation shall be paid to
the SS.
Immunity from
Jurisdiction
Article 31:
1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy
immunity from the criminal
jurisdiction of the RS. He shall
also enjoy immunity from its
civil and administrative
jurisdiction.
2. A diplomatic agent is not
obliged to give evidence as a
witness.
3. No measures of execution may
be taken in respect of a
diplomatic agent.
Article 43:
1. Consular officers and consular
employees shall not be amenable
to the jurisdiction of the judicial
or administrative authorities of
the RS in respect of acts
performed in the exercise of
consular functions.
Exceptions to
Immunity from
Jurisdiction
Article 31: A diplomatic agent is
not immune from civil and
administrative jurisdiction in
cases of
1. A real action relating to
private immovable property
situated in RS territory, unless
(exception to the exception) he
holds it on behalf of the SS for
purposes of the mission.
2. An action relating to
succession in which the
diplomatic agent is involved as
executor, administrator, heir, or
Article 43:
The immunity provided shall not
apply in respect of a civil action
either
1. Arising out of a contract
concluded by a consular officer
or a consular employee in which
he did not contract expressly or
impliedly as an agent of the SS;
or
2. By a third party for damage
arising from an accident in the
RS caused by a vehicle, vessel, or
aircraft.
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legatee as a private person and
not on behalf of the SS.
3. An action relating to any
professional or commercial
activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the RS
outside his official functions
*Measures of execution may be
taken in respect of a diplomatic
agent in the three cases listed
above, provided that such
measures can be taken without
infringing upon the inviolability
of his person or residence.

Waiver of
Immunity
Article 32:
1. The immunity from
jurisdiction of diplomatic agents
may be waived by the SS.
2. Waiver must always be
express.
3. Initiation of proceedings by a
diplomatic agent shall preclude
him from invoking immunity
from jurisdiction in respect of
any counter-claim directly
connected with the principal
claim.
4. Waiver of immunity from
jurisdiction in respect of civil or
administrative proceedings shall
not be held to imply waiver of
immunity in respect of the
execution of the judgment, for
which a separate waiver shall be
necessary.
Article 45:
1. The SS may waive the
privileges or immunities
provided for a member of the
consular post.
2. The waiver shall in all cases be
express, except as provided
under this Article, and shall be
communicated to the RS in
writing.
3. The initiation of proceedings
by a consular officer or a
consular employee in a matter
where he might enjoy immunity
shall preclude him from invoking
immunity from jurisdiction in
respect of any counter-claim
directly connected with the
principal claim.
4. The waiver of immunity from
jurisdiction for the purpose of
civil or administrative
proceedings shall not be deemed
to imply the waiver of immunity
from the measures of execution
resulting from the judicial
decision (in which case a
separate waiver shall be
necessary).
Special Obligations
of Agents/Officers
Article 41:
1. Without prejudice to their
privileges and immunities, it is
the duty of all persons enjoying
such privileges and immunities
to respect the RS laws and not
Article 55:
1. Without prejudice to their
privileges and immunities, it is
the duty of all persons enjoying
such privileges and immunities
to respect the RS laws and not to
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to interfere in the internal affairs
of that state.
2. All official business with the
RS entrusted to the mission by
the SS shall be conducted with or
through the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the RS or such other
ministry as may be agreed.
3. Premises of the mission must
not be used in any manner
incompatible with the functions
of the mission under this
Convention, rules of general IL,
or special agreements between
the RS and SS.
interfere in the internal affairs of
that state.
The consular premises shall not
be used in any manner
incompatible with the exercise of
consular functions. This
provision shall not exclude the
possibility of offices of other
institutions or agencies being
installed in part of the building
in which the consular premises
are situated, provided that the
premises assigned to them are
separate from those used by the
consular post. Said offices are
not considered to form part of
the consular premises.
Beginning and End
of Immunities and
Privileges
Article 39:
1. Immunities and privileges are
enjoyed from the moment the
agent enters the RS territory on
proceeding to take up his post.
2. If he is already in the RS
territory, immunities and
privileges are enjoyed when his
appointment is notified to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3. When the agents functions
have come to an end, the
immunities and privileges he
enjoys shall normally cease the
moment he leaves the country or
on expiry of a reasonable period
to do so (in the meantime, they
subsist, even during an armed
conflict).
4. With respect to acts
performed by an agent in the
exercise of his functions as a
member of the mission,
immunity shall subsist.
Article 53:
1. Immunities and privileges are
enjoyed from the moment the
member of the consular post
enters the RS territory on
proceeding to take up his post.
2. If he is already in the country,
immunities and privileges are
enjoyed when he enters on his
duties with the consular post.
3. When the functions of the
member of the consular post
have come to an end, immunities
and privileges shall cease the
moment he leaves the RS or on
the expiry of a reasonable period
to do so, whichever is sooner
(but shall subsist until that time,
even during an armed conflict).
4. With respect to acts
performed by a consular officer
or a consular employee in the
exercise of his functions,
immunity shall continue to
subsist without limitation of
time.



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F. Treaties

The law on treaties is found in the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (1969)

Article 2, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
A treaty is an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and
whatever its particular designation.



Summary of Essential Principles in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

Consent to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange of instruments
constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession, or by any other means if
so agreed (Article 11)
Summary of steps to make a treaty binding upon a state (as provided in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties):
1. Negotiation
2. Giving of consent to be bound:
a. Signing of treaty
b. Exchange of instruments with the express provision that in doing so the exchanging parties
become bound
c. Ratification/acceptance/approval process of ratification varies with each State. At all times
the instrument which is proof of the ratification must be deposited with the body specified as
depositary or, if not specified, the UN Secretary General. The effect of non-deposit is that the
treaty cannot be enforced against the state by any UN agency
*Ratification in the Philippines: Section 21 of Article VII of the Constitution provides that no treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate

Every state which has signed or otherwise expressed its consent to be bound by a treaty has
the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force
(Article 18)
Pacta sunt servanda is the principle that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith (Article 26)
States may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving, or acceding to a treaty, formulate a
reservation unless
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(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
(b) the treaty provides only specified reservations; or
(c) the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty (Article 19)
Treaties enter into force in a manner and date agreed upon by the parties. If there is no provision
as to how/when, the treaty enters into force as soon as consent to be bound has been given.
(Article 24) Most multilateral treaties contain provisions saying how many states must sign/ratify
the treaty before it enters into force. For example, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
was first signed in 1969 but only entered into force in 1980 because that was only when the
required number of states for it to enter into force was reached.
Treaties may be invalidated on the following grounds:
1. Error (Article 48)
2. Fraud (Article 49)
3. Corruption of a representative of a state (Article 50)
4. Coercion of a representative of a state (Article 51)
5. Coercion of a state by use of force (Article 52)
6. Violation of jus cogens (Article 53)
7. Violations of the restrictions imposed on the authority of representatives of a State (Article 47)
Treaties may be terminated or suspended outrightly on the following grounds:
1. Material breach (Article 60)
2. Supervening impossibility of performance (Article 61)
3. Rebus sic stantibus, or the fundamental change of circumstances (Article 62)

Cases

Lim v. Executive Secretary (Philippine Case, 2002)
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement and the Mutual Defense Treaty entered into between the
Philippines and the United States, US military personnel took part in Balikatan exercises. The Court saw
the word activities in the VFA as an intentionally broad phraseology that verbalized the parties
intentions. In so ruling, the Court applied Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which provide the standard rules for interpretation, e.g. (1) plain meaning; (2) good faith; and
(3) examination of preparatory work for the agreement.



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Pimentel v. Executive Secretary (Philippine Case, 2005)
The petitioners wanted to compel the DFA to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate
for ratification. The Court explained that the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the
concurrence of the Senate. The Court laid down its own enumeration of the treaty-making process:
(1) Negotiation by the head of state or his authorized representatives;
(2) Signing as a means of authenticating the instrument and symbolizing the good faith of the parties;
(3) Ratification as the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty
concluded by its representatives; and
(4) Exchange of the instruments of ratification.
Bayan Muna v. Executive Secretary (Philippine Case, 2011)
The Philippines signed the Rome Statute but did not ratify it. After signing, the Philippines entered into a
Bilateral Agreement with the United States where it agreed that it would not surrender any US national to
an international tribunal without the consent of the US. The petitioners claimed that this agreement was
in violation of specific provisions of the Rome Statute. The Court distinguished between a signatory state
and a state-party: the former is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of the treaty since it has yet to ratify; the latter, having ratified, is legally obliged to follow all the
provisions of the treaty in good faith.

Bayan v. Zamora (2000) and Nicolas v. Romulo, Salonga et al. v. Executive Secretary (2009)
Philippine Cases with the same issue
In both these cases, the petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the VFA and assailed its status as a
treaty binding the Philippines, since the US Senate did not ratify it. In both cases, the Court held that the
VFA was constitutional. In the 2000 case, it held that executive agreements were binding as treaties,
regardless of concurrence by Congress. In the 2009 case, the Court ruled that the VFA was the
implementing agreement to the main RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty and there was no need to submit it to
the US Senate for consent.

Medellin v. Texas (American Case, 2008)
Medellin invoked his right under international law to the review and reconsideration of his death
sentence. The Court explained that while treaties may comprise international commitments, they are not
domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an
intention that it be self-executing and is ratified on these terms.
G. Nationality and Statelessness
Nationality is the legal bond between a person and a state. It is a relationship that gives rise to
material rights and obligations on the part of the individual and the state concerned. It is a mutual
relationship between state and individual. (Weis, Nationality and Statelessness)

Article 1 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons

A stateless person is a person who is not considered a national by any state under the operation of its
law.

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CASES:

Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala, ICJ Case, 1955)
Nottebohm was extradited to the United States with the help of the Guatemalan government, who
considered him to be a German who had never acquired citizenship from Liechtenstein. The Court agreed
with Guatemala and explained that nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of
attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests, and sentiments, together with reciprocal rights
and duties. It is the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred is more
closely connected with the population of the state conferring nationality than with that of any other state.

Kookooritchkin v. Solicitor General (Philippine Case, 1948)
At war with Russias communist government, Kookooritchkin fled to the Philippines and filed a petition
for naturalization after 25 years of living in the country. The Solicitor General opposed on the ground that
he had failed to show that he had lost his Russian citizenship under Russian laws. The Court ruled in
favor of Kookooritchkin, finding that he was a stateless refugee who had lost all bonds of attachment to
his former fatherland, with which he had been at war prior to his arrival in the country.
H. State Responsibility

The doctrine of state responsibility is simply that if a state violates a customary rule of international law
or a treaty obligation, it commits an internationally wrongful act for which the State must be held
responsible.

The International Law Commissions Draft Articles on State Responsibility is instructive as to when
there is state responsibility.

Article 1 of the ILC Draft Articles. Responsibility of a State for its internationally wrongful acts
Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State.

Article 2 of the ILC Draft Articles. Elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission:
(a) Is attributable to the State under international law; and
(b) Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.

Article 3. Characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful
The characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful is governed by international law.
Such characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by internal law.

In general, there must be (1) an act or omission attributable to the state; and (2) a breach of an
international obligation (from any source of international law).

The ILC Draft Articles also provide for the standard of strict liability, i.e. intent, fault, or negligence is not
required for a State to be held responsible as long as breach of international law is shown. Intent, fault, or
negligence are only material in determining the amount of reparations to be made.






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Finally, the ILC Draft Articles provides for the consequences of state responsibility:

Article 30 of the ILC Draft Articles. Cessation and non-repetition
The State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to:
(a) Cease that act, if it is continuing; and
(b) Offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require.

CASE:

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (ICJ Advisory
Opinion)
The ICJ opined that the construction of a wall by Israel, the occupying power in the Palestinian Territory,
resulted in de facto annexation which is contrary to international law, in particular the UN Charter on the
Use of Force and international humanitarian law. The Court then enumerated the legal consequences of
an internationally wrongful act: (1) full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful
act (injury may consist of material or moral damage); (2) the responsible state is under duty to perform
the obligation breached; and (3) cessation of the wrongful act if it is still continuing, as well as the
offering of assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require.

Acts of State Organs

The acts of organs or officials of a state are attributed to that state as its own acts in determining its
responsibility for internationally wrongful conduct.

Article 4 of the ILC Draft Articles. Conduct of organs of a State
1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law,
whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial, or any other functions, whatever position it
holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government
or of a territorial unit of the State.
2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the
State.

Article 7 of the ILC Draft Articles. Excess of authority or contravention of instructions
The conduct of an organ of a State or of a person or entity empowered to exercise elements of the
governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law if the organ,
person, or entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions.

CASES:

Union Bridge Company Claim (US v. Great Britain, 1924)
Harrison, the storekeeper of the Cape Government Railways at Port Elizabeth and agent of the British
government, moved Union Bridge material from Port Elizabeth to the Imperial Military Railways on
instructions he received. The Court ruled that the consignment of the material was a wrongful
interference with property, and since Harrison committed the act under instructions, such instructions
fixed liability on the British government. This liability was not affected by the fact that the act was done
under a mistake and without intention to appropriate the material.


205

Youmans Claim (US v. Mexico, 1926)
A mob killed three American nationals and the Mexican polices attempt to quell the mob under the local
mayors instructions led to the opening of fire and more killings. The Court held Mexico liable for the acts
of its police, ruling that a wrongful act of an official acting in the discharge of his duties can be
attributable to the government and the state can be held liable. The Court refused to consider the polices
acts as being done in the polices private capacity, since at the time of commission of such acts they were
on duty and under the immediate supervision and in the presence of a commanding officer.

Acts of Private Individuals

1. Instructions/Control
Article 8 of the ILC Draft Articles. Conduct directed or controlled by a State
The conduct of a person or a group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international
law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the control of that
State in carrying out the conduct.

CASES:

Nicaragua v. United States (supra)
The Court held the conduct of the rebels (the contras) to be attributable to the United States and ruled
that the latter were responsible for the breaches of international humanitarian law committed by the
contras. In particular, the Court noted that the US exercised effective control over the rebels, since it
provided planning, direction, and support to the contras.

Zafiro Claim (Great Britain v. United States, 1925)
The Zafiro was a private ship commissioned by the US military and crewed by Chinese soldiers who
proceeded to loot houses in Cavite during the Spanish-American War while they were on shore leave. The
Court held the US liable for the whole damage caused, as the Chinese Crew was shown to have
participated to a substantial extent and the part chargeable to unknown wrongdoers could not be
identified. The Court disallowed the claim for legal interest, however, since the US did not exercise
effective control over the Chinese crew at the time when the real damage took place.

2. Ratification

Article 11 of the ILC Draft Articles. Conduct acknowledged and adopted by a State as its own
Conduct which is not attributable to a State under the preceding articles shall nevertheless be considered
an act of that State under international law if and to the extent that the State acknowledges and adopts
the conduct in question as its own.

CASES:

United States v. Iran (ICJ Case, 1983)
(As portrayed in the film Argo) The United States Embassy and its staff in Iran were seized by protesters
without any intervention from Iranian authorities. Later on, the Ayatollah made statements supporting
the actions of the protesters. The Court explained that the initial takeover of the embassy was not
attributable to the state. Attribution would be present only when it is established that the acts were
carried out in response to specific instructions from a component organ of the State. However, the
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statements of support and encouragement of the continuing detention of hostages made the militants
acts the acts of the Iranian State.

Rainbow Warrior Arbitration (1980)
French agents destroyed the Rainbow Warrior, a Greenpeace International Vessel, while it was in harbor
in New Zealand, prompting NZ to prosecute two captured French agents under the Directorate General of
External Security. A communique from the Prime Minister of France confirmed that the agents were
acting under the French governments instructions. The Court went on to determine the extent of
compensation that France would pay on account of its international responsibility.

3. Conduct of insurrectional movement

Article 10 of the ILC Draft Articles. Conduct of an insurrectional or other movement
1. The conduct of an insurrectional movement which becomes the new Government of the
State shall be considered an act of that State under international law.
2. The conduct of a movement, insurrectional or other, which succeeds in establishing a new
State in part of the territory of a pre-existing State or in a territory under its
administration, shall be considered an act of the new State under international law.
3. This article is without prejudice to the attribution to a State of any other conduct, however
related to that of the movement concerned, which is to be considered an act of that State by
virtue of Articles 4 to 9.

CASE:

Bolivar Railway Company Claim (Great Britain v. Venezuela, 1903)
After the revolution in Venezuela that brought Castro into power, Bolivar filed claims against Venezuela
and Castro in respect of obligations incurred by both the old and new governments. The Court allowed
the claims, explaining that responsibility was allowed in this case because what is involved is the same
nation. Nations do not die when there is a change of government; these changes are but expressions of a
change of national will. The nation is responsible for the debts contracted by its titular government until
the obligation is discharged. The nation is responsible for the obligations of a successful revolution from
its beginning, since such revolution represents ab initio a changing national will, crystalizing in the finally
successful result.

4. Color of Authority

Article 9 of the ILC Draft Articles. Conduct carried out in the absence of or default of official
authorities
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law
if the person or group of persons is in fact exercising elements of the governmental authority in the
absence or default of the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those
elements of authority.


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5. Empowered by law to exercise authority

Article 5 of the ILC Draft Articles. Conduct of persons or entities exercising elements of governmental
authority
The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under Article 4 but which is
empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be
considered an act of the State under international law, provided the person or entity is acting that
capacity in the particular instance.


I. Jurisdiction of States

1. Territoriality Principle

The fundamental source of jurisdiction is sovereignty over territory. A state has absolute, but not
necessarily exclusive, power to prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce rules for conduct that occurs within its
territory. This is why the determination of territorial boundaries are so important. (Bernas)

CASE:

Trail Smelter Case (Arbitration between US and Canada, 1938 1941)

The US brought Canada to arbitration over fumes discharged from the smelter of the Consolidated Mining
and Smelting Company in Trail, British Columbia. The Court reiterated the effects doctrine, where a
state also has jurisdiction over acts occurring outside its territory when the effects of the acts are felt
within it. This doctrine has two facets: (1) the subjective territorial principle, where there is jurisdiction to
prosecute and punish a crime committed within the state but completed or consummated abroad; and
(2) the objective territorial principle where there is jurisdiction to prosecute and punish a crime
commenced outside the state but consummated within its territory.

2. Nationality Principle and Statelessness

The nationality principle provides that every state has jurisdiction over its nationals even when those
nationals are outside the state. (Bernas)

Stateless persons are those who do not have a nationality. They are either de jure or de facto stateless. De
jure stateless persons are those who have lost their nationality, if they had one, and have not acquired a
new one. De facto stateless persons are those who have a nationality but to whom protection is denied by
their state when out of the state. This is the situation of many refugees. (Bernas)

CASE:

Blackmer v. United States (American Case, 1932)
Blackmer was an American living in France who was adjudged guilty of contempt for failure to respond to
subpoenas served upon him in France. The Court ruled that while he may have removed his residence to
France, it was undisputed that he continued to be a citizen of the United States. As such, he owed
allegiance to the US and the US retained authority over him, hence he was bound by its laws even though
he was a resident abroad.
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3. Protective Principle

A state may exercise jurisdiction over conduct outside its territory that threatens its security as long as
that conduct is generally recognized as criminal by states in the international community. (Restatement
402[3])

CASES:

Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions (House of Lords, 1946)
Lord Haw Haw was an American citizen who held a British passport until 1940. During World War II, he
broadcast messages from Germany trying to convince the Allies to surrender. He was convicted of
treason in the UK because no principle of comity demands that a state should ignore the crime of treason
committed against it outside its territory. A proper regard for the states security requires that all those
who commit treasons, whether commit it within or without the realm, should be amenable to its laws.

United States v. Yunis (American Case, 1988)
Yunis was one of the hijackers aboard a Jordanian plane that had three American nationals. The United
States wanted to prosecute him and invoked the protective principle. The Court explained that the
protective principle has been strictly construed to encompass only those offenses posing a direct, specific
threat to national security. In this case, the hijackers never made any demands on the US government nor
directly threatened its security. In fact, it was almost happenstance that three American nationals were
on board the aircraft.

4. Universality Principle

The universality principle recognizes that certain activities, universally dangerous to states and their
subjects, require authority in all community members to punish such acts wherever they may occur, even
absent a link between the state and the parties or the acts in question. This principle started with piracy
but has now expanded to encompass genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and terrorism.
(Bernas)

CASES:

Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (American Case, 1980)
This was a wrongful death action brought under the American Alien Torts Statute charging Pena-Irala,
then the Inspector-General of the police in Paraguay, of torturing to death a teenage Paraguayan. The
Court held that deliberate torture under the color of official authority violated customary international
law, regardless of the nationality of the parties.

Eichmann v. Attorney-General of Israel (Israeli Case, 1962)
Eichmann was a high-ranking SS officer who played a central part in the implementation of The Final
Solution that saw the persecution of millions of Jews in Europe during World War II. He escaped to
Argentina after the war and was kidnapped by Israeli agents in 1960 so he could face trial in Israel under
the latters domestic law. The Court explained that the crimes created by the Nazi Collaborators Law
always bore the stamps of international crimes, banned by international law and entailing individual
criminal liability. It is the universal character of these crimes that vests in each State the power to try and
punish any who assisted in the commission of such crimes. Jurisdiction was automatically vested in the
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State of Israel upon its establishment in 1948 as a sovereign State. It was immaterial that the crimes in
question were committed when the State of Israel did not exist.

5. Passive Personality Principle
The passive personality principle asserts that a state may apply lawparticularly criminal lawto an act
committed outside its territory by a person not its national where the victim of the act was its national.
The principle has not been ordinarily accepted for ordinary torts or crimes, but it is increasingly accepted
as applied to terrorist and other organized attacks on a states nationals by reason of their nationality, or
to assassination of a states diplomatic representatives or other officials. (Comment on Section 402 of the
Third Restatement)

CASE:

United States v. Yunis (supra)
Citing the Third Restatement, the Court ruled that the passive personality principle (as well as the
universality principle) were sufficient grounds to establish jurisdiction over a hijacker of a plane
containing three American nationals. According to the Court, not only was the US acting on behalf of the
world community to punish the commission of crimes that threaten the very foundations of world order,
but the US has its own interest in protecting its nationals.

6. Conflicts of Jurisdiction

Since there are various accepted principles for assuming jurisdiction, more than one state may have a
valid claim to jurisdiction. American courts have attempted to develop three sophisticated modes of
resolving conflict of jurisdiction (Bernas):

a. Balancing Test when the answer to the three questions below is YES, the court will assume
jurisdiction:
i. Is there an actual or intended effect on the state?
ii. Is the effect sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury to the state?
iii. Are the interest of, and link to, the state sufficiently strong (vis--vis those of other nations)
to justify an assertion of extraordinary authority?
b. International Comity even when a state has basis for exercising jurisdiction, it will refrain from
doing so if its exercise will be unreasonable. Unreasonableness is determined by evaluating
various factors, such as
i. The link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state;
ii. The connection (e.g. nationality, residence, or economic activity) between the regulating
state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated;
iii. The character of the activity to be regulated;
iv. The existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation; or
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v. The likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state
c. Forum non conveniens If in the whole circumstances of the case it be discovered that there is a
real unfairness to one of the suitors in permitting the choice of a forum which is not the natural or
proper forum, either on the ground of convenience of trial or the residence or domicile of the
parties or of its being the locus contractus, or locus solutionis, then the doctrine of forum non
conveniens is properly applied. There are public and private interest factors that the court must
consider:
i. Private interest factors: access to sources of proof, availability of compulsory process for
unwilling witnesses, and other personal problems which make trial easy, expeditious, and
inexpensive
ii. Public interest factors: congestion, desire to settle local controversies at home, and having
the case tried in a forum at home with the applicable law

J. Treatment of Aliens

Extradition

Extradition is the surrender of an individual by the state within whose territory he is found to the state
under whose laws he is alleged to have committed a crime or to have been convicted of a crime. It is a
process that is governed by treaty. The legal right to demand extradition and the correlative duty to
surrender a fugitive exist only when created by treaty. (Bernas)

Extradition is the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the
disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or
criminal law of the requesting state or government. (U.S. v. Purganan, below)


Fundamental Principles (from Bernas)

1. No state is obliged to extradite unless there is a treaty;
2. Differences in legal system can be an obstacle to interpretation of what the crime is; and
3. Religious and political offenses are not extraditable

CASES:

Ker v. Illinois (American Case, 1986)
Ker was kidnapped from Peru and brought to Cook County to face larceny and embezzlement charges.
Ker claimed that the extradition treaty between Illinois and Peru was violated. The Court ruled that there
was no prohibition on abduction in the treaty. Furthermore, any irregularity in the manner of obtaining
custody does not affect jurisdiction. Forcible abduction is no sufficient reason why a party should not
answer when brought within the jurisdiction of the court which has a right to try him.
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United States v. Alvarez-Machain (American Case, 1992)
Machain was abducted from Mexico and brought to Texas, where he was charged with the killing of a US
Drug Enforcement Agency agent. He argued that the abduction was in violation of the US-Mexican
Extradition Treaty. The Court ruled that the terms of the treaty did not contain any prohibition against
abduction, in essence reiterating the ruling in Ker v. Illinois.

United States v. Judge Purganan (Mark Jimenez Case, Philippine Case, 2002)
In 1999, the United States sent a note verbale to the Philippine government requesting the extradition of
Mark Jimenez for various crimes (among them tax evasion, conspiracy to defraud the US government, and
illegal election contributions). Ultimately the Court directed the RTC to conduct extradition proceedings
in compliance with the treaty between the US and the Philippines, as well as the Philippine Extradition
Law.

Proceeding for Extradition (based on the Mark Jimenez Cases, the Extradition Treaty, and the Extradition
Law, P.D. 1609)

1. There is an extradition request made by the foreign diplomat of the requesting state addressed
to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs which contains the copy of the criminal charge, recital of the
acts for which extradition is requested, the text of the applicable law, and other supporting
documents. It is the task of the executive to evaluate the sufficiency of the request.
2. Upon finding that the request is sufficient, the DFA shall deliver it to the Secretary of Justice who
shall immediately designate and authorize the lawyer to handle the case. An extradition petition
shall be filed with the appropriate RTC. The judge shall summon the person to be extradited and
may immediately issue a warrant of arrest in order to bring him before the court.
3. The extradition hearing shall not be inconsistent with summary proceedings (since extradition
proceedings are summary in nature). Upon receipt of the petition, the judge shall make a prima
facie finding as to whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance, whether it complies
with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and whether the person sought is extraditable. In the course
of the proceedings, the judge will determine whether the person is extraditable and if the offense
for which extradition is requested is a political one.
4. The RTCs decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals within ten days. The CA decision
shall be final and executory.
5. The decision (of the RTC or CA, as the case may be) shall be forwarded to the DFA through the DOJ.
6. The individual to be extradited is placed at the disposal of the authorities of the requesting state,
which shall shoulder the costs and expenses of the proceedings.






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Table 4. Extradition and deportation distinguished
Extradition Deportation
The removal of an accused from the
Philippines with the object of placing him at
the disposal of foreign authorities
Expulsion of an unwanted or undesirable
alien
Only available if there is a treaty between
the state making the request and the state
being requested
A purely unilateral act and exercise of
sovereignty
Done in the interest of the state making the
request
Done in the interest of the country of
residence


K. International Human Rights Law (IHRL)

Human rights are rights held simply by virtue of being a human being. They are part and parcel of the
integrity and dignity of the human being. They cannot be given or withdrawn at will by any domestic
legal system. Although human rights are most effectively implemented by the domestic legal system, that
system is not the source of the rights. Human rights law is different from international human rights law
in general in that obligations are owed directly to individuals and not to the national government of an
individual. It provides for individuals to have access to tribunals and for the effective guarantee of the
obligations owed to them on account of their human rights. (Higgins)

1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The emergence of an international bill of human rights was prompted by the atrocities committed in
World War II that solidified the view that the way nations treat people under their jurisdiction is no
longer just a domestic concern but also one that calls for the attention of the international community.
(Bernas)

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted and proclaimed by the UN General Assembly on
10 December 1948. It is not binding upon states in the sense of a law or treaty, but it provides a common
standard for international human rights.

2. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The ICCPR was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 16 December 1966. It takes the common
standard provided for in the UDHR and makes it binding on all states party to it. The substantive rights in
the ICCPR are provided in Articles 1 and 6 to 27. It is of note that the first substantive right provided for is
self-determination.

Article 1 of the ICCPR
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.
2. All peoples have the right, for their own ends, to freely dispose of their natural wealth and
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic
cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may
a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
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Non-Derogable Rights
Not all rights under the ICCPR are non-derogable. As provided in Article 4 of the ICCPR, in a time of public
emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the
States Parties to the Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the ICCPR to
the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely
on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion, or social origin.

The following rights are non-derogable, meaning even in times of public emergency States Parties are
bound to their obligations under the ICCPR:
1. Right to life (Article 6)
2. Freedom from torture and other inhuman punishment (Article 7)
3. Freedom from enslavement or servitude (Article 8)
4. Protection from imprisonment for inability to fulfill contractual obligations (Article 11)
5. Protection from ex post facto laws (Article 15)
6. Right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law (Article 16)
7. Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (Article 18)
Optional Protocols to the ICCPR
1. The First Optional Protocol is a separate treaty which enables private parties (i.e. individuals)
who are victims of human rights violations to file complaints directly with the Human Rights
Committee created by the Covenant. However, complaints may only be filed against States
Parties to the ICCPR.
2. The Second Optional Protocol was aimed at the abolition of the death penalty.

3. The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
The ICESCR was adopted on the same day as the ICCPR. The need for two separate treaties was both
ideological and practical. Ideologically, the contest was between Western countries on the one hand,
which argued that their governments would have difficulty accepting economic and cultural rights
beyond those provided in their respective Constitutions and domestic laws. On the other hand, socialist
and developing countries argued that the absence of economic, social, and cultural guarantees would
render civil and political rights meaningless. The practical consideration was the notion that civil and
political rights could be implemented immediately, whereas social and cultural rights could only be done
gradually and dependently on development conditions. (Bernas)

The rights specific to the ICESCR are social welfare rights stated in detail (Bernas), notably:

1. Right to work (Article 6)
2. Right to favorable conditions of work (Article 7)
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3. Right to form free trade unions (Article 8)
4. Right to social security and insurance (Article 9)
5. Right to special assistance for families (Article 10)
6. Right to adequate standard of living (Article 11)
7. Right to the highest standard of physical and mental health (Article 12)
8. Right to education including compulsory primary education (Articles 13 and 14)
9. Right to the enjoyment of cultural and scientific benefits and international contacts (Article 15)
Limits on the rights provided in the ICESCR

Article 4 of the ICESCR
The State may subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only insofar as this
may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general
welfare in a democratic society.

L. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Neutrality

International humanitarian law (IHL) is the law of war or the law of armed conflict. It seeks to protect
those most vulnerable in times of armed conflict (e.g. civilians, the wounded and sick, prisoners of war,
women and children) and tries to constrain the conduct of military operations in a humanitarian fashion.
(Shaw, International Law)

While states have always sought to regulate the conduct of warfare, IHL as understood today was the
product of the efforts of Henry Dunant, a Swiss businessman who was horrified by what he witnessed at
the Battle of Solferino. He wrote a book based on his experience (A Memory of Solferino) and inspired the
creation of the International Red Cross in 1863.

Primary sources of IHL

1. The Geneva Conventions of 1949:
Geneva I Wounded and Sick on the Battlefield
Geneva II Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked at Sea
Geneva III Prisoners of War
Geneva IV Civilians
2. Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions:
Protocol I International Armed Conflicts
Protocol II Non-International Armed Conflicts
3. The Hague Conventions on the Means and Methods of Warfare
4. IHRL
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The Philippines in 2009 enacted R.A. 9851, or the Philippine Act on Crimes Against International
Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity. In it, the Philippines adopted
the generally accepted principles of international humanitarian law, including the Hague
Conventions and Geneva Conventions, as part of the law of the land.
Jus in bello cf. Jus ad bellum (Higgins)
IHL is jus in bello, the law of armed conflict. It is operative only under specific circumstances, i.e. the
existence of an international or non-international armed conflict, and can be found in customary and
conventional law (most of which has been embodied in the Hague and Geneva Conventions). It is the set
of laws that come into effect once a war has begun.

Jus ad bellum is the law on the use of armed force and is governed by provisions in the UN Charter. It is
the law that defines the legitimate reasons a state may use force and engage in war and focuses on what
criteria renders a war just. As a general rule, all members of the UN must refrain from the threat or use of
force against any state (as provided in Article 2 of the UN Charter). However, a state may use force when
(a) the Security Council has authorized collective action to maintain or enforce international peace and
security (under Article 51 of the UN Charter); or (b) an armed attack occurs against a state (Article 42 of
the UN Charter).

Table 5. IHRL and IHL distinguished
IHRL IHL
Origin Modern (20
th
Century) Ancient (people have always
sought to govern the conduct of
warfare)
Structure 1. Provides only minimum
standards
2. State sovereignty is
recognized and states are
given leeway in enforcing
human rights
Non-derogable code of conduct
Period Applicable at all times Applicable only in times of
armed conflict
Subjects Primarily concerns states in
their dealings with individuals
Covers the conduct of State and
non-state actors
Enforceable
rights/duties
Political, economic, and
cultural rights
1. Limits the suffering of those
not actively participating in the
armed conflict
2. Limits the means and
methods of warfare









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1. Categories of armed conflicts
a. International armed conflict
Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions
An international armed conflict is one in which at least two States are involved. It includes all cases of
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more states which are
parties to the Conventions, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them, and all cases of
partial or total occupation of the territory of a State Party, even if the said occupation meets with no
armed resistance.

The operative rules covering an international armed conflict are found in the Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol I.

b. Non-International (referred to some as internal) armed conflict
Non-international armed conflicts are those which occur in the territory of a single State between its
organized armed forces and dissidents, or between armed groups against one another.

Non-international armed conflicts are governed by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and by
Additional Protocol II.

c. War of national liberation
This is not a separate category of armed conflict. A war of national liberation is strictly classified as an
international armed conflict and is properly defined in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.

Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
An armed conflict may be of such nature in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and
alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as
enshrined in the UN Charter and the Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning friendly
relations and cooperation among States in accordance with the UN Charter.

CASES:

Prosecutor v. Tadic (Appeals Judgment, 1999, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia)
Tadic was a Bosnian-Serb who was convicted of 9 out of 31 counts of war crimes for his conduct in
several concentration camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In order to convict him with war crime, the Court
had to explain why Tadics conduct was covered by the law of war. An armed conflict exists whenever
there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups, or between such groups within a State. The former refers to an
international armed conflict, the latter to non-international armed conflicts. It is also possible for a non-
international armed conflict to be transformed into an international armed conflict when another state
intervenes in the conflict by sending troops or when some of the participants to an internal armed
conflict act on behalf of another state.



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Prosecutor v. Limaj (Appeals Judgment, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
2005)
Limaj and his co-accused where charged with war crimes for their acts in a prison camp. Following the
guidelines in Tadic, the Court further qualified that the criteria used to determine the existence of a non-
international armed conflict are (1) the intensity of the conflict and (2) the organization of the parties.
These criteria are used to distinguish armed conflict from banditry, unorganized and short-lived
insurrections, or terrorist activities which are not subject to IHL.

2. Core international obligations of states under IHL

Parties to an armed conflict shall respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law
(Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions)


CASE:

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (supra)
In searching for a customary rule specifically proscribing the threat or use of nuclear weapons per se, the
Court established the cardinal principles contained in IHL:
1. States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use
weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets
2. It is prohibited to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants, hence it is also prohibited to
use weapons that would cause them such unnecessary harm or uselessly aggravate their
suffering. States do not have unlimited freedom of choice of means in the weapons they use
3. Principles of IHL
a. The Principle of Distinction
Article 48 of Additional Protocol I
The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants
and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only
against military objectives.

b. The Principle of Necessity
Article 57(3) of Additional Protocol I
When a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage,
the objective to be selected shall be the attack which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian
lives and to civilian objects.






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c. The Principle of Proportionality
Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited.

Article 51(5)(b)
Among others, the following are considered to be indiscriminate attacks:
xxx
(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated.

d. The Principle of Precaution
Article 57(1) of Additional Protocol I
In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population,
civilians, and civilian objects.


CASES:

Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez (Appeals Judgment, ICTY, 2001)
Kordic was convicted for war crimes committed against the Bosnian Muslim population during the
Bosnian-Croat War. In ruling against his defense of military necessity and consequent civilian casualties,
the Court explained that international customary law recognizes that collateral damage is not unlawful
per se, provided that the principles of distinction and proportionality are respected.

Prosecutor v. Galic (Trial Judgment, ICTY, 2003)
Galic was convicted of crimes against humanity for acts during the Siege of Sarajevo in the War in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. His many acts included intentionally launching attacks to spread terror among the
civilian population, which he defended as an act of military necessity. The Court convicted him, explaining
that if excessive casualties are expected to result, the attack should not be pursued. The test for
proportionality is whether a reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the actual
perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to him or her, could have expected
excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack.

Treatment of Civilians

Article 50 of Additional Protocol I
A civilian is any person who does not belong to an armed force and who is not a combatant. In case of
doubt as to whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.

Article 51 of Additional Protocol I
The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against dangers arising
from military operations. To give effect to this protection, the following rules, which are additional to the
other applicable rules of International Law, shall be observed in all circumstances:
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1. The civilian population as well as individual civilians shall not be the object of attack. Acts or
threats of violence, the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian
population, are prohibited.
2. Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals are prohibited.

Treatment of Prisoners of War

As provided in Article 4 of Geneva III, prisoners of war are:

1. Members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, including militia or volunteer corps
2. Militia or volunteer corps operating in or outside their own territory, even if such territory is
occupied, provided that (a) they are being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates; (b) they have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) they carry
arms openly; and (d) they conduct operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war
3. Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or authority not
recognized by the Detaining Power
4. Civilians who accompany the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization
from the armed forces which they accompany
5. Members of crews of merchant marines and the crews of civil aircraft of the parties to the
conflict
6. Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take
up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular
armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war
7. Persons belonging to the armed forces of the occupied territory

As provided in Geneva III, prisoners of war are entitled to several basic protections:

Article 12
Prisoners of war may only be transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power which is also a party to
Geneva Convention III.

Article 13
Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. No prisoner of war may be subjected to physical
mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are not justified by the medical,
dental, or hospital treatment of the prisoner concerned and carried out in his interest. They must at all
times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation, or insults and public curiosity.
Measures of reprisals against prisoners of war are prohibited.


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Article 15
Prisoners of war shall be free of charge for their maintenance and for medical attention required by their
state of health.

Article 14.
Women shall be treated with all regard due to their sex and shall in all cases benefit by treatment as
favorable as granted to men.

(Also see Article 75 of Protocol I:
Women shall be held in quarters separated from mens quarters. They shall be under immediate
supervision of women. Nevertheless, in cases where families are detained or interned, they shall,
whenever possible, be held in the same place and accommodated as family units.)

4. Law on neutrality
As provided in the Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers, the law on
neutrality is as follows:

1. The territory of the neutral power is inviolable
2. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or munitions of war and supplies across the
territory of a neutral power
3. A neutral power is forbidden to allow belligerents to use its territory for moving troops,
establishing communication facilities, or forming corps of combatants
4. Troops of belligerent armies received by a neutral power in its territory shall be interned away
from the theatre of war
5. The neutral power may supply belligerents with food, clothing, or relief as required by
humanity
6. If the neutral power receives escaped prisoners of war, it shall leave them at liberty. It may
assign them a place of residence if it allows them to remain in its territory.
7. The neutral power may authorize the passage into its territory of the sick and wounded if the
means of transport bringing them does not carry personnel or materials of war.
M. The Law of the Sea

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is a body of treaty rules and customary
norms governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over
maritime regimes. It is the branch of public international law which regulates the relations of states with
respect to the uses of the oceans. (Magallona)

A vital feature of maritime law is the baseline, or the line from which the breadth of the territorial sea
and other maritime zones is measured. There are normal baselines for most coastal states and baselines
for a different category of states (i.e. archipelagic states). The normal baseline is the low-water line along
221

the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal state. (Article 5 of the
UNCLOS)

CASE:

Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (supra)
In order to determine the low-water line, what is followed is the mean between the two tides, or the
low-water mark as opposed to the high-water mark.

Internal Waters

Article 8 of the UNCLOS
Waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the
State.

Examples: Bays, estuaries, ports, rivers, canals, lakes, and inland seas

Note!
In the case of archipelagic states, waters landward of the baselineother than rivers, bays, and lakes
are considered archipelagic waters (not internal waters) subject to a different maritime regime.

A state has sovereignty over its internal waters. As a general rule, therefore, no other states may enjoy
the right of innocent passage. However, there are exceptions to this rule: (1) there is a treaty granting the
right; (2) a ship is in distress and there is a risk posed against the lives of those on board; and (3) after
baselines are drawn internal waters encompass what were either territorial waters or straits used for
international navigation.

Innocent Passage
Article 18 of the UNCLOS: Passage means the navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of
crossing that sea without entering internal waters or of proceeding to or from internal waters. It may
include temporary stoppages, but only if they are incidental to ordinary navigation or necessitated by
distress or force majeure.
Article 19 of the UNCLOS: Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or
security of the coastal state. Such passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention and with
other rules of international law.

CASES

Nicaragua v. United States (supra)
The laying of mines in Nicaraguas ports was one of the grounds for the US obligation to pay
compensation. A states sovereignty extends to internal waters and airspace, and the states laws apply
over such areas. The laying of mines also hampered the states right to freedom of navigationnot just of
Nicaraguan ships, but foreign ships.

Saudi Arabia v. ARAMCO (supra)
The ports of every state must be open to foreign merchant vessels and can only be closed when the vital
interests of the state so require.

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Magallona et al. v. Executive Secretary (Philippine Case, 2011)
The petitioners assailed the constitutionality of R.A. 9522 (the Baseline Law), alleging that it reduced
Philippine territory, opened Philippine waters landward of the boundaries drawn up in the Treaty of
Paris to passage by all vessels and aircraft, and consequently undermined Philippine sovereignty and
national security. The Court upheld the laws constitutionality, finding that the drawing of the baselines
from the archipelagos outermost islands and drying reefs was merely in compliance with the Philippines
obligations under UNCLOS. As to the conversion of internal waters to archipelagic waters, the Court
emphasized that the Philippines would still exercise sovereignty over archipelagic waterssubject only
to the right of innocent passage and the right of passage through sea lanes.

The Territorial Sea

Article 2(1) of the UNCLOS
A coastal states sovereignty extends beyond its land territory and internal waters to an adjacent belt of
sea known as the territorial sea, although sometimes referred to as territorial waters. Sovereignty
extends also to the bed and subsoil of the territorial sea and the air space above it.

Article 3 of the UNCLOS
Every state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12
nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention.

Article 17 of the UNCLOS
Ships of all states, whether coastal or landlocked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the
territorial sea.

Note!
The provision does not distinguish between merchant ships or warships, meaning even warships enjoy
the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. As defined in Article 29 of the UNCLOS, a
warship is a ship belonging to the armed forces of a state, bearing the external marks distinguishing such
ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the
state and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew
which is under the regular armed forces discipline.

Obligations of a state pertaining to its territorial sea (Article 20 25 of UNCLOS)

1. Protect navigational aids, cables, and pipelines
2. Conserve marine living resources
3. Overall environmental protection and scientific research
4. Preventing the infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws
5. Ensuring the safety of navigation
6. Take the necessary steps to prevent passage which is not innocent


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When passage ceases to be innocent (Article 19[2] of the UNCLOS)
a. Any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political
independence of the coastal state
b. Any other violation of the principles of international law embodied in the UN Charter
c. Any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the
coastal state
d. Any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defense or security of the coastal state
e. The launching, landing, or taking on board of any aircraft or military device
f. The loading or unloading of any commodity, currency, or person contrary to the customs,
fiscal, immigration, and sanitary regulations of the coastal state
g. Any act of willful or serious pollution contrary to this Convention
h. Any fishing activities
i. The carrying out of research or survey activities
j. Any act aimed at interfering with any communication systems, facilities, or installations of the
coastal state
k. Any other activity not having direct bearing on passage
7. The coastal state shall not impose requirements on foreign ships which have the effect of denying
or impairing the right of innocent passage
8. The coastal state shall not discriminate against ships of any state, or against ships carrying cargo
to and from or on behalf of any state
9. The coastal state shall warn all ships of any known danger to navigation within the territorial sea

Rights of a state pertaining to its territorial sea

In general, a state enjoys full sovereign rights and jurisdictional control over its territorial sea. In
particular

1. Exercise of criminal jurisdiction
As a rule, a coastal state cannot exercise criminal jurisdiction on a foreign ship (or its passengers) passing
through the territorial sea. However, there are exceptions (as provided in Article 27 of the UNCLOS):

a. The consequences of the crime extend to the coastal state
b. The crime disturbs the peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea
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c. The assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the master of the ship or by a
diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag state
d. Such measures as are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or
psychotropic substances
2. Exercise of civil jurisdiction
As a rule, a coastal state cannot exercise civil jurisdiction over a foreign ship (or its passengers) passing
through the territorial sea. However, there are exceptions (as provided in Article 28 of the UNCLOS):

a. When the ship itself has assumed obligations or incurred liabilities in the course of its voyage
through the coastal state
b. If civil proceedings are commenced or concluded against a foreign ship in internal waters, the
coastal state may subsequently levy an execution against or arrest the foreign ship even if it
has already left internal waters and reached the territorial sea

CASES

The Gulf of Sidra Incidents (1989, published in the Italian Yearbook of International Law)
Libya shot down American aircrafts that were allegedly conducting military exercises over the Gulf of
Sidra. Libya claimed to be protecting its internal waters, as the Gulf of Sidra was not part of the territorial
sea but was a historic bay. The notion that waters may be considered historically subject to the
sovereignty of one state is a relic of an older and obsolete regime. While the international community
might be willing to consider existing claims under highly exceptional circumstances, extravagant claims
encroaching upon the common domain of the international community (i.e. the high seas) have always
been rejected.

Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (supra)
For the purpose of measuring the breadth of the territorial sea, it is the low-water mark, or the mean
between the high and low tides, which has been generally used as the starting point by states.

El Salvador v. Honduras with Nicaragua Intervening (supra)
Also in dispute in this case was the sovereignty over the Gulf of Fonseca, which lay between the three
states. The Court ruled that the Gulf was effectively a closed sea belonging communally to all three
states with the exception of each states unilaterally-declared three-mile zone. After the states achieved
independence in 1821, the waters remained undivided. The Court consequently held that the Gulf of
Fonseca were historic waters, and the three states succeeded to communal sovereignty over it.

Straits

A straight is a naturally-formed, narrow waterway that connects two larger bodies of water.

Article 34 of the UNCLOS (The legal status of waters forming straits used for international
navigation)
The regime of passage through straits used for international navigation established in this Convention
shall not in other respects affect the legal status of the waters forming such straits or the exercise by the
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states bordering the straits of their sovereignty or jurisdiction over such waters and their air space,
seabed, and subsoil.

Obligations of states bordering straits

1. Respect the right to transit passage
The right to transit passage is the right to exercise freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the
purpose of continuous and expeditious transit through the straits used for international navigation (e.g.
between two areas of the high seas). All ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage. (Article 38 of
the UNCLOS)

Note!
The wording of the right to transit passage is important. It is the right to exercise freedom of navigation
and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit. If the ship or aircraft does not
act in accordance with this right (e.g. the ship drops anchor in the strait for reasons other than distress or
force majeure) the passage will cease to be subject to the regime of passage through straits and will
instead be subject to the regime of the territorial sea or EEZ, as the case may be. (Article 39[1][c] of the
UNCLOS)

There shall be no suspension of the right to transit passage. (Article 44 of the UNCLOS) In regulating the
right to transit passage, states may only pass laws and regulations which (a) do not discriminate among
foreign ships; (b) do not have the effect of denying, hampering, or impairing the right to transit passage;
and (c) are given due publicity. (Article 38 of the UNCLOS)

What states may regulate in relation to the right to transit passage (Article 42[1] of the UNCLOS)

a. The safety of navigation and regulation of maritime traffic
b. The prevention, reduction, and control of pollution
c. The prevention of fishing (including the stowage of fishing gear)
d. The loading or unloading of any commodity, currency, or person in contravention of
customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws

When the right to transit passage does not apply (Articles 36, 38, and 45 of the UNCLOS)

a. The strait has a high seas or an EEZ route through it which is of similar convenience
b. The strait is formed by an island of a state bordering the strait and its mainland
c. The strait connects part of the high seas or an EEZ with the territorial sea of a third state
d. The legal regime of the strait is governed by a long-standing treaty



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In (a) to (c) above, the regime of innocent passage shall apply.

2. Give appropriate publicity to any danger to navigation or overflight within or over the strait of
which the state has knowledge. (Article 44 of the UNCLOS)
Obligations of ships and aircraft in transit passage (Article 38 of the UNCLOS)

1. Proceed without delay through or over the strait
2. Refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political
independence of states bordering the strait, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations
3. Refrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal modes of continuous and
expeditious transit unless rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress
4. Ships should comply with generally accepted international regulations, procedures, and practices
for safety at sea and the prevention, reduction, and control of pollution from ships
5. Aircraft must at all times monitor the radio frequency assigned by the competent internationally
designated air traffic control authority or the appropriate international distress radio frequency
6. Civilian aircraft must observe the Rules of Air established by the International Civil Aviation
Organization; state aircraft must take all safety measures and must at all times operate with due
regard for the safety of navigation
CASE

Corfu Channel Case (supra)
In times of peace, states have a right to send their warships through straits used for international
navigation between two parts of the high seas without the previous authorization of the coastal state.
However, the Court also emphasized that such passage must be innocent (not yet transit passage, since
this case predates the UNCLOS). The reason that nearly unrestricted passage through straits is granted is
because they are often useful routes for international maritime traffic.

Archipelagic Waters

Article 46 of the UNCLOS
An archipelago is a group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters, and other natural
features which are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters, and natural features form an intrinsic
geographical, economic, and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such. An
archipelagic state is a state made up wholly of one or more archipelagos and may include other islands.

Special circumstances relating to baselines of archipelagos
All waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines are archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or
distance from the coast. As provided in Article 49 of the UNCLOS, the sovereignty of the archipelagic state
extends to archipelagic waters, as well as to the airspace of the archipelagic waters, the seabed and
subsoil, and the resources contained therein. By virtue of their geographical formation, there are special
rules for the drawing of baselines of archipelagic states (provided in Articles 47 and 48 of the UNCLOS).
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The breadth of the territorial sea, contiguous zone, continental shelf, and the exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) is measured from the straight archipelagic baselines.
Straight archipelagic baselines join the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying
reefs of the archipelago, provided that within such baselines are included the main islands.
The drawing of archipelagic baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago.
Archipelagic baselines shall not be drawn from low-tide elevations unless lighthouses or
similar installations which are permanently above sea level have been built upon them.
The system of archipelagic baselines shall not be applied by an archipelagic state in such a
manner as to cut off the territorial sea of another state from the high seas or the EEZ.
Obligations of an archipelagic state with respect to archipelagic waters

1. Respect the right of innocent passage
2. Recognize traditional fishing rights and other legitimate activities of the immediately adjacent
neighboring states (Article 51[1] of the UNCLOS)
3. Respect existing submarine cables laid by other states and passing through its waters, permitting
the maintenance and replacement of such cables upon being notified of their location and the
intention to repair or replace them (Article 51[2] of the UNCLOS)
4. Respect the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage (Article 53[2] of the UNCLOS)
Archipelagic sea lanes passage is the right of foreign ships and aircraft to have continuous, expeditious,
and unobstructed passage in sea lanes and air routes through or over the archipelagic waters and the
adjacent territorial sea of the archipelagic state in transit between one part of the high seas and another,
or in transit between one part of an EEZ and another. (Article 51[1] and [3] of the UNCLOS) These sea
lanes and air routes include all normal passage routes used for international navigation or overflight
through or over archipelagic waters. (Article 53[4] of the UNCLOS) All ships and aircraft (military or
merchant) are entitled to the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage. (Article 53[2] of the UNCLOS) Like
transit passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage cannot be suspended.

The Contiguous Zone

The contiguous zone is the maritime zone adjacent to the territorial sea. It may not extend beyond 24
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. The coastal
state does not have sovereignty over the contiguous zone but it may exercise protective jurisdiction in
the contiguous zone under specific circumstances (Article 33 of the UNCLOS):

1. The coastal state may exercise the control necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; and
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2. The coastal state may exercise the control necessary to punish infringement of customs, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitary laws and regulations committed within its territory and territorial sea.

Note!
The coastal state may only undertake hot pursuit of a foreign ship in the contiguous zone if there has
been a violation of the rights for the protection of which the contiguous zone was established. (Article
111[1] of the UNCLOS)

In all other respects, the contiguous zone is an area that enjoys the freedom of the high seas.

The Continental Shelf

Article 76(1) of the UNCLOS
The continental shelf comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond the
territorial sea of a coastal state throughout the natural prolongation of the land territory to either

(a) the outer edge of the continental margin (the submerged prolongation of the land mass of the
coastal state); or
(b) 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured,
whichever is the greater.
Rights of coastal states over the continental shelf (Article 77 of the UNCLOS)

1. The coastal state exercises exclusive sovereign rights over the continental shelf for the purpose of
exploring it and exploiting its natural resources (i.e. mineral and non-living resources of the
seabed and subsoil, together with living organisms belonging to a sedentary species). No other
state may explore and exploit without the express consent of the coastal state, and if the coastal
state decides not to undertake any such activities, no one else may do so.
2. The rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation or on any
express proclamation.
CASES

North Sea Continental Shelf Case (supra)
The rights of the coastal state in respect of the area of continental shelf constituting a natural
prolongation of its land territory under the sea exists ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty
over the land. That right is inherent. No special legal acts need be performed.

Libya v. Malta (ICJ Case, 1985)
The case sprang from a dispute between Libya and Malta over the delimitation of the continental shelf
between them. The Court and the parties agreed that the division must be governed by a number of
equitable principles, among them: (1) there is to be no question of refashioning geography; (2) non-
encroachment by one party on areas appertaining to the other; (3) respect due to all relevant
circumstances; and (4) equity does not necessarily imply equality and there can be no question of
distributive justice.
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Tunisia v. Libya (ICJ Case, 1982)
The parties signed a special agreement requesting the Court to render its judgment of the rules and
principles of international law which may be applied in the delimitation of the continental shelf between
them. The Court explained that when the area to be delimited is a single continental shelf which is the
natural prolongation of both states, the principle of delimiting the continental shelf based on the natural
prolongation does not apply.

Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey, ICJ Case, 1978)
The relevant question in this case relates to whether certain islands under Greek sovereignty were
entitled to a continental shelf of their own, enabling Greece to call for the boundary to be drawn between
those islands and the Turkish Coast. Turkey argued that the islands in question were mere protuberances
of the Turkish continental shelf and were not entitled to a continental shelf of their own. Though
ultimately the Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the dispute, it did reaffirm the principle that
the land dominates the sea and it is by virtue of the coastal states sovereignty over the land that rights
of exploration and exploitation in the continental shelf can attach to it.

Anglo-French Case (United Kingdom v. France, ICJ Case, 1979)
The Court was asked to fix the boundaries between parties continental shelf in the English Channel. The
Court explained at length that the appropriateness of any method for effecting an equitable delimitation
in any given case is always a function or reflection of the geographical and other relevant circumstances
of the case.

Case Concerning Delimitation Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway, ICJ Case,
1993)
Denmark and Norway were arguing, among other things, over the division of their rights over the
continental shelf. Applying Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, the Court
explained that where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more states whose
coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such states shall be
determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary is
justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be the median line between the coasts. The
application of the provision did not exclude the application of customary law. International law does not
prescribe the adoption of a single method for the delimitation of the maritime spaces. Varying systems of
delimitation may be used for various parts of the coast.


Article 76 of the UNCLOS, Paragraphs 4 and 6. Extended continental shelf
The coastal state is allowed to claim a continental shelf of up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines;
however, if the outer margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines, then the outer limit
of the continental shelf shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines.









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The Exclusive Economic Zone


Article 55 of the UNCLOS
The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific
legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal state and the
rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention.

Article 56 of the UNCLOS
1. In the EEZ, the coastal state has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural
resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its
subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone,
such as the production of energy from the water, currents, and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to (i) the
establishment and use of artificial islands, installations, and structures; (ii) marine scientific research;
and (iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the EEZ, the coastal state
shall have due regard for the rights and duties of other states and shall act in a manner compatible with
the provisions of this Convention.

Article 57 of the UNCLOS
The EEZ shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured.

Article 58 of the UNCLOS
1. In the EEZ, all states, whether coastal or landlocked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this
Convention, the freedoms referred to in Article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of
submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these
freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft, and submarine cables and
pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.

CASE:

M/V Saiga (St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea, ICJ Case, 1999)
The M/V Saiga was an oil tanker flying the flag of St. Vincent and the Grenadines that was supplying oil to
fishing vessels licensed by Guinea to fish in its EEZ. The Saiga was arrested by Guinean patrol boats for
illegally importing gas into the customs radius of Guinea. The Court ruled that in the EEZ, customs laws
and regulations are only applicable with regard to artificial islands, installations, and structuresnot
over the waters of the EEZ. To permit Guinea to extend its jurisdiction over the waters of the EEZ would
curtail the rights of other states and any activities within the EEZ.

Note!
The delimitation of the overlapping EEZ between adjacent states is determined by agreement. (Bernas)



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The High Seas

The high seas are all parts of the sea that are not included in the EEZ, the territorial sea, the internal
waters of a state, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State. (Article 86 of the UNCLOS)

The high seas are open to all States, which enjoy the following freedoms (Article 87 of the UNCLOS):

1. Freedom of navigation
2. Freedom of overflight
3. Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines
4. Freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under international law
5. Freedom of fishing
6. Freedom of scientific research

International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)

Peaceful settlement of disputes is compulsory under the UNCLOS. If bilateral settlement fails, Article 285
of the UNCLOS requires submission of the dispute for compulsory settlement in one of the tribunals
clothed with jurisdiction. The alternatives are the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the ICJ, or
an arbitral tribunal constituted under the Convention. (Bernas)


Article 21, ITLOS Statute
The jurisdiction of the ITLOS comprises all disputes and all applications submitted to it in accordance
with the UNCLOS. It also includes all matters specifically provided for in any agreement which confers
jurisdiction on the Tribunal.

N. Madrid Protocol and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property

Madrid Protocol
As explained by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the Madrid Protocol is a
more flexible update of the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Regulation of Marks
(first concluded in 1891)
The Madrid System (as the Protocol and Agreement are referred to) makes it possible to protect
a trademark in a large number of countries by obtaining an international registration that has
effect in each of the designated contracting parties
An application for international registration may only be filed by a natural person or legal entity
having a connection (through establishment, domicile, or nationality) to a contracting party to
either the Protocol or Agreement
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A trademark may only be the subject of an international application if it has already been
registered with the trademark office of the contracting party to which the applicant is connected
International applications are presented to the International Bureau of the WIPO through the
intermediary of the office of origin
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Essential Provisions)

Article 1
(1) The countries to which this Convention applies constitute a Union for the proection of industrial
property.
(2) The protection of industrial property has as its object patents, utility models, industrial designs,
trademarks, service marks, trade names, indications of source or appellations of origin, and the
repression of unfair competition.
(3) Industrial property shall be understood in the broadest sense and shall apply not only to industry and
commerce proper, but likewise to agricultural and extractive industries and to all manufactured or
natural products, for example wines, grain, tobacco leaf, fruit, cattle, minerals, mineral waters, beer,
flowers, and flour.
(4) Patents shall include the various kinds of industrial patents recognized by the laws of the countries of
the Union, such as patents of importation, patents of improvement, patents of certificates of addition, etc.

Article 2
(1) Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the protection of industrial property, enjoy in
all the other countries of the Union the advantages that their respective laws now grant, or may hereafter
grant, to nationals; all without prejudice to the rights specially provided for by this Convention.
Consequently, they shall have the same protection as the latter, and the same legal remedy against any
infringement of their rights, provided that the conditions and formalities imposed upon nationals are
complied with.
(2) However, no requirement as to domicile or establishment in the country where protection is claimed
may be imposed upon nationals of countries of the Union for the enjoyment of any industrial property
rights.
(3) The provisions of the laws of each of the countries of the Union relating to judicial and administrative
procedure and to jurisdiction, and to the designation of an address for service or the appointment of an
agent, which may be required by the laws on industrial property are expressly reserved.

Article 3
Nationals of countries outside the Union who are domiciled or who have real and effective industrial or
commercial establishments in the territory of one of the countries of the Union shall be treated in the
same manner as nationals of the countries of the Union.

O. International Environmental Law

The concern of environmental protection is not just about the atmosphere, the sea, the land, flora,
and fauna. It is also about the preservation of the cultural heritage of mankind as found in
archaeological and artistic remains. (Bernas)
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Environmental law cases often have a human rights aspect as well, emphasizing the importance of
environmental law both on the domestic and the international fields. (Danube Dam Case; Oposa v.
Factoran, Jr., below)

CASES

Danube Dam Case (Hungary v. Slovakia, ICJ Case, 1998)
Hungary and then Czechoslovakia entered into a treaty to construct dams which Hungary later stopped
due to environmental concerns. While the Court ruled that Hungarys notice of termination was
premature, it also explained that the protection of the environment is an important part of human rights,
since a healthy environment is a condition sine qua non for numerous rights, e.g. the right to health, the
right to life.

Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. (Philippine Case, 1993)
The petitioners were minors asking the Supreme Court to order the Secretary of Natural Resources to
cancel all existing timber license agreements on the ground of intergenerational protection, suing on
behalf of their generation and those yet to be born. The Court recognized their right to bring the case. The
case emphasized that protection of the environment involves a vital human rights aspect.

The Stockholm Declaration of 1972 was formulated during a UN Conference on the Human
Environment attended by 113 states.
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration is a codification of a standing rule of international law
CASE

Trail Smelter Case (supra)
The arbitral tribunal ruled that no state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein.

P. International Economic Law

International economic law is the complex regulatory framework flowing from different sources of law
governing international economic relations and trans-boundary economic conduct by States,
international organizations, and private actors. In the interest of tangible contours, this notion is confined
to the regulation of cross-border transactions in goods and capital and the international protection of
intellectual property. (Herdegen, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law)




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Areas of International Economic Law (from Herdegen)

1. International trade law the international regulation of the exchange of goods and services across
borders; it is predominantly based on the reciprocal character of the respective rights and
obligations of all parties and considered to achieve mutual benefits for all of them
2. International anti-trust and competition law governs the interplay of domestic competition
(antitrust) rules concerning the issue of undertakings; it governs the legitimate reach of national
competition laws as to their extraterritorial effects
3. International investment law covers the promotion of foreign investments and their protection
against interferences by the host State; attracting foreign investments by establishing a favorable
investment climate is now recognized as a cornerstone of economic development
4. International monetary law deals with monetary relations; a major weakness of the actual
monetary system lies in the lack of a truly effective control of rate manipulations